Ethnic Conflict and the State in Sri Lanka-Laksiri Fernando

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Ethnic conflict and the state in Sri Lanka: A possible solution?Laksiri Fernandoaa University of Colombo,

To cite this Article Fernando, Laksiri(1997) 'Ethnic conflict and the state in Sri Lanka: A possible solution?', South Asia:Journal of South Asian Studies, 20: 1, 83 96

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South Asia, Vol. XX, Spec ial Issue (1997), pp. 83-95.

ETHNIC CONFLICT AND THE STATE IN SRILANKA: A POSSIBLE SOLUTION?

Laksiri Fernand oUniversity of Co lombo

TH IS ES S A Y A TTEMP TS TO ELU C ID A TE TH E A R G U MEN T TH A T TH E ETH N ICconflict between the majority Sinhalese (seventy-four per cent) and theminority Tamils (eighteen per cent) is primarily rooted in the nature andstructure of the state and, therefore, any resolution to the conflict should bebased on a profound reformation of the state system. The essay also explainsthat the conflict throughout decades, if not centuries, has involved andencompassed the ideological sphere of the two communities, and anysettlement to the conflict will not be sustainable without a conscious effort tochange the political culture of the country through education. This essayadvocates the approach of universal human rights applicable to allcommunities which by definition transcends the extreme ethnic demands ofboth comm unities.

The state as the principal rule-making body in society has directimplications on the rights that the citizens in general or a specific group ofcitizens - an ethnicity or minority in particular - would entertain under itsdomain.1 It is for this reason that the state has become the main bone ofcontention in the ethnic conflict not only between the Sinhalese and theTamils but also involving the Muslims (seven per cent) in Sri Lanka. Whowields power in a state system has much to do with who gets what and howmuch. This includes not only the niceties written in a constitution that couldguarantee the rights of the citizens but also the entire practice of the state1 C. Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990 (New York, Basil Blackwell,1991), p. 1; G. Poggi, The State, Its Nature, D evelopment and Prospects (Oxford, PolityPress, 1992), p. 19; K. Vasak, 'Human Rights: As a Legal Reality ' , in P. Alston and K. V asak(eds), The International D imensions of Hum an Rights (Paris, UNESCO, 1982).


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84 SOUTH ASIAranging from policies of employment to the administration of justice throughdifferent layers of the state apparatus. In a multi-ethnic society, the state has tobe constituted and should behave with an ethnic (and religious) impartiality ifits arena is to be free from conflict. The case of contemporary Sri Lanka so farproves the opposite. Throughout years, the state has become not only a field ofethnic conflict but also its main instrument. It is, unfortunately, the armedforces of the state that act as the main representative of the Sinhalese ethnicity.This is a fact which cannot easily be ignored and denies the ethnic impartialityof the state.

The state has at best been understood in Sri Lanka to have a class character. Atthe extreme of this view, the state is considered a direct instrument of thebourgeoisie. The intellectual life of the country has strongly been influencedby the Marxist strand of thinking throughout decades, even a most liberalacademic would entertain certain facets of this view. This view admits that thestate has an ethnic bias in its policies and prac tices, but this is considered to bederiving from its class character.2 The argument goes, 'the bourgeoisie fanethnic conflict to divide and rule the masses'. The origins of this divide andrule policy is seen in the colonial adm inistration.What the political liberals, only a minuscule viewpoint indeed, on theother hand, have attempted in recent times is to emphasise that the state shouldbe free from ethnic bias.3 They say what the state ought to be, but not what it

is . Meanwhile, the conservatives ardently defend the rule of the Sinhalese asthe rule of the majority and try to justify the situation by referring to thesystem of political democracy handed down by the British. They merely talkabout the formal structures of democracy without any reference to its content,human rights, including the rights of the minority.A more realistic view of the state would remind us that the state from itsorigins has had a distinct ethnic character alongside its class nature.4 But thisethnic character is not static, but dynamic and changeable especially under thepresent circum stances. The state as the principal rule-making body in societyseemed to have emerged in Sri Lanka between the third century and the first

2 See further K. Jayawardena, Ethnic and C lass Conflicts in Sri Lan ka (Colombo, Centre forSocial Analysis, 1986).3 C. Amaratunga, 'Some Political and Constitutional Aspects of Devolution', In Sri LankaFoundation Institute, Devolution Proposals: A Way Forward (Colombo, Sri LankaFoundation Institute, 1985), pp 20-5.4 L. Fernando, 'Human Rights and State Formation: A Comparative Study of Burma,Cambodia and Sri Lank a' (Ph.D. thesis, The Univ. of Sydney, 1985), pp. 64-8.

I


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ETHNIC CONFLICT 85century BC. Archaeological evidence directs us to believe the said timeframealthough the Pali chronicles written in the sixth century CE relate the originsof the state to the arrival of King Vijaya in the sixth century BC fromsomewhere in north India.

Before the formation of the state, the indigenous peoples in the country,the possible predecessors of the present day Veddas, seemed to have lived insmall groups organised as families, clans or tribes. In addition to hunting andgathering, more advanced groups were engaged in slash and burn dry ricecultivation but there was no particular need for the state to emerge. The state,it is reasonable to assume, is not a natural part of human existence but aparticular creation based on particular needs and socio-economicdevelopment. It is possible to argue that the state emerged during thetransformation of the mode of production from dry-rice cultivation to wet-ricecultivation, which required organised irrigation, land settlement and evenlabour control. The nature of this hydraulic state was undoubtedlyauthoritarian.Apart from the socio-economic transformation, there was a clear ethnicfactor involved in the formation of the states in the country. What is apparentis that people in Lanka, like in many other countries, tended to live in ethnicgroupings and to form their state institutions through ethnic mobilisation. Thenumerous river valleys, where the states emerged and thrived, had been awhirlpool of various ethno-linguistic groups for centuries. There had beenmigration flows of peoples between the subcontinent and the island, and

elsewhere. The inscriptions dating between the third century and first centuryBC reveal some names of these groups as Kaboja, Milaka, Dameda, Muridi,Meraya and Jhavaka.5 One intriguing factor is the clear absence of anymention of the Sinhalese as a distinct ethnic group or tribe during this time.Leslie Gunawardana, a leading Sri Lankan historian, has advanced the thesisthat the Sinhala ethnicity has been a later formation encompassing varioussub-groups taking the process of dynasty -* kingdom -* people. What is veryclear from this analysis is the role of the state in the formation of the S inhaleseethnicity.6The formation of ethnicities in Sri Lanka or elsewhere is not a muchstudied subject. The most ancient human remains found in Sri Lanka,Balangoda Man, dates back thirty thousand years. It would be futile tospeculate about the ethnic identity of the initial inhabitants of the country.

5 S. Paranavitana, Inscriptions of Ceylon, Vol. 1 (Colombo, Department of Archaeology,1970), p. ixxix.6 R. A. L. H. Gunawardana, 'The People of the Lion: The Sinhala Identity and Ideology inHistory and Historiography', Sri Lanka Journal of theHumanities, Vol. 1 (1979).


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86 SOUTH ASIAThey can best be called indigenous peoples. The argument, who first inhabitedSri Lanka, Sinhalese or Tamils?, is equally a futile exercise. Ethnicities ofboth the Sinhalese and Tamil, with a developed language and a culture aremuch later developments. The groups who could be identified before that eracan best be called proto-ethnicities. They were of both an indigenous and anon-indigenous nature. While the Sinhalese ethnicity seems to have evolved inthe country with probably the dominance of certain migrant groups fromnorthern India, the formation of the Tamil ethnicity must have primarily beena south Indian phenomenon. However, it is important to note the proximitybetween Sri Lanka and Tamil Nadu. It must well be the case that the Tamilethnicity evolved overlapping and over-flowing into certain parts of thenorthern Sri Lanka from historical times.

The ethnic state formation in ancient and mediaeval Sri Lanka did nottake a linear progression but a cyclical form. At least two major periods orcycles are evident. From around the fifth to the tenth century, there was aprocess of ethno-cultural integration in the country. This was the first cycle.The spread of Buddhism and the development of the Sinhalese language weremajor factors in this process. In the formation of the Sinhalese ethnicity, manyof the Tamil groups and their linguistic and cultural elements seem to havebeen absorbed and assimilated into the process. The Sinhalese identity in factwas an umbrella term to call all the inhabitants of the country. It has beenargued, that: 'The inscriptions of the period do not show a separate Tamilcultural element in the country'. 7 Nevertheless, there were references toTamil villages in the northwest of the island. By the tenth century, there hadbeen a clear Sinhalese ethnic state in the country. This was the ideal, and wasthe experience that the Sinhalese nationalists tried to emulate afterindependence in 1948.

It is clear that the Sinhalese ethnic and cultural integration took placewith a degree of coercion and suppression of the Tamils, their religion andculture. When relating the story of king Dutugamunu's military campaign tounite the country, the Mahavamsa written in the sixth century, records that theTamils were slain in large numbers and they were likened to beasts.8 Racismin Sri Lanka cannot be completely of modern origin. Roots of racism werepresent in the early history of the island in attitudes towards the indigenousinhabitants and the Tamils. It is equally possible that similar attitudesprevailed among the Tamils towards the Sinhalese and others. In ancientinscriptions, indigenous peoples, Yakkas and Nagas, were called non-human.

7 S. Kiribamune, 'Tamils in Ancient and Medieval Sri Lanka: The Historical Roots of EthnicIdentity ' , Ethnic Studies Report, Vol. 4, no. 1 (1986), p. 14.8 Ibid., p. 12.


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ETHNIC CONFLICT 87Pulindas or hill tribes constituted a major source of slaves. There arereferences to other groups in inscriptions, whom they called barbarians. 9

The second cycle of ethnic state formation was mainly a process ofpolarisation between the Sinhalese and the Tamil kingdoms after the twelfthcentury. This occurred after two centuries of south Indian occupation in thenorthern parts of the country in the tenth and the eleventh centuries. There wasthe emergence of a relatively autonomous Jaffna kingdom since this period,which remained side by side with the Sinhalese kingdoms until the advent ofWestern colonialism in the sixteenth century.10 The capitals of the Sinhalesekingdoms were pushed back or shifted to the southwestern and central regionsof the country. It was during this period that a clear and separate Tamilcultural identity developed in the country. It is partly the existence andexperience of the Jaffna kingdom that have given inspiration to the strugglefor a Tamil Eelam since 1983. However, in the process of the establishment ofa Tamil ethnic state, the Jaffna kingdom, there were obvious atrocitiescommitted against the religion and culture of the Sinhalese people and otherminority groups, as happened against the Tamils in the formation of theSinhalese ethnic states.

It is my view that ethnic states by nature are inimical to human rights,including the rights of ethnicities to enjoy their cultural, religious andlanguage rights in peace and harmony. To elucidate that argument the historyof ethnic state formation in the past was revisited. However, it should be notedthat the ethnic states in the past were loosely knit entities and as a result therewas much more flexibility than at present for the people to live in ethnicpeace. As Leslie Gunawardana and other scholars have explained, there wereperiods of 'cosmopolitan culture' in the country when the Sinhalese and theTamil communities interacted with a spirit of multi-culturalism.11 However,these situations emerged when the states were relatively free from exclusiveethnic identities.

I IThe objective of Sinhala nationalism since independence in 1948, and evenbefore, was to recreate an ethnic state on the basis of an imagined state ofancient Sinhala kingdoms. This effort marked the origins of the current ethnicconflict in the country. As a result, there had been a gradual but a clear

9 D . M. D. Wickremasinghe (ed .) , Epigraphia Zeylanica, Lithic and Other Inscriptions ofCeylon, Vol. I (London, Oxford Univ. Press, 1912), p. 37.1 0 S. Pathmanathan, The Kingdom of Jaffna (Colombo, Rajendran Press, 1978).11 Gunawardana, op. cit., p. 23.


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88 SOUTH ASIAalienation of minorities from the state system. First, in 1949, nearly a millionTamils of Indian origin who worked in the tea plantations were denied thecitizenship of the new state and eventually disenfranchised. Even beforeindependence, the Sinhalese farmers were preferred in selection to the Tamilsin the agricultural colonisation schemes in the Eastern Province. This waspossible since the Ministry of Agriculture had been transferred to the electedrepresentatives under a dominion arrangement in 1931.

A Sinhala only Board of Ministers was formed in 1936. This was toexclude the Tamils from power sharing. What perhaps encouraged theSinhalese to consolidate its political power was certain intransigent demandson the part of the Tamils. Instead of asking for a balance or proportionalrepresentation and constitutional guarantees, the Tamil politicians in the 1930sasked for fifty to fifty representation to the Legislative Council. This kind ofparity was considered a threat to the Sinhalese interests. While the Tamilswere popularly considered a privileged group under the British administrationit was felt, that a kind of affirmative action would be necessary to uplift theconditions of the Sinhalese. The Sinhalese also felt a sort of a minoritycomplex in the Indian subcontinent considering the prevalence of over fiftymillion Tamil speakers in Tamil Nadu itself.

A major turning point in this process of Sinhalese consolidation of statepower was in 1956 when 'Sinhalese only' was made the official language andin 'twenty-four hours'. This policy tremendously disadvantaged not only theTamils and Muslims but also the Burghers, the descendants of Europeansettlers or their off-spring of mixed marriages. The official language beforethat time was English. Another major contributory factor associated with thediscrimination against minorities was the economic policy. Beginning in 1956,economic policies of the governments moved towards a command economicstructure. By 1975, around sixty-five per cent of the economy was directly inthe state sector. While the power holders of the state continued an archaicpatron-client policy in allocating jobs, resources, governm ent loan s, con tractsand export-import l icenses anyone who was outside the pale wasdisadvantaged. A major burden of the situation was felt by the minorities.While there had been considerable primary accumulation of capital in thehands of the Tamil businessmen, their further progress was retarded becauseof their lack of state power or power sharing. A struggle for an independentstate or a reasonable share of state power was the logical outcome.

The picture of an exclusive Sinhalese state became categorically clear by1983, when Tamil representatives were forced to leave the NationalAssembly, the main legislative body of the state. The indubitable dominanceof the Sinhalese ethnicity in the state and their imposition of Sinhala Buddhistrights in detriment to the rights of the minorities were responsible for this


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ETHNIC CONFL ICT 89development. This was similar to what occurred in some other Asian countrieswhere the majority ethnicity took over the complete state power into its ownhands after the process of decolonisation. A comparable situation occurred inBurma where the Burman ethnicity consolidated its state and econom ic pow erto the great disadvantage of the ethnic minorities of Karen, Shan, Chin.

The nature of the state in Sri Lanka between 1956 and 1987 can clearlybe characterised as an ethnic one. It was not fascist, in the sense thatminorities were completely annihilated. But they were coerced. Coercioncame through both structural and direct violence. The years 1956, 1958, 1978,1981 and 1983 were major landmarks of ethnic violence against theminorities. As a result, the minorities were relegated to a subordinate positionin society and polity. A balancing factor to the ethnic nature of the state wasits parliamentary character, which nevertheless became restrictive under thepresidential system of governmen t since 1978. Under an ostensibledemocracy, how ever, certain concessions had to be made to the minorities forelectoral gain. These mechanisms fortunately balanced against the state, whichotherwise moved towards a fascist one.The ideology of the ethnic state was not geared directly to deny the rightsof the members of the minority communities as individuals. But to deny theirrights as a group, as a minority or an ethnicity. This denial of group rights ofminorities was caricatured in the following argument by an ardent advocate ofthe Sinhalese only official language policy, L. H. Mettananda, in 1956:

One may...concede that in a Tamil-speaking district, a CeylonTamilmay write to a local body in Tamil and receive a replyin Tamil.[However,] the minority cannot claim as a fundamental humanright the right to communicate with the government in theirown language, (emphasis added).12

The advocate added referring to minority rights that,Such a theme has no place in the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights proclaimed by [the] U.N.O.

Obviously, the arguments against the rights of minorities were based on utterignorance or a distorted knowledge of UN human rights.Both constitutions of the First Republic (1972) and the Second Republic(1978) incorporated a bill of fundamental rights of individuals. However, only

1 2 Ceylon Daily News, 16 May 1956.


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90 SOUTH ASIAthe rights of the Sinhalese were accepted as a group. This acceptance of theso-called rights of the Sinhalese as a group was explicit in the articles onOfficial Language and State Religion.

I l lWhen Tamil youth took up arms in the late 1970s, it was done against theSinhalese ethnic state to assert the rights of the Tamil people to self-determination. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was formed inMay 1976 under the leadership of Velupillai Prabakaran.13 There were othergroups formed during the same period with different political persuasion andleadership. As a group closer to the LTTE correctly declared,

The root of the matter is that the Tamil people are questioningthe validity of the political structure of the country.14What they questioned was the unitary character of the state which underminedany autonomy to the Tamil people in addition to the Sinhalese ethnic controlof the state system.

The unitary character of the state was an arbitrary one which wasimposed by the British in 1883. As Jeyaratnam Wilson very strongly argued,For convenience of the imperial ruler, Ceylon wasconsolidated into a centralised unitary entity. With its many'races' and religions, such an entity could be held togetherunder the supervision of an outsider such as a neutral imperialpower, but once the imperial power withdrew, the primordialconcepts of 'race', language and religion of distinct groupsbegan to reassert themselves.15

To be sure, before 1883 Sri Lanka had never been a centralised unitary stateeven during the worst forms of ethnic states. There was always room forregional autonomy. The structure of the state was in the form a Mandala,composed of a core (manda) and an enclosing element (la).16 The state was agalactic structure of a central planet surrounded by differentiated satellites.When Anuradhapura was the capital, there were four main divisions in thestate: the capital territory or Rajaratta; the south-western territory or1 3 LTTE, Diary of Combat 1975-1984 (Jaffna, 1985), p. 10.1 4 'Recent History of the Oppression of the Tamil Speaking People of Sri Lanka,' EROS (Apr.1985).1 5 A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, The Break-up of Sri Lanka (C. Hurst, London, 1988), pp. 21-2.1 6 For the concept of Mandala state see S. J. Tambiah, World Conqueror and World Renouncer(Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1976), p. 112.


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ETHNIC CONFLICT 91Dakkinadesa; the south-eastern territory or Rohana; and the hills or Malaya.While Malaya, the areas of indigenous peoples or Veddas were completely leftout from the central administration, other areas entertained relative autonomy.In addition, clusters of villages were governed by village councils (GamSabha) on matters related to local affairs. According to inscriptions, theseclusters included Demala Gam or Tamil v illages.

When the British unified the state system under a central administration,obviously, the purpose was different. It was to develop capitalism and abolishfeudalism. As the comm ission which dem arcated the new state administrationargued, the country has had a tradition of 'contempt for the rights of inferiors,and abominable spirit of caste'. Therefore, the assimilation under one legaland administrative system was considered desirable to break the caste systemand allow the mobility of labour, especially in the Kandyan areas. By'maintaining separate governments]' it was further argued that the influenceof the chiefs will be 'upheld to the prejudice, in some instances, of thepeople'.17 While the British introduced a system of civil rights, yet partial,what was terribly neglected were the social and cultural rights of differentcommunities and political rights of all. In the context of the nineteenthcentury, there was no recognition of minority or cultural rights in the liberalphilosophy. What was allowed instead was communal representation to theLegislative Council which proved to be divisive in practice.The first proposal for federalism in the country came from S.W.R.D.Bandaranaike in 1926, father of the current president, who was assassinated in

1959. The idea was not only to allow cultural diversity in the country but toavoid uneven development in education, society and economy. If majorregions were allowed autonomous decision making powers, it was believedthat local leaders would work for the betterment of the people. Federalismbecame a major Tamil demand after independence, in 1949, with theformation of the Federal (or Tamil State) Party by S.J.V. Chelvanayagam. Itwas to assert a degree of independence for the Tamil people from the centralgovernment that federalism was proposed. In the eyes of the Sinhalese, thedemand w as always equated with separatism.Even during the heights of Sinhalese nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s,there were some efforts for ethnic accommodation. The proposals foraccommodation were in the form of decentralisation and devolution of power.But these ventures unfortunately failed due to power rivalries between the twomajor parties: the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the United NationalParty (UNP). To be popular among the majority Sinhalese, the party in the

1 7 G. C. Mendis (ed.), The Colebrook-Cam eron Papers: Documents o n British Colonial Policyin Ceylon, 1796-1833 (London, Oxford Univ. Press, 1956), p. 52.


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92 SOUTH ASIAopposition always opposed any concession to the Tamils proposed by thegoverning party. This has been a major obstacle to the resolution of the ethnicconflict throughout. It is still not clear whether the situation has decisivelychanged.

Except for its extreme militarised character, the Eelam movement led bythe LTTE which emerged in the late 1970s was in the form of a 'liberationstruggle'. The militancy of the movement was appreciated by many radicalgroups inside and outside the country. The movement was fairly disciplined. Itinvolved itself in a war with the state but not with the people. The movem entin fact formulated its demands and aspirations in a more general manner,applicable to the country as whole. As a group ideologically closer to theLTTE argued,The national question, as indeed the more general conditionof wretchedness of the country as a whole, cannot be solvedwithin the framework of the 1978 constitution. Firstly, theTamils demand a most radical re-structuring of the principlesof state power, secondly the nation as a whole and the Tamilsin particular as its most oppressed section demand the right tobreathe freely again, the restitution of democracy and theabolition of the present conditions of oppress ion.18

During the period, there was a general and overall deterioration ofdemocracy and hum an rights in the country. Human rights which w ere heavilysuppressed were related to trade unions, student organisations, oppositionparties and the m edia. As a result, freedom of expression, the press and manyother civil and political rights were curtailed. What became true was theprophesy of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 'if man is not to becompelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny andoppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law'. In fact,there was a parallel rebellion by Sinhalese youth in the south.

In my opinion, however, there was a considerable political deteriorationof the Eelam movement in the late 1980s. A war against the state turned into awar against the people as well. The year 1985 marked the Anuradhapuramassacre of the Sinhalese villagers. Since then, there had been a constantpattern of attacks and human rights violations by the militants against civilianswho were living in Tamil areas. The victims included not only the Sinhalesebut the minority Muslims as well. There was also a bloody internecine warbetween different factions of the Eelam movement leading to hundreds ofkillings. The objective of the Eelam movement, now solely led by the LTTE,appeared to be to carve out an exclusive Tamil ethnic state. The LTTE in fact1 8 EROS (Apr. 1985).


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ETHNIC CONFLICT 93ran a mini-state in Jaffna between 1989 and 1995 and still controls certainareas in the northern Province.

There w ere arguments in the 1970s whether a separate Tamil state w ouldbe a viable one. The idea was ridiculed by a Tamil leftist leader, N.Shanmugathasan, calling it a 'postal-state'. The argument was that a separatestate would not be economically viable and would not manage anythingbeyond a postal system. This argument was incorrect. The problem about theJaffna mini-state was not its economic unviability, but its structure and nature.Far from being the realisation of the right of the Tamil people for democraticself-determination, the state which was created was oppressive both internallyand externally. The experience in Jaffna has fairly demonstrated that thecreation of a Tamil ethnic state against the Sinhalese ethnic state would open avicious cycle from which both communities would not be able to extricatethemselves for centuries. In this context, it is important to reformulate theconcept of self-determination as the right of democratic self-determination toavoid any deviation from democracy and human rights in its practice.rv

In the case of Sri Lanka the rights of three peoples are involved in respect ofself-determination: the Sinhalese, the Tamils and the Muslims. In addition,there are other minorities, religious and ethnic, whose rights need to beprotected. The differences between these peoples are not racial but ethnic.They are different in language, religion and culture, but not in physical traitsor colour. Both the Sinhalese and the Tamils are extremely mixed peoples.The idea that the Sinhalese are Aryans, racially different to the DravidianTamils, is a myth created for ideological reasons. Equally obnoxious is theview that Tamils are a pure Dravidian race. The terminology of Arya andDravida denotes linguistic differences between the two language groups andnot racial ones.The notion that the Sri Lankan state is the exclusive right of the Sinhalesepeople is unacceptable to any human rights standard. The rights, includingself-determination, are often claimed on the basis of history and not humanity.Claims of rights and claims of human rights are not necessarily the sam e. The

basis of human rights claims are common humanity, human dignity andequality. Both the Sinhalese and the Tamils can claim a right of self-determination on the basis of history. However, there had never been aMuslim state in Sri Lanka. Nevertheless, the Muslim community constitutes apeople with a distinct religion, and a culture associated with it. Their historicalorigins are also different from the other two communities.


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94 SOUTH ASIAThe right of self-determination primarily derives as a freedom fromoppression or colonialism, a political right for independence. It is also an

internal political right of a people, in a multi-ethnic society, to ensure a rangeof other rights with necessary political mechanisms - autonomy, federalism ordevolution of power - for its achievement. What exactly is the suitablepolitical structure for the achievement of internal self-determination is adebatable topic among scholars and peoples. The solutions may differ fromcase to case, and time to time. What m ight be of paramount im portance wouldbe the opinion of the peoples themselves. These opinions can be judgedthrough dem ocratic processes: referendum or election. As a human right, theright of self-determination, internal or external, should ensure democracy.Otherwise, the exercise of that right may go against a range of other humanrights finally jeopardising the self-determination itself. Attempts to createexclusive ethnic states hamper rather than facilitate the right of democraticself-determination. Violent and endless ethnic conflicts in many parts of theworld are due to this predicament.

Since 1987, there has been a relative loosening up of the Sri Lankan statesystem towards ethnic accommodation as a result of both internal and externalpressures. Since then a relatively autonomous Provincial Council system, akinto Indian federalism, has been created. Although slow in its implementation,language policy has been changed conferring Tamil an official languagestatus; English the status of a national language. The remaining Indian-originTamil plantation w orkers, who were stateless for good many y ears, have beengiven full citizenship. While these measures undoubtedly marked a progresstowards ethnic reconciliation, they were 'too little too late' in the eyes of theTamil militants, especially the LTTE.

There are new hopes in the country, though the war is continuing, of apossible solution to the ethnic conflict with the introduction of 'DevolutionProposals' and 'Draft Constitutional Reforms' by the current government.19The new proposals go a long way towards achieving federalism, mov ing awayfrom the unitary state system. Many ambiguities of power sharing in thepresent Provincial Council system have been avoided for a Regional Councilsystem. The powers of the central government and regional governments arefairly demarcated. 'Regional councils will exercise exclusive legislative andexecutive com petence w ithin the devolved sphe re'. These will include controlover the region's education, land settlement and public service which in factwere some of the central demands of the Tamils throughout the years.

1 9 Sri Lanka Foundation Institute, Devolution Proposals. See Appendix for the text ofproposals.


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ETHNIC CONFLICT 95There are other merits of having federalism. The centralised economicpolicies have proved to be lethargic in stimulating economic development in

the country. Regions in the future can be the relevant zones of economicdevelopment utilising local resources and attracting foreign investment.A major weakness of the current proposals, however, is their exclusivefocus on the constitution. The proposals cannot, therefore, be called a politicalpackage for a peace p rocess. To re-start political negotiations w ith the LTT E,or to ensure a peace process, proposals are necessary in order to outline astrategy through which a step-by-step settlement m ight be achieved. Breakingthe cycle of war has become problematic as a result of the lack of peaceproposals.The task of ethnic reconciliation will involve not only the re-structuringof the state but also changing its character - ethnic and oppressive. The ethnicquestion, as a major human rights problem, is linked to other human rightsproblems: discrimination, mistreatment, disappearances, torture and non-recognition of civilian rights in general. Democratisation of state structures,and functions, and education of state functionaries at all levels on humanrights will constitute major tasks. Given the long standing history of the ethnicconflict no solution will be possible or sustainable without a public educationprogram for ethnic reconciliation and for human rights. 'Since wars begin inthe minds, it is in the minds of men [and women] that the defences of peacemust be constructed.'20

2 0 Preamble to the UNESCO Constitution.


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96 SOUTH ASIA