Erwin Philosophy

8/12/2019 Erwin Philosophy

1/27

International Phenomenological Society

Review Essays: Psychoanalysis: Past, Present, and FutureAuthor(s): Edward ErwinSource: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 57, No. 3 (Sep., 1997), pp. 671-696Published by: International Phenomenological SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2953760.

Accessed: 23/02/2011 15:26

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at.http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless

you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you

may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at .http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ips..

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed

page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

International Phenomenological Societyis collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ipshttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2953760?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ipshttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ipshttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2953760?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ips


2/27

Philosophy and Phenomenological ResearchVol. LVII,No. 3, September 997

Psychoanalysis:Past,Present,andFutureEDWARD ERWINUniversity of Miami

OriginsIn thinking about the future of psychoanalysis, it may help to reflect aboutits past. Many believe that the field is now deeply troubled, n fact in a stateof serious decline. If they are right, how did this situation develop? WasFreud's researchprogramwithout promise from the start?Or, did he makesome importantdiscoveries,but laterveer off the correctpath?Or,aretoday'sproblems mainly practical,caused primarily by the reluctance of insurancecompaniesto payfor morethana few weeks of therapy?

On PatriciaKitcher'saccount,developedin her recent book (1992),1Freudstarted out reasonablywell, but laterwent wrong. His meta-psychology pro-pelled him in an interdisciplinarydirection, motivating him to develop acomplete science of the mindby drawingon material rombiology, psychol-ogy, history, and other disciplines. Although his attempt was only partlysuccessful, his failure to develop a scientificallysoundtheorywas not due towild speculationor pseudo-scientificbehavior. To the degree thathe did notsucceed, he failed largelybecause of his eclecticism combined with personalandinstitutionaldogmatism,andpartlybecause of badluck.

When Kitcher speaks of the interdisciplinary mpact of Freud's meta-psychology , she does not have in mind what other scholars do when theyuse the same term.They arereferring o a set of specific psychoanalyticsub-stantive doctrines,such as the claim that the mind is divided into an Id, Ego,and Superego.On the standardview, Freud held the meta-psychology to bespeculative:It could be abandonedor changed,as he noted, without oss orregretthe momentits inadequacyhas been proved (1925, S.E. XX: 32-33).The clinical theory,in contrast,was held by Freud to be solidly anchored nclinical observations.

This essay discusses some recent books on psychoanalysis written by philosophersincluding: P. Kitcher (1992), A. Grtinbaum 1993), D. Levy (1996), and R. Wollheim(1993).

REVIEW SSAY 671


3/27

Kitcherdoes not challengethe standardview of Freud'smeta-psychologyin so far as it applies to specific substantivedoctrines,but she arguesthat itis incomplete.The term meta-psychology ,she points out, is also used byFreudto denote a set of directives for constructinga scientific psychology(45). On this approach,psychic phenomenaare to be describedaccordingtothree aspects: the dynamic, the topographic,and the economic. Despite thelack of evidence for the specific substantivemeta-psychologicalhypotheses,therewas nothingobjectionable,Kitchernotes, aboutFreud's commitment ohis meta-psychologywhen construedas a set of directivesfor constructinganidealmentalscience.

On Kitcher's analysis,the search for dynamicforces, broadtopographicaldivisions, and economic principlesthat reflectedthe quantitativecharacterofbrain processes led Freudto use materialfrom othersciences in developingthe distinctive doctrinesof psychoanalysis.Furthermore, he argues,Freud,for the most part,engagedin sober theorizing (65). In workingout his coreprinciples,he drewon some of the mostspectacularandapparently olid re-sultsof nineteenth-centurycience (66).

Kitcher,not unreasonably, akes the core of Freudiantheoryto include:the theory of dreams,the Oedipal Complex, the pleasureand reality princi-ples, the unconscious system, libido andrepression,andpsychosexualdevel-opment(109). She tries to show two thingsabouteach of the hypothesesas-sociated with these core elements: (1) Each was a more or less reasonableworking hypothesis in the context of nineteenth-century cientific advances,views aboutthe goals of scientificexplanation,andstandards f evidence;and(2) Eacheitherfulfilleda requirement f Freud's meta-psychologyor was at-tractiveto him because of its abilityto uniteresults from differentdisciplines(109).

If the meta-analyticgoals werelegitimate,andhis theorizingwas basedonapparentlysolid evidence from biology and the social sciences, where didFreudstumble (if in fact he did)?A largepartof Kitcher'sanswer s suggestedby the title of herChapter6: Biology: Disappointmentand Disaster.

She notes that the ties of Freudiantheoryto biology were importantnotmerely in Freud's eyes; they remainedan essential partof the attractionofpsychoanalysisfor orthodoxFreudianssuch as Fenichel andAlexander.Theties, however, beganto frayas Freudmade some crucialmistakes.Althoughhis interdisciplinaryapproach,according to Kitcher, was basically sound,Freudrelied too much on the smoothprogressof neurophysiology,took toogreata risk in hopingthatphysiology would providean adequategroundingfor his libido theory,andwas overly impressedby the potentialunity of histheory of the mental, so much so thathe failed to see thatreal connectionshad to be made, not simply assumed(182). A furtherproblemis thathe re-acted to developmentsin the variousfields thathe relied on by, in essence,ignoringthem.672 EDWARD ERWIN


4/27

On Kitcher'saccount,a failed biology was not Freud'sonly seriousprob-lem. In addition,developmentsin early 20th Centurysocial science badlyundermined he foundationsof psychoanalytictheory (186). For example,the rise of behaviorism,accordingto Kitcher, essened the credibilityof psy-choanalysis in three obvious ways (188). One, the behavioristsrejectedmentalfacultiesandevery kind of mentalapparatus, ncludingFreud's. Sec-ond, behaviorismincorporatedoperationalism,which in turnprohibitedtheuse of any theoretical erm not definable n observational erms.Third,behav-ioristsencouraged he ideal of experimentalism.AlthoughFreud,according oKitcher, was not hostile to experimentation,he did little to encouragean ex-perimentaltradition,relying insteadon clinical validation,and on evidencefrom philology, folklore, mythology, and ritual.

In part,accordingto Kitcher,Freud also got unlucky(191). Experimental-ism both weakenedpsychoanalysisandpropelled ts rivals,principallybehav-iorism and gestalt psychology. The resultswere not nearlyas devastatingasthose in biology, butthey were largelyunfavorable o psychoanalysis.

One of Kitcher's goals in writing her book was to extract from theFreudian case interdisciplinary essons that will be of use to contemporarycognitive scientists attemptingto build their own interdisciplinaryscience.One she mentions (218) is that there is little point in assertingthat a theoryborrowed from anotherfield is merely provisional;the status of that theorywithin the otherdiscipline must be constantly monitored. Anotherlesson isthat it may not be helpfulto assumemerelythat the roughdirection of a fieldis correct,makingit permissible to borrow only genericversions of theories.If one does this, one opens the interdisciplinaryheory to the charge that it isvague andunsupported.

The interdisciplinarymorals thatKitcheroffers to cognitive science are akind of bonus. Whateverher originalmotivation in pursuingherproject, thevalue of this clearly written andinteresting book does not stand or fall withhow helpful it is to cognitive scientists; for it also provides an importantcontributionto the debateconcerningthe original biological and social sci-ence foundations of Freud's theories. The book's account of these mattersstands in stark opposition to the views of some Freud scholars, such asCrews (1995), Eysenck (1985), Macmillan(1997), andEsterson(1993), whoargue that the Freudianenterprisewas a failure from the very start.It alsoclashes with the more moderateview, arguedby ClarkGlymour(1993), thatshortlyafter 1900, Freudbeganreplacingthe scientific methods thathe hadlearnedearlierwith a kindof formalcaricature f them.

There areseveralquestions that arelikely to be raisedabout Kitcher's ac-count. One of these concerns the criticalresponsesof behavioriststo Freud'swork. As I noted earlier,Kitchersays that the rise of behaviorismlessenedthe credibilityof psychoanalysisin threeobvious ways (188). Exactly howdid this lesseningof credibilityoccur?

REVIEWESSAY 673


5/27

First, did the behavioristspresent any credible evidence againstthe exis-tence of mental faculties in particular, r a mental apparatusn general?If theanswer is no , as I believe it is, then the first criticism that Kitcher men-tions carriedno evidential weight. The second, the appeal to operationalistdoctrine,came relatively late (notuntil the 1930's), but was thatdoctrineeverwarranted? f there was no good reason to believe in operationalistdoctrine,then appealing o it did nothingto undermineFreudian vidence or doctrine.The rise of experimentalismraises a different issue. Behaviorists, in myview, were right to emphasize experimentation,but they never showed thatno causal theory could be confirmed without experimentation.In so far astheyrestedtheircase on a generalexperimental equirement, reudhada readyanswer, as Kitcher notes: If experimentationwere the requiredproof of sci-entificstatus,then to make their disciplinea science, astronomerswould haveto have the abilityto move the heavenlybodies (189).

If the behavioristswere not entitled to rely on a general requirement hatall causal claims be tested experimentally,did they provide a detailed credibleargument,of the sort that Grtnbaum(1984) has, that Freud's causalhypothe-ses in particular equireexperimental videnceforconfirmation?f the answeris again negative, as I believe it clearly is, then the third behaviorist objec-tion to Freudianpsychology is also withoutsubstance.

Kitcher also notes that from a behaviorist point of view, support thatFreudian theory received from above (i.e. from otherdisciplines, such asbiology) did not count, even though it provided indirect empirical support(189, my emphasis).Well, if the theoryreallydidreceive suchindirectempir-ical support,the behavioristswere wrong again.In short,in so far as the be-haviorists' criticisms were those mentionedby Kitcher, they did nothing atall to undermine he credibilityof anyof Freud'sviews.

Thereis, then,a mild puzzle here:If, as I contend,the behaviorists'criti-cisms were all unsound,how did such objections help at all in underminingthe foundationsof psychoanalytic heory?Thereis, however,an obvious wayof gettingrid of the puzzle withoutdoing any harmto Kitcher'soverallanal-ysis. A sociological questionneeds to be distinguished rom an epistemologi-cal one. Did developments n Americanpsychologyandthe social sciences ingeneralcontribute o a lack of acceptanceof Freud'sviews? Yes, they did, atleast in certainquarters, uch as in American academicpsychology. Kitchernicely explainssome of the reasonswhy this occurred.A verydifferentques-tion is an epistemological one: Did discoveriesor argumentsof the behavior-ists refute muchof Freudian heory,or at least undermine ts evidential base?Kitcher does not demonstratea positive answer to this latterquestion, andperhapswas not tryingto.

Anotherquestion concerns the science thatFreudallegedly appealedto.How good was it? As I noted earlier,Kitchersays (66) that Freud drew onsome of the most spectacularandapparently olid results of nineteenth cen-674 EDWARD ERWIN


6/27

tury science. Apartfrom Darwiniantheory,however, how many of the rele-vant biological or social science theories were really well confirmed? Insome cases, the knowledge required o answerthe question is ratherarcane.For example, Kitcher, citing other scholars, notes that in constructinghisdreamtheory, Freud relied in parton John HughlingJackson's hypothesisabout the constructionof the brain n evolutionary ayers.Was this hypothe-sis well supportedby the evidenceavailable n 1900?Was it supportedat all?If one is tryingto show merely that Freudwas not irresponsibleandnot apseudo-scientist,thenit might be enoughif Jackson's hypothesisconstituteda reasonablebit of speculation,but to show thatFreud's dream theory hadempirical supportpartly n virtueof its ties to Jackson's hypothesis,a higherstandardmustbe met:There mustbe a showingthat the latterhypothesiswasconfirmedto at least some degree. Perhapsthis could be shown for most ofthe hypothesesthat Kitcherdiscusses, includingLarmarkiannheritance he-ory (26), Haeckel'sbiogeneticlaw (27), Meynert'stheoryof the primaryego(23), Fechner'shypothesisof neural equilibrium 24), various Associationisttheses, the neuronand reflex doctrines,etc. (see pp. 36-37), but she providesno suchdemonstrationor any of them.

In fact, in some cases, Kitcher appearsto concede that the results hatFreuddrew on were not solid. For example,TheodoreMeynert'shypothesisabout a structure of associations in the nervous system is described as

speculative '23). The claim that all psychical acts are a combinationofreflex acts is said to have been disputed 70). Even with the supportal-legedly provided by work in other disciplines, Freud's pleasure and realityprinciplesare said by Kitcher to have been speculative,but not wildly so(73).

In other cases, to say that the hypotheses from other disciplines werespeculative s to give them too much credit. In reconstructingFreud's ar-

gumentfor his (1900) dreamtheory,Kitcher 118) includesthe following twohypotheses:(A) Only endogenousstimuli can enter the sleepingnervous sys-tem; and(B) In sleep, secondaryprocessesareshutoff. In a forthcomingpa-per, Grunbaum 1997, p. 16) arguesthat these hypotheses were not merelyunsupported,but ... were dead in the water in the face of empirical factsavailableto Freud n 1895.

Another problem,perhapsmore seriousthanthose discussed so far, is thefollowing. Even if it were truethat most of the biological and social sciencetheoriesthatFreud countedon were well confirmed,or at least confirmedtosome degree,did they permita kindof epistemictransferof their evidence toFreudian heory?Kitcherdoes addressthis question,especially (butnot only)withrespectto Freud'sdream heory.

Concerninghis basic thesis aboutall dreamsbeing wish fulfillments,shedrawson workof Fancher see his 1971) andSulloway (1979), and constructsthefollowingdeductiveargumenthatI referred o earlier:

REVIEW ESSAY 675


7/27

1. Dreamingrequiressome stimulusto the nervoussystem.2. Only endogenousstimulican enterthe sleeping nervoussystem.3. Endogenous stimuli revise perceptions associated with previous

satisfactionof the endogenous needs, therebyproducingwishfulimages.

4. Wishful images can be blockedonly by the operationof secondaryprocesses.

5. In sleep, secondaryprocesses are shutoff.

Cl. Therefore,the underlying biological cause of dreaming s endoge-nous stimulationarising from biological needs, and the phenom-ena of dreaming,visualand auditory mages and the like, representthose needs as beingfulfilled.(1-5)

C2. Therefore, dreaming is wish fulfillment (reformulationof Cl).Q.E.D. (118)

Kitcherclaims (119) that Freudreliedon the above argument,and adoptedhis wish fulfillment hypothesis largely on neurophysiologicalgrounds. Shethenoffers aninterestingconjectureas to why, if these werehis real grounds,Freudplaceddiscussion of them at theback of his dreambook.

Regardlessof whetherFreudreliedon the above argument,or merely hadit at his disposal while relying on something else, how good is the argu-ment? The first thing that hits the eye is that the conclusion is too weak:Freud'stheoryin his dreambook is thatall dreamsare wish fulfillments.(Inlater writings, Freudheld that a dream is an attempt at the fulfillmentof awish, but allowed that some attempts ail.) One could changeC2 to say all ,but then, contraryto what Kitchersays (118), the conclusion would not de-ductivelyfollow from thepremises.

Furthermore, here is a more fundamentalproblem:C2, even as stated,does not follow from C1. C2 talks about wish fulfillment; it implies, if itcaptures Freud's hypothesis, that infantile wishes are the instigators ofdreams. Cl does not; if it did, it would fail to follow from the conjunctionof 1-5, none of which talks about wish fulfillment. Instead, C1 speaks ofdreamimagesthatrepresentbiological needs as being fulfilled.Even if everydreamcontainedsuch dreamimages (what Kitcher calls wishfulimages ),thatdoes not imply or supportthe furtherclaim aboutthe etiological role ofrepressedinfantile wishes. A woman, for example, might be conscious of awish to have a baby,andher dream magerymight representher biologically

676 EDWARD ERWIN


8/27

determinedwish as being fulfilled; yet no infantilerepressedwish may havecontributed o the content of her dream.In fact, there could be wishful imagesrepresentedn every dreamevenif repressionnever occurred.

The second problem cannot be remedied, moreover, by treatingthe argu-ment as non-demonstrative.Even if all difficulties about confirmationof thepremisesarewaived, they fail to provide even non-demonstrative upport orC2.What of the other central Freudian hypotheses that Kitcher discusses?How many of these received reasonably firm empirical support, early on,from the evidence available to Freud from biology and the social sciences?Although I will not arguethe point case by case, my inclination is to sidewith those who believe thatthe empirical supportfrom otherdisciplines didnot melt away as time when on; it was never therein the firstplace. The the-ories in the otherdisciplines either were not well supported,or the ties be-tween them andspecificFreudianhypotheseswere fartoo loose to provide anevidentialtransfer rom the lending disciplineto Freudian heory.

I am uncertainabout the degree of initial support Kitcher wants to claimfor Freudianhypotheses.In supportof Freud,she asks if he erred n adoptingspeculative, poorly supported ocial andbiological theories,andshe answers(66) thatin most cases, he did not. She also contends (85) thatFreud's casefor repressionrested on four well supported oints.Later(94), she refersto

massivesupport orrepression it is notclearwhethershe meansmerelyitspurportedexistence, or Freud's theoryof the etiological role of repression),and contendsthatthis support or repression ent furtherweight to the impor-tance of sex (in the etiology of psychoneuroses).

Kitcher's general verdict, however, is weakerthan saying thatat one timeFreud's views had fairly firm, even if transient, empirical support gleanedfrom otherdisciplines;it is, rather, hat each of the hypothesesshe mentionswas a moreor less reasonableworking hypothesisin the contextof 19thcen-turyscientific advances,views aboutthe goals of scientific explanation,andstandardsof evidence(109). This weakerverdict s consistentwith thepropo-sition that most of Freudian heoryhadlittle or no empiricalsupportever.

One otherissue thatmight be raised is of an epistemologicalratherthanhistorical character.At times, in trying to explain the basis of supportforFreudian heory,Kitcherappears o rely on evidential standards hat are con-troversial.For example, she claims (118) that the confirmationof proposi-tion C2, which I referred o earlier,wouldconfirmpremises 1-5 inthe stan-dardhypothetico-deductiveashion .Many philosophersof science, however,have long disputed he standardhypothetico-deductivemodel of confirmation.Its applicationis especially dubious,in my view, when a confirmedpredic-tion of a theorycan be explained by a rival theoryof equalor greaterplausi-bility.

REVIEW SSAY 677


9/27

At other times, Kitcherappearsto endorsea controversialform of infer-ence to the best explanation,as when she takesthe fact thatcertainFreudianhypotheseswould,if true, explaincertaindata to countas confirmation 117).She also appealsto pragmaticactors ,suchas the unifyingpower of Freud-ian theory, as providingreasonsto believe in the truthof the theory (131). Imay be misinterpretingher in some of these cases, but I think there is nodoubt that Freudand many of his followers have relied on such evidentialreasoning, which I believe is unreliable(for reasons given in Erwin, 1996,Chapter2).

In the end, as just noted, Kitcher s content to conclude that Freud'scen-tral hypotheses,earlyon, were reasonableworkinghypotheses.She does notside with those who claim thattodaythereis good reason to believe most ofthese hypotheses,although she might say thatthereis firm supportfor somethem(a flyerforher book says thatFreudwas partly uccessful ).

Present Statusa. Griinbaum'sCritiqueAlthough many philosophershave questionedFreud's views, including, ofcourse,ErnestNagel andKarlPopper,Adolf Grunbaums generallyconsid-eredthe leadingcriticof the Freudiancorpus. Manyleadinganalystssee hisargumentsas constitutingthe most telling outside challenge to psychoanaly-sis yet developed (see, Edelson, 1988; Esman, 1995;Meehl, 1996).The argumentsof Grunbaum's 1984) book have been widely discussed,but they are sometimes misunderstood;so, a brief summary may be useful.Grinbaum begins in that book by challenging hermeneutical philosophersandanalystswho believe thatFreud's theoriesshouldbejudged by standardsother thanthose employedin the naturalsciences. After criticizing Popper'sviews aboutthe alleged untestabilityof Freudiantheory,he presentsa chal-lenge to those who rely primarilyon Freudianclinical data, one that Freudwas awareof, and triedto meet: thatthedataareirremediably ontaminated ysuggestion. Freud'sproposedsolution,Grinbaumargues,is to appealto theTally Argument. The argumenthas two premises. The first, which Grun-baum calls the NecessaryConditionThesis , says, roughly, that only psy-choanalysiscan yield correct nsight into the cause of the patient'sneurosis,and thatcorrect nsightis causallynecessaryfor curingthe neurosis.The sec-ond premisesays thatsome patientsare curedof theirneuroses.The conclu-sion is that(at least some) psychoanalytic nterpretations re true(they tallywith what is real ).

After reconstructingthe Tally Argument,Grunbaumargues that its firstpremise,the Necessary ConditionThesis, is false. The result is that therere-mains a serious problemin interpreting he clinical data thatFreudfailed toresolve. The point is not thateverythingthat a typicalpatientsays or does in

678 EDWARD ERWIN


10/27

the analyticsetting is caused by suggestion;it is ratherthatthere is no reli-able way to tell generally what is due to unwitting suggestion and what isnot.

In the second half of his (1984) book, Grinbaumarguesthat even if thecontamination ssue is ignored, and the clinical dataare taken at face value,the argumentsbased on these datafail to supportFreud'stheory of repression,which is the foundationof Freud'sentireclinical theory.In his newer book (1993), and in various papers published after 1984,Grunbaum xtends his earlierarguments,answers variouscritics, and devel-ops new objections.

One of the most prominentand methodologicallysophisticatedcritics ofGrunbaum'swork is the psychoanalystMarshallEdelson (1988), who arguesthat Freudian heory can be tested and confirmed n a clinical settingby usingsingle subject experimentaldesigns. There is an initial plausibility to thisview. Assume that Grunbaums right that experimentaltests (or epidemio-logical studies)are needed to confirmFreud'shypotheses.Why, however,aregroupdesigns needed?After all, behavioranalysts n the operantconditioningtraditionhave shownhow to use single subjectdesigns in confirmingvarioushypothesesaboutthe effects of behaviortherapy BarlowandHersen,1984).Why, then, not adaptthese designs to the testing of psychoanalytic proposi-tions?

Before assessing the viability of Edelson's proposal, it should be notedthat even if he is right, his point does nothing to undermine Grinbaum'smain (1984, 278) conclusion:thatin so far as Freudianhypothesesare basedon clinical evidence, their warrant,as of now, is remarkablyweak . Atmost, Edelsonwould be refutinga secondaryclaim:thatin the future, f sup-porting evidence is to be forthcoming, it must come from extra-clinicalsources.His proposal,moreover,has to overcomesome serious difficulties.

One problem,as Grinbaumpoints out (237-39), is the difficulty of rul-ing out a placebo hypothesis if we are testing an outcome hypothesis. In astandardA-B-A single subjectdesign, a therapy s introduced n the A phase,and then withdrawn n the B phase, and then introducedagain in anotherAphase.By repeating hesecycles, andmeasuring he degreeof impairmentbe-fore interventionand after withdrawalof treatment,t is possible to rule out aspontaneousremission hypothesisas an explanationof improvement.Whatis not easy to do even, with uncomplicatedbehavioraltreatments, s to ruleout placebofactorsas theprimarycauseof improvement.In the psychoanalyticcase, that would appearto requirea comparisonofwhathappenswhenrepressionsare liftedcompared o whenthey arenot.Thissort of comparison,Grunbaumnotes, would requiregoing beyond the psy-choanalyticsetting,which would defeat Edelson's purpose. There is anotherdifficulty,however. How would we establishwhile still using an A-B-A de-sign that there was any lifting of repressions?The patientreports,say, re-

REVIEW ESSAY 679


11/27

membering things that were not remembered in an earlier phase, but theveridicalityof the memories would have to be established,as would the claimthat repressionrather hanmere forgettingwas the cause of the events not be-ing remembered.

Even if all problemsof internalvalidity could be resolved, there wouldstill remain the furtherproblem of generalizingthe results to other peoplewith different personalitiesandhistories. There is not just the practicalprob-lem that it would be costly to replicate the same experiment over and overagain. As Grinbaum notes (p. 242), there is also the epistemologicalproblem of insuring thatsubsequent subjects do not differ from the originalsubject in causally relevant respects. Group designs address this problemthroughrandomassignmentto treatmentand controlgroups.Thatstrategy snot readily available when using single subject designs. Some other strategymight work, but which one?

Anotherkey issue, one raisedby philosopherswho would eschew any sortof experimentationn the testingof Freud'sviews, concerns the epistemolog-ical role of thematic(or,meaning)affinities. In his (1984), Grinbaum arguedagainst the views of Habermas,Ricouerand others who hold that Freudiantheoryis not causal,or at least is not causal in the same sense thatmany hy-potheses in biology andphysics are. In his (1993), he adds moredetails,con-centratingmainlyon the views of HabermasandJaspers.Some philosophersagree with Grunbaumabout the causal natureof Freudiantheory, but thenargue that thematic affinities provide evidence of causal connections, thuseliminatingthe need for experimentationn tryingto confirmFreud's views.

In response, Grinbaum (1993, ch. 4) argues that: (1) The presence ofthematic affinities by itself is not evidence of a causal connection;and (2)This is so even if the degreeof affinity s very great.One could agreeto bothpoints, but then counterthatgiven certainbackgroundevidence the thematicsimilarities may constitute at least some evidence for a particularcausalhypothesis. This point, however, is too trivial to be of much help. Virtuallyanythingcan be evidence for a causalhypothesis given the right backgroundevidence. If we had evidence that Freud was omniscient, for example, hissincere belief in his theories would constitute evidence thathe is right.Thetrouble s that we lack evidence for Freud's omniscience. Those who wish toappealto thematicaffinitiesare free to argue: here s suchandsuchempiricalevidence that where there is a thematic affinity of a certain kind, there islikely to be a causalconnection. Whatthey would need to do, however, is tospecify exactly what this evidence is. Merely saying that thematic affinitywould provide evidence of a causal connection if only we had the properbackground vidence is notenough. (Fora more detailedresponsebasedpartlyon some of Griinbaum's arlierpapers,see Erwin, 1996, pp. 26-40).

Anotherimportant ssue concerns the Freudianconcept of transference.Edelson claims (1984, p. 151) thatthe pathogen,the thing thatcauses a pa-680 EDWARD ERWIN


12/27

tient's neurosis, is not merely a remote event; it reappears n the transferenceunder the investigator's eye, so to speak . Grunbaum 1993, 157) rightly

asks: But how does the psychoanalyst n the clinical setting demonstrate hatthe original pathogen is replicated at all in the clinical setting, let alone thatthe current eplicaof the early event is presently what maintains he neurosis?The pathogen,for all we know, may be there under he investigator's eye ,but we need some way of getting evidence that it really is there.Edelson doesnot give any reason to think that this can be done in the clinical setting.

LesterLuborskyand his co-workers,in a directchallenge to Grunbaum,claim to offer empirical support or Freud's theory of transference n a paperwith the provocative title A Verification of Freud's GrandestClinical Hy-pothesis: The Transference Luborskyet al., 1985). In fact, they do not dowhat their title promises (see the discussionin Erwin, 1996 p. 286).

Much of Grunbaum'swork on psychoanalysishas been concerned withepistemological issues concerningthe validation of Freud's theoretical andtherapeutic hypotheses. The main conclusion of his epistemological argu-ments is thatclinical datahave not, andin all probabilitywill not in the fu-ture, providemuch support or Freud's views. That leaves open the possibil-ity, although Grinbaum appears o have increasingdoubtsthatthis will hap-pen, that some otherkind of inquiry,especiallycontrolledstudiesor epidemi-ological studies, will confirmsome major portionsof Freud's views. In his(1993), however,he goes somewhatbeyondhis original skepticalstance,andargues (Chapter10) that Freud's dreamtheoryis not merelyunfounded; t isalso false.

Grunbaum's atest book also containssignificantcontributionson a vari-ety of topics that I have not touched on including:furthercriticisms of Pop-per's critiqueof psychoanalysis (Chapter2), a furtherelaborationof his wellknown explication of the placebo concept (Chapter3), psychoanalysis andtheism (Chapter7), retrospectiveversus prospective testing of etiologic hy-potheses in psychoanalysis (Chapter 8), and the logical foundationsof theclinical theoryof repression.b. Levy's Reply to GrunbaumDonald Levy, in his new book (1996), challenges certainphilosophiccriticsof Freud's views, including Wittgenstein,AlasdairMacIntyre,and WilliamJames. James is not usually lumped togetherwith Freud's critics, but Levyconsiders his views because James argues against the idea of unconsciousmental ideation. Without necessarily agreeing with all of Levy's replies tothese philosophers,I agreewith his generalverdictconcerning heir criticisms(at least those which he discusses): None has stood up very well (Levy,126).

REVIEWESSAY 681


13/27

In the final sections of his book, Levy confronts a more formidablecritic,Adolf Grunbaum,whose (1984) book Levy describes as constituting By farthe most important philosophical rejection of the scientific credibility ofFreud's work ever to appear... (129). Despite this favorable assessment,Levy chargesthatthe latter's case againstFreudrests primarilyon an elemen-tary logical blunder.The mistake allegedly occurs in Grinbaum's reasoningconcerning he Tally Argument.As I noted earlier,one of its premises is the Necessary Condition thesis,which Levy partly paraphrasesas follows: (A) Therapeutic success resultsonly if true interpretationshave been offered. Levy argues that Grinbaummistakenlyconverts(A) into a differentproposition hat does not follow fromthe first:(B) True nterpretationsave beenofferedonly if therapeutic uccessresults. This latter proposition serves as GrUnbaum'sbasis, according toLevy, for concluding that the only indication of an interpretation's ruth istherapeutic uccess.

Why attribute he above logical mistaketo Grinbaum?Levy makes muchof Grunbaum'suse of the word the nstead of an n describing the epis-temic underwriter of the clinical validation of Freud's clinical theory(Grunbaum,1984, 138). It will help to quote Levy's exact argument:Let us assumethat Grunbaumwould not say of one thingthat it is the epistemic underwriterofsome truthif he thoughtthat anotherequally cogent epistemic underwriter or it existed. SoGrunbaumhas moved from the Tally Argument's second conjunct (Note: Levy means thesecond conjunctof one premise of the argument),which I shall paraphrase s

(A) Therapeuticsuccess resultsonly if true interpretations ave been offered (q only if p).to

(B) True interpretationshave been offered only if therapeuticsuccess results (p only if q).(Levy, 1996, p. 141)

Levy's argument ails for a very obvious reason. Grunbaum ttributes A),which is partof the Tally Argument,to Freud, butLevy has apparently or-gotten that Grinbaum himself does not accept the Tally argument;on thecontrary,he arguesthat data concerning spontaneousremissions show thattrueinterpretations re not neededfor therapeutic uccess. Given that Grun-baumrejects (A), his reasonfor accepting (B), assumingfor the moment thathe does accept it, could hardlybe that he believes that it follows from (A).Thatmeans, however,thatLevy's mainargument ollapses.

Although Grunbaums not guilty of the logical blunder hatLevy accuseshim of, we can still ask if he reallybelieves the foolish view thattherapeuticsuccess is the empirical groundon which Freud's theories must stand or fall.It is a foolish view partlybecause it rules out a prior any evidence from ex-perimentalstudies thatfail to discuss therapeuticsuccess, such as studies of

682 EDWARD RWIN


14/27

dream symbolism, slips of the tongue, or repression.It would be especiallyfoolish for Griinbaumn particular o embracesuch a view given thathe hascalled for experimentalstudiesof the very sort just mentioned.He does not,however,even hold the view thatLevy attributes o him (let alone hold it be-cause of an elementary ogical mistake);more importantly,he does not pre-suppose it in any of his arguments.

Here is what he says about the view in question, when he responds to apaper by Thomas Nagel. Nagel, says Grunbaum, ...asserts falsely withDavid Sachs and Paul Robinson that, in my view, therapeutic uccess... [is]the empiricalgroundon which Freud'stheories must stand or fall. This ac-countis wrong,if only becauseI stressedthe need for extra-clinicalevidence,and even proposedthe aforementioned pidemiologictest of Freud'setiologyof paranoia. (Grunbaum,1994, pp. 54-55). Levy came across this state-ment, which he quotes, apparentlyafter completingmost of his book. If myconjectureis right, the sensible thing to do would have been not to publishthe book, at least not in its presentform. Insteadof revising or not publish-ing his book, Levy providesan appendix n which he attemptsa tortuous n-terpretationof Grunbaum'swords to make them mean the exact opposite ofwhat they plainly say.

It would be pointless to run througheach of the possible interpretationsthatLevy gives of Grunbaum'swords,especiallysince his interpretationailsat the outset. Because Grinbaumallegedly contrasts extra-clinicalevidencewith evidence from therapeuticsuccess, Levy attributes o him (p. 173) thefurtherview thattherapeuticsuccess is not extra-clinicalevidence. He thenargues that this is plainly false; so, Grunbaummust be using therapeuticsuccess in some non-standardense. Theproblem s thatGrunbaum oes notsay that therapeuticsuccess is not extra-clinical evidence. In speaking of

extra-clinicalevidence in the quotedpassage, he is referringto evidencefrom experimentalorepidemiologicalstudies;such studiesneed not have any-thing directlyto do with therapeutic uccess.

The importantpoint that should be stressed is that none of Grunbaum'sargumentsdependson the arbitrary,a priorirestrictionof the Freudianevi-dence to therapeuticresults.Even if he were to believe in thatrequirement,which he does not, he rests nothingon it.

If Grunbaumrejects the view that Levy attributesto him, why does hespeakof the epistemic underwriter n the passageLevy quotes?As he hasexplained (1986, 272), he was referring to Freud's attempt to vindicatepsychoanalytic methods and evidence in general, not to the validation ofFreud's specific hypotheses.In otherwords,he is not denying the plain andobvious fact that Freudoffered both therapeuticand non-therapeuticargu-ments for his specifichypotheses.

Levy raisesan additionalproblem,one thathe sees as moretroubling hanthe one discussed so far. It is remarkable , ccordingto Levy (165), that

REVIEW ESSAY 683


15/27

Grunbaumdoes not address the problem of providing new coordinatingdefinitionsfor terms suchas unconsciousdea and unconsciouswish .Theproblemhere, according to Levy, is that these terms are definedin terms ofclinical phenomena;consequently,they lose theirmeaningif they are appliedoutside a clinical setting, and thereforethe hypotheses containingthem areuntestable.

If Levy is right, thenGrunbaum's ecommendationor experimental est-ing cannot be broughtto fruition.However, in so far as Grunbaums chal-lenging the evidential foundations of Freudiantheory, why should he notwelcome Levy's help if there is any substanceto his argument?A minorityof Freudians akethe positionthatthe best evidence for Freud's views can befound by mining the hundredsof Freudianexperimentalstudies producedinthe past eighty years or so. If Levy is right,all of this evidence can be wipedout in one fell swoop, thusfurtherweakeningFreud'scase, andstrengtheningGrUnbaum'skepticism.

Levy's argument,however, is without merit. It is remarkable,moreover,thata philosopherwouldthink thathe could answerhundredsof experimentalargumentswithout examining a single one, merely by appealing to someunargued,unobviousa prioridictate. What is especially oddis thata philoso-pher writingtoday would appealto operationalistdoctrines,in particular othe idea thattheoreticalconceptsaretypicallydefinedin termsof supportingevidence (or allegedly supporting vidence), and that withoutsuchcoordinat-ing definitions,the hypotheses that contain them are untestable.These doc-trinesencounteredso many problemsthatvirtuallyno philosopherhas seri-ously tried to defend them in the past 30 years or so (for a review of thedifficulties, see Erwin 1978, Chapter2). Does Levy offer any answers to thestandardcriticisms?Does he offer any positive reason to acceptthe need forcoordinatingdefinitions,except for quoting (83) an unarguedstatement ofErnestNagel, publishedmore than 35 years ago? The answer to both ques-tions is: none whatsoever.

Levy does have some positive arguments or Freud'sviews, but they areextremelyweak, and some were answeredbefore the publicationof his book.Forexample,he repeatsthe argumentof his (1988) paperthatFreudnever re-ally held the Tally Argument. I reply to this argumentin Erwin (1993),which Levy neithercites nor answers.Suppose, however, thatLevy is rightabout the exegetical point. Does this affect Grtinbaum'scritique of theFreudianclinical evidence?It does not,for reasons also given in Erwin(1993,pp. 415-16).

On anotherissue, Levy claims (139) that suggestion is nota greathaz-ard n interpretation,appealingto Freud's claim (1917, S.E., 16: 453) thathe founda coincidence betweenthe translationsof symbols and fantasiespro-duced spontaneouslyby suffersof dementiapraecoxandparanoia,and thoseproducedby neurotics.How does this solve the contaminationproblem?Ac-684 EDWARD ERWIN


16/27

cording to Freudthe paranoidsand the schizophrenicsare ... above any sus-picion of being influenced by suggestion. (1917, S.E.,16: 453). However,evidence from verbalconditioning studies show that what Freud says here isfalse, and that the claim, endorsed by Levy, that suggestion is not a greathazard s also false (see Erwin, 1993, pp. 422-32 ).

Even apart rom verbalconditioningevidence, there are two otherreasonsnot to rest anythingon Freud's alleged solution. Given his proclivity to readthings into his data, we cannot justifiably take his word for the claim thatthere is the coincidence thathe speaks of, especially since he does not saywhat the data are.Second,and moredamaging,we know fromstudies of neu-rotics that the responsesof neurotics n therapyarenot uniform. As Marmor(1970) found,the phenomenologicaldata reportedby neurotics vary with thekind of therapy:Freudian herapistsoften elicit materialabout Oedipuscom-plexes, Horneyitesabout idealized images, Alderiansabout feelings of inferi-ority, etc. How, then,can there be the coincidence that Freud speaks of whenthere is no such coincidence even within the class of neurotics?

Levy also claims that Freudused analogical arguments o supportsome ofhis etiological claims, somethingI do not question.On the issue of their co-gency, however, Levy says thatthey serve as valuable heuristicdevices, butadds I shall not arguetheir role as proof here... .(p. 140), and in fact, hedoes not. So, as far as Levy argues, they fail to helpFreud's case.

Finally, Levy makes the point that not all prospective causal inquiry isexperimental,a point agreedto by Griinbaum see the discussion in Erwin,1996, p. 90), andthat thematicaffinities can serve as evidence of causal con-nections, a point which is incorrect(see GrUnbaum, 989, 1990; andErwin,1996, pp. 26-40).

In short, Levy fails to undermineGrUnbaum'sase, and his positive casefor Freud'sviews does nothingto enhancetheircredibility.c. Wollheimon Philosophical AnthropologyGrUnbaum'swork on psychoanalysishas been mainlyconcerned with exam-ining the Freudianevidence. RichardRorty (1997), in referring o GrUnbaumin particular,has recently expressed skepticismaboutphilosophers ssuing orwithholding certificates f epistemologicalquality concerningFreudian he-ory. It would be convenient to have such an inspectorate,he writes,but onlyif its membersusuallyconcurred.Philosophersusuallydo not.

Whether or not one agrees with Rorty, one might see other tasks forphilosophers interestedin psychoanalysis besides the epistemological one.One of these might be describedas philosophicalanthropology . n his re-cent book, Richard Wollheim (1993) claims thatpsychoanalytic theory canbe regardedas an anthropology n that it provides an account of humannature that is explanatorilyrich. One philosophic task, then, is to articulate

REVIEWESSAY 685


17/27

the kind of understandingof humannaturethat the theorypromises. Woll-heim, in fact, sees this as the primary ob of philosophyvis-a-vis psychoana-lytic theory(78).

Throughouthis distinguishedcareer,Wollheim has pursuedthis goal ofarticulatingpsychoanalytictheory, especially the Freudianversion of it. Inhis new (1993) collection of essays, originally published between 1975-1989, he continues with this project, but in varying degrees also uses psy-choanalysisto elucidatephilosophical ssues.

In his first two essays, Wollheim discusses various topics of interest tomoralphilosophers ncluding voluntarism, he ends of life, and a certainver-sion of utilitarianism.Although Freudis mentioned (18), most of the sub-stance of these essays is not directly linked to psychoanalytictheory. Thesame commentcan be made aboutthe paperson the philosophyof art,essaysVIII-XII.To some degree, the views were probably nspiredby Wollheim'sreflection on psychoanalysis, but most of the argumentsand conclusionswould remain unaffectedeven if psychoanalytictheorywere entirely wrong.The middleessays, in contrast,aremuchmore directly inked to psychoanaly-sis.

In one of these, his paperon the Good Self and the Bad Self (essay III),Wollheim clarifiesBradley'smoraltheory, arguingthata centralcomponentof it is his theory of self-realization.The case that Bradley makes for thistheory, Wollheim furtherargues (60), rests heavily on substantive issuesconcerning the mind. To help resolve these issues, Wollheim appeals toMelanie Klein's account of internalobjects andher views of the depressiveposition. He argues that Kleinian theory not only conforms with Bradley'smoralpsychology,butalso goes some way towardunderpinningt (52).

In TheBodily Ego (IV), Wollheim relates Freud'sthesis of the bodilyego to the mind-body problem.The thesis says thatin the beginning of ourpsychology, we conceive of mental statesandprocesseson the model of cor-poreal entities and processes. A thoughtrepresents tself as, say, a piece offood, or vomit, or faeces (70; see also 87). In essay V, Wollheim analyzesthe impactof Freud's materialismon his theoryof sexuality, and in VII, hediscussescrime, punishment,and what Freudcalls palecriminality .

In perhapsthe richest article, essay VI, Wollheim rejects the view thatFreudwas a total conceptualrevisionist, and opts for the moderate viewthatFreudarrivedat a new conceptionof the mindby takingover, and thenadding to, the common sense conception(for an opposing view, see Erwin,1996, pp.106-24). He did this, Wollheimnotes, in threeways: by deepeningit, by elaborating,or producingvariations,on it, andby contextualizing t(94).Freuddeepened common sense psychology by appealing to a non-con-scious desireand belief which at once rationalizeanagent'sactionandjointly

686 EDWARD ERWIN


18/27


19/27

them . As he makes clear, the more general principles he has in mind arepsychoanalyticprinciplesabout symptom formation,mechanisms of defense,etc. If these principleshave not been established,and yet their truthmust beassumedif we areto confirmother Freudianhypotheses throughclinical test-ing, then clinical confirmation is clearly undermined,which is, subtletiesaside, Grfinbaum's hief conclusion in his (1984).

The Future of PsychoanalysisAs I notedin the beginningof this essay, many see the field of psychoanaly-sis as being in a state of serious decline. Some of the reasons for this judg-ment include:the decreasing mentionof psychoanalyticcontributions n theempirical literature (Holzman, 1993, xviii); a major diminution in theinfluence of the theory and therapyn psychologyand psychiatrydepartments;a precipitousdropin the numberof young candidatesapplyingfor training nthe psychoanalyticinstitutes;and a likely reductionby insurancecompaniesin reimbursingpatientsundergoing psychoanalysis (Griinbaum, 1996, 281;Kitcher, 1992, 153).

The factors cited above are evidence of decline, but they have to beweighed againstmorepositive indicators.As to the traditional,medically-ori-entedpsychoanalytic nstitutes, n 1988 theAmericanPsychologicalAssocia-tion went to court and secured the rightof psychologists to be acceptedintothe institutes. Thatthe APA went to courtat all is a sign that some psychol-ogists believe thatpsychoanalysishas a future; he resultof theirwinningthecase may be a reinvigorationof some of the traditional nstitutes. Further-more, new practitionersmay come from otherplaces besides the traditionalmedically-oriented nstitutes, ncludingthe psychoanalytic nstitutes set up insome psychology departments,such as New York University and AdelphiUniversity,andfromprofessionalschools thatprovideadvanceddegrees forpsychotherapists.In addition,Division 39 (Psychoanalysis)of the American PsychologicalAssociation still shows signs of vigor. Its membershiphas not been declin-ing, and it has recently produceda 28 chapterbook, writtenby leading schol-ars, dealing with researchresults on a wide variety of psychoanalytictopics(Barron,Eagle,andWolitzky, 1992).

As to Freud's current nfluence,the situation s mixed. Clearly,Freudiansare less influentialin the AmericanPsychiatricAssociation then they werebefore the developmentof drugtreatments or clinical problems.As to thefacts that Kitchercites (1992, 153) aboutthe neglect of Freudin Americanpsychology departments, t is difficult to know what to make of them giventhe historyof the relationshipbetweenpsychoanalysisandacademicpsychol-ogy. To oversimplifya bit, Freud was often ignoredor treatedskepticallybyAmerican academicpsychologists (for some of this history, see Hornstein,1992). His being ignorednow is not new.688 EDWARD ERWIN


20/27

On the question of citation rates, Friman,Allen, Kerwin, and Larzelere(1993) discuss this issue, and theirfindingsarea bit surprising.On the basisof an examination of citation rates for psychology journals for the years1979-1988, they concludethatthe ratesarenot as high as those for cognitiveand behavioralpsychology,butthat indicationsof decline aremarginal.Theyalso note (661) thatFreudis still cited more thanall othersources in historyexcept Lenin, Shakespeare,Aristotle,the Bible, andPlato.As to therapy,althoughorthodoxpsychoanalysis s not widely usedtoday,shortterm psychoanalyticallyorientedpsychotherapys still a majorfactorinthe field of psychotherapy,and there is an active experimentalresearchpro-gram designed to test its efficacy. Finally, whateverthe situation is in theUnited States, there are at least 40 psychoanalytic institutes in countriesaroundthe world. Generalizationsaboutthe fate of psychoanalysisneed totakenote of the differingsituations n differentcountries.

The currentstatusof psychoanalysis is not a crucial issue for any of themain argumentsof either Kitcheror Grtinbaum; linger on it because I sus-pect that many philosophersand academic psychologists, and some estab-lishment analysts, share the view that the future of psychoanalysis is notbright.I do not say thatthis view is clearlymistaken,but rather hatthe pic-tureis somewhatmixed:dark n some areas,much brighter n others.

Regardlessof its actualprospectsfor survival,we can ask if the Freudianresearchprogramought to continue.This clearly raises a differentquestionfromthe sociological onejust discussed.

Suppose,contrary o fact, thatthe insurancecompaniesposed no problem,thatthe traditionalnstituteshadquiteenoughapplicants, hat Freudianviewswere widely taught n psychiatryand psychology departments, tc. Even if allof this were true, there might still be reason to abandonFreudianresearchprograms.Whetherdiscontinuanceis warranted,all things considered, is acomplicatedissue; one needs to consider,for example,practicalfactorscon-cerningcost, efficiency, the availabilityof people willing to do the research,etc.. There are,however,three epistemicreasonsfor discontinuance n so faras the primarygoal of the research is one endorsed by ScientificRealism,i.e., the discovery of the truthor falsity of Freudian claims. These reasonsmay not be decisive, but they need to be considered.First, after a hundredyearsof suchresearch, here still exists no credible evidence for virtuallyanydistinctive Freudian heoreticalor therapeutichypothesis(Grilnbaum,1984,1993; Erwin, 1996); second, althoughthis cannotbe ruled out altogether,asubstantialevidential improvementis unlikely (see Erwin, 1996, 292-96);and third,for many of the kinds of phenomenathatFreud was tryingto ex-plain, there are much more promising alternativeresearch programsnowavailable in the areas of cognitive science, neurobiology, linguistics, andcognitive-behaviorherapy.

REVIEWESSAY 689


21/27

Many, of course, disagree with one or more of the above three reasons(see, for example,Fisher and Greenberg,1996). Even if thatdisagreement sput aside, however,there is another ssue: Not everyone who argues for moreFreudian research does so for reasons associated with Scientific Realism.Some argue thatinstead of trying further o figure out whereFreud was rightor wrong, we should continue to use his theories for heuristic purposes, inparticular or suggesting ideas about experimental esearch. doubt that Freudhimself would have been content with this instrumentalistposition. On anumberof occasions, Einstein expressed admiration for Freud's brilliantachievement while withholding assent about the truth of his theories. Afterreceiving one such congratulatory letter from Einstein, written to honorFreud's eightieth birthday,Freud responded(referringto his own theories):

ButI have often asked myself whatindeed there is to admire about them ifthey are not true-i.e. if they do not containa high degree of truth quoted inGrubrich-Simitis,1995).

We neednot,however,be guidedby Freud n ourphilosophyof science. IfFreudian heoryhas instrumental alue, thenwhy not use it guiding research?However, some cautionis obviously needed.Althougha false theorycan in-spire fruitful research,its use can also lead to intellectual sterility. It is im-portant, then, to make some judgment as to where Freudian views are notmerely unconfirmed,or off by just a little bit, but are off target altogether.That may mean,however, thatin some cases, findingevidence of truthor fal-sity may be required n orderto judge the instrumental alue of Freudianhy-potheses. To the degree thatwe cannotget such evidence, we may be unableto judge whether a particularpartof the theory is likely to be valuable inguidingresearch.We could extend ourgaze backward,andlook at the histori-cal record, but that requiresa complicatedaccounting, separating heuristicsuccessesandFreudiannspired esearchdead-ends.

One could also adopt a mixed instrumentalist-realist osition, and arguethat Freudianresearchshould be continuedpartlybecause some of Freud'sviews might still be confirmed,andpartlybecausewe might learnsomethinguseful about other matters.

So far,I have beendiscussingFreudian researchprograms,butmany psy-choanalystsand philosopherswho see a future for the field have somethingdifferentin mind. Many arebettingon eitherobjectrelationstheoryor self-psychology, and the therapies associated with these theories, ratherthanFreudianpsychoanalysis. One thing that adherentsof either theory tend toagree on is that the origins of psychopathology, at least for the non-psy-choses, are traceableto the pre-oedipalperiod, especially the firstyear of aninfant's life. A second commonalityamong objectrelation theoristsand self-psychologists is therejectionof Freudiandrivetheory.

Predictions about the probable payoff of the researchprogramsfor thenewer versions of psychoanalysisare likely to be speculative;in any event,690 EDWARD ERWIN


22/27

the issues are much too complex to resolve in a shortspace. Thereare, how-ever, certainempirical,conceptual,and epistemologicalquestionsthat need toconsideredbefore one of these newertheories can be judged a viable replace-ment forFreudian heory.

If one looks at the psychoanalyticournals, one finds widespreadappeal tovarioushypotheses of Melanie Klein, and her successors among the Britishschool of object relations theory, and to theories developed by Hans Kohutand other self-psychologists. How many of these theoretical hypotheses,however,have been confirmedby the results of controlledexperiments?Howmanyare well supportedby empiricalevidence of any kind?

MorrisEagle (1993) reviews the currentevidence, and finds some supportfor a few hypotheseshere and there, about, for example, the interruptionofphysicalcontactbetweenmotherand infant eadingto abnormaldevelopment.However,on the questionof support or specific hypotheses aboutthe natureand etiology of psychopathology,the nature of mental functioning,and hy-potheses about effective treatment,Eagle's conclusion is that the hypothesesaregenerallynot supportedby empiricalevidence.

Otherquestionsthat need to answeredareconceptualin nature.Althoughone can identify certainhypotheses of various objectrelations theoristsandself-psychologists, what is the overall theory for each school? Part of theproblem n answering he questionis that there appears o be no single theoryeven within each paradigm.Perhapswe shouldnot ask about the objectrela-tions theory, but about the object relationstheory (or theories) of MelanieKlein, or W. R. D. Fairburn,or D. W. Winnicott, etc. If there are multipletheories within each school, however, then which one is being referred towhen philosophers and analysts say: We accept psychoanalytic theory, atleast in part, but object relations theory or self psychology rather thanFreudian heory? Exactlywhichobjectrelationstheoryor self-psychologicaltheory s beingembraced?The problemof laying out the respective theories of the object relationsschool and the self-psychologists,moreover, s notmerelythat therearemul-tiple theories. Anotherproblemis that the key theoretical terms of the vari-ous theories are used in radicallydifferentways by differenttheorists, andsometimes by the same theorist.One of the most widely used of these is theterm self', but it is used in a bewilderingvarietyof ways. Some self-psy-chologists and object relations theorists use it to denote an agent within theperson,but the termis also used to refer to a person, self-representations,hecore of one's personality,etc. (for otheruses among psychoanalysts,see Er-win, 1997, 35-42).

More unclaritiesappearif one looks at other key concepts, such as theconcept of an object or that of a self-object (Erwin, 1997, 36-37; 38).Additional ambiguities will be found if one examines how traditional

REVIEWESSAY 691


23/27

Freudian concepts are now used, such as transference , counter-transfer-ence ,and resistance .

Pointing to unclarities and ambiguities does not show that the researchprogramsof eitherthe object relationsor self psychology theorists ought notto continue. It does, however, prompt again the question:What exactly arethe newer psychoanalytic theories that are supposed to replace Freudiantheory?One may take the positionthat the conceptual unclaritiescan be resolvedwith a little patientwork, and that there is no need to be worried yet aboutthe lack of empirical evidence. Yet there is a furthermatterof an epistemo-logical kind, which I think ought to be of greaterconcern.

Consider Wollheim's appeal (1993, 58) to Melanie Klein's hypothesisabout how the infant acts, and what goes on in its mind, in the first fewmonths of life: Inits oral-sadistic phantasiesthe child attacks its mother'sbreast,andthe means it employsareits teeth andjaws. In its urethalandanalphantasiesit seeks to destroy the inside of the mother's body, and uses itsurine andfacies for thispurpose.

The problemhere is notmerelythatmany yearsafter Klein formulatedherhypothesis, it still lacks supportingevidence. The more serious problem isthis:How could we get such evidence ever, even if the conjecturewere true?Should we rely on the traditionalargument rom analogy,or inference to thebest explanation? do not see how either of these traditional trategiesfor es-tablishingwhat goes on in the mind of another s going to work in this sortof case.

Melanie Kline's hypothesis may be thoughtto be unrepresentative,butconsider the postulationof self-psychologists of the various experiences ofthe infant that are reflected laterin life in the mirroring, dealizing, or twin-ship transference.How do the self-psychologists figureout what these vari-ous experiencesof the infantwerelike?Or,look at Winnicott's(1960) variousconjecturesabout the infant's mindwhen it emerges from the state of being merged with the mother,or its de-velopment of a false self, or its anxiety about annihilation, or its beliefsabout transitionalobjects . Winnicott,unlike the typical self psychologist,did observemanyinfants n his role as a pediatrician,but how did he discoverwhat was going on in their minds? His answer is that he did not make his

discoveries by observingchildren.Instead,he claims (1960, 594) thatit is... from the study of the transference n the analytic setting thatit is possi-ble to gaina clear view of whattakesplace in infancyitself.

Here is where Grunbaum'sargumentsburst through again. How doesWinnicott, or other object relations theorists or self psychologists, resolvethe difficulty of eliminatingcontaminationby suggestion when they rely onclinical findings concerning the transference?Even if thatproblem weresolved, how does the theoristmove frompropositionsdescribingthe behavior692 EDWARD ERWIN


24/27

of adult clients duringthe analysis of transference o conclusions aboutwhatwent on in their minds when they were infants? As Grtnbaum asks: Howdoes the analyst demonstrate hat the originalpathogenis replicatedat all inthe clinical setting, even if it had been shown that there is an infantilepathogen at all? Many analysts still rely on free association to make theircase, but in the light of Grunbaum's riticisms,what is the basis for attribut-ing epistemicvalue to these associations?Finally,even if varioushypothesesabout what goes on in thepre-oedipalperiodwere confirmed,how would oneestablish a causal connection,withoutdoing controlledexperiments,betweenthe infantile mentalevents and later pathology? There couldbe a causalcon-nection of some sortbetween, for example, the failureto develop a trueselfand the development of mental disorders,as some object relation theoristsclaim, or betweenthe earlyfragmentation f the self and the developmentof anarcissisticpersonality,as hypothesizedby self-psychologists, but how willwe everknowwithoutdoing controlledexperiments?

In short,althoughI makeno predictionsaboutthe futureof researchpro-grams associatedwith the newer psychoanalytictheories, I do not see howoptimismabouttheirlikely fruitfulnesscan be warranteduntil the above em-pirical,conceptual,andepistemologicalquestionsareansweredsatisfactorily.A philosopher,of course, may not be concerned aboutsuch issues; one maycontinue using the newer versions of psychoanalysisin doing what I earliercalled psychoanalyticanthropology , .e. drawingout the implications ofthese theories concerningthe mind or humannature.Eventually, however,someone has to go to the bankto see what the notes areworth.The danger sthat the newer theories will prove to be merely differentdenominationsofmore worthlessconfederatemoney.

In thinkingabout the future of psychoanalysis,there is at least one moreoptionthatshould be considered. Some who areoptimisticaboutpsychoana-lytic researchmay have in mind somethingmore modest thanwhat has beendiscussed so far. For example, one might propose that we study the causalrole of unconsciousideas, or defenses mechanisms,or what goes on in whatis called the ransference ,withoutbeingconcernedaboutwhether herespec-tive hypothesesaredistinctively psychoanalytic, et alone Freudian n nature.Othersproposeresearch hat takes accountnot of psychoanalytic heoriesbutof phenomenaunearthedn psychoanalyticpractice.

Proposalsof eitherkindmay holdmorepromisethan those discussedear-lier. For example,thereis quitea bit of experimentalworkbeing done on theso-called cognitiveunconscious ;see also the work of cognitive-behaviortherapists,such as Aaron Beck and his colleagues,on the role of unconsciousschemas in maintaining depression. What is unclear, however, is whetherthereis enoughhere of a specificallypsychoanalytickind tojustify a separatepsychoanalyticresearchprogram.It may turnout, then,thatwhatis valuablein psychoanalysis (for example, some of the clinical descriptionsof Kohut,

REVIEW SSAY 693


25/27


26/27

Fisher,S. and Greenberg,R. (1996) FreudScientificallyReappraised:Testingthe Theoriesand Therapy.New York:Wiley and Sons.

Freud, S. (1953-1974) Standard edition of the Complete PsychologicalWorks of Sigmund Freud, translatedby J. Strachey et al. London:HogarthPress.

Friman, P., Allen, K. Kerwin, M., and Larzelere, R. (1993) Changes inmodern psychology:A citation analysis of the Kuhniandisplacementthesis. American Psychologist, 48: 658-64.

Glymour,C. (1993) How Freud left science. In Philosophical Problems ofthe Internaland External Worlds:Essays on the Philosophyof AdolfGriinbaum, edited by J. Earman, A. Janis, G. Massey, and N.Rescher. Pittsburgh,Pennsylvania:Universityof PittsburghPress.

Grubrich-Simitis, . (1995) No greater,richer,more mysterioussubject [...]than the life of the mind :An early exchange of letters betweenFreudand Einstein.Int.J. Psycho-Anal.,76: 115-22.

Grinbaum,A. (1984) The Foundationsof Psychoanalysis: A PhilosophicalCritique.Berkeley,California.:Universityof California.

Grinbaum,A. (1986) Author'sresponse.The Behavioral and BrainSciences,9: 266-81.

Grinbaum,A. (1990) Meaning connectionsandcausal connections in thehumansciences; The poverty of hermeneuticphilosophy.Journal ofthe AmericanPsychoanalyticAssociation,38: 559_577.Grinbaum,A. (1993) Validation n the Clinical Theoryof Psychoanalysis:AStudy in the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis. Madison, Connecticut.:InternationalUniversitiesPress.

Grinbaum, A. (1994) Freud's PermanentRevolution: An Exchange. NewYorkReview of Books XLI: 54-55.

Grtnbaum,A. (1996) Is psychoanalysisviable? In The Philosophy of Psy-chology editedby W. O'Donohue andR. Kitcher.London:Sage.Grunbaum,A. (1997) A new critiqueof Freud'sneurobiologicalandpsycho-analytic wishfulfillment theories of dreaming. Unpublishedmanuscript.

Holzman,P. (1993) Introduction. n A. Grunbaum,Validation n the ClinicalTheory of Psychoanalysis: A Study in the Philosophy of Psycho-analysis. Madison,Connecticut: nternationalUniversitiesPress,Inc.

Hornstein,G. (1992) The returnof the repressed:Psychology's problematicrelations with psychoanalysis, 1909-1960. American Psychologist,47: 254-63.

Kitcher,P. (1992) Freud's Dream: A CompleteInterdisciplinaryScience ofMind.Cambridge,Massachusetts:MITPress.

Levy, D. (1988) Grtnbaum'sFreud.Inquiry,31: 193-215.Levy, D. (1996) FreudAmong the Philosophers.New Haven, Connecticut:

Yale UniversityPress.REVIEW ESSAY 695


27/27

Luborsky, L., Mellon, J., Alexander, K., van Ravenswaay,P., Childress, A.,Levine, F. Frits-Cristoph,D., Cohen, K., Hold, A., and Ming, S.(1985) A verification of Freud's grandest clinical hypothesis: Thetransference.ClinicalPsychology Review, 5: 231-46.

Macmillan,M. (1997, 1st ed. 1993) Freud Evaluated: The CompletedArc.Cambridge,Massachusetts:MIT Press.

Marmor,J. (1970) Limitations of free association . Archives of GeneralPsychiatry, 22: 160-65.Meehl, P. (1995) Commentary.Journalof the AmericanPsychoanalyticAs-

sociation, 43: 1015-21.Rorty, R. (1996) Sigmund on the Couch. The New YorkTimes Book Re-

view, September22.Sulloway,F. (1979) Freud:Biologist of the Mind. New York: Basic Books.Winnicott,D. W. (1960) The Theoryof the parent-infant elationship,Inter-

national Journalof Psycho-Analysis,41: 585-97.Wollheim, R. (1993) The Mind and Its Depths. Cambridge,Massachusetts:

HarvardUniversityPress.

696 EDWARD ERWIN

Documents

Erwin Philosophy