Euree Song - Plotinus on the World-Maker

7/28/2019 Euree Song - Plotinus on the World-Maker

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Plotinus on the World-Maker

Euree Song

This article aims to explore Plotinus concept o the world-maker, which plays a

pivotal role in his anti-Gnostic controversy and his demythologizing reading o Platos

Timaeus. It attempts to elucidate how Plotinus interprets Platos mythical fgure o theDemiurge, the divine Cratsman, and in what way he incorporates this interpretation

into his cosmology. It is shown that Plotinus provides us with a threeold world-maker

o Intelligence, Reason, and Nature, mirroring a three-leveled activity otheria,

praxis, andpoisis, although he reserves the title Demiurge or divine Intelligence. It

is also clarifed how Plotinus adapts and integrates the Aristotelian Intelligence, the

Platonic World-Soul, and the Stoic Nature into his own concept o world-maker.

In Plotinus conception of emanation, according to which the world ows

out from Soul and Soul in turn flows from Intelligence and Intelligence

from the One, there seems to be no place for Platos Demiurge, a

divine Craftsman who fashions the world out of given materials after a

preestablished model.1 Should the world not be made at all, there wouldbe no world-maker. In fact, in Plotinus monistic approach to the origin

of the world, the outowing principle of all things, the One or the Good,

eclipses the demiurgic god inherited from Plato. Besides, Plotinus rejectsthe artisanal image of a calculating, contriving, and toiling god. Has, then,

the gure of Demiurge become in Plotinus Neoplatonism just a vestigial

organ in the body of Platonic thought,2 or, even worse, a troubling

swelling only to be got rid of? However, in PlotinusEnneads, the Demiurge

1 The systematic problem of an artisanal production of the world in Plotinusphilosophy has been observed and discussed by OMeara, Gnosticism, 36872; OMeara,

Plotinus, 7276; and Opsomer, Craftsman, 6869.2

Gerson,Plotinus, 56.

2012 by the Institute of Humanities, Seoul National University

June 2012 | pp. 81-102 vol.

3,no.

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82 HORIZONS, vol. 3, no. 1 (2012)

does not lead a mere shadowy existence. Remarkably, he emerges in

Plotinus anti-Gnostic controversy as the main gure. Plotinus vehemently

attacks the Gnostic false Demiurge who is supposed to be a bad andignorant world-maker, and reproaches the Gnostics for misunderstanding

and abusing Platos conception of world-making.

In this article, I attempt to elucidate how Plotinus interprets Platos

conception of world-making, including the Demiurge and in what way

he incorporates this interpretation in his own vision of the world. First,

I briefly present Plotinus critique of the Gnostic myth of the world-

maker, while trying to discern assumptions underlying his critique. I then

undertake to uncover the identity of the true Demiurge conceived byPlotinus and to explore how the Plotinian Demiurge makes the world.

Next, I take into account the World-Soul, to which a demiurgic function

is assigned, whereby its two powers, Reason and Nature, turn out to be

responsible for the cosmic politics and economy. Finally, it is shown that

Plotinus provides us with a threefold world-maker of Intelligence, Reason

and Nature, mirroring a three-leveled activity of theria,praxis andpoisis,although he reserves the title Demiurge for divine Intelligence.

1. Myths of the World-Maker

In his Vita Plotini (Life of Plotinus; hereafter VP), Porphyry tells us that inPlotinus time (the third century CE) there were many Christians sectarians

who deceived themselves and, deceiving others, alleged that Plato had not

penetrated to the depth of intelligible reality (VP 16), which led Plotinus

to write an ardent polemic entitled Against the Gnostics.3

In the middle ofthe controversy stands a divine Craftsman (dmiourgos) who gures as theworld-maker in Platos Timaeus and subsequently in numerous Gnosticmyths, as another title of the previously mentioned work indicates, namely,

Against Those Who Say that the Universe and Its Craftsman Are Bad (VP 24).According to the Gnostic myth that Plotinus confronts in this treatise,

3Enn. II 9 [33] (= Book 9 of the second Ennead, chronologically the 33th treatise). As

Harder convincingly argues in his article Eine neue Schrift Plotins, this treatise is partof the so-called GrossschriftembracingEnn. III 8 [30], V 8 [31], V 5 [32], and II 9 [33].For a detailed study on the Gnostics in the Life of Plotinus, see Puech, Plotin, andTardieu, Les gnostiques.


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Song | Plotinus on the World-Maker 83

the universe is in fact a bad product fashioned by an ignorant Demiurge,

or a fallen demiurgic soul.4 Plotinus, being a faithful Platonist, endeavors

to defend the goodness of our universe and that of its Craftsman, asproclaimed in Platos Timaeus. He criticizes the Gnostics, claiming thatthey do not know who Platos Craftsman is. In addition, he accuses

them of falsifying (katapseudontai) Platos account of the world-crafting(dmiourgia) and, further, of debasing Platos thought as if they hadunderstood the intelligible nature but he had not (VP 16). Thus not onlythe orthodoxy of Platonism but also the authority of the Master are at

stake. How, then, does Plotinus interpret Platos story about the world-

making to rehabilitate his Master? Who is the divine Craftsman accordingto his interpretation? And how does he craft the world?

To answer these questions, it is useful to consider basic features of the

false Craftsman that Plotinus singles out for criticism. First of all, Plotinus

disapproves of the notion of a discursively thinking (dianooumenon)Demiurge. Hence there is no room for the Demiurge to plan or deliberate

about what he is going to do.5 Related to this, he excludes any purposeful

or intentional action of the Demiurge. For this reason, he ridicules the

idea that the Demiurge crafted the world in order to be honored, therebycontending that the Gnostics simply transfer to the divine Craftsman

what is true of human craftsmen such as sculptors.6 Likewise, he declines

to ascribe to the demiurgic god moral failure, repentance, vainglory,

arrogance, and all those emotions that are all too human. In general, he

does not allow any change in the divine nature of the Demiurge, let alone

human caprice.

Plotinus worry about the capricious Demiurge seems to be fueled by

the fact that it does not t into his concept of the eternal world. In fact, hedoes not agree with people assuming a beginning of that which always

is, namely, a temporal beginning of the world.7 From this perspective,

he challenges the Gnostic doctrine of the fallen demiurgic soul, according

to which a soul made the world as the result of her fall. He asks: But

4Enn. II 9 [33] ch. 4 & 10-12.5

Enn. II 9 [33] 6.1924. The textual basis of the Gnostic notion of a discursively thinkingDemiurge is Platos Timaeus 39e79.6Enn. II 9 [33] 4.14; 11.22.

7Enn. II 9 [33] 8.15.


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when did it fall? If it was from eternity, it remains fallen according to their

account. If it began to fall, why did it not begin before?8

Given the eternity of the world, it is surely idle to ask why the divineCraftsman made the world, as if he had at some point changed his mind

and decided to make the world. But it seems also dicult to make sense

of world-making. How can something eternal be made? Plotinus conceptof the eternal world, along with his anti-anthropomorphic theology, show

that he does not take Platos tale literally and sides with the interpreters

advocating a metaphorical or allegorical reading of the Timaeus.9 Plotinusexplicitly says that Platos mythical exposition in the Timaeus generates

and makes the things which exist in the nature of the whole, bringing outin succession for purposes of demonstration (eis deixin) what are alwayscoming into being and always existing there.10 Here it is worth mentioning

his characterization of the function of mythic narrative:

But myths, if they are really going to be myths, must separate in time thethings of which they tell, and set apart from each other many realities

which are together, but distinct in rank and powers . . . ; the myths, when

they have taughtus as well as they can, allow the man who has understoodthem to put together again that which they have separated.11

This passage suggests that the narrative form of myth is a tool for

teaching (didaskalias charin), to use Xenocrates formulation,12 namely,a teaching tool serving to explicate a complex hierarchical relation of

things. From this view of myth, it results for Plotinus are that Platos story

about the world-making is a pedagogicaldeviceto illustrate the principles

which allow us to understand the make-up of our world, and which,

once properly demythologized, provide us with a cosmology explaining

the perpetual order of the universe.13 Yet how far should the story be

8Enn. II 9 [33] 4.67.9

Since Antiquity, interpreters have been divided over how far to take the myth literallyor allegorically. For the controversy between a literal and metaphorical reading of theTimaeus, see Zeyl, Timaeus, xxxxiv; Brisson,Le Mme et lautre, 71106.10Enn. IV 8 [6] 4.4042.11

Enn. III 5 [50] 9.2429. The translations ofEnn. are Armstrongs throughout, withslight modications if needed. The italics are mine.12

Xenocrates, frag. 154.8; 156.3.13 Xenocrates is reported to hold such a position. For Xenocrates interpretation on


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demythologized? Who or what is then the unmasked Demiurge? What role

does he play in Platonic cosmology as interpreted by Plotinus?

2. Demiurgic Intelligence

Before we plunge into the rough sea of PlotinusEnneads to nd the world-maker, lets begin with a brief sketch of the section of the Timaeus in whichthe divine Craftsman comes on the scene. Starting from the assumption

that everything that becomes must of necessity become by the agency of

some cause, Timaeus introduces our Craftsman as a cause (aition)14

ofbecoming of the universe (28a5b1).15 A little later he calls this demiurgic

cause the maker (poits) and father of the universe (28c34).Plato goes on to say, in a highly anthropomorphizing way, that this

world-maker was good and free from any grudge (phtonos) and wisheseverything to be like him (29e13). He then calls this benevolent world-

maker the god (ho theos)16 and declares that the god, wishing (boultheis)all to be good and nothing bad, as far as possible, brings the disorderly

mass to order (taxis), while thinking that this will be entirely better(30a26).

Unlike the Judeo-Christian-Islamic Creator God, the demiurgic god does

not make the world from nothing.17 He is given the stus to work on. And

he fashions the world after an intelligible model, namely, the complete

Animal (31b1). As a copy, our world is an animal, a living organism, too.18

The world is nally described as a product crafted by Intelligence (nous)

Platos Timaeus, see Baltes, , 1822.14 There has been much reluctance and hesitance to translate the term aition and itscognate aitia as cause. Basically, an aition/aitia is an answer to the question dia ti (why,by what). It is worth mentioning Chrysippus distinction between the aition, the itemblamed or held responsible for the happening, and the aitia, which is the explanationof the aition. Cf. M. Frede, Original Notion of Cause, 22223; Annas, Aristotle onInecient Causes, 313, 31923.15 Cf. Plato, Timaeus 29a6.16

A demiurgic god is mentioned also in Platos Politicus 273b1, Republic 530a6, and

Sophist265c4.17Cf. Galen,De usu partium II 154162. Cf. Sedley, Creationism, 24041.

18In this respect, it is no wonder that the maker of the world-animal is called father.

Here is a procreation model at work.


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(47e4), a product that is intelligently designed to manifest harmony,

beauty, and goodness.19

From this description, Platos divine Craftsman emerges as a cause(aition) responsible for the good order of the world. He represents a kindof principle explaining how the world is ordered for the good. Indeed,

he embodies a cause that is somehow productive of the world-order. In

this light, the Platonic world-maker turns out to be the maker of order

(kosmos). The world is, in turn, supposed to be a work of Intelligence. Thissuggests strongly that the divine Craftsman personies Intelligence as the

cause of the cosmic order.20

Now, an attentive reader of Plato can hardly overlook how thissort of Intelligence is prefigured in the Phaedo. In the well-knownautobiographical digression of the dialogue, Socrates tells of his abortive

expectation for the Anaxagorean Intelligence, which is claimed to be

the ordering principle (diakosmn) and cause of all things (97c14).He expects that Intelligence orders all things and puts each other one of

them where it is best for it to be (97c46). It is not so dicult to imagine

a perfectly intelligent agent, who manages to arrange and coordinate all

things to bring about the best possible outcome by virtue of his knowledgeof what is best.

It is important that Socrates links Intelligence to the choice (hairesis) ofwhat is best (99a5b1). This shows that the Intelligence that he envisages is

not only equipped with the knowledge of the good, but also motivated by

that knowledge. Hence, the Socratic or reformed Anaxagorean Intelligence,

conceived as the ordering cause of the world, operates intentionally,

pursuing a goal. As a consequence, the world ordered by such an ordering

cause exhibits a goal-directed structure.21

What Socrates needs is anordering cause tting the teleological world-order. Such a cause seems to

be found in the guise of the divine Craftsman.22

19 For an underlying teleological conception of the world, see D. Frede, PhilosophicalEconomy, 5455.20

For this interpretation, see Halfwassen, Demiurg; Menn, Plato on God as Nous;Kark, Que fait et qui est le dmiurge?21

Cf. Lennox, Platos Unnatural Teleology, 119 f.22

There are other interpretations on the identity of the Demiurge. For an overview ofancient and modern interpretations, see Kark,Beseelung, 13035; Brisson, Le Mme etlautre, 55106.


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It is, therefore, no accident that Plotinus identifies the true

Craftsman and maker of the universe with Intelligence.23 But what sort

of Intelligence? As we have seen in his anti-Gnostic polemic, Plotinusrefuses to attribute to the divine Craftsman any purposeful activity.

He also excludes discursive thinking. Nonetheless, he holds that the

Craftsman is an ordering principle (to kosmoun) of the world.24 Yet howcan a purposeless Intelligence order and arrange all things for the best?

What use is Intelligence, if not for thinking? Plotinus concept of the

demiurgic Intelligence seems to be in conflict with Platos conception of

the teleological world-order.

On closer inspection, however, it turns out that Plotinus is by no meanswilling to renounce Platos teleological vision of the world, although he

attempts to adjust it to his concept of the perfect intelligence, and to his

view of the eternal world with no temporal beginning and end. He sticks to

the overall goodness of the universe advocated by Plato.25 In support of his

Platonic teleology, he does not hesitate to use Aristotles teleological notion

that nature does nothing in vain.26

To be sure, Plotinus Intelligence does not think discursively, yet this

is not because it is short on intelligence but because it does not needto do so. Being a perfect intelligence, it already knows what it wants to

know.27 Intelligence is, therefore, above reasoning (logismos). Based on thisconcept of Intelligence, Plotinus claims that the arrangement of the world

by Intelligence is such that, if anyone could reason as well as possible, he

would be astonished to see that reasoning could not have found another

way to make it.28

Besides, Plotinus advances a concept of the intentional structure of the

world involving no actual intention of its maker.29

To make this plausible,

23Enn. V 9 [5] 3.2526.

24Enn. IV 4 [28] 10.13.25

Enn. IV 8 [6] 6.1618: For there was certainly nothing which hindered anythingwhatever from having a share in the nature of good, as far as each thing was able toparticipate in it.26Enn. IV 8 [6] 5.31; Cf.Enn. I 4 [46] 16.27.27

For the distinction between discursive and non-discursive thinking in Plotinus, seeEmilsson,Plotinus on Intellect, 176 .28

Enn. III 2 [47] 14.15.29 Cf. Aristotles natural teleology inPhysics II 8, 199b26 f.


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to Intelligence.33

It should be underlined that the word before (pro) is not to be taken

in a temporal sense. Plotinus explicitly states that Intelligence is beforethis cosmos not in the sense that is prior in time, but in the sense that it isprior in nature, and that the cause of the cosmos as a kind of archetype

and model, whereas the cosmos is an image of it and existing by means

of it and everlastingly coming into existence.34 The upshot is that divine

providence refers to a causal dependence of our cosmos upon its intelligible

archetype, the true and first cosmos.35 Plotinus justifies this concept

through his basic assumption of the eternity of the world.36

It is remarkable that Intelligence is introduced here as the model of theworld, rather than as an ordering agency. Plotinus treats Intelligence as a

paradigmatic cause responsible for the formal aspect of the sensible things.

This treatment can be explained by the fact that he identies Intelligence

with the Model. Yet the meaning of this identication still puzzles. Does

Plotinus thereby mean to replace Intelligence with the intelligible model,

or reduce the former to the latter so that the cause of the cosmos is only

intelligible, but not intelligent? Does he relinquish the idea of Intelligence

as the active agency as a consequence of the static notion of Intelligence?Lets take a closer look at Plotinus Intelligence standing still as a model.

Certainly, it stands motionless and changeless, but this does not mean that

it is entirely inactive. In reality, it is an active model leading an intellectual

life. It thinks and knows.37 It knows all the intelligible models inhabiting

the intelligible cosmos, i.e., Intelligence itself. In this way, it knows itself.

Thus, its self-knowledge implies the knowledge of the world, insofar as it

knows its intelligible principles. In conclusion, Plotinus Intelligence is not

33Enn. VI 8 [39] 17.1012. This concept is derived from an etymological analysis (as asort of wordplay).34

Enn. III 2 [47] 1.2226. In the Timaeus (28b3), the universe is given the name cosmos.35

Enn. III 2 [47] 1.2728.36Enn. III 2 [47] 1.1523: If, then, we said that after a certain time the cosmos, whichdid not previously exist, came into being, we should in our discussion lay down thatprovidence in the universe was the same as we said it was in partial things, a foreseeingand reasoning of God about how this universe might come into existence, and how

things might be as good as possible. But since we arm that this cosmos is everlastingand has never existed, we should be right and consistent in saying that providence forthe universe is its being according to Intelligence, and that Intelligence is before it.37Enn. III 2 [47] 1.31.


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at all reduced to an intelligible object but remains a full-edged intelligent

subject.

A further aspect of the Plotinian Intelligence deserves our attention. Itdedicates itself entirely to knowledge. Thus it stands still, absorbed in its

contemplation, and does nothing other. The allegedly inactive Intelligence

in Plotinus turns out to be a contemplative intelligence (nous thertikos)concentrating on its theoretical activity. In this connection, Plotinus

emphatically says that Intelligence cannotdo other things. He argues thatonly something which is not altogether in a good state can do somethingto improve its state. This implies that Intelligence already dwells in its best

state and has no reason to busy itself with other things. Plotinus praisessuch Intelligence as a blessed being (makarion): For altogether blessedbeings, it is alone enough to stay still in themselves and be what they are;

restless activity (polypragmonein) is unsafe for those who in it violentlymove themselves out of themselves.38

Despite his admiration of the contemplative life, Plotinus obviously does

not want his divine Intelligence to be an egoistic theorist. He attributes

to Intelligence a sort of benevolent power, which could not stand still as

if it had drawn a line around itself in selsh jealousy.39

This ungrudgingcharacter of Intelligence evokes Platos generous Demiurge in the Timaeus(29e13). Thus, Plotinus seems to maintain that Intelligence exercises

beneficial influence on the world. In the same vein, he says that our

beautiful world itself is a revelation (deixis) of the power and goodnessof its maker.40 But he is reluctant to ascribe toil and travail to his blessed

world-maker.41 Finally, he declares that Intelligence is blessed in such a

way that in not doing or making ( ) it accomplishes great

works and in remaining in itself makes no small things.42

Hence we are left with a paradox of the making without making of

the world-maker. The crucial question can be put as follows: How can

contemplative Intelligence be alsoproductive of the world-order? Concerningthis question, we have a famous precedent. Aristotles divine Intelligence

38Enn. III 2 [47] 1.4144.

39Enn. IV 8 [6] 6.1213.

40Enn. IV 8 [6] 6.2326.

41Enn. V 8 [31] 7.2425.

42Enn. III 2 [47] 1.4345.


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in Metaphysics is on the one hand a contemplating agent, and on theother a moving cause responsible for the world-order. Thus, the way in

which it moves the world might be instructive to us. It is well known thatthe Aristotelian Intelligence moves while being unmoved. This Unmoved

Mover moves the cosmos as the object of desire and the object of thought

(to orekton kai to noton:Metaphysics 1072a26).Indeed, Plotinus seems to take up this concept of the Unmoved Mover

when he presents Intelligence as an object of contemplation and emulation

for souls.43 Intelligence moves the world through the intermediary of souls,

particularly the soul of the world. Inspired by Intelligence and according to

the intelligible models that they see in Intelligence, souls order this world.In this way, Plotinus demiurgic God concedes the ordering task of the

world to souls as hisStellvertreter.44

3. The Kingly Rule of Soul

According to Plotinus, it belongs to the very nature of soul to govern and

care for the body.45

Hence not only the soul of the world,46

but also othersouls, of individuals, govern and care for bodily nature. But the care of the

particular soul for the particular body is subordinated to the universal care

of the World-Soul for the body of the world as a whole.47 Plotinus presents

the World-Soul as the ruling principle (to hgemonoun) of the world andcalls it Zeus.48 As the ruler of the world, the World-Soul sets all things in it

in order and administers and governs them.49

43 A similar approach is taken by Alcinous (Didaskalikos 10, 2). Cf. Dillon,Alcinous, 10203.44

Enn. V 8 [31] 13.45

Enn. III 2 [47] 7.2325. Plotinus refers inEnn. IV 3 [27] 7.12 toPhaedrus 246b6: Allsoul cares for all that is soulless.46 According to Plotinus, the World-Soul is also an individual soul. Cf. Enn. II 9 [33]18.1417; IV 3 [27] 1017.47

Enn. III 3 [48] 2.3 f. Related to this, it is worth mentioning that Plotinus compares theWorld-Soul to the general in military commands giving the lead so that his subordinators

work in unity with him. For this image of the cosmic general, see also Aristotle,Metaphysics 1075a13 f.; pseudo-Aristotle,De mundo 399b3 f.48

Enn. IV 4 [28] 10.1517.49Enn. IV 4 [28] 9.1 . Cf.Phaedrus 24e46.


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In fact, Zeus stands in the Plotinian theology for the ordering principle

(to kosmoun), which turns out to be double, namely, the divine Craftsman

and the World-Soul.

50

In this connection, it is worth mentioning thatProclus ascribes to Plotinus a theory of double Demiurge, according to

which there is one Demiurge in the intelligible cosmos and another in this

cosmos. Proclus identifies the latter, i.e., the encosmic Demiruge, with

the ruler of the world.51 Since Plotinus reserves the title Demiurge for

divine intelligence that is identied with the intelligible cosmos, there is

no double Demiurge for Plotinus, but just one. Strictly speaking, Proclus is

wrong. But he seems to be on the right track. Indeed, the Plotinian World-

Soul, which corresponds to the encosmic ruler of the world in Proclusinterpretation, was assigned to exercise demiurgic functions and can,

therefore, be called Demiurge in a larger sense.

It is striking that Plotinus characterizes the care of the World-Soul as a

rule without act (apragmn), in contrast to the care of the particular soullaboring for itself (autourgos).52 He explains this difference between theuniversal care and the particular care by referring to the bodily condition.

While the particular body, due to its deciency, requires a great deal of

care from the soul, the body of the world, being perfect and self-sucient,just needs a brief command and stands under the royal supervision of

the World-Soul. Thus, the kingly rule of the World-Soul is without toil and

trouble.

This characterization of the rule of the World-Soul refers in my

interpretation to the kingly or political art discussed in PlatosStatesman(258e4261a1).53 Dividing knowledge and art (techn) into the practical

50Enn. IV 4 [28] 10.12. In Enn. IV 4 [28] 9.23; 10.1517, he identies Zeus with a

kingly soul and a kingly intelligence in PlatosPhilebus (30d12). He probably has theWorld-Soul and its intelligence in mind.51

Cf. Proclus, In Tim I, 305.1626: o ,

, , o

o o .[...]

o ,

o ,

o

o .

52Enn. IV 8 [6] 2.1229. Plotinus World-Soul evokes the god of the pseudo-Aristotelian

treatiseDe mundo, who does not take upon himself the toil of a creature that works andlabors for itself (397b1315). Cf. OMeara, Gnosticism, 367 n. 8; Opsomer, Demiurges,59.53 For this interpretation see my forthcoming article, The Ethics of Descent in Plotinus.


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and the cognitive part, and the latter in turn into the purely theoretical

(to kritikon) and the directive part (to epitaktikon), which involves

commanding and guiding actions, Plato classies kingship or statesmanshipas a directive art. The directive art is then described as an architectonic

art directing other arts and distinguished from a mere handicraft.54 Plato

finally defines the political art as an expertise that controls all of arts,

and laws, and cares for every aspect of things in the city, and weaves

everything together in the most correct way (305e26). Plotinus seems to

ascribe to the World-Soul exactly this kind of political expertise. Thus, it is

no accident that he takes up the weaver motif in the discussion of the ruler

of the world as follows:

But the reason of the universe is more like the reason which establishes the

order and law of a city, which knows already what the citizens are going

to do and why they are going to do it, and legislates with regard to all this,

and weaves together by means of laws all their experiences and arts and the

honor or dishonor that their acts merit, so that all that happens in the city

moves as if automatically into a harmonious order.55

In this passage, we encounter a crucial feature of the rule of the world. Itis by means of laws that the weaver of the universe produces a unied

political textile from all dierent strands in the city. Accordingly, the world

is not ruled by any arbitrary despot reigning over and above the law.

Rather, the ruler of the world is nothing other than a reason ordaining

and enforcing the law of the universe. This law-giving and law-guarding

reason rules the world not randomly, but according to established rational

principles. The law of the universe installs regularity in the course of things

and warrants thereby the stability of the structure of the world. Not onlythis. It ultimately serves to establish an overall harmonious order in the

world. We observe here a teleological approach still at work. The order of

the world is, thus, not the result of an accident or coincidence, although

one might have the impression that all things here occur automatically,56

54Aristotle uses the expression architectonic art in the Nicomachean Ethics (I, 2,

1904a2628) exactly to describe the political art. He equally makes the distinction

between an architect and a manual worker in the MetaphysicsA 981a30b2 and thePhysics II 194b17.55

Enn. IV 4 [28] 39.1117.56 For the concept of toautomaton, see Aristotle,Physics II 46. Cf. Sedley, Creationism,


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but a product of a rational plan or design, eternally revealed.

This concept of lawful ordering matches well with the aforementioned

notion of the universal care of the World-Soul. In the Plotinian worldconceived as a city of good laws, the divine ruler exerts no particular

care in the sense of intervening personally for particular persons. In this

connection, Plotinus clearly rejects the traditional concept of a divine

providence dispensed by arbitrary and manipulable gods, as is implicit

in the following passage: Here it would not be right for a god to ght in

person for the unwarlike; the law says that those who ght bravely, not

those who pray, are come safe out of wars; for, in just the same way, it

is not those who pray but those who care for (epimeloumenous) their landwho are to get in a harvest, and those who do not care for their health arenot to be healthy.57

There is a further important aspect of the lawful ordering of the world.

As quoted above, the reason of the world also weaves the honor and

dishonor that the citizens acts merit into its political fabric. This suggests

that the law of the universe operates with the principle of justice, a

principle which consists of giving to each according to merit (kat axian).58

This in turn implies that the order of the world established by the law ofthe universe is fundamentally moral.

In this connection, Plotinus resumes Platos assumption of the

transmigration of souls, referring to the decree of Adrasteia (the

Inescapable) in the Phaedrus (248c2), which is supposed to regulate thereincarnation of the soul by assigning to each soul its due body according

to its merits or demerits.59 According to this assumption, wrongdoers

eventually pay the penalty, if not in this life, then in the next. As an

immortal being, the soul has no escape from divine justice. In this respect,Plotinus says that this world-order is truly Adrasteia and truly Justice and

wonderful Wisdom, transferring three divine attributes to the order of

the world itself.60 In addition, he presents the world-order as a work of a

18694.57Enn. III 2 [47] 8.3640. For Plotinus conception of divine providence, see Song,Aufstieg, 11119.58

Cf. Plato, Defnitiones 411e2.59Enn. IV 8 [6] ch. 5; IV 3 [27] 24.611. Cf. Plato speaks of laws of fate in the Timaeus

(41e23).60Enn. III 2 [47] 13.1617.


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wonderful art (techn thaumast) and the making of the world-order as asort of wonder-making (thaumatourgia).61

Now, we should pay attention to the fact that Plotinus describes thiswonder-making of the divine law as something natural. He says that

the inevitable rule and justice are set in a natural principle (en physei)governing the incarnation of the soul.62 He then argues that there is no

need of anyone63 to send a particular soul into this or that particular body

at a particular time because the descent of the soul occurs in a natural way,

like the sprouting of beards or horns, as it were automatically.64

Furthermore, Plotinus holds that the law involving incarnation is not

merely imposed from outside, but rather is present in those beings subjectto it and works from within. He explains that the law makes itself a

sort of weight in them and implants a longing, a birth pang of desire to

come there where the law within them, as it were, calls them to come.65

According to this description, law mobilizes the internal impulse of souls so

that they accomplish the law themselves. Therefore, the law does not need

any external force (ischys) for its accomplishment.66

In Plotinus view, not merely incarnation but the government of the

world in general occurs naturally. He illuminatingly explains that thegovernor of the world does not governs the world like a doctor, who works

from outside and treats his patient part by part and is often perplexed and

deliberates what to do, but like nature working from inside, without need

of deliberation (bouleusis).67 Plotinus seems to take up the Aristoteliandistinction between craft and nature in the Physics (II 192b833).68According to Aristotle, in craft the moving cause is external to the

matter (as, for example, in medicine the doctor is external to his patient),

whereas nature is an internal moving cause. However, Aristotle does not

61Enn. III 2 [47] 13.20; 30.62

Enn. IV 3 [27] 13.12.63 Plotinus alludes to the Demiurge in the Timaeus, who is said to have sown theimmortal part of the human soul (41c8; 41e4; 42d46). Cf.Enn. IV 6 [8] 1.4647.64

Enn. IV 3 [27] 13.517.65Enn. IV 3 [27] 13.3032.66

Enn. IV 3 [27] 13.2526.67Enn. IV 4 [28] 11.12.

68For a detailed discussion of the distinction between craft and nature, see Sedley,

Creationism, 17681.


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96 HORIZONS, vol. 3, no. 1 (2012)

merely contrast craft with nature, but also points out that nature functions

analogously to craft. He draws attention to the special case of the self-

curing doctor and claims that nature is like him (199b3032).In fact, Plotinus regards the world as a single organism which as a

whole has a nature, i.e., an internal moving cause, while one nature

rules other natures. The governing principle of the world is internal to

the world.69 Thus, the government of the world can be conceived as a

natural process. Nevertheless, Plotinus does not deny the craftsmanship of

the governor of the world, although divine craft is not to be understood

in terms of familiar human craft. To be sure, the governor of the world,

unlike a human governor, does not deliberate. This, however, does notmean that the divine governor lacks craft or rationality. Indeed, the

governor of the world is a reason, namely, a perfect reason, which does

not need deliberation because it already knows. Plotinus ascribes to the

world-reason practical wisdom (phronsis).70 Under this aspect, the world-reason appears, I suggest, as a sort of practical intelligence (nous praktikos).Accordingly, the world-reason is fully master of the situation and in no way

in doubt and perplexity and, consequently, rules the world eortlessly.71

From this, Plotinus concludes that the government of the universe is noburden (dyskolon) for the governor of the world, as some have believed.72In this way, the world-reason produces the moral order of the world, and

in this sense is a world-maker.

4. The Craftsmanship of Nature

As we have seen, Plotinus assigns demiurgic functions to soul, notably tothe World-Soul and its reason, although he reserves the title Demiurge

for Intelligence. Now, the demiurgy of the World-Soul is not conned to

the government of the world; it also involves the production of the body.

The production of the world-body might be the rst thing associated with

69Enn. IV 4 [28] 10.1911; 25.70

Enn. IV 4 [28] 11.23.71Plotinus view ts the portrait of the World-Soul in the Timaeus, which leads a blissful

life (34b8; 36e4).72Enn. IV 4 [28] 12.3941. Plotinus seems to have Aristotle and the Epicureans in mind.


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the notion of world-making, but constitutes in Plotinus the last and lowest

level of world-making. This last demiurgic task is delegated to nature

(physis), which is identied with the forming power of the World-Soul orwith the lower soul of the world. Plotinus calls this nature the ultimatemaker (poits eschatos).73 To recapitulate, Plotinus provides us a three-leveled world-maker, Intelligence, Reason, and Nature, mirroring a three-

leveled activity, theria,praxis, andposis.74

With view to the question of how nature makes the world, it is of great

importance that Plotinus speaks of the crafting (dmiourgia) of nature.75With this, he credits nature with an inherent craft. Despite this notion of

crafting nature, he is reluctant to compare nature to an ordinary humancraftsman, as the following passage shows:

Well, then, it is clear, I suppose, to everyone that there are no hands or

feet, and no instrument either acquired or of natural growth, but there is

need of matter on which nature can work and which it forms (eneidopoiei).But we must also exclude levering (to mochleuein) from the natural making(ek ts physiks poises). For what kind of thrusting or levering canproduce this rich variety of colors and shapes of every kind? For the wax-

modelerspeople have actually looked at them and thought that naturescraftsmanship was like theirscannot make colors unless they bring colors

from elsewhere to the things they make.76

Plotinus rejection of the artisanal mode of world-making evokes the

Aristotelian and the Epicurean criticisms of the divine Craftsman in

Platos Timaeus.77 In De philosophia (fragment 18), Aristotle is reportedto have convicted of grave ungodliness those who thought that the great

visible god, i.e., the cosmos, is no better than the work of mans hands.The Epicurean spokesman in Ciceros De natura deorum (1.820) mocks

73Enn. II 3 [52] 18.15.

74 In my view, Plotinus is making use of Aristotles threefold division of human activityimplicated in his threefold division of science inMetaphysicsE1025b1828.75

Enn. III 8 [30] 2.78. Cf.Enn. V 8 [31] 2.31. Similarly, Plato advances the view thatthe so-called works of nature in reality come to be through a divine Craftsman (Sophist265c).76

Enn. III 8 [30] 2.19.77

The following discussion is much indebted to Baltes, , 2532; OMeara,Gnosticism, 36567. See also Armstrong,Plotinus III, 362 n. 2; Opsomer, Craftsman,89 n. 76; Runia, King, 98.


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98 HORIZONS, vol. 3, no. 1 (2012)

the Demiurge by asking, What tools and levers and derricks? and also

ridicules the idea that the world would almost have been made by hand.

The Epicurean gods are famously free from the burdens and toils of world-making. In these criticisms, Platos story is taken literally. Almost all the

Platonists, by contrast, and already Platos own pupils in the Academy,

refused such a literal approach.

Plotinus asserts that his Demiurge, namely, Intelligence, does not make

the world as craftsmen do now, using their hands and tools.78 He further

ascribes to his divine Craftsman an eortless craftsmanship.79 In his eort

to distance the divine Craftsman from our vulgar craftsmen, he goes so far

as to say that the world is made in every way after the manner of nature,rather than as the crafts make; for the crafts are later than nature and the

world.80 Yet he insists that nature itself crafts. What is, then, the point

of speaking of crafting nature, when natures craft is totally different

from our familiar craft? We can approach this question by searching for a

concept that can bind nature and craft together.

We can find, in fact, such a concept in Plotinus, namely, wisdom

(sophia). He states that some wisdom makes all the things which have

come into being, whether they are products of craft or nature, andeverywhere it is a wisdom which is in charge of their making.81 He is

suggesting that it is due to some wisdom that craft and nature both can

make things. From this perspective, he speaks of natural wisdom (sophiaphysik), that is, the wisdom responsible for natural production.82 He linksthis natural wisdom to the rational formative principle that lies in nature,

while alluding to the Stoic concept of seminal principles (spermatikoi logoi),a sort of blueprint of natural beings.83 From this we can infer that natural

wisdom refers to the inner rationality of nature working and developingfrom inside natural beings. This means that nature is a productive power

that is rationally and teleologically programmed, not a blind spontaneous

and fortuitous agency yielding outcomes by accident. As a result, the

78Enn. V 8 [31] 7.1012.79

Enn. V 8 [31] 7.25.80

Enn. II 9 [33], 12.1718. Cf. Alexander Aphrodisias,De anima 3.1516 Bruns.81

Enn. V 8 [31] 5.12.82

Enn. V 8 [31] 5.5.83Enn. V 8 [31] 5.911.


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physical world consists of things rationally designed, which in turn are

orchestrated from a global perspective. This is, in my view, the lesson of

the artisanal model of the world-making that Plotinus wants to preserve.Now, Plotinus claims that nature has its inner rationality or wisdom not

from itself, but from something dierent. Although it is a rational principle,

nature is, say, a vague vestige of other, clearer rational principles. Its

wisdom comes in the end from divine Intelligence, which is identified

with wisdom itself.84 This absolute wisdom is the original world-maker

in Plotinus. Hence this world is for Plotinus not a temporary appearance

resulting from the sudden fall ofSophia, as the Gnostics believe, but a

permanent manifestation of the eternal wisdom itself.In Plotinus non-literal reading of Platos Timaeus, the Demiurge is a

personicationor, more correctly, a deicationof wisdom manifested

in the order of the world, not only in the natural but also in the moral

order. Indeed, Plotinus assumes Intelligence as a transcendent cause

inspiring or informing the soul (in the function of reason or nature) in

making the world from inside. This connection between the transcendent

cause and the world through the immanent cause is the demythologized

meaning of divine providence. It is worth noticing that the transcendentand the immanent cause both are conceived as divine. No wonder

Plotinus connects the notion of divinity with the ideal of perfection. For

this reason, his divine Intelligence is far from a deliberating and toiling

handicraftsman, and his divine World-Soul rules and makes effortlessly

without itself laboring. More importantly, he holds that the perfect being is

productive, in giving and sharing the good.85

Despite his condence in the good upholding the world, Plotinus does

not overlook the imperfections or defects of the things and evils in variousforms haunting the world. In his theory of divine providence, he struggles

with this gloomy aspect of the world, in which he sees the reason the

Gnostics fabricated their myth of the bad world and its bad maker.86 In

defense of the providential order of the world and the lord of providence,

he appeals to an idea of cosmic dramaturgy, according to which the world

has a plan like the plot of a drama (dramtos logos) containing many battles

84Enn. V 8 [31] 4.39.

85This evokes the famous dictum bonum est diusivum sui.

86Enn. III 2 [47] 1.510.


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100 HORIZONS, vol. 3, no. 1 (2012)

in itself, although it is a beautiful work as a whole.87 Here, the world is

regarded as a poetical work (poima). In this way, the maker of the world

becomes a poet (poits).88

He also compares the world-order with theharmonious melody resulting from conicting sounds that all spring from

a single source.89 We can see here that Plotinus theory of providence

heavily relies on a poetic or artistic vision. This is probably because the

order of the world as a whole is not a subject accessible to human reason

without the aid of imagination.

Certainly, prudence teaches us that the realization of the good in the

world is a subject so elusive to our reason that it can be treated only in

the form of a myth and without any claim to truth.

90

But the love of truthdrives philosophers like Plotinus to demythologize the myth, in the hopethat the good of the world is not just a myth but a truth. In the same hope,

they not only interpret myths or metaphors, but also create. In this respect,

Plotinus also is a poet of the world, envisaging the good and beautiful

world despite all its shortcomings.

Kyung Hee University

KEYWORDS | cosmology, crat, Demiurge, Gnosticism, Intelligence, Nature, providence, teleology, wisdom,

world-maker

A Korean version o this article was presented at the Korean Society or Ancient Philosophy meeting

(Seoul, October 2011) and published in Chol Hak Sa Sang: Journal o Philosophical Ideas, no. 42 (2011):

336.

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Euree Song - Plotinus on the World-Maker