Eternal Objects Deleuze Whitehead

7/29/2019 Eternal Objects Deleuze Whitehead

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Eternal Objects

This is from the same chapter-in-progress as myprevious post. Its an attempt to work through

Whiteheads concept of eternal objects, and show how this concept is related to Deleuzesnotion of the virtual. I kind of feel this is not much more than Whitehead 101, but it is only by

working things out as slowly and painfully as I am doing here, that I am able to get the conceptstraight in my own mind. Page numbers refer to Process and Reality. Footnotes omitted.

Alongside events or actual entities, Whitehead also posits what he calls eternal objects. Theseare Pure Potentials (22), or potentials for the process of becoming (29). If actual entities aresingular occasions of becoming, then eternal objects provide the qualities and relations

(191) that enter into, and help to define, these occasions. When the potentiality of an eternal

object is realized in a particular actual entity, it contribute[es] to the definiteness of that actual

entity (23). It gives it a particular character. Eternal objects thus take on something of the rolethat universals (48; 158), predicates (186), Platonic forms (44), and ideas (52; 149) played in

older metaphysical systems. But we have already seen that, for Whitehead, concrete particular

fact cannot simply be built up out of universals; it is more the other way around. Universals,or things which are eternal, can and must be abstracted from things which are temporal (40).

But they cannot be conceived by themselves, in the absence of the empirical, temporal entitiesthat they inform. Eternal objects, therefore, are neither a priori logical structures, nor Platonic

essences, nor constitutive rational ideas. They are adverbial, rather than substantive; they

determine and express how actual entities relate to one another, take one another up, and enterinto each others constitutions (148-149). Like Kantian and Deleuzian ideas, eternal objects

work regulatively, or problematically.

To be more precise, Whitehead defines eternal objects as follows: any entity whose conceptualrecognition does not involve a necessary reference to any definite actual entities of the temporal

world is called an eternal object (44). This means that eternal objects include sensoryqualities, like colors (blueness or greenness) and tactile sensations (softness or roughness),conceptual abstractions like shapes (a helix, or a dodecahedron) and numbers (seven, or the

square root of minus two), moral qualities (like bravery or cowardice), physical fundamentals

(like gravitational attraction or electric charge), and much more besides. An eternal object can

also be a determinate way in which a feeling can feel. . . an emotion, or an intensity, or an

adversion, or an aversion, or a pleasure, or a pain (291). Sensa or what today are more

commonly called qualia are eternal objects; so are affects or emotions; and so are contrasts,

or patterns, or anything else that can express a manner of relatedness between other eternal

objects (114). There is, in fact, an indefinite progression of categories, as we proceed from

contrasts to contrasts of contrasts, and on indefinitely to higher grades of contrasts (22). The

levels and complexities proliferate, without limit. But regardless of level, eternal objects are idealabstractions that nevertheless (unlike Platonic forms) can only be encountered within experience,

when they are selected and felt by particular actual occasions. For this reason, they are welldescribed as empirico-ideal notions.

Whiteheads use of the word eternal might seem to be a strange move, in the context of a

philosophy grounded in events, becomings, and continual change and novelty. And indeed, as if

acknowledging this, he remarks that, if the term eternal objects is disliked, the term
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potentials would be suitable instead (149). But if Whitehead prefers to retain the appellation

eternal objects, this is precisely because he seeks like Nietzsche, Bergson, and Deleuzetoreject the Platonic separation between eternity and time, the binary opposition that sets a higher

world of permanence and perfection (a static, spiritual heaven) against an imperfect lowerworld of flux (209). The two instead must continually interpenetrate. For permanence can be

snatched only out of flux; and the passing moment can find its adequate intensity only by itssubmission to permanence. Those who would disjoin the two elements can find no interpretation

of patent facts (338). Actual entities continually perish; but the relations between them, or the

patterns that they make, tend to recur, or endure. Thus it is not substance which is permanent,

but form. And even forms do not subsist absolutely, but continually suffer changingrelations (29). In asserting this, Whitehead converts Plato from idealism to empiricism, just as

he similarly converts Spinoza, Leibniz, Hume, and Kant

When Whitehead says that forms as well as substances, or eternal objects as well as actual

entities, must be accepted as real, he is arguing very much in the spirit of the radical empiricismof William James. For James, experience is the sole criterion of reality; we live in a world of

pure experience. Classical empiricism has great difficultly in making sense of relations, as wellas of emotions, contrasts and patterns, and all the other phenomena that Whitehead classifies as

eternal objects. Since these cannot be recognized as things, or as direct impressions ofsensation, they are relegated to the status of mental fictions (habits, derivatives, secondaryqualities, and so on). But James says that, in a world of pure experience, relations are every bit

as real as things: the relations that connect experiences must themselves be experienced

relations, and any kind of relation experienced must be accounted as real as anything else in the

system. Whitehead argues, by the same logic, that eternal objects must be accounted as real as

the actual entities which they qualify, and which select them, include them, and incarnate them.

Eternal objects are real, because they are themselves experienced relations, or primordialelements of experience.

But even though eternal objects are altogether real, they are not the same thing as actual entities.

Like Deleuzes virtualities, they are precisely not actual. This is because, in themselves, they arenot causally determined, and they cannot make anything happen. Eternal objects involve in their

own natures indecision and indetermination (29); they always imply alternatives,contingencies, situations that could have been otherwise. This patch of wall is yellow, but it

might have been blue. This means that their role is essentially passive. An eternal object is

always a potentiality for actual entities; but in itself, as conceptually felt, it is neutral as to thefact of its physical ingression in any particular actual entity of the tempor al world (44). You

might say that yellowness in itself, understood as a pure potentiality, is utterly indifferent tothe actual yellow color of this particular patch of wall. Yellowness per se has no causal efficacy,

and no influence over the decision by which it is admitted (or not) into any particular actual

state of affairs. Eternal objects, like Deleuzes quasi-causes, are neutral, sterile, and

inefficacious, as powerless as they are indifferent.

At the same time, every event, every actual occasion, involves the actualization of certain of

these mere potentialities. Each actual entity is determined by what Whitehead calls the ingression

of specific eternal objects into it. The term ingression refers to the particular mode in whichthe potentiality of an eternal object is realized in a particular actual entity, contributing to the


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definiteness of that actual entity (23). Each actual entity creates itself, in a process of decision,

by making a selection among the potentialities offered to it by eternal objects. The concrescenceof each actual entity involves the rejection of some eternal objects, and the active

entertainment, or admi[ssion] into feeling (188), of others. And by a kind of circular process,the eternal objects thus admitted or entertained serve to define and determine the entity that

selected them. That is whyor better, howthis particular patch of wall actually is yellow. Byoffering themselves for actualization, and by determining the very entities that select and

actualize them, eternal objects play a transcendental, quasi-causal role in the constitution of the

actual world.

Whitehead also explains the difference, and the relation, between eternal objects and actual

entities by noting that the former can be dismissed at any moment, while the latter always

have to be felt (239). Potentialities are optional; they may or may not be fulfilled. Butactualities cannot be avoided. Indeed, an actual entity in the actual world of a subject must enter

into the concrescence of that subject by some simple causal feeling, however vague, trivial, and

submerged (239). An actual entity can, in fact, be rejected or excluded, by the process of what

Whitehead calls a negative prehension: the definite exclusion of [a given] item from positivecontribution to the subjects own real internal constituion (41). But even this is a sort of

backhanded acknowledgement, an active response to something that cannot just be ignored. Eventhe negative prehension of an entity is a positive fact with its emotional subjective form (41-

42). An actual entity has causal efficacy, because in itself it is entirely determined; it is

empirically given, and this givenness means Necessity (42-43). Once actual entities havecompleted their process, once the ingression of eternal objects into them has been fixed, they

are devoid of all indetermination. . . They are complete and determinate. . . devoid of allindecision (29). Every event thus culminates in a stubborn matter of fact (239), a state of

affairs that has no potential left, and that cannot be otherwise than it is. An event consistsprecisely in this movement from potentiality (and indeterminacy) into actuality (and complete

determination). The process of actualization follows a trajectory from the mere, disinterested

(aesthetic) envisagement of eternal objects (44) to a pragmatic interest in some of these

objects, and their incorporation within stubborn fact which cannot be evaded (43).

Still to be worked out:

The genesis of temporality in the process of actualization. Whitehead describes the futureas merely real, without being actual (238) the same phrasing that Deleuze uses to

describe the virtual.

Eternal objects as the focus of Whiteheads own version of Kants transcendentalargument. Like Kant, Whitehead seeks to critique positivist empiricism on the one hand,and dogmatic idealism on the other.

Part of the way that both Whitehead and Deleuze convert Kant is that, where Kantstranscendental argument is devised to answer the epistemological question What can we

know? (and also the questions What ought we to do? and, For what might we hope?),Whitehead and Deleuze instead found their transcendental reflection on trying to answer

the question How are novelty and change possible? How can we account for a future that

is different from the past?


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Double causality: In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze writes of the Stoic split in causality;there is real causalitycauses relate to other causes in the depths of bodies, and quasi-causalityeffects relate to other effects on the surfaces. InAnti-Oedipus, the distinction

between depths and surfaces is abandoned; but we still have a distinction between

desiring production and the quasi-causal anti-production of the Body without Organs.

How does Deleuzes split causality relate to the double causality in Whitehead, wherecausal efficacy or efficient causality refers to the inheritance of conditions and

orientations from the past, and final causality is the entitys decision, or creative self-

actualization in the final concrescence? Both Deleuze and Whitehead thus posit a secondcausality that has to do with the virtual, in opposition to the linear cause-and-effect of the

entirely actual. Can this be related in any meaningful way to Kants distinction, in the

2nd Critique, between causality as natural mechanism and causality as freedom?

Whiteheads concept of God, and Deleuze (or rather, Deleuze Guattaris) Body withoutOrgans. This is the comparison that I started out trying to get to. Both God and the BwO

are non-totalizable wholes in which all potential is contained; both can be regarded as a

quasi-cause and surface of inscription for all events, in such a way that it does not

determine these events, but allows precisely for their indeterminacy and continuingopenness to difference in the future. Both God and BwO need to be posited as a

consequence of the very logic of multiplicity and open totalities with which Whitheadand Deleuze/Guattari are working. Both God and BwO are traversed by similar dualities

(the primordial vs the consequent nature of God in ; the BwO as body of Capital in Anti-Oedipusand the emphasis on constructing a full BwO inA Thousand Plateaus).

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13 Responses to Eternal Objects

1. glensays:May 13, 2007 at 5:01 pm

The genesis of temporality in the process of actualization. Whitehead describes the

future as merely real, without being actual (238) the same phrasing that Deleuze

uses to describe the virtual.

this is huge! I have been thinking about this in trying to understand events.

I am surprised you dont mention discussion from _the fold_ although I might just bewanting you to blog your whole book at once!! In Deleuzes gloss of Whitehead in the

What is an Event chapter he goes through Whiteheads concept of prehension. Maybethe concresence of prehensions would also be a suitable way to talk about the temporality

of actualization? So like the two floors ofthe baroque house as a scaffold of virtualconceptual prehensions and actual sensual prehensions that is unfolded from duration to

abstraction. (and conceptual and sensual in the expanded whitehead sense of all monad-

entities that make decisions) Massumi does this in _PotV_ through possibilization that I
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mentioned in another blog post comments thread, which would correlate with your

pragmatic interest in the trajectory of actualization above.

Deleuze writes that Comprehension of the concept is distributive and not collective

(114). He is writing about Leibniz, but maybe the distinction between distributive

relationality and collective relationality could be useful for understanding the (extremelycomplex) production of relations necessary in the movement from duration to crystals

of time as heterogeneous materiality. Crystals to use Deleuzes _Cinema_ terminology

(or machine in the sense that Deleuze talked about language as a machine forproducing sense in _TLoS_ but I am not sure if this is the same machinic as in _ATP_

or in Guattaris work). Heterogeneous because shards of crystal are embeded in thetorsional flux of duration (ha a bit like a superman fortress of solitude) and this can be

deduced in various discussions of memory and bergson. (Actually what if memory frombergson was read via whitehead in expanded sense of conceptual prehension??)

Materiality following Negri in Alma Venus where creation is a force but also fromWhitehead where prehensions are vectoral.

I tend to think of Deleuzes expanded discussion of singularities in _The Fold_(expanded from _TLoS_) involves outlining the different singularities as they pertain to

this process of (un)folding genesis. In _TLoS_ this is glossed whenever he writes emitsa singularity or stream of singularities as it seems that Deleuze came to understand thatnot all of these singularities are comparable in the same relational way.

One question about your draft chapter extract above regarding this line:

Like Kantian and Deleuzian ideas, eternal objects work regulatively, or

problematically.

In what sense do you mean regulatively? I ask because grouping problematically and

regulatively through an or seems a bit odd. So problematic in the sense that Deleuzedefines singularities/events in _TLoS_ (54-55)? Is regulatively a Kantian term? Deleuzewrites: Kant was without doubt the first to accept the problematic not as a fleeting

uncertainty but as the very object of the Idea, and thereby as an indispenable horizon ofall that occurs or appears (54)


just read the comments in the other thread and your example to dominic about theconstantly shifting fitness landscape is how i imagine the unfolding scaffold of the

baroque house above.

i have a feeling that Deleuze called this the zone of indiscernibility for good reason!!!!
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3. Steven Shavirosays:May 13, 2007 at 5:22 pm

Glen, thanks for thisthere is a lot there for me to try to process and think through.

Just briefly:

Regulative ideas do, indeed, come from Kant. Deleuze links the regulative to the

problematic in Difference and Repetition, pp 168ff. Maybe there should be an and

instead of an or.

In terms of temporalitythis relates to part of the chapter that I have not posted here.

One of the differences between Whitehead and Deleuze is that for Deleuze (as for

Bergson), the bedrock assumption is continuity (of time). Whereas Whitehead says that

reality is ultimately atomic or discontinuous, so that there is no continuity of becoming,

but only a becoming of continuity(PR 35). An individual becoming an actualoccasion or actual entity cannot be temporally divided, it is a discrete and singular

happening that does not change. Change is rather defined by Whitehead as the passagebetween such occasions or becomings. What this means is that, for Whitehead, time is

quantized (as is space) (this is something that Lee Smolin and other physicists who

dissent from the hegemonic belief in string theory have been working with for some

time). Each actual occasion is a quantum of temporality, and time and space (orspacetime) are generated by, and out of, the occasions (rather than the occasions already

being in time, or in spacetime). So actual occasions would be a level of reality that is

more basic than Bergsonian duration.

I am not sure where to go with all of this yet. But it strikes me as highly significant. It is

directly relevant to issues of how to think of the future (as real but not actual) and how tothink about change and novelty (or, from my point of view, how to affirm a sort of

change/novelty/innovation that is not reducible to mere capitalist changes of fashion, to

innovation just for the sake of getting people to buy more, and always newer, stuff).


i was getting more at the problematic of temporality as part of the (at least) two-step

individuation process from Simondon that Deleuze references in D&R (246). So

crystals and machine as a way to talk about metastable preindividual fields fromwhich individuation _continually_ occurs as a process of transduction.

but I didnt realise that whitehead talked aboutpassage as between becomings. I need toread P&R again!!
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I was working from his earlier The Concept of Nature where he writes (or said, as

lecture):

Time is known to me as an abstraction from the passage of events. The fundamental fact

which renders this abstraction possible is the passing of nature, its development, its

creative advance, and combined with this fact is another characteristic of nature, namelythe extensive relation between events. These two facts, namely the passage of events and

the extension of events over each other, are in my opinion the qualities from which time

and space originate as abstractions. (34)

The disclosure in sense-awareness of the structure of events classifies events into those

which are discerned in respect to some further individual character and those which arenot otherwise disclosed except as elements of the structure. These signified events must

include events in the remote past as well as events in the future. We are aware of these as

the far off periods of unbounded time. But there is another classification of events which

is also inherent in sense-awareness. These are the eventswhich share the immediacy ofthe immediately present discerned events. These are the events whose characters together

with those of the discerned events comprise all nature present for discernment. [...] (52)The unity of this general present fact is expressed by the concept of simultaneity. The

general fact is the whole simultaneous occurrence of nature which is now for sense-awareness. This general fact is what I have called the discernible. But in future I will call

it a duration, meaning thereby a certain whole of nature which is limited only by the

property of being a simultaneity. Further in obedience to the principle of comprisingwithin nature the whole terminus of sense-awareness, simultaneity must not be conceived

as an irrelevant mental concept imposed upon nature. Our sense-awareness posits for

immediate discernment a certain whole, here called a duration; thus a duration is a

definite natural entity. A duration is discriminated as a complex of partial events, and thenatural entities which are components of this complex are thereby said to be

simultaneous with this duration. Also in a derivative sense they are simultaneous with

each other in respect to this duration. Thus simultaneity is a definite natural relation. The

word duration is perhaps unfortunate in so far as it suggests a mere abstract stretch oftime. This is not what I mean. A duration is a concrete slab of nature limited by

simultaneity which is an essential factor disclosed in sense-awareness.

Nature is a process. (53)

so my point was about duration as a complex of partial events, where the complex of

partial events are metastable virtualities that serve as abstract machines in the nonlineartransductive passage or correspondence between historical Chronos and eternal Aion.

The nonlinearity between the virtual and the actual in genesis or creation is the crazy

(indiscernible) complex bit.

i totally share your perspective about how to think beyond the capitalist apparatus of

capture for innovation, etc. That is the subject of my essay I am currently writing aboutgaming, the gaming-event, and the virtual gaming machine as the next stage of the

commodity (beyond the spectacle). Every commodity becomes a game, this subsumes

contingency into the event of the commodity. I read this as an emergent phenomenon thatattempts to circumvent the paralysis of affective flatline herald by two forms of saturation


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(market commodity saturation, ie new commodities, and affective saturation through

the circular temporality that conditions the possibile within the spectacle of the

commodity, ie the commodity produces a new). Such a flatline and correlative

subcultures of boredom and the spectacle styles of catatoniawould be catastrophic for

the advertising-exchange-consumption spiral of contemporary exchange relations.

Consumer confidence is a measure of the inverse entranced stimulation in thecapacities of the market, etc.


Glen,

The question is how, if at all (I am not sure) Whiteheads take on temporality changes

between The Concept of Nature and Process and Reality. I think that it did changesomewhat, if only because Whitehead was rethinking the consequences of Einsteins

relativity. His book on relativity came out, I think, in between Concept of Nature and PR

though I havent read it, and probably would not be able to understand its

mathematics. Stengers says that in the relativity book Whitehead took a risk that didntpan outproposing a somewhat alternative explanation to Einsteins, but one that had

mostly the same mathematical consequences. And I also seem to remember readingsomewhere that by the time of PR, Whitehead had in fact rejected his own relativity book

and tried to rethink duration and simultaneity in more Einsteinian termsthere are

passages in PR which talk about how simultaneity is not absolute, as well as the whole

section on The Theory of Extension, with its flat loci and strains, which is definitelythe part of PR that (partly because it is the most mathematical part?) I understand the

least. But that is where he talks about spatializationand part of how he differs from

Bergson, I think (I am not sure of this) is that he sees temporalization as going along withspatialization, and asserts the priority of time/duration over space/extension in a more

qualified manner than Bergson does.

But this is the aspect of Whitehead where I really feel out of my depth; and I cannot even

begin to think about how it relates to the Simondon/Deleuze stuff that you are citing on

crystals and individuation as forms of temporalization

As for the commodity/innovation stuff, this is where Max Barry (whom you have

mentioned a number of times on your blog) might really be helpful.

6. G says:May 15, 2007 at 11:45 am
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This is interesting, thanks, but where do reconstructions like this lead? Will this help you

create original ideas or is it the end in itself? I am not sure what kind of meaning areconstruction has. You quote theorists so much that I wonder where your ideas come in.

7.

Sinthomesays:

May 16, 2007 at 6:18 pm

Steven, I hate to be rude by jumping in midstream but I have only recently begun

following your blog closely (it looks like Ive really been missing out by not followingyour writing more closely). Am I correct in surmising that these recent posts are part of a

larger book project youre working on? If so, could you say a bit about what youredeveloping or arguing or refer me to a post that outlines this? I was exceptionally pleased

to see your development of the Kant/Deleuze connections with regard to problematic

ideas in your previous post. Are you working through any of the connections to Maimon

and Maimons critique of Kant? As a way of shamelessly pimping my own book, Idevote three chapters to the Deleuze-Kant-Maimon-Bergson connection vis a vis the

ontology of problems in my own forthcoming study of Deleuzes transcendental

empiricism,Difference and Givenness: Deleuzes Transcendental Empiricism and theOntology of Immanence. Until the publication of de Beisteguis Truth and Genesis (and

even there), there has hardly been any sustained or serious discussion of Deleuzes

account of individuation, actualization, and indi-different/ciation in the secondaryliterature, which is a significant problem in interpretations of Deleuze as this goes straight

to the core of his thought. Im thus very excited to see the work youre developing here.As an additional self-promotion, youll find various posts devoted to these issues at

Larval Subjects under the tag of individuation.


Sinthome, thanks for your comments. I read your blog regularly, and I am lookingforward to your book.

In terms of my own work, Ive worked on Deleuze, on and off, for a long time; I have

been especially interestedin the Kant/Deleuze connection. But I have never read Maimonor many of the other less familiar figures Deleuze talks about in Difference andRepetition. And overall I have to admit that I am weaker on the intricacies ofDifference

and Repetitionthan I am with regard to many other of Deleuzes books.

But my current (theoretical) focus is mostly on Whitehead.

I am currently trying to cobble together a book, partly with articles I have previously

published, and partly with new stuff, on Kant, Whitehead, and Deleuze.
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Though this is something of an interruption of my other in-progress book project the

one I am probably more impassioned aboutThe Age of Aesthetics, which is not reallya philosophy or theory book at all, but more a work of science-fictional politico-aesthetic

speculation.

9.

Roughtheory.org Holding Patternssays:

May 18, 2007 at 10:33 am

[...] Along the way, Sinthome picks up on Steve Shaviros recent reflections onWhitehead and Deleuze. Sinthome uses Whitehead to suggest some potential paths into

the questions of [...]

10. 01010101says:June 7, 2007 at 11:20 pm

Both God and BwO need to be posited as a consequence of the very logic of multiplicity

and open totalities with which Whithead and Deleuze/Guattari are working

Yes , the logic of multiplicity, or paraphrasing one of Russells yawps, from phucked-up

premises, anything follows.whether God or postmod

idealism

11.Points and Objects Naught Thoughtsays:November 18, 2009 at 2:16 am

[...] such as Deluzes category of the virtual. Steven Shaviro made this connection sometime ago here. It seems that there can be no guarantee as to the contours of

conceptualization (via Brassier) or [...]

12.Eternal Objects, OOP, and Political Analysis Struggleswithphilosophy.wordpresssays:March 23, 2010 at 4:58 pm

[...] reading of Whiteheads eternal objects in his book Without Criteria and his post

(here). The aim is to defend an OOP that argues objects are both actual and [...]

13.Relationalism to the Extreme, Excess, Eternal Objects, etc. Networkologiessays:May 8, 2010 at 9:21 pm
http://www.shaviro.com/Blog/?cat=11http://www.shaviro.com/Blog/?cat=11http://www.shaviro.com/Blog/?cat=11http://www.roughtheory.org/content/holding-patterns/http://www.roughtheory.org/content/holding-patterns/http://www.shaviro.com/Blog/?p=578&cpage=1#comment-40056http://www.shaviro.com/Blog/?p=578&cpage=1#comment-40056http://msn.com/http://msn.com/http://msn.com/http://www.shaviro.com/Blog/?p=578&cpage=1#comment-40136http://www.shaviro.com/Blog/?p=578&cpage=1#comment-40136http://naughtthought.wordpress.com/2009/11/18/points-and-objects/http://naughtthought.wordpress.com/2009/11/18/points-and-objects/http://naughtthought.wordpress.com/2009/11/18/points-and-objects/http://www.shaviro.com/Blog/?p=578&cpage=1#comment-49059http://www.shaviro.com/Blog/?p=578&cpage=1#comment-49059http://struggleswithphilosophy.wordpress.com/2010/03/23/eternal-objects-oop-and-political-analysis/http://struggleswithphilosophy.wordpress.com/2010/03/23/eternal-objects-oop-and-political-analysis/http://struggleswithphilosophy.wordpress.com/2010/03/23/eternal-objects-oop-and-political-analysis/http://www.shaviro.com/Blog/?p=578&cpage=1#comment-49418http://www.shaviro.com/Blog/?p=578&cpage=1#comment-49418http://networkologies.wordpress.com/2010/05/09/relationalism-to-the-extreme-excess-eternal-objects-etc/http://networkologies.wordpress.com/2010/05/09/relationalism-to-the-extreme-excess-eternal-objects-etc/http://networkologies.wordpress.com/2010/05/09/relationalism-to-the-extreme-excess-eternal-objects-etc/http://www.shaviro.com/Blog/?p=578&cpage=1#comment-49715http://www.shaviro.com/Blog/?p=578&cpage=1#comment-49715http://www.shaviro.com/Blog/?p=578&cpage=1#comment-49715http://networkologies.wordpress.com/2010/05/09/relationalism-to-the-extreme-excess-eternal-objects-etc/http://www.shaviro.com/Blog/?p=578&cpage=1#comment-49418http://struggleswithphilosophy.wordpress.com/2010/03/23/eternal-objects-oop-and-political-analysis/http://www.shaviro.com/Blog/?p=578&cpage=1#comment-49059http://naughtthought.wordpress.com/2009/11/18/points-and-objects/http://www.shaviro.com/Blog/?p=578&cpage=1#comment-40136http://msn.com/http://www.shaviro.com/Blog/?p=578&cpage=1#comment-40056http://www.roughtheory.org/content/holding-patterns/http://www.shaviro.com/Blog/?cat=11


11/11

[...] brings us to the Whiteheadian notion of eternal objects (for more see this excellent

post by Steve Shaviro) which he needs in order to make his whole system cohere.

Whiteheads [...]

Documents

Eternal Objects Deleuze Whitehead