Executive Department

7/17/2019 Executive Department

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Agustin. Arreza. Chan. Magtanong. Solis. Venturanza.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

EXECUTIVE POWER

It is the power to enforce and administer the laws.

THE PRESIDENT

SINGULAR EXECUTIVE

The executive power is vested in the President of the

Philippines [Art VII, Sec 1]

Villena v. Secretary of Interior (1939)

Division of Investigation of the DOJ, upon the request of the Sec. ofInterior, conducted an inquiry into the conduct of Villena, mayor of Makati, Rizal, as a result of which the latter was found to havecommitted bribery, extortion, malicious abuse of authority andunauthorized practice of the law profession. The respondedrecommended the suspension of Villena to the President, in which itwas verbally granted. The Secretary then suspended Villena fromoffice. Villena filed a petition against the Secretary to restrain himand his agents from proceeding with the investigation. Petition wasdismissed.

Doctrine: The President of the Philippines is the Executive of the

Government of the Philippines, and no other.Constitutional Provision: Art VII, Sec 1 (1935 Consti) – “The executive power shallbe vested in a President of the Philippines”

Notes:Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency/Alter ego principle There are certain constitutional powers and prerogativesof the Chief Executive of the Nation which must beexercised by him in person and no amount of approval orratification will validate the exercise of any of thosepowers by any other person. Such, for instance, is hispower to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim

martial law, and the exercise by him of the benignprerogative of mercy.

All executive and administrative organizations areadjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents ofthe Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the ChiefExecutive is required by the Constitution of the law to actin person or the exigencies of the situation demand thathe act personally, the multifarious executive andadministrative functions of the Chief Executive are

performed by and through the executive departments, andthe acts of the secretaries of such departments, performedand promulgated in the regular course of business, are,unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.

The heads of the executive departments occupy politicalpositions and hold office in an advisory capacity, and, Ithe language of Thomas Jefferson “should be of thePresident’s bosom confidence”, “are subject to thedirection of the President”. x x x their personality is inreality but the projection of that of the President. x x x CJ

Taft: “each head of a department is, and must be, thePresident’s alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by law to exerciseauthority.” [ Myers v. US ] The head of a department is aman of his confidence; he controls and directs his acts; heappoints him and can remove him at pleasure; he is theexecutive, not any of his secretaries. It is therefore logicalthat he, the President, should be answerable for the actsof administration of the entire Executive Departmentbefore his own conscience no less than before thatundefined power of public opinion, which in the languageof Daniel Webster, is the last repository of populargovernment.

The Secretary of Interior has the authority to order aninvestigation and the authority to decree the suspension.

QUALIFICATIONS, ELECTION, TERM,

AND OATH

QUALIFICATIONS

No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-

born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to

read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the

election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten

years immediately preceding such election. [Art VII, Sec 2]

ELECTION AND TERM

The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by

direct vote of the people for a term of six years which shall

begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the




day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date,

six years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for

any re-election. No person who has succeeded as President

and has served as such for more than four years shall be

qualified for election to the same office at any time.

No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive

terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of

time shall not be considered as an interruption in thecontinuity of the service for the full term for which he was

elected.

Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for

President and Vice-President shall be held on the second

Monday of May.

The returns of every election for President and Vice-

President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each

province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress,

directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the

certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not

later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all

the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the Houseof Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress,

upon determination of the authenticity and due execution

thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.

The person having the highest number of votes shall be

proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an

equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall

forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the

Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting

separately.

The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing

of the certificates.

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the solejudge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and

qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may

promulgate its rules for the purpose. [Art VII, Sec 4]

Canvassing of certificates is a ministerial function thus

Congress does not have the power to inquire into or decide

question on irregularities in elections

Such function is reserved for the Supreme Court

OATH

Before they enter on the execution of their office, the

President, the Vice-President, or the Acting President shall

take the following oath or affirmation:

“I do solemnly swear [or affirm] that I will faithfully and

conscientiously fulfill my duties as President [or Vice-President or

Acting President] of the Philippines, preserve and defend its

Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, and consecrate

myself to the service of the Nation. So help me God.” [In case of

affirmation, last sentence will be omitted]. [Art VII, Sec 5]

Macalintal v. PET

Atty. Macalintal prays for the unconstitutionality of t he creation ofthe Presidential Electoral Tribunal was created by the SupremeCourt.

Doctrine: Additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph ofSection 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decidepresidential and vice-presidential elections contests

includes the means necessary to carry it into effect. ThePET is no other than the SC itself.

Constitutional Provision: Art VII, Sec 4(7)

Notes:Doctrine of Necessary ImplicationIf an office is given a duty, it comes with the power toresort to necessary means to fulfil this duty.

Pormento v. EstradaThe petition asks whether Joseph Ejercito Estrada is covered by the

ban on the Preside nt from “any re - election.” Erap was elected thePresident of the Philippines in 1998. He sought the presidency againin the general elections of 2010. Atty. Pormento opposed Erap’scandidacy and filed a petition for disqualification. Petition wasdenied by COMELEC. Case at bar was denied and dismissed forbeing moot.Constitutional Provision: Art VII, Sec 4(1 ) x x x The President shall not be eligiblefor any re-election.x x x Notes:Erap was not elected President the second time he ran.Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase“any re-election” will be premised on a person’s second

(whether immediate or not) election as President, there isno case or controversy to be resolved in this case. No liveconflict of leal rights exists. Assuming an actual case orcontroversy existed prior to the proclamation of aPresident who has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010elections, te same is no lover true today. Following theresults of that election, Estrada was not elected Presidentfor the second time. This, any discussion of his “re-election” will simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose.




PRIVILEGES

OFFICIAL RESIDENCE AND SALARY

The President shall have an official residence. The salaries

of the President and Vice-President shall be determined by

law and shall not be decreased during their tenure. Noincrease in said compensation shall take effect until after the

expiration of the term of the incumbent during which such

increase was approved. They shall not receive during their

tenure any other emolument from the Government or any

other source. [Art VII, Sec 6]

IMMUNITY

Although there is no explicit provision in the 1987

Constitution, presidential immunity remains to be part of

the law.

In re: Bermudez (1986)

Bermudez questions Art. XVIII, Sec. 5 of the proposed 1986Constitution stating that the provision is not clear as to whom itrefers to – whether Aquino/Laurel or Marcos/Tolentino.

Doctrine: Presidents are immune from suit or from being broughtto court during the period of their incumbency andtenure.

Soliven v. Makasiar (1988)

Soliven broadcasted the statement that President Cory Aquino hidunder her bed during a coup d’etat. The President sued for libel.Soliven claimed that he can ’t be sued because the President wasimmune from suit. Petition was dismissed

Doctrine: While the President is immune from suit, she may not beprevented from instituting suit.

Notes: The rationale for the grant of the President of theprivilege of immunity is to assure the exercise ofPresidential duties and functions free from any hindranceor distraction, considering that being the Chief Executiveof the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all

of the office-holder’s time, also demands undi videdattention. The privilege of immunity from suit pertains to thePresident and may be invoked only by the holder of theoffice and not by any other person. The President may shed protection afforded by theprivilege and submit to the court’s jurisdiction. The choiceof whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solelythe President’s prerogative.

EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

It has been defined as “the right of the President and high-

level executive branch officials to withhold information

from Congress, the courts, and ultimately, the public.” This,

presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions

during closed-door Cabinet meetings, like the internal

deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiatecourts, or executive sessions of either House of Congress,

are recognized as confidential. This kind of information

cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government

[ Senate v. Ermita ]

The necessity for withholding the information must be of

such a high degree as to outweigh the public interest in

enforcing that obligation in a particular case [ Senate v.

Ermita ]

Neri v. Senate Committees (2008)Romulo Neri was the Director-General of NEDA was summonedby several Senate Committees to appear in a series of investigativehearings to shed light to the ZTE-NBN Project, however Neri wasonly able to attend one hearing (11 hours). In that hearing Neritestified that then COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos hadonce offered him a bribe of P200M to approve the said project. Neri further stated that he informed PGMA about the bribery and thatthe latter instructed him not to accept such bribe. However, when Neriwas probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer and invoked “executive privilege.” In particular, he refused to answer the questions on a) WoN PGMA followed up on the NBN Project, b) WoN she directed him to prioritize it, and c) WoN she directed him to approve. The Senatewas unrelenting and issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to

petitioner, requiring him to appear and testify on November 20.However in a letter dated Nov 15, Exec. Sec. Ermita requestedrespondent Sen. Comms. to dispense with the petitioner’s testimony onthe grounds of executive privilege explaining further that: “…foregoingquestions fall under conversation and correspondence between thePresident and public officials which are considered executive privilege. Maintaining confidentiality of conversations of the President isnecessary in the exercise of her executive and policy decision making

process…The context in which executive privilege is being invoked isthat the information sought to be disclosed might impair ourdiplomatic as well as economic relations with China.” Neri wassubsequently cited for contempt by the Senate saying that the claim ofexecutive privilege was “unsatisfactory.”

Doctrine:Invoking Executive Privilege and Question Hour There are two types of executive privileges:

1)

Presidential communications privileges applyto decision-making of the President. This isrooted in the constitutional principle ofseparation of power and the President’s uniqueconstitutional role. This applies to documents intheir entirety, and covers final and post-decisionalmaterials as well as pre-deliberative ones. As aconsequence, congressional or judicial negation of




the presidential communications privilege isalways subject to greater scrutiny.

2)

Deliberative process privilege – applies todecision-making of executive officials.

Review on the distinguishing Art. VI, Sec 21 and Art. VI,Sec 22. Although these provisions are closely related andcomplementary, they should not be considered as

pertaining to the same power of Congress. Sec. 21 relatesto the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation; itaims to elicit information that may be used for legislation. While Sec. 22 pertains to the power to conduct a questionhour, the objective of which is to obtain information inpursuit of Congress oversight function. Simply stated, while both powers allow Congress or any of its committeesto conduct inquiry, their objectives are different. Thedistinction gives birth to another distinction with regard tothe use of compulsory process. Unlike Sec. 21, Congresscannot compel the appearance of executive officials underSec. 22. Section 22 also provides that written questions besent in advance prior to the scheduled appearance ofexecutive officials.

Constitutional Provision: Art. VI, Sec. 22 (provision on question hour) Notes:Domestic and foreign jurisprudence somehow provide theelements of presidential communications privilege:

1. The protected communication must relate to a“quintessential and non-delegable

presidential power.” 2. The communication must be authored or

“solicited and received” by a close advisor of thePresident or the President himself. The judicialtest is that an advisor must be in “operational

proximity” with the President.

3.

The presidential communicationsprivilege remains a qualified privilege that may beovercome by a showing of adequate need,such that the information sought “likely containsimportant evidence” and by the unavailabilityof the information elsewhere by an appropriateinvestigating authority.

The Court held that the bases for which the executiveprivilege is invoked are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relatingto diplomacy or foreign relations.

AKBAYAN v. Aquino et al.Petitioners – NGOs, members of the HoR, citizens, and taxpayers – seek via petition for mandamus and prohibition to submit to them the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement(JPEPA). Petitioners emphasize that the refusal of the government todisclose the said agreement violates their right to information onmatters of public concern and of public interest. That the non- disclosure of the same documents undermines their right to effectiveand reasonable participation in all levels of social, political andeconomic decision making.

Respondents herein invoke executive privilege. They relied on the ground that the matter sought involves a diplomatic negotiation thenin progress, thus constituting an exception to the right to informationand the policy of full disclosure of matters that are of public concernlike the JPEPA. That diplomatic negotiation is covered by thedoctrine of executive privilege.Doctrine:Invoking Executive Privilege

Diplomatic negotiations are given privileged character inthis jurisdiction. The confidential nature of diplomacy is itsessential characteristic.Diplomatic negotiations privilege bears a close semblanceto the deliberative process and presidentialcommunications privilege. (see notes)Constitutional Provision: Art. VII, Sec. 21Notes:It is well-established in jurisprudence that neither the rightto information nor the policy of full public disclosure isabsolute. Their being matters which, albeit of publicconcern or public interest, are recognized as privileged innature – such are diplomatic negotiations.It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing atype of information as privileged does not mean that it willbe considered privileged in all instances. Only after aconsideration of the context in which the claim is mademay it be determined if there is a public interest that callsfor the disclosure of the desired information strong enoughto overcome its traditionally privileged status. Treaty negotiations normally involve a process of quid proquo and oftentimes negotiators have to be willing to makeconcessions in an area of lesser importance in order toobtain more favorable terms in an area of national interest. The “offers” exchanged by the parties during the

negotiations continue to be privileged even after JPEPAhas been published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese representatives submitted their offers with theunderstanding that “historic confidentiality would governthe same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability ofthe Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with otherforeign governments. The ground relied upon byrespondents is thus not simple that the information soughtinvolves a diplomatic matter, but that it pertains todiplomatic negotiations in progress.Similar to the privilege for presidential communications,the diplomatic negotiations privilege seeks, through thesame means, to protect the independence in decision-making of the President, particularly in its capacity as “the

sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its solerepresentative with foreign nations.” And, as with deliberative process privilege, the privilegeaccorded to diplomatic negotiations arises, not on accountof the content of information per se , but because theinformation is part of a process of deliberation which, inpursuit of public interest, must be presumed confidential. The Court ruled that the belated claim of executiveprivilege does not affect its decision to uphold theconfidential privileged status of the diplomaticnegotiations.




PROHIBITIONS

No increase in salaries during the term of

incumbent tenure [Art VII, Sec 6]

Shall not receive any other emoluments from the

government or any other source [Art VII, Sec 6]

Shall not hold any other office or employment

during their tenure, unless otherwise provided inthe Constitution [Art VII, Sec 13]

Shall not, directly or indirectly, practice any other

profession, participate in any business, or be

financially interested in any contract with, or in any

franchise or special privilege granted by the

government or any subdivision, agency, or

instrumentality thereof, including GOCCs or their

subsidiaries [Art VII, Sec 13]

Strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of

their office [Art VII, Sec 13]

May not appoint spouse or relatives by

consanguinity of affinity within the 4 th civil degree

of the President as Members of Constitutional

Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman,

or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen, or

heads of bureaus or offices, including GOCCs and

their subsidiaries [Art VII, Sec 13]

Funa v. Ermita

The constitutionality of Maria Elena Bautista' ́ s designation asOIC of MARINA while still DOTC Undersecretary. During the pendency of the case, Bautista was appointed MARINA

Administrator, relinquishing her DOTC post.

Doctrine: Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the generalrule applicable to all elective and appointive publicofficials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII ismeant to be the exception applicable only to thePresident, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet,their deputies and assistants.

Constitutional Provision: Art. VII, Sec. 13

Art. IX B, Sec. 7No elective official shall be eligible for appointment ordesignation in any capacity to any public office or position

during his tenure.Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primaryfunctions of his position, no appointive official shall holdany other office or employment in the Government orany subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,including Government-owned or controlled corporationsor their subsidiaries.

EXCEPTIONS TO PROHIBITION FROM

HOLDING ANOTHER OFFICE

Exceptions :

The Vice-President may serve as a member of the

Cabinet, without the need of confirmation by the

Comm. of Appointments [Art VII, Sec 3(2)]; and

The Secretary of Justice is an ex officio member of

the Judicial and Bar Council. [Art VIII, Sec 8]

CLU v. Executive Secretary

President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 284, declaring thatCabinet members, their deputies (undersecretaries) and assistantsecretaries may hold other public office, including membership in theboards of government corporations: (a) when directly provided for in theConstitution as in the case of the Secretary of Justice who is made anex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council under Section 8, paragraph 1, Article VIII; or (b) if allowed by law; o r (c) if allowedby the primary functions of their respective positions. EO 284 wasdeclared unconstitutional.

Doctrine: Intent of the framers was to prevent abuses and self-enrichment of public officials taking advantage of holdingmultiple offices in government, as was done in the time ofMarcos. Art. IX-B, Sec. 7 cannot provide exceptions for Art. VII, Sec. 13 because the first contains a blanketprohibition, whereas the latter contains a stricter and morespecific prohibition meant to put the President and his/herfamily, and the officials enumerated therein in a class oftheir own in terms of holding public offices.

Constitutional Provision: Art. VII, Sec. 13

Art. IX

B, Sec. 7

Notes:Prohibition under Art VIII, Sec 13, however, does not applyto posts occupied by the Executive officials in an ex-officiocapacity with no compensation, as provided by law, and asrequired by the primary functions of the said officials’office.

Ex officio:- From office, by virtue of office- Authority derived from official character merely,

not expressly conferred upon the individualcharacter, but rather annexed to the officialposition

-

Not another office, but, rather, the imposition ofadditional duties/functions- Official must already be holding office to be

designated ex officio to another- The additional duties must not only be closely

related to, but must be required by the official’sprimary functions

- No additional compensation




De la Cruz v. COA (2001)

Following the CLU ruling, COA issued a memo disallowingadditional compensation for multiple positions and ordering the refundof such compensation. Members of the NHA Board of Directors weredenied additional compensation in violation of the rule on multiple positions. Petitioners argue that the CLU ruling apply only tomembers of the cabinets, their deputies, and their assistants. It does notcover other appointive officials with equivalent rank or those lower than

the position of Assistant Secretary. COA denied their petition sayingthat the Directors were not sitting in the NHA Board in their ownright but as representatives of cabinet members covered by the prohibition. Petition was dismissed.

Doctrine: Representatives of cabinet members are subject to the sameprohibitions and limitations.

Constitutional Provision: Art VII, Sec 13

Notes:Sec. 7 of PD 757 (creating the NHA), mandates the ff. to sitat the NHA BoD: 1) the Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and Communications, 2) the Director-General of NEDA, 3) the Secretary of Finance, 4) the

Secretary of Labor, 5) the Secretary of Industry, 6) theExecutive Secretary, and 7) the General Manager of theNHA. Sitting at the NHA BoD is therefore an ex-officio function.Since the Executive Department Secretaries, as ex-officiomembers of the NHA Board, are prohibited from receiving“extra (additional) compensation, whether it be in the formof a per diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or someother such euphemism," it follows that petitioners who sitas their alternates cannot likewise be entitled to receive suchcompensation. A contrary rule would give petitioners abetter right than their principals.

POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE

PRESIDENT

EXECUTIVE POWER

POWER TO EXECUTE LAWS

The executive power shall be vested in the President of the

Philippines. [Art VII, Sec 1]

The President shall have control of all the executive

departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the

laws be faithfully executed. [Art VII, Sec 17]

It is not for the President to determine the validity of a law

since this is a question addressed to the judiciary. Thus, until

and unless a law is declared unconstitutional, the President

has a duty to execute it regardless of his doubts on its

validity. A contrary opinion would allow him to negate the will of the legislature and encroach upon the prerogatives of

the Judiciary. [Nachura]

Ople v. Torres

A.O. 308 (Adoption of a National Computerized IdentificationReference System) was used by Pres. Ramos to 1) Provide Filipinosand foreigners “the facility to conveniently transact business withbasic service and social security providers and other governmentinstrumentalities” and 2) to red uce fraudulent transactions andmisrepresentations by persons seeking basic services.

Doctrine: While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws,the President executes the laws. The executive power is vested in the Presidents. It is generally defined as thepower to enforce and administer the laws. It is the powerof carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcingtheir due observance.

Constitutional Provision: Art VII, Sections 1 and 17

Notes: Administrative power is concerned with the work ofapplying policies and enforcing orders as determined byproper governmental organs. It enables the President to

fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency andcheck the official conduct of his agents. To this end, hecan issue administrative orders, rules and regulations. Anadministrative order is an ordinance issued by thePresident which relates to specific aspects in theadministrative operation of government. It must be inharmony with the law and should be for the sole purposeof implementing the law and carrying out the legislativepolicy




Test to determine if a law is legislative in nature:1) if it confers a right,2) if it imposes a duty,3) if it affords protection,4) if it creates an office.

Delegation of legislative power is not permitted unlessprovided in the Constitution. Laws that leave Congressmust be 1) complete in itself; and 2) sets sufficient

standards.

CONTROL AND SUPERVISION OF THE

EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE

GOVERNMENT (POWER OF CONTROL)

The President shall have control of all the executive

departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that

the laws be faithfully executed. [Art VII, Sec 17]

Control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or setaside what a subordinate officer had done in the

performance of his duties and to substitute the former from

for that of the latter. It is distinguished from supervision in

that the latter means overseeing, or the power or authority

of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their

duties, and if the latter fail or neglect to fulfil them, then the

former may take such action or steps as prescribed by law to

make them perform these duties. [ Mondano v. Silvosa ].

THE ALTER EGO PRINCIPLE

Also known as the “doctrine of qualified political agency ”. Under

this doctrine which recognizes the establishment of a single

executive, all executives and administrative organizations are

adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the

various executive departments are assistants and agents of

the Chief Executive, and except in cases where the Chief

Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in

person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act

personally, the multifarious executive and administrative

functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and

through the executive departments, and the acts of the

Secretaries of such are, unless disapproved or reprobated by

the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief

Executive [ Villena v. Secretary of Interior ]

Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc v. Pano

Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, awarded disputedland to farmers regardless of the decisions of other department heads.The President, through his Executive Secretary, can override thedecision of department secretaries.

Doctrine: The President has the power of control over the wholeExecutive Department. The President has jurisdiction to

affirm, modify, or reverse an order done by hissubordinate.

Constitutional Provision: Art VII, Sec 17

Notes:Under the constitution, there are powers that thePresident must exercise in person. However, the ChiefExecutive is expected to perform all the executive andadministrative functions, and he may validly delegate acts which the constitution does not require him to perform inperson.Control – “the power of an officer to alter or modify ornullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done inthe performance of his duties and to substitute the

judgment of the former for that of the latter.” The President can undo the act of his departmentsecretaries.Under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of thePresident has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify,or even reverse an order.Only the President may rightfully say that the Executiveauthority is not authorized to do so. Unless the actiontaken is “disapproved or reprobated by the ChiefExecutive, that remains the act of the Chief Executive,and cannot be successfully assailed. (No such disapprovalor reprobation is even intimated in the record of this case)

Banda v. ErmitaOn Oct 25, 2004, Pres. Arroyo issued EO 378 amending Sec. 6, EO 285 removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NationalPrinting Office (NPO) over the printing services requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities and limiting itsappropriation to only its income w/o additional financial support from the government. Petit ioners are challenging the constitutionalityof EO 378. The Court DISMISSED the case finding that Pres. Arroyo had the continuing authority and the power to reorganizeand transfer functions in the Executive Department as the Chief Executive.

Doctrine: The President has the power to reorganize the offices andagencies in the executive department in line with thePresident’s constitutionally granted power of control over executive offices and by virtue of previousdelegation of the legislative power to reorganize executiveoffices under existing statutes.Constitutional Provision: Art. VII, Sec. 17Notes:- The Court, in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora ,

pointed out that EO 292 (Admin Code of 1987)




gives the President continuing authority toreorganize and redefine the functions of the Officeof the President.

- Reorganization “involves the reduction ofpersonnel, consolidation of offices, or abolitionthereof by reason of economy or redundancy offunctions.” It takes place when there is an alterationof the existing structure of government offices or

units therein, including the lines of control, authorityand responsibility between them.- In the case at bar, there was a mere alteration or

reorganization of the main function of the NPO bylimiting the exclusivity of its printing responsibility toelection forms. No abolition of office or a removal ofits functions

- The power of the President to reorganize may also beprovided for by other laws. This has been donethrough specific provisions in general appropriationlaws, such as RA 7645 (GAA of 1993) which grantedthe President powers to scale down and phase outactivities of agencies within the executive branch

- The power of control is broader and more intrusive

than the power of supervision.

Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretaryfor Legal Affairs

Petitioner seeks to declare EO 13, which abolished PAGC andtransferred its functions to a newly-established Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD), under the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), asunconstitutional for usurping power of legislature to create a publicoffice, appropriate funds, and delegate quasi- judicial powers toadministrative agencies.

Doctrine: The abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation ofa new office, as the functions were simply transferred tothe ODESLA, an existing office within the Office of thePresident. The President has authority to reorganize the ExecutiveDepartment for purposes of efficiency and economyunder Sec. 31, EO 292 [Administrative Code of 1987] The President has the power to augment any item in theGeneral Appropriations Law, or transfer funds from within the Executive DepartmentConstitutional Provision: Art VII, Sec 17 Notes:Under Sec. 31, EO 292, the President may:

1)

Restructure the internal organization of the Office ofthe President by abolishing, consolidating, merging, ortransferring functions from one unit to another;

2) Transfer any function under the Office of thePresident to any other Department or Agency, and vice versa;

3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the Presidentto any other Department or Agency, and vice versa

Araullo v. Aquino III (2014)

Petitioners contest the constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration Program and its related issuances for allegedly violatingSection 29 and Section 25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution. TheCourt held that the DAP was unconstitutional for violating the latter provision, as it did not comply with all the requisites for the validtransfer of appropriated funds.

Doctrine:

No law was necessary for the adoption andimplementation of the DAP because of its being neither afund nor an appropriation, but a program or anadministrative system of prioritized spending. Its adoption was by virtue of the authority of the President as ChiefExecutive to faithfully execute the laws, including theGAAs. Its adoption and implementation was also afunction pertaining to the Executive as the main actorduring the Budget Execution Phase.Requisites for the valid transfer of appropriated funds:

1. A law authorizing the President, the President ofthe Senate, the Speaker of the House ofRepresentatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme

Court, and the heads of ConstitutionalCommissions to transfer funds within theirrespective offices.

2. The funds to be transferred are savings generatedfrom the appropriations for their respective office

3. The purpose of the transfer is to augment an itemin the general appropriations law

Principles of savings:1. Congress wields the power of the purse. Congress

decides how the budget will be spent; what PAPsto fund; and the amounts of money to be spentfor each PAP.

2. The Executive, as the department of the

Government tasked to enforce the laws, isexpected to faithfully execute the GAA and tospend the budget in accordance with theprovisions of the GAA. The Executive isexpected to faithfully implement the PAPs for which Congress allocated funds, and to limit theexpenditures within the allocations, unlessexigencies result to deficiencies for whichaugmentation is authorized, subject to conditionsprovided by law.

3. In making the President’s power to augment

operative under the GAA, Congress recognizesthe need for flexibility in budget execution. In

doing so, it diminishes its own power of thepurse, for it delegates a fraction of its power tothe Executive.

4. Savings should be actual. “Actual” denotes

something that is real or substantial, or somethingthat exists presently in fact.

The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence ofthe law or the executive act prior to the determination ofits unconstitutionality as an operative fact that producedconsequences that cannot always be erased, ignored, or




disregarded. Hence, it nullifies the void law but sustains itseffects. However, it applies only to extraordinary cases.

Constitutional Provisions: Article VI, Section 25 (5). No law shall be passedauthorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, thePresident, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of theHouse of Representatives, the Chief Justice of theSupreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional

Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment anyitem in the general appropriations law for their respectiveoffices from savings in other items of their respectiveappropriations.Section 29 (1). No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made bylaw.

Notes:Section 25 (5) is NOT self-executing.Unobligated allotments cannot be construed as“savings” because savings, as defined by the GAAs, requirethat the portions or balances are at the stage when theappropriations was already obligated and the appropriation

already released (“free from any obligations orencumbrance”). Hence, the DBM’s use of unobligatedallotments contravened Section 25(5).Savings as defined by the 2011, 2012, and 2013 GAAs -Savings refer to portions or balances of any programmedappropriation in this Act free from any obligation orencumbrance which are: (i) still available after thecompletion or final discontinuance or abandonment of the work, activity or purpose for which the appropriation isauthorized; (ii) from appropriations balances arising fromunpaid compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of absence without pay; and(iii) from appropriations balances realized from theimplementation of measures resulting in improved systems

and efficiencies and thus enabled agencies to meet anddeliver the required or planned targets, programs andservices approved in this Act at a lesser costCross-border augmentations are funds that cross overfrom one office to another, usually in the guise ofaugmentation of a deficient item or items. Section 25(5)clearly prohibits this.Unprogrammed appropriations are appropriations thatprovide standby authority to incur additional agencyobligations for priority PAPs when revenue collectionsexceeded targets, and when additional foreign funds aregenerated. The DAP’s use of unprogrammedappropriations was declared contrary to law because itconsidered revenue targets individually, not as a whole.

Strategic Alliance Dev’t Corp. v. Radstock SecuritiesLtd. (2009)

Basay Mining Corp. contracted a private loan from Marubeni Corp(which assigned its entire credit to Radstock) with PNCC beingincluded as a guarantor. However, due to lack of funds, PNCCwasn’t able to pay Radstock. They entered into a compromiseagreement where the debt to be paid was decreased and where its terms

were to: (1) "assign to a third party assignee to be designated byRadstock all its rights and interests" to the listed real properties ofPNCC; (2) issue to Radstock or its assignee common shares of thecapital stock of PNCC issued at par value which shall comprise 20%of the outstanding capital stock of PNCC; and (3) assign to Radstockor its assignee 50% of PNCC’s 6% share, for the next 27 years, inthe gross toll revenues of the Manila North Tollways Corporationregarding t he transfer of PNCC’s real property should it not be able to

pay for the loan. The compromise agreement would have resulted to theassumption of the government of the liability. The SC held that thesaid agreement was void ab initio for being contrary to public policyand to the constitution.Doctrine:Public funds like toll fees, which form part of the GeneralFund can’t be used to pay a private debt. Public funds shallbe spend solely for public purposes. Toll fees do not qualifyas PNCC’s private funds for they are merely held in trust byPNCC for the National Government, which is the owner ofthe toll fees.Congress alone has the power to compromise consideringthat they alone have the power to appropriate. A foreign company cannot own the rights to ownership of

any land in the Philippines because it cannot lawfully ownthe land itself.Public bidding is required for the disposal of governmentproperties The government enjoys preference over Radstock in thesatisfaction of PNCC’s liability arising from taxes andduties.Constitutional Provisions:Sec 29(1), Article VI: No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made bylawSec 7, Article XII: Save in cases of hereditary succession,no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to

individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquireor hold lands of the publicNotes:Badges of Fraud:1. The fact that the consideration of the conveyances isfictitious or is inadequate.2. A transfer made by a debtor after suit has been begunand while it is pending against him.3. A sale upon credit by an insolvent debtor.4. Evidence of large indebtedness or complete insolvency.5. The transfer of all or nearly all of his property by adebtor, especially when he is insolvent or greatlyembarrassed financially.6. The fact that the transfer is made between father and son,

where there are present other of the above circumstances.7. The failure of the vendee to take exclusive possession ofall the property.Defense that PNCC could have used:- Prescription of the action to collect the Marubeni loans(Art 1144 CC - 10 years from the time the right of actionaccrues).- The fact that the loan was secured without any letters ofguarantee Three fold duty of BOD members: duty of obedience, ofdiligence and of loyalty




GENERAL SUPERVISION OF LOCAL

GOVERNMENTS AND AUTONOMOUS

REGIONS

The President of the Philippines shall exercise general

supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect

to component cities and municipalities, and cities and

municipalities with respect to component barangays, shallensure that the acts of their component units are within the

scope of their prescribed powers and functions [Art X, Sec

4]

The President shall exercise general supervision over

autonomous regions to ensure that laws are faithfully

executed. [Art X, Sec 16]

POWER OF APPOINTMENT

The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the

Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the

executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers

and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank

of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose

appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He

shall also appoint all other officers of the Government

whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law,

and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.

The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other

officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts,

or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or

boards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments

during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or

compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only

until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or

until the next adjournment of the Congress. [Art VII, Sec

16]

is the selection, by the authority vested with Appointment

the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functionsof a given office. It is distinguished from indesignation

that the latter simply means the imposition of additional

duties, usually by law, on a person already in the public

service. It is also different from the in that thecommission

latter is the written evidence of the appointment. [Nachura]

CLASSIFICATIONS OF APPOINTMENTS

- Permanent or temporary

o Permanent appointments are those

extended to persons possessing the

qualifications and the requisite eligibility and

are thus protected by the constitutional

guarantee of security of tenureo

Temporary appointments are given to

persons without such eligibility, revocable at

will and without the necessity of a just cause

or a valid investigation; made on the

understanding that the appointing power has

not yet decided on a permanent appointee and

that the temporary appointee may be replaced

at any time a permanent choice is made

A temporary appointment and a

designation are not subject to

confirmation by the CoA.

- Regular or ad interim

o A regular appointment is one made by the

President while Congress is in session, takes

effect only after confirmation by the CoA,

and once approved, continues until the end of

the term of the appointee.

o An ad interim appointment is one made by

the President while the Congress is not in

session, takes effect immediately, but ceases to

be valid if disapproved by the CoA or upon

the next adjournment of Congress. In the

latter case, the ad interim appointment isdeemed “by -passed” through inaction. The ad

interim appointment is intended to prevent

interruptions in vital government services that

would otherwise result from prolonged

vacancies in government offices.

STEPS IN THE APPOINTING PROCESS

o Nomination by the President

o Confirmation by the Commission on

Appointmentso Issuance of the commission

o Acceptance by the appointee




WITH CONSENT OF COMMISSION ON

APPOINTMENTS

Sarmiento v. MisonRespondent Salvador Mison was just appointed by the President tothe Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. Petitionersseek to enjoin the respondent Mison from performing the functions of

the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and therespondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department ofBudget, from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison's salariesand emoluments, on the ground that Mison's appointment asCommissioner of the BoC is unconstitutional for not having beenconfirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The CourtDISMISSED the case finding that even though the position ofCommissioner of the Bureau of Customs is that of a bureau head, itis not one of those within the first group of appointments where theconsent of the Commission on Appointments is required.Doctrine: The power to appoint is fundamentally executive orpresidential in character. Limitations on or qualificationsof such power should be strictly construed against them.

Constitutional Provision: Art. VII, Sec. 16Notes: According to Sec. 16, Art. VII, there are four (4) groupsof officers whom the President shall appoint:

1. Heads of the executive departments,ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,officers of the armed forces from the rank ofcolonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in thisConstitution

2. All other officers of the Government whoseappointments are not otherwise provided for by

law3. Those whom the President may be authorized bylaw to appoint

4. Officers lower in rank whose appointments theCongress may by law vest in the President alone

- Only those enumerated in No. 1 need consent of theCommission on Appointments. Appointments undernos. 2-4 need no such consent.

- As a result of the innovations introduced in Sec. 16, Art. VII, there are officers whose appointmentsrequire no confirmation of the CoA, even if suchofficers may be higher in rank, compared to someofficers whose appointments have to be confirmed bythe CoA under the 1st sentence of the same Sec. 16,

Art. VII- It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the

Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments where theconsent of the CoA is required

- The case is significant because it involves a conflictbetween the Executive (Bureau of Customs) and theLegislative (Comm. on Appointments) Departments

Manalo v. Sistoza (1999)

President Corazon Aquino appointed 15 police officers to positionsin the PNP, ranging from Superintendent to Director, which were permanent in capacity. Without the confirmation of the CoA, theappointees took their oath, and thereafter, the DBM authorizeddisbursements for their salaries and other emoluments. Petitionersquestion the constitutionality and validity of the appointments andthe disbursement for their salaries and other emoluments.

Doctrine: There are four groups of officers whom the Presidentmay appoint. Only those belonging in the first grouprequire confirmation by CoA. [See Sarmiento v. Mison ]Congress cannot by law expand the power ofconfirmation of other government officials not mentionedin the first group.

Constitutional Provision:Section 16, Article VII.

Notes: The Court also said that the PNP is separate and distinctfrom the AFP, as set forth in the Constitution (Section 4, Article XVI and Section 6, Article XVI).

LIMITATIONS ON APPOINTING POWER

OF THE PRESIDENT

The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet,

and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise

provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or

employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said

tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession,

participate in any business, or be financially interested in any

contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege

granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or

instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or

controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall

strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their

office.

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within

the fourth civil degree of the President shall not, during his

tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional

Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as

Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus

or offices, including government-owned or controlled

corporations and their subsidiaries. [Art VII, Sec 13]

Two months immediately before the next presidential

elections and up to the end of his term, a President or

Acting President shall not make appointments, except

temporary appointments to executive positions when

continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or

endanger public safety. [Art VII, Sec 15]




President’s power of appointment may also be limited

through:

Congress’ power to prescribe qualifications for

public office

Judiciary’s role in annulling appointments not

validly made

o If the appointee is not validly confirmed or does

not possess required qualifications

INTERIM OR RECESS APPOINTMENTS

The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on

Appointments shall be constituted within thirty days after

the Senate and the House of Representatives shall have

been organized with the election of the President and the

Speaker. The Commission on Appointments shall meet only

while the Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman

or a majority of all its Members, to discharge such powers

and functions as are herein conferred upon it. [Art VI, Sec

19]

x x x The President shall have the power to make

appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether

voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be

effective only until disapproved by the Commission on

Appointments or until the next adjournment of the

Congress. [Art VII, Sec 16]

TEMPORARY DESIGNATIONS

[Administrative Code of 1987, Book II, Sec 17]

Power to Issue Temporary Designation

(1) The President may temporarily designate an officer

already in the government service or any other competent

person to perform the functions of an office in the

executive branch, appointment to which is vested in him by

law, when: (a) the officer regularly appointed to the office is

unable to perform his duties by reason of illness, absence or

any other cause; or (b) there exists a vacancy;

(2) The person designated shall receive the compensation

attached to the position, unless he is already in the

government service in which case he shall receive only such

additional compensation as, with his existing salary, shall

not exceed the salary authorized by law for the position

filled. The compensation hereby authorized shall be paid

out of the funds appropriated for the office or agency

concerned.

(3) In no case shall a temporary designation exceed one (1)

year.

POWER OVER LEGISLATION

VETO POWER

(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it

becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he

approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall vetoit and return the same with his objections to the House

where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large

in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such

reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such

House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together

with the objections, to the other House by which it shall

likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of

all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all

such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by

yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or

against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall

communicate his veto of any bill to the House where itoriginated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof;

otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.

(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular

item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but

the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does

not object. [Art VI, Sec 27]

DELEGATED DECREE AUTHORITY

In times of war or other national emergency, the Congressmay, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period

and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to

exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a

declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by

resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon

the next adjournment thereof. [Art VI, Sec 23(2)]




SPECIAL POWERS

POWER AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

(MILITARY POWERS)

[Art VII, Sec 18] The President shall be the Commander-

in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and

whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed

forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or

rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public

safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty

days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or

place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.

Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial

law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas

corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in

writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or

special session, may revoke such proclamation or

suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the

President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress

may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or

suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress,

if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety

requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four

hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene

in accordance with its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate

proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual

basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension

of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the

extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the

Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil

courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the

conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies

over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor

automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas

corpus.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus

shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or

offenses inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeascorpus, any person thus arrested or detained shall be

judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be

released.

[Art VIII, Sec 1(2)] Judicial power includes the duty of the

courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving

rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to

determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the

part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

CALLING OUT POWER

The President may call pout the armed forces whenever it

becomes necessary. Under the calling-out power, the

President may summon the armed forces to aid her in

suppressing lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion; this

involves ordinary police action. But every act that goes

beyond the President’s calling-out power is considered

illegal or ultra vires. For this reason, a President must be

careful in the exercise of her powers. She cannot invoke a

greater power when she wishes to act under a lesser power[ David v. Arroyo ]

PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS:

The right to have an immediate determination of the legality

of the deprivation of physical liberty.

Araneta v. Dinglasan5 petitions challenged the validity of the executive orders issued by the president pursuant to CA 671, otherwise known as the EmergencyPowers Act. Petitioners allege that the said act has ceased to haveany force and effect. SC held that CA 671 became inoperative ex

proprio vigore when congress met in regular session and the EOs pursuant to it were issued without authority of law. (When Congressreconvened, the Emergency Powers Act ceased to have effect, because

authority is purely statutory). CA 671 did not fix the term ofduration of its effectiveness, its intent had to be sought for in itsnature, the object to be accomplished, the purpose and its relation tothe ConstitutionDoctrine: Although the duration of its effectiveness wasn’t fixed, theConstitution dictates that any law passed by virtue thereofshould be “for a limited period” only. The branches of government are called to perform dutiesand discharge the responsibilities committed to themrespectively. Only when absolutely necessary (cannotconvene due to state of war) may Congress delegate itslegislative power (President: create policies in times ofemergency).

Constitutional Provisions: Sec 23(2), Article VINotes: Ex propio vigore is a Latin term meaning of its own,inherent force




SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Grounds: Invasion or rebellion, when public safety

requires it

Duration: Not exceed sixty days, following which it

shall be lifted, unless extended by Congress

Duty of the President to report action to Congress: within 48 hours, personally or in writing

Congress may revoke (or extend on request of the

President) the effectivity of proclamation by a majority

vote of all its members, voting jointly

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate

proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the

factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the

suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension

thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon

within 30 days from its filing.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ does not

impair the right to bail [Art III, Sec 13]

The suspension applies only to persons judicially

charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly

connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any

person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially

charged within three days, otherwise he shall be

released.

MARTIAL LAW

Grounds for declaration: Invasion or rebellion, when public

safety requires it.

Note: The following cannot be done:

o Suspend the operation of the Constitution

o Supplant the functioning of the civil courts and the

legislative assemblies

o Confer jurisdiction upon military courts and

agencies over civilians, where civil courts are able

to function;

Open court doctrine – civilians cannot be tried by

military courts if the civil courts are open andfunctioning

o Automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of

habeas corpus

The constitutional limitations for the suspension of the

privilege of the writ of habeas corpus are likewise imposed

on the proclamation of martial law

Note: The constitutional validity of the President’s

proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of

habeas corpus is first a political wuestion in the hands of the

Congress before it becomes justiciable in the hands of the

Court [ Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo ]

Although the Constitution reserves the SC the power to

review the sufficiency of such proclamation or suspension,

SC must allow Conggress to exercise its own review powers,

which is automatic rather than initated. Only when

Congress defaults should the SC step in as its final rampant.

[ Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo]

Gudani v. SengaOn Sept 22, 2005, Sen. Biazon invited senior AFP officers toappear at a public hearing before the Senate with regard to theconduct of the 2004 elections in relation to the purported cheatingand the “Hello Garci” conversation between Pres. Arroyo and

COMELEC Comm. Garcilliano. Despite of direct orders by Pres. Arroyo prohibiting AFP officers to appear before the Senate inquiry, petitioners Gen. Gudani and Lt.Col. Balutan still proceeded. Theyhave then become subject to the Gen. Court Martial for the defianceof the orders of the President, the Commander-in-Chief. They arenow asking the Court to annul the orders of Pres. Arroyo preventing

AFP officers from testifying before Congress without the President’sconsent.The Court DENIED the petition stating that the Constitutionitself grants the President the power of being a Commander-in-Chiefof all armed forces, and petitioners, as members of the AFP, must atall times abide by the orders of the President as the Commander-in- Chief. Doctrine:

The commander-in-chief clause vests on the Presidentabsolute authority over the persons and actions of themembers of the armed forces.Constitutional Provisions: Art. VII, Sec. 18Notes: The Constitution reposes final authority, control andsupervision of the AFP to the President, a civilian who isnot a member of the armed forces The commander-in-chief clause vests on the Presidentabsolute authority over the persons and actions of themembers of the armed forces. Such authority includes theability of the President to restrict the travel, movement

and speech of military officers, activities which mayotherwise be sanctioned under civilian law. Where a military officer is torn between obeying thePresident and obeying the Senate, the Court will withouthesitation affirm that the officer has to choose thePresident. The Constitution prescribes that it is thePresident, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces




Lansang v. GarciaDue to the Plaza Miranda bombing, President Marcos issuedProclamation 889, which suspended the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus. Petitioners question the validity of this proclamationas well as WON the Court had the power to look into the factualbasis of the suspension of the privilege.Doctrine: The Court has the authority to inquire into the existence

of the factual bases in order to determine theconstitutional sufficiency of the proclamation. Grant ofpower to suspend the privilege is neither absolute norunqualified. The function of the Court is merely to check whether the Executive has gone beyond the constitutionallimits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vestedin him or to determine the wisdom of his act.

Conditions to suspend the privilege of the writ(a) there must be "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or — pursuant to paragraph (2), section 10 of Art. VII ofthe Constitution – "imminent danger thereof"(b) "public safety" must require itConstitutional Provision: Article VII, Section 10(2) (1935 Constitution)Notes: The phrase “and imminent danger thereof” was removedin the 1987 constitution.

Burgos v. Macapagal-Arroyo Jose Burgos was unjustly arrested and detained by AFP soldiers.His mother asks for a writ of habeas corpus, a writ of amparo and amotion to declare the respondents in contempt. After an investigationby the CHR, the Court granted the writ of habeas corpus, requiredthe case to be remanded to the CA for the writ of amparo and

provisionally affirmed the declaration of the respondents in contempt.Doctrine:Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s name wasordered to be dropped from the list of respondentsbecause of the unconditional dismissal of the contemptcharge against her. As then President at the time of thefiling of the petition, she was immune from suit.Since she was being sued in her capacity as Commander-in-Chief, she should not be named as a respondent onceher tenure as president has elapsed.Constitutional Provision: Section 18, Article VIINotes:2 types of Contempt:1. Criminal contempt: conduct directed against theauthority and dignity of the court or a judge actingjudicially; it is an act obstructing the administration ofjustice which tends to bring the court into disrepute ordisrespect.Purpose: to punishIn Proceedings: the defendant is presumed innocent andthe burden is on the prosecution to prove the chargesbeyond reasonable doubt.- presumption of innocence that precludes everyreasonable hypothesis

2. Civil contempt: the failure to do something ordered tobe done by a court or a judge for the benefit of theopposing party therein and is therefore, an offense againstthe party in whose behalf the violated order was made.Purpose: to compensate

Sanlakas v. Angelo Reyes The president issued Proclamation No. 427 (declaring astate of rebellion) and General Order No. 4 (directingthe AFP and the PNP to suppress rebellion) due to thecoup d’etat in Oakwood. The petitioners assail the powerof the president to declare a state of rebellion and the validity of the calling out of AFP.Doctrine:- The Constitution has granted the president as theCommander-in-Chief a sequence of graduated powers.- The power of the president as Commander-in-Chief mayhave been limited, but the power as Chief Executive isever broad.- It is true that for the purpose of exercising the calling

out power, the constitution does not require the presidentto make a declaration of rebellion, according to Sec 18, Art VII. However, by the same provision, the president isalso not prohibited from declaring a state of rebellion.(The president exercised a wedding of her powers as ChiefExecutive and Commander-in-Chief.)Constitutional Provision:Sec 1 and Sec 18, Art VII Notes:Commander-in-Chief sequence of graduated powers(starting from the most benign)

1) Calling Out Powers (whenever it is necessary)2) Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of

Habeas Corpus (actual case of invasion, rebellionor insurrection and when public safety requiresit)

3) Declaration of Martial Law (actual case ofinvasion, rebellion or insurrection and whenpublic safety requires it)

IBP v. Zamora

In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila,invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art.VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief ofStaff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the properdeployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing cr iminal or lawless violence. The Presidentdeclared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaignare merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only,until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional

Doctrine: Whenever it becomes necessary’ is the only requirementto call out the AFP. President has the widest leeway and




broadest discretion in using the power to call out becauseit is considered as the lesser and more benign powercompared to the other two powers. The President asCommander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network togather information, some of which may be classified ashighly confidential or affecting the security of the state.

Lacson v. PerezOn May 1, 2001, PGMArroyo, faced by a violent mob which triedto break into Malacanang, issued Proclamation No.38 declaringthat there was a state of rebellion (SOR) in the NCR. She thenissued General Order No.1 directing the AFP and the PNP tosuppress the rebellion. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leadersand promoters of the “rebellion” were thereafter effected. Petitionersassail the aforestated issuances as having no basis both in fact and inlaw. Significantly, on May 6, 2001, PGMA lifted her declarationof SOR in NCR, thus rendering the instant petitions moot andacademic . Moreover, petitioners’ contention that they are underimminent danger of being arrested without warrant do not justifytheir resort to the extraordinary remedies of mandamus and prohibition, since individual warrantless arrests are not withoutadequate remedies in the ordinary course of law.Doctrine: Wisdom of the president in exercising his role asCommander-in-Chief of all armed forces is oneconsidered as political (political question); but it isnot without any limit and could be transformed into ajusticiable question.

The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is noteasily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established

since matters considered for satisfying the same is acombination of several factors which are not alwaysaccessible to the courts. In many instances, the evidence which the President might decide that there is a need tocall out the armed forces may be of a nature notconstituting technical proof.On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chiefhas a vast intelligence network to gather information,some of which may be classified as highly confidential oraffecting the security of the state. In the exercise of thepower to call on-the-spot decisions may be imperativelynecessary in emergency situations to avert great loss ofhuman lives and mass destruction of property.Constitutional provision: Art. VII, Sec. 18Notes: The Court, in a proper case, may look into the sufficiencyof the factual basis of the exercise of this power (becomesa justiciable question). However, this is no longer feasibleat the time Proclamation No. 38 having been lifted.

David v. ArroyoPursuant to Sec 17(2), Article 7, the President issued PP 1017 (to

be implemented by GO 5) declaring a State of national emergencycommanding the AFP to maintain law and order in the Philippinesdue to the extreme left and extreme right attempting to bring downthe democratic Philippine State. The SC ruled that PP 1017 isunconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate decrees. However, SC also ruled that PP 1017 is not a

Martial law declaration and is instead a valid exercise by the president of her calling out power. Moreover, SC held that theOverbreadth Theory (free speech cases) does not find application inthe case because PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not freespeech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation. Doctrine: Take Over Power Doctrine refers to Congress’ exerciseof emergency powers and without express delegation; thePresident cannot act upon it. It is not automatically givenin a state of emergency. This is due to the fact that thedeclaration of state of emergency (power as ChiefExecutive) is different from the exercise of emergencypowers which only Congress can delegate The president may call on the AFP to suppress lawless

violence, invasion and rebellion (involving ordinary policeaction), but every act that went beyond this power wasconsidered illegal. The president can only “take care” of the carrying out oflaws but cannot create or enact laws. The President’s ‘calling-out’ power is a discretionarypower solely vested in her wisdom. This, however, doesnot prevent an examination of whether such power wasexercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting graveabuse of discretion. The only criterion for the exercise ofthe calling-out power is that ‘whenever it becomesnecessary,’ the President may call the armed forces ‘to

prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion orrebellion.’ Constitutional Provision:Sec 17, Art XII Sec 23(2), Art VISec 17, Art VII Notes:Emergency connotes the existence of conditions suddenlyintensifying the degree of existing danger to life or well-being beyond that which is accepted as normal. Implicitare the elements of intensity, variety, and perception.Emergencies are classifiable under three principal heads:a) economic, b) natural disaster, and c) national security.(thus, it’s not limited to natural calamities but also includes

rebellion) The authority from Congress must be based on thefollowing: (1) There must be a war or other emergency. (2) The delegation must be for a limited period only. (3) Thedelegation must be subject to such restrictions as theCongress may prescribe. (4) The emergency powers mustbe exercised to carry out a national policy declared byCongress.




Ampatuan v. PunoOn November 24, 2009 (day after the Maguindanao massacre –

placing the provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and thecity of Cotabato under a state of emergency. She directed the AFPand the PNP to undertake such measures as may be allowed by theConstitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents oflawless violence in the named places. On November 27, 2009,

PGMA issued AO 273, “transferring” supervision of the ARMM from the Office of the President to the DILG. Due to the issuesraised over the terminology used in AO 273, PGMA issued AO273- A, amending the former by “delegating” instead of“transferring” supervision from ARMM to DILG. Petitionersclaim that the issuances encroached on the ARMM’s autonomyunder Section 1, Article V of RA 9054 (Expanded ARMMOrganic Act) and Section 16, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.Doctrine: The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppresslawless violence in such places is a power that theConstitution directly vests in the PresidentConstitutional Provision: Art VII, Sec 18Notes: The DILG Secretary did not take over control of thepowers (administration or operations) of the ARMM. The deployment of AFP and PNP personnel in the placesmentioned in the proclamation is not by itself an exerciseof emergency powers as understood under Section 23(2), Article VI of the Constitution. The President did notproclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted byCongress that authorized her to exercise extraordinarypowers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent orsuppress lawless violence in such places is a power thatthe Constitution directly vests in the President. She didnot need a congressional authority to exercise the same.

The President’s call on the armed forces to prevent orsuppress lawless violence springs from the power vestedin her under Section 18, Article VII. While it is true thatthe Court may inquire into the factual based for thePresident’s exercise of this power, it would generally deferto her judgment on the matter. It is clearly to thePresident that the Constitution entrusts the determinationof the need for calling out the armed forces to preventand suppress lawless violence. The imminence of violence and anarchy at the time thePresident issued Proclamation 1946 was too grave toignore and she had to act to prevent further bloodshedand hostilities in the places mentioned. To pacify thepeople’s fears and stabilize the situation, the President had

to take preventive action.

EXECUTIVE CLEMENCIES (PARDONING

POWER)

Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided

in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,

commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures,

after conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with theconcurrence of a majority of all the Members of the

Congress. [Art VII, Sec 19]

No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for

violation of election laws, rules, and regulations shall be

granted by the President without the favourable

recommendation of the Commission. [Art IX-C, Sec 5]

Definitions:

Pardon – an act of grace which exempts the individual on

whom it is bestowed from the punishment that the law

inflicts for the crime he has committed.Commutation – reduction or mitigation of the penalty

Reprieve – postponement of a sentence or stay of

execution

Parole – release from imprisonment, but without full

restoration of liberty, as parolee is still in the custody of the

law although not in confinement

Amnesty – act of grace, concurred in by the legislature,

usually extended to groups of persons who committed

political offenses, which puts into oblivion the offense itself.

Purpose: relieving the harshness of the law or correcting

mistakes in the administration of justice

Discretion of the President

Kinds of Pardon:

o Absolute: extended without strings attached,

o Offender does not have right to reject offer

o Conditional: convict required to comply with

requirements;

o Offender has right to reject offer

o Plenary: extinguishes all penalties

o Partial: does not extinguish all penalties

Effects of Pardon:o Restoration of civil and political rights

o Restoration of liberty




POWER OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS

(DIPLOMATIC POWER)

President as chief architect of foreign policy

Sole authority to negotiate with other states for the

creation of treaties

Full powers: credentials given to negotiators

TREATY-MAKING

No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and

effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the

Members of the Senate. [Art VII, Sec 21]

The power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to

the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate,

however, is limited only to giving or withholding its

consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is

within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a

treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its

ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state

to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a

serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision

is within the competence of the President alone, which

cannot be encroached by the Court via a writ of mandamus

[ Pimentel v. Office of the Executive Secretary ]

EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS

Bayan v. Executive Secretary (J. Puno’s dissent) In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement, the PH and the US negotiated the possible elements ofthe VFA. Said agreement was ratified and approved by thePresident and concurred with by the Senate. Petitioners assail itsconstitutionality because insofar as US ratification was concerned, itwas done without the concurrence of the Senate. SC upheld itsconstitutionality on the basis of T. Hubbard’s letter to the Presidentwhere he stated that the US recognizes it as an executive agreement.On the other hand, Puno declared that it should be unconstitutionalbecause although an executive agreement is recognized as having astatus like that of a treaty, its constitutional effectiveness can’t be at par with the latter.Doctrine:In ascertaining the VFA’s compliance with theconstitutional requirement that it be “recognized as atreaty by the other contracting state,” the yardstick shouldbe the US constitutional law. Recognition of the UnitedStates as the other party of the VFA should be by the USPresident with the advice and consent of the US Senate.Constitutional Provision:

Sec 25, Article 18: After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines andthe United States of America concerning military bases,foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not beallowed in the Philippines except under a treaty dulyconcurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress sorequires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by thepeople in a national referendum held for that purpose,

and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.Notes: Three constitutional requisites must be complied withbefore military bases, troops, or facilities can be allowed inPhilippine territory:(1) their presence should be allowed by a treaty dulyconcurred in by the PH Senate;(2) when Congress so requires, such treaty should beratified by a majority of the votes cast by the Filipinopeople in a national referendum held for that purpose;and(3) such treaty should be recognized as a treaty by theother contracting party

In US practice, a treaty is only one of four types ofinternational agreements, namely: (1) Article II treaties; (2)executive agreements pursuant to a treaty ( accepted to havebeen pre-approved by the Senate ); (3) congressional-executiveagreements( authorized by Congress ); and (4) sole executiveagreements ( no concurrence of the Senate ). The VFA fell underthe fourth and could be considered constitutionallyproblematic. Treaties and executive agreements equally bind the US butthere are distinctions namely: (1) state law; (2) acts ofCongress and treaties; and (3) the US Constitution

NEGOTIATE

Province of North Cotabato v. GRP (2008)The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspectof the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001 (MOA) isassailed on its constitutionality.Doctrine:GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisionson public consultation and the right to information whenthey negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD. It isunconstitutional because it is contrary to law and the

provisions of the Constitution.Constitutional Provision: Art II, Sec 28; Art VII, Sec 21

The President’s power to conduct peace negotiations is

implicitly included in her powers as Chief Executive and

Commander-in-Chief. As Chief Executive, the President has

the general responsibility to promote public peace, and as

Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty to

prevent violence and suppress rebellion and lawless




violence. [ Province of North Cotabato v. GRP ] (Residual power,

no explicit Constitutional provision)

The President – in the course of conducting peace

negotiations – may validly consider implementing even

those policies that require changes to the Constitution, but

she may not unilaterally implement them without the

intervention of Congress, or act in a way as if the assent of

that body were assumed as a certainty. x x x The President

has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to

preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential

power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change

the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed

amendments or revision. [ Province of North Cotabato v. GRP ]

CONTRACTING AND GUARANTEEING

FOREIGN LOANS (BORROWING POWER)

The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on

behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior

concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such

limitations as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board

shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the

calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete report of

its decision on applications for loans to be contracted or

guaranteed by the Government or government-owned and

controlled corporations which would have the effect of

increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as

may be provided by law. [Art VII, Sec 20]

Foreign loans may only be incurred in accordance with law

and the regulation of the monetary authority. Information

on foreign loans obtained or guaranteed by the Government

shall be made available to the public. [Art XII, Sec 21]

RA 4860 – AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE

PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES TO OBTAIN

SUCH FOREIGN LOANS AND CREDITS, OR TO

INCUR SUCH FOREIGN INDEBTEDNESS, AS MAY

BE NECESSARY TO FINANCE APPROVED

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PURPOSES OR

PROJECTS, AND TO GUARANTEE, IN BEHALF OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, FOREIGN

LOANS OBTAINED OR BONDS ISSUED BY

CORPORATIONS OWNED OR CONTROLLED BY

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PURPOSES

INCLUDING THOSE INCURRED FOR PURPOSES

OF RE-LENDING TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR,

APPROPRIATING THE NECESSARY FUNDS

THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Constantino v. Cuisia (2005)

Following a negotiated approach, the Aquino administrationimplemented the Philippine Comprehensive Financing Program for1992, which entailed buyback and bond-conversion programs.Petitioners alleged that these mechanisms do not constitute the loan“contract” or “guarantee” contemplated in Section 20, Article VIIof the Constitution and that there was unlawful delegation ofexecutive power.

Doctrine: The Constitution allows the President to contract andguarantee foreign loans. It makes no prohibition on theissuance of certain kinds of loans or distinctions as to which kinds of debt instruments are more onerous thanothers. Hence, the plain, clear and unambiguous languageof the Constitution should be construed in a sense that will allow the full exercise of the power provided therein. Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all the provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, orto make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences asmay be fairly and logically inferred from its terms.

There are certain constitutionally vested powers thatdemand the exclusive exercise of the President. Toascertain these powers, they must (1) arise out ofexceptional circumstances, AND (2) if exercised, wouldinvolve that suspension of fundamental freedoms, OR atleast call for the supersedence of executive prerogativesover those exercised by co-equal branches of government. The decision to contract or guarantee foreign debts is of vital public agency, but only akin to any contractualobligations undertaken by the sovereign, which arises notfrom extraordinary incident, but from the established functions of governance .

Constitutional Provision: Section 20, Article VII. The President may contract or

guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of thePhilippines with the prior concurrence of the MonetaryBoard, and subject to such limitations as may be providedby law. The Monetary Board shall, within thirty days fromthe end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit tothe Congress a complete report of its decision onapplications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed bythe Government or government-owned and controlledcorporations which would have the effect of increasingthe foreign debt, and containing other matters as may beprovided by law.

Notes:Sovereign default is not new to the Philippines, having

experienced it in 1983 when the government declared amoratorium on principal payments on its external debts, which virtually closed the country’s access to new foreignmoney and drove investors to leave the Philippine market.Qualified political agency is valid when (1) there isprior authorization, or (2) there is ratification by thePresident.




TARRI FF POWERS

The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix

within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and

restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export

quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties orimposts within the framework of the national development

program of the Government. [Art VI, Sec 28(2)]

Southern Cross Cement Corp. v. CementManufacturers Association of the Philippines

RA 8800 or the Safety Measures Act was enacted, which providesthe structure and mechanics for the imposition of emergency measures,including tariffs, to protect domestic industries and producers fromincreased imports. The Tariff Commission conducts investigations to find out if conditions exist to warrant the imposition of safeguardmeasures and reports it to the DTI Secretary who may or may notimpose safeguard measures upon positive determination that these

conditions are present. The DTI Secretary imposed a safeguard oncement although the Tariff Commission reported negative conditions.Doctrine:- Positive final determination by the Tariff Commission isan indispensable requisite to the imposition of safeguardmeasures and is binding upon the DTI Secretary. This isthe limitation that Congress legislated in Art VI Sec 28(2)- The power of taxation is solely legislative, not inherentin the executive. Article VI Sec 28(2) is an exceptionalgrant of legislative power to the President (which may alsobe exercised by his alter egos.) Therefore, it is within theCongress to impose limitations. Executive control andsupervision cannot outweigh Congress’s inherent powerto tax and set limitations because the power to imposetariffs is contingent in nature and legislative in origin.- DTI has no power of review over the TariffCommission, not even the President.- The President and his alter egos are agents of CongressConstitutional Provision: Article VI, Section 28(2) Notes:Executive Control is NOT absolute. The President cannotorder his subordinate to disobey a Court ruling. ThePresident is the administrative head over administrativebodies but it is Congress which reclassifies, redefines orabolishes the administrative superstructure. Public officersswear allegiance to the Constitution, not the President.

BUDGETARY POWER

The President shall submit to the Congress, within thirty

days from the opening of every regular session as the basis

of the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures

and sources of financing, including receipts from existing

and proposed revenue measures. [Art VII, Sec 22]

RESIDUAL POWERS

The powers of the President are more than the sum of the

enumerated executive powers. The duty of the government

to serve and protect the people as well as to see the

maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life,liberty and property, and the promotion of general welfare

is the basis of the existence of “residual unstated powers”

[ Marcos v. Manglapus ]

Whatever is not judicial, whatever is not legislative, is

residual power exercised by the President. [ Marcos v.

Manglapus ]

Marcos v. ManglapusPetitioners Ferdinand Marcos and family have signified their wish toreturn to the Philippines after being sent to Hawaii on exile, but Pres.Corazon Aquino has rejected their return considering the direconsequences to the nation of his return. Petitioners insist their right totravel and ask the Court to order the issuance of their travel documentsto be able to return to the Philippines.Respondents, on the other hand, argue for the primacy of the right ofthe State to national security over individual rights which are supportedby Sec. 4 (prime duty of the Government) and Sec. 5 (maintenance of peace & order, etc.), Art. II, 1987 Constitution.The Court DISMISSED the case finding that Pres. Aquino did notact arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that thereturn of former President Marcos and his family at the present timeand under present circumstances pose a serious threat to nationalinterest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines. Doctrine:

The residual powers of the President are those which areimplicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing inthat office to safeguard and protect general welfare. Theyinclude powers which by tradition are reposed in thePresident. It is founded on the duty of the President, assteward of the people.Notes: The powers of the President cannot be said to be limitedonly to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution.In other words, executive power is more than the sum ofspecific powers so enumerated. To the President, the problem is one of balancing thegeneral welfare and the common good against the exerciseof rights of certain individuals. The question to the Court is whether or not there existfactual bases for the President to conclude that it was in thenational interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to thePhilippines. If it exists, she cannot be said to have actedarbitrarily.o The Court may determine if there is sufficient factual

basis to determine the proclamation of the President.Once found that there is sufficient factual basis, thePresident has complete authority which powershe/she deems appropriate to address the issue athand.




INFORMING POWER

The President shall address the Congress at the opening of

its regular session. He may also appear before it at any other

time. [Art VII, Sec 23]

The President usually discharges the informing power

through what is known as the State of the Nation Address.

OTHER POWERS

Call Congress to a special session [Art VI, Sec 15]

Consent to deputization of government personnel by

COMELEV [Art IX-C, Sec 2(4)]

Discipline such deputies [Art IX-C, Sec 2(8)]

SUCCESSION

Estrada v. Desierto (2001)

On October 4, 2000, President Estrada was accused of receivingmillions of pesos from jueteng lords. This exposé triggered a chain ofevents that eventually prompted the Senate to open an impeachmenttrial. Despite massive pressure from both public officials and the public, Estrada refused to resign. On January 20, 2001, Vice- President Arroyo was sworn in as the President of the Philippines.On the same day, Estrada left the Malacañang and issued a letter,saying that he was “unable to exercise the powers and duties” of hisoffice, and that “the Vice - President shall be the Acting President”.The main issue that the Court resolves in this case is whether petitioner resigned as President or whether he was merely on leave,making Arroyo only an Acting President.

Doctrine: Resignation is a factual question and its elements arebeyond quibble: there must be intent to resign and theintent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formalrequirement to form and may be proved by the totality ofprior, contemporaneous, and posterior facts andcircumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance onthe issue.Congress has the ultimate authority under theConstitution to determine whether the President is

incapable of performing his functions in the mannerprovided for in Section 11 of Article VII. Hence, theCourt cannot exercise its judicial power for this is an issuein regard to which full discretionary authority has beendelegated to the Legislative branch.Incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or frombeing brought to court during the period of theirincumbency and tenure, but not beyond. However,immunity from suit does not include unofficial acts (ultra vires acts). Unlawful acts of public officials are not acts ofthe State.

Constitutional Provision: Article VII, Section 8. In case of death, permanentdisability, removal from office, or resignation of thePresident, the Vice-President shall become the Presidentto serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanentdisability, removal from office, or resignation of both thePresident and Vice-President, the President of the Senateor, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of

Representatives, shall then act as President until thePresident or Vice-President shall have been elected andqualified. The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve asPresident in case of death, permanent disability, orresignation of the Acting President. He shall serve untilthe President or the Vice- President shall have beenelected and qualified, and be subject to the samerestrictions of powers and disqualifications as the ActingPresident.Section 11. Whenever the President transmits to thePresident of the Senate and the Speaker of the House ofRepresentatives his written declaration that he is unable todischarge the powers and duties of his office, and until he

transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary,such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President. Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinettransmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speakerof the House of Representatives their written declarationthat the President is unable to discharge the powers andduties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediatelyassume the powers and duties of the office as ActingPresident. Thereafter, when the President transmits to the Presidentof the Senate and to the Speaker of the House ofRepresentatives his written declaration that no inability

exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of hisoffice. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Membersof the Cabinet transmit within five days to the Presidentof the Senate and to the Speaker of the House ofRepresentatives, their written declaration that thePresident is unable to discharge the powers and duties ofhis office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For thatpurpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of call.If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelvedays after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the

President is unable to discharge the powers and duties ofhis office, the Vice- President shall act as President;otherwise, the President shall continue exercising thepowers and duties of his office.

Notes: Three-part test in determining whether voluntariness was vitiated by duress brought about by government actions:(1) whether one side involuntarily accepted the other’sterms; (2) whether circumstances permitted no otheralternative; and (3) whether such circumstances were theresult of coercive acts of the opposite side.




THE VICE-PRESIDENT

There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same

qualifications and term of office and be elected with, and in

the same manner, as the President. He may be removed

from office in the same manner as the President.

The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the

Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation. [Art VII, Sec 3]

[Art VII, Sec 4] The President and the Vice-President shall

be elected by direct vote of the people for a term of six

years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June

next following the day of the election and shall end at noon

of the same date, six years thereafter. The President shall

not be eligible for any re-election. No person who has

succeeded as President and has served as such for more

than four years shall be qualified for election to the sameoffice at any time.

No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive

terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of

time shall not be considered as an interruption in the

continuity of the service for the full term for which he was

elected.

Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for

President and Vice-President shall be held on the second

Monday of May.

The returns of every election for President and Vice-

President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each

province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress,directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the

certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not

later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all

the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House

of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress,

upon determination of the authenticity and due execution

thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.

The person having the highest number of votes shall be

proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an

equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall

forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the

Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting

separately. x x x

[Art VII, Sec 5] Before they enter on the execution of their

office, the President, the Vice-President, or the Acting

President shall take the following oath or affirmation:

“I do solemnly swear [or affirm] that I will faithfully and

conscientiously fulfill my duties as President [or Vice-President or

Acting President] of the Philippines, preserve and defend its

Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, and consecrate

myself to the service of the Nation. So help me God.” [In case of

affirmation, last sentence will be omitted].

[Art VII, Sec 6] x x x The salaries of the President and

Vice-President shall be determined by law and shall not be

decreased during their tenure. No increase in said

compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of

the term of the incumbent during which such increase was

approved. They shall not receive during their tenure any

other emolument from the Government or any other

source.

[Art VII, Sec 9] Whenever there is a vacancy in the Officeof the Vice-President during the term for which he was

elected, the President shall nominate a Vice-President from

among the Members of the Senate and the House of

Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation

by a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of the

Congress, voting separately.

RIGHTS OF SUCCESSION AND

MEMBERSHIP IN CABINETIn case of death, permanent disability, removal from office,

or resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall

become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case

of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or

resignation of both the President and Vice-President, the

President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the

Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as

President until the President or Vice-President shall have

been elected and qualified. [Art VII, Sec 8]

[Art VII, Sec 11] Whenever the President transmits to the

President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of

Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to

discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he

transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such

powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President

as Acting President.



Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet

transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker

of the House of Representatives their written declaration

that the President is unable to discharge the powers and

duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately

assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting

President.

Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President ofthe Senate and to the Speaker of the House of

Representatives his written declaration that no inability

exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office.

Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the

Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the

Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives,

their written declaration that the President is unable to

discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress

shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall

convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in

accordance with its rules and without need of call.

If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days

after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds

vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is

unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the

Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the

President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of

his office.

[Art VII, Sec 3(2)] The Vice-President may be appointed

as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no

confirmation.

REMOVAL

The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the

Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional

Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from

office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable

violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and

corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All

other public officers and employees may be removed from

office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. [ArtXI, Sec 2]

[Art XI, Sec 3] (1) The House of Representatives shall have

the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by

any Member of the House of Representatives or by any

citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member

thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business

within ten session days, and referred to the proper

Committee within three session days thereafter. The

Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its

Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty

session days from such referral, together with the

corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be

calendared for consideration by the House within tensession days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the

House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable

resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the

Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of

each Member shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of

impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the

Members of the House, the same shall constitute the

Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall

forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated againstthe same official more than once within a period of one

year.

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide

all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the

Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the

President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of

the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No

person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-

thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend

further than removal from office and disqualification to

hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, butthe party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject

to prosecution, trial, and punishment, according to law.

(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment

to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.

Documents

Executive Department