Evolutionary IED Prevention 09 2006 Updated W Comments Jan2010

SMi CBRN 20 September, 2006

Evolutionary Detection and Prevention of Improvised Explosive Devices and Related Terrorist Weapons

TETRAD Technologies Group, Inc.Richmond, VA (USA)

Martin Joseph Dudziak PhD

REMOVE THIS: I have edited only certain things, not sure about changing other text (like company name) since this was something from a conference in 2006

Three Absolutes for Adequate ProtectionAgainst Today’s and Tomorrow’s Terrorists

• Ability to Think and Act Ahead, not merely reactively, postfacto

Copyright 2006 TETRAD Technologies Group, Inc.

• High-sensitivity for multiple substances in diverse environments• Not limited to one type of chemical agents• Not restricted to particular operating environments and

architectures (functional and literal chokepoints and get-arounds)

• Usability – the non-technical-specialist needs to be able to use this effectively without a great deal of concentration or specialized learning(If it is so specialized and sensitive, it will have predictable operational fail-points)

Conventional TNT

Compact C4, Cemtex

HMTD, TATP

????

Martin, 7.jan.10:

for instance, one can add not only body-wrap but body-cavity-insert weaponry - the drug carriers perfected that art long ago

Martin, 7.jan.10:

for instance, one can add not only body-wrap but body-cavity-insert weaponry - the drug carriers perfected that art long ago

High-Demand Challenges

• Weapon Technology– Chemistry– Architecture– Concealment

• Weapon Effectiveness– Fault-tolerance and Fail-safe Mechanisms– Necessary vs. Sufficient Yield – Ability to mimic false positives and build “immunity” to detection

• Detection Strategy– Must evolve from “detect at point of deployment” to “detect at

place of design and manufacture”– Must “look ahead” to new weapon design engineering, operations


Lessons from Manila, London et al

• Finding– “Mega-bureaucracy” practices are reinforcing an “ossification”

process that inhibits innovation and variation.– “Plans and plots disrupted in the nick of time” - not a strong

defence but an invitation to keep trying.– “Thinking outside the box” is the enemy’s strength but is a

technique discouraged in various “noveau securité” circles.

• Recommendation– Need for more versatile programs and contracting vehicles.

• Applying “innocent until proven guilty” attitude into “plausible until demonstrated otherwise”

• Mobility and transformability• Unpredictability from the perspective of the enemy

– Need for “gateway intelligence systems” comparable to gateway communications (e.g. Raytheon ACU-1000) that allow for interoperability.

– Need for more than “Yada yada” – Yet Another Device Again


Martin, 7.jan.10:

This paper and presentation was originally 2005, then reshaped for 2006, and all the big agencies and bureaucracies have done exactly the wrong things, even the opposite of this sound strategy.

Martin, 7.jan.10:

This paper and presentation was originally 2005, then reshaped for 2006, and all the big agencies and bureaucracies have done exactly the wrong things, even the opposite of this sound strategy.

Solutions

• One reconfigurable, easy, cheap, adaptable technology (applying what EE & IT learned long ago)

• Non-intrusive for mass transit, esp. air travel

• Harder (for terrorists) to predict or get-around by coming up with a modified chemistry or biology

• Integrable with Existing Detection and Inspection Systems


Martin, 7.jan.10:

Like even Obama admits now, and all the smart Old-Guard (retired) NSC and CIA guys are saying, WE HAVE NO SYEM, NO INTEGRATION, just a lot of data collection. This is like being able to cut, split and stack firewood, but have no stove in which to burn it. what happens? You freeze to death.

Martin, 7.jan.10:

Like even Obama admits now, and all the smart Old-Guard (retired) NSC and CIA guys are saying, WE HAVE NO SYEM, NO INTEGRATION, just a lot of data collection. This is like being able to cut, split and stack firewood, but have no stove in which to burn it. what happens? You freeze to death.

Chemical Explosive Biothreat Identification and Tracking


JEDI (aka “CEBIT”)

AF

123 – LA

X –

1234567-BR

OW

NJ

BatteryMSL

(e.g., 4x4 cell array)

PWRMEM

PROC

DCL

ACT

Martin, 7.jan.10:

This is not imaginary but real and ready for mfgr. and use - the images at left are from working prototypes, from 2005 and earlier!!!

Martin, 7.jan.10:

This is not imaginary but real and ready for mfgr. and use - the images at left are from working prototypes, from 2005 and earlier!!!

JEDI / CEBIT A solution that (economically, and ergonomically) CAN “cover all bases”

Components:1. An extensible grid (array) of multi-spectral, multi-functional sensor elements – Not Only For Explosives (but that is the Present Focus and Demand).

2. A chip set operating in a card package – self-contained, self-powered, easy, robust, and very inexpensive. 3. A human factors system that is unobtrusive and can increase protection while speeding up the inspection process.

4. Adaptable “engine” to meet future needs (especially “E” and “B” threats) As They Emerge.

5. Aerosol concentrator auxiliary system to handle cases of extremely difficult concentrations due to the nature of the compound or the operating environment.

6. A scalable architecture that can be operated as a network in a number of confined physical environments or expanded to roadside/neighborhood outdoor operations.




JEDI / CEBIT

CHECK-IN

CheckedChecked

CheckedCarry-On

Security (Std)

GATEPRE-LOAD

Security (Std)

ValidationValidation

Activation

Working

Martin, 7.jan.10:

We were told by bureaucrats in DHS, JIEDDO and TSWG in 2005, 2006, 2007 that all this was not necessary because the problem was solved and under control - I kid you not!

Martin, 7.jan.10:

We were told by bureaucrats in DHS, JIEDDO and TSWG in 2005, 2006, 2007 that all this was not necessary because the problem was solved and under control - I kid you not!

JEDI / CEBIT Analysis based upon predictive, modeling-building order/lattice theory, inverse methods, support vector algorithms, and related nonlinear reasoning models

Reliance upon sensors, Bayesian PR, post-symptomatic reports alone is insufficient

Greatest risk of missing the threat underway is in slow ability to rapidly plan and coordinate response on multiple levels – similar as with biothreats – sensing agents, decon, sampling, diagnosis, treatments

Information Integration must occur at the micro (chip) level

JEDI (CEBIT) learns from what worked and failed in similar system environments

Confirmation and refinement of identified threats, false positives requires improved methods – SVM and IRM (GENET) can provide better discrimination & classification

Coordination of resources, teams, delivery, dissemination, disbursement requires the approach used in CHAIN and COPF




JEDI / CEBIT

Deformable Registration

Mutual Information

Diffusion-Attraction


JEDI / CEBIT

Hierarchically ordered networks of relations (events)


JEDI / CEBIT

NOT ONLY for Operation at TARGETS but at SOURCES

JEDI CONOPS Model – built upon biological foundations



Incident (Site) Prediction Example

Detections during span t1,2

Predicted Incidents post-t2IRM Predicted Convergence post-t2

Reported Indicators overlapping t1,2



The GIS components are essential for critical data and interactive human+machine analysis. The missing ingredients are available and readily integrated with the mathematical analytics. With architectures such as Nomad Eyes or Red Cell, the communication gaps can be crossed for data gathering, verification, planning and response.



JEDI / CEBIT IS READY FOR FIELD TESTING AND PROTOTYPING

Actions Required:One Agency that wants to take the lead in protecting their people, their country.

One specific flexible, receptive test environment (real airport, real neighborhood). One firm step forward to enable co-creating the fieldable, working operational system.

One “break” from the monotony of the usual prolonged set of procedures and delays that often are indirectly serving the aims of terrorists.

A few open doors.

A modest budget.

A unified team with the determination to stop those who want to destroy our lives.

NEXT STEPS Needed Now, Not After Another 9-11


Contacts

Martin Dudziak (Exec Chmn)– (757) 847-5511– (804) 740-0342– (202) 415-7295– [email protected]

– also see http://tetradyn.com/contact.php for more of the business team

TETRADYN (TETRAD Dynamics)28 Chase Gayton Circle, Suite 731Richmond, VA 23238 USA

Copyright © 2006 Martin J. Dudziak, PhD and The S4 Center, Inc.

Coordinated Biothreat Protection and Response System

Backup Material

CUBIT / CBPR as System, Program

Nitrate

Peroxide

Organophosphate

Carbamate

Sulfate

MRSA

VRE

H5N1

TB

Protein marker1

Protein marker2

U-Decide-It

Sense Targets

MC (Micro-cantilever)

ROB (Resonant Optical)

PLC (Polymer Laminate Catalyst)

Sensing Methods

CUBIT CONOPS VisionUnified Communications from Every Perspective

Translating Data Visualization & Analysis into concrete “go here, don’t go there” messages

Real-Time Situational Awareness: Decision-makers can get the helicopters and HMMWVs to the victims fast!

Get the Right Information to the Right People for the Purpose of Saving Lives.

• Verona™ is a field-tested intelligent knowledge management and discovery notebook [1]

• Command-Post-of-the-Future is now in-the-present serving US forces [1]

• CMDRS [1] and other agent-based situation awareness and knowledge discovery components are readily adaptable to Clinical Medicine, Epidemiology, Disease Management and Public Health applications

Coordinated Unified Biothreat Intervention and Tracking


Intelligent Services Layer (ISL)

CHAINEngine

ChainAPI

MonitorAgents

AnalysisAgents

CMDLine

FatClients

WebClientsV

IEW

CNTL

Intelligent Workflow Management

Implement Plans which Operate on Events & Operator Direction

Communicate Knowledge Across Activities

Execute External Processes Based on Results

Utilizes ISL for Agent Coordination

Monitor, Analysis, Notification- Query Databases, Repositories, Web Pages, & Sensors- Monitor Critical Events Across the Globe- Intelligently Notify Users of Critical Events

MonitorAgents

MonitorAgents

AnalysisAgentsAnalysisAgents

NotificationAgents

Multiple Comm Protocols

- SOAP/HTTP- RMI/IIOP

MonitorAgents

MonitorAgents

ChainAgents

ChainAgents

ChainAgents

CHAIN Overview


Coordinated Unified Biothreat Intervention and Tracking

ISL Architecture

Intelligent Services Layer (ISL)

DataWrapper

DataWrapper

DataWrapper

DataWrapper

DataWrapper

DataWrapper

Weather Data

Traffic Data

GeologicalData

Public Services

Coast Guard

Fire/RescueCMDRS Desktop

Law Enforcement

Health Services

National Guard

Master Schedule

Unit Locations

D-COP

Knowledge Organizer

Analyst PortalLe Monde

Al Jazeera

Ettelaat

Translation

Concept Analysis

Visualization

GISIntelligent Agents

Search Agents

Link Analysis

Person…OrganizationLocationKeyword Search Clear

Search>>and

or

not

Reset Save as Search Agent

Federated Search

LumINT: Knowledge Discovery

Agent and Service basedIntegration Framework

Best of Breeds COTS

GoogleSearch

Mediator QuickTime™ and aTIFF (Uncompressed) decompressor

are needed to see this picture.

YahooNews

Mediator

LumINT Information Flow

KStore

WorkflowController

Agent

LumINTJ2EE

WebApps

ToolDiscovery

Service

CHAINAgents

VerityFederated

Search DocumentCollection

Indexes

ChiliadSearch

ConceptAnalysisEngine

ConceptDatabase

VeronaNotebook

Grid Enabled Integration Framework - Plug-and Play of ALL components

Security Guard - (e.g. ISSE Guard, Radiant Mercury, InfoPump)

Information Sharing Policy Manager - Per-agency or per-analyst

** Knowledge RepresentationMediator (e.g. OWL, KIF, CL, OKBC)

Core Services and AgentsCommon Infrastructure Components

Analyst ActivityLogger

*** CASE Web Services and Agents Components

Workflow ManagerPortal - Distributed Collaborative Content Sharing

CASE Evaluation ToolsQuantitative Analysis

*** CASE Applications GUICommon Look and Feel

Documents

RDBMS

*** AdvancedVisualizations

Message Streams

WWWKnowledge

RepositoriesLogger

Repository