EU and Arab Spring

7/30/2019 EU and Arab Spring

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N 100 - OCTOBER 2011

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Richard Youngs

The EU and the Arab spring:from munificence to geo-strategy

>> For all the fears over potential instability and less amenablegovernments taking office, political change in the Middle Eastand North Africa (MENA) is good news for Europe. The EU is rightto set the deepening of Arab reform as a key objective. Many admirablenew European policy initiatives have been introduced offering supportfor Arab reform. The recently-held inaugural EU task force meeting onTunisia produced an impressive list of assistance projects. Butemerging dynamics in the region suggest that over the longer-term theEU will also require a fundamentally more strategic approach. Muchmore is needed than the current plethora of small-scale transition-related projects. A paradigm shift is called for: from the EU endlesslyreiterating the responsibility it has to help MENA reforms to a morehard-headed look at how Europe needs to reposition itself geo-

strategically in light of changes in the region.

With the anniversary of the Tunisian revolt not far over the horizon, thenext step is for an evolving EU policy to move onto this new paradigm.Some astutely forward-looking policy-makers in the European externalaction service and national foreign ministries do show signs of wanting tomove policy in this direction. What follows below is a series of suggestionsthat might contribute towards thinking on this more strategic outlook.

THE UNWANTED?

One refrain is routinely and somewhat ritually now repeated: Arabprotests are in the name of freedomfrom the West and not in aspirationof joining a Western project. This apparently fundamental difference

The EU has in many ways

reacted well to the Arab

spring, but must now

gradually move beyond its

stance of listening and

helping;

The EU should map out ageostrategic vision for how

the Arab spring conditions

its own long-term

interests;

To do this, the EU must

seek to influence a nascent

set of underlying

economic, governance and

security dynamics across

the Middle East.

HI G HLI G HTS


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THE EU AND THE ARAB SPRING:FROM MUNIFICENCE TO GEO-STRATEGY

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with previous transition waves, especially in

southern and then eastern Europe, is nowfrequently noted. The same point of view hasbeen forwarded even by the most prominent ofLibyan writers and intellectuals, after six monthsof British- and French-led commitment in thiscountry. The rather stage-managed receptiongiven to David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy inTripoli in September cannot mask the fact thatautonomy has been the leitmotif of uprisingsacross the MENA region.

While policy-makers have outwardly taken thisobservation on board, there is a growingmismatch between European and Arabperspectives on EU-MENA relations. In Europethe focus is on how the EU should be doing moreto foster genuine partnership, be more generousand less self-interested, listen to local voices andbe more sensitive to different forms of politicalorganisation. This author is struck by thefrequency with which European diplomats andanalysts now suggest that the EU should refrainfrom emphasising its own preferences and

interests, and rather follow the flow of unfoldingtrends in the MENA. Listen to every interviewsenior officials or ministers offer upon departingfor the region: we are going to listen and not toimpose our preferences, they invariably insist.Nomenclature portrays this aspired glow ofshared warmth: think of the Commissions so-called SPRING programme, promising Supportfor Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth.

In contrast, Arab reactions are notably combative.

A familiar stock of complaints is forthcomingfrom Arab interlocutors. In what is apparentlybecoming the standardised term of warning, eventhe most liberal of reformers say Europe is not anacceptable partner in religious matters. Arabswant European money and the freedom to workin Europe, but the fuzzy talk of culturalpartnerships and shared communities leaves themunimpressed. Mediterranean Union certainlydoes not appear on their wish lists for outsidehelp; indeed questions on this benighted initiativeusually trigger a wry grin of slight disbelief fromones Arab interlocutor.

European must stop preaching its experiences

and models of transition, most Arabs say. WhileEuropeans give great weight to initiativespurporting to disseminate the lessons oftransitions, Arab reformers dismiss these as well-intentioned but marginal. The EU has no role inthe ebb and flow of Egypts process of politicalchange; the shifting alliances and tactics ofdifferent actors in Egypt are unfolding quitebeyond the orbit of EU influence. Algeria isdistancing itself increasingly from EU policyinitiatives.

Arabs leave the EU an unenviably thin line towalk. If Europe fails to help, it is lambasted as evilconspirator with authoritarian remnants. If itdoes help, it is often berated for being driven onlyby pernicious self-interest. The commonly heardplea is that the EU should also keep out of foreignpolicy questions on which more representativegovernments are likely to become morenationalist and assertive.

In short, the EU appears to be more the suitor

now, and on many matters unrequited by its Arabpartners. Of course, many in the region wantEuropean funds. But one cannot help feeling thatthe EUs painfully politically-correct embrace ismet with an increasingly cold shoulder. Given thepast hypocrisy in European policies this shouldcome as no surprise. The EU is paying and willpay for its past misdemeanours. More than a fewspeeches claiming humility and many mea culpaswill be needed to correct Europes legitimacydeficit in the region. In this sense, many Arab

complaints are largely as they should be. Mostlythey do not reflect actual hostility towardsEurope, but governments past actions have breda dearth of trust. Add in Europes patent declineand financial crunch, and the absence of a strongEuropean orientation among Arab reformers isperhaps even more understandable.

But while Arab reactions may be unsurprising andjustifiable, the EU must similarly be less insipid inresponse. The EU must wake up to the fact thatnorth and south of the Mediterranean are talkingqualitatively different languages. The tone of

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European discourse is: thanks to the Arab spring

we can join together in partnership. The Arab lineis: tangible help is welcome, but now you can takethe opportunity to get out of our affairs.Europeans are dressed in hair shirt, Arabs in theregalia of mordant assertiveness.

The EU needs to change its mindset from that ofpassive and limpid helper to that of the geo-strate-gic planner. If Arab actors keep repeating that theEU is not an acceptable partner to interfere,the EU insistence on equal partnership and shared

dec i s ion-making seems increasinglylike recondite self-abasement. Theimplication of hee-ding Arabs owncomplaints aboutEU policies is thatreformers in theregion must ultimate-ly sort out their ownproblems. Europe

should help, andgenerously so. But it should drop the often-heard pretence that we are part of the regionand that we are engaged in the creation of amutually-desired project of deep and harmo-nious politico-social integration.

The EU should aim for more careful calculationof where change in the region can advanceEuropean interests. Arabs should be heeded whenthey say they do not want Europe trying to

micro-manage reform processes. But the Unionmust make clear that the other side to this coin isthat the EU must be tougher in ascertainingwhere its own interests lie in the complex andvaried processes of political change across theMENA region.

If Arabs are not particularly enamoured ofnebulous EU visions of shared community-building, they should not object to a lesssentimental riposte from European governments.It is legitimate for the EU to focus far more onmaking sure that the instability of change does

not spill-over to have negative repercussions on a

broader regional basis. If Arab reformers wantmore freedomfrom the West, then the EU shouldalso map a more autonomous vision of itsstrategic positioning.

To be absolutely clear: this is categorically not aquestion of becoming less ethical, sensitive or softpower-oriented. The EU must be more geo-strategic but not in an old style realpolitikfashion. Europe should be unapologetically pro-reform. But governments are not NGOs. It is

unsatisfactory for European politicians to besaying merely that they wish to listen to theregion without any set of clear strategicpreferences. They have the responsibility to mapout a vision that advances European interests itis for this that they are responsible to theircitizens. This author has been upbraided bysenior EU officials based in the region for evenposing the question in terms of strategic interests.These officials earnestly commit to listening tothe NGOs more and putting the welfare of localpeople first. An admirable and necessary

sentiment, indeed, but not a foreign policy.Beyond this, one probes strategic intent in vain.The question of what their ten year geostrategicvision is for safeguarding EU interests isinvariably met with bashful and blank-eyedsilence. This is deeply pre-occupying.

The EU needs to move beyond its bureaucraticmindset of thinking that a response to the Arabspring is a matter merely of embellishing existingframeworks like the European Neighbourhood

Policy (ENP), the Union for the Mediterranean(UfM), the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership(EMP) or any other so-far ineffectual acronym.Offering more money, markets and mobility ispart of the equation but does not constitute a geo-strategic response to such potentially momentousevents. The EU needs a geostrategic vision forwhere it wants the region to be in the next ten ortwenty years, which problems need to beovercome and where Europe should be able towork with new regimes on broader globalquestions. It should work back from this vision todecide which policy changes are appropriate in >>>>>>

The EU needsa geostrategic

vision for where itwants the regionto be in the nextten or twenty years


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the short-term. At present, the direction of

deliberation is almost the reverse: policy-makerslook at what is bureaucratically feasible now, thensee what can this achieve in strategic terms.

GEOSTRATEGIC PRISMS

Many will say that the EU is already too self-centred and focused on its own immediate powermaximisation. In fact, its policies gravitate to twoextremes simultaneously. At one extreme, its

pronouncements are too NGO-like, in eschewingany focus on interests. At the other extreme, theystill betray a reflex of exclusion and control that isdevoid of longer-term rationale. What is missingis a renewed attempt to delineate the longer termimplications of current changes in the region.Here are (non-exhaustive) suggestions for issuesthat merit consideration.

First, the EU must map out what kind ofgovernance model is envisages for its relationswith the MENA. In the long-term, the challenge

is not merely to think in terms of what amountsof new assistance the EU should be offering, butalso how the underlying institutional templates ofEuropean-MENA relations will change as a resultof the Arab spring. Through the EMP, the EUpurported to create a collective securitycommunity based on shared decision-making anddeeply integrated policy structures across allrealms. In practice, European governmentsthemselves limited the depth of such dynamics.Reassessing its interests in the light of Arab

protests, does the EU now want deep integrationbetween Europe and the southern Mediterranean?Or would it be better served by a more distantrelationship, offering support for reform but froma basis of autonomy? The best way forward islikely to be eclectic. The EU should opt for amore selective and lighter-touch use of the Euro-Mediterranean governance model, combiningthis with a more pro-reform and agileengagement at the level of high-politics.

Second, the EU must assess the risk of the Arabspring hastening the rise of non-Western powers

in the region. Is this more of a modern Suez

moment than a new opening to the spirit ofEuro-Mediterranean collective security? If so,the EU needs a vision for how it intends to react.How can it best influence the way that emergingpowers act in the MENA? Will the EU adopt ageo-strategy of positive-sum cooperation, basedon the hope that having more actors involved canhelp improve the soft security deficits that effectEuropes own interests so acutely? If so, it has along way to go to put such an approach intoaction. Most obviously, the EU must look at how

it can engage Turkey more systematically on thefuture of the Arab spring. Despite all theattention lavished on Turkeys rising regional role,the EU has not attempted to devise a jointstrategy with Ankara towards Arab democracy or,conversely, thought about what the limits mightbe to Arabs acceptance of Turkish involvement.

Third, the EU needs to look beyond Islam. It isoften said that being more strategically self-interested would involve trying to reduce thelikelihood of Islamist governments. This would

be a mistaken approach. But neither willEuropean engagement with Islamists be especiallyrelevant. If there is a turn towards more socialconservatism in the Middle East this is of noprimordial matter to Europe. It might complicatereally deep social linkages and it might not besomething Europeans look upon with muchadmiration after such courageous democracyprotests. But it is not of major geo-strategicinterest. Geopolitical problems are more likely toflow from the depth of social anger if reforms fail,

rather than from the inclusion of Islamist parties.The EU must transcend the debate over engagingversus containing Islam. Its own interests willdepend a lot more on the institutional processesand economic strategies through which socialjustice is pursued.

Which leads on to a fourth consideration: EUeconomic interests will require a fine balancebetween markets and the state. The EU mustrecognise that the way in which economicliberalisation was prompted during the lastdecade nourished much social discontent. But it


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should be wary of over-shooting in the other

direction. It is currently fashionable to argue thatthe Arab spring will and should usher in afundamentally different and strongly anti-marketeconomic model. Many see this as the key tosocial stability, job creation and a reduction inmigration. However, the EU needs a much moregranular analysis of the interweaving of politicaland economic opening. A rigid model ofeconomic liberalisation is to be avoided. But theEU should also resist current anti-market fashionand try to dissuade the region from veering too

far away from economic liberalisation.

The region needs more dynamic private sectors togenerate jobs, not a return to state-socialism.Problems have arisen from the corrupt andnepotistic way in which economies have beenliberalised, much more than from the principle ofeconomic openness per se. The key for geo-economic interest is to support a better quality ofeconomic governance, with balanced roles for thestate and market, devoid of the clientelisticdynamics that have for long distorted both

sectors. The EU must take particular advantage ofthe opportunity to push the region beyond therentier-dominated management of the energysector that has fed both economic and politicalpathologies for so long.

Fifth, the EU must begin to get to grips with whatthe Arab spring means for the long-ruminatedprospects of a pan-regional security framework.The EU needs to sort out its interpretation ofhow the Arab spring conditions intra-regional

relations. What does it feel about an incipientcompetitiveness between Egypt and Saudi Arabia?Clarity is lacking here: some diplomats argue thatEgypt will be the big winner, others insist that thekey will be to back Saudi Arabia as the regionsstar rising power. The way that the Arab springpromises to reshuffle the already-fragile set ofinter-state relations within the Middle East placesmore of a premium on pan-regional politicaldialogue. The regional dimension to non-proliferation efforts are, for example, likely tobecome more important. The impact on theArab-Israeli conflict will also be complex. In

consequence, the EU must shift beyond its rather

fragmented set of policy frameworks across theregion and make more effort to joint together itsMediterranean, Gulf, Yemen, Iran and Iraqpolicies.

Finally, the EU must consider how and where itcan engage with North African states on widerglobal issues. In some ways, North Africa is sosmall in economic and demographic termscompared to the magnitude of the challenges andopportunities emanating from Asia, that Euro-

Mediterranean relations must be crafted with thisbroader context in mind. The EU needs to movebeyond a mind-set that sees the southernneighbourhood only as a burden to be lightened.In view of shifting global power balances, the EUwill need a broader set of strategic alliances builtaround key principles of internationalism. So faronly limited coordination on crisis managementissues with the likes of Morocco has been pursuedin the MENA. The EU must map out a visionthat conceives of deepened partnerships across theneighbourhood as instruments to help the EU

build its global presence. The EU and countries toits south (and indeed, east) will need to establisha common cause in confronting future challengestogether. The template will be to build from astrong neighbourhood out towards the broaderchanges to global order.

CONCLUSION

Both Europeans and Arabs want things both

ways. Europeans want the cach of a politically-correct discourse that we are only here to listenand help, but still have to acknowledge that thelocal response to this may be keep your distance.Arabs convey this message of keep your distance,but simultaneously complain of the paucity ofEuropean money and labour market access. Bothsides need a reality check.

Some will feel that such hard-nosed sobrietyruns contrary to a spirit of other-regardingbrotherhood latent in the Arab spring. Yet, forthe EU to focus more on its own geo-strategic

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vision would not represent a betrayal of

courageous reformers. The EU is broadly rightto be in listening mode and accept locally-drivensolutions. But it must be legitimate tocomplement this with a clear vision of its ownconcerns. The EU should not be so cautious thatit does nothing to make it harder for reform-spoilers to regroup. This would replay the EUsmiscalculated hands-offs approach in theBalkans in the 1990s and waste a potentiallyhistoric opportunity. Some already fear that theLibya intervention was only undertaken because

it was reasonably easy, where resources might berequired in more strategically important parts ofthe region. The EU needs to supplementadmirable humanitarianism with a morevariegated assessment of its geopolitical interests.

The appropriate strategic doctrine might bedefined as a form of liberal realism. Some willdoubt that such a mix of non-prescriptive supportfor locally-driven reforms is compatible with thepursuit of self-interest. The EU must certainlywork hard to ensure that liberal realism is

something more than the symbolic complimentthat virtue pays to vice. Yet, the risk currently liesin the direction of under-playing the strategicimpact of changes afoot in the Middle East. TheUnion is moving so far towards a rhetoric ofdisinterested munificence that its pleas to beinvolved in the regions future look like meresupplicant importuning. The EU risks much if itfails to deal in a more geo-strategic coinage.

Richard Youngs is director general of FRIDE.


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EU and Arab Spring