Ethics in Technological Culture

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Ethics in Technological Culture: A Programmatic Proposal for a Pragmatist ApproachAuthor(s): Jozef Keulartz, Maartje Schermer, Michiel Korthals and Tsjalling SwierstraSource: Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Winter, 2004), pp. 3-29Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1558004 .

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Ethicsin TechnologicalCulture:A ProgrammaticProposalfor a PragmatistApproachJozef Keulartz

WageningenUniversityMaartje Schermer

ErasmusUniversityRotterdamMichiel KorthalsWageningenUniversity

Tsjalling SwierstraUniversityof Twente

Neither traditionalphilosophynor currentappliedethics seem able to cope adequatelywith thehighly dynamiccharacterof our modern echnologicalculture.This is becausetheyhave insufficient nsightinto the moralsignificance of technological artifactsandsystems.Here,much can be learned rom recent science and technologystudies(STS).Theyhaveopened uptheblackboxof technologicaldevelopments nd have revealed heintimate intertwinementof technologyand society in minute detail. However,whileappliedethics is characterizedbya certain "technologyblindness," he mostinfluentialapproacheswithinSTSshow a "normativedeficit" and display an agnostic or evenantagonisticattitude owardethics. Torepairthe blindspots of bothappliedethicsandSTS, he authorssketch he contoursofa pragmatistapproach.Theywillexplore he tasksand tools of a pragmatistethics andpay special attention to the explorationoffutureworlds disclosed andshaped by technologyand themanagement f deepvalueconflictsinherent o a pluralist society.

Keywords: applied ethics; pragmatism;STS;philosophyof science and technology;normativity

Pragmatist ethics ... is not only interested in the application of pregiven nor-mative rules, but in the construction of new possibilities for moral action ...[in] the creative character of the solution of moral problems.

-Joas (1993, 253)Science, Technology,& HumanValues,Vol.29 No. 1,Winter2004 3-29DOI: 10.1177/0162243903259188? 2004 Sage Publications

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4 Science, Technology,& HumanValues

In The Public and its Problems (1927), the pragmatistJohn Deweydescribed he rise of technologicalculture.Columbusmayhave discoveredanew world in the geographicalsense, but in reality, Dewey says, the newworld was createdonly duringthepastcentury."Steamandelectricityhavedone moreto alter he conditionsunderwhich menassociatetogether hanallthe agencies which affectedhumanrelationshipsbefore our time"(Dewey1954,323). Dewey argues hat hesenewtechnologieshave contributedmoreto the establishmentof modern democraticforms of government hanthepoliticaltheoriesof Locke and theutilitariansdid."Thetransitionrom fam-ily anddynasticgovernment upportedbytheloyaltiesof tradition opopulargovernmentwas the outcome primarilyof technological discoveries andinventionsworkinga changein the customsby whichmen had been boundtogether.It was not due to the doctrinesof doctrinaires"p. 326).

Dewey (1954) remarks urther hatthe value of technologicaladvances sseldomfairlyassessed.These advancesaregenerallyheldresponsible or allthemiseryof moder existence,a widespread endencythathe dismisses aslazy thinking."It is alwaysconvenientto have a devil as well as a savior tobearthe responsibilitiesof humanity.In reality,the troublespringsratherfrom the ideasand absence of ideasin connectionwith whichtechnologicalfactorsoperate" p. 323).There seems to have been littlechangein thisproblematic ituationsinceDewey's time. In a recentarticle, n which he posedhimself thequestionof"how to live" in a technologicalculture,the DutchphilosopherGerarddeVries concludedthat the customaryphilosophicaland ethicalvocabulary snot properlyequippedto formulatean appropriate nswer to this question.Thisvocabularys more of a hindrance hanahelpto aproperunderstandingof the technologicalculture(De Vries, 1999).Theproblemwe will betackling n this articlecan be formulated n similarterms. On one hand, it is safe to say that the technologicalculture has astronglydynamiccharacter: ld ways of life arecontinuallybeing replacedby new ones, norms and values arecontinuallybeing put up for discussion,andwe regularly ind ourselvesconfrontedwith new moralproblems.On theotherhand,however,neitherphilosophynorethics seem topossessa vocabu-larythatcan accommodate hisdynamiccharacter dequately. n thisarticle,we will firstelaborateontheclaimthat he traditional thicalvocabularyallsshortin view of the technologicalculture.Next, we will show that scienceandtechnologystudies(STS) can make some contribution o ethicalevalu-AUTHORS'NOTE: This studyis carriedout within the frameworkof the IncentiveProgramEthics and PoliticalIssues, which is supportedby the NetherlandsOrganizationor ScientificResearch.We would like to thankHansRadder orhis useful comments andsuggestions.



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Keulartzet al. / Ethicsin TechnologicalCulture 5

ation of technologicaldevelopmentsbut thatthis contribution s currentlylimitedduetothe "normative eficit"of STS. We will thendiscuss howprag-matism can be useful in developing an ethical approachthat is betterequipped o deal withtechnologythancurrent thics. Whatwe propose s nota completealternative or otherformsof appliedethics butrathera comple-ment. To develop a new perspectiveon the moral and social problemsandconflicts that are typical for a technological culture, we will thus bringtogether insights from applied ethics, STS, and pragmatist philosophy.Although,dueto ourprogrammaticntent,we will not be ableto do fulljus-tice to eachof thesethreedisciplines;we hopeto avoidsketchingcaricaturesanderectingstrawmen.

The "Technology Blindness" of EthicsModem philosophybuildsupon two traditions:an empiricalone and arationalone. Thefoundation or theempirical raditions formedbythe work

of FrancisBacon,in whicha utopianprograms launched,aimed at achiev-ing socialprogressthroughscientific andtechnologicalmeans. The leadingproponent f the rationalistic raditionwas ReneDescartes.Heregarded on-sciousness as the one andonly unshakeable oundationuponwhich knowl-edge couldsystematicallybe constructed.Theimageof man thatarises frommodernphilosophy s oneof acompletelyautonomous ubjectwhouses sci-ence andtechnologyin a sovereign way to achieve his or her aims.This humanisticand heroicself-imageis still to a largeextent characteris-tic of applied ethics. This discipline centers completely on people, theiractions,and theregulation hereof."Dependingon the sort of ethicaltheoryonesupports,attentionwill be focused eitheronthepresuppositions nderly-ingactionsoron theconsequencesof actions.In the formercase,thequestiontobe answered s whether heprincipleunderlying he action satisfiesethicalcriteria,particularlywhether t can be universalized.In the lattercase, oneasks whether he actioncontributes o theaggregatedndividualwelfare" DeVries 1999, 19).As a resultof thisconceptualrestriction, thicists imit theirsearch or thecementholding societytogether othevalues,principles,norms,andrulesbywhichpeopleattune heiractionsto each other.However,society'ssocial andmoralorder s notonly determinedby symbolicconstructions uch as these,butjust as much by materialobjects:"Fire, food, money, steam engines,dikes andpolders, sewage pipes, viruses andcomputersystemshavejust asstronga bindingeffect as symbolicconstructions, f not more so" (Harbersand Koenis 1999,4).



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As aresultof its humanisticandanthropocentricelf-image, appliedeth-ics hasbeen unableto move on from its technologyblindness.If one weretolook upthesubjectof "technology"n the most recenteditionof Beauchampand Childress's famous handbook, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, onewould search n vain.Nevertheless, t is obviousthattechnologicaladvancesin theveryfieldof medicine andhealthcareare animportantourceof moralproblemsand conflicts. Appliedethics seems to view technologymainlyininstrumentalerms; t can beused forgoodorfor bad butdoes notform a sub-ject of considerationn its ownright.Apart rom the view of technologyas aneutralresource, echnologyis also oftendepictedas a threat,or as thepolaroppositeof goodcare.Thisnegativeview firstappearedn Dutchdiscourse na book by Jan Hendrikvan den Berg titled MedischeMacht en MedischeEthiek MedicalPowerandMedicalEthics1969),whichplayedanimportantpart n the rise of "principlism"n this country.1Toputitbriefly,(medical)ethics is dominatedbyeithera neutralor aneg-ativevision of technology.Inmoder philosophy,bothvisions are now con-sideredto be outdated.While classical philosophyof technologyhas givenshortshriftto the ideathattechnologyis no more thanan innocentresource,moder technologyresearchhas inturnraiseddoubtsas to theutterlyapoca-lypticview classicalphilosophyof technologyadopted o replacethe instru-mentalistvision.

Classical Philosophy of TechnologyClassical philosophersof technology, among whom MartinHeidegger

andJaquesEllul were the most prominent,hold a substantive ather han aninstrumentalist ision. Accordingto this view, technology is anythingbutneutral. topensas if it were a specificwindowon the world anddeterminesto a largeextent how we observe andassess reality.This is the case foreveryform of technology,from the mostprimitive o the most advanced.However,whiletechnologywaspreviouslyno morethanone of manywindows on real-ity, in "the atomicage," t has infiltrated very partof our cultureand estab-lished absolute domination.As a result, science, art,religion,politics, andphilosophy have lost their own independent ability to unlock reality andcreate sense.

Heideggerargues hatunder hereignof modern echnology,realitymani-fests itself as rawmaterial orproductionandexploitation.Thepresentenvi-ronmental risis illustrateswhereunbounded ubjugation f nature o man'squest for power leads. However,not only the environmentbut also peoplethemselves are victims of the"anthropocentriciolence" that seems inextri-cablyboundupwith thehumanisticdiscourseof modernity.As thedevelop-



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mentof biotechnologyhasshown,man's controlovernature s not limitedtothe external environmentbut extends deep into the inner structureof thehumanbeing. Back in the 1930s, Heideggerhadalreadypredictedthat thehumanbeing would be relegatedto a mere "technicizedanimal,"once hebecame the main resourcefor technologicalcontrol.Thisconjuresupanimagewithunmistakably pocalypticcharacteristics.In the "age of his technological reproducibility,"he once all-powerfulhumanbeing seems condemnedto absolute nsignificance.Technologyhasnotbroughtabout iberationbut nsteadanew form of slavery,which casts allforms of slavery hroughout istory nthe shade.Thisis alsothethemeof TheDialectic of the Enlightenment, by Max Horkheimer and Theodor W.Adoro. Farfrombeinganinnocenttool thatcanbe used for bothgood andbad, technology seems to be emergingas an independent ife form, whichhumansnolongercontrol.Ortoputit anotherway,notmanbuttechnology sin realityautonomous.It follows its own logic and knows only one course:that laid down imperativelyby the drive towardmaximumefficiency.Thisview,powerfullyexpoundedby Ellul in particular nd also knownas "tech-nologicaldeterminism,"as noplacefor the normativeassessmentand dem-ocraticcontrolof technological nnovation.Any attempt oofferresistance otheseprocesses s doomed to failure romthe start.Societycan offeronlyonepossible reactionto the unavoidablecourse of technologicaldevelopment:resignation,adjustment,andabstention.In classicalphilosophyof technology, technologyand cultureform eachother'sopposites and the idea of a technologicalculture could only be anoxymoron.Moder technologystudieshave abandoned hisdualistic, nfact,absolutelyManicheanwayof thinking.Incontrast, heynowplacetheinter-play of technologyandcultureat theircenter.

Modern Technology StudiesModer technologystudieshavereplaced he substantive isionof classi-calphilosophyof technologywith apluralistone.2Theyhave madea resolute

break with the gloomy view of technologyas a Moloch, to the gluttonyofwhicheveryexpressionof anauthentic ulture allsvictim,and which leavesbehindonly a one-dimensionalworld. Moder technologystudiessplitthismonolithicconcept of technology into a varietyof specific technologies,each of whichrequiresseparateanalysis.The focus thereby s less uponthefinishedproductand moreupontheprocessesandpracticesthroughwhichtheseproducts akeshape.Thisexplainsthe trendtowardstudying"sciencein action"on site in the laboratory.



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Modemtechnologystudieshaveopenedupthe "blackbox"of technolog-ical developmentand revealedthe intimateintertwinementof technologyandsociety.Both scientific factsandtechnologicalartifactsappear o be theoutcome of negotiations, n which manydiverseactors areinvolved.Tech-nology does not thereforeoperateupon society as anexternal nfluence butactuallyforms an integralpartof it. Furthermore,here is rarelyone singlepathof developmentbutrathera numberof potentiallyviable alternatives,which fall by the wayside when they are unableto obtainsufficient socialbacking.Technologicaldevelopmentsarenotcompletelyautonomousatall.Theydo notso much follow theirownpatternsbutratherarea fairlyrandomresult of social interactions.Moder technologystudieshaveabandonedhedoctrineof technologicaldeterminism ndfor themostpartreplaced twithaconstructivist pproach.Constructivism oes notview cultureasunilaterallysubject o technological mperatives,butargues hatthere s a coevolutionoftechnologyandsociety.To be able to introduce echnologicalartifactssuc-cessfully into society,one mustchangecertainaspectsof society,while onecanalsosaythat hedevelopmentanddesignof theseartifactsakesplaceinasocial field of influence, with many differentplayers, each with diverseinterests,aims,resources,andmeans of power.It is of greatimportance or ourargument hatconstructivismhas vigor-ously exposedthenormative ignificanceof technologicalartifacts.Accord-ing to thesociologistof technologyMadeleineAkrich(1992), theseartifactscarrya scriptor scenariowithinthem.They requireparticular ole patternsandlay down a specific "geographyof responsibilities."

The Scenario of the PillModerncontraceptiveechnologyoffersa good illustration f thisidea ofanormative cenario see Oudshoorn1995).Thepillcanbeclassed asa tech-nology thatlargelydelegatesthe responsibility or its use to the consumer.Sheor hemaystillbe dependenton a doctorforaccessto thismedicationbutis otherwise free to decidewhether o keeptakingit. Oneproblemwiththisproduct s that it demands a greatdeal of self-disciplinefrom the user. Toremedythis,animplantable ontraceptivewasdevelopedwith a working ifeof up to five years and broughtonto the marketunder the brandname"Norplant."tconsistsof six smallsiliconerods,whichareimplantedunderthe skin of theupperarmandwhichgraduallyrelease a hormone.Norplantimpliesa differentgeographyof responsibilities hanthepill. Responsibilityis partlydelegated o thehealthcareprofessionals;afterall, a surgicalproce-dure s involved,precededby a gynecologicalexamination,andfollowedby

regularcheckups.Responsibility s alsopartlydelegated o theartifact tself.



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Keulartzt al. EthicsnTechnologicalulture 9

"Tocompensate orthe assumed ack of self-disciplineon thepartof the con-sumer, his newcontraceptivewasdeveloped n suchawaythat t containsanin-built guarantee for continual use. The requirementsformulated byresearchersortheuse of contraceptiveswere no longerdelegated o the userbut to the artifact. n this way, artifactsbecome 'technicaldelegates',to useLatour'swell-chosen term.They are designedto compensatefor assumed'moraldeficiencies' on the partof the user and to bring discipline to thebehaviorof people"(Oudshoom1995, 281). Well-knownexamplesof such"technical delegates" are door-springs, seat belts, speed limiters, and"sleeping policemen"(see also Latour1993).As with all newpostwarcontraceptives,hepill impliesa gender-specificgeographyof responsibilities.The pill is meant for women, not men. Thisunequaldivision of responsibilitieshas promptedcriticism from feminists.Thefemalepill mayhavegivenwomen moreautonomyovertheirown bod-ies, buton the otherhand,theyare also theones exposedto all of the associ-atedhealth risks. Thedevelopmentof a malepill, which is currentlyunder-way, would enable a more equal division of responsibilities and risksbetweenmenandwomen. Male interestgroupshave also made the caseforamale pill. This is not so surprising,because the female pill not only makeswomen less dependentuponhealthcareprofessionals,but it also gives themmorepowerover family planningin comparisonwith men than was previ-ously the case. "Thescriptof the malepill is thusdouble-edged.Whilethereis a moreequaldivisionof healthrisks andresponsibilitiesbetween men andwomen, there is also a shift in who has authorityover whether or notcontraceptivesare used"(Oudshoom1995, 286).The exampleof the pill makes clearthattechnologicalartifactsprovidepeoplewith certainsocialroles andpower relationships,n accordancewiththeirscriptor scenario.However,their influenceextendsstill further.Moreindirectly handirectly, heycanbringaboutprofoundchanges n ourmental-ityandmoralsoverabroadsocial front.Toillustrate his,thepillcanbe takenas anexample again.Thanks o itshighlevelof reliability, hepillcreated hepossibilityof sep-arating exualityfromreproduction.This has hadfar-reachingonsequencesforsexualbehaviorandmorals.Thepillplayedalargeroleinthe sexualrevo-lutionbecauseitenabledpeopletoexperiment"unpunished" ith theirsexu-alityfromanearlyage,withall of theconsequences his has hadformarriage.The introductionof the pill was also accompaniedby a shift in society'sperceptionof reproduction.Under the influence of the pill, a "birth egula-tion mentality"graduallydeveloped."This does not only meanthateverychildoughtto be a wantedchild,but also thatpeopleareplanning heir ivesaround the proviso that a child should only come-and then must also



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10 Science,Technology, HumanValues

come-once the desired social and economic space has been created"(Ketting2000, 285). This new mentalityhas hadrepercussions or theprac-tice of abortion.Theremaywell be much fewer unintendedpregnanciesnowthanbeforethepill was introduced,but the few thatstill occurare,as aresultof thismentality,much less readily acceptedthanpreviously.If a pregnancyoccursbeforethe set conditionshave beenmet,then arequest oranabortionwill often follow.The annualnumberof abortionshas thereforenotactuallydecreasedsincethe introduction f thepill.Whereaspreviously, heoptionofabortioncame up for discussion only when a pregnancywas completelyunwanted, t now comes upeven if thepregnancywasjust unplanned."Theinteresting hing is that the simple fact of the pregnancybeing unplanned,almost always rendersthatpregnancycompletely unwantedtoo" (Ketting2000, 285).Theexampleof thepill makes it clearthattechnologicalartifacts mbodyparticularoptions and restrictions:they invite certainkinds of action orbehavioranddiscourageotherones, and thusreinforceor alterexistingroledivisionsandpowerstructures.The normative amifications f technologicalartifactsare rarelylimited to the practicefor which they are intended butoften also filterthrough nto associated or adjacentpractices(in the case ofthe pill, into marriageandabortion).The significanceof these insightsforethics has untilnow not been acknowledgedsufficiently.Perhapsas a resultof the anthropocentrism f traditionalethics, applied ethics has not yetopened up the black box of technological development.Thoughit does paysome attention o the moralproblemsinvokedby the use of new technolo-gies, it remainsblind to themoralsignificanceof thetechnologyitself.Thiscondemnsappliedethics to be left running o catchup with the facts. Moreand more attentionmaybe devoted to theeverydayfunctioningof laborato-ries,hospitaldepartments, ndnursinghomes,andtheremaybe moreaware-ness of the importanceof negotiationanddecision-makingprocessesin theworkplace,butthis mostlyremains imited to the actions of people, therebyignoringthe normativesignificanceof technologicalartifacts.As long as it clings to its "anthropocentric rejudice," thics will not beable to accommodateadequately hedynamiccharacterof thepresenttech-nologicalculture.Of further mportances thatfoundationalism,which hasdominated ethics for a long time, is mainly aimed at underpinningmoralrulesandjudgmentson the basis of one or moreuniversalstartingpointsorprinciples.Consequently,ittle attention s paidto changeof normsand mor-als overtime, influencedby technologicaland otherdevelopments.The ideaof change plays no significantrole in ethicaltheory building.In the previ-ously mentionedhandbookby BeauchampandChildress, his notion is alsoconspicuous by its absence. A search in the PhilosophersIndex or the



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Bioethicslineusingthekeywordmoralchange producesveryfew references.In as far as changeis discussed at all in ethics, it is usuallyin an extremelylimitedway,either n termsof continuityorof the"slippery lope."Thiscanbe illustratedby the debatesurrounding iotechnologyandcloning.The Example of Biotechnology and Cloning

Supporters f biotechnologyare oftenthe first to arguethatthistechnol-ogy is notactuallyas new aspeoplethinkbutratherusta smallstepin a longline of development.Biotechnologydoesnot differessentiallyfrombreedingtechnologies long acceptedandappliedon a largescalein livestockfarming,agriculture, nd horticulture. n the sameway, objections o thereproductivecloning of humans areusuallybrushedaside with the argument hat this isjust "businessas usual."Ask whetherwe are notplayingGod, and thereforeplayingwith fire, in practicingcloning, andyou will receive the followinganswerfrom the AmericanphilosopherRonald Dworkin:"But that is whatwe mortalshave done ever since Prometheus, hepatronsaint of dangerousdiscoveries. We play with fire and accept the consequences,because thealternative is an irresponsiblecowardice in the face of the unknown"(Dworkin1999).Inthe debateoncloning,theargumenthat here s nothingnew under hesun recurs time andagain.The argument hat the transplantationf a rela-tively "old"cell nucleus could lead to a shortened ife expectancy s metbythe answer hatwe acceptedsuch"irresponsible"iskswhen invitrofertiliza-tion (IVF) was being developed.Afterall, no one knew back thenhow thefirsttest-tubebabywouldgeton. Tocounter heobjection hat hepsycholog-icalwell-beingof the clone could be harmedbypressure o liveuptotheorig-inal,itcan be argued hateven children n "normal"amilycircumstances recontinuallyconfrontedwith arangeof expectations.Tocounter heobjectionthatwe arecomingtosee childrenasproductsn whichno defects of anykindarepermitted, t could be argued hatwe alreadyhave such a view as a resultof a rangeof existing technologies, such as prenatalgenetic diagnosticsorpreimplantation iagnostics(see De Beaufort1998).By relyingupon continuityarguments uch asthese,one deniesthat hereis actuallyanythingnew involved. The new element is tracedbackto some-thing thatalreadyexists, therebyrendering t harmless as it were. This isoftenanimmunization trategy,with whichpeoplewantto shield themselvesfrom criticism and to preventan extensive debateon the pros and cons oftechnologicalinnovations.Theslippery slope argument s usuallyusedby opponentsof new devel-opments.Accordingto thisargument, akinga firststepon a particularoad



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will inevitablyandirreversiblyead to a whole series of steps,whichin turnwill leadultimately nto the moralabyss.Thisargumenthas also arisenregu-larlyin the debateon cloning: "Straight rom 'Dolly fromScotland'to 'theBoys fromBrazil';no stopping n between" De Beaufort1998, 110).Whilethecontinuityargumentrivializes he newelement,theslipperyslope argu-ment demonizesit. This argumentdoes nothelpmove the debatefurtheroneither,which Inez de Beaufortargues s not unintentional."The ntention ofthisargument)s actuallyto stopthe debate.Andoften: to stopthepractice"(De Beaufort1998, 111).The empiricalversion of the slipperyslope arguments only plausibleifone takes the view thattechnologicaldevelopmentshave only one course,uponwhichsocietycannotexerciseanyinfluence at allonce the firststephasbeen taken.Thelogicalversionof theslipperyslope arguments infact a con-tinuity argument.3t goes as follows: once we regarda practiceas morallyacceptable,we will logically also have to accept other(undesirable)prac-tices, as there s no essentialdifferencebetween thesepractices.Here,by theway,thecontinuityargument howsitself to be adouble-edgedsword,whichcan be used retroactivelyby opponentsof a particularnew technology toquestionthe existing, alreadyestablished,andacceptedpractice.Whatalltheseargumentshave incommon s that hey udgenewdevelop-ments fromwithin theexistingmoralframework.Thenew is tracedback totheold, or it is demonized,butthis does notpromptanychangein themoralvocabulary tself.

The Normative Deficit of STSAs aresultof itstechnologyblindnessandfoundationalistendencies,eth-ics is barelyable to cope with the changeandrenewalthat is an everydayaffair in a technological culture in a creative or innovativeway. In thisrespect,ethicshas muchto learnfrommoder technologystudies,in whichthe intimate ntertwinement f technologyandsociety is exposedin minutedetail.As a result,moder technology studies seem to offer the necessaryscope for thedemocraticcontrolandnormativeassessmentof technologicaldevelopments.On the otherhand,most constructivistshave an agnosticoreven antagonisticattitude owardethics.WithinSTS, two broadvarietiesof constructivism an be distinguished:moderateconstructivismandradicalconstructivism see Hagendijk1996).Primeexamplesof moderateconstructivismaretheStrongProgrammeSP)of BarnesandBloor andtheEmpiricalProgramme f Relativism EPOR)of

HarryCollins. Theinsightsof EPORwithrespectto "interpretativelexibil-



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Keulartzet al. / Ethics in TechnologicalCulture 13

ity"and"closuremechanisms"weretransplantedrom the sociology of sci-ence to thesociology of technology by Pinch andBijker(1987) in particular.They developedan approachcalled the Social Constructionof Technology(SCOT).Moderate orms of constructivism haretheassumption hatscien-tific andtechnological developmentscan be explainedby social factors ikedominantgroup interests or existing power structures.Radical construc-tivistsprofoundlychallengethisassumption.The mostimportant arietiesofradical constructivism hatnowadaysare highly influential in the field oftechnologystudies are the Actor-NetworkTheory(ANT), by Bruno Latour(1987) and Michel Callon (1987), and the reflexive approachto science("reflexiveethnography"), y SteveWoolgarandMalcolmAshmore(1988),amongothers.Radical constructivistsaccuse moderate constructivistsof substitutingone form of determinism-technological determinism-with just anotherform-social determinism e.g., Woolgar1991). Insteadof explainingtech-nology on the basis of society and its structures, adicalconstructivists ookat bothtechnologyandsociety as fabrications.Theyoppose the idea,force-fully put forwardby LangdonWinner(1980), that artifactshave politics"built into" them. The discussion of Winner'sby-now-classicexample ofRobertMoses's low bridgeshas made it clear that the politics of artifactsshouldnotbe interpreted s intrinsicand nvariable eaturesand that hekindof scriptthat artifactsdisplaydependson the specificcontextin whichtheyaredesigned,developed,and used.4Radicalconstructivistswill subscribe othe firstconclusion but not to the second one becausetheyinsist thatwe can-not determinewhat the specificcontextlooks like apart rom the interpreta-tions of relevantactors or "actants."Here,we runup againstwhatcould becalled the normativedeficit of the constructivistapproaches o science andtechnology.Itis certainly ruethatmoderateconstructivism s already ackingin nor-mativerespect,5but with the turnfrom moderate o radicalconstructivism,normativereflexivitybecamenearlyabsent(see Radder1992, 1998). Radi-cal constructivistsare committed to a "methodologicalagnosticism,"notonly aboutwhatkindsof societal influencesshape technologybut alsoaboutwhatkindsof social,political,andmoral mpacts echnologyhas(seeWinner1993).For thenormative valuationof emergingtechnologies,theirfavoritemotto "follow the actors of science and technology withouttakingsides"means thatwe aretotally dependenton thevarious nterpretationsf thedif-ferentrelevantgroupsinvolved,unable to choose betweenthem or to comeupwith aninterpretationromthe "outside."Whatcounts as thecapacityandeffect of a technologyis socially structured nd is consequentlycontingentand open to renegotiation GrintandWoolgar1995, 298). But, as Radder



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(1992) rightlyobserved,sucha "judgmentalelativism"according o whichanyinterpretations as valid or as invalidas anyother is impossiblein prac-tice. In view of this fact,two reactionscan be observed.Onone hand,someconstructivistsargue that symmetrical social analysis should favor theweaker side or"underdog"n scientific andtechnologicalcontroversies ikewomen orlay people.6But thispartisanships notonly inconsistentwiththemethodologicalagnosticismthat most constructivists ndorse,but it is alsoquitearbitrary-a kind of a "crypto-normativism."Ontheotherhand,especiallywithinthe actor-network pproach,here stheoppositetendencyordanger o analyzetheprocessof networkorsystembuildingexclusively from the winner'spoint of view rather hanfrom theloser'spointof view.According oRadder,he"winners-losers"erminologyis suggested quite strongly by the militarymetaphorsof the actor-networktheory.Accordingto Latour(1993), the constitutionof normsand valuesshould be describedandanalyzed n the sameway as theemergenceof factsandartifacts:notin termsof consciousness,cognitivepower,method,funda-mentals,andrationality, ut ntermsof alliesandopponents, trategicnegoti-ations,andtacticalmaneuvers.Regardlessof howeffective suchmetaphors,derivedfrom warandpowerstruggles,maybe for questioningthe standardview of science andtechnology,theiruse is difficultto reconcilewith ethicaldeliberation,in which justified norms and values are sought in order toevaluatethe developmentof technologies.In his 1992 article,RadderarguedthatSTS shouldovercomeits fear ofbecomingexplicitly normative.He concludedthatone should"tryto com-bine theachievementsof theempiricalapproach-their moreadequateviewson thepracticeof science andtechnology-with normativensightsconcern-ing the problematicaspects of our technoscientificworld"(p. 143).7It isexactlythiscombinationwe have in mindwith ourproposal or a pragmatistapproach o ethics in a technologicalculture.

The Pragmatist AlternativeSo, whileappliedethics hasto a largeextentremained tuck nits technol-ogy blindnessanddevotesinsufficientattention othenormative ignificanceand effects of technologicalartifactsandsystems,moder technologystud-ies arecharacterizedby a certainhostilitytowardethics.8The impassethathasarisenfrom thiscan,we believe,be brokenby areevaluation f pragma-tism. Pragmatismshares with constructivism ts centralinsight in the co-evolutionof technologyandsocietybutdiffersfromconstructivism n that tgives seriousconsideration o the associatednormative mplications.



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Duringthepast few decades,pragmatismhas madea remarkable ome-back as a broadphilosophicalmovement,notonly inAmericabut also muchfurtherafield.InEurope,even in theheydayof pragmatism,here was littleenthusiasm or the works of "theclassicalquartet":CharlesSandersPeirce,WilliamJames,JohnDewey, andGeorgeHerbertMead. The historyof thecontinentalreceptionof this Americanphilosophywas a "historyof misun-derstanding"Joas1993). Due to its supposedutilitarianism ndmeliorism,this philosophy"fromthe land of the dollar"was dismissedon the easternside of the Atlantic as superficialand opportunistic.But even in Americaitself, pragmatismlost much of its original appeal following the GreatDepression.After the Second WorldWar, t even seemed thatpragmatismhad had its day,and its place was takenby analyticalphilosophy.However, n the 1960s already here was evidence of a turnaroundn theappreciation f pragmatism.Remarkably nough,thefirstsignsof this wereobserved in Germany, where, from 1963, Karl-Otto Apel and JiirgenHabermasgave lectures and wrote articleson Peirce and his pupilCharlesMorris,and lateron Mead too. Both expressly positionedthemselvesin thepragmatistradition,describing heirphilosophyas "transcendentalragma-tism"and "formalpragmatism,"espectively.Another mportant pur owardthe reevaluationof pragmatismcame from analytical philosophy itself,whichbeganto showincreasingsignsof exhaustion n the 1960sand 1970s.The namesof WilfridSellars,W.V.Quine,andHillaryPutnammarked hemain stages in the transition rom a more analyticalto a more pragmatistapproach o philosophy.Thefinalstagewas reachedwith the work of Rich-ardRorty, he"Trojan orseof analyticalphilosophy,"who contributed s nootherhad to the current evivalof pragmatism.Rortyhas addedWittgensteinand Heidegger to the canon of pragmatismand, together with Dewey,declaredthem to be thegreatestphilosophersof the twentiethcentury.Fur-thermore,he has worked vigorously to lay bare certain "family resem-blances"betweenpragmatismandpostmodernism,as Derridarepresents tin particular.

The Three Pragmatist "Antis"Given this widediversityof philosophers, t is clear thatpragmatismmustnotbe understoodas a systematic heory nthe usual sense butrather sapar-ticularseries of theses,"theseswhich canbeandwerearguedvery differentlyby differentphilosopherswith differentconcerns" Putnam1994, 152). AsRortycontinually emphasizes,these theses are in fact antitheses,thatis tosay,theses aimedagainstparticular asicphilosophicalprinciplesthat form



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obstacles to a productivesolution of problemsand a satisfactorysettlementof conflicts.Antifoundationalism.Pragmatistsreject every form of foundationalismand insteadadhereto a distinct fallibilism. The "questfor certainty,"which

philosophyhas celebratedsinceDescartes,oughtto be given upforgood asillusory.All ourconvictions,withoutexception,areof a provisionalnatureand are in principlesusceptibleto repealor review.Antidualism. As well as foundationalism, pragmatists also rejectessentialism.The dualismof essence andappearances howeveronly one ofthe many dualisms with which philosophicaljargon has been punctuatedsince timeimmemorial.Otherwell-knownexamplesare the dualism of the-

ory andpractice,of consciousness and externalreality,of dutyandinclina-tion,andof fact andvalue. As we havealreadyestablished,appliedethics andclassical philosophyof technologyalso have a stronglydualisticcharacter.They assume that there is a sharpdividingline between scientific facts andtechnologicalartifacts,on one hand,and moralnormsand culturalvalues onthe other.Traditional hilosophyprovides hese distinctionswithanontolog-ical status and makes them a favoredsubjectof metaphysicalspeculation.Pragmatistsdenysuch anelevated statusto thesedistinctionsandgive themonly a functionalsignificance,in accordancewith theirpotentialusefulnessfor problem solving. In other words, these distinctions do not precederesearchbut are formed or construedonly duringthe research tself, with aview to practice.Thedividinglines betweenopposingconceptsare notclearand fixedforeverfrom the startbut ratherdisplaya changingandfluid char-acter.9

Antiskepticism.According to pragmatists, fallibilism should not beequatedwithskepticism.If absolutecertainty s notachievabledue to a lackof metaphysicalguarantees, his does not mean thatpeople are left at themercyof universaldoubt.Accordingto Peirce,there s a worldof differencebetweenfallibleknowledgeand no knowledgeat all.There s only more andless reliableknowledge.The Cartesiandoctrinethatphilosophymustbeginwithuniversaldoubt to finally obtainabsolutecertainty s nottenable.Wecannot eginwithcomplete oubt.Wemustbeginwithalltheprejudiceswhichwe actually avewhenwe enterupon hestudyof philosophy.heseprejudicesrenot o bedispelled yamaxim,or heyare hingswhich tdoesnotoccur ous canbequestioned. ence he nitial kepticism illbe a mereself-deception,ndnotrealdoubt.... Apersonmay,t is true,nthecourse fhisstudies,indreasono doubtwhathebeganbybelieving;ut nthat asehe



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Keulartzt al. EthicsnTechnologicalulture17doubts ecause e hasapositive eason or t,andnotonaccount f theCarte-sianmaxim.Letus notpretendo doubtnphilosophy hatwe do notdoubtnourhearts.inStuhr 000,55)

Peirce distinguishesin this passage between real doubtand philosophicaldoubt,andarguesfor a symmetrical reatmentof doubt andbelief, withtheunderstandinghat the entertainment f either mustbe justified. One musthave reasonsto doubt,as well as to believe.10

Living and Working TogetherThesepragmatic ntithesesareof importanceorapragmatist pproachoethics. Themoralcore intuitionsof pragmatism evolve around hepossibili-ties for living andworkingtogether.Whileconsequentialistsake collectivehappiness o be the moral ouchstoneanddeontologists, heobligingcharac-ter of moralnorms,peacefulcohabitationand fruitfulcooperationserve asthe moral touchstoneforpragmatism.This normativeperspectivesheds a specific lighton the central(anti)the-ses of pragmatism.Thesecan be seen as beingdirectedagainstcertainphilo-sophical assumptionsthatoften become, in practice,obstacles for fruitfulcooperation.Becauseof theirpreoccupationwithgeneraland abstractruths,foundationalism ndessentialismareoftencounterproductive-theydistractattention romconcreteproblemsandconflicts tied to particularimes andplaces,whichactuallycall for a measureof flexibility,hermeneuticact,andcontext sensitivity. Dualism is counterproductivebecause it encourages"black-and-white"hinking, which brings conflicts to a head and leadsdebatesto degeneratentounproductive oundarydisputesorto get stuck inchildish "does not"-"does too" exchanges. Skepticism, which cultivatesphilosophicaldoubt at theexpenseof realdoubt,also formsanobstacle to acreative acklingof problems.Anyonewhoputs everythingupfordiscussionwill simplyhaveno time left for therealproblemsof the moment.

Two "Progressive Problemshifts"Themoralpointof referenceof fruitfulcooperationandpeacefulcohabi-tationdoes notonly shedlighton thepragmaticantithesesandtheir nternalrelationship,but it also reinforces two progressive problemshiftsthat arecharacteristicor pragmatism.Because of its attention o the settlementofconflicts for the sake of furthercooperation,pragmatismhas always beeninterestedas much in the process of (moral)inquiryas in its ready-madeproducts(see Caspary2000, 153).Topromote hefairnessandqualityof the



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processof inquiryanddeliberation,t is essentialthatall thoseconcernedcanhave theirsay and thatdecisions are made on the basis of acarefulconsider-ationof all relevantconflictingmoral claims andarguments.A secondshift to whichthe standard f fruitfulcooperationandpeacefulcohabitationgives rise is a shiftin emphasisfromthe contextofjustificationto thecontextof discovery(Caspary2000, 161). Pragmatists ttachas muchimportanceo thejustificationof moral udgmentsastheydo toheuristics, othe"artof invention."Pragmatism mphasizestheimportanceof novel con-structsandhypotheseswithwhichemergentproblemscan be tackled,whilein moretraditional thics the entireemphasisstill lies upon justificationofmoral udgments.Thedistinctionbetweenthecontext ofjustificationand thecontextof dis-coveryis related o what hasbeencalled thesplitpersonalityof pragmatism,a termreferring o the distinctionbetweenthe rationalistandthe romanticsideof pragmatismsee Westbrook1998).Thatpragmatismhas shownbothrationalistandromantictraitsfrom the very outset was alreadynoticed in1911 by Rene Berthelot,who dedicated a critical studyon the pragmatistmovement see Rorty1998).Berthelot raced herationalist oots of pragma-tismto theinfluenceof CharlesDarwinandHerbertSpencer,andthe roman-tic rootsbackbehindRalphWaldoEmerson o SchellingandHolderlin.Therationalistside of pragmatisms concernedwith the cognitivecapacityforargumentative roblemsolving andjustification,while the romanticside isconcernedwith the creativecapacity for the innovationand invention ofvocabularieswhichprovidenew meaningsandopen new perspectives.

Tasks and Tools for Pragmatist EthicsIf we combine thedistinctionbetweenrationalistandromanticaspectsofpragmatismwith the distinction between product-orientedand process-orientedapproaches, hisresults in the following matrixof tasksfor a prag-matistethics(see Table1). Some of thesetasksarewell knownto prevailingforms of appliedethics,butothersconstitutesupplements hatwe believearenecessaryto makeethicsbettergearedto dealingwith moralproblems n atechnologicalculture.Weproposethatdependinguponthe moralproblemathand,pragmatistswill switchbetweenthesedifferent asks andtheircorre-

spondingmethodsor tools.The tasks in box (a) arethe traditionalasks of appliedethics. Here,therole of the ethicist is that of the lawyer or the moralengineer.The main



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Keulartzt al. / Ethics nTechnologicalulture 19

Table 1. Tasks for a Pragmatist EthicsProduct Process

Rationalist"context (a)Traditionalthics (b)Discourseethicsof justification") Providing rguments Structuringndandjustificationsor safeguardingairpublicoragainstcourses of deliberation ndaction decisionmakingRomantic "context (c) Dramatic ehearsal (d)Conflictmanagementof discovery") Criticizingnd renewing Aidingan openvocabularies, xploring confrontation fpossiblefutureworlds heterogeneousmoralvocabulariesandworldviews

activities includeproviding,clarifying,andexplicatingvariousarguments,constructingmoralarguments nd ustifyingmoralrules for(oragainst)spe-cific courses of action. Commonmethodsin appliedethics areprinciplism,casuistry,cost-benefitanalysis,and so on.The tasks in box (b) formthe domain of the so-called discourseethics,especially as it was developedby Apel (1988) and Habermas 1991). Thegoalof discourseethics is theimprovement f therationality f publicdebateand decisionmaking.Therefore,one shouldhelpto develop proceduresandinstitutions hatguarantee qualaccess to publicdeliberationand fairrepre-sentationof all relevantarguments o ensure that moraldecisions are basedon the "force of the betterargument" ather han on the forces of power,money, and the like. The methods of discourse ethics include stakeholderanalysis(who has a stake in the matter n questionand shouldconsequentlyhave a say in the debate?)and institutionalanalysis (to what extent is theinstitutional ettingof the debate n line with the "idealdiscoursesituation,"as characterizedn Habermas's heoryof communicativeaction?).Formore "common" ndfamiliar ypesof problems or which the relevantethical considerations are in principleknown,12 he prevailingrationalisttools of appliedethics and discourse ethics usually suffice, while for newproblemsfor which existing rules and routinesarenot adequate, t will benecessaryto resortto the romanticside of pragmatism. n this final section,we will concentrateon this romanticside, since therationalist ide is alreadyrelativelywell known.First,we will discuss some tasks andtools belongingto dramaticrehearsaland next some tasks and tools pertaining o conflictmanagement.



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20 Science,Technology, HumanValues

Dramatic RehearsalThe romanticside of pragmatism omes preeminently o the fore in whatDewey calls "dramatic ehearsal,"he imaginingof a pluralityof possiblefuturesandthewaysthat ead to theirrealization.Thisinvolvesthickdescrip-tions of complexscenarios,of variouscompetingpossiblelinesof actionandcourses of conduct.Accordingto Dewey,creativedeliberation s dramaticnthreesenses: in itsconcernwithcharacter,which mirrorsour dominantnter-est in the manifestationand interactionof personalities; n its concernfor

plot,for creativeredescriptions ndnewnarratives;nd n its suspensefulandopen-endednature see Caspary2000, 113-14).Dramaticrehearsal s similar to whatGustafson(1990) once termedthe"propheticdiscourse" n ethics.13Gustafsondistinguishestwo varieties: heapocalypticand theutopian.Inaddition othisdistinction,anothermportantdistinctionshould be mentionedhere:thedistinctionbetween futurescenar-ios pertaining o technologicalcultureas a whole and scenariosconcerningseparate echnologies.The firsttypeof futurescenario akes on the characterof culturalcriticismandideology critiquepursuedby authors uch as Nietz-sche andFoucaultor by movements such as feminism or Marxism.Wholevocabularies,discourses,orbroadtechnologicaldevelopmentscan be criti-cized orputupfor revision.Classicalphilosophyof technologyin thetradi-tion of Heideggerand Ellul thatsketches a ratherapocalyptic mage of thefutureprovidesanotherexampleof this type.For future scenariosconcerningseparate echnologies,STS can provideuseful tools-for example,the"material ermeneutics" f Don Ihde(1998).Materialhermeneuticsaimsattheexplorationof possiblefutureworlds thatare disclosed andshapedby new technologiesandinvestigates hequestionwhether our common moral vocabularies and our current institutionalarrangementsre still suitableorhave to be revised orreplaced n thelightofthesepossible futureworlds.An example of materialhermeneuticscan be found in SchermerandKeulartz 2002). Theytake thecase of IVF to exploretheconsequencesandramificationsa new techniquecan have on society. IVF has increased thenumberof parties nvolved nthecreationof achild. Notonlycommissioningparents,donors,andsurrogatesbut alsophysicians, abtechnicians, awyers,institutions ike spermand embryobanks, infertilitycenters, laboratories,andsurrogacyagencies are involved. A complex network s thuscreated,anetwork nwhich theembryoorchild-to-be s the centralknot. SchermerandKeulartz ocus on the novel characterof IVF andshow the emergenceof anewentity("theembryo"),of a new medicalpractice productiven steadofcurative),and of new (family) relationships.They map the accompanying



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shifts in moralresponsibilitiesand social roles and arguethat these shiftshave not alwaysbeen adequatelynoticed and accountedfor in bioethics.Perhaps hegreatestnoveltyof IVF wasthat t separatedheembryofromthebodyof its mother. ndoingso, itactuallycreateda new distinctentity, he

"earlyhumanembryo."Theembryoas a new subjecthas been discussedatlengthin bioethics.Thiswasnot thecase, however,withrespectto two othermain issues that were raisedby IVF.Thefirstissue concernsthe division of biologicalmotherhood.WithIVF,it becamepossible to have one woman's fertilizedegg carriedby a secondwoman. Thus biological motherhood(which could alreadybe opposed tosocialmotherhood)wasbrokenupintogeneticandgestationalmotherhood.Itbecamepossiblefor a child to have five parents: wo genetic parents, wosocial or rearingparents,and a surrogateor gestationalmother.Differentcombinationsof gametes,wombs,andrearingparentsrendermanydifferentparentingarrangements.The possibilitiesfor creatingnew familyrelation-ships, living arrangements,and forms of parenthoodseem sheer endless.They signal the need to rethink he social, moral,andlegal basis of familyrelationshipsand themeaningof conceptslikefamilyandkinship.However,these questionshave received rather ragmentedandone-sided attention nbioethics. SchermerandKeulartz2002) claim thatapragmatist thics wouldargue or anopenandcreativeview onnewfamilyconstructions ndarrange-ments. A pragmatist thics couldargue or anunderstandingf thefamilyinfunctional erms as suggested by Hickman(1999); it mightexplorea notionof "multipleparenthood";or it might explore possibilities to understand"parenthood"n a moregradualway, with differentdegreesof involvementandresponsibilities.Thesecondkey questionthat s raisedby IVFconcernsthe shift frompri-vate procreation o publicreproduction.WithIVF, Schermerand Keulartz(2002) notice,reproductivemedicineliterallybecameproductive, or it cre-ated new life. Theemergenceof a new "practice"withinmedicine has gonelargelyuncommented,whereas t makes it necessaryto createnew conceptsora new vocabulary,o define new(social)roles andresponsibilities,andtodevelopnew rulesguidingthispractice.This newpracticecan be character-izedbythe fact that ttreatspeople'sdesiresandnottheirdiseases.Itincludesnotonly a numberof reproductiveechniquesbutalso, forexample,electivecosmeticsurgery.Bothreproductivemedicine andcosmeticsurgeryarepro-ductiverather han curativeandtheycreate a differentrelationshipbetweenclientandphysicianthanthe traditional ne. This hasbeenrecognized nsuf-ficientlyby traditionalbioethics-a pragmatist thics would emphasizetheemergenceof a new practiceandexplore possible arrangementsor the newrules,relations,andresponsibilities o go with that new practice.



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Conflict ManagementAssessmentand evaluationof technologicaldevelopmentsoftenbringtolight deep-seatedandfundamental alue conflicts.Handlingsuchvaluecon-flicts forms one of the mainchallengesfor a pragmatist thics becausethe

problemsthatthreatencooperationand cohabitationare most pregnantandmanifesthere. Antifoundationalism nd antiessentialism reimportant tart-ing pointshere,since pragmatistswill look for solutionsin a morepracticaldirection nstead of lookingfor ultimatemoraltruthsor foundations or the"onlyrightanswer"as traditional thics tends to do. It is also important orecognizethatthe traditional iberalsolution of makinga splitbetweenthepublic and the privateis more difficult to maintainwhere technologicaldevelopmentsareconcerned.Suchdevelopmentsoften have aprivateas wellas apublicside thatcannotbe simplyorclearlyseparated,as thecaseof IVFillustrated.Liketraditional thics,discourseethics is notalwaysable to handle unda-mentaldifferences anddisagreementsn a satisfactoryway.Discourse ethics is mainly concerned with what Habermashas called"moraldiscourses."Such discoursesevolve aroundssuesofjustice, inwhichthequestionof "what s equally good for all" is central.Incontrast,"ethicaldiscourses" urnon the issue of thegood life and on thequestionof "what sgoodforus" asmembersof a specificnation,membersof a localcommunity,inhabitants f aregion,and so on. Inethicaldiscourses, heattempts madetoreveal,throughcriticalreflection,thedeeperconsonances n acommon formof life thatcanbridgedifferencesof opinion.Unlike a moralconsensus suchan ethicalconsensus s not(andcannotbe) entirelyrationallymotivated.Par-ticipantsin an ethicaldiscussioncan, afterall, neverworkthemselves freefrom theplace-andtime-boundperspectiveof thecultural ormof life that sthesubjectof theirdeliberations.Anethicalconsensuscanexistonlywithinasinglecommunity. nmoder pluralistic ocieties,however,discussionstakeplaceprimarilybetweendifferentcommunities,which oftenholdcompetingviews of thegood life. In thatsituation,an ethicalconsensus is impossible,andbecauseethicalconvictionsdifferfromnegotiable nterests,a faircom-promise s notsuitableeither; nethicalmatters,onecannotbargainnormakeconcessions without compromisingoneself and one's integrity(Bohman1996).So thequestionbecomeshow to handledeep-seatedvalueconflicts if thepossibilitiesfor consensus andcompromiseareeliminated.The answerwewouldsuggestis thatwe shouldaspireto an"equalcoexistence"of differentethicalconvictions.14 The ideal of equalcoexistencerequiresa certainatti-tudeof the conflicting parties.Theyhaveto appreciate hefact thattheyare



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competingfor primacywithin the same universe of discourse with otherswho cannot beforehandbe brandedas unreasonable.Such reflexiveaware-nessrejects henaivetyof dogmaticbeliefs,recognizesits ownfallibility,andleaves room for "reasonabledissensus."

Pragmatistsaim to develop differenttools of "conflictmanagement"oenhance mutualrespectand to promotethe ideal of equalcoexistence. Onemethodto makepersistentconflictsmanageables breakingupdualismsandrelativizing rigid dichotomies. This can be done through gradualization:thinking n terms of degreesinstead of boundaries.15One example of this is the debate between animal protectionistsandnatureconservationistsabout the moralproblemsassociated with the intro-duction of largeherbivores n newly developednatureareas in the Nether-lands (Klaver et al. 2002; Keulartz et al. forthcoming).The herbivoresreleasedarebasicallydomesticated peciesthatarederived rom hoofedani-mals that were once wild, such as cattle, horses, sheep, and goats. Konikhorses and Heck oxen representa special subcategory n this group,sincetheyare meantto "function" s semiwildsurrogatesor such extinctspeciesas thetarpanand the auroch.Most of them come fromfarms,zoos, or smallparks, n short,fromquitedomesticatedbackgrounds;when introduced ntorelativelywild areas,theywill be subjectto a processof, whatKlaveret al.call, "de-domestication,"hatis, they have to learnto fend for themselves.Themanagementpolicies of dedomestication,which entailminimizingsup-plementary eedingandveterinaryassistance,have been most controversial.Most controversies evolve around he "domestication tatus"of the animals:shouldthey be seen as (still) domesticatedor as (already)wild? While themajorityof theanimalprotectionists,armers,and visitors view the releasedhorsesandcattle as domesticatedanimals o be cared or asindividuals,mostpark rangers,herdmanagers,andecologists preferto treatthem,ethologi-cally andethically,the same as wild animals in the areas at stake. Unfortu-nately,environmentalphilosophyis in no positionto offer a way outof thisstalemate,because within this branch of philosophy,there is an ongoingdebate between individualisticallyoriented animal-welfare ethicists andholistically oriented ecoethicists thatstronglyreflects the polarizeddebatebetween animalprotectionistsand nature onservationists.As a resultof thisdiscord,people exhaust themselves in unproductiveboundarydisputesinwhich both sides claim an exclusive "moral jurisdiction" over largeherbivores.

According o Klaveret al. (2002), thisimpassecanbe broken f wereplacethenotion of a clear-cutborderlinebetweennatureand cultureby the ideaofa broadcontinuum,a hybridmiddleground, n which it is no longera ques-tion of "either-or"but of "less or more."Herbivores ntroduced n nature



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areasdo notsimplycross a distinctdividinglinebetween cultureandnature;they do not walk from domestication into the wild, that is, from a moraldomainof individualcare to one of concernfor theecological whole. Theygraduallymovefrom athoroughlyculturalcontext to one that s increasinglynatural.

To do justice to the gradualcharacterof dedomestication,Klaver et al.(2002) introducea new ethical notion with regard o the treatmentof largeherbivoresin newly developed nature areas: the principleof "respectforpotentialwildness."Emphasizing hepotentialaspectof wildness concedes acapacity for wildness, and at the same time, it acknowledges that dedo-mestication s a dynamic process with an uncertainandunpredictable ut-come.Insuchaprocess,both animalwelfareethicistsandecoethicistswill beindispensable.Klaveret al. launched hisnewethicalconcept explicitlywiththe pragmatic ntention to overcome the deadlock in the debate betweenadvocatesandopponentsof the Dutch herbivores ntroductionprogram.But often sucha strategyof gradualization oes not work well enoughoratall, as is evident from the discussion over the statusof theembryo n con-nection with abortionor medical experimentation. n this case, an attemptwas made tobreak heimpasseby redefining heembryoas a "potentialper-son."From the ensuing debate, it is clear how rigid thinkingin terms ofdichotomies is: while some say that we have no obligations to embryosbecause a potentialpersonis not a realperson,othersthinkthat we do haveobligations,even to humaneggs, because these arepotentialpersonstoo. Inthiscase, theconceptof thepotentialperson s once againseen as a questionof "either-or" nd not as one of "less or more."If makingthe changefromboundaries o degreesdoes not work sufficientlyor at all, one will have tolook forotherways to obtain anequalcoexistencebetween rival vocabular-ies. A particularly romisingway seems to be theso-calledcommon-grounddialogue.16Common-groundgroupsfind it more constructive o leave corecommitmentsoff thetableandto search orareasand ssues wheresome kindof agreement s withinreach.WilliamCaspary 2000) describesas anexam-ple of this strategy he efforts to createa common-grounddialoguebetweenpro-lifeandpro-choicerepresentativesn theabortiondebate.Theseeffortswere motivatedby dismayat the escalating incivility in clinic protestsandpublicdebates,andtheyalsoreflectedaperceivedstalematenthecourtsandlegislatures. Pro-life and pro-choice representativesmet and discoveredsharedconcernsabout,for example,the expediencyto reduceabortionbypreventingunwantedpregnancies-teaching young people to resist peerpressure or earlysexualactivityprovedto be acceptableto bothsides.Lookingfor commonground s in ouropiniona promising way to com-bine two centraltenets of pragmatism: he candidacknowledgmentof the



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inevitablepluralityof moral vocabularieson one hand and the commitmentto work at finding solutions for the problemsof humancooperationandcohabitationon the other.

ConclusionIn thisprogrammaticrticle,we have intended o show thatappliedethicshas insufficient nsightintothemoralsignificanceof technologicalartifacts

and systemsand that it thereforecannotcope adequatelywith the dynamiccharacter f ourtechnologicalculture.Analysesof thistechnologicalcultureand of technologicaldevelopmentsas areperformedwithin STS areuseful,but they fall short in normativerespect.To repairthe blind spots of bothapplied ethics and STS, we have sketched the contours of a pragmatistapproach hatdoes not representa radicalbreakwith the currentpracticeofethicsbutrathers complementaryncharacter. n thelightof the centralcon-cern of pragmatism,cooperationand cohabitation,we have exploredthetasks and tools of a pragmatist thics. We havepaid specialattention o theexplorationof future worlds disclosed and shaped by technology and themanagementof deep value conflicts inherent to a pluralist society. Todevelopanethics that s well equipped or ourtechnologicalculture, urthertheoreticalanalysisof the tasks we havesuggestedandpracticalexperimen-tation with the correspondingools arerequired.

Notes1. The termprinciplismwas coined by Clouser and Gert(1990).2. Thedistinctionbetween nstrumentalist,ubstantive, ndpluralistviewsof technology sderivedfrom AlbertBorgmann 1984).3. See VanderBurg(1991)for thedistinctionbetweentheempiricaland helogicalversionsof the slipperyslope argument.VanderBurgdistinguishes wo different ogical versions,but itwouldgo beyondthe scope of this article to go into moredetail on this.4. Two discussions shouldbe mentionedhere:(1) the discussion in Science, Technology,and Human Valuesbetween Keith Grint and Steve Woolgar(1995, 1996) and Rosalind Gill(1996); and(2) the discussionin Social Studiesof Science betweenBernwardJoerges(1999a,1999b)and SteveWoolgarand Geoff Cooper(1999).5. For a critiqueof theStrongProgramme'sneglectof normativequestions,see, forexam-

ple, Lynchand Fuhrman 1991).6. See the special issue on "ThePolitics of SKK:Neutrality,CommitmentandBeyond."Social Studiesof Science (May 1996).7. Ina recentarticleonthe debateabout he normative elevanceof constructivism,nwhichhe arguesthatthe criticisms of Winner,Radder,and others arefundamentally ccurate,PatrickW.Hamlett 2003) comes to a similarconclusion:"Itmaybe time for constructivistanalysesto



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move beyond the descriptiveexaminationof the social dynamics of technology to a moreproactiveapproachon the larger ssues criticsidentify"(p. 114).

8. Vicky Singleton(1996) expressivelyphrases he constructivist version o ethics.Inhercontributiono theMay 1996specialissue of Social StudiesofScienceon "ThePoliticsof SSK,"she suggests "that to engage in a 'should' discourse is to engage in an oppressive andexclusionarydiscourse" p. 461). The shoulddiscourse is a guild-inducingdiscourse,"whichseems to be basedin a discourseof oppressionanddomination"p.462). In his commentonSin-gletonandothers,Radder 1998) finds that"anormative pproach ppears o be simplyan unde-sirable,authoritariannterprise" p. 327).9. This view explainsmuch of theappealof pragmatismor feministphilosophers suchasCharleneHaddockSeigfried)and forAfro-Americanphilosophers suchas CornelWest),whoresist the drawingof strict demarcation ines between "male"and "female"and "black"and"white."

10. Putman 1994) says that the unique nsightof pragmatisms that one can be antifoun-dationalistandantiskepticist t one andthe same time. This is one of theways in whichpragma-tismdistinguishes tself frompostmodernism,whichmaybe antifoundationalistut is certainlynotantiskepticist.Referring o thisdifference,Rortysaid,inthe laconicway so characteristic fhim: "One differencebetween DerrideansandDeweyans is that Derrida ikes to put thingsinquestion,whereasDewey insistedonasking'What's heproblem?'Ourattitude s: if it isn't bro-ken, don't fix it.... Derrideans end to think that the more questioning,problematizingandmettant-en-abimeoucansqueezeinto theday'swork,the better.Deweyans,on the otherhand,thinkthatyou shouldonlyquestionwhenyoufindyourself n whatDewey called a 'problematicsituation'-a situation nwhichyouareno longersureof whatyou aredoing.... Unlessyousuf-fer fromsome suchuncertainty, oushouldsaveproblematizingorweekends" Rorty1996,44).11. To avoid heimpressionofbeing overly dealistic,we wantto stress heregulative harac-ter of the ideal of peacefulcohabitation nd fruitfulcooperation.We aresurelyawareof the real-worldconstraintsof time and finite resources money,energy, ntelligence)on problemsolving,consensusbuilding,and so on.12. Inengineeringethics,forexample, he most familiar opicsareresearch-andpublication-ethics andprofessionalcodes of conduct.Here,traditional ationalistmethodsof ethicalinquiryprevail.We do not claim thatthese methodsarewrongor mistaken-we merelywant to empha-size thatthey fail to incorporate he lessons of science andtechnologystudiesconcerningtheinterplayof science, technology,andsociety.See also SchermerandKeulartz 2003).13.Thework of CornelWest(1989), who is aproponent f a "prophetic ragmatism"hat scharacterizedby culturalcriticism andpolitical engagement,can also be situatedhere.14. This suggestion is derived from Habermas 1997), who has introduced he notion of"equalcoexistence"butwho has not furtherdeveloped his notion nthe contextof his discourseethics.

15. Anotherway of breakingupdualisms s "decomposition,"s has beenproposedby YrjoHaila. Hailaaims to show thatcertainboundaries,orexample, heboundarybetween natureandculture,are drawndifferently n differentpractices."Differentpracticesconnect to different le-ments of nature.Aqua/culture s different from agri/culture s different from silvi/culture.Althougheach one of these 'cultures' s practiced n the same social context,specificrules andnormsof dealing with theirrespectivenaturalrealmsvary.Forinstance,farmingandforestryeverywhereare based on differentsocial structures ndnetworks,and theirmutualrelationshipvaries across countries.An analysisof such differencesmightreveal mportant eneral eaturesin how the conceptionof nature s shapedwithinsocial practices" Haila2000, 167).16. Still anotherpossibilityis aredefinition hat would "tilt" heperspectiveon theproblemin question.An example is the proposalby Den Hartogh(1997) to give embryosa relational



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value.This wouldmeanthat he statusof anembryowould no morebe (exclusively)connected owhether t is a person,but instead to the significancethatparentsand other concernedpartiesattachto its life.

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Woolgar,S., and K. Grint. 1996. A furtherrefutationof the assumptionthatpolitical actiondependson the "truth" nda suggestionthat we need to go beyondthis level of debate:Areplyto Rosalind Gill. Science, Technology,& Human Values21 (3): 354-57.

JozefKeulartzs an associateprofessorofappliedphilosophyat WageningenUniversity,the Netherlands.He haspublishedextensively n differentareas of social andpoliticalphilosophy,environmental thics,and naturepolicy. E-mail: ozef [email protected] s a physicianand ethicist. She is an assistantprofessorof medicalethics at ErasmusUniversityRotterdam, heNetherlands,and a policy advisorfor theCenterof Ethics and Healthof theNetherlands.Her ields of interest ncludeempiricalethics researchand health carepolicy. E-mail:[email protected] Korthalsis a professor of applied philosophyat WageningenUniversity, heNetherlands.His academic interests ncludebioethics, ood ethics, and environmentalethics. E-mail:[email protected] s anassistantprofessor ntechnologyethics at University f Twente,the Netherlands.Currently, e is workingon a studyof the ethicalandpolitical implica-tionsof genomics.E-mail: [email protected].

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Ethics in Technological Culture