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An Investigation into the Causes of the Six Day War: To What Extent was the Outbreak of the Six Day War a result of
Cold War tensions?
Syed Ibrahim Rashid #002730-0102 Internal Assessment History (HL) March 16th, 2015 Word Count: 2,000
Table of Contents Section A: Plan of the Investigation .................................................................... 3 Section B: Summary of the Evidence .................................................................. 4 Section C: Evaluation of Sources: ......................................................................... 6 Section D: Analysis ..................................................................................................... 8 Section E: Conclusion ............................................................................................ 11 Works Cited: ............................................................................................................... 13
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SECTION A: PLAN OF THE INVESTIGATION
The topic of this investigation is: To what extent was the outbreak of the Six-Day War
a result of Cold War tensions? The Six-Day War of June 1967 was a full-scale war between
the armies of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan against Israel, which ultimately resulted in an Arab
defeat (Westervelt).
To determine the effect of the Cold War on instigating the conflict, this investigation
will examine the USSR’s policies in the region and their relations with Syria along with
Egyptian president Nasser’s policy towards Israel.
To answer the aforementioned question, primary sources such as a speech by Nasser
will be used along with secondary sources written by Israeli and Soviet historians about the
USSRs role in the Six-Day War. Two sources, Foxbats over Dimona by Isabella Ginor, an
Israeli historian, and The Soviet Union and the June 1967 War, by Yaacov Roi and Boris
Morozov, two soviet historians, are used to evaluate the role of the USSR in instigating the
conflict in which Roi’s work is a direct response to Ginor’s Foxbats over Dimona. Moreover,
The Soviet Union and the June 1967 War by Roi and Morozov along with Nasser and the Six
Day War, 5 June 1967: A Premeditated Strategy or an Inexorable Drift to War? By Moshe
Gat will be evaluated for their origin, purpose, value and limitations.
Word Count: 219
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SECTION B: SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE
• 1947: US President Harry Truman issues the Truman Doctrine, indicating, “it was
America’s job to contain communism” (The Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan).
• 1954: American forces enter Vietnam to topple the communist Viet Cong forces (Vietnam
War History).
• 1956: US Sixth-Army Naval Fleet is stationed in the eastern Mediterranean to aid Arab
allies (Marolda).
• September 1959: Israel begins work on the National Water Carrier to transport water from
the Jordan River to the Negev Desert (Gat 614).
• 1966: The existence of the Dimona Nuclear reactor in the Negev desert is unveiled and
Nasser warns that Egypt will attack Israel if she is suspected to possess nuclear weapons
(Gat 610).
• April 7th, 1966: The Israeli air force attacks Syrian artillery batteries without warning
destroying six Syrian aircraft in the process (Gat 618)
• November 4th, 1966: Egyptian-Syrian Defense Pact is signed promising collective security
in the event of Israeli military aggression (Gat 617).
• May, 1967: 70,000 Egyptian soldiers are stationed in Yemen to aid the rebels in the
Yemeni Civil War (Gat 613).
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• May 20th, 1967: Soviets inform Egyptian defense minister Shams Badran of an Israeli
troop buildup on the Syrian border (Morozov 47).
• May 22nd, 1967: Nasser closes the Straits of Tiran, a naval seaport, to Israeli ships. Israel
views this as an act of declaration of war (Morozov 55).
• May 23rd, 1967: Soviets issue a statement requesting that all sides cease hostilities and
issue restraint (Golan 60).
• May 27th, 1967: The Soviet ambassador to Egypt Marshal Grechko remarks to Shams
Badran that, “if America enters the war we [The USSR] will enter it on your [the Arab]
side” (Oren 125).
• May 29th, 1967: Nasser declares in a speech to the Egyptian National Assembly that, “the
USSR supported us [Egyptians] in this battle [against Israel]” (Williams 163).
• June 5th, 1967: Israeli forces launch a preemptive air strike against the forces of Jordan,
Syria, and Egypt, starting the Six Day War (Gat 608).
Word Count: 290
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SECTION C: EVALUATION OF SOURCES:
The Origin of Source 1, Nasser and the Six Day War, 5 June 1967: A Premeditated
Strategy or an Inexorable Drift to War? Is an article written by Moshe Gat in the academic
journal Israel Affairs, volume 11, no.4 published in August 2006 by Taylor and Francis.
Israel Affairs is an academic journal containing articles covering Israeli art, history, politics,
and economics (Israel Affairs) while Taylor and Francis is a publishing firm that publishes
and distributes academic journals via the Internet on topics in the humanities and sciences
(About Taylor and Francis).
The purpose of this source is to provide an academic analysis on whether Nasser
willingly instigated the Six-Day War or if Egyptian-Israeli tensions made the outbreak of the
conflict inevitable.
Source 1 is valuable for historians studying the influence of the Cold War on the
outbreak of the Six-Day War because it’s author, Moshe Gat, is the head of the General
History Department at Bar-Ilan University, Israel (Gat 608). Being a leading researcher, Gat
is able to provide a reputable academic analysis challenging the view that Cold War tensions
instigated the conflict by providing an alternative argument emphasizing the role of Nasser
and Egyptian-Israeli tensions in causing the war. Moreover, as this document a secondary
source published in 2006, Gat is able to produce a holistically balanced analysis by evaluating
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many factors in hindsight in relation to one another that were not apparent following the
outbreak of the war.
The limitation of this source is that it only analyzes Nasser role and Egyptian-Israeli
tensions, making it difficult for historians to determine how American-Soviet tensions
influenced the outbreak of the war.
The Origin of Source 2 is a book titled The Soviet Union and the June 1967 War
published by the Stanford University Press in 2008 by Yaacov Roi and Boris Morozov. Both
authors are faculty at Tel Aviv University where Roi is a professor of history while Morozov
is a research fellow for European studies (The Soviet Union).
The purpose of Source 2 is to provide an academic analysis arguing that the Soviet
Union did not intentionally orchestrate the outbreak of the Six-Day war due to Cold War
tensions.
The value of this document for historians studying the effect of the Cold War on
instigating the Six-Day War is that it is solely dedicated towards analyzing the role of the
Soviets during the war by evaluating their relations with Syria and Egypt, their policies during
the Six-Day War, their naval presence in the Mediterranean, and their response to the
outbreak of the war; all of which offer an opportunity to arrive at a well informed decision on
the research question.
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A limitation of this document, which is mentioned in it’s preface, was the authors
difficulty in obtaining primary sources since access to Soviet-Era documents from the
presidential, military, and intelligence archives is restricted by the Post-Soviet Russian
government. This necessitated an emphasis on using oral history and documents from
American, Israeli, Arab, and former Warsaw Pact countries such as Yugoslavia for much of
the analysis (Roi xii).
Word Count: 497
SECTION D: ANALYSIS
Following the establishment of the Truman doctrine, the USSR and the USA were pit
against one another vying for global dominance in the Cold War. To establish hegemony in
the Middle East, Isabella Ginor claims that the USSR instigated a regional conflict between
Syria and Egypt against Israel to expand their influence, gain access to oil resources, and
counteract the growing American presence (Ginor 22) as Soviet regional dominance would be
assured as an armed confrontation would increase Arab dependence on the USSR for military
resources and aid (Morozov 48). As the Americans were heavily involved in Vietnam, the
Soviets expected American neutrality and Israeli passivism in the face of aggression
(Morozov 53), hence a Soviet sponsored victory would increase their prestige, giving them
the upper hand in their Cold War against the west.
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However, this claim assumes that the Soviets had faith in an Arab victory. Petr
Ivashutin, the head of the GRU (The Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of
Defense) of the Soviet Union, expressed concerns that neither Syria nor Egypt would be able
to withstand an Israeli assault by highlighting the April 7th, 1967 attack as evidence of Israel’s
military superiority (Morozov 50). Moreover, Nasser already had 70,000 soldiers stationed in
Yemen by May, 1967 (Gat 613), so an Arab defeat was almost but guaranteed in the Soviets
eyes. As the Arabs were Soviet allies, their defeat would only dampen Soviet prestige and
influence in the region.
Although the presence of the US Naval Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean was definitely
something the USSR had wanted to see limited, instigating a losing war between the Arabs
and the Israelis would only hamper their efforts in curtailing the American presence
(Morozov 51).
These realities show how the USSR saw now strategic interest in orchestrating an
Arab-Israeli war.
However, despite this, the USSR had deliberately relayed false information to the
Egyptians regarding the buildup of Israeli troops on the Syrian border (Morozov 48). To
counter Isabelle Ginor’s claim that this was done to achieve Soviet regional dominance, Boris
Morozov believes that this was done to protect Syria, their ally. According to Moshe Gat, the
April 7th attack of 1967, “had shown the extent of Syria’s vulnerability to Israeli air power.
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…[And highlighted] Syria’s isolation, as none of the Arab states, Egypt included… [came to
Syria’s] aid” (Gat 618). While Morozov explains that, “the Soviets…had anticipated that
after receiving the information about Israeli troop concentrations… Nasser would move his
troops… [To] ensure Syria’s security… [By deterring] Israel with the threat of a two-front
war” (Morozov 52). Essentially, the Soviets sought to invoke the Egyptian-Syrian Defense
Pact to force Nasser to create a buffer zone between the Israelis and Syrians to prevent any
further hostilities.
However, it is important to note that prior to this, Nasser already had sufficient reason
to wage war with Israel. Nasser felt that Israel’s expansion of the National Water Carrier
would strengthen their economic power allowing them to further expand against Egyptian
interests, something he was willing to counteract with a military solution (Gat 614-615).
Moreover, the announcement of the Dimona Nuclear plant in the Negev desert only further
fueled Egyptian-Israeli tension (Gat 610).
Despite this, Gat explains that, “Nasser would only fight if victory was assured” (Gat
614). So when the Soviet Ambassador to Egypt remarked that the Soviets would support
Egypt only if America intervened (Oren 125), Nasser interpreted this as a sign of unequivocal
military support against Israel, as evidenced by his speech to the Egyptian National Assembly
(Williams 163). Although Nasser’s forces were loosely spread in Yemen, he believed that
with Soviet support, he would emerge victorious against Israel.
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This misinterpretation of the Soviets message gave Nasser the confidence to act
aggressively and close the Straits, counter to the Soviets desires, thus mistakenly instigating a
war he was ill prepared for. The Israelis saw this as an act of declaration of war (Morozov 55)
which they countered with a preemptive, defensive strike against the Arabs, thus starting the
Six-Day War (Gat 608).
The Arabs were defenseless as the USSR never planned to intervene militaristically.
Their support was conditional upon an American intervention, which, because of their
presence in Vietnam, seemed highly unlikely (Morozov 53). The USSR was never really
committed towards engaging in an armed confrontation, which is highlighted by the fact that
prior to the war, they had publicly called for a de-escalation of the crisis and urged restraint
between both sides (Golan 60). This shows that although they had willingly relayed the false
information, they had no intention to see the outbreak of a full-scale regional war, hence
absolving them of the responsibility of willingly instigating the conflict.
Word Count: 745
SECTION E: CONCLUSION
Clearly, the Soviet Union saw no intrinsic strategic value in instigating an Arab-Israeli
war. Not only did they believe that the Arab armies were inferior to Israel’s, but also, they
were unwilling to intervene militaristically. While it is true that the Soviets did in fact relay
the false information towards Nasser regarding the buildup of the Israeli troops on the Syrian
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border, this was done to deter Israel from any further acts of aggression against Syria. Nasser
already had ample reason to wage war against Israel but acted aggressively only because he
believed that he had the unequivocal support of the USSR, which was not the case.
In conclusion, the outbreak of the Six Day War was caused by both a
miscommunication between the Soviets and the Egyptians along with the buildup of
Egyptian-Israeli tension in the region over the issue of Nuclear power and water as opposed to
being caused by Cold War tensions. However, this conclusion neglects the possibility that the
war was caused by Israeli aggression. It was well established that the Israeli Defense Force
was superior to any collective Arab force, suggesting that the Israelis didn’t really believe the
Arabs would or could wage war against them, thus calling into question whether their
preemptive strike was really defensive. So it can’t be said with complete confidence that
Egyptian-Israeli tension and the Soviets miscommunication had caused the war, as it is
possible that Israel acted aggressively for some ulterior motive, a claim that demands further
investigation.
Word Count: 249
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Inexorable Drift to War?" Israel Affairs 11.4 (2006): 608-35. Taylor & Francis
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