G.R. No. L-33037-42 August 17, 1983

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant vs.DEMETRIO JARDIN, accused-appellee.

The Solicitor-General for plaintiff-appellant.

Marcos C. Lucero, Jr. for accused-appellee.

 

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Two constitutional rights—speedy trial and freedom from double jeopardy—are interposed as defenses by the accused in this petition for review on certiorari.

The petitioner asks us to review and annul the orders of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch V, which dismissed the criminal cases against accuse Demetrio Jardin because his constitutional right to speedy trial was allegedly violated.

The criminal prosecutions originated from a letter complaint of the Provincial Auditor of Quezon requesting the Provincial Fiscal to file the necessary criminal action under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code against Demetrio Jardin for malversation of public funds thru falsification of public documents on six counts.

The cases were assigned to Assistant Fiscal Meliton V. Angeles who set them for preliminary investigation.The accused moved to postpone the investigation twice. On the third time that the investigation was re-set, the accused and his counsel failed to appear.

On the fourth resetting, the accused and his counsel again failed to appear. Inspire of their absence, the preliminary investigation was conducted and shortly afterwards, six informations were filed against the accused before the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch II, docketed as Cases Nos. 16052 (0043-M), 16053 (0044-M), 16054 (0045-ML 16055 (0046-M), 16056 (0047-M), and 16057 (0048-M). The arraignment was set for May 9, 1967.

The records show that from May 9, 1967, the arraignment was re-set for June 6; then re-set for June 26; then from August 16, the same was re-set for September 5, all because of the motions for postponement filed at the instance of the accused. (Original records [0043-M] pp. 54, 61, 66 and 69).

When the arraignment of the accused was called on September 5, 1967, counsel for the accused verbally moved for reinvestigation on the ground that the accused was not given the opportunity to present his defense during the preliminary investigation. This was granted by the court and the first reinvestigation was set on November 24, 1967. On this date, however, the Investigating Fiscal motu proprio postponed said reinvestigation due to the non-appearance of accused and his counsel and re-set the date for December 21, 1967.

A series of postponements was again filed by the accused causing further. delays of the reinvestigation. On June 27, 1968, accused and his counsel appeared together but requested for a period of fifteen (15) days within which to file a memorandum.

In view of the expiration of the 15-day period, the Investigating Fiscal filed a manifestation before the court that the records of these cases be returned and the trial on the merits of the same be set.

The court without acting on said manifestation, issued an order transferring the six (6) cases to the new branch (Branch V) of the Court of First Instance at Mauban, Quezon. Upon receipt by the latter of the records of these cases, the arraignment and trial were set for December 3, 1968.

On the latter date, the counsel for the accused sought again the postponement of the arraignment and this was followed by more postponements, all at the instance of the accused. (Original records, [0043-M] pp. 90,93,120 and 125).

On March 31, 1969, counsel for the accused moved for the postponement of the arraignment and requested the court that the records be returned again to the Office of the Fiscal for further reinvestigation. This was granted and the reinvestigation was again set for May 5, 1969. The accused and his counsel, however, failed to appear and thus, the said reinvestigation was re-set for June 2, 1969. On this date, counsel for accused requested that he be given five (5) days within which to file a written sworn statement of the accused which would constitute the defense of the latter, subject to the cross-examination of the Investigating Fiscal.

Considering the fact that the period to file such sworn statement had already expired without anything being filed, the records of the cases were returned to the court which set said cases for arraignment and trial on September 2, 1970. On this date, the accused again moved for postponement.

When these cases were called for arraignment on September 8, 1970, Demetrio Jardin, pleaded not guilty to the crime as charged, after which he requested that the trial be postponed and re-set for September 29, 1970.

On September 29, 1970, the trial scheduled on that day was postponed again on motion of counsel for the accused. The trial was re-set for October 12, 1970, with notice to both parties.

On October 12, 1970, when the said criminal cases were called for hearing, no one appeared for the prosecution, except a state witness, Mr. Cesar Alcala of the Provincial Auditor's office who remained silent during the proceedings.

Invoking his client's constitutional right to speedy trial and seizing the opportunity to take advantage of the prosecution's failure to appear on that day, the defense counsel moved for the dismissal of the cases. The respondent court granted the oral motion for dismissal "for reasons of constitutional rights of the accused Demetrio Jardin. "

Two questions are now raised by the People in this appeal:

I. Considering the factual setting in the criminal cases at bar, was the respondent Court correct in dismissing the cases and in predicating the dismissal on the right of the defendant to a speedy trial?

II. Does the present appeal place the respondent accuse in double jeopardy?

The respondent court committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the cases and in basing the dismissal on the constitutional right of the accused to speedy trial. The right to a speedy trial means that the accused is free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, its salutary objective being to assure that an innocent person may be free from anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatever legitimate defense he may interpose. (See Andres v. Cacdac, 113 SCRA 216)

[From a perusal of the facts, it is readily seen that all the delays in the prosecution of the cases were caused by the accused himself.] All the postponements of proceedings were made at his instance and for his behalf. Hence, the constitutional right to a speedy trial afforded to an accused by our Constitution cannot be invoked. From the start of the preliminary investigation of the cases up to the trial on the merits, the accused always managed to delay the proceedings through postponements and requests for reinvestigation. [It would, therefore, be a mockery of the criminal justice system if the accused would be allowed to benefit from his own wrongdoings or tactical maneuvers intended to frustrate the administration of justice. By his own deliberate acts, he is deemed to have waived or abandoned his right to a speedy trial. In the case of Andres v. Cacdac, 113 SCRA 216, we ruled:]

In this case, however, there was a waiver or abandonment of the right to a speedy trial in the first case when the herein petitioners sought and obtained several postponements of the trial: first, when they asked for the deferment of the arraignment because the accused Ladislao Tacipit was not present; second, when they asked for the postponement of the trial for March 5, 1968 upon the ground that they have requested the Provincial Fiscal of Cagayan for a reinvestigation of the case; and finally, when they agreed, with the prosecution, to postpone the hearing set for November 28, 1968 to January 4, 1969..

The dismissal of the criminal cases against the accused by the respondent court on the ground that his right to speedy trial had beer violated was devoid of factual and legal basis. The order denying the motion for reconsideration is similarly infirm. There being no basis for the questioned orders, they are consequently null and void.

Would a reinstatement of the dismissed cases place the accused in double jeopardy?

In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure to the benefit of an accused, the following requisites must be present in the first prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. (Rule 117, Section 9, Rules of Court; People v. Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77). The last requisite assumes a valid acquittal and a valid acquittal presupposes a valid judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction. Since in the instant cases, the dismissal was void for having been issued without legal basis, it follows that the acquittal brought about by the dismissal is also void. Hence, no jeopardy can attach from such acquittal. The act of respondent judge in discussing the cases amounted to lack of jurisdiction which would prevent double jeopardy from attaching. In the case of People v. Court of appeals (10 1 SCRA 450) we ruled:

Private respondents further argue that a judgment of acquittal ends the case which cannot be appealed nor reopened, otherwise, they would be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense. That is the general rule and presupposes a valid judgment. As earlier pointed out, however, respondent Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. (Comia v. Nicolas, 29 SCRA 492 [1969]) By it no rights are divested Through it, no rights can be attains & Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. (Gomez v. Concepcion, 47 Phil. 717, 722.[1925]; Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, 685 [1968]; Parades v. Moya, 61 SCRA 526, [1974]). ...

We also note that the dismissall of the criminal cases was upon motion and with the wxpress consent of respondent Demetrio Jardin. For double jeopardy to attach, the general rule is that the dismissal of the case must be without the express consent of the accused. (People v. Salico, 84 Phil. 722; People v. Obsania, 23 SCRA 1249; People v. Pilpa, 79 SCRA 81; and People v. Cuevo, 104 SCRA 312).

If the accused had been denied his right to speedy trial or if some other basic right had been impaired, the doctrine of waiver of the right to invoke double jeopardy would not apply even if the accused had expressly moved for the termination of proceedings. In the instant case, however, the defendant had deliberately used all the available dilatory tactics he could utilize and abused the principle that the accused must be given every opportunity to disprove the criminal charge. The doctrine of double jeopardy was never intended for this purpose.

Even as we rule that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion, we also rebuke the attorneys for both the defense and the prosecution and to a certain extent, the court itself because of the breach of duties to the courts and to the administration of justice apparent in this case.

The duties of an attorney found in Rule 138, Section 20 include: -

xxx xxx xxx

(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as are consistent with truth and honor,...

xxx xxx xxx

(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding, or delay any man's cause, from any corrupt motive or interest.

xxx xxx xxx

The dilatory tactics of the defense counsel and the failure of both the judge and the fiscal to take effective counter measures to obviate the delaying acts constitute obstruction of justice.

As aptly stared:

12.09 Obstructing the administration of justice

An attorney as an officer of the court is called upon to assist in the due administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its cause. (Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, G.R. No. 11071, Jan. 9, 1972, 31 SCRA 1; In re Climaco, G.R. Adm. Case No. 134-J, Jan. 21, 1974, 55 SCRA 107) For this reason, any act on the part of a lawyer that obstructs, perverts or impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary action against him. (Cantorne vs. Ducasin 57 Phil, 23 [1932]; De los Santos vs. Sagalongos 69 Phil. 406 [1940]).

Acts which amount to obstruction in the administration of justice may take many forms. They include such acts as instructing a complaining witness in a criminal action not to appear at the scheduled hearing so that the case against the client, the accused, would be dismissed. (Cantorne vs. Ducasin supra) asking a client to plead guilty to a crime which the lawyer knows his client did not commit, (Nueno v. Santos, 58 Phil. 557 [1933]) advising a client who is detained for a crime to escape from prison, (Cf. Medina v. Yan, G.R. No. 30978, Sept. 30, 1974) employing dilatory tactics to frustrate satisfaction of clearly valid claims, Pajares vs. Abad Santos, G.R. No. 29543, Nov. 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 748) prosecuting clearly frivolous cases or appeals to drain the resources of the other party and compel him to submit out of exhaustion (Samar Mining Co. vs. Arnado, G.R. No. 22304. July 30, 1968) and filing multiple petitions or complaints for a cause that has been previously rejected in the false expectation of getting favorable action. (Gabriel vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 43757, July 30, 1976, 72 SCRA 173; Ramos vs. Potenciano, G.R. No. 27104, Dec. 20, 1976, 74 SCRA 345; Macias v. Uy Kim, G.R. No. 31174, May 30, 1972, 45 SCRA 251) Acts of this or similar nature are grounds for disciplinary action." Agpalo Legal Ethics, U.P. Law Center, 1980 Edition, pp. 405-406)

The invocation of constitutional rights by the private respondent is without merit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned orders of the respondent court are hereby SET ASIDE. Criminal Cases Nos. 0043-M, 0044-M, 0045-M, 0046M, 0047-M, and 0048-M are reinstated and the proper regional trial court is ordered to proceed with all deliberate speed in these cases.

SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 4058.  March 12, 1998]

BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. complainant, vs. ATTY. ERNESTO B. FLORES, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The profession of law exacts the highest standards from its members and brooks no violation of its code of conduct.  Accordingly, a lawyer who trifles with judicial processes, engages in forum shopping and blatantly lies in his pleadings must be sanctioned.

The Case

This is an administrative complaint against Atty. Ernesto Flores filed by Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. (BENECO) before this Court on July 5, 1993, seeking his removal or suspension from the bar for forum shopping, which amounted to “grave misconduct, x x x unduly delaying the administration of justice, and violating with impunity his oath of office and applicable laws and jurisprudence.”[1]

After the respondent submitted his Comment, dated August 21, 1993, we referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on September 27, 1993 for investigation, report and recommendation.  On August 15, 1997, we received a resolution from the IBP Board of Governors, finding respondent guilty of violating Canons 10 and 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommending his suspension from the practice of law for a period of six months, viz:

“RESOLUTION NO. XII-97-149Adm. Case NO. 4058Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs.Atty. Ernesto B. Flores

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, hereinmade [sic] part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex “A”; and finding the recommendation therein to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, Respondent Atty. Ernesto Flores is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months for violating the provision of Canon[s] 10 and 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.”[2]

The Facts

Because the parties[3] agreed to dispense with the presentation of testimonial evidence, the case was submitted for resolution on the basis of their documentary evidence.  As found by Investigating Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose, the facts are as follows:

“x x x.  On February 25, 1993, Labor Arbiter Irenarco Rimando of the National Labor Relations Commission, Regional Arbitration Branch, Cordillera Administrative Region, Baguio City, issued a Writ of Execution (x x x) in NLRC Case No. RAB-1-0313-84 to enforce the decision rendered by the Supreme Court on May 18, 1992 in G.R. No. 89070 (Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. NLRC, 209 SCRA 55).  The Writ of Execution was issued on motion of Benguet Electric Cooperative (BENECO for short) to collect the amount of P344,000.00 which it paid to Peter Cosalan during the pendency of the case before the Supreme Court, on the basis of its decision ordering the respondent board members

‘to reimburse petitioner BENECO any amount that it may be compelled to pay to respondent Cosalan by virtue of the decision of Labor Arbiter Amado T. Adquilen.’

After issuance of the writ of execution, the respondent, as new counsel for the losing litigant-members of the BENECO Board of Directors, filed a Motion for Clarification with the Third Division of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 89070, the minute resolution to wit:  ‘to note without action the aforesaid motion’.

Thereafter, the respondent instituted a suit docketed as Civil Case NO. 2738-R (x x x) with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Baguio City, seeking to enjoin the defendants Clerk of Court, et al. from levying on their properties in satisfaction of the said writ of execution.  That case, however, was dismissed by the Presiding Judge Clarence Villanueva in his Order dated March 18, 1993 (x x x).

Accordingly, the Office of the Clerk of Court, MTC, Baguio City, through Sheriff III Wilfredo Mendez, proceeded to levy on the properties of the losing board members of BENECO. Thus, a sale at public auction was set on June 1, 1993, at 10:00 o’clock in the morning in front of the Baguio City Hall, per Sheriff’s Notice of Sale dated May 4, 1993 (x x x), of the properties of Abundio Awal and Nicasio Aliping[,] two of the losing members of the Board of Directors of BENECO in the aforementioned case.

Respondent claims in his comment (x x x) that Branch 7, motu proprio, dismissed Civil Case No. 2738-R for lack of jurisdiction on March 18,1993, which dismissal was [sic] became final due to respondent’s failure to perfect an appeal therefrom which claim according to the complainant, constitute[s] deliberate misrepresentation, if not falsehood, because the respondent indeed interposed an appeal such that on May 11, 1993, the RTC 7 of Baguio City transmitted the entire record of Civil Case No. 2738-R to the Court of Appeals per certified machine copy of the letter transmittal of same date (x x x).

While respondent ‘never essentially intended to assail the issuance by the NLRC of the Writ of Execution x x x nor sought to undo it’ (x x x) the complaint in Civil Case No. 2738-R which he filed prays for the immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary writ of injunction for defendants Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio City Sheriff to cease and desist from enforcing  the execution and levy of the writ of execution issued by the NLRC-CAR, pending resolution of the main action in said court (x x x) which complainant likewise claims as an unprocedural maneuver to frustrate the execution of the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 89070 in complete disregard of settled jurisprudence that regular courts have no jurisdiction to hear and decide questions which arise and are incidental to the enforcement of decisions, orders and awards rendered in labor cases citing the case of Cangco vs. CA, 199 SCRA 677, a display of gross ignorance of the law.

On May 26, 1993, respondent again filed for Abundio Awal and Nicasio Aliping with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, La Trinidad, Benguet, separate complaints for Judicial Declaration of Family Home Constituted, Ope Lege, and thus Exempt from Levy and Execution the subject properties with Damages, etc. docketed as Civil Cases Nos. 93-F-0414 (x x x) and 93-F-0415 (x x x), which are essentially similar actions to enjoin the enforcement of the judgment rendered in NLRC Case No. RAB-1-0313-84.  He also filed an urgent Motion Ex-parte (x x x) praying for temporary restraining order in these two (2) cases.

The complainant further alleges that respondent’s claim for damages against the defendant Sheriff is another improper and unprocedural maneuver which is likewise a violation of respondent’s oath not to sue on groundless suit since the said Sheriff was merely enforcing a writ of execution as part of his job.”

Recommendation of the IBP

As noted earlier, Investigating Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose recommended, and the IBP Board of Governors concurred, that respondent be suspended from the bar for six months for: 

1. Falsehood, for stating in his comment before this Court that the order of the RTC dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 2738-R was not appealed on time

2. Failure to comply with Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 on forum shopping

Commissioner Jose ratiocinated:

“A cursory glance of (sic) x x x the complaint filed by the respondent in Civil Case No. 2738-R before the RTC of Baguio City, which complaint was signed and verified under oath by the respondent, reveals that it lacks the certification required by Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 which took effect on January 1, 1992 to the effect that ‘to the best of his knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof or any tribunal or agency.  If there is any other action pending, he must state the status of the same.  If he should learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or pending before the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof or any tribunal or agency[,] he should notify the court, tribunal or agency within five (5) days from such notice.’

“Among the other penalties, the said circular further provides that the lawyer may also be subjected to disciplinary proceedings for non-compliance thereof.

“In sum, it is clear that the respondent violated the provisions of Canon[s] 10 and 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility under which the lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court and exert[s] every effort and consider[s] it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.”[4]

This Court’s Ruling

We adopt and affirm the recommendation of the IBP suspending the respondent from the bar, but we increase the period from six (6) months to one (1) year and six (6) months.

Forum Shopping

Circular No. 28-91,[5] dated September 4, 1991 which took effect on January 1, 1992, requires a certificate of non-forum shopping to be attached to petitions filed before this Court and the Court of Appeals.  This circular was revised on February 8, 1994.  The IBP found that the respondent had violated it, because the complaint he filed before the RTC of Baguio City “lack[ed] the certification required by Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91.”[6]

We distinguish.  Respondent’s failure to attach the said certificate cannot be deemed a violation of the aforementioned circular, because the said requirement applied only to petitions filed with this Court and the Court of Appeals.[7] Likewise inapplicable is Administrative Circular No. 04-94 dated February 8, 1994 which extended the requirement of a certificate of non-forum shopping to all initiatory pleadings filed in all courts and quasi-judicial agencies other than this Court and the Court of Appeals.  Circular No. 04-94 became effective only on April 1, 1994, but the assailed complaint for injunction was filed on March 18, 1993, and the petition for the constitution of a family home was instituted on May 26, 1993.

Be that as it may, respondent is still guilty of forum shopping.  In Chemphil Export and Import Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,[8] this Court declared that “(t)he rule against forum shopping has long been established and subsequent circulars[9] of this Court merely formalized the prohibition and provided the appropriate penalties against transgressors.”  The prohibition is found in Section 1(e) of Rule 16 and Section 4 of Rule 2 of the 1964 Rules of Court, which provide:

“SECTION 1.  Grounds. -- Within the time for pleading, a motion to dismiss the action may be made on any of the following grounds:

xxx  xxx                              xxx

(e)     That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause;

xxx  xxx                              xxx[10]

“SEC. 4. Effect of splitting a single cause of action. -- If two or more complaints are brought for different parts of a single cause of action, the filing of the first may be pleaded in abatement of the other or others, in accordance with section 1 (e) of Rule 16, and a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a bar in the others.”[11]

The prohibition is also contained in Circular No. 28-91.  This circular  did not only require that a certification of non-forum shopping be attached to the petitions filed before this Court or the Court of Appeals; it also decreed that forum shopping constituted direct contempt of court and  could subject the offending lawyer to disciplinary action.  The third paragraph thereof reads:

“3. Penalties.

(a) Any violation of this Circular shall be a cause for the summary dismissal of the multiple petition or complaint.

(b) Any willful and deliberate forum shopping by any party and his lawyer wit the filing of multiple petitions and complaints to ensure favorable action shall constitute direct contempt of court.

(c) The submission of false certification under Par. 2 of the Circular shall likewise constitute contempt of Court, without prejudice to the filing of criminal action against the guilty party.  The lawyer may also be subjected to disciplinary proceedings.” (Underscoring supplied.)

The foregoing were substantially reproduced in Revised Circular No. 28-91[12] and Administrative Circular No. 04-94.[13]

In a long line of cases, this Court has held that forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another, [14] or when he institutes  two  or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the gamble that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.[15] The most important factor in determining the existence of forum shopping is the “vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs.”[16]

After this Court rendered its Decision[17] in Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.[18] and upon motion of BENECO, Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando issued a writ of execution[19] ordering the clerk of court and ex officio city sheriff of the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City to levy on and sell at public auction personal and real property of the members of the Board of Directors of BENECO.

On March 18, 1993, Respondent Flores, acting as counsel for BENECO Board Members Victor Laoyan, Nicasio Aliping, Lorenzo Pilando and Abundio Awal, filed with the RTC an injunction suit praying for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) “to preserve the status quo as now obtaining between the parties,” as well as a writ of preliminary preventive injunction ordering the clerk of court and the ex officio city sheriff of the MTC of Baguio to “cease and desist from enforcing by execution and levy the writ of execution from the NLRC-CAR, pending resolution of the main action raised in court.”[20]

When this injunction case was dismissed, Respondent Flores filed with another branch of the RTC two identical but separate actions both entitled “Judicial Declaration of Family Home Constituted, ope lege, Exempt from Levy and Execution; with Damages, etc.,” docketed as Civil Case Nos. 93-F-0414 and 93-F-0415.[21] The said complaints were supplemented by an “Urgent Motion Ex Parte” [22] which prayed for an order to temporarily restrain Sheriff Wilfredo V. Mendez from proceeding with the auction sale of plaintiffs’ property “to avoid rendering ineffectual and functus [oficio] any judgment of the court later in this [sic] cases, until further determined by the court.”

Civil Case Nos. 93-F-0414 and 93-F-0415 are groundless suits.  Modequillo vs. Breva,[23] reiterated in Manacop vs. Court of Appeals,[24] shows the frivolity of these proceedings:

“Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence.  There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code.  If the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law.  Thus, the creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the home.

xxx.

The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such, and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.”

Adhering to the Court’s declaration in said cases, the subject properties are deemed constituted as family homes by operation of law under Article 153 of the Family Code.

The suits for the constitution of a family home were not only frivolous and unnecessary;  they were clearly asking for reliefs identical to the prayer previously dismissed by another branch of the RTC,  i.e., to forestall the execution of a final judgment of the labor arbiter.  That they were   filed  ostensibly  for  the judicial declaration of a family home was a mere smoke screen; in essence, their real objective was to restrain or delay the enforcement of the writ of execution.  In his deliberate attempt to obtain the same relief in two different courts, Respondent Flores was obviously shopping for a “friendly” forum which would capitulate to his improvident plea for an injunction and was thereby trifling with the judicial process.[25]

We remind the respondent that, under the Code of Professional Responsibility,[26] he had a duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.[27] The Code also enjoins him from unduly delaying a case by impeding the execution of a judgment or by misusing court processes.[28]

In consonance with Millare vs. Montero[29] and Garcia vs. Francisco,[30] respondent should be suspended from the practice of law for one year.  In Millare, the respondent filed with different courts a total of six appeals, complaints and petitions which frustrated and delayed the execution of a final judgment.  Holding that “respondent ‘made a mockery of the judicial processes’ and disregarded canons of professional ethics in intentionally frustrating the rights of a litigant in whose favor a judgment in the case was rendered [and], thus, ‘abused procedural rules to defeat the ends of substantial justice,’” [31] this Court suspended the respondent from the practice of law for one year.

In Garcia, the respondent was also suspended for one year from the practice of law, for violating the proscription against forum shopping.  This Court held that “he deserve[d] to be sanctioned, not only as a punishment for his misconduct but also as a warning to other lawyers who may be influenced by his example.”[32]

Falsehood

The investigating commissioner also held respondent liable for committing a falsehood because, in this administrative case, he stated in his comment that he had not “perfected an appeal on the dismissal” of his petition for injunction.  In his said comment, the respondent stated:

“Branch 7 (of the RTC) motu proprio, dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction on March 18, 1993.  Not having perfected an appeal on the dismissal, the order of dismissal became final under the Rules 15 days after its receipt by respondent on record, or before April 6, 1993.  So that today this case is no longer pending.

xxx.

It should be noted that when Civil Case Nos. 93-F-0414 and 93-F-0415 for family homes and damages were filed in the court below on May 26, 1993, Civil Case NO. 2378-R which seems to give basis to the present Complaint was deemed terminated, there being no appeal formally taken and perfected in accordance with the Rules.

xxx.

And that precisely was the primal reason why respondent decided not to appeal any further anymore [sic] the order of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of the court below in Civil Case No. 2738, and let it be deemed final by the Rules and jurisprudence.”[33] (Underscoring supplied.)

The indelible fact, however,  is that respondent did file an appeal which was perfected later on.  The original records of the injunction suit had been transmitted to the appellate court. [34]Moreover, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution dismissing the appeal.[35] Thus, in denying that he had appealed the decision of the RTC, respondent was making a false statement.

Respondent argues that the withdrawal of his appeal means that no appeal was made under Section 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.  The pertinent provisions of Rule 50[36]read:

“SEC. 2.  Effect of dismissal.-- Fifteen (15) days after the dismissal of an appeal, the clerk shall return to the court below the record on appeal with a certificate under the seal of the court showing that the appeal has been dismissed.  Upon the receipt of such certificate in the lower court the case shall stand there as though no appeal had ever been taken, and the judgment of the said court may be enforced with the additional costs allowed by the appellate court upon dismissing the appeal.”

“SEC. 4.  Withdrawal of appeal.-- An appeal may be withdrawn as of right at any time before the filing of appellee’s brief.  x x x.  The withdrawal of an appeal shall have the same effect as that of a dismissal in accordance with section 2 of this rule.”

Respondent’s explanation misses the point.  True, he withdrew his appeal.  But it is likewise true that he had actually filed an appeal, and that this was perfected.  False then is his statement that no appeal was perfected in the injunction suit.  Worse, he made the statement before this Court in order to exculpate himself, though in vain, from the charge of forum shopping. 

A lawyer must be a disciple of truth.  Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, he owes candor, fairness and good faith to the courts.[37] He shall neither do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any.  He also has a duty not to mislead or allow the courts to be misled by any artifice.[38]

For this offense, we suspend the respondent from the practice of law for another year.  True, in Ordonio vs. Eduarte,[39] Porac Trucking, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals[40] and Erectors, Inc. vs. NLRC,[41] we imposed a suspension of only six months for a similar malfeasance.  But in Flores’ case, his falsehood is aggravated by its brazenness, for it was committed in an attempt, vain as it was,  to cover up his forum shopping.

Before we close, we note that this simple case was referred to the IBP on September 27, 1993.   It was deemed submitted for resolution per the investigating commissioner’s order dated May 10, 1995.  However, the investigating commissioner submitted his report only on May 5, 1997.  Moreover, the IBP transmitted its recommendation to the Court only through a letter dated July 31, 1997, which was received by the Office of the Bar Confidant on August 15, 1997.  Why it took the IBP almost four years to finish its investigation of the case and over two years from the date the parties filed their last pleadings to resolve it escapes us.  After all, the case did not require any trial-type investigation, and the parties submitted only documentary evidence to prove or rebut their respective cases.  Thus, we find it opportune to urge the IBP to hasten the disposition of administrative cases and to remind it that this Court gives it only ninety days to finish its investigation, report and recommendation.  Should it require more time, it should file with the Court a request for extension, giving the reason for such request.

WHEREFORE, for trifling with judicial processes by resorting to forum shopping, Respondent Ernesto B. Flores is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR and, for violating his oath and the Canon of Professional Responsibility to do no falsehood, he is SUSPENDED for another period of ONE (1) YEAR, resulting in a total period of TWO (2) YEARS, effective upon finality of this Decision.  He is WARNED that a repetition of a similar misconduct will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be included in his files which are with the Office of the Bar Confidant, and circularized to all courts and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 3923. March 30, 1993.

CONCORDIA B. GARCIA, complainant, vs. ATTY. CRISANTO L. FRANCISCO, respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; MISCONDUCT OF COUNSEL; VIOLATION OF OATH NOT DELAY ANY MAN OR MONEY OR MALICE; SUSPENSION FOR ONE YEAR FROM PRACTICE OF LAW FOR GROSS ABUSE OF RIGHT OF RECOURSE TO THE COURTS BY ARGUING A CAUSE THAT IS OBVIOUSLY WITHOUT MERIT. — The cause of the respondent's client is obviously without merit. The respondent was aware of this fact when he wilfully resorted to the gambits summarized above, continuously seeking relief that was consistently denied, as he should have expected . . . By grossly abusing his right of recourse to the courts for the purpose of arguing a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed, he was disdaining the obligation of the lawyer to maintain only such actions or proceedings as appear to him to be just and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. By violating his oath not to delay any man for money or malice, he has besmirched the name of an honorable profession and has proved himself unworthy of the trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court . . . For this serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he deserves to be sanctioned, not only as a punishment for his misconduct but also as a warning to other lawyers who may be influenced by his example. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED for ONE YEAR from the practice of law and from the enjoyment of all the rights and privileges appurtenant to membership of the Philippine bar.

R E S O L U T I O N

PER CURIAM, p:

In a sworn complaint filed with the Court on October 6, 1992, Concordia B. Garcia seeks the disbarment of Atty. Crisanto L. Francisco.

On March 9, 1964, Concordia B. Garcia and her husband Godofredo, the Dionisio spouses, and Felisa and Magdalena Baetiong leashed a parcel of land to Sotero Baluyot Lee for a period of 25 years beginning May 1, 1964. Despite repeated verbal and written demands, Lee refused to vacate after the expiration of the lease. Lee claimed that he had an option to extend the lease for another 5 years and the right of pre-emption over the property.

In this disbarment case, the complainant claims that Lee's counsel, respondent Francisco, commenced various suits before different courts to thwart Garcia's right to regain her property and that all these proceedings were decided against Lee. The proceedings stemmed from the said lease contract and involved the same issues and parties, thus violating the proscription against forum-shopping.

Respondent, in his comment, says that he inserted in defense of his client's right only such remedies as were authorized by law.

The tangle of recourses employed by Francisco is narrated as follows:

1. On March 29, 1989, Lee, through Francisco, filed a complaint against Garcia and the other lessors for specific performance and reconveyance with damages in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-2118. On June 9, 1989, Garcia filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of failure to state a cause of action, laches and prescription. The case was dismissed by Judge Felimon Mendoza on August 10, 1989.

2. On May 29, 1989, Garcia and the other lessors filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Lee in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1455. Through Francisco, Lee filed an answer alleging as special and affirmative defense the pendency of Civil Case no. Q-89-2118 in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On September 5, 1989, Judge Marcelino Bautista issued a resolution rejecting this allegation on the ground that the issues before the two courts were separate and different.

3. On October 24, 1989, Lee, through Francisco, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction against Judge Bautista, Garcia and the other lessors. This was docketed as civil Case No. Q-89-3833. In filing this petition, Francisco knew or should have known that it violated the Rule on Summary Procedure prohibiting the filing of petitions for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court.

Francisco claims that what he appealed to the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-89-3833 was the denial of his prayer for dismissal of Civil Case No. 1455. This is not true. Civil Case Q-89-3833 was clearly a special civil action and not an appeal.

On November 13, 1989, Judge Abraham Vera issued an order enjoining Judge Bautista from proceeding with the trial of the unlawful detainer case. Upon motion of the complainant, however, the injunction was set aside and Civil Case No. Q-89-3833 was dismissed on January 9, 1990. Lee did not appeal.

4. On April 6, 1990, Lee through Francisco, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals against Judge Vera, Judge Singzon, Garcia and the other lessors. Docketed as CA G.R. Sp No. 20476, the petition assailed the January 9, 1990 order of Judge Vera dismissing Civil Case No. Q-89-3833. On May 31, 1989, the petition was denied.

5. On June 14, 1990, Judge Singzon decided Civil Case no. 1455 in favor of complainant Garcia and the other lessors. Lee did not appeal. Instead, on, June 21, 1990, through Francisco again, he filed a petition against Judge Singzon and the other lessors for certiorari and annulment of the decision in Civil Case No. 1455 and damages with prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction. This was docketed as Civil case No. 90-5852 in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98, presided by Judge Cesar C. Paralejo.

In Francisco's comment before us, he alleges that Civil Case No. Q-90-5852 is an appeal from the unlawful detainer case. Again, he lies. Civil Case No. Q-90-5852 was a specified civil action and not an appeal.

On July 2, 1990, Garcia's group filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 90-5852. On July 13, 1990, Judge Paralejo issued an order enjoining Judge Singzon from enforcing the decision in that case. Garcia attacked this order in a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction docketed as CA Sp. No. 22392. The petition was granted by the Court of Appeals on September 19, 1991, on the ground that the judgment in the unlawful detainer case had come final and executory as June 30, 1990.

6. On September 24, 1991, Garcia filed a motion for execution in the unlawful detainer case. On September 27, 1991, Lee, through Francisco, filed a motion to inhibit Judge Singzon and to defer the hearing of the motion. A writ of execution was nonetheless issued by Judge Singzon on October 8, 1991.

7. Two days later, Lee, through Francisco, filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order against the Court of Appeals, Judge Singzon, Garcia and the other lessors. This Court denied the petition on January 27, 1992, and reconsideration on April 8, 1992.

8. Finally, Lee, still through Francisco, filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction against Judge Singzon, Garcia and the other lessors in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to set aside and declare the writs of execution in Civil Case No. 1455. This was dismissed on August 4, 1992, and Lee, through Francisco, filed a motion for reconsideration. According to Francisco, he was relieved as counsel while this motion was pending.

A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but not at the expense of truth and the administration of justice.

The cause of the respondent's client in obviously without merit. The respondent was aware of this fact when he wilfully resorted to the gambits summarized above, continuously seeking relief that was consistently denied, as he should have expected. He thereby added to the already clogged dockets of the courts and wasted their valuable time. He also caused much inconvenience and expense to the complainant, who was obliged to defend herself against his every move.

By grossly abusing his right of recourse to the courts for the purpose of arguing a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed, he was disdaining the obligation of the lawyer to maintain only such actions or

proceedings as appear to him to be just and such defense only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. By violating his oath not to delay any man for money or malice, he has besmirched the name of an honorable profession and has proved himself unworthy of trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court.

Atty. Crisanto l. Francisco took his oath as a lawyer on March 2, 1956. Considering his age and experience in the practice of the laws, he should have known better than to trifle with it and to use it as an instrument for harassment of the complainant and the misuse of judicial processes. For this serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he deserves to be sanctioned, not only as punishment for his misconduct but also as a warning to other lawyers who may be influenced by his example.

Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED for ONE YEAR from the practice of law and from the enjoyment of all the rights and privileges appurtenant to membership in the Philippine bar.

Let a copy of this Resolution be served immediately on the respondent and circularized to all courts and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-26694 December 18, 1973

NELITA MORENO VDA. DE BACALING, petitioner, vs.HECTOR LAGUNA, HON. VALERION ROVIRA, Judge, Court of First Instance and HON. JUDGE ROSENDO BALTAZAR, Judge, City Court of Iloilo, respondents.

Nicanor D. Sorongon for petitioner.

Apeles L. Padilla for respondents.

 

ESGUERRA, J.:

I.

Nature of the Case

The petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari with preliminary injunction to annul an Order of Hon. Rosendo Baltazar, as Judge of the City Court of Iloilo, dated June 30, 1966, ordering the demolition of the residential house of petitioner. 1 Assailed likewise is an Order, dated August 25, 1966, of Hon. Valerio V. Rovira, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, stationed at Iloilo City, approving said demolition. 2

II.

Facts of the Case

The record of this case discloses the following facts:

Private respondent Hector Laguda is the registered owner of a residential land known as lot No. 3508 situated at La Paz, Iloilo City 3 many years back, petitioner and her late husband, Dr. Ramon Bacaling, with the acquiescence of private respondent Laguda, constructed a residential house on a portion of said lot fronting Huevana Street, paying a monthly rental of P80.00. 4 Unable to pay the lease rental from July 1959 to September 1961, totalling P2,160.00, an action for ejectment (Civil Case No. 6823) was filed by private

respondent Laguda against petitioner in her capacity as judicial administratrix of the estate of her late husband, Dr. Bacaling, in the City Court of Iloilo City. 5 The filing of said case spawned various court suits.

Petitioner on July 23, 1962, filed certiorari proceedings in this Court (G.R. No. L-20061) but was dismissed for lack of merit on August 3, 1962. 6 With this setback, petitioner on November 12, 1962, filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction (Civil Case No. 6162) but the same was dismissed on December 1, 1962. 7 Unsuccessful in her motion for reconsideration, petitioner went to the Court of Appeals by way of certiorari (CA-G.R. No. 31882-R) but her petition was dismissed by that Court on March 7, 1967. 8

Suffering from these series of legal reverses, the petitioner entered into a compromise agreement on July 29, 1964, with private respondent Laguda relative to Civil Case No. 6823. 9 Said agreement inter alia, provides as follows:

1. Defendant (petitioner herein) agreed to vacate the premises and remove ... the residential house therefrom ... before December 31, 1966;

2. For the use and occupation ... of the said premises ... from June 1964 to December 31, 1969, the said defendant will pay plaintiff a monthly rent ... of Eighty (P80.00) Pesos per calendar month ...;

3. Upon failure of defendant to comply with any ... provision of the amicable settlement within ... fifty (50) days ... the plaintiff shall be entitled to "immediate execution to restore plaintiff in possession of the premises and to recover all the unpaid monthly rents from June 1, 1964 until said premises are vacated" by defendant;

4. Defendant "waive her right, under Sec. 6, Rule 39, Rules of Court, to bar enforcement of the execution of the judgment in the case at anytime within one year from December 31, 1969".

In a decision dated July 30, 1964, the City Court of Iloilo City approved the amicable settlement and enjoined the parties to comply with its terms. For failure of the petitioner to satisfy the conditions of the settlement within the 50-day period, private respondent Laguda moved for execution which the Court granted on July 7, 1965. 10

On July 14, 1965, petitioner moved for reconsideration to quash the writ of execution, but before the Court could resolve the motion, petitioner on July 19, 1965, served notice of her intention to take the case to the Court of Appeals. 11 Meanwhile on July 23, 1965, respondent Laguda filed an opposition to the petitioner's July 14, 1965, motion, alleging that as judicial administratrix as of July 29, 1964, she was legally authorized to enter into the amicable settlement which was the basis of the decision dated July 30, 1964, of the City Court of Iloilo sought to be executed and, therefore, her act was binding upon the present judicial administrator, Atty. Roberto Dineros, who replaced petitioner upon her discharge as such on November 28, 1964. 12

Denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and to quash writ of execution on September 30, 1965, the City Court however, held in abeyance the enforcement of the alias writ of execution until the Court of First Instance of Iloilo stamped its imprimatur considering the pendency of Special Proceedings No. 1469 and of the fact that the properties involved therein are in custodia legis. 13 Thereafter, on October 25, 1965, private respondent Laguda moved the Court of First Instance of Iloilo in Special Proceedings No. 1469 for the approval of the City Court's order of execution which was granted despite petitioner's opposition. 14 With the denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration on December 4, 1965, a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction was brought before the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 36939-R) which dismissed the same on January 18, 1966. 15

On April 14, 1966, the respondent City Judge of Iloilo City issued an alias writ of execution upon representations of private respondent Laguda, copies of which were served sheriff upon the petitioner and Atty. Roberto Dineros in his capacity as judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased, Dr. Ramon Bacaling, in Special Proceedings No. 1469. 16

On June 30, 1966, a Special Order of Demolition was issued by the respondent City Judge upon motion of private respondent Laguda and over petitioner's opposition, subject, however, to the approval of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo in Special Proceedings No. 1469. 17 Upon the denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration, respondent Laguda on July 12, 1966, filed a manifestation in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo in Special Proceedings No. 1469, praying for the confirmation of the Order to demolish the house under custodia legis. 18

On August 4, 1966, petitioner interposed an opposition alleging:

1. That she was no longer in control of the estate funds when the stipulated obligations in the amicable settlement became due and payable;

2. That the residential house to be demolished is worth P35,000.00 for which she is entitled to reimbursement as a builder in good faith, in addition to reasonable expenses they may incur in transferring the same to another place; and

3. That the guardian ad litem of the minor children was not notified of the motion for the issuance of an order of demolition; 19

On August 25, 1966, respondent Laguda by way of reply disputed petitioner's claim and supported the legality of the court's ruling. 20 On the same date, the probate court in Special Proceedings No. 1469 approved the order of demolition of the house in controversy. 21 Impugning the said Order as violative of the provisions of Sec. 14, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, and of the constitutional mandate on due process, petitioner moved to reconsider the same but the motion was denied by the Court on September 26, 1966. 22 Frustrated in her effort to set aside the Order of Demolition, petitioner brought this present action of certiorari with preliminary injunction. Upon giving due course to the petition, this Court issued a temporary restraining order on October 21, 1966, to prevent the enforcement of the order of demolition in Special Proceedings No. 1469 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, but when served upon the respondents, the building in question was already partially demolished. 23 Upon petitioner's posting a bond of P1,000.00, this Court on November 10, 1966, issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the herein respondents from proceeding with the order of demolition, until further orders. 24

III.

Issues of the Case

The issues raised in the instant petition boil down to the following:

1. Whether or not the acts of the petitioner as judicial administratrix prior to her discharge or removal are valid and binding upon her successor;

2. Whether or not petitioner is a builder in good faith and, therefore, entitled to reimbursement, and/or reasonable expenses that may be incurred in transferring the house to another place;

3. Whether or not due process was denied to the minor children of deceased Ramon Bacaling, and petitioner in connection with the motion for the issuance of the order of demolition.

IV.

Discussion

Petitioner claims before this Court that since she was no longer the judicial administratrix of the estate of her late husband, Dr. Ramon Bacaling, and was no longer in control of estate funds when the stipulated

obligations in the amicable settlement became due and payable, the special order of demolition could not be enforced.

Such a view is not tenable. Under Section 3, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, petitioner's lawful acts before the revocation of her letters of administration or before her removal shall have the same validity as if there was no such revocation or removal. It is elementary that the effect of revocation of letters testamentary or of administration is to terminate the authority of the executor or administrator, but the acts of the executor or administrator, done in good faith prior to the revocation of the letters, will be protected, and a similar protection will be extended to rights acquired under a previous grant of administration. 25

In connection with the petitioner's contention that she be considered a builder in good faith and, therefore, entitled to reimbursement in addition to reasonable expenses that may be incurred in transferring the house to another place, the same cannot stand legal scrutiny. The rule is well-settled that lessees, like petitioner, are not possessors in good faith, because they knew that their occupancy of the premises continues only during the life of the lease, and they cannot as a matter of right, recover the value of their improvements from the lessor, much less retain the premises until they are reimbursed. Their rights are governed by Article 1678 of the Civil Code which allows reimbursement of lessees up to one-half of the value of their improvements if the lessor so elects. 26

It is next urged by petitioner that there was a denial of process for failure of private respondent to notify the guardian ad litem of the minor children of the deceased Ramon Bacaling, of the motion for execution.

A perusal of the pleadings yields the conclusion that petitioner failed to meet the burden of demonstrating that there was denial of due process. On the contrary, there is evidence to show that Acting Fiscal Alfonso Illemberger guardian ad litem of the minor children of the late Ramon Bacaling, has been duly apprised of the issuance of the assailed special order to demolish, as shown by the certification of the counsel for petitioner at the foot of his opposition dated August 4, 1966, 27 filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, and as also shown by the certification of private respondent's counsel at the foot of his opposition dated September 15, 1966, 28 likewise filed with the same Court.

V.

Conclusion

The petitioner is not entitled to the writ of certiorari. In the case at bar, there is absolutely no showing that the respondent courts acted so "arbitrarily", "despotically" or "capriciously" as to amount to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned orders.

"Grave abuse of discretion" which is a ground for certiorari means "such capricious and arbitrary exercise of judgment as is equivalent, in the eyes of the law, to lack of jurisdiction." 29 Even mere abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari. For that purpose the abuse of discretion must be grave and patent, and it must be shown that it was exercised arbitrarily or despotically, which is not the case made out by the present petition. 30

There is something more to be said about the nature and apparent purpose of this case which has its genesis in the case for illegal detainer (Civil Case No. 6823) brought before the Iloilo City Court. What transpired therein presents a glaring example of a summary proceeding which was deliberately protracted and made to suffer undue delay in its disposal. It was originally filed on September 13, 1960; 31 it reached the appellate courts five (5) times, twice before the Court of Appeals 32, Once before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo 33, and twice before this Court.34 The present petition smacks of a dilatory tactic and a frivolous attempt resorted to by petitioner to frustrate the prompt termination of the ejectment case and to prolong litigation unnecessarily. Such conduct on the part of petitioner and her counsel deserves the vigorous condemnation of this Court, 35 because it evinces a flagrant misuse of the remedy ofcertiorari which should only be resorted to in case of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion by a inferior court. A recourse of this kind unduly taxes the energy and patience of courts and simply wastes the precious time that they could well devote to really meritorious cases.

VI.

Judgment

IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the instant petition should be, as it is hereby, dismissed.

The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court on November 10, 1966, is immediately set aside. 36

Treble costs against the petitioner for the reasons above set forth. 37

G.R. No. L-35867 June 28, 1973

FRANCISCO A. ACHACOSO, in his own behalf and in behalf of Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, COTRAM, S.A., CAPITAL LIFE ASSURANCE CORP., JOAQUIN G. GARRIDO, respondents.

Rodrigo M. Nera for petitioner.

Norberto J. Quisumbing & R.P. Mosqueda for private respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

 

TEEHANKEE, J.:

The Court censures the practice of counsels who secure repeated extensions of time to file their pleadings and thereafter simply let the period lapse without submitting the pleading or even an explanation or manifestation of their failure to do so. The Court herein reprimands petitioner's counsel for such misconduct with the warning that a repetition thereof will be dealt with more severely.

Upon the filing on December 15, 1972 of the petition at bar for review of the Court of Appeals' decision dismissing petitioner's petition for mandamus filed with said court to compel the Manila court of first instance to allow petitioner's proposed appeal from its adverse judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint, the Court per its resolution of December 22, 1972 required respondents to comment thereon.

Respondents filed on February 8, 1973 an extensive eighteen page comment and petitioner's counsel, Rodrigo M. Nera, filed on February 12, 1973 a motion for leave to file reply within 15 days from notice alleging that there was need for such reply "in order that this Honorable Court may be fully and completely informed of the nature of the controversy which gave rise to the instant petition." The Court granted such leave per its resolution of February 23, 1973 and notice of such leave was served on counsel on February 27, 1973.

On the last day for filing of the reply, viz, March 14, 1973 counsel asked for an additional 15 days averring that "due to the pressure of urgent professional work and daily trial engagements of the undersigned counsel during the original period granted, he has not had sufficient material time to complete the preparation of petitioner's reply." The Court granted the requested extension per its resolution of March 20, 1973.

On the last day of the extended period for filing of the reply, viz, March 29, 1973 counsel again asked for still another 15-day extension stating that "due to the pressure of urgent professional work and daily trial engagements of the undersigned counsel, he has not had sufficient material time to complete the preparation of petitioners reply. The undersigned counsel humbly apologizes that in view of his crowded schedule, he has been constrained to ask for this extension, but respectfully assures the Honorable Court that this will be the last one requested.' As per its resolution of April 6, 1973, the Court granted counsel's motion for such third and last extension.

The period for the filing of petitioner's reply lapsed on April 13, 1973 without counsel having filed any reply manifestation explaining his failure to do so.

Accordingly, the Court in its resolution of May 24, 1973 denying the petition for review for lack of merit, further required petitioner's counsel to show cause why discipline action should not be taken against him for failure to file the reply after having obtained such leave and three extensions time within which to do so.

Counsel filed in due course his verified Explanation dated June 7, 1973 stating that he was retained in the ease "on a piece-work basis on the verbal understanding that all expenses for the preparation of pleadings and the cost of services of stenographer-typist shall be furnished in advance by petition upon being notified thereof," that when he asked for a third extension on March 29, 1973, he so informed petitioner and requested him to remit the expenses for the preparation of reply as per agreement" and that he tried to contact petitioner before the expiration of the extended period but failed to do as petitioner "was then most of the time out of his office."

Counsel relates that it was only on May 30, 1973 when he received notice of the Court's resolution of May 24, 1973 denying the petition and requiring his explanation — long after the expiration on April 13, 1973 of the extended period for the filing of the reply — that he wrote petitioner and in turn asked the petitioner to explain the latter's failure to comply with his request for a remittance of P500.00 to cover the necessary expenses, and that petitioner had replied that counsel's letter had been misplaced by a clerk and hence, petitioner had "failure to act on the same."

Counsel pleads that "this counsel has not the least intention of delaying the administration of justice and much less trifle with the resolutions and orders of this Honorable Court. The inability of this counsel to submit the reply within the extension granted by this Honorable Court was due to supervening circumstances which could not be attributed to this counsel and that "if this poor and humble practitioner has been impelled to inaction it surely was not intentional on his part, the truth of the matter being that this counsel was just helpless in the face of petitioner's failure to comply with his commitments aforesaid;" and that "this counsel deeply regrets this incident and hereby apologizes to this Honorable Court for all his shortcomings relative to this case, which after all were due to causes and circumstances not of his own making and far beyond his control."

Counsel's explanation is far from satisfactory. If indeed he was not in a financial position to advance the necessary expenses for preparing and submitting the reply, then he could have filed timely the necessary manifestation that he was foregoing the filing of such reply on petitioner's behalf. His inaction unduly delayed the Court's prompt disposition of the case after the filing by respondents on February 8, 1973 of their comments on the petition showing its lack of merit.

The Court would have then so disposed of the petition had it not been for petitioner's plea to be given time and opportunity to file a reply to the comments in order to fully apprise the Court of the nature of the controversy, which plea the Court granted in reliance on his good faith. Yet after having obtained three extensions of time for the filing of the reply, counsel simply failed to file any reply nor to give the Court the courtesy of any explanation or manifestation for his failure to do so.

Counsel readily perceived in his explanation that his conduct comes close to delaying the administration of justice and trifling with the Court's processes. It does not reflect well on counsel's conduct as an officer of the Court that after assuring the Court that the third extension requested by him "in view of his crowded schedule" and "of urgent professional work and daily trial engagements" would be the last within which period he would at last file the awaited reply, for him thereafter to let the period simply lapse without any explanation whatsoever, and worse, to wait to be found out, and have the Court require him to explain.

Considering, however, that counsel's record shows no previous infractions on his part since his admission to the Philippine Bar in 1953, the Court is disposed to be lenient in this instance.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby administers a reprimand on Atty. Rodrigo M. Nera, with the warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this resolution be filed in his personal record.

[A.M. No. P-03-1690. April 4, 2003.]

(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P)

JUDGE ESTRELLITA M. PAAS, Petitioner, v. EDGAR E. ALMARVEZ, Respondent.

[A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363. April 4, 2003.]

EDGAR E. ALMARVEZ, Petitioner, v. Judge ESTRELLITA M. PAAS, Respondent.

[A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC. April 4, 2003.]

IN RE: USE BY ATTY. RENERIO G. PAAS AS AN OFFICE IN HIS PRIVATE PRACTICE OF HIS PROFESSION THE OFFICE OF HIS WIFE, PASAY CITY METC JUDGE ESTRELLITA M. PAAS.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Pasay City Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 44 Presiding Judge Estrellita M. Paas administratively charged Court Aide/Utility Worker Edgar E. Almarvez with "discourtesy, disrespect, insubordination, neglect in performing his duties, disloyalty, solicitation of monetary consideration and gross violation of the Civil Service Law." The case was docketed as A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P.

In her complaint, Judge Paas alleged that Almarvez is discourteous to his co-employees, lawyers and party litigants; has failed to maintain the cleanliness in and around the court premises despite order to do so, thus amounting to insubordination; was, and on several instances, habitually absent from work or made it appear that he reported for work by signing the logbook in the morning, only to stay out of the office the whole day; asked from detention prisoners P100.00 to P200.00 before he released to them their Release Orders; asked for amounts in excess of what was necessary for the purchase of stamps and pocketed the difference; once failed to mail printed matter on July 11, 2000 and kept for his own use the amount given to him for the purpose; and divulged confidential information to litigants in advance of its authorized release date for a monetary consideration, thus giving undue advantage or favor to the paying party, in violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). 1 

Pasay City MeTC Branch 44 Clerk of Court Pedro C. Doctolero, Jr., by his Affidavit, 2 and members of the court staff, 3 by a Joint Affidavit, attested that Almarvez failed to maintain the cleanliness in and around the court premises, and had shown discourtesy in dealing with Judge Paas and his co-employees. Doctolero’s affidavit also corroborated Judge Paas’ allegation that Almarvez would merely sign the logbook in the morning and thereafter stay out of the office.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Pasay City Postmaster Emma Z. Espiritu, by Certification dated August 2, 2000, 4 attested that the alleged printed matter intended to be mailed on July 11, 2000 was not included in the list of registered mails posted in the Pasay City Post Office on said date.

Jail Escort Russel S. Hernandez and Jail Officer II Rosendo Macabasag, both assigned to the Pasay City Jail, by their respective affidavits, 5 attested that on several occasions, they saw Almarvez receive from detention prisoners P100.00 to P200.00 in consideration of the release of their Release Orders.

Almarvez, by Answer of September 25, 2000, 6 denied Judge Paas’ charges, and alleged that the real reason why Judge Paas filed the case against him was because she suspected him of helping her husband, Atty. Renerio G. Paas, conceal his marital indiscretions; since she failed to elicit any information from him, she resorted to calling him names and other forms of harassment; on September 6, 2000, she hurled at him the following invectives before the other employees of the court: "Walang kuwenta, ahas ka, driver lang kita, pinaasenso kita, walang utang na loob, pinagtatakpan mo pa ang asawa ko, ulupong;" and she insisted that he sign a prepared resignation letter, a copy of which he was not able to keep.

Almarvez added that he had been subjected by Judge Paas to the following incidents of oppression and abuse of authority: On July 28, 2000, he was called by the Judge to her chambers where she berated him as follows: "Sinungaling ka, ang dami mong alam, hindi ka nagsasabi ng totoo sa akin, gago, tanga, pirmahan mo itong resignation letter, kung hindi kakasuhan kita ng estafa at falsification;" the next day, the Judge, on seeing him, told him "Bakit ka nandiyan, mag-leave ka sa Lunes;" and on July 31, 2000, the Judge called him again to her chambers and told him "Ang kapal ng mukha mo, pumasok ka pa dito, gago, kaya kita ipinasok dito dahil

driver kita."cralaw virtua1aw library

Continuing, Almarvez claimed that on July 31, 2000, he reported the foregoing incidents to Pasay City MeTC Executive Judge Maria Cancino Erum who advised him to report the same to the Office of the Clerk of Court; and on August 1, 2000, he executed a sworn statement-complaint 7 against Judge Paas and went to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to file it, but he was advised to try to talk the matter over with her who then told him that they should forget all about it.

On the merits of the charges, Almarvez denied ever requesting for money in exchange for the release of court orders and alleged that both Hernandez and Macabasag executed their respective affidavits because Judge Paas was a principal sponsor at their respective weddings; Hernandez was in fact indebted to the Judge for helping him cover-up the escape of a detainee under his charge; the court’s mail matters were always sealed whenever he received them for mailing and he never tampered with their contents; the alleged unmailed printed matter was actually posted on June 28, 2000, not on July 11, 2000, via ordinary instead of registered mail, because the money given to him for the purpose was insufficient; and on the days when he was out of the office, he was actually performing personal errands for the judge and her husband, Atty. Paas, who treated him as their personal driver and messenger.

As further proof of Judge Paas’ oppressive behavior towards him, Almarvez claimed that she ordered him to undergo a drug test per Memorandum dated September 7, 2000, 8 even if he had no history of drug abuse on a periodic or continuous basis as shown by the test results of his examination. 9 

The Court treated respondent’s Answer as a counter-complaint against Judge Paas and docketed it as A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363.

The two administrative cases were consolidated and referred for evaluation to the OCA, which assigned them to Executive Judge Vicente L. Yap of Pasay City RTC, Branch 114 for investigation.

In a separate case for inhibition of Judge Paas in a criminal case, it was revealed that Judge Paas’ husband, private practitioner Atty. Paas, was using his wife’s office as his office address in his law practice, in support of which were submitted copies of a Notice of Appeal signed by Atty. Paas, notices from Pasay City RTC Branch 109 and from the Supreme Court with respect to the case of People v. Louie Manabat, Et. Al. (GR Nos. 140536-37) which indicated Atty. Paas’ address to be Room 203, Hall of Justice, Pasay City, 10 the office assigned to Pasay City MeTC, Branch 44.

Pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 139-B 11 of the Rules of Court which allows the Supreme Court to motu proprio initiate proceedings for the discipline of attorneys, this Court resolved to docket the matter as A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC and to consolidate it with A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P and AM No. MTJ-01-1363.

In compliance with the December 4, 2001 Resolution 12 of the Court en banc, Judge and Atty. Paas submitted their January 16, 2002 Joint Affidavit 13 wherein they vehemently denied the charge that the latter was using Room 203 of the Pasay City Hall of Justice as his office address, they claiming that Atty. Paas actually holds office at 410 Natividad Building, Escolta, Manila with his partner Atty. Herenio Martinez; Atty. Paas would visit his wife at her office only when he has a hearing before the Pasay City courts or Prosecutor’s Office, or when he lunches with or fetches her, or when he is a guest during special occasions such as Christmas party and her birthday which are celebrated therein; and Judge Paas would never consent nor tolerate the use of the court for any personal activities. Attached to the Joint Affidavit were the separate sworn statements of Atty. Paas’ law partner Atty. Herenio E. Martinez 14 and secretary Nilda L. Gatdula 15 attesting that he is holding office at the above-said address in Escolta, and the Joint Affidavit of the Pasay City MeTC Branch 44 court personnel 16 attesting that Atty. Paas’ visits to the court are neither routine nor daily occurrences, and he never used the court in the practice of his profession.

On January 24, 2002, Judge Paas executed a Supplemental Affidavit 17 wherein she admitted that Atty. Paas did use her office as his return address for notices and orders in Crim. Case Nos. 98-1197 to 98-1198, "People v. Louie Manabat y Valencia and Raymond dela Cruz y Salita," (now docketed in this Court as G.R. Nos. 140536-37), lodged at the Pasay City RTC, Branch 109, but only to ensure and facilitate delivery of those notices, but after the cases were terminated, all notices were sent to his office address in Escolta.

By Resolution of February 12, 2002, 18 the Court referred the matter to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

After the completion of his investigation of A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P and A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363, Judge Yap submitted his Report/Recommendation dated February 28, 2002. 19 

On March 11, 2002, the OCA submitted its Report on A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC dated March 1, 2002. 20 

I. OCA Findings and Recommendations

A. On the charges against Almarvez:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The OCA, for lack of evidence, recommended the dismissal of the charges against Almarvez of exacting money from detainees, violating confidentiality of official communication, absence without official leave, discourtesy and insubordination. Given Almarvez’ unsatisfactory performance ratings for three rating periods covering January to June 2000, 21 July to December 2000, 22 and January to April 2001, 23 however, the OCA recommended that he be duly penalized for inefficiency in the performance of his official duties with One (1) Month suspension without pay, instead of dismissal as warranted under Memorandum Circular No. 12, s. 1994, his supervisor having failed to observe the procedure thereunder for dropping of employees from the rolls, which procedure is quoted at the later portion of this decision.

B. On the charges against Judge Paas:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

With respect to the complaint of Almarvez against Judge Paas, the OCA, for lack of supporting evidence, recommended the dismissal of the charges of maltreatment, harassment and verbal abuse. It found, however, that Judge Paas "had used her administrative power of supervision and control over court personnel for her personal pride, prejudice and pettiness" 24 when she issued her September 7, 2000 Memorandum ordering Alvarez to undergo a drug test after she had already filed an administrative case against him. It thus concluded that, in all probability, the purpose of Judge Paas in ordering Almarvez to undergo a drug test was to fish for evidence to support the administrative case she had already filed against him.

Accordingly, the OCA recommended that Judge Paas be found guilty of simple misconduct in office, and be penalized with reprimand with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

II. This Court’s Findings:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

A. On the charges against Almarvez:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Indeed, this Court finds that there is no sufficient evidence to support the charge of violation of confidentiality of official communication against Almarvez. The charge against Almarvez in Judge Paas’ complaint-affidavit which reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

That said ALMARVEZ being in charge of the mails had divulged informations which is confidential in nature to party litigants in advance of its authorized release date before the release of Court Order and Decision for consideration of a sum of money thus giving undue advantage or favor to the paying party detrimental to the due administration of justice.25cralaw:red

in fact lacks particularity. It is devoid of material details to enable Almarvez to intelligently meet the same.

As for the charges of neglect of duty, discourtesy and insubordination which were echoed in the affidavits of court personnel, they are also too general to support a conviction and are contrary to what is reflected in his performance rating that he cooperated willingly, even wholeheartedly, with his fellow employees.

On the charge of violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act): Absent any evidence to support the charge, the affiants jail officers who claimed to have witnessed Almarvez receive money from detention prisoners in exchange for the release of their Release Orders not having been presented, hence, their claim remains hearsay, Almarvez’ categorical denial and counter-allegation that these affiants executed their affidavits only out of fear of or favor to Judge Paas gain light.

As for the charge that Almarvez would merely sign the logbook and would thereafter leave the office, again Judge Paas failed to present the affiant-Clerk of Court Atty. Pedro C. Doctolero, Jr. While she submitted in evidence a copy of her October 6, 2000 memorandum 26 requiring Almarvez to explain why he was not in the office on September 8, 11, and 13, and October 5, 2000, despite his affixing of his signature in the logbook on those dates indicating that he reported for work, Almarvez satisfactorily explained that on September 8, 11, and 13, 2000, he submitted himself to drug testing as required by her in her September 7, 2000 27 memorandum, which explanation is supported by the September 14, 2000 letter of Dr. Rosendo P. Saulog, Medical Specialist II of the Dangerous Drug Board. 28 As to his whereabouts on October 5, 2000, Almarvez’ explanation that he was actually present in the morning but left in the afternoon for the Supreme Court 29 was not controverted.

On the charge of inefficiency, this Court concurs with the following findings of the OCA that he should be faulted therefor:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The performance ratings of respondent Almarvez for three (3) rating periods covering January to June 2000, July to December 2000 and January to April 2001 evidently shows that he failed to perform his official duties.

The fact that respondent Almarvez never disputed the performance ratings given him is tantamount to an implied acceptance thereof pursuant to Sec. 5 Rule IX Book V of Executive Order No. 292, quoted as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 5. An employee who expresses dissatisfaction with the rating given him may appeal through the established Grievance Procedure of the Department or Agency within fifteen (15) days after receipt of his copy of his performance rating. Failure to file an appeal within the prescribed period shall be deemed a waiver of such right."cralaw virtua1aw library

The performance ratings of respondent for the said periods are valid grounds to drop him from the Rolls. However, considering that his superior/supervisor failed to comply with the requirements set forth in Memorandum Circular No. 12, Series of 1994 of the Civil Service Commission, which is hereunder quoted, and that he was able to make up and cure his inefficiency after he was given the opportunity to improve his performance in his detail to Branch 11, MeTC, Manila, as shown by his performance rating for the period April to June 2001 with a "very satisfactory" rating, dropping him from the roll will no longer be appropriate 30 (Emphasis and Italics supplied.)

Par. 2.2 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 12, s. 1994 referred to in the above-quoted findings of the OCA reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

2.2 Unsatisfactory or Poor Performance.

(a) An official or employee who is given two (2) consecutive unsatisfactory ratings may be dropped from the rolls after due notice. Notice shall mean that the officer or employee concerned is informed in writing of his unsatisfactory performance for a semester and is sufficiently warned that a succeeding unsatisfactory performance shall warrant his separation from the service. Such notice shall be given not later than 30 days from the end of the semester and shall contain sufficient information which shall enable the employee to prepare an explanation. (Emphasis and Italics supplied.)

The suspension of Almarvez for One (1) Month without pay, as recommended by the OCA, is thus in order.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

B. On the charges against Judge Paas:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Regarding the charges of abuse of authority and oppression against Judge Paas, Almarvez failed to substantiate the same.

Judge Paas’ order for Almarvez to undergo a drug test is not an unlawful order. Per Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 34, s. 1997, public employees are required to undergo a drug test prior to employment to determine if they are drug-free. To be drug-free is not merely a pre-employment prerequisite but is a continuing requirement to ensure the highest degree of productivity of the civil service. However, considering that the order was issued after Judge Paas filed the administrative case against Almarvez, it elicits the suspicion that it was only a fishing expedition against him. This is conduct unbecoming of a member of the judiciary, for which Judge Paas should be duly reprimanded.

C. On the charges against Judge Paas and Atty. Paas:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

By Judge Paas’ own admission in her January 24, 2002 Supplemental Affidavit, 31 she was aware that her husband Atty. Paas was using her office to receive court notices and orders in a case lodged in a Pasay court. As the OCA puts it," [w]hile the same appears to be innocuous, it could be interpreted as a subtle way of sending a message that Atty. Paas is the husband of a judge in the same building and should be given special treatment by other judges or court personnel." 32 

The following are instructive in the disposition of these charges against the judge and her spouse, Atty. Paas:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SC Administrative Circular No. 01-99, "Enhancing the Dignity of Courts as Temples of Justice and Promoting Respect for their Officials and Employers" reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

As courts are temples of justice, their dignity and sanctity must, at all times be preserved and enhanced. In inspiring public respect for the justice system, court officials and employees must:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. In general: (a) avoid committing any act which would constitute grounds for disciplinary action under, as the case may be, the Canons of Judicial Ethics, Code of Judicial Conduct; and Section 46, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292); and (b) faithfully comply with the norms of conduct and perform the duties prescribed in the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public

Officials and Employees (R.A. No. 6713);

2. Zealously guard the public trust character of their offices;

x       x       x

6. Never use their offices as a residence or for any other purpose than for court or judicial functions. (Emphasis and Italics supplied.)

Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that "A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities." Specifically, Rule 2.03 thereof provides that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Rule 2.03. A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge. (Emphasis supplied.)

SC Circular No. 3-92, 33 dated August 31, 1992, of this Court reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SUBJECT: PROHIBITION AGAINST USE OF HALLS OF JUSTICE FOR RESIDENTIAL OR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES

All judges and court personnel are hereby reminded that the Halls of Justice may be used only for purposes directly related to the functioning and operation of the courts of justice, and may not be devoted to any other use, least of all as residential quarters of the judges or court personnel, or for carrying on therein any trade or profession.

Attention is drawn to A.M. No. RTJ-89-327 (Nellie Kelly Austria v. Judge Singuat Guerra), a case involving unauthorized and improper use of the court’s premises for dwelling purposes by respondent and his family, in which the Court, by Resolution dated October 17, 1991, found respondent Judge guilty of irresponsible and improper conduct prejudicial to the efficient administration of justice and best interest of the service, and imposed on him the penalty of SEVERE CENSURE, the Court declaring that such use of the court’s premises inevitably degrades the honor and dignity of the court in addition to exposing judicial records to danger of loss or damage. (Emphasis supplied.)

By allowing her husband to use the address of her court in pleadings before other courts, Judge Paas indeed "allowed [him] to ride on her prestige for purposes of advancing his private interest, in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct" 34 and of the above-stated Supreme Court circulars, which violation is classified as a less serious charge under the Rules of Court 35 and is punishable under the same Rule. 36 

A judge’s official conduct should indeed be free from the appearance of impropriety; and his behavior not only in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life should be beyond reproach. This is premised on the truism that a Judge’s official life cannot simply be detached or separated from his personal existence and that upon a Judge’s attributes depend the public perception of the Judiciary. 37 

On his part, Atty. Paas was guilty of using a fraudulent, misleading, and deceptive address that had no purpose other than to try to impress either the court in which his cases are lodged, or his client, that he has close ties to a member of the juiciary, in violation of the following rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

CANON 3 — A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.

CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

CANON 13 — A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS CAUSE AND REFRAIN FROM ANY IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING THE COURT.

CANON 15 — A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

Rule 15.06. A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body.

The need for relying on the merits of a lawyer’s case, instead of banking on his relationship with a member of the bench which tends to influence or gives the appearance of influencing the court, cannot be overemphasized. It is unprofessional and dishonorable, to say the least, to misuse a public office to enhance a lawyer’s prestige. Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by such reprehensible and improper conduct.

This Court does not subscribe to the proffered excuse that expediency and a desire to ensure receipt of court orders and notices prompted Atty. Paas and Judge Paas to allow him to have his court notices sent to office of Judge Paas, especially given the fact that for his other cases, Atty. Paas used his office address but there is no showing that he failed to receive the notices sent to that address. While a lawyer should make the necessary arrangements to ensure that he is properly informed of any court action, these should not violate his lawyer’s oath or the Code of Professional Responsibility, nor provide an opportunity for a member of the judiciary to breach his or her responsibilities under Supreme Court circulars and the Code of Judicial Conduct.

WHEREFORE, this Court finds:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) In A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P, respondent Edgar E. Almarvez GUILTY of inefficiency and is hereby SUSPENDED for One (1) Month without pay;

(2) In A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363, respondent, Judge Estrellita M. Paas GUILTY of conduct unbecoming of a member of the judiciary and is hereby REPRIMANDED, with warning that repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely;

(3) In A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC,

(a) Judge Paas GUILTY of violating SC Administrative Circular No. 01-99, SC Circular No. 3-92 and Canon 2, Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and is hereby ordered to pay a FINE of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00), with warning that repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely; and

(b) Atty. Renerio Paas GUILTY of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS, with warning that repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

This Decision shall take effect immediately.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and appended to respondents’ personal record.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 188 November 29, 1976

RICARDA GABRIEL DE BUMANGLAG, complainant, vs.ESTEBAN T. BUMANGLAG, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

 

TEEHANKEE, J.:

In the Court's decision of September 24, 1973, the Court found respondent guilty of gross immoral conduct and ordered his suspension from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years. Respondent filed several motions for reconsideration, all of which were denied per the Court's Resolutions of November 20, 1973, December 19, 1973, January 9, 1974 and October 30, 1974.

On March 31, 1975, the Clerk of Court received a 1st Indorsement dated February 21, 1975 from then Assistant Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora "requesting comment and/or appropriate action" on the therewith enclosed petition of respondent to the President of the Philippines that he "promulgate(s) a decree that the order of suspension by the Supreme Court be set aside and that your humble self be allowed to become an active member of the New Society".

The Court per its Resolution of June 16, 1975 directed the Clerk of Court "to furnish the Office of the President through Assistant Executive Secretary Zamora with copies of the Court's decision of September 24, 1973 wherein the Court in a spirit of liberality by majority vote imposed a lesser penalty of two-year suspension instead of disbarment (as voted by a minority composed of Justices Castro and Makasiar) and of the Court's resolutions of November 20, 1973 and December 19, 1973 denying for lack of merit respondent's two motions for reconsideration dated October 18, 1973 and December 12, 1973"; and further resolved "to require respondent to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why he should not be subjected to further disciplinary action for making false statements and misrepresentations in his petition to the President that he has been allegedly deprived of due process of law contrary to the facts of record as stated in the Court's decision, and for gross ignorance of the law and of the Constitution in asking the President to set aside by decree this Court's decision imposing upon him two-year suspension from the practice of law".

In a 2nd Indorserment of June 18, 1975 and received by the Clerk of Court on the same day, then Assistant Executive Secretary Zamora forwarded respondent's letter of the same date to the President stating that "(T)he undersigned by now (has) come to realize that I made a big mistake by making said letter to you, Your Excellency, because the Honorable Supreme Court may believe that I may be challenging the decision which is already final and executory and as such do not observe the doctrine of protocol of separation of power(s)", and withdrawing and asking the President to disregard his first letter.

Respondent in his Explanation of July 23, 1975 cited the fact that he had "immediately" withdrawn his letter asking for the President's intervention and that "lately, however, he has fully realized that the Chief Executive is bereft (of) any authority to set aside or modify the decision of this Honorable Supreme Court" and "with folded hands begs and asks an apology from the members of this Honorable Court, with the full assurance that nothing of this sort will be repeated by him in the future."

Respondent served his two-year suspension, as duly noted in the Court's Resolution of November 7, 1975. Since respondent has apologized for his "big mistake" and now appreciates that under the fundamental principle of separation of powers enshrined in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, a decision of this Court may not be set aside by the President, the Court is disposed to view his misconduct and/or ignorance with liberality and will administer a reprimand with warning of severe action on any future transgressions, considering respondent's unenviable record.

A final word is called for on respondent's statement in his Explanation inferring that he was led to file his petition with the President by the fact that his motions for reconsideration "were only denied by the Clerk of Court without any comment whatsoever". As the Court has had occasion to state in People vs. Catolico * and

earlier cases, this remark of respondent exposes his lack of appreciation or disregard of the time-honored usage of the Court that minute resolutions, summons and processes of the Court, upon being duly adopted and recorded are transmitted to the interested parties by and upon the signature of the Clerk of Court who is duly authorized to do so. With the thousands of resolutions approved monthly by the Court, it would unduly tax the time and attention of the Chief Justice and members of the Court to the prejudice of the administration of justice if all such papers, other than decisions, could be released only upon their own signatures.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent is hereby administered a reprimand for gross ignorance of the law and of the Constitution in having asked the President to set aside by decree the Court's decision which suspended him for two years from the practice of law, with warning that the commission of any transgression in the future of his oath and duties as a member of the bar will be severely dealt with.

SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 6084.  September 3, 2003]

FELICITAS BERBANO, complainant, vs. ATTY. WENCESLAO BARCELONA, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PER CURIAM:

A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.  The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients require in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the public.  The bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.  To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession.[1]

In a sworn Affidavit-Complaint dated March 11, 1999 filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), complainant Felicitas Berbano seeks the disbarment of Atty. Wenceslao Barcelona for Malpractice and Gross Misconduct Unbecoming a Lawyer, Dereliction of Duty and Unjust Enrichment.[2] Complainant alleges:

1. I am one of the heirs of Rufino Esteban Hilapo, owner of a 244-hectare lot situated at Alabang, Muntinlupa, which property is being claimed by Filinvest Dev. Corp. in a case pending with the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP), Quezon City.  The heirs of REH has appointed Mr. PORFIRIO DAEN as their attorney-in-fact giving him authority to prosecute the case for and in their behalf.

2. On January 26, 1999, Mr. Porfirio Daen was arrested by a Muntinlupa police on the strength of an expired warrant of arrest-it was issued on February 1990-and subsequently detained at the Muntinlupa City Jail, Tunasan, Muntinlupa City, until his release on February 18, 1999.

3. Since Mr. Daen needed the assistance of a lawyer for his release from incarceration, we tried to look for one.  We told our friend Naty Sibuya, about the predicament of Mr. Daen, who recommended Atty. Wenceslao Barcelona to us, his wife being Naty’s cousin/relative.

4. So on January 26, 1999, at about 10:30 in the evening, Atty. Wenceslao Barcelona arrived at the Muntinlupa City Jail and conferred with Mr. Daen.  We learned later that Mr. Daen has engaged the services of Atty. Barcelona for the latter to secure the release of the former from prison.  After their conversation, Atty. Barcelona told us that if you could produce the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) Pesos he will cause the release of Mr. Daen from prison the following day.  I told him that it was already late in the evening and I cannot any more produce the amount.  But he insisted that I must produce even just a small amount.  So, what I did was ask my relatives who were with me at the time to contribute and we were able to raise FIFTEEN THOUSAND SEVEN-HUNDRED (P15,700.00) Pesos.  In the meantime, Atty. Barcelona proceeded to Chowking Restaurant which is just located across the city jail where he waited for us there.

5. At the aforesaid restaurant, I handed to Atty. Barcelona the amount who accepted the same.  He reiterated his promise to secure the release of Mr. Daen the following

day.  Before he left, he asked us to meet him at Max’ Restaurant at around 12:00 noon at EDSA Crossing.  He thereafter left because according to him, he would go and see somebody, (a justice) from the Supreme Court who could help the release of Mr. Daen.  It was already about 12:30 in the early morning of January 27, 1999.

6. As agreed upon, I, together with Romana Soriano, proceeded to Max’ Restaurant.  We arrived at around 12:00 noon.  Atty. Barcelona came at around 1:00 P.M.  He even told us that he just came from the Supreme Court where he “fixed” the case of Mr. Daen.  It surprised me though, that he did not have with him any single document at the time.  Then, I handed him a “pay-to-cash” check for TWENTY-FOUR THOUSAND (P24,000.00) Pesos, dated January 29, 1999.  We told him that the check may be encashed on the said date.  Although, he said that the Justices of the Supreme Court do not accept check he nonetheless, accepted it saying that he will have the same rediscounted.  We thereafter left.

7. The following morning, January 28, 1999, at around 7:00 o’clock Atty. Barcelona called me up by phone to say that since he was unable to have the check rediscounted, I must produce the amount of P5,000.00 and give the amount to him at Max’ Restaurant at EDSA Crossing at around 12:00 noon.  We were unable to meet him because we arrived at about 1:00 o’clock already.  Nonetheless, we waited for him until 3:00 in the afternoon.  Thereafter, I called him through his pager saying that we were waiting for him at Max’.   I also called up our house and inquire (sic) if a lawyer has called up.  I was able to talk to my husband who informed me that a certain Atty. Barcelona called up.  That Atty. Barcelona wanted to meet us at McDonald’s at Barangka Drive, Mandaluyong.  So we rushed to the place but he was not there.  I again paged him informing him that we were already at McDonald’s and to return my call through my cell phone.  After a while, his wife called up to inform us to proceed to their house which was just five houses away from McDonald’s.  When we reached their house, we were met by his daughter who called her mother.  We were ushered inside the house and after introducing ourselves, we gave not only P5,000.00, but TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) Pesos in cash to his wife in the presence of his daughter.  Then we went to Putatan, Muntinlupa, hoping that he might be there.

8. We arrived at Putatan, Muntinlupa at around 4:30 in the afternoon and there we saw Atty. Barcelona.  We informed him that we left the P10,000.00 with his wife at their house.  Since Atty. Barcelona informed us that he could not secure the release of Mr. Daen because the check had not been encashed, Mr. Gil Daen, a nephew of Porfirio Daen, gave him FIFTEEN THOUSAND (P15,000.00) Pesos in cash.  I also gave him an additional P1,000.00 for his gasoline expenses.

9. The next time that we saw Atty. Barcelona was on February 3, 1999, Wednesday at around 6:00 in the evening at Putatan, Muntinlupa.  He informed us that he just came from the city jail where he had a conversation with Mr. Daen.  He told us that he is going to release Mr. Daen from prison tomorrow, February 4, 1999.  However, in the morning of February 4, we learned from the wife of Atty. Barcelona when she returned my call that her husband had left for Mindanao early that morning on board a private plane owned by Chiongbian allegedly to attend a peace talk with the Muslims.

10. After more than a week, I went to Putatan, Muntinlupa, because I was informed by the son of Mr. Daen that he saw Atty. Barcelona there.  When I saw him, I confronted him about his undertaking to release Mr. Daen from prison, but he only advised us not to worry and promised (again) that he will return the entire amount of P64,000.00 more or less, on Thursday, February 18, 1999.  But I never saw him again since then.  I have repeatedly paged him to return my call but he never returned any of my calls.[3]

In an Order dated April 15, 1999, Investigating Commissioner J. Virgilio A. Bautista of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, required respondent to submit his answer to the complaint, with a warning that he will be considered in default and the case will be heard ex parte, if he fails to do so. [4] Despite due notice,[5] respondent failed to file his answer.  Thus, complainant filed a motion to declare respondent in default,[6] resolution of which was held in abeyance by the Investigating Commissioner who required the parties to appear for hearing before the Commission on August 13, 1999.[7] On said date, respondent again failed to appear despite due receipt of notice.[8] Commissioner Bautista was thus constrained to consider respondent in default and complainant was allowed to present her evidence ex parte.  Complainant testified and affirmed  under oath the truthfulness and veracity of her Affidavit-Complaint. [9] Complainant also manifested that she will present the check in the amount of P24,000.00[10] at the next date of hearing.

Further hearings were set by the Commissioner, on October 1, 1999, November 19, 1999, October 12, 2001, December 14, 2001 and June 28, 2002, but both parties failed to appear on said dates despite due notice.[11]

Commissioner Bautista submitted his Final Report and Recommendation on December 23, 2002 finding respondent guilty of malpractice and serious breach of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommending that respondent be disbarred and ordered to return to complainant the amount of P64,000.00.  The IBP Board of Governors adopted Commissioner Bautista’s findings but reduced the penalty to suspension from the practice of law for six years.

The Court disagrees with the IBP Board of Governors in reducing the penalty and upholds the findings and recommendation of Commissioner Bautista.  Under the facts established by complainant, respondent should not only be suspended, but disbarred from practice.

The object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish the individual attorney himself, as to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court, and to remove from the profession of law persons whose disregard for their oath of office have proved them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar.[12]

In In re Almacen, the Court expounded on the nature of disbarment proceedings, viz.:

. . . Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis .  Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an  action or a suit, but rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers.  Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution.  Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein.  [They] may be initiated by the Court motu propio.  Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such.  Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. . . .[13]

As in the Ricafort case,[14] herein respondent chose to forget that by swearing the lawyer’s oath, he became a guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice – a vital function of democracy a failure of which is disastrous to society. [15] In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.[16] Considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.[17]

Complainant’s evidence consists solely of her Affidavit-Complaint and testimony before the Commission attesting to the truth of the allegations laid down in her affidavit.  Commissioner Bautista and the IBP Board of Governors found her testimony together with her affidavit sufficient to support the finding that respondent committed the acts complained of .  The matter of assigning values to the testimony of witnesses is best done by the investigating body (which in this case is the Investigating Commissioner) because unlike appellate courts, it can weigh such testimony in light of the demeanor, conduct and attitude of the witnesses at the trial.[18] Witnesses are weighed not numbered, and the testimony of a single witness may suffice if trustworthy and reliable.[19]

The non-presentation of the check given to respondent does not affect complainant’s case as it will merely serve to corroborate her testimony and there is no law which requires that the testimony of a single witness needs corroboration except where the law expressly mandates such corroboration [20] which is not so required in administrative cases.

The act of respondent in not filing his answer and ignoring the hearings set by the Investigating Commission, despite due notice, emphasized his contempt for legal proceedings.  Thus, the Court finds no compelling reason to overturn the Investigating Commissioner’s judgment.

Respondent is guilty of culpable violations of several Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:

CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes.

CANON 7 – A lawyer shall at all times upholds the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the integrated bar.

CANON 11 – A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

CANON 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession.

Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

The Code exacts from lawyers not only a firm respect for law, legal processes and the courts but also mandates the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with clients and the moneys entrusted to them pursuant to their fiduciary relationship.  Instead of promoting respect for law and the legal processes, respondent callously demeaned the legal profession by taking money from a client under the pretext of having connections with a Member of this Court.

The Court has taken into consideration the penalties imposed in other administrative cases involving similar offenses, e. g.:

In Judge Angeles vs. Atty. Uy, Jr.,[21] the respondent was suspended from the practice of law for one month for failing to promptly report and remit the amount of P16,500.00 he received on behalf of his client.

In Gonato vs. Atty. Adaza,[22] the respondent was suspended from the practice of law for six months for charging his clients the amount of P15,980.00 as filing fees when in fact no such fees were due.

In Dumadag vs. Lumaya,[23] the Court ordered the indefinite suspension of a lawyer for not remitting to his client the amount of P4,344.00 that he had received pursuant to an execution.

In Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc., vs. Atty. Naldoza,[24] the respondent was disbarred for obtaining from his client the amount of US$2,555.00 allegedly as cash bond in an appealed case before this Court, when in fact no such amount has been paid or that the Court required such payment.

In the present case, respondent collected money from the complainant and the nephew of the detained person in the total amount of P64,000.00 for the immediate release of the detainee through his alleged connection with a Justice of the Supreme Court.  He deserves to be disbarred from the practice of law.

This is not the first time that respondent has been charged with and found guilty of conduct unbecoming a lawyer.  In Gil T. Aquino vs. Atty. Wenceslao C. Barcelona,[25] respondent misrepresented to the complainant that he could secure the restructuring of the complainant’s loan with the PNB through his connection with a certain Gonzalo Mericullo, legal assistant in the PNB.  Based on such misrepresentation, respondent asked and received the amount of P60,000.00 from the complainant allegedly to be paid to the PNB.  It turned out that there was no such employee in the PNB by the name Gonzalo Mericullo and the complainant’s property was eventually foreclosed.  As in the present case, respondent did not appear before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline despite receipt of the notices sent and duly received by him.  After due proceedings, the IBP Board of Governors found respondent guilty of professional misconduct, and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for six months and ordered to render the accounting and restitute whatever remained of the P60,000.00 to the complainant.   The Court adopted such finding and recommendation and respondent was ordered suspended from the practice of law for six months, effective immediately.

Respondent has demonstrated a penchant for misrepresenting to clients that he has the proper connections to secure the relief they seek, and thereafter, ask for money, which will allegedly be given to such connections.  In this case, respondent misrepresented to complainant that he could get the release of Mr. Porfirio Daen through his connection with a Supreme Court Justice.  Not only that, respondent even had the audacity to tell complainant that the Justices of the Supreme Court do not accept checks.

In so doing, respondent placed the Court in dishonor and public contempt.   In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel,[26] the Court expounded on a lawyer’s duty to the courts, viz.:

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, “like the court itself, and instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice.’  [People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 60 A.L.R. 851, 855].  His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, ‘not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.”  [In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, 602].  Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice “is a disastrous to the continuity of the government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people.”  [Malcolm Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1949 ed., p. 160].  Thus has it been said a lawyer that “[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice.”

The Judiciary has been besieged enough with accusations of corruption and malpractice.  For a member of the legal profession to further stoke the embers of mistrust on the judicial system with such irresponsible representations is reprehensible and cannot be tolerated.  Respondent made a mockery of the Judiciary and further eroded public confidence in courts and lawyers when he ignored the proceedings in the Aquino case and in the present case.  More so, when he misrepresented to complainant that he has connections with a Member of the Court to accommodate his client and that Justices of the Court accept money.  Indubitably, he does not deserve to remain a member of the Bar any minute longer.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.  Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law.  The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys.  This authority to discipline its members is not only a right but a bounden duty as well . . . That is why respect and fidelity to the Court is demanded of its members.[27]

WHEREFORE, for gross misconduct, respondent Wenceslao C. Barcelona is DISBARRED from the practice of law.  His name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.  He is further directed to return to complainant Felicitas Berbano the amount of Sixty Four Thousand Pesos (P64,000.00) within thirty (30) days from notice of this Decision.

This Decision shall take effect immediately.

Let copies hereof be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent’s personal record; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; the Office of the President; the Department of Justice; the Philippines Judges Association; and all courts of the land for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.