European Power by Design

Review by Lina M. SvedinDepartment of Political Science, University of Utah

Veto Power: Institutional Design in the European Union. By Jonathan B. Slapin. Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press, 2011. 184 pp., $58.93 hardcover (ISBN-13: 978-0-472-11793-2).

Security Integration in Europe: How Knowledge-Based Networks Are Transforming the EuropeanUnion. By Mai’a K. Davis Cross. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011. 281 pp.,$52.02 hardcover (ISBN-13: 978-0-472-11789-5).

Jonathan B. Slapin’s book Veto Power: Institutional Design in the European Unionand Mai’a K. Davis Cross’ book Security Integration in Europe: How Knowledge-BasedNetworks Are Transforming the European Union address fundamental questionsabout how, when and why integration happens in the European Union (EU).While Slapin focuses on the institutional foundation of incentives and regimesin the European Union, Cross focuses on the importance of shared ideas, per-suasion, and perception for the creation of regimes and the actual work insideEU institutions.Slapin’s book is, first and foremost, a book about European integration. As

such, it contributes to the literature on the evolution of institutional develop-ment in that region. Slapin’s study adds to the already rich field of historicalinstitutional analysis of EU governance structures by looking specifically at theintergovernmental conferences, the forums where EU members negotiate theirtreaties. These conferences establish the rules that govern work that takes placewithin all of the other structures and institutions that govern the EuropeanUnion on a daily basis. Slapin likens these understudied formative moments toconstitutional conventions for EU members. Slapin examines the interactionsbetween sovereign states in these conferences as they battle for the “EU’s grandbargains” (p. 5)—the-rules-that-will-set-the-rules—in what seems to be a classicinternational bargaining and alliance-building situation. Slapin’s work makes acontribution to the literature on international negotiations: particularly thedevelopment of norms and regimes, and the crafting of agreements among sov-ereign states in particular issue areas (see Krasner 1983; Young 1989; Ostrom1990; and Gowa’s 1995 work on regimes, governing the commons, and negotia-tions to establish international trade agreements). Because Slapin sees the vetopower in intergovernmental conferences (IGCs) as key to explaining the relativesuccess small states have had in negotiating the rules that govern EU countries(despite their clear disadvantage in terms of real bargaining power), his workseems to fall in line best with Keohane’s (1984) work on cooperation underanarchic conditions.Cross’ book is an in-depth exploration of the role of epistemic communities

(see Haas 1992) in pushing the EU agenda toward ever deeper integration,specifically in the area of common security and defense policy. Cross traces theprocess of developing internal and external security policy, focusing on the per-iod since 1992, when real advances in this realm started taking form. While sheacknowledges the extensive research on member states’ contribution to policydevelopment, Cross’ affinity, unlike Slapin’s, is with networks of high-rankingprofessionals and public servants in Brussels. Unlike Slapin’s work, which focuses

Svedin Lina M. (2014) European Power by Design. International Studies Review,doi: 10.1111/misr.12109© 2014 International Studies Association

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on the metarules of the game in the European Union, Cross maps the day-to-daywork of seasoned experts as they operate from within the bureaucracy to buildadvocacy coalitions, design long- and short-term policy, and persuade electedofficials to see the practical benefits of a more integrated stance on security pol-icy. Cross argues that we cannot make sense of why nation states have beenwilling to give up sovereignty over key areas like security and foreign policy with-out looking at how expert communities have laid the groundwork for integrationthrough changes to perceptions and interest framing, long before any politicaldecisions materialize.While the two books reviewed here share an interest in and respect for norms

and regimes, they look at different actors and employ very different epistemolog-ical approaches. Cross’ contribution looks below the member-country surface ofthe European Union, attributing change-agency to networks of experts with simi-lar training, socialization, and world views, who work horizontally and ofteninformally across national lines in particular policy areas. The mechanisms Crossidentifies as driving change are also more constructivist than Slapin’s account:Cross focuses on shared understandings, with particular value placed on profes-sionalism and a strong focus on finding common ground and practical policysolutions. As such, her work falls more in line with public policy scholarship suchas Sabatier’s work on advocacy coalitions, and constructivist IR scholarship likeKeck and Sikkink’s (1998) work on activism beyond borders and Checkel’s(2003, 2005) work on socialization and identity in institutions.Cross’ answer to the how and why of EU integration, as well as continued EU

cooperation, comes back to the effectiveness of epistemic communities in per-suading national governments to see integration and the collective good as abetter way to protect their national interests. The story here is one of how pro-fessionals and respected experts are trusted to play the part of the “governmentby citizens” that the European Union prefers to see as its governing principle. Inthe spirit of Rohr’s statement that public servants are citizens in lieu of the restof us, Cross’ epistemic communities seem to work as policymakers in lieu ofnational politicians. Here, Cross inadvertently taps into a deep suspicion of manyEU skeptics, citizens, and scholars alike, who see the European Union as undem-ocratic, largely run by bureaucrats out of sight, and as an institution where theimportant decisions are made behind closed doors.In Veto Power, Slapin presents a number of formal models: one “to explain

when and how the veto bargaining dynamic arose in EU history” (p. 4), one thatdemonstrates the differences between institutional and intergovernmental theo-ries of bargaining power (complete with a formal statistical model to determinewhich type of power matters more in international treaty negotiations), and one“to explain when veto rights become an important source of bargaining power”(p. 6). He contrasts institutional and intergovernmental theories of integrationand concludes that institutional ideas better explain the outcomes of IGCs, usingthe Amsterdam Treaty as his primary case (Chapters 4, 5, and 6).Slapin addresses the fact that, at some point in time (it is hard to tell exactly

when from his account), countries become too vested in a collaborative ventureto realistically follow through on any threat to withdraw or defect from this coop-eration. The example of Great Britain comes to mind. Slapin asserts that at acertain point it became too costly, in terms of transaction-cost economics, forBritain to pull out of the European Union. Consequently, its threat to “defect”became hollow, and instead its threats to veto progress have become increasinglyimportant. Here, Slapin connects to game-theoretic models �a la Axelrod (1984)and Axelrod and Keohane (1985) to demonstrate that the calculations statesmake include the costs of defection or a failure to cooperate, as well as issuelinkages and the time horizon of the interactions with other states. In the caseof Europe, time horizons and issue linkages have historically been very long and

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rich, so one could assume that states there have anticipated an extended futureneed to interact with each other on economic, military, legal, and culturalissues.Key takeaways from Slapin’s research are that “veto power associated with insti-

tutional theories is more important than power derived from size at IGCs,” that“veto power only matters when exit threats are not credible,” and that these prin-ciples explain why “the EU is different from most other international organiza-tions, and how, in many ways, it is similar to a federal state” (p. 6). Anadditional contribution Slapin makes is accounting for domestic politics. Heargues from a refreshingly pro-democratic place that states in IGCs follow publicopinion in their respective countries as they set out to bargain about the rulesthat will govern all. Slapin also lends support in these chapters to two-level gametheory (think Putnam and subsequent research) that domestic ratificationconstraints influence the size of the win-set in treaty negotiations.Cross’ Security Integration in Europe does a number of things that have not been

done before, mainly because scholars have thought it too difficult. Epistemiccommunities as a concept are notoriously hard to define, get research access to,and to set boundaries around in terms of their influence. Cross takes on allthese challenges by conducting more than eighty interviews and scouring officialdocuments in order to compare and contrast what she sees as the key to anepistemic community’s impact: its internal characteristics. Think tanks in Europewill be sad to note that Cross did not find that they meet the criteria for anepistemic community and are excluded from the study for being too scatteredand largely impactless. Cross argues, and demonstrates in her five case studies ofepistemic communities in the EU security policy realm, that the more cohesivethe group is in terms of causal logic, socialization, and policy goals, the morepersuasive it comes across to political decision makers. The result is a greaterimpact on furthering integration in the security realm. Cross shows that some ofthe key factors that make epistemic communities especially successful in EUpolicymaking are knowledge as a means to combat uncertainty in a policy area,the degree to which European experts share causal logic, and the frequency andinformality with which they can meet once they have been assigned to Brussels.Both of these works represent excellent scholarship and add different insights

into how and why the European Union has developed the way it has. They alsoboth provide some tentative predictions on where the European Union mightbe going in the future. Slapin’s book is painstakingly methodical and clear in itspresentation. Three of the chapters have previously been published as articles.There is a clear effort to outline ways in which his work has relevance to interna-tional relations, broadly speaking, and the study of federalism as part of the con-clusions (pp. 150–153). This, however, seems more like an afterthought, but atleast it gets us out of the rather square box of EU integration. My interest waspiqued by the conclusions Slapin offers, namely that while no state can bethrown out of the European Union, recent efforts have made it possible to cur-tail the rights of states that violate core EU values. This has opened a legal doorfor states to actually withdraw from the European Union, a possibility that didnot exist before. He also points out the challenge posed by “enhanced coopera-tion” through which states that wish to integrate further can challenge laggardstates to either get on board or be relegated to the sidelines. Slapin states thatthis is likely to profoundly change the decision calculus of the states objectingto, and previously vetoing, further integration (pp. 153–154).Cross provides critical insight into how interest group politics and advocacy

coalitions among experts shape the how and why of EU integration. She doesthis using process tracing and other qualitative methods to their best advantage.Her writing is very clear, the logic is easy to follow and thankfully not nearly asdry as Slapin’s work. That said, I would much rather hire Cross as an expert on

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epistemic communities and EU development than I would as a scholar on demo-cratic theory. Her account of how these epistemic communities work within theEuropean Union and how their impact on policy comes about raises several con-cerns for me, not only as a policy scholar interested in accountability and ethics,but also as an EU citizen. Her discussion in the concluding chapter on whetherthe epistemic communities she studied contribute to the democratic deficit inthe European Union dismissed any concerns in far too fleeting and miscon-ceived a way.Veto Power is directed at anyone who studies the European Union for a living

(graduate students and faculty), as well as well-informed readers outside of aca-demia who have an interest in the European Union. Slapin’s style of writing isaccessible and, while it makes me long for a surprising argument, the clarity ofargument and the well-choreographed structure of the book makes it accessibleto anyone interested in an extensive discussion of the intricacies of institutionbuilding in the European Union.Security Integration in Europe is an excellent fit for graduate students interested

in how things really get done in the European Union, as well as anyone inter-ested in epistemic communities. The content covered is rather sophisticated, yetpresented in a readable way. The book does not elaborate on its methodologyenough to be readily used as research for other scholars to build on, but thecase studies are great illustrations of a challenging, important, and under-researched topic that deserves first cuts like the one Cross embarks on.

References

Axelrod, Robert. (1984) The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.Axelrod, Robert, and Robert Keohane. (1985) Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies

and Institutions. World Politics 38: 226–254.Checkel, Jeffrey. (2003) “Going Native” in Europe? Theorizing Social Interaction in Eurpean

Institutions. Comparative Political Studies 36: 209–231.Checkel, Jeffrey. (2005) International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and

Framework. International Organization 59: 801–826.Gowa, Joanne. (1995) Democratic States and International Disputes. International Organization 49:

511–522.Haas, Peter M. (1992) Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination. International

Organization 46: 1–35.Keck, Margaret, and Kathryn Sikkink. (1998) Activism Byond Borders: Advocacy Networks in

International Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Keohane, Robert O. (1984) After Hegemony. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Krasner, Stephan D. (1983) International Regimes. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Ostrom, Elinor. (1990) Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action.

Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions Series. Cambridge, New York, and Melbourne:Cambridge University Press.

Young, Oran. (1989) International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and theEnvironment. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

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