Essay the Coming of Glasnost and the End of the Cold War

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University of Greenwich

School of Social Science

Methodology Unit

(MA)

Essay:

“Prior to the coming of glasnost and the end of the

Cold War the study of Soviet policy raised serious

methodological problem for Western scholars.”

What were these problems and to what degree have

they been resolved?

Abdisalam M Issa-Salwe

September 1996



Contents

1. Introduction -------------------------------------------------------------------------1

2. The Cold War Era ------------------------------------------------------------------2

3. The Ideological Biased Tools -----------------------------------------------------3

4 Soviet: Information Control -------------------------------------------------------4

4.1 Publishing and Censorship---------------------------------------------------------6

4.2 Propaganda and Its Influence------------------------------------------------------7

4.3 Testing Peoples’ Mood ------------------------------------------------------------8

4.4 Data Manipulation------------------------------------------------------------------8

5. Glasnost and Information Control ------------------------------------------------11

5.1 The Burden of the Past-------------------------------------------------------------13

6. The Foundations For A New Era In Soviet Scholarship -----------------------13

7. Conclusions -------------------------------------------------------------------------15

References------------------------------------------------------------------------------------16

Tables:

Table 1: Growth rate estimates, 1965-1985----------------------------------------------9

Table 2: Soviet economic growth, 1951-1985 -------------------------------------------10



List of Abbreviations

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

GNP Gross National Product

KGB The Soviet Unions secret service.

CPSU Communist Party of the Supreme Soviet



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1. Introduction

Traditionally, Russians were secretive people. In Tsarist times not only military but

also quite harmless social information was withheld from the population as well from

foreigners. In fact in recent years it has become even more obvious how much of pre-

Revolutionary Russia there was in Soviet thought, emotions, and basic attitudes. The

Soviet Union, and Tsarist Russia before, had been secretive, unaccountable political

regimes. Many Western students of Soviet affairs had problems getting statistical data

or on how to get information from the Soviet Union.

West and East had also great influence on the study of Soviet policy. Western

perceptions of the Soviet Union distorted by an approach which focused on the

ideological function of the state, thus, neglecting other aspects of the Soviet life.

Western journalists have generally been compelled to live within a separate foreigners’

compound and operate under great restrictions. This fear was not only based on their

paranoia for being spied, but control information concerning many important aspect of

the Soviet Union. For example, Soviet official statistics, until recently, left out whole

areas of social and economic life, from crime and mortality rates to balance of payment

and road accident data (White, 1992c: 76). However, with the advent of Gorbachev’s

accession to power, things began changing in the Soviet Union. From the outset

Gorbachev committed himself to a policy of openness or glasnost.

This changing environment geared a new situation where students of Soviet affairs

could re-evaluate Soviet studies. What were the obstacle which faced the Western

political analysts studying Soviet studies? How this development came about and how

it was shaped will be the theme of this essay.

To examine the reason behind these problems it is important to look both the internal

factors how government controlled and manipulated information and the

methodological faults which hampered the study of Soviet policy. Without the help of

one to the other, it is difficult to imagine to explore the said difficulties.



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It is important to look also other elements which influenced the East/West relationship

which hampered or contaminated the study of Soviet policy.

2. The Cold War Era

The main element of the Cold War of the two post-war superpowers lied in the mutual

hostility and fears of the protagonist. This animosity had its roots in their several

historical and political differences as they were strongly stimulated by the myths which

at times turned hostility into hatred (Calvocoressi: 1991: 23; Kissinger, 1994).

In Soviet Union eyes the West was inspired by capitalist valued which aimed the

destruction of the Soviet Union and the annihilation of communism by any means

available but above all by force or the threat of irresistible force. In West eyes the

Soviet Union was dedicated to the subjugation of Europe and the world for itself and

for the communism and was capable of achieving, or at least initiating, this destructive

and evil course by armed abetted by subversion. Both judgement were dramatised by

the lack of understanding towards each others’ historical and political backgrounds

(Ibid: 3; Kissinger, 1994: 201). The acceleration of hostility was fed by growing

tension between the West and East in the early years which followed the Second Word

War. The Cold War protagonists sough to extend their influence of sphere.

Following World War Two western European countries were in a state of physical

and economic collapse. The European economic and military powers were reduced to

rubble by the effect of the war. The only real powers who began victors out of the war

were the Soviet Union and the United States a as they both enjoyed immense

superiority over other contenders (Roberts, p.525).

In July 1944, representatives of the Western countries established an international

economic system which gave the United States, which was the strongest economic

country, the role to assume the primary responsibility for establishing a post-war

economic order. This followed an economic aid program, known as Marshall Plan,

which was offered to all Europe. The offer included also Soviet Union, however,





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historians. Again these new school did not differ much from the ‘totalitarian school’ as

they also focused to the state and the state-run political and economy.

By focusing on the state, probably as the sole actor, may have obstructed other

important factors, e.i. the complex social fabric of the USSR. A political system

without a social one is difficult to imagine. Furthermore, the interrelation of society

and culture with the economy, the state, and the party lost focus (or remained

unexplored). In Lewin opinion, what had been missing was “... the conceptualization

of a dynamic historical process in which all the subsystems interacts in time and space,

yielding ever more complex and intricate pattern.” (Ibid: 5). Lewin goes further by

reiterating that because Soviet society has not been studied in all its manifestation, the

Soviet historical and political experience continues to be poorly understood. (Ibid: 5).

“Until broadened perspective enter into Western thinking about the USSR, constant

and costly errors of judgement will be made” concludes Lewin.

Leading Western sovietologiests represented by Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel

Huntington, focused more the kind on the top of the hierarchy or the “oligarchy” as is

commonly known. Observations confined to the hierarchy could yield fruitful analysis

for researchers. This approach, commonly also obscured Jerry Houg’s perceptive

discussion of institutional pluralism (Ibid: 103).

4. Soviet: Information Control

The quality of public information had steadily deteriorated over the Brezhnev period as

problem after problem was ‘resolved’ by simply discontinuing the publication of

information about it. The census in 1959, for example, which was published in sixteen

volumes in 1962-63, was reduced to one in 1979. The first official statistical

handbook, published annually since 1956, which in the beginning was composed of

more than 880 pages, in 1980 reduced to less than six hundred pages (White, 1992c:

85). Statistics were manipulated, e.g. the rise in alcohol consumption was disguised by

merging the figures for sales of drink with those of foodstuff.



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A Soviet political analysts trying to write the political history of his country could face

insurmountable difficulties. He could not write about the 1930s as access to the

archives was minimal. Neither could he write about the post-war period because some

leaders feared it would be critical of their leadership. The ideal history book was one

which mentioned no names. For example, in a television interview in December 1987,

Andrei Voznezenski drew attention to a book published in that year which managed

not to mention either Khrushchev or Brezhnev and there was hardly anything about

Stalin. Instead of writing about substance, many historians engaged in methodology

(Laqueur, 1989: 56).

A member of the Estonian Academy of Science writing in Izvestiia compared Soviet

historians with arithmaticians who knew the solution from the beginning and worked

their way back (Laqueur, 1989: 57). A group of high-level agricultural experts were

arrested on Stalin’s order in 1931 and accused of political conspiracy (Laqueur, 1989:

59) after it was believed that they attempted to publish a survey they made on the

country’s agricultural output. Their survey was feared by the regime, and the only way

to stop its publications was to arrest them on false charges and thus undermining their

findings.

Other branches of knowledge which Stalin had suppressed included political sociology

as sociologists tended to “seek out problems”. In the 1960s some sociologists had

cautiously begun to reassert the importance of sociology. In 1968 the Academy of

Science created an Institute for Concrete Sociological Research and Rumiantsev as its

director. Social surveys appeared on many subjects, but before long, Rumiantsev had

been sacked and the adjective ‘concrete’ disappeared from the institute’s title (Keep,

1995: 279).

Political science (politologiia) which was called previously “state and law” itself

implied a privileged subject or discipline which only party sympathisers could venture

to write about.



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4.1 Publishing and Censorship

Although in modern world the press has an important role to play, the Soviet Union

used it primarily for spreading its political ideologies. This was true even in tsarist

Russia. To curb competing ideology or rival political ideas from within or outside,

they introduced censorship which shaped the characteristics of the Soviet press in the

following decades (Kenez, 1985: 22).

Russian censorship was as old as educated public opinion. In the 1860s, at the time of

the great reforms, the harsh censorship laws were ameliorated somewhat.

Nevertheless, the regulations of 1865, which remained in force until the 1905

Revolution, prescribed precensorship, from which only certain categories of printed

materials were exempted. Publishers of book and some newspapers and journals

required the censure's approval only after printing (Ibid: 32). The Ministry of the

Interior periodically sent out a list of subjects that could not be discussed. For

example, V. M. Doroshevic, a well-known journalist of the period, complained that his

paper, Rash Slovo (The Russian word) had to hire a specialist to keep up with the over

13,000 copies dealing with forbidden matters (Kenez, 1985: 22).

The government justified their action by arguing that this would protect people from

subversive ideas. It followed from this paternalistic attitude that the Soviet

government was most vigilant in censoring material aimed at a mass audience.

The Soviet leadership feared that allowing freedom for private enterprise in the trade

and production of books would cause ideological and therefore political damage. The

state system was geared toward regulation and control.

The KGB maintained its own research network, as it had infiltrates among the student

and institution's staff. Academics who showed an independent spirit would be denied

promotion or the ‘privilege’ of attending scholarly conferences abroad (Keep,

1995:280-1). Their research and findings would be delayed or prevented from being

published. The most obstreperous would be summoned before a meeting and would

be forced to retract their opinions. One of the leading academic dissidents was Andrei



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Sakharov who was denied receiving the Nobel Peace Prize which he was conferred in

1975. Sakharov became a symbol of the Democratic movement which sprang up later

in the Soviet Union.

4.2 Propaganda and Its Influence

Propaganda is more than the attempt to transmit social and political values in the hope

of affecting people’s thinking, emotions, and thereby behaviour. They include

manipulating and distorting information, lying, and preventing others from finding out

the truth.

The Soviet state was more permeated with propaganda than any other. One of the

unusual elements was the attitude of the communist leaders toward indoctrination.

The Bolshevik regime was the first to set itself propaganda goals through political

education to aim to create a “new humanity suitable for living in a new society”

(Kenez, 1985: 4). The origins of these institutions, and to a considerable extent the

mentality of their leaders have their roots to during the difficult days of the Civil War.

To fight back against their enemies, the Bolsheviks created an massive propaganda

apparatus to indoctrinate the Soviet people. In spite that many observers believed that

the indoctrination campaign failed to achieve their purpose, they were impressed by the

Soviet method.

Soviet propagandists depicted their society in terms of mechanistic images as they

portrayed the Party as a motivator and engine which provided society the force

necessary for change and development. Ideas generated by the Party come in the

“masses” by “transmissions belts”. These transmission belts were the mass

organisations such as the trade unions, the Zhenotdel, and the Komsomol (Kenez,

1985: 84). In the eyes of the Soviet leaders, publishing had a far greater importance

than any other mass media. They considered books the chief vehicle of culture, and

the printed word as an essential method of propaganda.

4.3 Testing Peoples’ Mood



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In June 1983 the CPSU Central Committee approved the establishment of a national

opinion poll centre, based at the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Science. In

the event it was not until 1988 that the All-Union Institute for the Study of Public

Opinion (VTsIOM) was established in Moscow under the auspices of the trade union

council and the State Committee on Labour and Social Question. The polls covered a

wide range of topics, from assessments of work organisation to the future of

perestroika, and individual members of leadership.

However, the reasons for sanctioning public opinion polls was of narrow scope as

these was mainly for the party chief to know how people lived and what they thought.

Questionnaires were also limited to particular subject away from such issues as

people’s opinion about the government.

To find out public responses to perestroika studies were made as new advanced and

techniques of opinion polling were introduced during 1980s. The first reasonable

representative surveys were carried out in the 1960s, particularly through the youth

newspaper Komsomol’skaya pravda. Its findings, however, were based upon the

written responses of readers. The surveys of later years were based to a greater extent

upon professionally conducted polling.

4.4 Data Manipulation

By looking at the record of Soviet economic management one can find a very

impressive achievement. Russia in 1913 was a backward country by the standards of

other European countries. The overwhelming majority of the Russian people were

engaged in agriculture, and only a quarter of them were able to read and write (White,

1992c: 104).

It took only seventy years for USSR to become one of world’s economic superpowers,

with a level of industrial production that was exceeded only by that of the United

States. According to official sources, Soviet national income increased 149 time

between 1917 and 1987, and over 18 times between 1940 and 1987. The rate of



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growth between the late 1920s and 1950s and was 6 per cent a year. National income,

58 per cent of that of the United States in 1960, increased to 67 per cent. Industrial

production increased to more than 80 per cent, and agricultural production was about

85 per cent of the US total. Soviet industrial production, about 3 per cent of the

global total in 1917, had increased to about 20 per cent by 1987. The USSR by this

date produced more than the whole world had done in 1950 (White, 1992c: 104-6).

Although the USSR did make very impressive development, it cannot be proved that

the figures were genuine. It is difficult to make any real assessment as the data

available for analysis have been open to manipulation and distortion.

Table 1. (White, 1992c: 106)

The figures tend to exaggerate the true level of Soviet achievement. One of the

striking issues are that it left out the growth of population, about 0.9 per cent annually

during these years. According to a highly controversial reassessment of official figures

published by the economists Vasilii Selyunin and Grogorii Khanin in early 1987, taking

such faction into account Soviet national income from 1928 to 1985 increased six to

seven times (White, 1992c: 106; Keep, 1995: 223). Selyunin and Khanin showed how

officials had wilfully manipulated and falsified data, creating of what Keep called “veil

of illusions” to conceal the contradictory reality (Keep, 1995: 223).

Western observers had always to adjust published Soviet figure to reassess Soviet

situation. In such situation for a Western researcher this may not help.

Other obstacle included the dissimilarity of the structure of Soviet scholarship to that

of the West. In the Soviet Union many disciplines were neglected or dismantled by

Stalin. Only recently have some disciplines begun to develop subfields. For example,

sociology has begotten a variety of subfields such the sociology of knowledge, of law,



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of culture, of art, parallel to those practised in the West (Lewin, 1989: 86-7). In such

a situation it would have been a difficult task for scholars to read Soviet studies.

Table 2:

(Keep, 1995: 223)

A large share of Soviet GNP was allocated to investment and by 1980 this had reached

33 per cent, although the annual rate of increase was slower than it had been earlier:

less than 3 per cent against 7.6 per cent in 1965/70. Much of it went on defence

(Keep, 1995: 222-3).

Exactly how much went to the defence expenditure cannot be assessed as this matter

was a contentious issue, which at one time led to a cold war between Western

intelligence experts as well as between the superpowers. In 1967 the CIA revised its

estimate upwards to 12-13 per cent of GNP (1970) and put the annual increase at 4-5

per cent (Ibid: 223).

The evolution of Soviet social science in the last two decades is a manifestation of

deep structural change. Social science was not accorded the same prestige as the

natural science (Lewin, 1988: 85-6). Social scientists were handicapped by numerous

restrictions on the kinds of topics deemed fit for investigation and publication.

Another problem which this branch of science met was the scarcity of raw material

such as social statistics which in the vaults of the Statistical Agency. In the opinion of

one author, such data were not accounted as social statistics (Ibid: 86). Only with

special permission by the security authority could one access such data.

Tatiana Zaslavkaia, an outspoken sociologist and member of the Academy of Science

published an article in Pravda in February 1987 criticising the restriction of the debate



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about Soviet social problems without theoretical reflection and explanation. She

claimed that if sociology is to help “unearth the root causes of complex social

problem”, sociologists must “not be blocked by signs reading ‘Enter to Strangers

Forbidden’” (Lewin, 1988: 86-7).

5. Glasnost and Information Control

Glasnost which meant self-criticism aimed to reduce the ever-widening gap between

words and deed. However, for the Russian intelligentsia glasnost was a spiritual event

of enormous importance, a breath of fresh air after decades of stifling censorship. For

many other Russians it was an important device to let off steam, to give vent to their

frustration. Largely the story of glasnost was the account of the revelation of

shortcomings and failures in the recent political history of the Soviet Union.

As any new social or political development has its pro and cons, glasnost has enemies.

In March 1987 Yegor Ligachev, a one time a Central Committee Secretary and

Politburo member, said that the re-examination of history should emphasise above all

the “period of the triumph of socialist construction.” (Laqueur, 1989: 250). He

emphasised that history should provide an “honest and open look back,” and not a

“portrait of our history as a series of continuos mistakes and disappointment.” (Ibid:

250).

In June 1986 Gorbachev told a group of leading writers that one of the aspects still

off-limits to glasnost was the Soviet past. He argued that “If we start to deal with the

past, we’ll dissipate all our energy. It would be like hitting the people over the head.

We’ll have to go forward. Eventually we’ll sort out the past and put everything in its

place. But right now we have to put our energy forward” (Laqueur, 1989:53). What

Gorbachev was picturing was that the Soviet history did not portray the full truth

about the country. But before the Soviet Union begins to tackle this the past, it has to

face the present and the future.

In spite of this perhaps honest reiterating, what this meant was postponing the

historical debate for some decades as such debate would stir up many passions and



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would produce a great deal of dirty linen. Opponents of glasnost argued that it could

mirror the negative view of Russian history as this could have destroyed the mythology

of great achievements which had been constructed over many decades (Laqueur, 1989:

53).

However, because of the new mood it seemed impossible to keep the past out

altogether from the new development. By February 1987 Gorbachev seemed to have

reached the conclusion that glasnost should also be extended to Soviet history and to

the academic as well. The statistical administration was named as the USSR State

Statistics Committee (White, 1992c: 86). Glasnost led to change also in the creative

arts and literature, cinema, television and political fiction writings. The work of émigré

writers of various generations also began to be published in local papers.

The call for glasnost made little impression on Soviet academics during 1985 and

1986. There were no major changes in the professional literature. Soviet academics

either thought that there was no need for revelations or, more likely, having no clear

lead from party authorities, they preferred to wait and see. However, the initiative of

confronting the past was taken up by professionals like journalists, filmmakers,

playwrights and novelists (Laqueur, 1989: 56).

With the advent of Gorbachev a new approach to the provision of information began

to emerge. It was not only Soviet academics who were cautious about the events

which led to glasnost, even some Sovietologists counselled prudence not to oversell it,

as détente had been oversold in the early 1970s which gave way to a bitter

disappointment later.

5.1 The Burden of the Past

The difficulties of accepting true glasnost were nowhere more obvious than in science.

For many decades the leadership of the CPSU had found it impossible to come to term

with its own past. For example, the writing of Soviet history under Stalin “wasn’t

history, but wrote something completely different.” (Quoted in Laqueur, 1989: 52).

This has changed since Stalin, but not very much. Professor Yuri Afanasiev, head of



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the state institute of historical archives, reiterates, “As far as coming to terms with

Stalinism is concerned were are still living under Stalinism even though we are saying

that were are living in a great time” (Laqueur, 1989: 52). Afanasiev was criticised by

several colleagues for distorting facts and providing comfort to anti-Marxist. Those in

Afanasiev’s favour was usually non-academics as leading academics and heads of

institutions preferred to stay out of the debate (Ibid: 59-60). Why so? They knew

from long experience that in their field silence was golden (Ibid: 60). All important

development and new revelations, e.i. about the purges and trials come not from

the leading academics but from journalists.

6. The Foundations For A New Era In Soviet Scholarship

With the advent of Gorbachev coming to power, a new approach to the provision of

information began to emerge. Influential researchers laid the foundations for a new era

in Soviet scholarship. This followed the creation of institutional settings such as

academic institutions which promoted quantity and quality of research in political

studies and its sister discipline.

However, things did not begin to ease as it was hoped. In spite the collapse of the

Soviet Union, there are still some restrictions which can pose obstacles to scholars.

In 1987 the Politburo appointed a special committee to examine a list of books which

were kept in sections not open to the public. These books are believed to number

hundreds of thousands. The following year the committee released only those books

believed sympathetic to Communism. The list excluded books by critics of the

Bolsheviks, the Mensheviks, the Socialist Revolutionaries as well as books published

outside the Soviet Union (Laqueur, 1989: 300)

In 1988 a law was introduced which covered access to archives. The decisions of how

to deal with declassification of a document were left to the head of the institution

concerned. Documents in the archives of the ministries of foreign affairs, foreign



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trade, the Communist Party, the army and the KGB are still not all easily accessible to

foreign researcher.

Recently, changes began to shape Soviet social science fields. Influential researchers

laid the foundations for a new era in Soviet scholarship. The creation of a more solid

institutional setting such as academic institutions improved schooling and promoted the

quantity and quality of research in social science. One of the most pioneering

enterprises and reform-oriented intelligentsia is the monthly review Sotsiologicheskie

Issledovaniia (Sociological Inquiries) which addressed a readership beyond the

professional public (Lewin, 1988: 87-8). It published research findings (published and

unpublished), book reviews, material written by sociologists, philosophers, historians,

and artists. Another field which is in development is political science (politologiia)

which was previously called “state and law”. This new development is beneficial for

Soviet study students.

It is worth mentioning a newly founded branch called system analysis which came

under one of the branches of the Academy of Science. This new field became

beneficial to all the social sciences as it supplies useful analytical tools to its sister

disciplines (Lewin, 1988: 90). By promoting a different ontological conception,

system analysis uses language largely untainted by conventional ideological jargon.

This approach enabled its researcher and theoreticians to confront problems that still

face natural science.

When presenting different laws of system, for example, the system analyst can explain

that “laws do exist in social system, but that, as in the natural science, these laws are

conceptualised as being irregular...” (Lewin, 1988: 90). System analysis helps to

surmount the dogmatic hurdles that once made serious thinking impossible.

7. Conclusions

To do field research such conducting poll or survey was impossible for the western

scholar. On the other hand, scarcity of Soviet statistical data in the West libraries or in

the Soviet Union was exasperated by other methodological problems. They could not



15

rely on the official data on one hand, on the other hand they could not carry out

research in the Soviet Union because of various restrictions. There was always

suspicious of the activities of Western researchers.

Available data could help the scholars do some assessment (Manheim and Rich, 1981).

However, data were being manipulate and distorted, which further could confuse and

undermine the result. For example, according to some Western studies the impact of

the great purge of the 1930s had been greatly exaggerated although it had affected the

upper and middle echelons of the party. Now under glasnost it became known that life

did not go on as usual, that there was a climate of general fear, that, in fact, more

people disappeared, temporarily or forever, than had been commonly assumed

(Laqueur, 1989: 241)

In spite of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new state from the

rubble, it is yet difficult for the Western scholar to study either the former Soviet

Union or Russia. As Russia took the mantle of the Soviet Union, partially, it is

information attitude still reminiscent of the defunct Soviet state.

On the other hand, some of discipline or discipline subfield we have in the West are not

found in Russia today as they are still in the developing stage embryonic stage.

Nevertheless, the evolution of Soviet social science in the last two decades is already

reshaping Soviet studies which turn will resolve the methodological problem.



16

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