EU Youth Youth Activism in the Yemeni Civil War 2019Jan21 · • Opportunities for youth activism abounded in the transitional period after the 2011 uprising, although youth political

©2019YemenPollingCenter.Allrightsreserved.

2ndFloor,InfrontoftheCBY-Taizbranch,JamalSt.,Taiz,YemenPhone:00967-4-283764

Fax:00967-4-283765Email:[email protected]

www.yemenpolling.org

YouthActivismintheYemeniCivilWarInternetMitigatesEffectsofViolenceasLocalFactors

ShapeActivismScene

MareikeTransfeldFebruary2019

Contents

TheYemenPollingCenter...................................................................................1

Author................................................................................................................2

Acknowledgement.............................................................................................3

Abbreviations.....................................................................................................4

Graphs...............................................................................................................4

MainFindings.....................................................................................................5

ReportObjectives...............................................................................................6

LegacyoftheYemeniRevolt...............................................................................7

LocalDynamicsTakeCentreStage....................................................................11

Graph1:Whatisyourpositionwithinyourcommunity?........................14

Graph2:Whichgroupofpeopledoyouthinkisthemostimportantgrouptokeepinclosecontactwithwithinyourcommunity?...........................15

ResponsivenessofLocalLeaders......................................................................15

Graph3:Howofteninaweekdoyoumeetorspeakwithmembersofyourcommunitytounderstandtheiropinionandlivingsituation?.........18

ThreatsagainstYouthAdvocacyCompound.....................................................18

ConsequencesofEconomicCollapse................................................................23

SocialMedia:AChannelforAdvocacy?............................................................24

Graph4:Socialmediauseamongdecisionmakers..................................26

OnlineCampaigninginConflict.........................................................................27

Recommendations...........................................................................................29

References.......................................................................................................31

PolicyReport 1

YouthActivismintheYemeniCivilWar

February2019

TheYemenPollingCenterTheYemenPollingCenter(YPC)isanindependentorganizationprovidingsocialscienceresearchservices.TheYPCwasestablishedin2004asthefirstpollingcenterinYemen.WereceivedourregistrationcertificateNo.147fromtheMinistryofSocialAffairs&LaborinDecember2005.YPCisthe2010recipientoftheBestPartnerintheMiddleEastandNorthAfricaawardfromGallup International.We design and implement opinion polls, household andothersurveys,andprovideotherservicesthat fulfill researchneedsofnationalandinternational institutions, non-profit organizations, corporations, governmentagencies,andprofessionalassociations.YPCconductspublicattitudesurveys, focusgroups,interviews,demographicstudies,andmarketresearchemployingquantitativeand qualitativemethods for development projects, international organizations andfoundations,publications,businessgroups,andbanks.AsamemberoftheWorldAssociationforPublicOpinionResearchandtheAmericanAssociation for Public Opinion Research, YPC is committed to excellence in socialscience.Sinceitsinception,YPChasconducteddozensofresearchprojectsonissuesranging from satellite television and radio consumption patterns and consumerattitudes,tohumanrights,women‘srights,politicalreform,corruption,publichealth,andothergovernance-relatedstudies.In addition to public opinion surveys and research projects, YPC has implementedseveraleconomicssurveysandstudiescoveringallgovernoratesinYemen.Wehavesurveyed nearly 100,000 Yemeni citizens in face-to-face interviews. YPC has adedicated and experienced team. The center cooperates with dozens of experts,consultantsanduniversityprofessorswithinYemenandabroad.ThepersonnelandtechnicalresourcesatourdisposalallowustoconductsurveysofanysizeinYemenwhileadheringtointernationalstandardsindataquality.Yemenisareligiousandconservativesocietyandmale-femaleinteractionsarelimited.Aroundhalfofourenumeratorsarewomen,whichmakesiteasiertointerviewwomenrespondents.TheYPChasimplementedmanyinternationally-fundedprojects;ithascooperatedwiththeWorldBank,theUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgram,theU.S.NationalDemocraticInstituteforInternationalAffairs,theU.S.NationalEndowmentfor Democracy, the PanArab Research Center, the United States Agency forInternationalDevelopment,andtheYemeniMinistryofLocalAdministration.

PolicyReport 2


February2019

AuthorMareike Transfeld is a PhD candidate at theGraduate SchoolMuslimCultures andSocieties(BGSMCS),FreieUniversitätBerlin.SheiscurrentlyAssociateFellowattheCenterforAppliedResearchinPartnershipwiththeOrientinBonn,anduntil2015wasaResearchFellowattheGermanInstituteforInternationalandSecurityAffairs(SWP)inBerlin. Transfeldheaded theResearchDepartmentat YPCuntil 2014,where shemanaged the YemenParliamentWatch project (ypwatch.org), and the YPC’s youthprogram.Sheisaformerco-editorofMuftah’sYemenandGulfcountriespages.Contact:[email protected]

PolicyReport 3


February2019

AcknowledgementThisreportwaswrittenbyMareikeTransfeld,anindependentresearcher.TheYemenPollingCenterandtheYouthLobbyGroupsconductedtheresearch.TheauthorwouldliketothankKhaledYacoubOweisandL.E.Picard for theirvaluablecommentsandfeedback.ThereportwasdesignedbyAhmedSharjabi.TheEuropeanUnionfundedtheresearchandpublicationofthereport.

PolicyReport 4


February2019

Abbreviations NDC NationalDialogueConference SPC SupremePoliticalCouncilCSO CivilsocietyorganizationGPC GeneralPeople’sCongress

Graphs

Graph1 Whatisyourpositionwithinyourcommunity?

Graph2 Whichgroupofpeopledoyouthinkisthemostimportantgrouptokeepinclosecontactwithwithinyourcommunity?

Graph3 Howofteninaweekdoyoumeetorspeakwithmembersofyourcommunitytounderstandtheiropinionandlivingsituation?

Graph4 Socialmediauseamongdecisionmakers.

PolicyReport 5


February2019

MainFindings• TheconditionsforpoliticalactivismandadvocacyhavebecomeextremelydifficultinYemen.RestrictionsaremostsevereinareasunderHouthicontrol,wherethereispervasive surveillance and a crackdown on civil activism, academia, human rightsorganizations and themedia. Security threats are not limited to Houthi-controlledterritory,butarise fromanarrayofactors, in linewiththebreak-upof theYemenistate. The lack of security, deteriorating economy and loss of donor funding havecausedmanyyouthgroupstoceasetheirwork.• Opportunities for youth activism abounded in the transitional period after the2011 uprising, although youth political participation did not significantly increase.YemenipolicymakersbecamereceptivetotheideasofYemen’syounggeneration.Theinternationalcommunitysupportedyouthactivismwithfunding,training,networkingevents and travel opportunities.With the collapse of the political process in 2014,theseopportunitiesbegantodwindle.• Accesstosocialmediahasbluntedsomeoftherestrictionsonpoliticalactivismandadvocacyplacedbythearmedfactions.AsteadyproportionofyouthretainaccesstotheInternet.TheYPCsurveyfoundthatonethirdof15-to25-year-oldshaveaccessto the Internet. Crackdowns across the country have not stifled the Internet as asignificantpoliticaltool.Eighteenpercentof15-25-year-oldswithInternetaccessusethe Internet frequently todiscusspolitics. Thosewhodescribe themselvesasusingsocialmediaoccasionallyforpoliticalpurposesnumber28percent.• Inasurveyof300influential figures(mainlytribalsheikhs,militaryofficersandlocalcouncilrepresentatives),90percentsaidtheybelieveitisimportanttoconsiderthe opinion of their communities. Almost all of the 300 rely on social media forinformation.• ElevenpercentofyoungYemenisbetween15and25yearsoldsay theyare incontactwiththeircommunityleadersandhaverelayedtheirneedstothem.Forty-onepercentofthedecisionmakersfinditimportanttoconsidertheopinionsofyouth,butonlyfewmeetwithyouth.• Thewarreinforcedgendergaps.WomencontinuetolaginaccesstotheInternetand remainmoresidelinedwithin their communitieswhencompared to theirmalepeers.

PolicyReport 6


February2019

ReportObjectives

ThereportispartoftheprojectYouthVoicesinPolicy,whichtheYemenPollingCenter(YPC) ran from2015 to2017. Theprojectwas funded through theSharakaShababprogram of the Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Yemen. Theproject aimed to set up Youth Lobby Groups (YLG) at the community level and toinvolve them in policy debates. Realizing that communicationwas key, the projecthopedto link thesegroupsandtheir localandnational representatives tohighlightissuesdealingwithwomen’sandyouth’srights.In2013,whentheprojectwasinitiallydesigned,thetimeseemedripeinYementotrytotakearights-andinstitutions-basedapproach to push for better conditions for Yemeni youth. The new environment,however,withthedemiseofnational level institutions,madeadvocacy increasinglydifficult.Violenceruledthepoliticalsceneandthetransitionalprocessfailed.GiventhenewpoliticalconditionsinYemen,itwasunclearwhetheryouthadvocacywasstillpossible,howitcouldbesupportedandwhetherYemenipolicymakersvaluedthe opinion of community members at all. The goal of this report is to betterunderstandtheconditionsforyouthactivism.Tothisend,theYPCconductedasurveyof300local-leveldecisionmakersandinfluentialsocialandpoliticalfiguresfromacrossthe country in the July 2017. The objectivewas to determine how receptive thesefiguresweretotheircommunities’opinions.Many of the 300were tribal sheikhs, local councilmembers andmilitary or policeofficers.Weuseddatacollectedthrougharepresentativenationwidesurveyofyouth(implemented in May 2017) to assess how valued youth feel by their communityleaders andwhether andhow they are in contactwith them. The respondents arebetween the ages of 15 and 25; half female and halfmale. The youth surveywasconductedinmostofYemen’sgovernorates,exceptforSocotraandSaada,theHouthistronghold. The implementationof surveys has becomedifficult in Saada since theHouthisseizedpowerinthe2014coup.Thedecision-makersurveywasconductedin15 out of Yemen’s 22 governorates.1Further datawas collected in six focus groupdiscussionsheldinSanaa,Marib,Ibb,al-Hodeidah,al-Dhali’andAden,andinterviewswith72ofthe120membersoftheYLGsinthesamegovernorates.

1TheseareSanaacity,Taiz,Aden,Hadhramout,Ibb,Dhamar,Lahj,Amran,Hajjah,Al-Hodeidah,Rayma,Al-Dhale’,Al-Mahweet,AbyanandMarib.

PolicyReport 7


February2019

LegacyoftheYemeniRevolt

In2011,massesofyouthmostlyuntaintedbypoliticalaffiliationemergedasadrivingforcebehindthedemonstrationsdemandingtheendofthe33year-ruleofAliAbdullahSaleh. Hopes for a better future ran high, until young Yemenis found themselvesdisenfranchisedagain.2TheGulfCooperationCouncil’s (GCC) Initiative inNovember2011 defined a formal transition process for the country, marginalizing the‘independentyouth’whohad forcedchange throughnonviolence.Next to theGCCInitiative,thetraditionalpartieswiththeirdivide-and-rulestrategiesposedanobstacletoyouthpoliticalparticipation.3Nevertheless,thetransitionalperiodinitiatedwiththeGCC agreement provided some space for political involvement and advocacy. Thismarkedashort-livedbutimportantperiodinwhichyouthandcivilsocietyactivismhadatleastsometangibleimpactonpolitics.Youthactivismdidnotimpactgovernmentpolicytoimprovelivingconditionsacrossthecountry,andyouthparticipationdidnotincrease substantially. Yet it was a historic time for Yemeni youth towork towardpoliticalchangewithinthecomplex institutionalenvironmentthatYemen’spoliticalsystemprovided.4

Theroletheyouthhadplayedduringthe2011protestsandtheirimageasanagentfordemocraticchangemadepolicymakersreceptivetotheideasofyouthactivistsandrelativelyopentomeetingwiththem.AttheNationalDialogueConference(NDC)in2013-2014, youth accounted for 40 out of 565 delegates. 5 They contributed toconferencedebatesonthefuturestructureofthestateanddiscussedwaystoresolve

2AlaQasemlooksatthebarriersofyouthparticipationinpoliticalpartiesinthecontextofthetransitionalperiodinQasem,Ala(2013):Fivebarrierstoyouthengagement,decision-making,andleadershipinYemen’spoliticalparties;SaleemHaddadandJoshuaRogersanalyzeyouthparticipationduringthetransitionalperiodinHaddad,Saleem&Rogers, Joshua (2012): Moving beyond promises. Perceptions, priorities and participation of youth in Yemen’stransition.Saferworld;andAtiafAlwaziranalyzesyouthgroupsandtheirimpactonpoliticsduringthetransitionalperiod in Alwazir, Atiaf (2016):Yemen’s enduring resistance: youth between politics and informal mobilization,MediterraneanPolitics;alsoseeAlwazir,Atiaf (2013):Yemen’s IndependentYouthandTheirRole intheNationalDialogueConference.SWPComments2013/C23,forananalysisoftheindependentyouthmovementintheNDC.3Haddad,Saleem&Rogers,Joshua(2012):Movingbeyondpromises.Perceptions,prioritiesandparticipationofyouthinYemen’stransition.Saferworld,pg.15-17.4SeeAlwazir(2016)forexamplesofyouthactivismduringthetransitionalperiod.5SeeAlwazir,Atiaf(2013):Yemen’sIndependentYouthandTheirRoleintheNationalDialogueConference.SWPComments2013/C23.

PolicyReport 8


February2019

the multitude of problems plaguing the country. 6 Activists with connections tointernationalorganizationsandtoelitesthroughoutYemenroseinpoliticalstature.7

StreetArtGraffiti and street art developed since the 2011 uprising tobecome successful means for advocacy. In political messagesdisplayedinpublicspaces,decisionmakerswerenotthedirectaddressees;insteadthegoalwastoraisecommunityawarenessandtherebyincreasepressureonpoliticalelites.InaninterviewstreetartistMuradSubaydescribedhoweasyitwastomobilizeactivistsforhisstreetcampaignsduringthetransitionalperiod:“Itwasatimeofrevolution,peoplehadthefreedomtodothis.Itwasn’tevennecessaryformetogetapermit.Thischangedinphases.”According to Subay, the conditions for street-art activismbecame difficult before the war started, and fluctuated inrelationtothethemeoftheactivities,buttherewasstillsupporttobegarneredwithingovernmentinstitutions.“ThefirsttimeIneededapermitwasforthe2012graffiticampaign‘TheWallsRemember Their Faces,’ when trucks filled with soldiersapproachedustopreventthecampaign,”hesaid,referringtoaprojecthighlightingthethousandswhohadbeendisappearedinYemensincethe1960s.Theissueofthedisappearedwasadifficultoneforthesecurityapparatus to stomach,becauseof theirown involvement.Butwith support from other activists and the media as well asfamiliesofthedisappeared,Subaygotapermitfromthemayor

6TheNDCoutcomessaidYemenshould"takethenecessarymeasurestoachieveawideryouthparticipationinsocial,economic, cultural and political development of the country." Specifically, this entailed the establishment of anumber of institutions,which could have improved the lives of young Yemenis. Examples include the “SupremeCouncil forYouth,”whichwouldoverseeandsteerpublicpolicyonyouth issues.The“SkillsDevelopmentFund”wouldhavebeentaskedwithalleviatingunemployment.Moreoverandthestatewastomakeavailablefundsforyouthprojects,facilitateloansandensurethatYemenicitizensareprioritizedoverforeignnationalsintheprivatesectorandinstalla20percentquotaforyouthingovernmentbodies.7Mohammedal-Shami,civilsocietyactivist,interviewwiththeauthor(April2018).

PolicyReport 9


February2019

of Sanaa and pressed on with the campaign. 8 The campaignraised awareness on forced disappearances, and the mediaattentionhelpedmakeanimpact,withpressurereachingbothinternationalorganizationsandtheYemenigovernment.9

Largenumbersofyouthaspiredduringthetransitionalperiodtoplayanactiveroleincivil society or politics, hoping their civic engagement would lead to workopportunities. Youth activists volunteered to gain experience and participated intraining workshops. However, except for the well-heeled, they had little access to

8MuradSubay,streetartist,interviewwiththeauthor(25.October2018).9SeeQaid,Abdulrahman(2017):Griffiti:CreativityandInfluence.04.07.2018.Al-MadaniyaMagazine.10Mohammedal-Shami,civilsocietyactivist,interviewwiththeauthor(April2018).

AmplifyingYouthVoicesMohammedal-Shami,ayouthactivistandthen-projectmanagerforSaferworld,saidinaninterviewthatthetargetsofadvocacycampaigns in Yemen need to be considered depending onlocation, because different authorities are relevant in eachlocality, with tribal authorities holding sway in one area andstaterepresentativesinanother.10

Shamiworkedin2012ontheproject‘AmplifyingYouthVoices’involvingtheYemeniorganizationResonate!Yemen,aswellasthe international organization Saferworld: “Youth activistssponsoredbyuswereabletohavesuccessesbecauseoftheirflexible approach, particularly when it comes to local leveladvocacy,”Shamisaid.

Citingtheproject’ssuccess inconnectingwithprominentlocalfigures, Shami said youth activists implementing the projectworkedwiththen-governorofTaizShawqiHayelSaeedtosetupayouthunitwithinthegovernor’soffice.

PolicyReport 10


February2019

elaboratenetworksandinternationalorganizations.Moststruggledtoreachdecision-makers.Infact,despitetrainingandvolunteering,manyyouthactivistsstilllackedthenecessaryeducation,trainingandexperienceforeffectiveadvocacycampaigns.Youthwhobecameactiveingroupswereoftendividedbytheirdifferingpoliticalattitudes,andnotallgroupswereabletoacquire funding.Somewerediscouragedby lackofimmediateresults.Thelimitedpoliticalchangethatdidoccurhadlittleeffectonthedaily lives of youths in regard to jobs, basic services, infrastructure and thehumanitariansituation.Yet,observersandinternationalorganizationstooknoticeofyouthactivismdespitethesechallenges, includingthelackoffunding, inexperience,politicalinfightinganddisorganization.A needs-assessment survey with 485 youth activists from seven governoratesconducted by YPC in September 2012 found that youth activists believed thegovernmentshouldfocusontheeconomyandpublicservices(25.5percent),andonproviding security (19.7percent). 11 However, the momentum unleashed by thetransitionalperiodfailedtospurthegovernmenttoraiseyouthparticipationinpoliticsor improveconditions for youtheducationandemployment.Politics inYemenwasinstead shaped by infighting among the elite. The youth, similar to most of thepopulation,baskedinneglect.Theill-designedformaltransitionprocessandthefailureoftheNDCcontributedtoescalatingviolence.12TheHouthisseizedpower,promptingthemilitaryinterventionoftheSaudi-ledcoalitionandplunginglivelihoodindicatorstonewlows.Thestatebrokeapart,withvariousfactionshijackingorreplacingcentralinstitutionsandcomplicatingthepoliticallandscape.Opportunitiesforyouthactivismaboundedinthetransitionalperiodafterthe2011uprising,althoughyouthpoliticalparticipationdidnotsignificantly increase.Yemenipolicy makers became receptive to the ideas of Yemen’s young generation. Theinternationalcommunitysupportedyouthactivismwithfunding,training,networkingevents and travel opportunities.With the collapse of the political process in 2014,theseopportunitiesbegantodwindle.

11Funck,Lydia&Transfeld,Mareike(2013):SupportingYouthActivisminYemen:Challenges,PrioritiesandNeeds.Yemen Polling Center. The survey mentioned in the study covered Ibb, Sanaa city, Al-Baidha, Taiz, Houdeidah,Hadramout,AdenandMarib.Thesampleconsistedoftheleadersoforganizedyouthgroupswhowereactiveintheprotestsquaresoftherespectivecities.12TheNDCwasseenbyoutsidepowersasaninclusiveforumandamodelforapeacefultransitionintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica.But theconference failed tobe truly inclusive.ThesouthernHirakmovementandYemenicivilsocietywereunderrepresented. Traditional political forcesdominated theproceedings. The conference failed toempowertherangeofvoicesincluded,whilethetimeframeforthedeliberationwasunrealisticandeliteinfightingandviolencesurroundingtheconferenceultimatelycontributedtoitsfailure.ForananalysisoftheconferenceseeTransfeld(2016).

PolicyReport 11


February2019

LocalDynamicsTakeCentreStage

TheviolenttakeoverofthecapitalbytheHouthimovementinSeptember2014andthe military intervention of the Saudi-led coalition in March 2015 resulted in thedisintegrationofnational-levelinstitutions,alteringtheinstitutionalenvironmentforyouthactivism.Twoauthoritiesarose,claimingtorepresenttheYemenistate.Bothwereatthesametimechallengedbylocalactors.TheinternationallyrecognizedgovernmentofPresidentAbduRabbuMansourHadi,toitssupporters,symbolizessomeofthelegitimacyoftheYemeninationstate.Hadiisseenas theonlypolitical figurewithanysortofdemocratic legitimacy. InFebruary2012,Hadiwasconfirmedinareferendumastransitionalpresidentfortwoyears.HistermwasextendedbyavoteintheNDCfortwomoreyearsin2014.However,since2015theHadigovernmenthasbeenlargelyrestrictedtooperatingfromexileinSaudiArabia. It retains limited reach inside Yemen, mainly in the southern and easterngovernorates,withsomecentralgovernment institutionsreplicatedoutsideHouthi-controlledterritory.OntopoftheHouthichallenge,theHadigovernmenthasbeenlosingauthority infavorofthesouthernindependencemovementandother locallysupportedgroups.TheHouthisenjoymorehands-oncontrol.InFebruary2015,theHouthisformedtheSupremeRevolutionaryCommittee,whichwasfromthenontorulethecountry.Thegroupcametopowerafewmonthsearlierthroughacoup,whichtheHouthicalleda‘popular revolution’. TheHouthis alliedwith former president Saleh,whomHouthimilitiakilledinDecember2017afterhehadsignaledtoSaudiArabiathathewasreadytoswitchsides.Currently,thegroupcontrolsthenorthwestofYemenontheirown.TheyexercisepowerthroughtheSupremePoliticalCouncil(SPC)andoutfitsdatingtothecentralgovernment,aswellasthelocalauthorities.Inaddition,theHouthissetuptheso-calledrevolutionarysub-committees,whichexertbroadinfluenceoverpublicinstitutions,despitehavingnoformalstatus.Onthenationallevel,parliamentissplitbetweenthetwomainfactionsoftheconflict.Those loyal to the Houthis assemble in Sanaa, but their meetings lack quorum.PresidentHadihasnotbeenabletobringloyalparliamentarianstogetherforsessions.(thelastparliamentaryelectionswereheldin2003).ParliamentaryelectionsmeanttobeheldduringSaleh’srulein2009werepostponedduetodisagreementsbetweenthepolitical parties. The 2011 revolt prevented elections scheduled for the same year.During the transitional period, parliament functions were dictated by the GCC

PolicyReport 12


February2019

Initiative. It has been widely acknowledged that the Yemeni parliament lackslegitimacy.13Currently,therearenonational-levelstateinstitutionsthatareseenaslegitimateandrepresentativewithinYemenicommunities.Amongtheyoung,theroleofthestateasaproviderofopportunities,educationandbasic services has sunk intooblivion. The YPC2017 survey indicates awidespreadsenseamongyoungpeoplethatthestatehadseizedtoexistintheregionswheretheylive.Askingifthe‘state’(ad-dawla)waspresentintheirarea,onlyfivepercentoftheyouth interviewed said the statewas ‘very present’ in their area. Amajority of 42percent said the statewasabsent.14Theviewof anabsent statewas strong in thecapital,wheretheHouthishavetakencontroloftheinstitutions.Ninety-threepercentoftheyouthinSanaacityand96percentofthoseresidinginSanaagovernoratesaythatthestatewasnotpresent.Otherareaswhereaclearmajority(70percentormore)whosawthestateasbeingabsentcompriseTaiz(70percent),al-Baydha’(73percent),Abyan (73percent), Lahj (82percent),andal-Jawf (83percent).AreaswhereyouthresidentssaidthestatewasratherpresentcompriseIbb,Hajja,Hadhramawt,al-MahraandAmran.Thefragmentationextendstothelocallevelandisfeltwhenlookingattheperceptionsofyoungpeopleregardingsecurity.Demonstratingasecurityvacuumcreatedbytheabsenceof thestate,19percentof theyouthsaidnoonebroughtsecurity totheirarea.Overall,only9.7percentoftheyouthmentionedstateinstitutions(policeandthemilitary)whenaskedwhoprovidessecurityintheirarea.Inthesouth,respondentsweremoreinclinedtonamestateinstitutionsasprovidingsecurity,with30percentsayingitwasthearmyand19percentsayingitwasthepolice.Thismaybeduetothepresenceoftheinternationallyrecognizedgovernment,whichgenerallymoreassociatedwith‘legitimatestatehood’thantheHouthiscontrollingthenorth.However, thesurvey found that thecommunity itselfor localactorsprovidesecurity inmanycases insteadofstate institutions.Twenty-onepercentnationwide

13Transfeld,Mareike; Al-Taj, Anwar; et al. (2014) Evaluating Parliament Performance in the Transitional Period:December2011-December2013.YemenPollingCenter.14Itisdifficulttodeterminewhatexactlyisunderstoodas“state”bytheyouth.However,resultsfromsurveys,in-depthinterviewsandfocusgroupdiscussionswithcivicfigures,youthactivists,decision-makersandmembersofthesecurityestablishmentcollectedbyYPCbetween2017and2019indicatethatthemoretherespondentidentifieswiththestateanditsbasisoflegitimacy,themorepresentthestateisperceivedtobe.Further,thestateisunderstoodintermsofitsfunctions.Theabsenceofstateservicesisthusassociatedwiththeabsenceofthestate.

PolicyReport 13


February2019

saiditwasthecitizensthemselveswhoprovidesecurity.Twentypercentsaiditwastheaqil(neighbourhoodauthority)15orthelocalsheikh.Theyouthsurveyshowssharpshiftsofpowertolocalfiguresfromstateinstitutionsandrepresentatives.Thirty-fourpercentconsidertheaqil tobethemost importantcommunity leader, followed by tribal sheikhs (28 percent). Military commanders,politicalparty leadersor state representativeswerenamedbyonly7percent.Civilsocietyorganizations(CSOs)arealsoperceivedbyyouthtobeactiveinmorebeneficialwayswhencomparedtostateinstitutions.Amajorityof45percentofyouthregardtheCSOsasactiveintheirareas,withathirdregardingtheiractivismasbeingpositive,andanotherthirdhavinganindifferentview.OnefactorthatmayhavecontributedtothefavorableviewofCSOsisthattheyhavecontinuedtoprovidesomebasicservices,filling vacuums created by the absence of the state. They have done so despitesufferingfromlackoffinancingandprotection.16Localstateinstitutions,namelythelocalcouncils,arelookedatwithdisregardamongtheyouth.Thecouncilsweresetupaspartofthecountry’snominalmovestodecentralizationduringSaleh’srulein2000.They were tasked with the provision of basic services, including water, sanitation,electricity,roads,education,health,oragriculturedevelopment.

Mostyouth(60percent)hadheardoflocalcouncilsintheirarea;20percentconsiderthecouncil’sworktobepositive,15percentfindtheirworknegativeand25percentsayitisneitherpositivenornegative.Twentypercentsaidlocalcouncilsintheirareawere inactive.Especially inHouthi-controlledterritory, the localcouncilsalongwithotherlocal-levelinstitutionsweretakenoverbyinformalgroups.Theloyaltiesofthelocalcouncilsarethusdivided.Manywhowereinitiallyappointedbythestateshiftedtheir allegiance to the de facto power in their respective governorate. Since thebeginning of the war, each party to the conflict has cultivated loyalty throughappointmentstopublicpositionsandlocalcouncils.InthecityofAden,focusgroupdiscussionparticipantssaidinFebruary2018thatthepopulationisdisappointedandfrustratedbecausetheirdreamsoflivingunderastrongstatebuiltonjusticeandequalityhavenotbeenfulfilled.Theysaidthedeteriorationofgovernmentservices—particularlyhealth,waterandelectricity—isoneofthemainconcerns of the city’s inhabitants. They described the poor performance of thegovernmentaswellascorruptionhinderingserviceprovisionascausesforconflictatthecommunitylevel.

15 The aqil is a social figure selected to act as an informal connection between communities and governmentinstitutions.Usually,theyarefigureswithsocialinfluenceandaremembersofoneofthepoliticalparties.16Seeal-Shami(2015).

PolicyReport 14


February2019

Shifting to theperspectiveofdecision-makers, itbecomes clear that the closer therespondentswerelinkedtothestate,suchasgovernmentofficialsorthemilitaryandpolice,themorepresenttheyperceivedthestatetobe.Overall,20percentsaidthestatewasverypresent,comparedwith14percentwhosaidthestatewasnotpresentat all.Amajority (28percent)wereundecided.Membersof the securityapparatustendedtooverstatethereachofthestatewhileordinarycitizensandsocietalfiguresdidnotseethestateinsimilarmanner.AsaresultoftheHouthicoupandtheSaudi-ledmilitaryintervention,thestatehasfragmentedandisconsideredabsentbythemajorityofYemen’syouth.Thisabsencechangestheconditionsforyouthactivism.Asdemonstratedbythedata,localsocialfigures are more influential than state representatives. Because of these newcircumstance,targetsofyouthadvocacycampaignsneedtochangefromthenationaltothelocallevel.

Graph1:Whatisyourpositionwithinyourcommunity?

PolicyReport 15


February2019

Graph2:Whichgroupofpeopledoyouthinkisthemostimportantgrouptokeepinclosecontactwithwithinyourcommunity?

ResponsivenessofLocalLeadersWith the seizureof the capital by theHouthis and the Saudi campaign camedeepfragmentationoftheYemenistate.Self-relianceamonglocalcommunitieswithregardtotheprovisionofserviceshelpeddiminishtheimportanceofstateinstitutionsanddroveyouthtolooktolocalfigures,alteringthedynamicsofyouthactivism.ActivistMohammedal-Shamisaidthatsincethewartheaqilhas insomelocalitiesbecomemore influential than the governor.17 But just as on the national level, there is adisconnectbetweentheyouthandleadersatthelocallevel.Local decision makers claim to value the opinions of the youth within theircommunities.ThisisreflectedintheresultsofYPC’ssurveyofthe300decision-makers.NinetypercentofthecommunityleadersinterviewedbyYPCstatedthattheybelieveitisimportanttoconsidertheopinionofmembersoftheircommunities.41percentsaid it is important tokeep inclosecontactwith theyouth. Interestingly,with that

17Mohammedal-Shami,civilsocietyactivist,interviewwiththeauthor(25.October2018).

PolicyReport 16


February2019

number,youthrankhigherontheprioritylistofthelocaldecisionmakersthanelitemembersof thecommunity.The surveyattempted tobreakdown thegroupswholeadersthinktheyshouldstayincontactwith.Whenaskedifdirectorsandsub-districtdirectorsmatter,40percentagreed,while31percentsaiditisimportanttoconsiderthe governor or his staff. Religious figures were important to 29 percent of thedecision-makers,politicalpartieswereimportanttoconsideraccordingto23percent;andjournalistsreceivethelowestinterest,astheyareconsideredimportantonlyby9percent.Thehigh interest in theyouth ismost likelya legacyof the2011uprisingsand thespread of themantra of the youth as forming the country’s future. However, therhetoricofYemenipoliticiansdoesnotresonateamongtheyouthortranslateintoasense of inclusion. Thirty-seven percent of youth said community leaders do notunderstandtheirneedsand‘donottrytheirbest’tosatisfythem.Fourteenpercentsaidtheydonotknowiftheleadersunderstandtheirneedsortrytosatisfythem.Inan indication of marginalization, 20 percent said community leaders somewhatunderstandtheirneedsandtrytosatisfythem.Thenumbersofdecisionmakerswhomeetyouthmayexplainthedisconnect.Whilecommunityleadersvaluetheopinionsofyouthandbelieveitisimportanttostayincontact,theydon’tactuallysolicittheiropinionsonaregularbasis.Roughlyhalfofthesample(53percent)meetwithmembersoftheircommunitiesatleastonetofivetimesaweek,whiletwopercentdonotmeetmembersoftheircommunities.ThesenumbersshouldbeviewedagainstthebackdropofYemen’sstrongtraditionofcommunal meetings. Of the decision-makers who meet with members of thecommunityregularly,75percentgaugetheopinionsofthecommunityinqatsessions.QatisamildstimulantthatisparticularlyconsumedbymaleYemenisintheafternoon.Traditionally,communityleadersinvitetotheirhomesmembersofthecommunitytochewqatanddiscussrelevantmatters.Ratherthanallowingnewactorsaccess,thesemeetingsoftenreinforceexistinghierarchies.Almost80percentofdecisionmakerssaidtheymeetequallywithdifferentgroupsmakinguptheircommunity.Whilethedecision-makers thought it was important to consider the youth’s opinion, theyactually meet with other elites more often than with youth. These elites mainlycomprise tribal figures (70 percent), other social figures (45 percent), local councilmembers (59 percent) or the security apparatus (44 percent). Youth outside thesecirclesdonothaveaccesstotheqatsessions,leavingamajorityofthemexcluded.

PolicyReport 17


February2019

Nevertheless, 11 percent of 15-to-25-year-olds are in direct contact with theircommunity leaders and have communicated their needs to them. Themajority ofthosewhoareincontactwiththeseleaderstalkwiththemface-to-faceatqatsessions,themosqueor themarket.Ninepercentare incontactwithcommunity leadersbyphone and four percent visit these leaders in their office, while two percent areconnected with them through social media. Yet, 40 percent of the youth saycommunityleadersdonotgivethemtheopportunitytocommunicatetheirneedsand13percentsaytheydonotknowofanysuchopportunities.Fourteenpercentsaidthey“somewhatdonotbelieve”thatcommunityleadersoffertheyouthopportunitiestocommunicate.Amongthedecisionmakerssurveyed,sevenpercentdonotthink it is importanttoconsidertheopinionsofthecommunity.ThedecisionmakerswhodonotbelievethistobeimportantarelocatedmostlyinAbyan,HadhramawtandMarib.Thethreeareasare rather remote governorates that are tribally organized andmostly rural. Theserespondentsperceivethemembersof thecommunity tobe illiterateand lacking inawareness(36percent).Othersaredisinterestedintheopinionswithinthecommunitybecause they understand their position as not requiring consideration of publicopinion.Eighteenpercentsaidtheydonothavetogaugetheopinionofthecommunitybecausetheywerechosenbythepeopletorepresentthem.Fourteenpercentbelievethereisnosuitablewaytogaugepublicopinion.Marginalizationisacutewhenitcomestoyoungwomen.Onlyninepercentofthe300decision makers find it important to consult women. Two percent of females, asopposedto20percentofmales,areincontactwithcommunityleaders.ParticipantsinthefocusgroupsfrequentlymentioneddiscriminationbetweenmalesandfemalesandactivistsoftheYLGoftenreportedaboutthedisadvantagedpositionofwomenwithinthecommunities.Theactivistsunderlinedthelimitededucationalopportunitiesforwomen,forcedmarriageandthehighlyconservativenormswhichrestrictwomen’opportunities.Sixty-threepercentofthefemalessaidtheywere“somewhatvalued”bytheircommunitiescomparedwith76percentofmales.Thefeelingofneglectbycommunityleadersrunhighamongyouth,althoughknowingyouthopinionrankshighontheprioritylistofdecisionmakers.Elevenpercentoftheyouthare incontactwithcommunity leadersandopportunities foryouthadvocacycampaignshavenotvanished.However,theopportunitiesarelimited.Advocacythusneedstobuildonpre-existingcommunicationchannels,whilecarefullycraftingnewones.

PolicyReport 18


February2019

Graph3:Howofteninaweekdoyoumeetorspeakwithmembersofyourcommunitytounderstandtheiropinionandlivingsituation?

ThreatsagainstYouthAdvocacyCompoundAlthoughopportunitiesforyouthactivismremain,withlocaldecision-makersatleastpresentingthemselvesasinterestedintheopinionsoftheircommunities’youth,thescope for youth activism plummeted after 2014. State institutions faded and thewarring parties regardedmost activism as hostile and a threat.18Peace campaignswereviewedastargetingonefactionbutnottheother,puttingparticipantsinthesecampaigns indangerofarrestorkidnap.Activists launchedsome less controversial

18Seefore.g.Beckerle,Kristine(2017)YemeniActivistsFaceReprisalsforSpeakingOut.12.07.2018.HumanRightsWatch;Mohammedal-Shami,civilsocietyactivist,interviewwiththeauthor(26.April2018).

PolicyReport 19


February2019

campaignsasnottoinviteaviolentbacklash,butopportunitiesforyouthtoshapetheircommunities fell sharply.Asenseofhopelessnessset in, intensifyingmentalhealthissuesamongyoungYemenis.

TheBadihiCampaignActivistsintheYLGs,whicharepartoftheYPC’sYouthVoicesinPolicy project, implemented a campaign in 2017 to spreadmessageson1)buildingcommunityandbridgingdivideswithinsociety;2)raisingawarenessonthehumanitariansituationand3)de-radicalization.Fourfilmsfocusingonthesethemeswereattheheartofthecampaign.ThefilmsavoidedcontestedlanguageandsymbolisminordertouniteYemenisandavoidangeringtheparties to the conflict in various parts Yemen. An offlinecomponententailedthedistributionofthefilmsonDVDalongwithbrochures.Duringtheimplementation,participatingyouthactivists were temporarily arrested and held in custody,campaignmaterialwasconfiscatedandauthoritiesonallsidesof the conflict tried to hinder the offline activities of thecampaign.Yet,thematerialreachedmorethan20,000people. During the campaign, YLG activists tried to arrange meetingswithdecision-makerstoadvocateforissuesthatwererelevantto their communities. The decision-makers selected werepurposefullynotpartofthesecurityestablishmentsortherulingauthority.TheYLGoftensought tomeet representatives fromuniversities,who are appointedby the authorities.Organizingsuchmeetings often proved difficult, however.Meetingswithofficials from Aden and Marib universities were not possiblebecause the officials preferred not to be associated with thepublicadvocacynatureofthesemeetingsanddidnothavethepermissiontospeaktonewspapersandonlineoutlets.InSanaa,membersoftheYLGmetwithintellectualsfromhighereducation institutionsandofficialsfromtheMinistryofYouth.Themeetings focused on the question ofwhy youth had notbeenappointedtogoverningbodiesinSanaa.Thisfocusshould

PolicyReport 20


February2019

be understood against the backdrop of the NDC. One of theoutcomes of the conference was to introduce a 20-percentquota foryouth inall governmentbodies. In2014, theYLG inSanaa campaigned for the implementation of such quota.However,asisthecaseforallotherNDCoutcomes,itwasnotimplemented. Inal-Hodeidahtheyouthtookuptheissueofprisonconditions.Youthactivistsmetwithjudges,withwhomtheyfoundcommoncause.As the judges soughtpopular support for theirpush toimproveprisonconditions,theypromisedtosupporttheyouthcampaign.After thesemeetings in al-Hodeidah,HouthimilitiaarrestedmembersoftheYLGandinterrogatedthemabouttheirmeetingswiththejudges.

AcrossYemen,youthhavebecomeactiveinfillingthevacuumleftbythestateandbegunproviding security tomembersof their communities,oftencooperatingwith(andattimesbeingrestrictedby)armedgroups.InAden,the‘AdenSecurityAlliance’and the ‘Aden Without Arms’ initiatives are known to have contributed to theimprovementoflocalsecurity.Likewise,youthgroupsbecameactiveintheprovisionofsecurity insmallercities,suchasIbbandal-Hodeidah; inSanaayouthgroupsareinvolvedinthecreationofsafespacesandtheprotectionofchildren.

Still,focusgroupparticipantsunderlinedfearfromabductionasarisk.InSanaa,CSOsandyouthactivistsinterviewedontheirsecurityconcernsinearly2018saiditissafestto“stayathomeandkeepthedoorsshut.”TheydescribedHouthiruleasiron-fistedanddeploredthearbitraryandpseudo-religiousnatureofHouthipolice.ActivisminHouthi-controlled territory thus has become mostly limited to the distribution ofhumanitarianaid.

“Oneday,Iwaswalkinginthestreet.WhenIreachedAlDhiharMarket,agroupofarmedmeninterceptedmeandpointedtheirgunsatmyhead,”saidafocusgroupparticipantfromIbb,inFebruary2018.“Theytookawaymymobilephoneandlaptopandlefttheplace.Then,Iapproachedthepolicestationandtoldthemwhathappenedto me. Although the perpetrators were arrested, they were shortly released fromdetentionduetopolicecomplicity.”

PolicyReport 21


February2019

In Aden, activists fear violence from ultra-nationalist and religious groups, whichrestrictfreedomofspeechanddescribeactivistsas“spiesormissionaries.”19AccordingtomediaexpertsandactivistsinAden,youthactivistsarenotabletocriticizetheSaudicoalitionorspeakoutagainstthecauseofsouthernindependence.Southernresidentswith family ties to northern Yemen feel threatened and excluded, as they arediscriminatedagainstbyauthorities. Southernactivists feelmarginalizedwithin theYemeniactivistsceneaswellasbyinternationalorganizations.

ThemarginalizationharkstothelegacyofnortherndominanceinYemen.Sanaahasbetterinfrastructureforyouthintermsoftrainingandeducation,whichiswhyactivistsfromSanaaareprioritizedinrecruitmenttolocalandinternationalorganizations.20

Accordingtoseasonedactivists,campaignsmustbepreparedinamannerthattheirmessagesandactivitiesdonotprovokeanymilitiasandthattheworkmightnotbeexploitedbythemilitiasfortheirownagenda.“Youcannotstopthemediaworkingforthemilitiasfromusingyourworkandyourmaterial,butyoucanmakesurethatiftheyuse your material, it does not hurt, but support your goal,” said media activistAbdulrahmanHussein.Thefirstfilmreleasedforthe#Badihicampaign,titled“Badihi,”wasairedonvariousTVchannelsbelongingtothedifferentpartiestotheconflict.Themessageofthecampaignwasamplifiedbecausethefilmwasbroadcastonallsidesofthewar,andtheactiviststhusavoidedhavingtheirworkhijacked.Thevariousrisksdescribedinthesurveyhavecausedmanyyouthgroupstoceasetheiractivities.Amajorityof54percentoftheyouthinterviewedinthe2017surveywerenotawareofanyyouthgroupsbeingactiveintheirarea.Manygroupsstoppedtheiractivitiesduetothelossoffunding.Internationaldonororganizationseitherfocusedon humanitarian aid or stopped working in Yemen.21 The activists regretted theirinabilitytostayactiveintryingtoencourageYemen’syounggenerationtocompletetheireducationorimprovethefieldsofhealth,environmentanddevelopment.Thesekindsofactivitiesarenotjustimportantbecausetheyallowyoungpeopletocontributetotheircommunities,buttheygiveyoungpeopleasenseofpurpose.“It is interestingtoworkwithchildren inthistime,whiletheHouthisareattacking.Really, the children give us somuch positive energy,” saidHanna, an activist fromSanaaworkingina“safespaceforchildren.”Someyouthgroupssoughttomitigate

19CivilsocietyactivistinAden,interviewwiththeauthor(25.October2018).20FocusgroupdiscussionswithyouthandCSOsinAden(February2018)andcivilsocietyactivistinAden,interviewwiththeauthor(25.October2018).21Saferworld(2015)WherenextforyouthinYemen?06.08.2015.Saferworld.

PolicyReport 22


February2019

therisksofactivismbyavoidingpoliticalthemes.InAden,agroupofyouthstartedabookclub,heldbookfairsandculturalfairstorevivethereadingcultureinthecity.22Numerousstudentinitiativestookoffinthefieldofknowledgetransferandassistingtheneedy.23Otheryouthsareactiveintheater,comedy,mediaandfilm.24

“FacesofWar”Conditionsforstreetarthavedeterioratedduringthewar.AccordingtoartistMuradSubay,militiasthatcontrolthevarious territories inYemendonotallowanyalternativevoices.Subaydescribedmomentsofcensorship inAden,whereheasanorthernerisconsideredproblematic,andwherethesouthernindependencemovementcontrolsthepublic sphere. In northern cities, Subay describedharassmentbythesecurityforces:“Ihavebeenharassedby security and members of the militias during mycampaigns; I have been held by security forces, andtemporarilyimprisoned,”hesaidinaninterview.Subay said he had learnt how to deal with the securitysituation in different parts of Yemen as it evolved anddeveloped mechanisms to avoid trouble. However, hestoppedmobilizingotherstojoinhiminthecampaigns,ashe deems it too dangerous. “I also can’t make themessagesofmycampaigns toodirectandtooclear.Youhavetobesmartwithhowyoutransportwhatyouwanttosay,”hesaid.

22Surib, Noor (2017) Al-Nasieh Club in Aden: A Civil Breeze in the Face of the Artillery ofWar and Intolerance.26.07.2017.Al-MadaniyaMagazine.23Abdulmalik,Weaam(2017)StudentInitiativesinTaiz:FormsofYouthEffectivenessagainsttheWarandOngoingSiege.21.08.2017.Al-MadaniyaMagazine;Mohammedal-Shami,civilsocietyactivist,interviewwiththeauthor(April2018).24Abdu, Sahar (2017) Yemeni Theater Returnswith A “YemeniMovie.” 28.11.2017. Al-MadaniyaMagazine; BouAbbes, Ahmed (2018) Community Radio inHadramout. 23.04.2018. Al-MadaniyaMagazine; Civil society activist,interviewwiththeauthor(April2018).

PolicyReport 23


February2019

ConsequencesofEconomicCollapse

The deterioration of the economic situation has made youth activism extremelydifficultandtheyouththemselvesincreasinglydesolate.Themanifoldconsequencesofthewar—pricehikes,shortagesoffood,fuelandmedicine,unpaidsalaries,currencydepreciationanddiminishingjobopportunities–hitfamiliesmostdirectly.Two-thirdsoftheyouthsurveyrespondentssaidthereweretimesin2016thattheirfamilydidnothavefood.FortypercentofthefamilieshavereceivedhumanitarianaidatleastoncebetweenJanuaryandMay2017.Often,Yemen’syouthfindtheirparentsunabletofeedthemandtheirsiblings,forcingtheyouthtocontributetotheirfamily’sincome.Thesalarycrisisandeconomicfactorsarethereasonsthatpreventthemfromcompletingtheireducation.Thirty-fivepercentofthoseintervieweddroppedoutofschoolwithoutasecondaryschoolcertificate.Atthesametime,mostoftheyouthseelittletonoworkopportunitiesforthemselvesintheir communities. The opportunities that they do see are as day-laborers inconstruction,agriculture,transportorsmalljobs.Thewarandsalarycrisisisdrivingyoungpeopleintothehandsofmilitiasorcriminalgroups. In focus group discussions in August 2017, lack of opportunities andpsychological problems and depression among youthwere amain concern. In Ibb,focusgroupparticipantssaidyouthwereperceivedasacauseforconflictwithinthecommunity. They did not receive acknowledgment bymembers of the communitybecause theydonothaveaccess to jobsand financial resources,orconnections toinfluentialfigures.Nevertheless,42percentoftheyoung(15-25years)feelvaluedbytheircommunities,with27percentfeelingsomewhatvalued.ThismaybeindicativeofoverallcommunalloyaltythatstillexistswithinYemenisociety.Duringtimesofwar,theyouth’srelianceontheircommunityhasdeepened.

Theyoutharelosinghope,withouthopetheironlyoptionistojointhebattlestofeedtheirfamilies.Buttherearestoriesofyouthgoingmad,depression,theycan’tleavetheirhouses,theycommitsuicide.Thewarcreatesuglypeople,butitisbecauseofthewar.Mostpeoplearegood,butbecauseof

PolicyReport 24


February2019

thesecircumstancestheybecomebad,notbecausetheywantto,butbecausetheydon’thaveotheroptions.

–MuradSubay,streetartist(October2018)

Youthswithnoeducationaloreconomicopportunitiesfeltmostabandonedbytheircommunities,althoughtheywereeagertocontribute.Limitedfinancialreturnsfromcivil societyactivism forcedmanyYemeniyouths to seekadaily living inways thatoften harmed peace building and may have added to radicalization. However,opportunitiestobecomeactiveremainalive.Youthshouldreceivethesupporttheyneed to take up ameaningful rolewithin their communities; even if it is confinedonline.

SocialMedia:AChannelforAdvocacy?Sincetheviolenceincreasedin2014,FacebookandTwitterbecamespaceswherewarpropagandaspread,involvingbotnetworks.Atthesametime,theInternethasbeenseenasanimportantoutlettocounterinsecurityandlimitedopportunities.25Thesewebsitescomprisedplatformsforpeaceandcommunitybuildingcampaigns,suchas#KafayaWar, #Coexist and #Badihi. Activists have used social media channels toaddressYemenidecisionmakersmoredirectly,astheydidwiththecampaign“Don'treturnwithoutpeacetoYemen.”AfteryoungrevolutionariesfoundTwitterandFacebookindispensableduringthe2011protests,politicalandsocialelitesbeganjoining.26DomesticmediainYemenishighlypoliticized and many activists and civil society organizations inside and outside ofYemensawFacebookandTwitternotjustasbestwaytoreachandmobilizepeople,butalsotoaccessinformation.Socialmediaoffersthepotentialfordifferentsocialandpoliticalhierarchiestomix.Itthusoffersyouthactivistsopportunitiestoconnectwithpoliticalandsocialleadersandcommunicatetheirneeds.However,socialmediauseinYemenmustbeunderstood

25Abdulmalik,Weaam(2018)Yemen’swarpusheswomentothedigitalworld.11.03.2018.Al-MadaniyaMagazine.26ForinsightsintohowsocialmediawasusedduringYemen’s“ArabSpring”protestsseeforinstanceAlwazir,Atiaf(2011):SocialMediainYemen:ExpectingtheUnexpected.30.12.2011.Al-Akhbar.

PolicyReport 25


February2019

against thebackdropofapronounceddigitaldivide,both in termsofa rural-urbandivide,agendergapandclassdisparity.Thedigitaldivide is relatedtotheunderdevelopmentof internet infrastructureandYemen’sculturalandsocialnorms.Yet,aftertelevisionandradio,socialmediaisthemediumYemen’syouthusethemost.One-thirdofthe15to25-year-oldshaveaccesstotheInternet,withmalesinurbanareasmostlikelytohaveaccesstotheInternet.Females in rural areas are least likely to have access. Among decisionmakers, 71percentofthosesurveyedhaveaccesstotheInternet.Oftheoneswhohaveinternetaccess,75percenthaveatleastonesocialmediaaccount.MostYemeniusersflockedtosocialmediaduringthe‘ArabSpring’.Howeversocialmediaremainsamediumpredominantlyforpersonaluses.Themajority(82percent)ofyouthwhohaveInternetaccessandasocialmediaaccountusetheplatformstocontacttheirfriendsandfamily.Aboutone-thirdusesocialmediatofollowreligiousfiguresandtheircontentstatements.Amajority(54percent)ofthosewithanaccountchoosesnottodiscusspoliticswithfamilyandfriendsoversocialmedia.Socialmediaremainsaplatformforpoliticalactivism,however,withasteadynumberofyouthusingsocialmediaforpoliticalends.Inoursurvey,18percentofyouthwithInternetaccessandasocialmediaaccountsaidtheyfrequentlyor‘veryfrequently’usesocialmediatodiscusspoliticswiththeirfriends,while28percentsaidtheyusesocialmedia ‘at least sometimes’ to do so. Detailing their socialmedia political use, 18percentoftheyouthsaidtheyfollowpoliticians'somewhatfrequently’and29percentsaidtheysometimesdo.Ninepercentofyouthsfrequentlyusesocialmediasitestorelaytheirneedstopoliticianswhile23percentsometimesdo.Withtriballeadershavingstrongsocialandpoliticalinfluence,itisnotsurprisingthattheyhavejoinedthesocialmediafrayandarepartlyfollowedbyyoungYemenis.Eightpercentoftheyouthfollowtriballeadersonsocialmediaatleastsomewhatfrequentlyand20percentsometimesdo.Eightpercent‘somewhatfrequently’usesocialmediatocommunicatetheirneedstotriballeaders.Nineteenpercentdososometimes.The research shows that socialmedia could be an effective channel for advocacy.Shiftingtotheperspectiveofthedecisionmakers,mostrespondentsclaimedtousesocialmediatounderstandtheneedsofmembersoftheircommunitiesandtointeractwiththem.Whilesocialmediaismostlyusedforpersonalreasons,thereisaconstantnumberofyouthwhousesocialmediatodiscusspoliticsandtoconnectwithdecision

PolicyReport 26


February2019

makers. Likewise, decision makers use social media to establish a communicationchannelwiththeirconstituencies.Thisiscertainlyaspacethatcanbebuilton.Therisksassociatedwithonlineactivismarelowerwhencomparedwithstreetpolitics.However,securitythreatstoonlineactivistsshouldnotbeunderestimated.InYemen,freedom of speech within the digital space is at risk; the quality and diversity ofinformationspreadonsocialmediaischallenged.Activistswhousesocialnetworkingforpoliticalmeans,particularlythoselivinginHouthi-controlledareas,areatriskofarrest,murderorkidnapping.OutsideofHouthiterritory,thespaceforfreeexpressioniswider,butonlyrelatively.Intheseareas,theabundanceofarmedgroups,someofwhichhaveextremeIslamistagendas,alsolimitfreedoms.Repeatedlyyoungmenhavebeenkilledbyunidentifiedgunmenforhavingspreadideasthatextremistsconsideranti-Islamic.27

Graph4:Socialmediauseamongdecisionmakers.

27“Yemenimurderedbyextremistsafterbeingaccusedofatheism,”TheNewArab,26April2016,availableonline:https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2016/4/26/yemeni-murdered-by-extremists-after-being-accused-of-athiesm(lastcheckedNovember5,2018);“SecularYemenisliveinfearafterstudentiskilledinAden,”Reuters,26June 2018, available online: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-assassination/secular-yemenis-live-in-fear-after-student-is-killed-in-aden-idUSKBN19H10E(lastcheckedNovember5,2018).

PolicyReport 27


February2019

OnlineCampaigninginConflictExamplesofcampaignsdonebyyouthactivistsusingsocialmediainclude#LetsCoexistinearly2016,“Don’treturntoYemenwithoutpeace”duringthepeacetalksinKuwaitin2016,aswellasthe#Badihicampaignstartinginsummer2017.

The campaign “Don’t return to Yemenwithout peace”was launchedby themediaactivistHindal-EryaniinthecontextofthepeacetalksinKuwaitheldin2016.ThegoalwastopressurethedelegationstocometoanagreementinKuwaitbeforereturningtoYemen.ThecampaigntookplaceonTwitterandreceivedsupportfromYemenis,activistsfromtheregion,internationalmedia,andsomeYemenipoliticians.Hindal-Eryanistates:

ManyinfluentialpeoplereactedtothishashtagincludingtheUNenvoyto Yemen, who mentioned it in his press conferences, the BritishForeignOffice,theambassadorsofGermanyandBritain,aspokesmanfor the British government, politicians representing parties to theconflictinYemen,suchastheYemeniforeignMinister,chairmanoftheGeneral People's Congress. 28 A number of artists reacted to thehashtag, such as superstar and Goodwill Ambassador Ragheb andYemeniartistFouadAbdulWahid.29

Al-Eryanisaidshemanagedtogainsupport fromallpoliticalparties involved inthetalkswiththeexceptionoftheHouthis.Demonstratingthatpeacecampaignsoftenprovoke thepartiesof the conflict, journalists loyal to the international recognizedgovernment began to threaten the campaign, accusing al-Eryani of supporting theHouthis,oncethecampaignwaslaunched.30The campaigns #LetsCoexist 31 and #Badihi 32 were conducted by Yemeni youth,respectivelysupportedbytheBritishNGOSaferworldandtheYemeniNGOYPC.Thecampaigns aimed to contribute to community building and de-radicalization byfocusingonthecommonalitiesofYemenis,includinglandscapes,food,music,childrenorheritage.Thecampaignsweresuccessfulinreachingahighnumberandwidevariety

28TheGeneralPeople’sCongress(GPC)istheformerrulingparty,whichwasheadedbyAliAbdullahSalehuntilhisdeathinDecember2017.29Al-Eryani,Hind(2016)Facebookpost.30Hindal-Eryani,civilsocietyactivism,interviewwiththeauthor(April29,2018).31Saferworld(2016)PromotingpeaceandcoexistenceinYemen.20.04.2016.Saferworld.32Badihi(2017)Website.

PolicyReport 28


February2019

of individualsacrossYemen,generatingpositivefeedback.However,bothcampaignteamssetthemselvesthegoaltobuilduplargenetworksofactivists,organizationsandmedia to contribute and sustain their message. Neither of the campaigns weresuccessful indoingso.Someofthechallenges inthisregardwerethatmanyoftheyouth involved in such campaigns work voluntarily. They had to prioritize otherprojects,becausetheywerenotpaidfortheirefforts.Thelivesoftheseyouthswereverymuchinflux,withmanypursuingpersonalopportunitiesabroad,fleeingfromthewarathome.

Violence in Yemenand its impacton the livesof youthweakenedyouthnetworks,whichneed tobe rebuilt.Accordingly, it is verydifficult tokeepupmotivationandenthusiasm within campaign teams, particularly with limited funding. Often teammembersareindifferentcountriesaroundtheworld,whichmakescoordinationdueto timedifferencedifficult,whilemanyactivistsarenotawareyetof softwareandonlinetoolsthatassistwithremotecommunicationandcoordination.

PolicyReport 29


February2019

Recommendations

Conditions for political activism and advocacy have become extremely difficult,especially in Houthi-controlled territories. Threats against the safety of activistsemanatefromanarrayofdifferentarmedactors.Itisnotrecommendedtoconductadvocacy or campaigning, unless an organization iswell-connected on the ground.International andnational organizationsmust assess indetail the conditions at thelocationwhere activities are to takeplace.Organizationsmust factor in the risk ofarrestsandkidnappingofactivists.Due to the lack of experience and training, and the incoherence of youth groups,projectsfocusingonyouthshouldbedesignedwithawidertime-frame.Theperiodofanyprojectinwhichyoutharetobecomeactiveingroupsmustallowspacefortheparticipantstodeveloppositiverelationswitheachother.GiventhecurrentconditionofYemenisociety,anygroupofpeopletendstohavesharppoliticaldifferencesthatmaygetinthewayofprojectimplementation.Developingastrongbondbeforetheimplementationofactivitiescouldhelpachieveprojectoutcome.Projectswitha focusonknowledge transfer shouldget the lion’s shareof support,rather than projects focusing on advocacy. Many youth in Yemen lack basicopportunitiesbecausetheylackaccesstoknowledge.Knowledgetransfermayincludetrainingworkshopsonskillsnecessaryforadvocacyandcampaigning,andcouldentailbook clubs, self-organized knowledge transfer group or Internet resource training.Supporting researchprojectswill not only enhance the awareness of youth, but ofinternationalobserversaswell.Afocusonresearchoftenmitigatestherisks,andisawaytobuildthecapacitiesofyoungactivists,byinvolvingthemintheresearchandwritingprocess.FundersshouldnotassumethatYemeniyouthcanvolunteerforprojectsforextendedperiods.Giventheeconomiccrisisandlackofsalaries,youthareoccupiedwiththeirownsurvivalandsupportfortheirfamilies.Theseabjectfinancialconditionsmustbetaken inconsiderationwhencraftingaprojectbudget,withaneyetowardminimalrelianceonvolunteers.Channels of communication between youth networks must be reestablished.Communicationbetweenvariousyouthorganizationshascollapsedoverthelastthreeyears. Activists have been forced to spread out in different countries, makingcommunication ever more difficult. A regional conference bringing youth activists

PolicyReport 30


February2019

togetherinanefforttore-establishcommunicationandenhancenetworksisanentrypoint.Funders should support online activism and training workshops on remotecollaborationtohelpcounterfragmentation.ManyactivistshavehadtoleaveYemenand have been occupiedwith important issues regarding their legal status in hostcountries.Othershavesufferedtraumasduetothewar.Manyactivistshaveresettledoradjustedtotheirnewlivingsituations.Trainingnowneedstocoverthebasicstohelpactivistsadjusttheirworkingmodetotheirnewlivingsituation:communicationplatforms, collaborative platforms (for example: Trello and Doodle), collaborativeword processing (Google Docs) and digital security. Other activities that could beencouraged online include knowledge transfer through the Internet, training onhuman rights, citizen and peace journalism, campaigning, and other civic activismtools.

PolicyReport 31


February2019

References

Abdu,Sahar(2017):YemeniTheaterReturnsWithA“YemeniMovie.”28.11.2017.Al-MadaniyaMagazine.Availableathttps://www.almadaniyamag.com/english/2017/11/26/yemeni-theater-returns-with-a-yemeni-movie,checkedon28/04/2018.

Abdulmalik,Weaam(2017):StudentInitiativesinTanz:FormsofYouth

EffectivenessAgainsttheWarandOngoingsiege.21.08.2017.Al-MadaniyaMagazine.Availableathttps://www.almadaniyamag.com/english/2017/8/20/student-initiatives-in-taiz-forms-of-youth-effectiveness-against-the-war-and-ongoing-siege,checkedon28/04/2018.

Abdulmalik,Weaam(2018):Yemen’sWarPushesWomentotheDigital

World.11.03.2018.Al-MadaniyaMagazine.Availableathttps://www.almadaniyamag.com/english/2018/3/11/yemens-war-pushes-women-to-the-digital-world,checkedon28/04/2018.

Al-Eryani,Hind(2016)FacebookPost.Available

at:https://www.facebook.com/HindAleryaniPage/photos/a.959878827455269.1073741827.313014988808326/960152397427912/?type=3&theater,checkedon28/04/2018

Al-Shami,Mohammad(2015):YouthandCivilSociety.TheMissingPowersin

Yemen.WilsonCenter.Availableonline:https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/youth-and-civil-society-the-missing-powers-yemen,checkedon21/11/2017.

Alwazir,Atiaf(2011):SocialMediainYemen:Expectingthe

Unexpected.30.12.2011.Al-Akhbar.Availableat:https://english.al-akhbar.com/node/2931, checkedon26/04/2018.

PolicyReport 32


February2019

Alwazir,Atiaf(2013):Yemen’sIndependentYouthandTheirRoleintheNational

DialogueConference.SWPComments2013/C23.Availableonlinehttps://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/yemens-independent-youth/,checkedon21/11/2017.

Alwazir,Atiaf(2016):Yemen’sEnduringResistance:YouthBetweenPolitics

andInformalMobilization,MediterraneanPolitics,21:1,170-191.

Badihi(2017):Website.Availableathttps://www.badihi.org/,checkedon26/04/2018.

Beckerle,Kristine(2017):YemeniActivistsFaceReprisalsforSpeakingOut.

12.07.2018.HumanRightsWatch.Availableat:https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/12/yemeni-activists-face-reprisals-speaking-out,checkedon28/04/2018.

BouAbbes,Ahmed(2018):CommunityRadioinHadramout.23.04.2018.Al-

MadaniyaMagazine.Availableat:https://www.almadaniyamag.com/english/2018/4/23/community-radio-in-hadramout,checkedon28/04/2018.

Funck,Lydia&Transfeld,Mareike(2013):SupportingYouthActivismin

Yemen:Challenges,PrioritiesandNeeds.YemenPollingCenter.Availableonline:http://www.csfyemen.org/upfiles/csf-p3817.pdf,checkedon21/11/2017.

Haddad,Saleem&Rogers,Joshua(2012):MovingBeyondPromises.

Perceptions,PrioritiesandParticipationofYouthinYemen’sTransition.Saferworld.Available

athttps://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloadfile.php?filepath=downloads/Yemen%20Moving%20Beyond%20Promises%20-%20Final%20EN.pdf,checkedon28/04/2018.

Qaid,Abdulrahman(2017):Griffiti:CreativityandInfluence.04.07.2018.Al-

MadaniyaMagazine.Availableathttps://www.almadaniyamag.com/english/2017/7/4/graffiti-creativity-and-influence,checkedon28/04/2018.

PolicyReport 33


February2019

Qasem,Ala(2013):FiveBarrierstoYouthEngagement,Decision-Making,and

LeadershipinYemen’sPoliticalParties.Saferworld.Availableonlinehttps://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/176063/five-barriers-to-youth-engagement.pdf,checkedon21/11/2017.

Saferworld(2015):WhereNextforYouthinYemen?06.08.2015.Saferworld.

Availableathttps://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/news-and-analysis/post/169-youth-in-yemen,checkedon28/04/2018.

Saferworld(2016)PromotingPeaceandCoexistenceinYemen.20.04.2016.

Saferworld.Availableathttps://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/news-and-analysis/post/644-promoting-peace-and-coexistence-in-yemen,checkedon26/04/2018.

Surib,Noor(2017):Al-NasiehClubinAden:ACivilBreezeintheFaceofthe

ArtilleryofWarandIntolerance.26.07.2017.Al-MadaniyaMagazine.Availableat:https://www.almadaniyamag.com/english/2017/7/25/al-nasieh-club-in-aden-a-civil-breeze-in-the-face-of-the-artillery-of-war-and-intolerance,checkedon28/04/2018.

Transfeld,Mareike(2017):Yemen’sYouthinPeril:WaitingfortheState,

RelyingontheFamily.CountryAnalysisofYemen.FESMENAYouthStudy“CopingwithUncertainty–YouthintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica.”Availableathttp://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/14151.pdf,checkedon28/04/2018.

PolicyReport 34


February2019

Documents

EU Youth Youth Activism in the Yemeni Civil War 2019Jan21 · • Opportunities for youth activism abounded in the transitional period after the 2011 uprising, although youth political