European and U.S.

Counter-Terrorism

Strategies:

Quo Vadis?

June 9, 2017

THE INTER-UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR TERRORISM STUDIES

“European and U.S. Counter-

Terrorism Strategies:

Quo Vadis?”

Table of Contents Michael Whine .......................................................................................................................... 1

Erik Brattberg ........................................................................................................................... 7

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1 European and U.S. Counter-Terrorism Strategies

Michael Whine

Michael Whine MBE is Government and International Affairs Director at the Community Security Trust and the UK member of ECRI, a human rights agency of the

Council of Europe. From 2010 to 2012 he was the Lay Advisor at the Counter Terrorism Division of the Crown Prosecution Service.

Yonah Alexander described me as the UK Member of ECRI, which is a human rights

monitoring commission of the Council of Europe, which I am. Every Member State nominates a Member, but our appointment is by the national delegations’ representatives, and our task is to advise governments on human rights issues through the means of five-yearly inspections and policy recommendations.1 But for 30 years I have been employed by the Community Security Trust, which advises the UK Jewish community on security matters. You have nothing like it in the U.S., although other European Jewish communities have similar agencies.2 We are a civil society organization, and are funded by the Jewish community, although we now also manage and disburse government funds to enhance the security of the Jewish community and its institutions. We provide security advice and training but also research political and physical threats to our community. The product of our research goes to the community leadership and to government and law enforcement agencies. We have a contractual relationship with the police in Britain whereby we mutually share data on antisemitic incidents, and intelligence. We not only work with the police but also closely with government. So in that sense we are quite unique.

I also advise the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the

largest regional inter-government security agency in Europe, and for the last 18 months or so, I have been helping to draft ‘Words into Action’, a policy advisory for governments on the security of Jewish communities. It reminds states of their convention and other responsibilities but also provides much practical guidance on security for Jewish communities and how they can transpose best practice to all OSCE member states.3 I was at the launch of the project two weeks ago in the German parliament in Berlin and I shall be a panel speaker at the second launch, to the diplomatic and law enforcement community, in Vienna on the 7th of July. So that is me.

This session is about the U.S. and European strategies. I am no expert on American

strategies, although I am here every year, talking to U.S. Government departments, and have participated in counter terrorism workshops and seminars with your security agencies in years past. I no longer have any operational role, but I was involved in the early stages of the Prevent mechanism, which is the UK strategy for countering radicalization and violent extremism. So I look at it from all those various perspectives now.

With that said, let me make a few points about European counter-terrorism

strategies. The first is that the member states of Europe have primary responsibility for their own security. The second is that there has been a tremendous effort to enshrine multilateral cooperation through a series of agreements at European Union (EU), and the wider European level. The OSCE counter terrorism track exists primarily as a forum for the exchange of best practice, but the agency provides observers in contested areas and advisors for post conflict states as well as elections monitors. The EU and the European Commission (EC) have focused on binding multilateral agreements, and the establishment of agencies to facilitate counter-terrorist action. The first was in 2004

European and U.S. Counter-Terrorism Strategies 2

following the terrorist attacks in Madrid, when the Council of the European Union (the Council) adopted a declaration on combating terrorism.4 Among its measures was the appointment of a Counter-Terrorism Coordinator. His function is to coordinate the work of the Council in combating terrorism, present policy recommendations and propose priority areas for action based on threat analyses, monitor the implementation of EU counter-terrorism strategies, maintain an overview of all relevant EU instruments, coordinate the relevant bodies of the Council, the Commission and the European Action Service, and ensure that the EU plays an active role in this effort.5

In 2005, the Council adopted its Counter-terrorism Strategy, based on four strands:

preventing people from turning to terrorism by tackling the root causes which lead to radicalization and recruitment, protecting people and infrastructures and reducing vulnerability to attack, pursuing and investigating terrorists across borders and disrupting networks, responding to terrorism by managing and minimizing risks.6

The Strategy was revised in 2014, but following the January 2015 terrorist attacks

in Paris, the Council agreed to accelerate the implementation of previously agreed measures (they has already agreed a strategy focused on Syria and Iraq in October 2014).7 Over the course of the next two years they legislated by means of Directives on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons, strengthening the legal framework to prevent terror attacks and the growing phenomenon of jihadi volunteers, reinforcing checks at external borders (ie outside the Schengen zone), and improvements in the interoperability of national and regional information systems. They also mandated Europol to create an Internet Referral Unit to identify terrorist and extremist content online and to advise Member States accordingly, and to enhance cooperation with Middle East and North African states.

European heads of state agreed in February 2015 to strengthen the strategy by

adopting the following security measures: to adopt an effective European passenger names record, systematic and coordinated checks on cross border movements relevant to counter-terrorist measures within the Schengen framework, improved and enlarged information sharing and operational cooperation by law enforcement and judicial authorities, improved cooperation to clamp down on illicit arms trafficking, improved security services cooperation, strengthened money laundering and terror financing mechanisms, and to work toward the adoption of a cyber-security Directive.8

Preventing radicalization and violent extremism was regarded as a key element in

the Strategy and this measure included, inter alia, the identification and removal of internet content which promotes extremism and terrorism and encouraging greater cooperation between public authorities and the public sector, communication strategies to promote tolerance, fundamental freedoms and inter-faith and community dialogue,

enhanced education, improved social integration and rehabilitation of former extremists.

Cooperation at the international level required a re-think about conflict in the Middle

East, Balkans, the Sahel and Yemen, with the introduction of capacity-building projects and better targeted EU assistance to the countries involved, sustained and coordinated international engagement with the UN and its Counter Terrorism Forum, as well as the promotion of fundamental freedoms between cultures and religions.

3 European and U.S. Counter-Terrorism Strategies

The European Commission (the Commission) reported on the progress of

implementing the enhanced strategy during 2015, noting improvements to the Schengen Information System database, the establishment of the Internet Referral Unit in Europol, the establishment of a platform to enable the rapid transfer of financial intelligence and other practical tools. Among these were the establishment of the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) which commissions research on countering radicalization and exchanges best practice through seminar and symposia, and the exchange of forensic data such as DNA, fingerprints, vehicle information and other operationally important intelligence, under the auspices of the 2005 Prum Convention, a formerly limited agreement to exchange data on cross-border criminal investigations signed by 14 Member States, but since extended to all EU Member States and to include forensic data on terrorism suspects.9

It was under the Schengen accords that the Italian authorities have stated that they

tipped off the British to their concerns about one of the London Bridge attackers, Youssef Zagbha, although there has been no confirmation of this (at the time of writing), that the British received the intelligence. The RAN initiative encourages the participation of civil society organisations, and I was involved in this when a group of us were invited to oversee a joint European initiative to develop counter radicalization models, using best practice learned from Dutch and Danish national models. These ‘prevent’ initiatives, such as the Copenhagen, Aarhus and Amsterdam models bring together educators and social workers to steer potential extremists and terrorists away from violence. They are not normally police led, although they may involve police officers, but are usually initiated by local authorities at the request of police and security services.10

In the UK, for example, local authorities, high schools and universities have a

statutory duty to monitor violent radicalization, although some universities are reluctant to do so as they regard it as spying on their students.11 A subset of the UK Prevent program, the Channel program focuses on individuals who may be on the path to becoming terrorists. Its purpose is to divert potentially violent extremists.12 Again I was involved in a Channel program to do just that, but details are necessarily kept secret as the targets have not committed crimes and therefore must be regarded as innocent. Our target’s communications were being monitored and it was clear that the person was researching bomb-making materiel and capabilities although it was too early to determine when and how any device might be used. I assume that the intervention was successful and that the target was channeled away from the path that they had previously embarked on.

These are the major elements in the Strategy. The primary institutions which

institutionalise these agreements are the Schengen agreement, the European police agency Europol which now has an operational capacity as well as acting as a clearing house, Eurojust, which facilitates the exchange of information between the courts and the judiciary, and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training CEPOL, which is headquartered in Budapest and which trains EU police officers and prosecutors on some counter-terrorism operational aspects, such as using the internet to access terrorist groups’ messaging.

At the EU Foreign Affairs Council meeting in February 2015, counter-terrorism was

fully mainstreamed into EU foreign policy.13

European and U.S. Counter-Terrorism Strategies 4

The counter-terrorism strategy is effective and it is only the failures that we hear about, but bilateral relationships between states’ law enforcement and security agencies are regarded by many officials as more productive than multilateral arrangements. The former head of UK counter terrorism, Richard Walton, published a paper recently repeating the message he conveyed at the 2016 World Summit against Terrorism at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) in Israel. There he stressed the value of bilateral relationships. Stationing police officers in other states’ police headquarters facilitates and enhances immediate and direct communications. Therefore, many EU states, and the US, send representatives to other states, and to Europol and Interpol. They can shortcut the multilateral arrangements and in many ways produce more immediate results because of personal rapport and understanding between services.14

The problems and the mistakes that do occur appear to be when information is not

passed on fast enough, or because the sheer volume overwhelms services’ capacities. In the UK there 20,000 suspects engaged in extremist activity, of whom approximately 3,000 are regarded as potential terrorists and who are under some level of investigation. Additionally, another 800 people went as volunteers to ISIS in Syria and Iraq. A number have come back, but not all are potential terrorists, and some may regard their commitment as over and wish to return to normal life. Nevertheless, there are several thousand people who are potentially engaged, or likely to be engaged, in terrorism. This represents a prioritisation problem for security and police services. Surveillance on an individual suspect might require the full- time commitment of 20 to 30 persons. Sometimes the authorities fail in their priorities, and that may have happened in recent months.

At the aforementioned ICT conference, the head of counter terrorism at the

Bundesnachrichtendienst (German Federal Intelligence Service) spoke about the continuing ISIS threat to European states from returning jihad volunteers and from locally radicalized potential terrorists. His and other services believe that the threats to at least six European states are immediate and continuing and that the prospects for Europe are alarming.15

Now some words about the recent attacks in the UK. My organization, Community

Security Trust, has close connections with the British police. We have received warnings for the past two or more years from them to maintain our guard. The UK government has followed through effectively, and provides funds for us to enhance the security of our Jewish institutions, and we are now also asked to advise other faith communities who may be at risk. For example, we have run workshops and training for churches in the wake of the ISIS inspired attack on the Catholic priest in France and churches in the Far East, as well as for members of mainstream Mosques and Hindu temples. With 30 years’ experience in researching terror threats and the operational security

experience thus gained, we are happy to assist others beyond our own community. The attack on Westminster Bridge and outside the Palace of Westminster on 22nd of

March 2017 by Khalid Masood was similar to recent Islamist terrorist attacks across Europe; a hostile vehicle attack followed by a knife attack. This is specifically promoted in ISIS online journals, Dabiq and Rumiyah, and the following day ISIA claimed he was a one of their volunteers via their online Amaq News Agency.16 Masood was initially thought to be lone operator, but the ensuing police investigation has led to 11 arrests of potential collaborators. I would suggest that very few terrorist attacks in Europe today

5 European and U.S. Counter-Terrorism Strategies

are carried out by lone operators.17 Investigations can take years to complete and almost always reveal connections, either online or organizational, with ISIS, al Qaeda or other terrorist groups. The senior investigator of the 2012 Toulouse and Montauban attacks carried out by Mohammed Merah, addressing a meeting of police and Jewish representatives in November 2016 in Toulouse, stated that he had at first believed Merah to be a lone operator but that in the ensuing investigations he had established that Merah had travelled extensively in Afghanistan and the Middle East and had been in touch with others there regarding his planned attacks. He noted that it was taking years to trace these connections.

The bombing of the Manchester Arena on 22nd May by Salman Abedi, was again

thought to be by a lone operator, but his sophisticated attack could not have been carried out without assistance. In his case, it is now thought probable that he had returned to Libya where his family originated to receive training from one of the ISIS offshoots that now operate there, and on 23rd May they claimed responsibility for the attack via the Telegram messaging app. Abedi had been considered suspicious because of his family’s Muslim Brotherhood connections. Again, not truly a lone operator.

The London Bridge attack on 27th May was carried out by three men who had

connections with al-Muhajiroun, an extreme Islamist group that is banned and which has been a crucial instrument in radicalizing young Muslims who become terrorists. At least one of them, Khuram Butt, was an al-Muhajiroun activist, who was featured on the Channel 4 TV documentary two years ago. Allegedly the police had been warned about him by moderate Muslims on several occasions.18 A second member of the group, Youssef Zagbha, of Moroccan Italian origin was considered a potential terrorist by the Italian police when they had prevented him from travelling to Syria. They have claimed that they had reported their suspicions to the British authorities via the Schengen agreement. The third terrorist, Rachid Redouane, had been excluded from the UK some years ago, but had travelled to Ireland where he had married a British woman thereby enabling him to subsequently enter the UK. So all three members of this group had previous involvement with violent extremism that the authorities had been aware of. But they had failed to maintain their surveillance.

In conclusion, the threat of terrorism in Europe is a continuing one and as a

consequence the European institutions have had to redefine their missions and enhance their counter-terrorist capabilities. They also need to engage more effectively with civil society in order to gain information from affected and threatened communities, and to counter radicalization. Terrorism can only be defeated by effective and sustained counter-terrorism strategies which involve society as a whole.

1 European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), Council of Europe, accessed 16 June 2017. http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/default_en.asp. 2 Community Security Trust, London, accessed 16 June 2017. https://cst.org.uk/. 3 “Understanding Anti-Semitic Hate Crimes and Addressing the Security Needs of Jewish Communities – A Practical Guide.” Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Warsaw, 2017, accessed 16 June 2017. http://www.osce.org/odihr/317166?download=true. 4 “Declaration on Combating Terrorism.” Council of the European Union, Brussels, 25 March 2004, accessed 16 June 2017. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/DECL-25.3.pdf.

European and U.S. Counter-Terrorism Strategies 6

5 “Counter-Terrorism Coordinator.” Office of the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Brussels, 19 September 2007, accessed 16 June 2017. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/counter-terrorism-coordinator/. 6 “The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy.” Council of the European Union, Brussels, 30 November 2005, accessed 16 June 2017. http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2014469%202005%20REV%204 7 “Response to foreign terrorist fighters and recent terrorist attacks in Europe.” Council of the European Union, Brussels, December 2015, accessed 16 June 2017. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/foreign-fighters/. 8 “Informal meeting of the Heads of State or Government Brussels, 12 February 2015 - Statement by the members of the European Council.” Council of the European Union, Brussels, 12 February 2015, accessed 16 June 2017. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/02/150212-european-council-statement-fight-against-terrorism/. 9 “State of play on implementation of the statement of the Members of the European Council of 12

February 2015, the JHA Council Conclusions of 20 November 2015, and the Conclusions of the European Council of 18 December 2015.” Council of the European Union, Brussels, 4 March 2016, accessed 16

June 2017. http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6785-2016-INIT/en/pdf. 10 See for example: Braw, Elisabeth. “Inside Denmark’s Radical Jihadist Rehabilitation Programme.” Newsweek, 17 October 2014, accessed 16 June 2017. http://psy.au.dk/fileadmin/Psykologi/Forskning/Preben_Bertelsen/Avisartikler_radikalisering/Newsweek_20141017.pdf; Veldhuis, Tinka and Jorgen Staun. “Islamist Radicalisation: A Root Cause Model.” Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, The Hague, October 2009, accessed 16 June 2017. https://www.diis.dk/files/media/publications/import/islamist_radicalisation.veldhuis_and_staun.pdf; “Strong Cities Network Global Summit 2017.” City of Aarhus, accessed 16 June 2017. https://www.aarhus.dk/sitecore/content/Subsites/Antiradikaliseringsindsats/Home/English/International-conference-2017.aspx?sc_lang=da. 11 “Prevent Duty Guidance.” Home Office, London, 23 March 2015, accessed 16 June 2017. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-duty-guidance. 12 “Channel Guidance.” Home Office, London, 23 October 2012, accessed 16 June 2017. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/channel-guidance. 13 “Outcome of the Council Meeting, Foreign Affairs.” Council of the European Union, Brussels, 9 February 2017, accessed 16 June 2017. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2015/02/09/ 14 Walton, Richard. “The Importance of Bilateral Collaboration in International Counter-Terrorism Investigations.” Policy Exchange, 30 May 2017, accessed 16 June 2017. https://policyexchange.org.uk/the-importance-of-bi-lateral-collaboration-in-international-counter-

terrorism-investigations. 15 “Europe and North America: Lessons Learned from Recent Attacks.” Friedrich Grommes at the World Summit on Counter-Terrorism, International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Israel, 14 September 2016, accessed 16 June 2017. https://www.ict.org.il/Article/1809/europe-and-north-america-lessons-learned-from-recent-attacks-ict16. 16 “Source to Agency: The attacker yesterday in front of the British parliament in London was a soldier of the Islamic State, executing the operation in response to calls to target citizens of coalition nations.” Amaq Agency, 23 March 2017. 17 For additional comment, see for example, “Lone Wolves No More: The Decline of a Myth,” Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Foreign Affairs, Council on Foreign Relations, 27 March 2017. 18 Whine, Michael. “Will the ban on the Al Muhajiroun successor groups work?” International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 8 August 2006, accessed 16 June 2017.

https://www.ict.org.il/Article/954/Will%20the%20ban%20on%20the%20Al%20Muhajiroun%20successor%20groups%20work.

Erik Brattberg Director, Europe Program and a Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International

Peace

I am really delighted to be here and to be back here. I started my career in research working with Dr. Alexander over a decade ago. So it is really tremendously an honor for me to be back. That was an impetus for me pursuing research on international security, so really an honor to be here. I think Michael covered a lot of ground in terms of the evolution and origins of EU counter-terrorism strategy, which I was planning to talk about. But I think I will, instead of repeating his excellent overview, I think I will focus on two things. And I will keep it very brief so that we can have a conversation on it.

I think first of all, Michael talked a lot about counter-terrorism cooperation within

the European Union, which is obviously hugely important, but I think there is another

element, which is also the EU’s and European countries’ efforts to promote counterterrorism strategies in foreign countries outside of Europe. So I will just start and say a few words on that. And this is obviously an activity that sort of corresponds with the evolution of the EU’s internal counter-terrorism strategies.

Post 9/11, we have seen the European Union, both in terms of the EU institutions

but also obviously individual member states, increasingly including counter-terrorism as part of broader stabilization and assistance efforts. Primarily or particularly in Europe’s southern neighborhood and sort of the regions surrounding Europe, but also going beyond in places like Pakistan. So we have seen external assistance in terms of counter-terrorism covering areas such as justice, human rights, law enforcement, but also education, media, transportation, and so forth. And the type of activities that the EU has been involved include judicial capacity building, obviously police and law enforcement assistance, border management. The EU’s own CSDP tool has not really been used for counter-terrorism purposes, but it certainly could have an application there. We have also seen increasingly in the EU’s political dialogue with referred states that counter-terrorism has increasingly over the past decade become part of the agenda. It is one of the topics that are being talked about. And, of course, we have also seen the EU adopting counter-terrorism clauses very much along the lines of the UN’s legal framework for counter-terrorism as part of its external work, as well. And also including sanctions in its relations for referred countries. So it has been this evolution, if you will, of the EU as a global counter-terrorism actor.

In addition to that, as I mentioned, of course you have individual EU member states

that also have a focus on counter-terrorism in its relations with other countries. Sometimes at odds perhaps with what the European Union is doing, sometimes as a compliment to what the EU is doing. Certainly European countries with deep historical ties or colonial ties to certain countries, such as in North Africa, are able to utilize those relationships in promoting counter-terrorism work. I think I mentioned Pakistan; the UK, in particular, has been very active in Pakistan over the years. So this is another aspect of Europe’s effort to promote counter-terrorism vis-à-vis referred states.

Because we are here also talking about transatlantic cooperation, I will just say a

few words about that. I think sort of at the same time you will see the evolution of the EU as a counterterrorism actor both within Europe and externally. You have obviously seen much closer cooperation over the years between the EU and the United States on

European and U.S. Counter-Terrorism Strategies 8

counterterrorism. Things like the passenger name records, for instance, and things like the container security initiative; that is sort of about border security. You have seen cooperation on SWIFT and trying to counter terrorist financing, information sharing.

So there has been this evolution of EU-U.S. counter-terrorism as well that I think is

very important to highlight. Not always easy, not always straightforward, but nevertheless a very important aspect. And also, cooperation between Europol and Eurojust and its U.S. equivalents. And I am sure Ralf can talk more about these sorts of things.

In addition to this and going back again to the EU’s external work, I do think it is

important to also mention the role of military in countering terrorism. I think here I would argue that you all have seen, especially in more recent years, a convergence perhaps of U.S. and European approaches. Where the U.S traditionally has been more comfortable with sort of applying military tools for counter-terrorism purposes, whereas European’s have traditionally focused on some of these more if you will soft power efforts that have I have outlined. But I think there has been a growing appreciation in at least some European capitals about the applicability of military tools also for counterterrorism purposes. And certainly over the past few years we seen several European countries being willing to contribute to the counter-ISIL coalition in Syria and Iraq but also more broadly being able to carry out training and assistance, security sector reform to improve the local counter-terrorism capacity also for the local military in foreign states. So that is an important aspect as well.

I did want to also comment briefly because General [Gray] also brought up NATO

and the role of NATO. So that is another aspect that I just want to highlight. Obviously NATO was not designed or created to deal with counter-terrorism. It is still not the primary focus. However, if you read NATO strategic documents, terrorism has been part of the conversation going back to the 1990s if you look at NATO’s strategic concepts. Obviously post 9/11 and the ISAF mission in Afghanistan and while not focused primarily on terrorism it has increased the sentiment that this should be one of the aspects that NATO should deal with. Especially in both using intelligence sharing to use NATO as a platform and a vehicle for counter-terrorism work internally but also as NATO’s broader global commitment. I know that Dr. Alexander has also edited a book on NATO’s global security role.

I think there is an expectation from the new Trump Administration that NATO should

take on a larger counter-terrorism role. We saw this at the NATO summit in Brussel’s recently, statements about NATO stepping up its role in counter-terrorism, joining officially the counter-ISIL coalition not to directly carry out strikes but to be part of the coalition and contribute in other ways. I think this is going to be an ongoing conversation

to what extent NATO will be able to do more on counter-terrorism, especially in Europe’s immediate neighborhood. Already it is doing quite a lot in terms of the things that I mentioned earlier: technical assistance, security training, support and so on and so forth. But I think there is going to be a growing demand and I think this also where you will maybe will see differences not only between U.S. expectations and Europe but also within Europe. Certain member states that are exposed to terrorism. Some of the states that have unfortunately had terrorist attacks in recent months and years are maybe more prone to the idea of using NATO as a vehicle and a tool for addressing this challenge whereas other states, maybe primarily Central and Eastern European states,

9 European and U.S. Counter-Terrorism Strategies

would like to sort of maintain the focus on more traditional defense, territorial defense against Russia rather deviating into counter-terrorism.

So I think this is very much going to be an ongoing conversation within Europe but

also across the Atlantic that I think we will continue to watch. But I do think the expectations from the new U.S. administration is that this is an area where they would like to see a bigger role for NATO going forward.

Academic Centers

Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies (IUCTS)

Established in 1994, the activities of IUCTS are guided by an International Research Council that offers recommendations for

study on different aspects of terrorism, both conventional and unconventional. IUCTS is cooperating academically with

universities and think tanks in over 40 countries, as well as with governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental bodies.

International Center for Terrorism Studies (ICTS)

Established in 1998 by the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, in Arlington, VA, ICTS administers IUCTS activities and

sponsors an internship program in terrorism studies.

Inter-University Center for Legal Studies (IUCLS)

Established in 1999 and located at the International Law Institute in Washington, D.C., IUCLS conducts seminars and research

on legal aspects of terrorism and administers training for law students.

International Advisory and Research Council Honorary Chairman

Prof. Edward Teller * Hoover Institution

Prof. A. Abou-el Wafa Cairo University Prof. Asher Maoz Tel Aviv University

Prof. Jayantha W. Atukorala Sri Lanka Prof. Serio Marchisio Instituto di Studi Giuridcic sulla

Prof. Paolo Benvenuti Universita Di Firenze Communita Inernazionale

Prof. Edgar Brenner * Inter-University Center for Legal Studies Prof. Dr. Herman Matthijis Free University Brussels

Prof. Ian Brownlie Oxford University Prof. Jerzy Menkes Poland

Prof. Abdelkader Larbi Chaht Universite D-Oran-Es-Senia Prof. Eric Moonman City University of London

Prof. Mario Chiavario Universita Degli Studie Di Torino Prof. Yuval Ne’eman * Tel Aviv University

Prof. Irwin Cotler McGill University Prof. Michael Noone The Catholic University of America

Prof. Horst Fischer Ruhr University Prof. William Olson National Defense University

Prof. Andreas Follesdal University of Oslo Prof. V.A. Parandiker Centre for Policy Research

Prof. Gideon Frieder The George Washington University Prof. Paul Rogers University of Bradford

Prof. Lauri Hannikaninen University of Turku, Finland Prof. Beate Rudolf Heinrich Heine University

Prof. Hanspeter Heuhold Austrian Institute of International Affairs Prof. Kingsley De Silva International Center for Ethnic Studies

Prof. Ivo Josipovic University of Zagreb Prof. Paul Tavernier Paris-Sud University

Prof. Christopher C. Joyner * Georgetown University Prof. B. Tusruki University of Tokyo

Prof. Tanel Kerkmae Tartu University, Estonia Prof. Amechi Uchegbu University of Lagos

Prof. Borhan Uddin Khan University of Dhaka Prof. Richard Ward The University of Illinois at Chicago

Prof. Walter Laqueur CSIS Prof. Yong Zhang Nankai University, China

Francisco Jose Paco Llera Universidad del Pais Vasco *Deceased

Director Professor Yonah Alexander

Senior Staff Sharon Layani Patrick Murphy

Lisa Winton

Senior Advisors Michael S. Swetnam

CEO and Chairman, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies

Professor Don Wallace, Jr.

Chairman, International Law Institute

Technical Advisors Mary Ann Culver

Alex Taliesen

Summer 2017 Internship Program

Slavina “Sally” Ancheva Stetson University Michael Keen Emory University

Zachary Fesen Wichita State University Elizabeth Morgan University of Maryland

Jillian Goldberg University of Michigan Nicholas Pagel Harvard University Alexandra Hain University of Virginia Isaac Shorser American University

Nicole Heitsenrether Georgetown University Chelsea Thorpe University of Georgia

Please contact the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 901 North Stuart Street, Suite 200,

Arlington, VA 22203. Tel.: 703-525-0770 Email: yalexander@potomacinstitute.org, ICTS@potomacinstitute.org