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Escaping competition and competency traps: identifying how innovative
search strategy enables market entry*
Benjamin Balsmeier a, Gustavo Manso b and Lee Fleming b
a) ETH, Zurich, Switzerland
b) University of California, Berkeley, USA
December 2016
Abstract: Innovation is usually assumed to be a crucial component of firm performance, yet the
optimal strategy and progression from invention to performance remains unclear and poorly
identified empirically. Likewise the idea of a fundamental tradeoff between exploration and
exploitation has been extremely influential, however, the stages and causal linkages between
search strategy and performance have not been established. We first demonstrate that a variety of
simple patent based measures clearly load onto exploration and exploitation principal
components and illustrate the temporal relationship between exploration and new market entry.
To identify the effect of innovative strategy on entry and successful entry, we rely on exogenous
shocks that precede exploration (non-compete enforcement switch) and exploitation (anti-
takeover regulatory reform). Using these exogenous shocks with different and opposite
mechanisms but consistent effects on market entry, we isolate one pathway from invention to
performance and demonstrate how exploration enables market entry and increased sales in new
markets. Exploration strategies appear less effective
technology space; closeness in market space appears to have no effect on the impact of
technology strategy.
Keywords: Exploration, Exploitation, Patents, Innovation, Strategy, Market Entry, Experiment
* The authors thank Guan Cheng Li for invaluable research assistance. We gratefully acknowledge financial support
from The Coleman Fung Institute for Engineering Leadership, the National Science Foundation (1360228), and the
1
Introduction
According to much popular press, we live in a knowledge economy and an age of innovation.
Academic research has only begun, however, to establish how the invention of technology and
innovative search strategy influences firm performance. Our current understanding of the
relationship comes mainly from economics, finance, and strategy. Griliches (1984) built a log
linear model of physical and intangible assets to estimate the value of a patent to be about
$200,000; Kogan and co-authors (forthcoming) built an event study that implies a median value
of $3.2 million in 1982 dollars. At the portfolio level, Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005) found
a positive correlation with and future citations; past innovative efficiency (as measured
by patents/R&D dollar, see Hirschleifer, Hsu, and Li 2013) or R&D performance (Cohen,
Diether, and Malloy 2013) predict abnormal returns. Firms search locally (Stuart and Podolny
1996) and enter markets more proximal to their current technological capabilities and experience
(Silverman 1991, Nerkar and Roberts 2004, Helfat and Lieberman 2002). Greater innovation
capabilities facilitate entry and competition decreases entry (de Figueiredo and Kyle, 2006,
Cockburn and MacGarvie 2011). Modularity aids innovation when not taken to extremes
(Schilling 2017); similarly, moderate exploration, as measured by text analysis of news articles,
correlates with financial performance (Uotila et al. 2009). At the risk of over simplification,
innovation appears to improve future performance, tends to build cumulatively on past
innovation and success
Research opportunity persists, however, in at least three areas. First, there is probably no single
path through applied research, product development,
manufacturing, marketing, distribution, sales, and ultimately financial success; many
contingent paths probably exist, some better than others, and successful journeys may well
branch and recombine a variety of intermediate strategies. Theory that jumps directly from
invention to performance misses this nuance, complexity, and variety of successful strategy
combinations. Second, much work proceeds empirically and regresses financial outcomes
directly on patent and citation counts. Better measures could capture intermediate richness and
outcomes and motivate more nuanced theory. Third, little work separates the endogeneity of
strategy choice from the impact of the choice. This is particularly important for a field where the
object of study is fundamentally wrapped up with numerous unobservable variables; while it is
2
easy to download patent data and measures of firm performance, it remains very difficult to
observe and measure the decision processes and wealth of inside information that went into the
strategy process and choices.
We begin to address these issues by 1) focusing on the link between search strategy, market
entry, and performance, 2) developing a principal components method that operationalizes
measures, and
3) using two exogenous experiments to isolate and identify the impact of exploration vs.
exploitation strategies on new market entry and performance. First demonstrating how eight
basic measures of patent portfolios load 79% of their variance onto two components, we present
lagged regression models that illustrate the temporal relationship of innovative search strategy
and new product market entry (exploration correlates positively with entry, exploitation
correlates negatively, and both effects weaken with time). To strengthen causal inference, we
use two exogenous shifts, in labor markets and governance, namely, the passage of the Michigan
Anti-trust Reform Act of 1985 and anti-takeover regulations and (we refer to these as MARA
and ATO, respectively). MARA moved firms towards more exploration and ATO moved them
towards more exploitation. Their mechanisms were different; for MARA it appears that
inventors moved into new technical fields, both within and across firms (Arts and Fleming,
2016), and possibly because firms undertook more risky research and development (for evidence
of the effect from changes in Texas and Florida but not Michigan law, see Conti, 2014); for ATO
we conjecture that opportunities for selling the firm declined and that the market pressure for
novelty decreased. Despite differences in mechanisms, however, the result of exploration on new
market entry is consistent and strong; MARA induced a 0.202 point increase in the exploration
measure that resulted in a 42% increase in the propensity to enter a new market, while ATO
induced a 0.105 point decrease that resulted in a -14.9% decrease in entry. Sales in new markets
changed in a similar manner. While the exogenous push towards exploration appears to have
been less beneficial for firms which had been operating in more crowded technological space, it
appears to have been Results remain robust
across correlations, instrumental variables, and differences in differences models.
3
Innovation Strategy and Performance
Invention and innovation are often modeled as a search process (March and Simon 1958). (Here
we adopt the typical convention of referring to raw patents and technology as invention and the
commercialization of such as innovation; search strategy encompasses the choices and processes
of both invention and innovation.) Individuals, groups, or firms search for novel and creative
solutions to problems or societal and market needs. Novelty is often defined as a new
combination of things, ideas, or processes (one can call these the components of recombination
see Gilfillan 1935, Schumpeter 1942, and Henderson and Clark 1990). To the extent that a
searcher combines familiar and well-understood and previously used components, they search
locally and exploit; to the extent that they use less familiar or previously unused components or
recombine them in new ways, they pursue distant search and explore. Exploitation is more
certain and likely to pay off and pay off sooner, though rewards may be smaller and incremental;
exploration is risky, more likely to fail completely or discover a breakthrough, and take longer to
bring to fruition. Local search is more accessible but ultimately often leads the searcher to a
competency trap and strands them on a local maximum (March 1991).
If this model of search is correct, it presents firms with a strategic and fundamental conundrum.
On the one hand, they can explore new areas of technology, for example, by hiring outside of
their current expertise, acquiring firms from new industries, and funding speculative projects that
seek breakthroughs in new areas. The reward to such a strategy will probably be a more skewed
distribution of outcomes, with a lower mean and more complete failures and breakthroughs. On
the other hand, the firm can stick to its knitting, refine current trajectories, and build on its
current expertise. The rewards to this strategy will be quicker and more assured successes, and
fewer completely failed projects, though also fewer breakthroughs. Ultimately it may also trap
the firm on a local maximum and competency trap.
While this model should generalize to a variety of search strategies, we focus on one obvious
path, namely, from invention to new market entry and competitive conditions for success with
that entry. Firms can enter new markets with a variety of strategies, for example, re-labeling an
existing product from an existing market, foreign expansion using extant products, superior
manufacturing and/or distribution, or acquisition, however, we focus on new technology based
4
entry. The hypothesis is simple; firms that explore will develop new technologies that provide
the opportunity to build new products, differentiated at least from their current product line and
possibly This capability will enable and facilitate entry and
should be observed in an increased probability of entry and number of new markets that are
entered - assuming that managers see value and pursue such a strategy. If the strategy succeeds,
one would expect sales from ne in new
markets to increase. Exploration on average should move the firm further away from other
firms, as it enables differentiation with new to the world products; it is less likely that new
technology capabilities will precede follower entry strategies.
One would also expect reactions from competitors that would lessen the benefits of exploration
and market entry (Wang and Shaver 2016), especially when other competitors have similar
portfolios of technologies. (Stuart
and Podolny 1996; Aharonson and Schilling 2016) and the focal firm resides in a crowded
technological neighborhood, the appropriability and effectiveness of an exploration strategy will
decrease, for a variety of reasons. This occurs because competitors can understand and respond
to the exploration strategy more easily due to more similar absorptive capacities (Cohen and
Levinthal 1990). Knowledge transfer will be easier, from diffusion of patents, papers, and other
codified knowledge, and from personnel transfer, as poached employees can more readily
suffuse their prior knowledge from the exploring firms to competitors. As a result, we would
anticipate decreased efficacy for an exploration strategy on new market entry and performance,
for firms that pursue such a strategy from a crowded starting point in technology space. We
would also assume a negative effect of crowding in market space, defined as firms that operate in
a similar set of industries. We propose similar mechanisms, that firms with similar market
exploration strategy. We would also expect, however, that the market crowding effect would be
technical absorptive capacity that will enable and facilitate response.
5
Data and measures
The empirical analysis is based on all public US based firms that field at least one patent in a
given year between 1977 through 2001 as identified in the NBER patent data. Data on basic firm
characteristics comes from Compustat North America and market entry and sales from
Historic Segment File. Detailed information on each patent provides the raw
observations for our reduced measures exploration and exploitation, are taken from the United
States Patent and Trademark Office, the NBER patent database, and the Fung Institute database
at UC Berkeley (Balsmeier et al. 2016). Based on the year of application of a given patent, we
aggregate our measures to the firm level of analysis. As patent based measures have no obvious
value in case of non-patenting activity, the sample comprises only observations when a firm
applied for at least one patent in a given year (as such, the results do not generalize to firms
without a patentable innovation strategy). Table 1 shows the distribution of firm-year
observations over the sampling period.
Table 1 Frequency count of firm-year patent portfolio observations. Year Frequency Percent Cum.
1977 718 2.97 2.97
1978 718 2.97 5.94
1979 747 3.09 9.03
1980 756 3.13 12.16
1981 765 3.17 15.33
1982 770 3.19 18.52
1983 763 3.16 21.67
1984 783 3.24 24.91
1985 831 3.44 28.35
1986 832 3.44 31.8
1987 855 3.54 35.34
1988 873 3.61 38.95
1989 844 3.49 42.44
1990 877 3.63 46.07
1991 937 3.88 49.95
1992 1,024 4.24 54.19
1993 1,106 4.58 58.76
1994 1,191 4.93 63.69
1995 1,348 5.58 69.27
1996 1,315 5.44 74.71
1997 1,347 5.57 80.29
1998 1,323 5.48 85.76
1999 1,232 5.1 90.86
2000 1,141 4.72 95.58
2001 1,067 4.42 100
Total: 24,163 100
6
The increasing number of observations over time reflects the increase of patenting firms during
the sampling period. In order to limit selection in and out of the sample we require firms to be
observed at least 4 times (results remain robust to 2, 3, 5, 6 or 7 years as the threshold value).
The following eight patent portfolio characteristics are used to assess the direction of innovation
pursued by companies in terms of exploration and exploitation (further detail and
characterization of the data and measures are provided in Manso et al. 2016). Table 2 shows
summary statistics of these measures.
1. Number of patents that are filed in a 3-digit technology classes where the given firm has
never filed beforehand in that class.
2. Number of patents that are filed in a 3-digit technology classes where the given firm has
filed beforehand in that class.
3. Number of new technology classes entered where the given firm has never filed
beforehand in that class.
4. Technological proximity between the patents filed in year t and the existing patent
portfolio held by the same firm up to year t-1 (the normalized correlation between two
years of the proportion of activity in a given class, calculated according to Jaffe 1989).
5.
6. Number of prior art citations to patents held by the -
7. Number of claims a patent makes.
8. Average age of the inventor(s) mentioned on the patent document as calculated by the
database and the application year of a given patent.
7
Table 2 Summary statistics patent portfolio measures
Variable N mean Median sd min max
Patents 24163 34.26 4 137.2 1 4054
New tech classes entered 24163 2.539 1 4.559 0 89
Patents in new classes 24163 3.016 1 6.183 0 185
Patents in known classes 24163 31.25 3 134.4 0 4051
Technological proximity 24163 0.541 0.581 0.328 0 1
Av. age of inventors 24163 3.633 3.063 3.131 0 26
Backward citations 24163 331.0 41 1387 0 48540
Self-citations 24163 42.55 1 280.6 0 11413
Claims 24163 528.5 66 2357 1 85704
Patent stock 24163 312.7 23 1279 0 34942 Notes: This table reports summary statistics of patent portfolio variables used in the study. Patents is the total number of eventually
granted patents applied for in a given year. New classes entered is the number of technology classes where a firm filed at least one
patent but no other patent beforehand. Patents in new/known classes is the number of patents that are filed in classes where the
given firm has filed no/at least one other patent beforehand. Technological proximity is the technological proximity between the
patents filed in year t to the existing patent portfolio held by the same firm up to year t-1, calculated according to Jaffe (1989).
Average Age of inventors measures
patent database and the application year of a given patent. Backward citations is the total number of citations made to other patents.
Self-citations is the total number of cites to patents held by the same firm. Claims is the total number of claims on each patent.
Patent stock is the sum of all patents held by a given firm up to the year t-1.
To reduce the dimensions of these data, we run a principal components analysis based on the
eight variables (similar results are obtained with a count based approach, or running a PCA at the
patent level). Two components have an eigenvalue above one, suggesting that extracting two
components are sufficient to explain the joint variation of the variables of interest. It supports
mapping the theoretical focus of exploration vs. exploitation onto two dimensions of innovative
search.
The output shown in Tables 4 to 5 indicate that 79 percent of the joint variation of the eight
patent variables of interest can be explained by these two principal components. In order to
optimize the factor loadings and reflecting the idea that exploration and exploitation are two
distinct dimensions of innovative search, we apply a Varimax rotation of the two extracted
components (results are robust to other orthogonal rotations). Table 4 shows the corresponding
results and Table 5 shows how much and in which direction each variable loads on the two
components. Loadings below 0.2 are not shown for easier comparability. Patents in known
classes, technological proximity, inventor age, backward citations, self-backward citations, and
claims all positively load on component 1, from which we label component 1 as .
The number of new technology classes entered and patents in new to the firm technology classes
strongly and positively load on component two. Negatively related to component two is the
8
technological proximity and the age of the inventors. Consistent with characterizations that firms
are more likely to explore if we observe new technological areas, we label component 2 as
1
Tables 4 and 5 Principal Component Analysis
Component Variance Difference Proportion Cumulative
Comp1 4.02 1.72 0.50 0.50
Comp2 2.30 0.29 0.79
Notes: This table reports the results of a Principal Component Analysis after Varimax
Rotation. Only components with Eigenvalues above one are extracted. The 8 variables
that entered the PCA are: new classes entered, patents in new/known classes,
technological proximity, av. age of inventors, backward citations, self-citations, and
claims; all variables log-transformed.
Variable Comp1 Comp2 Unexplained
New tech classes entered 0.58 0.08
Patents in new classes 0.58 0.08
Patents in known classes 0.45 0.09
Technological proximity 0.39 -0.38 0.47
Backward citations 0.41 0.10
Self-citations 0.45 0.16
Claims 0.41 0.09
Av. age of inventors 0.31 -0.37 0.60
Notes: This table reports the results of a Principal Component Analysis after Varimax
Rotation. Only components with Eigenvalues above one are extracted. All variables
log-transformed. Variable definitions provided above.
Table 6 KMO test Variable KMO
New tech classes
entered 0.70
Patents in new classes 0.70
Patents in known classes 0.85
Technological proximity 0.86
Backward citations 0.92
Self-citations 0.89
Claims 0.89
Av. age of inventors 0.87
Overall 0.83
Notes: This table reports the Kaiser-Mayer-
Olkin (KMO) measures on sampling adaquacy.
All variables log-transformed. Variable
definitions provided above.
1 Measures of originality and generality (Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2001 - does the patent cite a wide variety of
classes and is it cited in turn by a wide variety) do not load on either of our components (neither at the firm nor
patent level). The measures do not map clearly to our theory; a patent could cite a wide variety of classes that had
could be citing a previously uncombined set of classes or a very commonly combined set of classes.
9
The Kaiser-Mayer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy, shown in Table 6, confirms that the
data can be summarized using a PCA analysis. The correlation between the two factors is 0.37.
While this correlation indicates that there are some firms working in areas that score high on
exploration and exploitation, the correlation is far from being perfect, implying substantial
independent variation. Figure 1 illustrates this by plotting the factor values of the exploration
component against the factor values of the exploitation component. Red lines represent the
median values of each component. In the multivariate empirical analyses below, the scores of the
exploration and exploration component, respectively, will be our main explanatory variables of
interest. In a simple robustness check (not shown) we find similar results when counting the
number of variables that score above or below the median value for each variable in a given year
(the score varies from 0 to +8, though the empirical range is 0 to +6).
Figure 1: Scatter Plot of PCA scores
Notes:
extracted from the Principal Component Analysis shown above. Red lines mark the
median values of each factor. 19% of the observations are each in the upper left and
lower right quadrants, 31% in each of the other quadrants.
reactions. In the current context of search this can be conceptualized and visualized as a
position in technological or market space (Stuart and Podolny 1996; Aghion et al. 2005,
Aharonson and Schilling 2016). The efficacy of a particular search strategy will depend on a
For example, if firms face competitors that are
-50
510
Explo
ita
tion
-4 -2 0 2 4 6Exploration
Exploitation vs Exploration Scores
10
active in the same technological or market areas, it might be harder for those firms to realize the
benefits from exploration as it may be easier for close competitors to anticipate or follow search
success.
To assess technology space empirically we calculate pairwise correlations between a given
(1989). Specifically, we calculate the technological proximity TP between each firm i and j at
time t as:
where is the fraction of firm i -digit CPC patent class k at
time t. To detect firms that compete closely in technological space we counted for each firm in a
given year how many other firms are close in technological space as measured by a TP score
higher than 0.95 (results are robust to alternatively taking 0.9 or higher thresholds)
positions in market space are calculated similarly with sales generated in 3-digit sales classes
instead of patents filed in 3-
s in market space.