n the 10th of May 1940, the Germanhigh command put into action Fall

Gelb, Plan Yellow, the invasion of France andthe low countries. Intended to punish Francefor her draconian terms in the Treaty ofVersailles, the invasion had been originallyconceived as a variant of the World War ISchlieffen Plan, a conventional sweepthrough the low country of Holland andBelgium. However, the plan finally adoptedwas that of von Manstein, that of anarmoured assault through the difficult terrainof the Ardenne region of Belgium andLuxembourg, followed by a sweep to theEnglish Channel behind the defendingarmies. The cutting edge of this "Sweep ofthe Sickle" (Sichelschnitt) was the sevenpanzer divisions of von Rundstedt's ArmyGroup A. One of these divisions was theSeventh Panzer division commanded byErwin Rommel.

Rommel had no direct experience of tankwarfare prior to the day he took command ofSeventh Panzer, in mid February 1940.However, within three months Rommel'sdivision was taking part in Fall Gelb, andwas the first unit to breach the Meuse Riverdefences. Elements of Seventh Panzercrossed between Houx and Dinant on thenight of 12th/13th May. This was half a dayearlier than the Meuse crossing of HeinzGuderian's panzers near Sedan. However,this was not Rommel's first assault across theMeuse. In August 1914, immediately afterthe German declaration of hostilities,Lieutenant Erwin Rommel led his platooninto Belgium and by 31st of August, they hadcrossed the Meuse by pontoon bridge toSassey in the French Argonne.

The assault of Seventh Panzer division onMay 12, 1940 was to be Rommel's second“Meusing.”

One of the main natural obstacles to tankmovement in Western Europe are rivers, andtherefore river crossings deserve particularattention. In the region of Rommel's cross-ing, the Meuse River is 80 to 120 metreswide and flows through a steep sided lime-stone gorge some 150 metres below the levelof the surrounding countryside. In addition tothe natural obstacle presented by this river, on12 May 1940 the crossing point was defendedby elements of General Corap's Ninth Army.Despite these problems, Rommel's forceswere able to cross quickly, consolidate andthen rapidly pierce the French defences as faras the border of France. During this opera-tion, Rommel made a risky night march withtanks, advancing 50 miles in 24 hours to LeChateau. Such a daring act embodied HeinzGuderian's maxim for good panzer comman-ders: To ride forward with his lead elements;to press forward with all speed and fight abattle of mobility, thereby retaining the ele-ment of surprise.

So who was Rommel?

Erwin Johannes Eugen Rommel was born inHeidenheim, Swabia on 15 November 1891,the son of a schoolmaster. Despite therebeing almost no military service in his familybackground, he joined the armed forces andserved with distinction in World War I.Rommel's first experience of war was onAugust 22nd 1914 - a platoon level action inBleid, Luxembourg. Here he efficientlycleared the village of French soldiers usingthe aggressive, innovative tactics whichwould become the hallmark of all his laterbattles. After the Argonne and a quiet periodin the Vosges, Rommel went on to serve inthe Carpathian Mountains in Rumania, andthen in Italy. On October 26 1917, Rommel'sbattalion captured Mt Matajur, during theBattle of Caboretto. In the process,Rommel's force had captured 150 Italian offi-cers, 9000 men and 81 guns. For this feat,

Rommel was awarded the Pour de Merite,Germany's highest award for valour. Duringthese engagements, Rommel used his infantryas if they were mobile infantry, his tacticsemphasising fire, movement and the momen-tum of the attack.

After the war, Rommel held a number of mil-itary posts including the position of instructorat the Infantry School at Dresden in 1929,command of a Jaeger battalion at Goslar in1935 (where he met Hitler for the first time,as his battalion served as security for theFuhrer during his visit there), and a brief peri-od as an instructor of the Hitler Jugend(Hitler Youth). Rommel's book InfanterieGreift An (Infantry Attacks) was published in1937, and in 1938 Rommel commanded theFuhrerbegleitbattalion (The Hitler EscortBattalion, or Hitler's bodyguard) during theoccupation of the Sudatenland and again dur-ing the invasion of Poland. By this time,Rommel had come to know Hitler quite well,and was able to ask for a fighting commandof his own. Hitler had taken a liking to thisbrave soldier, and asked Rommel what hewanted. "Command of a panzer division"replied Rommel. By mid February 1940,

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O

Rommel’s Second “Meusing”Seventh Panzer Cross at Dinant & Houx, Belgium- May 1940 Part 1

Hoth and Rommel

Rommel was at Godesburg, on the Rhine,ready to take over the command of the 7thPanzer division.

During the invasion of Poland, Germany hadfielded something like 44 divisions, of whichthere were five panzer, four motorised andfour light divisions. These latter divisionswere armoured reconnaissance divisions simi-lar to the French division Légère de Cavalerie(D.L.C, or Light Cavalry Division). The lightdivisions showed themselves lacking inarmoured punch and were later reorganised aspanzer divisions. The 2nd Light divisioncrossed the Reich frontier into Poland nearGleiwitz, and took part in fighting to thesouth of Warsaw, until the fall of Poland 26days later. However, from 9th September, the2nd Light division was only used for mop-ping up operations. At the end of September,the 2nd Light division returned to Germanyand were reorganised as the 7th Panzer divi-sion, also known as the "Ghost Division". Byan order issued on 6th February 1940, ErwinRommel was to take command of the 7thPanzer division, and he took up his postsometime between 10th and 15th May 1940.At the time of Rommel's assumption of com-mand the 7th Panzer's organization was:

Armor25th Panzer Regiment (of three tank bttns)37th Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion

Motorised Infantry6th Rifle Regiment7th Rifle Regiment7th Motor-cycle Battalion

Engineers58th Pioneer Battalion

Artillery78th Field Art. Rgt. (of three bttns,

each of three four-gun batteries)42nd Anti-tank Artillery Battalion

Within this organization, the complement ofarmoured fighting vehicles was as follows:

Pz. Regt. 25:109 light and command tanks

(PzKpfw I and II)110 gun-armed tanks

(more than half were PzKpfw 38(t),the remainder being PzKpfw III and IV)

Aufkl. Abt. 37:50 Armored cars

Pi. Btl. 58:13 PzKpfw I and PzKpfw II

During the period of its reorganisation, the7th Panzer division was trained in panzer tac-tics, and the correct use of panzer equipment.

Part of this train-ing and equip-ment involvedthe delicate art ofriver crossings.

The same yearRommel pub-lished his bookInfanterie GreiftAn, 1937, alsosaw the publica-tion of anothermilitary classic,Heinz Guderian'sAchtung Panzer!On the subject ofriver crossings,Guderian wrote:"When the twosides are in closecontact and the terrain favours the attack, thetanks will attack simultaneously with theinfantry; the infantry will have to attack under

artillery cover ahead of the tanks when weneed to overcome initial obstacles - a stretchof river, for example, or barriers or minefields- before the tanks can intervene".

Getting troops across a body of water requiresthe correct equipment, and in this too, the 7thPanzer was well equipped. Pionier-Bataillon58 had in its inventory the standard "pneu-matic boats" - four man inflatable rubber

boats, as well as sixteen man wooden assaultboats (powered by 12 horsepower engines),pontoon bridges and even four experimental

2

bridge laying PzKpfw II. The pontoonbridges came in three major designs, theBrückengerät B, capable of eight tonne loads,the Brückengerät C, capable of five tonneloads and the Brückengerät K, capable of 16tonne loads. In addition, if a Brückengerät Bwas assembled with twice the number of pon-toons, it could also be used to bear 16 tonneloads.

The standard technique for crossing a riverinvolved suppression of the far bank withartillery and direct fire from small arms andsupporting tanks. A crossing of panzergrenadiers in rubber dinghies and woodenassault boats followed this, preferably underthe cover of smoke or darkness. Engineerswould also cross with equipment to destroyenemy strongpoints, while rubber boats couldbe used to bring across heavy equipment andmotorcycles. Ferry systems consisting ofboats pulled back and forth by ropes werealso employed. Troops from the initial lodge-ment were to clear the river bank of allenemy soldiers, and then to press outward toexpand the bridgehead. Pontoon sectionswere then assembled, floated across the riverand used to construct a bridge. Each pontoonsection usually carried a vehicle or heavyweapon, so that in the process of floating thebridge section over, a vital piece of equip-ment for the beachhead could also be raftedacross. Panzers were to be brought over asquickly as possible, to allow a breakout and

exploitation from theriver's edge, the targetbeing a deep penetrationof the enemy position.

Despite such preparation,such an operation remainsa delicate affair, and a lotdepends on the efficiencyof the defence.

The French 9th Army ofGeneral André Corapoccupied the Meuse riverdefences from Namur inthe north to Pont-à-Bar,near Sedan, in the south.The defensive front wasdivided up into three corpsareas, from north to south,the II Corps of GeneralJean Bouffet (5thMotorised division), theXI Corps of GeneralJulien Martin (18th and22nd Infantry divisions)and the XXXXI Corps of

General Libaud (61st Infantry and 102ndfortress divisions). In reserve were the 4thNorth African and the 53rd Infantry divisions.Additionally, tasked with scouting across theMeuse were the1st and the 2nd Light Cavalrydivisions (Division Légère de Cavalerie orD.L.C.), as well as three Spahi brigades. Allof the infantry divisions were Series A or Bunits, which were effectively militia, with fewregular officers.

Across the Meuse, the Ardennes were defend-ed by the Belgian Groupement K, command-

ed by General Maurice Keyaerts, and consist-ing of the 1st Division de ChasseursArdennais and the 1st Division de Cavalerie.

10th of May

At 4:35 am on the morning of the 10th, the7th Panzer rolled into the forests of theBelgian Ardenne. To their north was 5thPanzer division, under the command ofGeneral Hartlieb. Collectively, these twodivisions made up XV Panzer Corps, underthe command of General Hoth. South ofRommel's panzers was XXXXI PanzerCorps under the command of GeneralReinhardt, consisting of 6th and 8th Panzer.Further south again were the tanks of 2ndPanzer, 1st Panzer and 10th Panzer, collec-tively being XIX Panzer Corps under thecontrol of General Heinz Guderian. EachPanzer Corps was the spearhead of an army- 4th Army under von Kluge in the north,12th Army under List in the centre, and16th Army in the south under Busch.Collectively this formation was ArmyGroup A, under the command of vonRunstedt.

Ahead of the panzers were variousBrandenberger units, tasked with seizingvital crossroads and bridges, required forthe efficient advance of the German forma-tions. Overhead, ensuring the advance wasprotected from enemy reconnaissanceplanes flew Me109's of Luftflotte 3.

The advance was slowed only slightly byBelgian demolitions (though these weremore of a problem for the French as will beseen shortly), because while these were

The Meuse River at Dinant, Belium

3

Houx Crossing Point

extensive, few of the obstacles were cov-ered by defensive fire, and so engineerswere able to quickly put things right.However, at Chaberez, 7th Panzer was heldup by elements of the 3rd Regiment of theChasseurs Ardennais and was not able toadvance again until the Belgian forces sur-rendered at 9 pm that evening. Rommelwas furious as his troops had gone toground without returning fire. Rommel'sown experience had been:"…that the day goes to the side that is thefirst to plaster its opponent with fire".Standard panzer tactics required a rapidadvance to contact, and then the enemy wasto be engaged from the halt. However,Rommel was a strong advocate of firing onthe move and spraying possible enemy posi-tions with machinegun fire.

Meanwhile, the infantry of General Corap'sleft wing were still marching to the line of the

Meuse, and his cavalry had crossed the Meuseand were probing toward the advancingGermans. The French cavalry and mecha-nised units were having difficulty getting for-ward, however, due to the extensive Belgiandemolitions to their front, and sometimes evenbehind them! Tempers grew short, and in oneBelgian command post at Laroche, a Frenchcaptain, Edouard de Verdelon drew his pistoland threatened "If you blow the road, I willblow your head off!"

11th May

Despite Belgian opposition, 7th Panzer con-tinued to advance, and by the morning of 11thMay, they had crossed the Ourthe River atBeffe, Marcourt and Laroche. Shortly there-after they found themselves engaging the 4thArmored Car Regiment (an element of theFrench 4th D.L.C.) at Marche. Later in themorning, the German high command ordereda halt for fear that the Allies would becomesuspicious, and stop their advance to the DyleRiver in the north.

Continued in theNov./Dec. 2000 issue of

TACNEWSBy Christopher J Harrod

AcknowledgementsThanks to Steven Thomas for modern dayphotographs of Rommel's crossing point.

Topographic map of Houx & Dinant, Belium