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Ernest

Gellner Words and Things

An examination of, and an attack on, Linguistic Philosophy

Foreword by Bertrand Russell

With a new preface by lan Jarvie

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First published 1959 by Victor Gollancz Ltd

First published by Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd 1979

First published in Routledge Classics 2005 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada

by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor 11{ Francis Group

© 1959,1979,2005 Estate ofErnest Gellner © 2005 the Preface to Routledge Classics edition, I an Jarvie

Typeset in Joanna by RefineCatch Limited, Bungay, Suffolk Printed and bound in Great Britain by TJ International Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

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ISBN 0-415-34548-o

The later Wittgenstein ... seems to have grown tired of serious thinking and to have invented a doctrine which would make such an activity unnecessary. I do not for one moment believe that the doctrine which has these lazy consequences is true ...

The desire to understand the world is, they think, an outdated folly.

Bertrand Russell

CONTENTS

FOREWORD BY BERTRAND RUSSELL Xi

PREFACE TO THE ROUTLEDGE CLASSICS EDITION XV

AcKNOWLEDGEMENTS xxv

INTRODUCTION: The Saltmines ofSalzburg or Wittgensteinianism Reconsidered in Historical Context

II

Of Linguistic Philosophy 45 1 Introductory 45 2 First Approaches 48 3 A Theory of Philosophy 49 4 A Theory of the World and of Language 51 5 A Theory of Mind 53

Of language 1 The Theory of Language Expanded 2 Language Games 3 The Four Pillars

58 58 59 61

viii CONTENTS CONTENTS ix

4 The Argument from Paradigm Cases 63 5 What One Looks Like when not Looking 183 5 From Fact to Norm 70 6 "Seeing the World Rightly" 186 6 The Contrast Theory of Meaning 74 7 The Sages of Lagado 189 7 General Comments on the Three Fallacies 78 8 Not to Ask the Reason Why 193 8 The Cult of the Fox 79 9 The Proselytising Solipsist 197 9 Everything is Unlike Everything Else 87 10 The Elusive but Comforting Doctrine 199

10 The Best of all Possible Languages go 11 The Delphic Insight 202 12 The Argument from Impotence 206

Ill Of Philosophy 94 13 Conclusion 214 1 Activity not Doctrine 94 2 The Imperturbable Universe 97 VI Structure and Strategy 216 3 Flashback 104 Explanation ofthe Diagram and Instructions for Use 216 4 Logical Atomism 109 1 The Structure of Linguistic Philosophy 218 5 Logical Positivism 119 2 The Spectrum 224 6 Logical Constructions 130 3 The Prayer-Wheel 228 7 Common Sense 132 4 The Needle in the Haystack 229 8 Transition 139 5 Philosophy by Filibuster 230 9 Appearance and Reality, or Monsieur Jourdain's 6 The Reluctant Centipede 231

Revolt 142 7 The Withering away of Philosophy 232 8 The Spurious Fox 233

IV Of the World 144 9 Two-tier Doctrine and Invertebrate Philosophy 234 1 The Secret of the Universe 144 10 The Full Circle 235 2 Naturalism 149 11 Solvitur Ambulando 237 3 A Special Kind of Naturalism 152 12 Differential Realism 238 4 The Bait and the Trap 159 13 The New Koran 240 5 The Turn of the Screw 162 14 Saladin's Fork 242 6 Triple Star 163 15 The Indian Rope Trick 245 7 De Luxe 168 16 Philosophy by Frisson 247

17 Keep them Guessing 248 v Of Knowledge 170 18 Insinuation and Taboo 250

1 The Circle of Knowledge 170 19 Whoever Said This? 252 2 Multiplication beyond Necessity 176 2o Offensive and Defonsive Positions 253 3 Some Contrasts 178 21 A Sense of Decorum 255 4 Realism and Idealism 180 22 Collective Security 255

X CONTENTS

VII Assessment 1 What Remains? 2 The Circularity 3 Travesty ofThought

4 Failure of Normativeness

5 The Paradox of Passivity 6 The Dimensions of Caution

7 The Dimensions of Empiricism. . 8 Linguistic Philosophy as an Onentatton and a

Style ofThought 9 A Collector's Piece

10 Originality 11 The Corruption ofYouth

VIII Implications 1 Religion 2 Politics

3 The Three Stages ofWeltanschauung

IX Sociology 1 Philosophy and Sociology 2 An Ideology

3 Some Comparisons 4 The Narodniks of North Oxford 5 Science, Power, Ideas 6 Internal Organisation

7 Conspicuous Triviality 8 Philosophy as an Institution

9 A Secularised Established Religion 10 Rival Styles 11 Existence precedes Essence

X Conclusion

INDEX

257 257 260 263 267 272 276 279

280 282 284 287

290 290 293 296

301 301 305 308 312 314 317 321 323 325 329 332

343

347

FOREWORD

By Bertrand Russell

Mr Gellner's book Words and Things deserves the gratitude of all who cannot accept the linguistic philosophy now in vogue at Oxford. It is difficult to guess how much immediate effect the book is likely to have; the power of fashion is great, and even the most cogent arguments fail to convience if they are not in line with the trend of current opinion. But, whatever may be the first reaction to Mr Gellner's arguments, it seems highly probable­to me, at least-that they will gradually be accorded their due weight.

The first part of his book consists of a careful analysis of the arguments upon which linguistic philosophers rely. He sets forth what he calls "The Four Pillars" of the theory of language which forms the basis of the philosophy in question. The first of these four pillars he calls "the argument from the Paradigm Case". This consists in reasoning from the actual use of words to answers to philosophical problems, or from a conflict in actual uses to the falsehood of a philosophical theory. Mr Gellner quotes as an example of this argument what some, at least, of the

Xii FOREWORD

linguistic philosophers regard as a solution of the free-will prob­lem. When a man marries without external compulsion, we may say, "he did it of his own free will". There is, therefore, a lin­guistically correct use of the words "free will", and therefore there is free will. No one can deny that this is an easy way to solve age-old problems. The second of the four pillars consists in inferring values from the actual use of words. The third, which is called "the Contrast Theory of meaning", maintains that a term only has meaning if there is something that it does not cover. The fourth, which is called "Polymorphism", maintains that, since words have many uses, general assertions about the uses of words are impossible. All these four pillars assume that common speech is sacrosanct, and that it is impious to suppose it capable of improvement. This fundamental dogma, it is not thought

necessary to establish. While the first portion of Mr Gellner's book is admirably

done and very necessary for the support of his general conten­tions, I have found the later chapters even more interesting. In these later chapters he examines the motivation of the advocates of the new philosophy and the effects which it is likely to have if it remains prevalent. What he has to say in these later chapters will, I fear, be resented, though, in my opinion, unjustly. Linguistic philosophy, he says, "has an inverted vision which treats genuine thought as a disease and dead thought as a para­digm of health". It excludes almost everything that is of genuine interest, and prescribes either ineffable mysticism or dreary exe­gesis of the nuances of usage. It is attractive because it has renounced science and power, and because it is suitable for "gentlemen" in a society which has become democratic. With .a reference to Veblen's theory of conspicuous waste, he accuses It of" conspicuous triviality". It holds, he says, that the best kind of thought is pedantic and dull, and that ideas are to be eschewed because they are generally products of carelessness and confu­sion. This criticism is summed up in an epigram: "A cleric who

FOREWORD xjjj

loses his faith abandons his calling, a philosopher who loses his redefines his subject."

Behind all the minute argumentation of the linguistic philo­so~h~rs, there is a curious kind of arid mysticism. In Wittgen­stem s. Trac~atus, .the mysticism still had a certain substantiality, but With t1me. It has .grown continually more dim and dusty. Ne~er~eless, 1t remams an essential ingredient. Wittgenstein ~am tamed that there are things of which one carmot speak. This VIew, which is an essential part of all mysticism, Mr Gellner parodies and rejects in the final sentence of his book: "That which one would insinuate, thereof one must speak."

For my own part, I find myself in very close agreement with Mr Gellner's doctrines as set forth in this book. The outlook which underlies the linguistic philosophy is one which has recurred at intervals throughout the history of philosophy and theology. Its most logical and complete form was advocated by those who adopted the Abecedarian heresy. These heretics main­tained that all human knowledge is evil, and, since it is based upon the alphabet, it is a mistake to learn even the ABC. Carl­~.tadt, originally an ally of Luther, after adopting this heresy, forsook all study of Holy Scripture and looked for Divine truth

at the mouths of those who, by all ordinary men, were accounted the most ignorant of mankind"*. In milder forms ~.irnilar doctrines have been not uncommon. Pascal's dictu~ the heart has its reasons which reason does not know" leads

easily to such views. So does Rousseau's adulation of the "Noble Savage". Tolstoy's admiration of the peasants, and his preference for Uncle Tom's Cabin to more sophisticated literature, belong to the same way o~ feeling. The Oxford Abecedarians do not reject ~I human learmng, but only such as is not required for a First m Greats-i.e .. such as has been discovered since the time of

• Dictiooory of Sects, Heresies, Ecclesiastical Parties and Schools of Religious Thought, edited by the Rev. John Henry Blunt, D.D.

XiV FOREWORD

Erasmus. This, surely, is a somewhat arbitrary limit. I cannot see why we should not condemn everything discovered since the time of Homer or the time of Adam and Eve. It is only by means of a mystic illumination that science is shown to be unnecessary for a philosopher, and one would suppose that the insight thus

derived might just as well be more sweeping. When I was a boy, I had a clock with a pendulum which

could be lifted off. I found that the clock went very much faster without the pendulum. If the main purpose of a clock is to go, the clock was the better for losing its pendulum. True, it could no longer tell the time, but that did not matter if one could teach oneself to be indifferent to the passage of time. The linguistic philosophy, which cares only about language, and not about the world, is like the boy who preferred the clock without the pen­dulum because, although it no longer told the time, it went more easily than before and at a more exhilarating pace.

PREFACE TO THE ROUTLEDGE CLASSICS EDITION

Words and Things is a philosophical polemic that bears comparison with some of the great demolition jobs of the past. 1 It criticized and undermined Linguistic Philosophy, a movement that dom­inated English-speaking philosophy in the mid-twentieth century and that threatened to transform the subject into con­ceptual therapy. Gellner examines both the movement's ideas and what he takes to be the intellectual sleight-of-hand by means of which they are expounded. He shows that key ideas are never stated, rather insinuated by attacking disapproved ideas, and that there is systematic denial of all attempts by outsiders to state these ideas. Gellner allows that no single philosopher affirms all of the ideas of the school, indeed some of the set are inconsistent

1 I have in mind David Hume's Dialogues on Natural Religion, Voltaire's Candide, Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer's many attacks on Hegel, Heinrich Heine's Rdigion and Philosophy in Germany, Thomas Love Peacock's Nightmare Abbey, Nietzsche's The Gay Science and Beyond Good and Evil, George Santayana's The German Mind. A Philosophical Diagnosis.