Eu Georgia Seminar Annexes Media Freedom Nov 2009 En

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Disclaimer

e contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of the authors and can in no way be taken to

lect the views of the European Union.

European Union Georgia

Civil Society Human Rights Seminaron

Media Freedom

Tbilisi, 10-11 November 2009

AnnexesNovember 2009

Contract n2009/218350

European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights

This seminar is funded by

The European Union

This seminar is organised by

Cecoforma


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Disclaimer

The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of the authors and can in

no way be taken to reflect the views of the European Union.


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European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights

European Union Georgia

Civil Society Human Rights Seminar

on

Media Freedom

AnnexesNovember 2009


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ANNEX I: GEORGIA COMPREHENSIVE MEDIA RESEARCH: ........................................... 5

SUMMARY FINDINGS .................................................................................................................... 5

DISCLAIMER....................................................................................................................................................................... 6

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................................................. 7

PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF MEDIA: SCEPTICAL INTEREST ........................................................ .......................................... 7

MEDIA PROFESSIONALS: CRITICAL AND CONCERNED .................................................................................................... 10

THE TV SECTOR: STATIONS IN CONFLICT, STANDARDS IN JEOPARDY ...................................................... ..................... 11

ANALYSIS ......................................................................................................................................................................... 12

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................................................................ 14

BASELINEDESKRESEARCH................................................................................................................................ 14PUBLICOPINIONSURVEY................................................................................................................................... 14FOCUS GROUPS................................................................................................................................................... 14IN-DEPTHINTERVIEWS....................................................................................................................................... 14MEDIAPROFESSIONALSMINI-SURVEY.............................................................................................................. 15MEDIAMONITORING .......................................................................................................................................... 15FINALREPORT.................................................................................................................................................... 15QUESTIONS OR COMMENTS ................................................................................................................................ 15

ANNEX II: MEDIA RESEARCH SURVEY FINDINGS ............................................................ 16

ANNEX III: INTRODUCTORY REMARKS ............................................................................... 25

SESSIONI:ELECTRONICMEDIAINGEORGIA .......................................................... ........................................ 25

SPEAKER 2: ANOUSHBEGOYAN, EUROPEPROGRAMOFFICER,ARTICLE 19 ..................................................... 25

SESSIONIIGEORGIANPUBLICBROADCASTER........................................................................... ..................... 27

SPEAKER 2: WOJCIECHDZIOMDZIORA,ATTORNEY,FORMERMEMBER OF THEPOLISHNATIONALBROADCASTING COUNCIL................................................................................................................................... 27COMMENTATOR:FIRDEVSROBINSON,EDITOR,BBCCENTRALASIA &CAUCASUS SERVICE ........................... 29

SESSIONIII:RIGHTTOACCESSANDIMPARTINFORMATION.MEDIALEGISLATIONANDPRACTICE ..................................................................................................................................................................... 31

SPEAKER 1: ILIADOHEL,OFFICE OF THEREPRESENTATIVE FOR THEFREEDOM OF THEMEDIA,OSCE ........ 31

SESSIONIV:PROFESSIONALISMANDSELF-REGULATION ........................................................................... 35

SPEAKER 1: BENOTCALIFANO,DIRECTOR,GRADUATE SCHOOL OFJOURNALISM,ESJ-MONTPELLIER ......... 35COMMENTATOR:PATRICKLEUSCH,HEAD OFPROJECTDEVELOPMENTDIVISION,DEUTSCHE WELLE

AKADEMIE .......................................................................................................................................................... 36

SESSIONV:MEDIAASBUSINESS ...................................................... ........................................................... ........... 37

SPEAKER 1:SHORENA SHAVERDASHVILI,OWNER,MPUBLISHING,PUBLISHER ANDEDITOR-IN-CHIEF,LIBERAL.............................................................................................................................................................. 37SPEAKER 2: OLEGKHOMENOK,PRINTMEDIAADVISOR,INTERNEWSNETWORK,UKRAINE ............................. 39


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ANNEX IV: AGENDA .................................................................................................................... 41

ANNEX V: CONCEPT NOTE ....................................................................................................... 46

ANNEX VI: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS ....................................................................................... 50


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ANNEX I: GEORGIA COMPREHENSIVE MEDIA RESEARCH:

SUMMARY FINDINGS

Georgia Comprehensive Media Research: Summary FindingsAugust-November, 2009

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:Dr. Hans GutbrodRegional DirectorCaucasus Research Resource [email protected]

Koba TurmanidzeCountry Director

Caucasus Research Resource Center -- [email protected]

---------------------------------------------------------

The Caucasus Research Resource Centers program (CRRC) is a network of research and training

centers in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. We strengthen social science research and public

policy analysis in the South Caucasus. A partnership between the Carnegie Corporation of New

York, the Eurasia Partnership Foundation, and local universities, the CRRC network integrates

research, training and scholarly collaboration in the region.

A project implemented by the Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EPF).

Caucasus ResearchResource Centers(CRRC) This project isfunded by the European

Union


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DisclaimerThis publication has been produced with the assistance of the European Union. The contents of thispublication are the sole responsibility of the Caucasus Resource Research Centers and can be in no waytaken as to reflect the views of the European Union.


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IntroductionThe Georgian media landscape has long been the subject of intense debate, as well as of fierce politicalcompetition. Although Georgia enjoys the highest press freedom index in the region, it is widelyaccepted that there remain major problems in this sphere.1 President Saakashvili himself has said thatthe media remains a challenge for Georgia2, and visiting Western politician regularly call for steps tobe taken to cement media freedom and independence.3

In many respects, Georgia has a vibrant media scene. Laws passed by the current government havebeen welcomed by independent observers4, and there is a wide variety of viewpoints available in printand on radio, as well as on television in the capital Tbilisi. However, rather than acting as impartialproviders of information, media outlets are often viewed as biased, serving the interests of one oranother political group. This has a long history in Georgia, where nationwide channel Rustavi 2 is seenas having played a large role in facilitating the Rose Revolution of 2003. During the political crisis ofNovember 2007, Imedi TV took centre stage, even being raided and closed by the authorities. Morerecently, Tbilisis Maestro TV has played an overtly political role, calling on its viewers to attend anti-government demonstrations in April this year.

With this in mind, it is no wonder that debates surrounding the Georgian media are highly charged.However, little research has been conducted into the actual state of the media landscape: how it isperceived by the public and professionals alike, what Georgians expect from this sector and what themajor strengths and weaknesses are today. In an effort to bring concrete data to this politicised issue,CRRC has undertaken an in-depth and holistic study into the Georgian media landscape. The studyconsisted of a comprehensive survey of the Georgian populations attitudes to media, a series of focusgroups with citizens, detailed interviews with forty-seven top media professionals, and a media-monitoring project to analyse the current state of Georgian TV news.

It is the aim of this report to synthesise the results of these studies to try to achieve a rounded pictureof the media landscape in Georgia. It is hoped that by bringing specific findings to a debate so often

dominated by political consideration, it will be possible to begin a constructive conversation among allstakeholders on improving the Georgian media scene.

Public perceptions of media: sceptical interest

Georgias media is more trusted than media in neighboring countries. Some 47 percent of surveyrespondents partially or fully trust the media, as compared with 43 percent in Azerbaijan, and 39percent in Armenia {CRRC Data Initiative 2008}.

Georgians are also avid consumers of news, with 84 percent of respondents watching TV news everyday, most for between half an hour and two hours {tv10}. Although TV is the most important sourceof information, 86 percent of respondents read a weekly paper, and 80 percent read a news magazine,

at least once a month {p3.3 }5

. In addition, 33 percent receive information from the radio each day{r4.2}, and internet use is growing, with 12 percent accessing the net daily. This shows that while TV

1See http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439 for regional scores.2Civil.ge, Saakashvili Speaks of New Wave of Democratic Reforms. Retrieved 01/11/09http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=19526

3US Vice President Joe Biden, for example, told the Georgian Parliament in July that the Rose Revolution would only becomplete when the media is totally independent and professional. See Civil.ge, Biden Addresses Parliament. Retrieved

01/11/09 http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=21283&search=biden%20parliament

4International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX). (2009). Media Sustainability Index. Retrieved September 25, 2009

from http://www.irex.org/MSI/index.asp5Many respondents said they did not read newspapers because of their cost, or because they were no on sale in the area.This suggests that there could be a latent appetite for cheap and widely distributed newspapers among much of the Georgian

population.


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remains the dominant force, newspapers and radio do play a significant role, and that the internet isgaining traction.

Nationwide private channel Rustavi 2 is by far the most popular in Georgia, with 79 percent ofrespondents watching its news broadcasts every day {tv12,3}. There is, however, a certain ambivalencesurrounding the channel. While 59 percent of respondents trust Rustavi 2s news to at least some extent

{tv14.5}, 51 percent also think that it reflects the interests of the government. Focus-groups show thatmany audience members are sceptical towards Rustavi 2s coverage, but keep tuning in due to the high-quality delivery offered by the channels news broadcasts. Commenting on its speed, one Tbilisiresident said that Rustavi 2 does not provide objective information, but they are fast, when somethinghappens they are there first.

Focus group participants also frequently commented that they watch a combination of news broadcastsfrom different channels and then decide what to believe, however, the high quality product, as well asthe nationwide reach, were frequently cited as reasons for Rustavi 2s popularity. One Kutaisi residentcalled it the only watchable channel in Georgia.6

It is clear that Georgian viewers like professionally presented news broadcasts. In describing theirfavorite journalists, they value intelligence (59 percent), courage (34 percent), the ability to ask the rightquestions (19 percent), as well as a clear presentation of facts (18 percent). Respondents did nothesitate to identify journalists that they respect. Bad pronunciation or a provocative demeanour wereconsidered the two most unpopular traits for a journalist to possess (by 25 and 19 percent ofrespondents respectively) {tv19}, showing that good presentation is an important factor for Georgian

viewers. One focus-group participant spoke with disdain of journalists who made grammatical mistakesin their speech.

Georgian news consumers are not only aware of potentially biased reporting on television, but manyfeel they can make up for that by watching a variety of stations. However, outside the capital, it is muchmore difficult to access channels with editorial policies significantly different from Rustavi 2.

There is an ongoing divide in terms of access to different sources of TV news in Georgia. Most of thecountry can only access Rustavi 2, Imedi TV and Channel 1 of the state-funded Public Broadcaster.

These stations are considered pro government by 51, 33 and 51 percent of respondents respectively.Tbilisi is also served by two channels, Maestro and Kavkasia, widely considered to be supportive of theopposition (68 percent of Tbilisi residents believe Kavkasia represents opposition interests, and 50percent say Maestro is also supportive of the opposition). Although this means that Tbilisi residentscan access a broader range of views, focus-group participants from the city showed little confidence inthe objectivity of any channel, also seeing Kavkasia and Maestro as biased and one sided.

Biased reporting is unacceptable to 75 percent of respondents, but most feel that the impartiality of TV

news is compromised {tv35}. 61 percent believe that news coverage is influenced by the owners of theTV stations. Controversy has dogged the ownership of both Rustavi 2 and Imedi and most focus groupparticipants felt that station owners were themselves beholden to government. Given that 49 percent ofGeorgians also agree to at least some extent that journalists serve the interests of the government, theredoes seem to be genuine concern about the level of media freedom {q9}.

Georgians are strongly opposed to any from of state censorship. 63 percent agree that the governmentshould not control media output, with just 22 percent agreeing that the government has a right tocontrol media output {q15}. In the focus groups, participants agreed that censorship was onlyapplicable in a time of war. In spite of this, many respondents think that Georgia currently lacksfreedom of speech. 44 percent at least partially disagree with the statement that there is freedom of

speech in Georgia, compared to 35 percent who agree.

6Focus groups, divided by age and media habits, were carried out in Tbilisi and Kutaisi.


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Most Georgians, therefore, are well aware of the problems in their media sector. However, it is alsoclear that there is a real desire to have a more professional, unbiased and independent media landscape.Many respondents have distinct ideas of issues they would like to be reflected more extensively onnational television. Generally, this shows a preference for several issues that are relevant to their ownlives.

Coverage on National TV

7

Too littleRightamount Too much Don't Know

Social issues 50 27 4 16

Human rights 39 34 3 22

Freedom of speech 38 32 4 23

Healthcare 37 35 3 23

Religion 36 37 4 20

Court system 34 32 3 28

Property rights 31 35 4 27

Economic issues 24 47 7 19

Corruption 22 42 5 28

Education 22 47 7 22Situation in Abkhaziaand South Ossetia 19 44 18 17

Territorial integrity 18 44 19 16

Political stability 15 47 14 22

Relations with Russia 13 47 21 18

Elections 9 41 26 21

Politics of othercountries 9 57 11 21

NATO membership 6 43 30 19

Moreover, respondents also show a clear appetite for investigative reporting. Beyond investigative filmsshown on Kavkasia and Maestro, there are currently no dedicated investigative reporting programs onany national channel. Yet respondents were overwhelmingly positive when asked if they would like tosee a wide variety of issues investigated by journalists. Over 75 percent of respondents said they wouldlike to see investigations into healthcare, the courts, elections, the protection of freedom of speech andother issues. Interestingly, 64 percent of respondents said they would also like to see relations betweenpoliticians and the Orthodox Church investigated. This is striking given the overwhelming support thechurch receives, and the fact that it enjoys the trust of 84 percent of the public {CRRC Data Initiative2008}.

Overall, the data paints a complex picture of the Georgian publics relationship with the media. It is

clear that Georgians are familiar with the shortcomings of even their most popular news sources, butstill watch in vast numbers. While most people demand unbiased, independent reporting fromjournalists, they also want professional presentation and a high quality product. Although TV news isby far the most influential, most Georgians also turn to other sources at least occasionally, and a largemajority would like to see crucial current events be investigated by journalists without interferenceeither from the government, or from the owners of media outlets.

In spite of the problems of the Georgian media, 64 percent of Georgians trust journalists to at leastsome extent. Over sixty percent {d15} would be happy for their children to go into journalism. Thissuggests that many respondents might be cautiously optimistic for the future of the Georgian media.

7Those refusing to answer are not shown, so numbers do not add up to 100 percent {tv7}.


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Media professionals: critical and concerned

Compared with the general public, media professionals are much more uneasy about the state of theGeorgian media, and their own place within it. CRRC surveyed and interviewed forty-seven mediaprofessionals in October 2009, and it is clear that most are much more critical toward the media sectorthan the rest of the population.8 While almost 40 percent of general respondents broadly agreed withthe statement that Georgian journalists served the interests of people like them, 79 percent of media

professionals broadly disagreed {q8}.

Media professionals are also much more concerned about government interference, with 83 percentbelieving that journalists are often influenced by government interests, compared to just 18 percent ofthe general public {tv16}. Many of the professional respondents said that pro-government bias wasmost detectable in TV stations. Most said that a lack of ownership transparency in these media outletsmade it easier for pressure to be exerted: The fact that the ownership of the various TV channels isnot made transparent proves that they are associated with particular leaders and parties, said onerespondent. 79 percent of media professionals believe the owners of TV channels influence coverage toa great extent {tv35}.

While problems in TV were mainly seen as arising from government interference, it was lack ofprofessionalism that was highlighted as a primary concern in the rest of the media. Many thought this

was particularly apparent in the print sector, as well as on the Tbilisi based Kavkasia and Maestrochannels, which most respondents said sided with the opposition. Georgian journalists write for thepoliticians they are trying to please, from one or another political group said one respondent, anotherfelt that Georgian journalists dont serve the public, they serve the political class.

54 percent of journalists agree to some extent that they have freedom of speech but this agreement ismuted. Respondents stressed that there were strong constraints to journalists' freedom. Several issues

were highlighted as limiting freedom of speech, including lack of training and professionalism on thejournalists part: journalists do not know their rights, and this hinders freedom of speech. Other

factors hindering freedom of speech included lack of ownership and financing transparency in mediaoutlets and lack of confidence in the court process.

Self-censorship is also mentioned as a problem. You don't like it, but you are still doing it, is how onejournalist put it. Another commented that those who did not censor themselves were marginalised, andthat a 'clean-up' has been in progress for so long that a new breed of journalists has appeared, who areinherently, consciously pro-governmental. In this context, the preferences of the government (83percent) and the media owner (79 percent) are more important than personal views (49 percent) ininfluencing how TV journalists report on issues {tv16, tv15, tv35}. Again and again, journalistshighlighted the weak institutional base for sustained independent journalism as a major challenge forquality journalism.

Another issue raised was the polarization of the media scene: journalists do not have freedom ofspeech in Georgia. This is because of the absence of a neutral mediachannels either serve thegovernments or the oppositions interests. Media professionals see the TV landscape as morepolarized than the rest of the population. Whereas 51 percent of the general public think Rustavi 2serves the governments interests to at least some extent, that view is held by 94 percent of mediaprofessionals {tv17.5}.

Media professionals also believe that the public is much more distrustful of the Georgian TV sectorthan is actually the case. Whereas 59 percent of the general public trusts information provided byRustavi 2 to at least some extent, media professionals thought that figure was just 28 percent. The

8The professionals included journalists, managers and academic experts. They represented TV, print, radio and internetoutlets, and came from across the political spectrum.


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difference is equally striking in regard to the news provided by Imedi, while 60 percent of the publictrust it to at least some extent (and it is the nations most trusted broadcaster according to anotherquestion, tv13), media professionals thought it was trusted by just 25 percent of people{tv14.3}.

One area where survey results from the general population and media professionals coincide is in thedesire for investigative reporting. While there is significant donor funding for investigative programs,

and some are broadcast on Maestro and Kavkasia, no investigative programs run on a national channel.Over 90 percent of media professionals would like to see investigative reports into issues as diverse aseducation reform to the situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, 62 percent of mediaprofessionals would not like to see investigations carried out into the private lives of politicians,compared to the 53 percent of the general public that would. In interviews, most media professionalsheld up journalistic ethics as the reason such an investigation would be inappropriate, suggesting thatthere is a strong desire for professional and ethical reporting within the media sector.

The TV sector: stations in conflict, standards in jeopardy

Given the importance and the attention focused on the television sector in Georgia, CRRCcommissioned three phases of in-depth media monitoring to be carried out this year.9 The monitoring

targeted national broadcasters often seen as serving the governments interests, Rustavi 2, Imedi andChannel 1 of the public broadcaster, as well as Kavkasia and Maestro, Tbilisi-based channels generallyseen as sympathetic to the opposition. The monitoring was carried out in early April, coinciding withlarge scale anti-government street protests, late May, when those demonstrations reached their apogee,and September, when a highly publicized EU-commissioned report into the causes of the 2008 war wasreleased.

In general, qualitative analysis of news reports from the five targeted stations found that viewers couldexpect to see radically different versions of events portrayed on Rustavi 2, Imedi and Channel 1 ascompared with Kavkasia and Maestro, meaning that it might indeed be possible to watch a number ofchannels and then come to ones own conclusions. When channels covered the same news event, it was

often possible to discern the editorial sympathies of the station through the differences in reportage.For example, when the EU-commissioned report was released, Imedi gave priority to MPs from boththe ruling party and the opposition, who discussed how the report backed up Georgias claim ofRussian aggression. This was then followed by excerpts from President Saakashvilis speech whichserved to validate the earlier claims. Kavkasia, on the other hand, did not show President Saakashvili atall, and dedicated fifty percent of its coverage to the non-parliamentary opposition (who are consideredmore radically anti-government and had not appeared on Imedi). These speakers categorically blamedthe president for the war, and suggested that his resignation was necessary to move beyond the crisis.

Thus, viewers watching Imedi were informed that the report basically confirms the governments claimof Russian aggression, whereas Kavkasias viewers were led to believe that the EU-report laid the blamefor the war squarely at the feet of President Saakashvili.

The media monitoring also found that the targeted channels do indeed fall into opposing camps, withImedi, Rustavi 2 and Channel 1 often broadcasting similar stories and not criticizing one another, withKavkasia and Maestro doing much the same thing from the other side. This is highlighted by a reportfrom September: Channel 1 broadcast a statement from the Patriarchate, saying that it was not involvedin inviting some controversial Russian journalists to Georgia. The report on Kavkasia showed the samestatement, but also broadcast another part, where the patriarchate criticized Imedi TV for airing aprevious report saying that the patriarchate had indeed invited the Russian journalists. Thus, Channel 1refrained from airing criticism of Imedi. The two camps also frequently refrain from criticizing thepolitical groupings they are seen to be allied with. During the anti government protests in April, Rustavi2, Imedi and Channel 1 broadcast the story of a student who addressed the protestors, he called on

9The monitoring was carried out by the Center of Social Sciences (CSS) at Tbilisi State University, with external double-blindreview and extensive practical project management by CRRC.


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them not to use swear-words or threatening language about their political opponents, and was booedand jeered off the stage. The incident, potentially bad publicity for the opposition, was not covered byKavkasia or Maestro. Incidents such as these demonstrate the extreme polarization of the Georgian TVlandscape.

Furthermore, the lack of professionalism which was complained about by a large number of focus

group participants and media professionals, was readily apparent across the targeted channels.Monitoring detected several examples of unbalanced reporting, opinions presented as facts, andmisleading and confusing information. After a clash between protestors and municipal officials on

April 12, Rustavi 2s coverage dedicated 55 seconds to the officials side of the story, and just 12seconds to the views of the protestors. On April 1, Kavkasia broadcast an item about a group of peopleprotesting against the alleged sale of Georgian art treasures abroad. The protest was shown, as well assound-bites from the participants, but there was no attempt to show the other side of the story. Thechannel did not interview anyone from the government, the Ministry of Culture or the nationalmuseums, and the allegations of the protestors were presented as facts, with no evidence being offered.Incidents like this were in evidence regularly in all three monitoring phases.

Overall, the monitoring showed that many of the issues raised by both the general public and the mediaprofessionals are genuine concerns. Biased and unprofessional reporting is frequently in evidence on allthe targeted channels. Furthermore, the perception that Channel 1, Rustavi 2 and Imedi favour thegovernment, while Kavkasia and Maestro favour the opposition is borne out. The ongoing polarizationof the television sector is one of the biggest challenges facing media development in Georgia today.

Analysis

Although much needs to be done to guarantee a free and professional media scene in Georgia, it isimportant not to overlook some fundamental strengths that have led to the diversity of views availableto many Georgians today. News broadcasts are the most popular TV programs in the country, andmore than 84 percent of Georgians watch news every day. Georgia, therefore, has a tremendous

appetite for news, and the fact that high percentages of respondents think popular channels like Rustavi2 represent government interests suggests that Georgians are not uncritical viewers. Several focusgroup respondents said that they watch a number of different channels in order to work out the issuefor themselves, something also re-iterated by one of the media professionals interviewed. Respondentsexpressed a strong desire for professional and balanced reporting, showing that the Georgianpopulation know what they want from their journalists.

Furthermore, although television is still the dominant force in the Georgian media, it is a mistake todiscount print, radio and the internet as insignificant. Over 80 percent of Georgians read weeklynewspapers at least once or twice a month, and this sector is renowned for the diversity of its political

views. The growth of internet use also matters. The most popular activity among Georgian internet

users is social networking, practiced by more than 50 percent of respondents who use the internet.Social networking sites are ideal forums to exchange information, articles and videos, and there havebeen several instances of internet-based discussions spilling over into the traditional media in Georgia.10

Almost every journalist interviewed said that the internet has the potential to be the main source ofinformation in Georgia within the next ten years.

However, there are significant weaknesses in the Georgian media landscape. Among the mostsignificant is the deep polarization in the TV sphere. As the media monitoring shows, channelsconsidered pro-government and pro-opposition both frequently broadcast information that ismisleading, inaccurate and highly partisan. Media professionals underscore this challenge, with one

10Currently, a scandal surrounding videos insulting the Georgian Orthodox Church is one of the top stories in Georgia. Thestory began when these videos were posted onto social-networking site Facebook.


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focus group participant saying that there are no neutral channels in Georgia, just pro-government orpro-opposition.

Georgian journalists themselves highlight a range of further shortcomings of the media sector, and aresignificantly less trusting of media outlets than the general public. Almost all of the media sectorinterviewees highlighted the need for more professionalism on the part of Georgian journalists, as well

as less interference from owners.

Media professionals were also critical of themselves. One media professional commented that one ofthe biggest challenges facing the media sector was that there is no solidarity among journalists. Thissituation is not helped by the financial dependence of journalists. Media jobs, especially in TV, arerelatively highly paid, and there is therefore pressure to toe the line of the media outlets owner ratherthan risk unemployment. Moreover, it is said that the problem is compounded by the poor contractsstaff are employed under.

Nevertheless, the research findings indicate opportunities. Transparency of ownership, mentioned bymany respondents, can be addressed in a short time frame. Also, with the overwhelming majority of

both media professionals and the general public keen to see a wide variety of issues investigated, thereis an ideal opportunity for any channel to produce a high-quality investigative show. Not only wouldsuch investigative reporting be a welcome addition to the airwaves, but with over 75 percent of thepublic interested in such a programme, it is likely to be popular. Moreover, the demand for policy-related programming is evident from the preferences that the public has expressed.

In addition to this, many media professionals interviewed put forward concrete ideas about how toimprove the media environment. There is no shortage of ideas on how to move forward. In terms ofideas, the sector is not in stagnation.

Yet if there are opportunities and ideas, the research suggests that complacency is misplaced. In themost extreme case, an entrenched polarization can be a threat to political stability. Politicaldisagreements should be negotiated in one arena, rather than remaining segregated in separate realms.

A losing side that considers itself consistently marginalized will question the very legitimacy of thesystem and goes in search of radical alternatives. Once it enjoys the support of considerable parts of thepopulation, this begins to undermine the institutional and parliamentary processes that the Georgianpublic is keen to see functioning.

In May 2009, when asked what issues the government and the opposition should resolve betweenthemselves, media freedom was cited by 69 percent, closely following the issue of judicial independence(73 percent) and legislative reform to guarantee free and fair elections (70 percent). In other words,respondents believe that a further improvement of media is an integral part of the ongoing process ofGeorgian democratization {CRRC, Politics & Protest Survey}.

More broadly, results from ongoing opinion research suggest that this is a good time to tacklefundamental issues. Since September 2007, Georgia has faced a number of bitter internal and externalchallenges. By comparison, survey results indicate that the country right now is less divided than it hasbeen for more than two years. Relatively speaking, this therefore is a real window of opportunity tomove forward on the major issues facing the Georgian media, many of them highlighted by thisresearch.


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Research Methodology

The findings presented in this report are based on several research components. CRRC undertook1. baseline desk research, to summarize the existing state of research;2. a nationally representative public opinion survey throughout Georgia with 1768 respondents;3. 8 targeted focus groups in Tbilisi and Kutaisi;4. in-depth semi-structured interviews with 20 media professionals;

5. a mini-survey among 47 media professionals;6. media monitoring, both quantitative and qualitative, of Georgia's main television channels.

Baseline Desk Research

The baseline desk research synthesized previous studies, but also drew on CRRC's extensive research inGeorgia at the Caucasus on social, political and economic developments. It drew on multiple surveysthat were conducted throughout 2007, 2008 and 2009, and contained relevant media data. The deskresearch helped to guide further parts of the research effort.

Public Opinion Survey

The public opinion survey (also referred to as Media Consumer Survey) was undertaken by the CRRCwith its own fieldwork staff from October 3-15, 2009, with 1768 full interviews. The response rate was64%, and the sample size included a total of 2,750. To draw the sample, the country was stratified intotwo macro-strata (capital, urban), and subsequently 170 primary sampling units were selectedthroughout the country (70 in Tbilisi, 50 outside Tbilisi, to reflect routine higher non-response in

Tbilisi). Clusters coincided with electoral districts. Households were selected by random routesampling, and the respondent within the household was selected using the last birthday method.Nonresponse arose primarily from not being able to locate the selected respondent within the surveytime frame, and is not expected to have a major impact on the accuracy of results. As other surveysdone according to international standard, this survey has a 95 percent confidence interval, with a 5

percent margin of error.

The survey language was Georgian, since the survey targeted those following the Georgian media. Thesample excluded primary sampling units with more than 60% of non-Georgian residents. (For surveysincluding Armenian and Azerbaijani interviewing language, please check the annual CRRC DataInitiative.) It also excluded areas that are difficult to access, such as Svaneti.

Focus Groups

Eight focus groups were conducted in total, with four in Tbilisi and in Kutaisi each. The FG in Kutaisialso recruited participants from rural areas. FGs were divided by age (21-40, 41-70) and by the sourcesof information (those who rely primarily on TV for news versus those who also draw on other sources

of information for news; both groups were screened for an active interest in politics in Georgia).

The respondents were recruited from two sampling points, one centrally located, and one in a suburb,and screened participants through questions to identify their eligibility. Focus groups in Tbilisi wereconducted on October 14-15, and in Kutaisi on October 16-17, 2009.

In-depth Interviews

In-depth interviews were conducted with 20 media professionals. These comprised journalists, mediamanagers, and academics specializing in journalism or media studies. They also represented a mix of

TV, radio, newsprint and online journalists, from across the political spectrum. These interviews weremostly pre-structured, to ensure comparability. Interviews lasted between 40 minutes and one hour,

and were conducted by a team of four specifically trained interviewers, under the supervision of anexperienced journalist and academic with international standing. This activity focused on Tbilisi.Interview language was Georgian, and the interviews were conducted between October 7-14, 2009.


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Media Professionals Mini-Survey

To compare public opinion with the views of experts, CRRC conducted a mini-survey among mediaprofessionals. The media professionals targeted for in-depth interviews were asked more than 30questions that had been directed at the Georgian public, to allow for comparison. To increase thenumber of respondents, CRRC used judgmental/purposive sampling to identify further interviewees.Media experts were asked to name further media professionals who play a significant role in opinion-

making in Georgia. In addition to the 20 media professionals interviewed, CRRC identified a further 30journalists, from which 27 were interviewed, yielding a total of 47 completed interviews. The interviews

were again conducted between October 7-14, 2009. These results are only indicative, and notrepresentative, since a representative survey of journalists would require a clearly defined targetpopulation of journalists. In Georgia, at this point, the concept of journalism is too fluid to allow forsuch precision. (In countries with a more established profession similar surveys are sampled from listsof unions, or journalism accreditations.)

Media Monitoring

The media monitoring component of the project was undertaken by the Center for Social Sciences(CSS) at Tbilisi State University from September 15-November 15 with a sample of 350 news

broadcasts. The monitoring periods were April 1-14, May 19-31, and September 1-October 13, 2009.News broadcasts were monitored from the networks Imedi, Rustavi2, Georgian Public Broadcasting(GPB), Kavkasia, and Maestro. One broadcast was monitored per network per day; specifically thebroadcast of longest duration during the prime-time period (defined as 8:00 PM - 12:00 AM). Monitorscollected data on variables including time allocation to various actors (e.g. the state, the non-parliamentary opposition), the portrayal of news items as positive, negative, or neutral, and the numberof instances of inflammatory language or hate speech. In addition, the inclusion or omission of newsitems broadcast by the independent sources Radio Liberty and Civil.ge was recorded. Qualitativeexamples of the types of media bias observed during the monitoring process were collected tocomplement the quantitative data.

Final Report

The report has been written by a team and received structured feedback at various stages of thedrafting process, and reflects a consensus view on the findings. It focused on highlighting the mainfindings that are relevant to a broader debate about the current stage of Georgian electronic media andits future development.

To facilitate independent analysis, CRRC provides an appendix presenting the main data from theresearch. Other research findings not directly pertaining to the report have been omitted, and can bemade available separately. The data set and other items will be made available online in the coming

weeks. This will allow for a detailed analysis according to age, location of residence, education, sex,employment, and many other variables. Additional presentations or targeted analysis can be offered on

request. Please address your requests for more information to [email protected].

Questions or Comments

This report is circulated in advance of the EU-Georgia Civil Society Human Rights Seminar on MediaFreedom, due to take place in Tbilisi on November 10-11. Specific comments or questions before the

workshop are gratefully received by CRRC's Regional Director, Hans Gutbrod, [email protected].


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ANNEX II: MEDIA RESEARCH SURVEY FINDINGS

The tables below present a selection of main findings from the media research, as they are

relevant for the report. They draw primarily on the quantitative components of the research.

Some of the tables contrast media consumers (the general public in Georgia) with media

professionals (journalists, managers, editors). Since the number of media professionals

interviewed is small, the frequency/number is noted separately. Note that survey findings should

be interpreted with considerable caution, and not quoted out of context. This especially applies to

trust ratings.

[MEDIA CONSUMER SURVEY q2] First main source of information for

receiving news about current events in Georgia?

TV 88

Neighbors, friends 3

Internet 3

Newspapers 2Family members 2

Radio 1

[MEDIA CONSUMER SURVEY q4.1] How often do you receive information

about current events in Georgia from the Internet?

Every day 7

Several times a week 4

Once a week 2

Once or twice per month 5

Never 50Not applicable 31


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[MEDIA CONSUMER SURVEY q4.3] How often do you receive information

about current events in Georgia from national TV channels?

Every day 84


Once a week 2


Never 2

Not applicable 1

[MEDIA CONSUMER SURVEY q8] To what extent do you agree or disagree

that the Georgian journalists serve interests of people like you?

1 - Disagree completely 8

2 3

3 7

4 8

5 21

6 9

7 10

8 11

9 2

10 - Agree completely 7

Don't know 11

Refuse to answer 1

[MEDIA PROFESSIONALS SURVEY q8] To what extent do you agree or

disagree that the Georgian journalists serve interests of people like you?Frequency Percent

1 - Disagree completely 2 4

2 6 13

3 12 26

4 6 13

5 11 23

6 2 4

7 1 2

8 3 6

9 1 210 - Agree completely 1 2

Dont know 1 2

Refuse to answer 1 2


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[MEDIA CONSUMER SURVEY q10] Statements on freedom of speech in

Georgia

Strongly agree that there is no freedom of

speech17

Agree that there is no freedom of speech

28Agree that there is freedom of speech 31

Strongly agree that there is freedom of speech 4

Agree with neither 5

Dont know 13

Refuse to answer 3

[MEDIA CONSUMER SURVEY q11] Should the following issues be

investigated by journalists?

Healthcare programs 78Courts 75

Elections 80

Protection of freedom of speech 82

Relationship between the politicians and the

church64

[MEDIA CONSUMER SURVEY q15] Which of the following statements you

agree with?

Strongly agree that government should control

media

7

Agree government has the right to control 15

Agree government does not have the right to

control42

Strongly agree that government should not

control media21

Agree with neither 2

Don't know 12

Refuse to answer 1

[MEDIA CONSUMER SURVEY r4.2] How frequently do you receiveinformation about current events in Georgia from national radio stations?

Every day 33


Once a week 12


Never 7

Not applicable 1

Don't know 1


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[MEDIA CONSUMER SURVEY p3.2] How frequently do you receive

information about current events in Georgia from national weekly

newspapers?

Every day 2


Once a week 33


Never 11

Not applicable 3

Dont know 1

[MEDIA CONSUMER SURVEY i1] How frequently do you use the Internet?

Every day 12

Once a week 5

Once a month 3

Less often 5

Never 69

I dont know what the Internet is 5

Dont know 1

[MEDIA CONSUMER SURVEY tv10] On an average weekday, how much time

in total do you spend watching TV? (Hours)

Less than hour 1

hour to 1 hour 6

More than 1 hour, up to1 hours 7More than 1 hours, up to 2 hours 10

More than 2 hours, up to 2 hours 10


More than 3 hours 41

Watch, but not daily 4

Dont know 6

[MEDIA CONSUMER SURVEY tv11] How much time in total do you spend

watching news and current events on TV? (Hours)Less than hour 16

hour to 1 hour 32

More than 1 hour, up to1 hours 16




More than 3 hours 3

Watch, but not daily 5

I do not watch news programs at all 3

Dont know 8Refuse to answer 1


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[MEDIA CONSUMER SURVEY tv12] How often do you receive news on

politics and current events in Georgia from Rustavi 2?

Every day 79


Once a week 3


Never 1

Not applicable 1

Don't know 1

[MEDIA CONSUMER SURVEY tv14.3] How much do you trust news

broadcasted on Imedi?

Valid Percent

1 - Distrust completely 2

2 1

3 4

4 4

5 14

6 9

7 13

8 16

9 6

10 - Trust completely 16

Not applicable 2

Dont know 11

[MEDIA PROFESSIONALS SURVEY tv14.3] To what extent do you think

people trust news broadcasted on Imedi?

Frequency Valid Percent

1 - Distrust completely 2 4

2 8 17

3 7 15

4 7 15

5 7 156 6 13

7 3 6

8 1 2

9 2 4

10 - Trust completely 0 0

Dont know 4 9


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[MEDIA CONSUMER SURVEY tv14.5] In general, how much do you trust

news that is broadcasted on Rustavi 2?

1 - Distrust completely 3

2 2

3 5

4 5

5 15

6 8

7 15

8 14

9 8

10 - Trust completely 14

Not applicable 1

Don't know 11

[MEDIA PROFESSIONALS SURVEY tv14.5] To what extent do you think

people trust news broadcasted on Rustavi 2?


1 - Distrust completely 3 6

2 5 11

3 8 17

4 8 17

5 5 11

6 4 9

7 4 9

8 3 6

9 1 2

10 - Trust completely 1 2

Dont know 5 11

[MEDIA CONSUMER SURVEY tv16] How often do Georgian TV journalists

let the government's political preferences influence the way they report

the news?

Often 18

Sometimes 30

Seldom 20

Never 11

Don't know 18

Refuse to answer 2


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[MEDIA PROFESSIONALS SURVEY tv16] How often do Georgian TV

journalists let the government's political preferences influence the way

they report the news?


Often 39 83Sometimes 2 4

Seldom 2 4

Never 2 4

Dont know 1 2


[MEDIA CONSUMER SURVEY tv17.11] Whose interests are reflected in news and

current affairs broadcasted on the following TV stations?

Governme

nt

Oppositio

n

Neither

of those

Not

applicable

Dont

know

Refuse to

answer

Imedi 33 7 30 1 24 5

Kavkasia 2 22 5 36 32 3

Rustavi 2 51 1 22 1 20 5

GPB 51 1 11 7 26 4

Maestro 1 16 4 39 36 5

[MEDIA CONSUMER SURVEY tv19] What do you like about your favorite

Georgian TV news and political show hosts? Is it that they are

Good-looking / handsome 13Intelligent 58

Pronouncing clearly 35

Dressed well 4

Displaying a sense of humor 4

Courageous 34

Getting guests to open up 8

Confrontational 1

Asking the right questions 19

Presenting facts clearly 18

Making convincing arguments 11Balanced 15

Provocative 2

Listening to the guests attentively 5


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[MEDIA CONSUMER SURVEY tv35] To what extent do you agree or

disagree that TV channels' coverage is influenced by their owners' personal

interests?

Yes, to a great extent 30

Yes, to a small extent 31

No 4

Don't know 33

Refuse to answer 2

[MEDIA PROFESSIONALS SURVEY tv35] To what extent do you agree or

disagree that TV channels' coverage is influenced by their owners' personal

interests?


Yes, to a great extent 37 79

Yes, to a small extent 6 13

No 1 2

Dont know 3 6

[MEDIA CONSUMER SURVEY d15] Would you approve or disapprove of

your child's decision to become a journalist?

Yes 61

No 13

Not applicable 7

Dont know 18

Refuse to answer 1

[MEDIA PROFESSIONALS SURVEY d15] Would you approve or disapprove

of your child's decision to become a journalist?


Yes 23 49

No 10 21

Not applicable 5 11

Dont know 8 17


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[MEDIA PROFESSIONALS SURVEY] To what extent do you agree or disagree

with the opinion that the Georgian journalists enjoy freedom of speech?


1- Disagree completely

2 1 23 7 15

4 2 4

5 10 21

6 2 4

7 9 19

8 9 19

9 3 6

10 - Agree completely 3 6


For further information, please contact CRRC. Details on the Summary Report.


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ANNEX III: INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

SESSION I: ELECTRONIC MEDIA IN GEORGIA

Speaker 2:Anoush Begoyan, Europe Program Officer, Article 19

BROADCASTING MEDIA IN GEORGIA: MAIN CONCERNS AND WAY FORWARD

In Georgia, as in many other countries, broadcasting media plays a special role in the society as the

main media accessible for large masses of population. Difficulties of distributing newspapers and

their often prohibitive prices for the majority of population mean that broadcast media plays a

central role as affordable and accessible source of information and entertainment. Therefore, it is

difficult to overrate the role and the significance of broadcasting media, especially television, in the

society. While around 40 different stations, including municipal channels, broadcast in Georgia,

few nationwide television and radio channels are the main source of information in the country.

This is especially true for the Georgian Public Broadcasting (GPB).

As elsewhere in the world, in Georgia too Public service broadcasting has the potential to play a

crucial role in ensuring the publics right to receive a wide diversity of information and ideas, by

supplementing and complementing the programming provided by private broadcasters. The aim of

the public service broadcasting is to ensure the provision of quality news and current affairs

programming, promote a sense of national identity, foster democratic and other important social

values, provide quality educational and informational programming, and serve the needs of

minorities and other specialised interest groups.

At the very heart of the idea of Public Service Broadcasting is the goal of serving the needs and

interests of the public. This goal is reflected in the ownership, funding and programming of publicservice broadcasting organisations which, ultimately, need to serve the public. Public service

broadcasting represents a public sphere for discussion and the dissemination of information and

ideas, essential for the proper functioning of a democratic society.

In order to be able to fulfil that mandate and to meet those objectives public service broadcasting

requires three main elements. First, the independence of public service broadcasters must be

guaranteed through appropriate structures such as pluralistic and independent governing boards.

Second, public service broadcasters must be guaranteed funding which is adequate to serve the

needs and interests of the public, and to promote the free flow of information and ideas. And third,

public service broadcasters must be directly accountable to the public, especially in respect of the

discharge of their missions and the use of public resources.

As a result of its centrality as a source of information and news, and its growing profitability,

governments and dominant commercial interests have historically sought to control broadcasting.

All too frequently, the public broadcaster operates largely as a mouthpiece of government rather

than serving the public interest. In many countries, broadcasting was until recently a State

monopoly, a situation which still pertains in some States. In other countries, private broadcasting is

becoming increasingly important and a variety of mechanisms have been used to try to control it.

Governments have exerted control through the licensing process while commercial interests have

sought to monopolise the broadcasting sector and to focus on low quality but profitable

programming.

Thus, while state-funded broadcasters exist in almost every country in the world, only some of these

conform to the standards commonly associated with public service broadcasting. Public service


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broadcasting organisations are generally associated with a number of features, derived in large part

from the guarantee of freedom of expression. In addition, these features flow from the fact that

public funds are being spent on broadcasting which engages certain general principles relating to

public spending.

Although it is recognised that Georgian media legislation is generally liberal and progressive (and

possibly the most liberal in the Caucasus), many foreign and domestic analysts note that theimplementation of the legislation proves more problematic, with unequal implementation of the

laws through regulatory bodies and courts. Meanwhile, Georgian media suffered through two

turbulent years marked by armed conflict with Russia and internal political turmoil which polarized

media landscape and pushed it into two opposing camps, leaving little room for neutrality and

balanced reporting.

Much has been said (or will be said) by Georgian colleagues about the specific issues that Georgina

media was confronted with throughout the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2008 and

during the Russian invasion of Georgia last summer. Without going into many details, I will try to

present a brief summary of main issues that we observed during that period.

- The media careened wildly during the Russian invasion of Georgia. As tensions over breakaway

South Ossetia swiftly snowballed into war in August, Georgian media struggled to rationalise the

developments. Facing an onslaught of propaganda, spin, and censorship, reporters were often

choosing between professional ethics and patriotic feelings.

- The lack of both transparency and diversity in media ownership seems to be one of the main

problems for the freedom of media in the country. Ownership of the leading Georgian broadcasters

remains obscure due to complicated corporate ownership structures and chronic changes in majority

control. There are concerns that current laws are not effective in preventing monopolisation of the

news outlets by one corporate owner. Article 60 of the Law on Broadcasting forbids a person or

legal entity from owning more than one broadcast license for television and radio in one service

area, a single media owner or a corporation can still amass shares of various broadcasting

companies through third parties.

- Mystery around ownership of some of the major broadcasting channels gives rise to rumours and

concerns about increasing government monopoly (direct or indirect) over mainstream media of the

country, affecting quality, impartiality and variety of news. This apprehension is supported also by

instalment in of several managers closely associated with the government to main broadcasting

media outlets.

- Selective enforcement of broadcasting licensing regulations is another area for concern for mediaand freedom of expression watchdogs. Rows over licenses for a number of television and radio

channels (TV Maestro, radio Hereti, two community radio stations operating in Javakheti and

Kvemo Kartli) in recent years highlights some serious concerns regarding the work of Georgian

National Communications Commission (GNCC).

Some analysts feel that by issuing content-bases licenses (a political programming permit, an

entertainment programming permit, etc) GNCC enjoys powers that are too broad and allow the

regulator to exercise control over editorial content of broadcasting media. GNCC must restrict its

role to dealing with technical aspects of broadcasting and issuing general broadcast license that

would allow television and radio companies to make their own choices regarding the content of

their programming. Otherwise, the GNCC might end up playing a role of an editorial control tool.


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- And finally, it is important for Georgian media to take all necessary steps for the improvement of

professional standards of journalisms, through adoption and implementation of active and effective

self-regulations mechanism, as only professional and ethical media can enjoy the trust of the

population and play its public role within society.

SESSION II GEORGIAN PUBLIC BROADCASTER

Speaker 2: Wojciech Dziomdziora, Attorney, Former Member of the Polish NationalBroadcasting Council

PowerPoint Presentation

THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC BROADCASTING TO GUARANTEE THE FREEDOM

OF SPEECH POLISH CASE

AGENDA

-Public merit-Practice-The character of programmes and services of public media-Important factors for public media independence

Public merit

WHO?

Public media (television and radio)

WHAT?

are obliged to offer different programmes and other services in the field of:

- information and commentary

- culture, entertainment and education

- sport

TO WHOM?

to the whole society, and its parts,

The character of programmes and services of public media pluralism

balance independence innovation high quality


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Practice

What is important for public media independence?

The position of the supervisory board

INDEPENDENCE

regulations political practice

Financing

Independent from political powers Balance between public and commercial sources

Thank youWojciech Z. Dziomdziora


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Commentator:Firdevs Robinson, Editor, BBC Central Asia & Caucasus Service

WHAT MAKES THE BBC EXAMPLE RELEVANT

The BBC example is a good one for public broadcasting elsewhere. It embodies some key

principles of the public service ethos. The name and reputation have more than 75 years of legacybehind it.

So, what are these key principles?

The BBC is not a government or a state broadcaster. It is a public broadcaster. To be public is to beindependently available to every citizen and to be accountable and fair to all. The basis of the

BBCs offer is universal access for every citizen to high quality journalism, free at the point of

access.

The BBC as a public broadcaster has constitutional independence and this is established by a Royal

Charter. There is also an Agreement setting out its editorial independence and its public obligationsin detail.

So, it is important to have this legal status clearly set out and guaranteed by the constitution.

Under the terms of the Charter and Agreement, the BBC is set six public purposes. These make up

the essence of the contract between the public and the BBC:

sustaining citizenship and civil society

promoting education and learning

stimulating creativity and cultural excellence

representing the UK, its nations, regions and communities

bringing the UK to the world and the world to the UK

taking a leading role in the switchover to digital television.

As a public broadcaster, we have an additional duty to serve the public interest. But what it ispublic interest? It is often quite different than the interests of the state, the government or the

business. And the public interest is not always the same thing as what the public is interested

in.

The BBC can only deliver these public purposes if it remains robustly independent. We guard

against control or undue influence by governments, political parties or pressure groups of

whatever tendency. Our credibility stems from our independence. It is a fundamental part of our

contract with the audience which owns and pays for the BBC.

A commitment to accuracy, fairness and impartiality are at the heart of all the BBC's

journalism, irrespective of the language or the medium we use to reach our audiences.

The BBC imposes responsibilities on its journalists so as to guard its independence and freedom. As

BBC journalists, it is our professional duty to be well informed and fair minded. Were required to

remain within the law, and to take the greatest care not to commit libel. We strive for accuracy. We

do not judge an issue before we possess all available facts. We must remain impartial whatever ourpersonal views. As programme makers, we constantly need to examine and challenge our own

assumptions.


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Accuracy, context, even-handedness, fairness, objectivity, open-mindedness, awareness,

transparency, truth, distance and rigour- these are all essential elements of impartiality.

Due impartiality should not be synonymous with a mathematical balance, nor should it be confused

with neutrality or interpreted as indifference. It is different from balance and neutrality. It has three

basic requirements.

It should allow the widest possible range of views and opinions to be expressed, provided they

are lawful.

It should take account not just of the whole range of views on an issue but also of the weight of

opinion which supports these views.

It has to recognise that range of views and the weight of opinion are constantly changing.

We see our task not as telling people what to think, but as enabling them to make up their

own minds.

For a public broadcaster to remain robustly independent, it is necessary for it to be adequately

funded. Around the world, there are many different ways of funding an independent public

broadcaster but the way we do it in Britain is the licence fee. Everyone with a television set is

required to pay a set amount of money each year. This allows it to run a wide range of popular

public services for everyone, free of adverts and independent of advertisers, shareholders or

political interests. This is an increasingly controversial method of funding and if there are any

questions, we can go back to it later.

I would like to go back to 6 public purposes that I had mentioned before.

As a public broadcaster, the BBC is specifically required to sustain civil society.So, providing impartial news and current affairs is not an end in itself. It is a means to promote a

thriving civic life in the country by providing citizens with the necessary information and insight to

take an effective part in the debates on which democracy hinges to hold those in power to account.

This is a crucial element of being a public broadcaster. We have a duty to challenge power and

hold it to account on behalf of the public.

Questions are directed not only to the state organs, the establishment and to the government but

equally to other political entities. We ask the same searching questions to the opposition parties or

other public and private bodies. Thats where the principal of impartiality lies.

As the Chairman of the BBC Trust Sir Michael Lyons puts it: an informed democracy requires an

informed electorate, not just an informed elite.

Another crucial element among those six public purposes is informing our understanding of the

world. In this globalised, interconnected world, international coverage is increasingly becoming a

vital test of the value of any public broadcaster. Commitment to cover the world is an important

part of public service definition and it is one of the most difficult and expensive activity abroadcaster can undertake. Not surprisingly, it is the first thing that gets reduced or cut altogether

when commercially funded broadcasters start tightening their belts.

Britain, along with many countries has to achieve the digital TV switchover in 2012. As part of its

public service remit, the BBC has been tasked with taking a leading role in this switchover. Thisis a multi-faceted task. It means we need to support digital distribution so, we need to help people

acquire digital technology.


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Media literacy is an essential tool of modern citizenship. The BBC has a clear public serviceimperative to think about how it can support citizens and help them keep up developments. It is a

public broadcasters duty to help prevent the emergence of an underclass of people whose ability to

participate in society is reduced as a result of rapid technological change.

And finally, a public broadcaster has set the standard for the rest of the media for high quality of journalism by not only being an example but by providing leadership and training to the media

sector.

This is the idea behind the BBCs College of Journalism.

SESSION III: RIGHT TO ACCESS AND IMPART INFORMATION. MEDIALEGISLATION AND PRACTICE

Speaker 1:Ilia Dohel, Office of the Representative for the Freedom of the Media, OSCE

PowerPoint Presentation

ACCESS TO INFORMATION BY MEDIA IN THE OSCE REGION

Access to information by media Survey

- Conducted by the Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media- Supported by 2006 Belgian CiO- Questionnaire sent to Governments,- civil society, and field missions- Results based on responses for 52 out of 56 countries- Findings and 450-page database:

www.osce.org/fom

The four surveyed areas

- Freedom of Information (FOI) laws- Classification rules (What is a secret?)- Punitive laws and practices (Breach of Secrecy)- Protection of journalists confidential sources

Freedom of information laws (FOI)

- Positive trend: 45 out of 56 states have national FOI laws- Trend exists in all regions- Many laws adopted in recent years:UK (2000), Switzerland (2004), Germany (2005),

Armenia (2003), Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan (2006), Russia (2008)

- Currently develop or consider laws: Luxembourg, Malta


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Access to Information Laws in the OSCE Area

FOI: deficiencies despite successes (1)

- Laws are not implemented- Inherited freedom of expression problems:

Tajikistan: info withdrawn on the typhoid fever, anthrax, other diseases, statistics on divorces,suicides, some public expenditures, seized drugs, natural disasters

Uzbekistan: lack of access to info on the Andijan events


- Laws are not adequate

Italy: law limits access to stakeholdersAustria: broadly defined exemptionsSpain: Government does not recognize law on administrative procedures as a FOI law and doesnot answer requests.


- Withdrawing of openness in advanced FOI states

USA: controversies over reduction of access to data on internal decision-making based onExecutive Privilege.

Ireland: high fees on FOI requests reduced the use of the act significantly (requests declined by 83per cent between 2003 and 2004)

UK: Government proposed fees to reduce media use of FOI.Bulgaria:proposals to show interest, extend timeframes and increase fees

FOI Recommendations

- Adopt FOI laws as general basis for obtaining information from public bodies.


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- Bodies should be required in law to respond promptly. Time-sensitive requests or thoserelating to an imminent threat to health or safety should be responded to immediately.

- Requesting information should be simple and free or low-cost.- The public interest in disclosure should be considered in each case.- The FOI law must have precedence over other rules on information handling.- Adequate mechanism for appealing each refusal to disclose (an independent oversight

body).- There should be sanctions for deliberately withholding information in violation of the law.

CLASSIFICATION RULES

- Too wide arrays of info classified- Most states have not adjusted classification to FOI

Recommendations on rules of classification

- Only data that directly relate to the national security may be classified.

- Information on violations of the law or human rights, maladministration, on threats topublic health or the environment, statistical information, etc., or that which is embarrassing

to individuals or organisations should not be classified as a state or official secret.

- Information should only be classified for a limited period of time.- An independent body should have oversight over classified information, and power to

declassify information upon complaints.

CRIMINAL SANCTIONS for breaches of secrecy

- At least 29 OSCE participating States (mostly post-1989 democracies) punish non-officials,including journalists, for breaches of secrecy

- Danger: in such countries courts may not acquit a journalist caught with secrets. Thejournalist may only prove the data was inappropriately classified.

Best Practices CRIMINAL SANCTIONS for breaches of secrecy

- USA: no provisions on disclosure. The 1917 Espionage Act does not apply to publicationsof secrets in the media.

- Norway: the duty of secrecy does not apply to members of public- Georgia: Law on Freedom of Speech and Expression punishes only officials for breach of

secrecy

- Austria, Moldova: Public interest scrutiny, protection of whistleblowers

Recommendations on criminal sanctions for breaches of secrecy

- Criminal and Civil Code prohibitions should only apply to officials and others who have aspecific legal duty to maintain confidentiality.

- Whistleblowers, officials who disclose secret information of public interest to the mediashould not be sanctioned.

- The test of public interest in the publication should become an integral part of courtpractice.


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PROTECTION OF SOURCES

- Trend is the worst of all the others revealed by the survey:only a minority of states haveshield laws

- ECtHR (Goodwin v. the UK, 1996):Without such protection, sources may be deterredfrom assisting the press in informing the public in matters of public interest. As a result the

vital public-watchdog role of the press may be undermined and the ability of the press toprovide accurate and reliable information may be adversely affected.

Best Practices PROTECTION OF SOURCES

- Best practices:Belgium a free standing comprehensive law

34 states in the USFrance and US Federal shield laws pendingGood provisions: Armenia, Austria, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, FYR

Macedonia, Georgia, Germany, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Norway, Poland, Portugal,

Romania, Sweden, TurkeyCase law:Cicero case in Germany

PROTECTION OF SOURCES

THREE PARADOXICAL TRENDS:- 67 per cent of cases registered in the pre-1989 democracies. Most of these countries have

some degree of sources protection.

- These attempts were regularly overturned by courts, except in federal cases in the UnitedStates. All recorded cases of journalists actually punished (even imprisoned) resulted fromthis legislative deficiency at the U.S. federal level.

- The insignificant amount of breach of secrecy and of protection of sources cases in theCIS region. The small amount of such cases may be caused by weak investigative

journalism in the region.

Recommendations on the protection of sources

- Each participating State should adopt an explicit law on protection of sources to ensurethese rights are recognized and protected.

- Journalists should not be required to testify in criminal or civil trials or provideinformation as a witness, unless in exceptional cases of pressing need defined by the law.

Details:

- Access to information by the media in the OSCE region: Trends and Recommendationshttp://osce.org/item/24250.html

- Access to information by the media in the OSCE region: Country Reportshttp://osce.org/item/24251.html


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SESSION IV: PROFESSIONALISM AND SELF-REGULATION

Speaker 1: Benot Califano, Director, Graduate School of Journalism, ESJ-Montpellier

MEDIA AND DEMOCRACIES

We can measure the democratic level of a society by the place held by the press, the media and the journalists. You just need to observe the severity of controls of information in the authoritarian

regimes or the absence of independent information in the dictatorships to demonstrate how

journalists are the foundation for an alive democracy. This year, China, Erythre, Iran, and Cuba

have had the worst record amongst imprisoned journalists. In two thousand nine, one hundred

seventy journalist have been imprisoned and thirty three were killed.

There is no freedom without freedom of the press, but summarize the concept of democracy by the

simple idea of freedom is insufficient. The democracy is a system which must give to each citizen

the power to individually contribute and act on the common life in the society. Not only through his

vote, which approves or sanctions the choices, the actions and the decisions of the elected leaders.

But also through the expression of a public voice, which we could call the public debate. Therichness of this democratic debate, where dominant and minority ideas confront themselves, gives

birth to a process of social cohesion. It gives the possibility for a society to be built and for its

leaders to define the rights and the duties of the citizens according to the common good and shared

values.

In regards to this democratic challenge, the press plays an important role in sparking and diffusing

the citizen expression, with diversity and contradiction in order to make the points of view heard by

all. In a certain manner, it must go through this plural expression to reflect what we call the public

opinion. Expressions and points of view from ordinary citizens, intellectuals, decision makers or

experts Thus, each informed citizen feels that he belongs to a participative community. The

media becomes vectors of the social link, and journalists, the mediators between I and us,

between I and the world.

But the journalists should not be satisfied to be the simple megaphone of the citizens. The public

expression has a democratic sense only if it is pertinent, which means reflected and argued. The

media have this essential and fundamental mission to inform the citizen to allow him not to react

anymore in an emotive way but in a rational way while being conscious of the challenges of the

world and the complexity of the debates raised in the society. Thus he will be better armed to react

to the frequent simplistic and tempting speaches demagogic and populist, in order to resist against

the strategies of propaganda of economic or political powers, more and more perfomant in their

public communication. The journalists role is not to direct public opinion but to nourish and train it- giving facts and perspective - so that it can take part in the public debate in an enlightened way.

It is a heavy responsibility which weighs on their shoulders and which make them the essential

actors of a democratic society: a fourth power and a counter-power vis-a-vis the legislature, with

the executive, and the legal one. It implies for them a clear definition of rights and duties , an ethics

without fault, a deontology engraved in the marble and a rigorous professionalism. The text of

reference which defines professional journalism in the European standards is the charter of Munich

signed in nineteen seventy one. It is adopted by the majority of the European trade unions

journalists, by the international federation and organization of the journalists. Necessary but not

sufficient, it draws the ethical requirement of our profession.

Any worthy journalist must : respect the truth, defend freedom of information, publish verified

information, refuse any pressure, respect private life, rectify inaccurate informations, maintain the


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secrecy of the sources, prohibit plagiarism, calumny and slandering, not receive advantages, not

confuse journalism and propaganda, and not use unfair methods.

This charter, which define the framework in which a professional of information must evolve,

traces also the contract of confidence which links the journalist with his readers, its listeners and its

televiewers. It is this link which forges the credibility of the media and allows them to fulfill their

role near the citizens. But today, it would be untrue to idealize this contract. For many citizens, we journalists are not identified any more like researchers of truth, but like an instrument of the

dominant thought. We are not regarded any more as a counte-power but as an associated power.

This situation questions our independence, our professionalism and our function within the society.

Even in the old democracies, the situation of journalists is not simple and the requirement for good

and reliable information is an every day struggle. With the pressure of political power is added

today the one of economic power Globalization, concentration, acquisition of media by powerful

industrial groups, budgetary restrictions and marginalisation weaken the independence of the

journalists and the conditions under which they can work with rigour, ethics and professionalism.

Moreover, a new industrial revolution, as powerful as the invention of printing or the control of the

waves hustles our professional community and requires us to reconsider our practices. Becausetoday, the emergence of the new media on the Web makes it possible for all to be a producer of

information on a worldwide scale. The individuals and the communities who until now have been

receivers now have the possibility of becoming transmitters for better and for worse. In this world

wide web where information and communication, truth and lies mix together, the journalist no

longer has the monopoly and control of the diffusion. While this new environment has created

challenges, it is a great opportunity for journalists to affirm their professionalism and their role of

scout in this new profusion of information: to check, treat and classify information based on matter,

put in prospective, and separate the essential from the insignificant which floods the web. He is also

confronted with new challenge, to integrate and associate the Citizen voice born of these new media

within a coherent informative framework.

More than ever, we have to affirm our democratic mission, our professional values, our rights and

our duties and transmit them to the young generation of journalists. If a few years ago, our

journalism could be learned on-the-job, in an empirical transmission, the media universe has now

become too turbid, too powerful and too technical to be left in the hands of amateurs. Today, the

training of qualified and responsible professionals has become an absolute necessity. The schools of

journalism must be places of reference, built on solid and invariable values, with the charter of

Munich, its rights and its duties, pinned at the main entrance door. They must transmit the know-

how as much as the ethics, for the young people who enter the trade, but also for the professionals

throughout their life. It is by this condition that we will be able to continue to be the foundation in

the perpetual construction of the democratic structure.

Commentator:Patrick Leusch, Head of Project Development Division, Deutsche Welle Akademie

COMMENTS

Like in the whole region, also in Georgia journalism is taught at universities. This implicates a more

theoretical approach, which is OK on one hand, concerning the challenging task in media and it's

social relevance. However, analysing the curricula and its effects when working with professional

journalists, vocational training in the region seems partly dysfunctional when it comes to teach

students the reality on media workers job. The reality of work in media, in terms of ethicalstandards, rights and duties of journalists, workflow, power sharing, etc. seems mostly unclear or

unknown. Thus the role of journalism or the function of media in a society is distorted in the view


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of many media workers. Tackling this gap between theory and practice is still the challenge in

professionalism. Therefore a revised curricula for the vocational training is needed and a huge effort

to empower professionals still working in the sector since, with a non-adequate understanding of

their role. This weakness can not be addressed without being integrated in HRD concepts in which

media owners and managers are involved, because of the need for their commitment to changed

roles and habits.

Recommendations

1) There is an need of an independent and trustworthy self-regulatory body for media, which can

efficiently monitor media and set journalistic standards. The self regulatory body should be owned

by the media sector itself establish mechanisms to make the media respect the rules agreed.

(We know that this project is ongoing, but would like to stress the importance of self-regulatio

Documents

Eu Georgia Seminar Annexes Media Freedom Nov 2009 En