Essex. Paper Estrategias Discursivas

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Lasse Thomassen

From antagonism to heterogeneity: discourse analytical strategies

No. 21 (April 2005)

Essex Papers In Politics and Government

Sub-Series In Ideology and Discourse Analysis


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From antagonism to heterogeneity: discourse analytical strategies

Lasse Thomassen

Abstract

Ernesto Laclaus theory of hegemony and the ideology and discourse analyses

inspired by it have been inspired by a number of sources, among them Jacques

Derridas deconstruction. Hegemony analysis and deconstruction are often presented

as different but complementary theoretical moves. In this paper I argue that this is not

the case, and that they can instead be seen as dealing with the same issues of the

conditions of possibility and impossibility of the discursive constitution of ideology

and identity. The argument is pursued through an examination of the central

categories of the theory of hegemony, in particular antagonism and, from Laclaus

more recent work, heterogeneity. Especially the category of heterogeneity renders

the theory of hegemony closer to deconstruction. In the concluding section of the

paper, I explore the implications of this argument for how one approaches the analysis

of ideology and discourse.

Keywords

Deconstruction; hegemony; Laclau; antagonism; heterogeneity


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Introduction1

One of the most influential approaches to the study of discourse and ideology is

Ernesto Laclaus theory of hegemony and the so-called Essex School of discourse

theory employing Laclaus work. The hegemonic approach to discourse and ideology

draws upon different strands of thought, among them Wittgenstein, Heidegger, post-

Saussurean linguistics, and Lacan.2 Another source of inspiration is Derridean

deconstruction which has played a central role for Laclau and those inspired by his

work from the very beginning.3

The appropriation of deconstruction for the theory of hegemony is seemingly

unproblematic: deconstruction and the theory of hegemony are often presented as the

two sides of the same coin, with deconstruction showing the contingency of structures

and identities and the theory of hegemony explaining the constitution of structures,

identities and ideology.4 Recently, Aletta Norval has put this complementary

relationship between deconstruction and the theory of hegemony into question,5 and

here I wish to continue this problematisation of the relationship between

deconstruction and hegemony.

This meta-theoretical question of the relationship between hegemony analysis

and deconstruction is linked to a more specific issue arising from Laclaus conceptual

apparatus. In his most recent work, Laclau has introduced the notion of

heterogeneity to refer to an excess escaping the attempt to discursively objectify the

boundaries of identities.6 One example of an heterogeneous entity is the

Lumpenproletariat, which, in Marxs work, is a discursive excess escaping the

creation of a conceptual frontier between bourgeoisie and proletariat. I shall return to

the notion of heterogeneity and to this and other examples in more detail below. The

introduction of the notion of heterogeneity requires us to reconsider the notion of


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antagonism, which has held a central place in Laclaus work.7 This, in turn, raises the

question of what one must look for as a discourse analyst, and whether discourse and

ideology analysis comprises simply the dual strategy of deconstruction and hegemony

analysis.

My claims in this paper are threefold. First, with Norval, I will argue that

deconstruction is not a negative preparation for hegemony analysis. Second, I will

argue that the central category, if there is one, of hegemony and discourse analysis is

heterogeneity, not antagonism. As a result, hegemony analysis, like deconstruction, is

also concerned with showing the contingency and precariousness of discourses and

social identities. Here, deconstruction and hegemony are again shown to be not

simply different and complementary discourse analytical strategies. Third, and linked

to the previous point, my argument implies that social identities are not necessarily

constituted around antagonistic frontiers.

Although the argument of the paper is mainly theoretical and conceptual, I

shall use a number of concrete examples. In the first section, I examine the existing

literature on the relationship between deconstruction and hegemony and discourse

analysis. In the following sections, I examine the key parameters of Laclaus theory of

hegemony empty signifiers, equivalence and difference, and so on and show the

implications of Laclaus recent reformulations of these for the notion of antagonism. I

argue that the notion of antagonism must be qualified, and this has implications for

the use of the theory of hegemony for the analysis of discourse and ideology. This

conclusion is further emphasised with the introduction of the notion of heterogeneity,

the consequences of which I discuss in the last section of the paper.


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Deconstruction, hegemony and discourse analysis

Derridean deconstruction has been part of the theory of hegemony from its inception

inHegemony and Socialist Strategy. In this section, I will first consider Laclaus

appropriation of Derridas work and then the views of several commentators on

Laclaus work.

Aletta Norval has already dealt with Laclaus appropriation of Derridas

deconstruction, so I will only make some brief comments in this regard.8 In

Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Laclau and Mouffe make reference to the Derridean

notion of supplementarity in their deconstructive genealogy of the role of hegemony

in the history of Marxist thought. More importantly in the context of this paper is their

reference to Derridas deconstruction of structuralism. The deconstruction of

structure, showing that ultimately no structure or system can be held together by a

transcendental signified, makes Laclau and Mouffe question the emphasis on

structure, determinism and necessity in Marxist thought.9 Deconstruction provides an

argument for contingency and, hence, for the centrality of hegemony understood as

the articulation of contingently linked differential elements into a more or less stable

whole. In short, no hegemony without contingency and the deconstruction of

structure.

In the 1990s, Laclau reformulated this insight in terms of the Derridean notion

of undecidability. Deconstruction, he argued, shows the undecidability of structures

and identities, and the theory of hegemony provides a theory of the decision in an

undecidable terrain.10 As Norval has shown,11 this rests on a misunderstanding of

undecidability. Not only is undecidability not a general infrastructure, but a specific

notion introduced by Derrida in specific contexts; in addition, the decision does not

dissolve undecidability. This goes against the temporal dimension of Laclaus use of


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undecidability/decision: first undecidability, then decision. Likewise, deconstruction

is not a negative and preparatory move that one needs to make and can subsequently

leave behind before embarking on the analysis of the decision or hegemony.

Deconstruction and hegemony, undecidability and decision, can neither be temporally

separated, nor conceived as different and complementary analytical moves. As I shall

argue below, this is of utmost importance for the way one does hegemony analysis as

it means that it cannot simply consist in showing how a hegemonic project was

possible, but must also consider the limits of any hegemonic constellation (that is,

incorporate the purportedly specifically deconstructive move into the hegemony

analysis).

Laclaus appropriation of deconstruction and undecidability as different from

and complementary to the theory of hegemony is reflected in the work of some of his

commentators. Thus, three introductions to Laclaus work and to discourse analysis

all argue that deconstruction and the theory of hegemony are different and/but

complementary discourse analytical strategies.12 For instance, Jacob Torfing writes:

Deconstruction in a certain sense implies a theory of hegemony and the theory

of hegemony implies deconstruction. Whereas hegemony brings us from

undecidability to decidability, deconstruction shows the contingent and

constitutive character of decidable hegemonic articulations by revealing the

undecidability of the decision.13

While I agree that there is a mutual implication between hegemony and

deconstruction, this should not be understood as if the two constitute two

complementary and reciprocal movements.14

Deconstruction is not a merely


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preparatory analytical move, nor is it a purely negative undertaking. As Derrida has

argued in several places, deconstruction is affirmative. Deconstruction does not

merely take texts and discourses apart, showing the contingency of structures,

identities and binary oppositions. Deconstruction does not leave us with a terrain of

indeterminacy. As most forcefully argued by Rodolph Gasch, deconstruction aims to

account for the conditions of impossibility as well as the conditions of possibility of

identities, distinctions, and so on.15 This is the case, for instance, in relation to

undecidability and decision: the former at once makes the latter possible and

impossible. There is no decision without undecidability, but, importantly, because of

undecidability, no decision is ever complete or final. Hence, it is a mistake to argue

that deconstruction and hegemony analysis are different and, as such, complementary

discourse analytical strategies. Deconstruction already involves what the theory of

hegemony is thought to add to it, namely the accounting for the possibility of

identities, distinctions, and, more generally, the stabilisation of meaning. As I will try

to show in the following, the theory of hegemony should not be seen as exclusively

concerned with an account of how decisions and hegemonic totalities come about.

Hegemony, empty signifiers and antagonism

While Laclau has formulated his theory of hegemony in a number of works over the

years, I wish to start from Laclaus most recent formulation of it. This is not to

suggest that one can understand Laclaus work as the teleological unfolding of his

present position. Indeed, I shall argue that the argument made here could also have

been made starting from the formulation of the theory of hegemony inHegemony and

Socialist Strategy.


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In a recent work,16 Laclau uses the following model to clarify the way

hegemonic articulation works:

T

______________________ F

D1

D1 D2 D3 D4

Figure 1

In the model, D1, D2, D3, D4, and so on, represent particular signifiers (or demands),

which are articulated into a chain of equivalence.17 One of the signifiers (D1) has

been able to empty itself of its particular content. As a result, it can stand in for and

represent the chain as a whole, thereby establishing the equivalence among the

different signifiers. This creates an antagonistic frontier (F) vis--vis an antagonistic

force (T), in relation to which the particular signifiers of the chain of equivalence

stand in the same relation insofar as they take part in the chain of equivalence as

represented by the empty signifier. This links together the creation of a chain of

equivalence, the empty signifier and antagonism.

In the original model, T refers to Tsarism and the chain of equivalence is

formed by different demands united through their opposition to the Tsarist regime. A


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more recent example of the same hegemonic construction is the so-called War on

Terror in the aftermath of the 9-11 attacks. The US government was able to put

together a coalition united through their opposition to terrorism, especially the

international terrorism associated with the names of Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda and

the Taliban regime. There was an antagonistic frontier dividing us from them: you

are either with us or you are with the terrorists. This hegemonic formation made

certain things possible that had not previously been possible (the coalition of hitherto

mutually opposed states, for instance), but also excluded certain possibilities from the

hegemonic political space (putting into question the particular way the War on

Terror was carried out, for instance).

Tendentially empty signifiers and internal divisions

It is often unclear whether Laclau is referring to the articulation of identity and

meaning as such or to a particular way of articulating meaning and identity, for

instance populist discourses emphasising antagonism, equivalence and emptiness.

This also applies to the model presented above. However this may be, my argument in

the following is that, even in the case of, for instance, populist discourses, it is

necessary to pay attention to tendential emptiness, the relativisation of antagonism,

and heterogeneity.

Just as the world has turned out to be more complex than the simplistic

discourse of George W. Bush would allow, so Laclau has complexified his model.

The signifiers in the chain of equivalence are equivalent and not identical, that is, they

retain some of their mutual differences. Like the other signifiers, the empty signifier is

split between its equivalential content and its differential content, thus making it only

tendentially empty. Laclau speaks here of a differential remainder18

or a remainder of


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particularity.19 The tendentially empty signifier is not a transparent medium; rather,

the signifier has an ineliminable materiality.20 This is of utmost importance for the

model and has implications for the analysis of hegemony.

The tendentially empty signifier simultaneously represents the whole chain

and is one part of it among others; this is why it appears twice in the model. The

tendentially empty signifier is unable to represent the whole as a whole. In

Emancipation(s), Laclau links the notion of the empty signifier to the subversion of

the play of differences: insofar as the empty signifier does not have any particular

differential content, it is able to represent the totality of the relations of differences

without being merely one more difference in an infinite field of differences. Yet,

insofar as it is only tendentially empty, the (tendentially) empty signifier is not able to

fulfil this role. It never ceases to be also one particular signifier among others; that is,

it is never just any signifier but always also this rather than thatsignifier.

Similarly, the equivalence never completely dissolves the relations of

difference: just as the logic of difference never manages to constitute a fully sutured

space, neither does the logic of equivalence ever achieve this.21 Since Laclau

conceives of meaning and identity in post-Saussurean terms as constituted through

relations of difference, equivalence supposedly halts or subverts the play of

difference. Again, insofar as the equivalence is only tendential, this subversion is only

tendential. As a result, the signifiers of the chain of equivalence are partly floating

signifiers. Their interiority or exteriority to the chain cannot be established in a clear

and stable manner, and they can therefore be dis- and re-articulated. This is an

essential part of hegemonic struggles; if there were no floating signifiers, it would be

the end to any future hegemonic struggle. Before turning to the consequences of this

argument for antagonism, I want to deal with another aspect of the argument.


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The hegemonic operation of a particular signifier taking up the signification of

the chain of equivalence is essentially a relation of representation. Importantly it is not

the representation of something already present. What is missing is precisely the

equivalence, and this is what the relation of representation brings into existence. What

is represented does not pre-exist the relation of representation; rather, the latter

constitutes the former in a performative fashion.22 Yet, as we know from Derridas

deconstruction of performativity, the performative is never pure, but always made

possible and contaminated by the constative. The performative representation of the

chain of equivalence involves an irreducible element of citation: one of the signifiers

of the (as yet not fully constituted) chain is partly emptied of content. We thereby

have an operation involving both continuity and discontinuity, both citation and

performative institution. The relation of representation is only possible insofar as the

particular signifier is gradually emptied, yet this process of emptying is never

complete. Thinking of hegemony as a relation of representation in this way means that

there is no pure (performative) origin; but nor does the process of representation come

to an end and establish the full identity of the chain, where there would be a simple

relation of repetition across the different parts of the chain. This suggests that we can

think of the hegemonic relation not only in terms of decision/undecidability and

representation but also the Derridean notion of iterability.

Again, it matters which particular signifier is cited, that is, which signifier

takes up the task of representing the whole. While this is ultimately contingent, it is

not arbitrary. The particular signifiers are not equally able or likely to take up this task

because it takes place in an already partly sedimented terrain permeated by relations

of power. Hence, the particular signifier taking up the task of signifying the totality

must not only be available, but must also compete with other particular signifiers.


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This takes place, not on a level playing field, but in a terrain that is itself the result of

prior hegemonic articulation.23 Moreover, since the empty signifier is only

tendentially empty, it matters which particular signifier takes up this role. The

emptying of the signifier opens up a space within which other signifiers can be

included and represented, but this opening up is only possible via a simultaneous

closing off, because it is the relative emptying of a particular signifier.

It is one of the tasks of discourse analysis to examine why some signifiers

come to represent the whole and why others do not. The analysis of hegemony cannot

stop at the identification of a successful hegemony, but must also examine which

alternatives have been excluded. For instance, in the case of the War on Terror, one

must ask what would have been possible, and what would have been excluded, if it

had not been a War, but a police or law-enforcement operation.

Glenn Bowmans study of the way in which Palestinians in exile have

imagined their lost nation provides a good example of these theoretical points.

Bowman shows how the empty signifier (the Palestinian nation) is necessarily split

between its emptiness and a differential remainder. Since the nation is imagined

through synecdoche, the lost whole (the Palestinian nation) depends on which part of

it one puts in its place, that is, which particular signifier takes up the task of signifying

the whole.24 The means of signification at our disposal will depend on our

embeddedness in a particular context, which is always partially sedimented and

permeated by relations of power. Not every means of signification is equally available

in every context, and, given the different contexts, a signifier will have different

meanings in different contexts. As a consequence, different significations of the

same empty thing (for instance, the lost Palestinian nation) may not be

compatible, and some of them may eventually need to be suppressed in order for a


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coherent and unitary identity to emerge. Insofar as the split in the signifier is

constitutive, it is always possible to imagine things otherwise, for instance, for the

nation to be a different nation. And there will always be persons and groups whose

points of views cannot be represented within the space of representation opened up

but simultaneously closed by the tendentially empty signifier. In the case of

Palestinians in exile, Bowman shows how these different images of the nation

emerge, how they depend on their different contexts of enunciation, and how they

mutually conflict.25

One note of caution must be raised at this point, though. Bowmans

explanation of the inherent split in the signifier is ambiguous. At times, he seems to

suggest that this is so for the intrinsic reasons just explained. At other times, however,

he explains it with reference to the geographical dispersion of Palestinians and their

physical, political and social separation from their land.26 Likewise, Bowman

sometimes presents the dispersion of Palestinians from one another and from their

land as the result of some external force (namely, Israeli occupation), rather than as an

inherent part of identity that cannot be overcome.27 This would imply that if only they

were not geographically dispersed, and if only the Israelis did not occupy their land

and discriminate against them, the Palestinians would regain their lost fullness.

Antagonism: the limit of objectivity?

If the empty signifier is only tendentially empty, and if the equivalence is unable to

completely subvert the relations of difference, then the frontier vis--vis the

antagonistic outside will not be a clear and stable frontier (it should be represented in

the model above as a dotted line). Antagonism only exists as a discursive effect and

only as one end of a spectrum that is never reached. If anything, there are tendential


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antagonisms, that is, frontiers and identities that are constructed as more or less

antagonistic. As argued above, this means that the frontier is open to dis- and

rearticulation. For instance, in the War on Terror it was not difficult to create a

coalition for freedom, democracy, and so on, and against bin Laden and the Taliban.

Once the War went on to Iraq, however, the cracks that were already to some extent

present in the coalition started to open up. With Iraq, it was no longer possible to

represent the enemy as an absolute threat (or evil). The freedom that was supposed

to hold the coalition together appeared to be the freedom of a particular agent, and as

a result the coalition was unable to stay intact. Before turning to some of the

implications of the relativisation of antagonism for discourse analysis, it is necessary

to examine Laclaus different formulations of antagonism.

InHegemony and Socialist Strategy, antagonism is introduced as the limit of

objectivity, as a threat to my identity: [I]n the case of antagonism the presence of

the Other prevents me from being totally myself. The relation arises not from full

totalities, but from the impossibility of their constitution. Insofar as there is

antagonism, I cannot be a full presence for myself.28 And: Antagonism as the

negation of a given order is, quite simply, the limit of that order, and not the moment

of a broader totality in relation to which the two poles of the antagonism would

constitute differential i.e. objective - partial instances.29 Antagonism is conceived

as the limit of objectivity because it refers to the subversion of the discursive

constitution of meaning and objectivity. More specifically, antagonism refers to the

moment when the system of differences is constituted into a chain of equivalence

opposing an external threat. The equivalence is established through an empty signifier

signifying a set of differences as a totality. Supposedly, antagonism both makes

meaning possible (because it provides the condition of possibility for the differences


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to coalesce into a totality) and impossible (because it denotes a point where the

relations of difference, which are constitutive of meaning, are subverted by

equivalence). Yet, the antagonistic relation does not actually threaten the identity

established through the chain of equivalence. Instead, antagonism is the flipside of

equivalence: it is constituted by and constitutes equivalence, because the equivalent

signifiers are equivalent insofar as they are all opposed in the same way to the

antagonistic Other. Hence, the emptiness of the empty signifier and the antagonistic

relation go hand in hand: the emptiness of the empty signifier signifies the fullness of

an identity (for instance, of a communal identity by fixing the meaning of its

differential elements in relation to that fullness), and the antagonistic Other is

supposed to threaten this fullness.30

However, although this type of antagonistic relation is indeed not a positive,

differential relation, as Laclau and Mouffe rightly argue, this is not what precludes the

possibility of its representation. Antagonism precisely refers to and presupposes a

broader totality in relation to which the two poles of the antagonism would

constitute, if not differential, then at least objective, partial instances. Since

antagonism presupposes the fullness of the community with a clear division between

inside and outside, antagonism presupposes the space of signification within which

both the community and its antagonistic other are constituted. With an antagonistic

frontier, you have a clear inside with a clear outside. Hence, Laclau and Mouffe are

both right and wrong when they write inHegemony and Socialist Strategy that the

experience of the limit of all objectivity [has] a form of precise discursive

presence, and this is antagonism.31 Antagonism has a precise discursive presence: it

is a discursive representation and objectification, and, as such, it is not the limit of

objectivity or signification. Similarly, the empty signifier may be the limit of


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signification insofar as the latter is constituted through relations of difference. Yet, the

empty signifier makes the signification of a space of fullness with clear boundaries

possible. Both pure equivalence (or the pure emptiness of the empty signifier) and

pure difference would constitute a set of fixed relations, namely an identity with clear

and stable limits. The limit of objectivity must instead be found in the mutual

contamination of equivalence and difference, which, to paraphrase Laclau and

Mouffe, is what prevents the impossibility of the constitution of full identities.

Slavoj iek has argued that antagonism is a way to externalise the

ineliminable split (or lack) in the subject and, in this way, to discursively master the

always-already dislocated character of any identity.32 A good example is racism and

xenophobia: if only we could get rid of the foreigners, then crime and unemployment

would disappear If the identity of the community is constituted through a

hegemonic articulation, and if hegemony is essentially a relation of representation,

then the identity of the community will be marked by an inherent split (or lack),

which it can only erase by projecting it onto something represented as external to and

negating the identity. We do not start with a pure inside; the inside is always already

dislocated, and it is only the negation of this dislocationits externalisationthat

creates the purity of the inside. As a consequence, iek argues, we should distinguish

between dislocation and any discursive response to it, including antagonism. Since

New Reflections (1990), Laclau has thought of identity and discourse in this Lacanian

sense, as constituted around a lack and, as such, inherently dislocated, with

antagonism being one way of discursively mastering dislocation, even if this always

eventually fails.33 Moreover, as Nathan Widder has argued, the turn to dislocation

would be redundant if it necessarily manifests itself in antagonistic relations.34

Laclau concludes:


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InHegemony and Socialist Strategy the notion of limit is more or less

synonymous with antagonistic frontier. Objectivity is only constituted through

a radical exclusion. Later on I came to realize that this assimilation presented

two flaws. The first, that antagonism is already a form of discursive

inscription i.e. of mastery of something more primary which, fromNew

Reflections on the Revolution of our Time onwards, I started calling

dislocation. Not all dislocation needs to be constructed in an antagonistic

way. The second flaw is that antagonism is not equivalent to radical exclusion.

What it does is to dichotomize the social space, but both sides of the

antagonistic relation are necessary in order to create a single space of

representation.35

Bowmans study of Palestinian nationalism is a good example of an analysis that

takes this point into consideration. He shows how the Palestinian nation is defined

through its antagonistic relationship with the state of Israel. At the same time,

Palestinian identity is internally divided and only the result of contingent

articulations.36 Whatever alternative antagonisms there may be within the Palestinian

community occur within and are subsumed to the antagonistic frontier vis--vis the

state of Israel. At present at least, these secondary antagonisms do not put the

defining antagonism with Israel into question.37 However, the antagonistic frontier

vis--vis Israel and the resultant fullness of the lost Palestinian identity masks, not an

essence, but the essential lack of an essence, that is, the inherently dislocated

character of identity. It is the task of hegemony analysis to examine whether, and

how, antagonism is the response to dislocation, and how the construction of one


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antagonism may rely on the suppression of alternative antagonisms (even if the

analysis cannot stop at this).38

Hegemony analysis and the relativisation of antagonism

The relativisation of antagonism antagonism is one possible discursive response to

dislocation, and there are only tendential antagonisms has implications for the

strategy one pursues in ideology and discourse analysis. The discourse analytical

examination of hegemony can neither assume antagonism to be always in existence

nor can it consist only in looking for antagonisms to emerge. Discourse analysis must

look both behind and beyond antagonism. It must look behind antagonism in

order to see whether and why an antagonism was constructed, something only

possible through a careful analysis of the historical context. Discourse analysis must

also look beyond antagonism in order to examine how the antagonism is never fully

constituted. That is, discourse analysis must take a dynamic perspective that takes

antagonism as one possible outcome among others and not as the teleological aim of

any identity formation. Significantly, this outcome is not the end of the matter, but

instead requires further analysis of the possibilities of its transformation. Hegemony

analysis does not necessarily aim at the identification of antagonisms, and even if an

antagonism is identified, this cannot be the last word in the matter.

A good example of the kind of discourse analysis that takes antagonism as its

endpoint is Sebastin Barros and Gustavo Castagnolas attempt to explain the shape

of Argentine politics after World War II. They argue that Peronism was not only a

particular hegemonic project, but became the imaginary horizon of other hegemonic

projects, thus setting the terms of Argentine politics long after its fall from power in

1955. Peronism shaped Argentina in two ways: it divided Argentine politics and


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society into two antagonistic camps, and these camps were Peronism and anti-

Peronismyou were either for or against Peronism. Barros and Castagnola write that

Peronist populism introduced the representational resources which functioned as a

negative imaginary precluding the stability of Argentine politics. This prevented

the formation of a common imaginary sustaining a stable political order. Social

differences were immediately read in terms of political exclusion. The political

frontiers thus framed by the constitution of political identities, prevented the

emergence of a stable hegemonic articulation.39 The problem with this analysis is the

link between antagonism and instability. If the imaginary horizonincluding the

central antagonismof Argentine politics was the same for almost half a century,

then it seems wrong to talk about instability. There was stability with regard to the

terms of political and social struggles, and there was a common imaginary shared by

the whole political order, including the antagonistic forces.

There was a stable hegemonic articulation, and it was the articulation of

society into two opposing camps divided by an antagonistic frontier that meant that

hegemonic articulation was difficult. Barros and Castagnola write: [t]his strict split of

the political space into two fields overdetermined by an equivalential division

prevented the constitution of two conditions for a stable hegemonic practice: the

presence of a plurality of antagonistic forces and the instability of the frontiers

separating them.40 This is the crux of the matter, however. It is correct that hegemony

is only possible insofar as frontiers and identities are ultimately unstable. In this

sense, dislocation, not antagonism, is the condition of possibility of hegemony.

However, although antagonism may lead to war, it does not necessarily lead to the

instability of frontiers and identities. In fact, you can only have antagonism insofar as

frontiers and identities are stable. Hence, to link the possibility of hegemony to the


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existence of antagonisms is a mistake. Insofar as there is a pure and stable

antagonistic frontier, there can be no hegemonic (dis- and re-) articulation. Moreover,

the constitution of the imaginary horizon (through the emptying of a signifier and the

creation of equivalence) relies on the exclusion of those who are barred from

representation within the imaginary horizon because the latter is not infinite but

limited by the differential remainder. One must therefore not stop at the identification

of antagonistic frontiers and discourses, as Barros and Castagnola do; discourse

analysis must go one step further and identify the discursive heterogeneity resulting

from andmaking possible these antagonistic frontiers and identities.41

Heterogeneity, antagonism and discourse analysis

In his most recent work, Laclau has introduced the notion of heterogeneity to refer to

a discursive excess escaping categorisation and conceptual mastery. Heterogeneity

stands in an undecidable tension between internality and externality vis--vis the

boundaries of the discourse.42 As examples of heterogeneity, Laclau gives the

Lumpenproletariatin Marxs work, the peoples without history in Hegel, and the

subaltern.43 The point of this section is to develop a more systematic account of the

category of heterogeneity in the context of the hegemonic approach to ideology and

discourse analysis. I will, first, discuss Peter Stallybrasss analysis of Marxs notion

of theLumpenproletariatin order to show how heterogeneity relates to antagonism. I

will then further develop the notion of heterogeneity through a discussion of Georges

Batailles notions of homogeneity and heterogeneity.

The figure of theLumpenproletariatin Marxs discourse is an example of a

heterogeneous entity. TheLumpenproletariatis a discursive excess escaping the

conceptual categories of Marxs analysis of capitalism, in particular the determination


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of the antagonistic relation between proletariat and the capitalist class. Yet, as Peter

Stallybrass has argued, theLumpenproletariatnot only shows the limit of the

objectification of the relation between proletariat and bourgeoisie. The exclusion of

theLumpenproletariatfrom the other categories it belongs neither to the proletariat,

nor to what is antagonistically opposed to the proletariat, namely the bourgeoisie

makes it possible to theorise the relation between proletariat and bourgeoisie as an

antagonistic relation.44 TheLumpenproletariatis precisely the irreducible

remainder45 Laclaus characterisation of heterogeneity from the constitution of

the identity of the proletariat, which is constituted through the antagonistic relation

vis--vis the bourgeoisie. The exclusion of heterogeneity from the chain of

equivalence supports the unity of the chain and of the identity in question. However,

this heterogeneity is not excluded in an antagonistic fashion as opposed to the

identity. Two things are worth emphasising here. First, with heterogeneity we are

dealing with something excessive and undecidable; in the case of Marxs

Lumpenproletariat, something escaping the attempt to conceptualise social relations

as antagonistic relations. Yet, the exclusion of the heterogeneous from the

antagonism also makes the antagonism possible. In Laclauian terms, the condition of

possibility of antagonism is the exclusion of the heterogeneous differential remainder.

Second, the heterogeneous is not excluded from the discourse, for instance, from

Marxs texts. It is not something external to the discourse, something that would

presuppose a closed discourse with clearly demarcated limits. Hence, why we can

refer to discursive heterogeneity, and hence why the discursive heterogeneity also

undermines the antagonism.

The heterogeneous does not simply disappear from the discourse. The

existence of these heterogeneous elements shows the ultimate contingency of the


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constitution of an identity or a discourse, including antagonistic identities and

discourses. Heterogeneity therefore provides a privileged point of entry for hegemony

analysis. One must locate the heterogeneous elements in a discourse, examine what

this heterogeneity is the trace of, and how it is dealt with in the discourse.

Stallybrasss analysis of Marxs texts is exemplary in this regard. The

Lumpenproletariatprovides a point of entry for the analysis of Marxs texts tracing

theLumpenproletariatas an effect of Marxs discursive decisions and examining how

Marx deals with the heterogeneous excess arising from these decisions.

We should not be led to think that, normatively, there is anything inherently

progressive about heterogeneity. For instance, although Marx finds some

revolutionary potential in the spontaneity of theLumpenproletariat, he also sees the

Lumpenproletariatas a regressive force and as the foundation for the conservative

discourse of Bonapartism. Georges Batailles analysis of The Psychological Structure

of Fascism is also telling in this regard.

Bataille refers to homogeneity as the commensurability of elements and the

awareness of this commensurability. Production, according to Bataille, is the basis

of social homogeneity.46 What is productive is useful, and money is the equivalent

through which each person exists.

As agents of production, the workers fall within the framework of the social

organization, but the homogeneous reduction as a rule only affects their wage-

earning activity; they are integrated into the psychological homogeneity in

terms of their behaviour on the job, but not generally as men [sic]. Outside of

the factory, and even beyond its technical operations, a labourer is, with regard


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to a homogeneous person (boss, bureaucrat, etc.), a stranger, a man [sic] of

another nature, of a non-reduced, non-subjugated nature.47

Science can only take homogeneity as its object of knowledge, thus excluding the

possibility of a science of heterogeneity. Therefore, it is necessary to posit the limits

of sciences inherent tendencies, and to constitute a knowledge of the non-explainable

difference, which supposes the immediate access of the intellect to a body of material,

prior to any intellectual reduction. Tentatively, it is enough to present the facts

according to their nature.48 Heterogeneity does not lend itself to any intellectual

reduction within a coherent and closed scientific system. This suggests that the study

of the heterogeneous can only proceed through categories or examples including the

category of heterogeneity and the example of theLumpenproletariat that gesture

towards, but never appropriate, the heterogeneous.

[W]ith a view to defining the term heterogeneous,49 Bataille, echoing Marxs

description of theLumpenproletariat, gives the following examples of heterogeneous

waste and unproductive expenditure: the numerous elements or social forms that

homogeneous society is powerless to assimilate: mobs, the warrior, aristocratic and

impoverished classes, different types of violent individual or at least those who refuse

the rule (madmen, leaders, poets, etc.).50 Pointing to these things makes Bataille able

to talk about the heterogeneous as a positive experience without falling back upon the

homogeneous to understand the heterogeneous and without viewing the latter merely

as the failure of the former.51 Here one must avoid two opposite pitfalls. On the one

hand, as pointed out by Bataille, heterogeneity is not simply the negation of

homogeneity, and one should avoid thinking heterogeneity and homogeneity in a

dualistic fashion. Heterogeneity is, rather, the simultaneous condition of possibility


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and impossibility of homogeneity. On the other hand, one must also avoid Batailles

more or less implicit references to a vitalistic and immediate access to the world of

heterogeneity. Instead, heterogeneity is, as I have argued above, inherently linked to

representation.

A related question concerns the relationship between the category of

heterogeneity and the examples of it. One must avoid the temptation to reduce

heterogeneity to Stallybrasss, Batailles or Laclaus examples or to any other

examples. Likewise, we must not think that these examples express an underlying

essence. The notion of heterogeneity, as I have used it here, is what Derrida calls a

non-synonymous substitute52 for different discursive aporia, which could also be

referred to in Laclauian terms as, for instance, the differential remainder and the

tension between equivalence and difference. In terms of ideology and discourse

analysis, the category of heterogeneity is rearticulated each time it is applied in

concrete analyses.

Social homogeneity, according to Bataille, may become dislocated by

economic contradictions, causing elements to split off from the homogeneous sectors

of society. These elements may then align themselves with the heterogeneous

elements and form a new social formation. This is how Bataille accounts for the

emergence of Fascism in the 1920s and 1930s.53 Despite Batailles tendency to reduce

things to the economy in the last instance, from the perspective of hegemony, it is

interesting to note that the existence of heterogeneity is the condition of possibility of

hegemonic (re)articulation. What orthodox Marxism cannot explain, namely the

emergence of the non-class, non-homogeneous phenomenon of Fascism, can be

accounted for in this way, according to Bataille. Fascism thrives upon the

heterogeneity that cannot be accommodated within the relation between worker and


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24

capitalist. Likewise, in the case of Louis Bonapartes successful articulation of the

Lumpenproletariat, the phenomenon of Louis Bonaparte is not reducible to the

relation between the proletariat and the capitalist class.54 In both cases, the

heterogeneous elements are articulated into an anti-system antagonism, even if that

articulation never completely succeeds. Significantly, the heterogeneous is not

something wholly other as the example of theLumpenproletariatin Marxs discourse

might suggest. It is discursive heterogeneity, part of the discourse, which can, then, be

rearticulated. Thus, heterogeneity has important consequences for both hegemony

analysis and radical democratic politics.

To sum up, then, the notion of heterogeneity is a non-synonymous substitute

for different discursive aporia and for different ways in which we can refer to the limit

of discursive objectivity. It stands in for other terms, yet it does not refer to some

underlying principle or essence, which the other terms merely reflect. One can use

heterogeneity to refer to the undecidable relationship between equivalence and

difference, that is, to the way in which they both require and subvert one another. In

short, heterogeneity can be expressed as the inherent split in the signifier as well as

the differential remainder.55 Similarly, we can say that there is something

heterogeneous in the relationship between performative and citation. In these cases we

are dealing with the limit of objectivity. Yet, what is the limit to hegemonic

articulation is simultaneously the condition of possibility of hegemonic articulation.

Without the unstable relationship between equivalence and difference, for instance, no

hegemonic articulation would be possible.

In the terms ofHegemony and Socialist Strategy, heterogeneity not only

appears in the undecidable relationship between equivalence and difference, but also

in the fact that [t]he transition from the elements [i.e., any difference that is not


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25

discursively articulated] to the moments [i.e., differential positions articulated

within a discourse] is never entirely fulfilled.56 Again, we are dealing with

something that is both the condition of possibility and limit of hegemony. Laclau and

Mouffe also use the term field of discursivity to refer to the inherent inability of any

discourse to close itself as a totality:

a [discursive] system only exists as a partial limitation of a surplus of

meaning which subverts it. Being inherent in any discursive formation, this

surplus is the necessary terrain for the constitution of every social practice.

We will call it thefield of discursivity. it determines at the same time the

necessarily discursive character of any object, and the impossibility of any

given discourse to implement a final suture.57

The field of discursivity refers to the discursive constitution of objects, and to the

ultimate unfixity of moments within a discourse. Like heterogeneity, the field of

discursivity is not something external to discourse in the sense of a region lying

beyond the borders of the discourse. If the subversive character of the field of

discursivity was due to its location in a beyond the limits of the discourse, it would

presuppose what it was supposed to subvert, namely the discourse as an inside with an

outside. Rather, the field of discursivity is an inherent characteristic of any discourse,

an internal limit to the discourse. The field of discursivity is closely linked with what

Laclau and Mouffe refers to as the discursive exterior which is constituted by other

discourses.58 The field of discursivity refers to the ultimate unfixity of the moments

within the discourse, whereas the discursive exterior refers to the competing

discourses potentially able to rearticulate the discursive moments. The field of


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26

discursivity and the discursive exterior are, thus, two sides of the same coin: without

one, we would not have the other. In both cases we are dealing with a heterogeneity

that cannot be discursively mastered it is the heterogeneity that, in Batailles

analysis, makes the fascist articulation of the workers possible. Indeed, we are dealing

here with something undermining the very possibility of establishing a discursive

inside with clearly demarcated boundaries. Hegemony analysis then involves not only

the identification of emerging and persisting discourses, but also as a way of

examining the historical character of these discourses the identification of the field

of discursivity and the discursive outside. As with theLumpenproletariatin Marxs

texts, heterogeneity does not disappear from the discourse once that discourse has

become more or less stable and hegemonic.

If there is no discourse or hegemony without heterogeneity, there is no

hegemony analysis without attention to heterogeneity, that is, without consideration of

what is simultaneously the condition of possibility and impossibility of hegemony.

The identification of contingency and conditions of impossibility cannot simply be

referred to as a specifically deconstructive move; rather, it is an inherent part of

hegemony analysis. As a result, deconstruction and hegemony analysis cannot be

distinguished in this fashion. Both are concerned with the conditions of possibility

and impossibility of texts or discourses, and the conditions of possibility cannot be

clearly distinguished from the conditions of impossibility. Similarly, whatever

heterogeneity there may be in a discourse, it is not simply a heterogeneity preceding

its supersession with the establishment of a hegemonic discourse and, for instance, an

antagonistic frontier. Heterogeneity persists.


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Conclusion: deconstruction and hegemony, heterogeneity and antagonism

The introduction of the category of heterogeneity into the hegemonic approach to

ideology and discourse analysis has consequences for the category of antagonism and

for the relationship between hegemony analysis and deconstruction.

Just as there are only tendentially empty signifiers, so there are only

tendentially antagonistic frontiers. Pure antagonism is impossible, and we should

rather speak of different degrees of antagonism. As a consequence, hegemony

analysis can neither take antagonism as the necessary outcome of the formation of

social identities, nor, should it be the case, as the end of the process. Hegemony

analysis must examine if and how discursive heterogeneity is articulated into

antagonism, but also the heterogeneity created through the articulation of antagonism.

As a result, hegemony analysis acquires an inherently dynamic and historical

perspective. This is amply demonstrated in the cited analyses by Bowman,

Stallybrass, Bataille, and others.

So, heterogeneity is absolutely central for the hegemonic approach. It may

even be possible to go one step further and argue that the hegemonic approach is not

necessarily linked to antagonism, or that antagonism is only one of several forms of

hegemony formation or, more generally, of identity formation. Not only is Figure 1 in

need of qualification, it may not be the whole story either. This may also suggest that

we look to other theoretical sources for analysing identity, ideology and discourse.

Given the constraints of space, I can only point towards these alternative accounts

here. One possible theoretical source is Wittgensteins later philosophy, which may

provide a different account of identity and ideology59 and of radical democracy.60

Other potential sources are Foucault and Derrida, as evidenced in Judith Butlers


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work.61 Yet another source are Deleuze inspired theories of abundance, for instance

the work of William Connolly.62

Heterogeneity refers to the simultaneous condition of possibility and

impossibility of hegemonic articulations, including antagonism. Accordingly,

hegemony analysis and deconstruction cannot be distinguished according to dualisms

of possibility/impossibility, closure/contingency, or decision/undecidability. Both

hegemony analysis and deconstruction address both sides of these dualisms. The

supposedly deconstructive move is an inherent part of hegemony analysis (and vice

versa, we might add). It is at least possible to conceive of hegemony analysis in this

way, something that is more likely with the introduction of the category of

heterogeneity (even if the theoretical tools for instance the field of discursivity

were already there in previous formulations of the theory of hegemony). So, even if

hegemony analysts and deconstructionists sometimes emphasise different aspects,

hegemony analysis and deconstruction are not opposed and complementary discourse

analytical strategies.

Lasse Thomassen is Teaching Fellow in Political Theory in the Department of

Government at the University of Essex. He is the author of articles, chapters and

reviews on Habermas and post-structuralist theory, and the co-editor (with Lars

Tnder) ofRadical Democracy: Politics Between Abundance and Lack. He is

currently working on a research monograph onHabermas and Radical Democracy, to

be published with Routledge, and The Derrida-Habermas Reader, to be published

with Edinburgh University Press.


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Notes

1 I would like to thank Jason Glynos, Leonard Williams, Aletta Norval, Lars Tnder,

and Ernesto Laclau for their discussions about the argument of this paper. I would

also like to thank the participants at the conferences where I initially presented this

argument for their comments and questions.

2 For Laclaus work, see E. Laclau and C. Mouffe,Hegemony and Socialist Strategy:

Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, 2nd edition (London: Verso, 2002); E.

Laclau,New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time (London: Verso, 1990); E.

Laclau,Emancipation(s) (London: Verso, 1996); and J. Butler, E. Laclau and S.

iek, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left

(London: Verso, 2000). On the intellectual influences of Laclau and the Essex

School, see J. Townshend, Laclau and Mouffes Hegemonic Project: The Story So

Far,Political Studies 52:2 (2004), 269-88; A. Norval, Theorising hegemony:

between deconstruction and psychoanalysis, in L. Tnder and L. Thomassen (eds),

Radical Democracy: Politics between Abundance and Lack(Manchester: Manchester

University Press, forthcoming 2005); and Y. Stavrakakis,Lacan and the Political

(London: Routledge, 1999). For discourse analytical studies using Laclaus theory of

hegemony, see the contributions in E. Laclau (ed.), The Making of Political Identities

(London: Verso, 1994); D. Howarth, A. J. Norval and Y. Stavrakakis (eds),Discourse

theory and political analysis: Identities, hegemonies and social change (Manchester:

Manchester University Press, 2000); D. Howarth and J. Torfing (eds),Discourse

Theory in European Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004); and F. Panizza (ed.),

Populism and the Mirror of Democracy (London: Verso, forthcoming 2005).


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30

3 A. Norval,Deconstructing Apartheid Discourse (London: Verso, 1996); and D.

Howarth, Complexities of identity/difference: Black Consciousness ideology in

South Africa,Journal of Political Ideologies 2:1 (1987), 51-78.4 For this view, see E. Laclau, Deconstruction, Pragmatism, Hegemony, in C.

Mouffe,Deconstruction and Pragmatism, pp. 47-68 (London: Verso, 1996), pp. 47-

60; E. Laclau, Discourse, in R. E. Goodin and P. Pettit (eds),A Companion to

Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 431-7, at p. 435;

Laclau,Emancipation(s), pp. 78f, 90; Laclau and Mouffe,Hegemony and Socialist

Strategy, p. xi (Preface to the Second Edition); J. Torfing,New Theories of

Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe and iek(Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 102f; N.

kerstrm Andersen,Discursive Analytical Strategies: Understanding Foucault,

Koselleck, Laclau, Luhmann (Bristol: The Policy Press, 2003), pp. 56-62; N.

kerstrm Andersen, Political Administration, in Howarth and Torfing (eds),

Discourse Theory in European Politics, pp. 139-69, at pp. 142-5; and L. Phillips and

M. Winther Jrgensen,Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method(London: Sage,

2002), pp. 48f.

5 A. Norval, Hegemony after deconstruction: the consequences of undecidability,

Journal of Political Ideologies 9:2 (2004), 139-57.

6

E. Laclau, Paul de Man and the politics of rhetoric,Pretexts 7: 2 (1998), 154, 156;E. Laclau, Democracy between autonomy and heteronomy, in O. Enwezoret al.

(eds),Democracy Unrealized: Documenta11_Platform1 (Ostfieldern-Ruit: Hatje

Cantz, 2002), p. 381; C. Pessoa et al., Theory, democracy, and the Left: an interview

with Ernesto Laclau, Umbr@ (2001), 9f; and E. Laclau, On Populist Reason

(London: Verso, forthcoming 2005), chapter 5. The term heterogeneity is used in a

similar fashion in J. Derrida,Positions (London: Continuum, 2002, 2nd edition).


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7 A note of caution is necessary here: as will become evident, Laclaus texts are

themselves heterogeneous. L. Thomassen, Reading radical democracy: a reply to

Clive Barnett,Political Geography 24 (forthcoming 2005).8 Norval, Hegemony after deconstruction.

9 Laclau,Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, pp. 111f. InNew Reflections (pp. 17f,

172f), Laclau introduced the deconstructive notion of constitutive outside from H.

Staten, Wittgenstein and Derrida (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), pp.

16-8, 24. On Statens and Laclaus uses of this notion, see L. Thomassen,

In/exclusions: towards a radical democratic approach to exclusion, in L. Tnder and

L. Thomassen (eds),Radical Democracy: Politics between Abundance and Lack

(Manchester: Manchester University Press, forthcoming 2005).

10 Laclau, Deconstruction, Pragmatism, Hegemony, pp. 47-60; Laclau,

Emancipation(s), pp. 78f, 90; and Laclau and Mouffe,Hegemony and Socialist

Strategy, p. xi (Foreword to the Second Edition). Yet, Laclau also rightly

acknowledges that Derrida himself theorises the decision, cf. Laclau, Deconstruction,

Pragmatism, Hegemony, p. 48.

11 Norval, Hegemony after deconstruction.

12 Torfing,New Theories of Discourse, pp. 102f, 300; kerstrm Andersen,

Discursive Analytical Strategies, pp. 56-62; and Phillips and Winther Jrgensen,Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method, pp. 48f. When making the distinction

between deconstruction and hegemony analysis, they all make reference to Laclaus

distinctions between deconstruction and hegemony and between undecidability and

the decision. For a similar view of the complementarity of deconstruction and

hegemony in relation to politics, see S. Critchley, On Derridas Specters of Marx,

Philosophy & Social Criticism 21:3 (1995), 1-30, at p. 21.


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13 Torfing,New Theories of Discourse, p. 103.

14Ibid.

15

R. Gasch, The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection

(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986).

16 E. Laclau, Constructing Universality, in Butler, Laclau and iek, Contingency,

Hegemony, Universality, pp. 281-307, at p. 303.

17 Hence the . In Laclaus original model, the equivalence is represented by =, but it

is clear from the text that it should be , that is equivalence and not identity. In the

model, the signifiers are demands, hence D.

18 E. Laclau, On the names of God, in S. Golding (ed), The Eight Technologies of

Otherness (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 262.

19 Laclau, Constructing Universality, p. 305. See also E. Laclau, Glimpsing the

future, in S. Critchley and O. Marchart (eds),Laclau: A Critical Reader, pp. 279-328

(London: Routledge, 2004), p. 281; and E. Laclau, The death and resurrection of the

theory of ideology,Journal of Political Ideologies 1 (1996), 219. In the model, this is

represented by the division (split) of the parts of the chain.

20 E. Laclau, Identity and Hegemony: The Role of Universality in the Constitution of

Political Logics, in Butler, Laclau and iek, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality,

pp. 44-89, at p. 70.21 Laclau and Mouffe,Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, p. 129.

22 Laclau refers to the empty signifier as a name as opposed to a concept or

description, cf. Laclau, On Populist Reason.

23 Laclau,Emancipation(s), pp. 41-3; and Laclau, Structure, History and the

Political, in Butler, Laclau and iek, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, pp.

182-212, at p. 208.


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24 G. Bowman, A Country of Words: Conceiving the Palestinian Nation from the

Position of Exile, in E. Laclau, (ed), The Making of Political Identities (London:

Verso, 1994), p. 142.25 For good examples of analyses similar to Bowmans, see D. Howarth, The difficult

emergence of a democratic imaginary: Black Consciousness and non-racial

democracy in South Africa, in D. Howarth, A. J. Norval and Y. Stavrakakis (eds),

Discourse theory and political analysis: identities, hegemonies and social change,

168-92 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), pp. 175-7; and N. B. elik,

The constitution and dissolution of the Kemalist imaginary, in D. Howarth, A. J.

Norval and Y. Stavrakakis (eds),Discourse theory and political analysis: identities,

hegemonies and social change, pp. 193-204 (Manchester: Manchester University

Press, 2000), pp. 200f.

26 See, for instance, Bowman, A Country of Words, p. 139.

27 See, for instance, ibid., p. 164.

28 Laclau and Mouffe,Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, p. 125.

29Ibid., p. 126.

30 My account of Laclaus theory of hegemony enjoys the comfort of hindsight as the

notion of the empty signifier is only introduced in a later work,Emancipation(s),

whereas the notion of antagonism is already present inHegemony and Socialist

Strategy.

31 Laclau and Mouffe,Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, p. 122. See also ibid., p. 146.

32 S. iek, Beyond Discourse-Analysis, in E. Laclau,New Reflections on the

Revolution of Our Time (London: Verso, 1990), pp. 251-4.

33 Laclau,New Reflections, pp. 39-41, 44f, 65; Laclau, The death and resurrection of

the theory of ideology, 203ff; Laclau in L. Worsham and G. A. Olson, Hegemony


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34

and the Future of Democracy: Ernesto Laclaus Political Philosophy, in L. Worsham

and G. Olson (eds),Race, Rhetoric and the Postcolonial(Albany: SUNY Press,

1998), pp. 129-64, at p. 137; and Pessoa et al., Theory, democracy, and the Left, 15.

At times, Laclau and his commentators continue to treat antagonism as the limit of

objectivity, though. Dislocation may also be said to be a discursive construction

because it depends on the discursive construction of what is dislocated and of what

dislocates, cf. Laclau, Glimpsing the future, p. 319; and T. B. Dyrberg, The Circular

Structure of Power: Politics, Identity, Community (London: Verso, 1997), pp. 146-8.

34 N. Widder, Whats lacking in the lack: a comment on the virtual,Angelaki 5 (3)

(2000), p. 133 (note 23). For the argument that we need to distinguish dislocation and

antagonism and understand the latter as merely one way among others to construct

identities, see A. J. Norval, Frontiers in question,Filozofski vestnik18 (2) (1997),

pp. 51-75; and U. Stheli, Competing figures of the limit: dispersion, transgression,

antagonism, and indifference, in S. Critchley and O. Marchart (eds),Laclau: A

Critical Reader, pp. 226-40 (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 234-9.

35 Laclau, Glimpsing the future, pp. 318f.

36 G. Bowman, A Country of Words: Conceiving the Palestinian Nation from the

Position of Exile, in E. Laclau, (ed), The Making of Political Identities (London:

Verso, 1994), p. 156.37Ibid., pp. 143, 155.

38 In Social Ambiguity and the Crisis of Apartheid, in E. Laclau (ed.), The Making

of Political Identities (London: Verso, 1994), pp. 121f, 127, 131f, Aletta Norval does

to the South African apartheid regime what Bowman does to the imagined Palestinian

nation. Norval shows how, despite a seemingly clear antagonistic frontier dividing

South African society into two camps, there are, in fact, criss-crossing frontiers. These


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competing frontiers not only undermine the stability and clarity of any particular

frontier. When suppressed, they return as discursive heterogeneity or as, in Norvals

terms, ambiguity and indeterminate elements.39 S. Barros and G. Castagnola, The political frontiers of the social: Argentine

politics after Peronist populism (1955-1973), in D. Howarth, A. J. Norval, and Y.

Stavrakakis (eds),Discourse theory and political analysis, pp. 24-37 (Manchester:

Manchester University Press, 2000), p. 35.

40Ibid. For Laclau and Mouffes formulation of the same, seeHegemony and

Socialist Strategy, p. 136.

41 The argument here about antagonism and heterogeneity could also be applied to

Laclaus notions of myth and imaginary used by Barros and Castagnola. Laclau,New

Reflections, pp. 61-8.

42 Laclau, Paul de Man and the politics of rhetoric, 156. See also ibid., 154; Laclau,

Politics, polemics and academics, 103; Laclau, Identity and hegemony, pp. 72, 77;

and Laclau, Can immanence explain social struggles?, 5. For an ambiguous

characterisation of heterogeneity, see Laclau, Democracy between autonomy and

heteronomy, p. 382.

43 Pessoa et al., Theory, democracy, and the Left, 9f; Laclau, Democracy between

autonomy and heteronomy, pp. 381f; and Laclau, On Populist Reason, chapter 5.44 P. Stallybrass, Marx and heterogeneity: thinking the Lumpenproletariat,

Representations 31 (1991): pp. 69-95.

45 Laclau, Democracy between Autonomy and Heteronomy, p. 381.

46 G. Bataille, The Psychological Structure of Fascism, trans. F. Botting and S.

Wilson, in F. Botting and S. Wilson (eds), The Bataille Reader(Oxford: Blackwell,


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36

1997), p. 122. It is tendential homogeneity, though, cf. ibid. For Laclaus use of

Bataille, see Laclau, On Populist Reason, chapter 5.

47

Ibid., pp. 123.48Ibid., p. 126. See also ibid., pp. 125, 146 (note 3).

49Ibid., p. 126.

50Ibid., p. 127. In addition to these things, Bataille refers to the unconscious, the

sacred, and affect, cf. ibid., pp. 126-8.

51Ibid., pp. 126f.

52 J. Derrida,Margins of Philosophy, trans. A. Bass (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf,

1982), pp. 12, 25f.

53Ibid., pp. 125, 140, 142.

54 Stallybrass, Marx and Heterogeneity, pp. 79ff.

55 Heterogeneity can also be expressed in terms of the irreducible gap between what is

represented (the absent fullness of the community, an absent universality) and the

means of representation (a particular signifier). It refers simultaneously to a lack (the

particular signifier is never quite up to the task) and an excess (the empty signifier is

only tendentially empty because it contains too much difference).

56 Laclau and Mouffe,Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, pp. 105, 110.

57

Ibid., p. 111.58Ibid., pp. 111 and 146 (note 20).

59 Norval, Frontiers in question; and M. Freeden,Ideologies and Political Theory: A

Conceptual Approach (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 89-91.

60 A. Tanesini, In search of community: Mouffe, Wittgenstein and Cavell,Radical

Philosophy 110 (2001), 12-19.


38/38

37

61 See her contributions in Butler, Laclau and iek, Contingency, Hegemony,

Universality.

62

Widder, Whats lacking in the lack; W. E. Connolly, Review essay: twilight of

the idols,Philosophy and Social Criticism 21:3 (1995), 130-6. For the political

implications, see Tnder and Thomassen (eds),Radical Democracy. For the

implications of the argument about heterogeneity for radical democracy and

exclusion, see Thomassen, In/exclusions.

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