Environmental Change and Security Program Report 4: Event Summaries

7/31/2019 Environmental Change and Security Program Report 4: Event Summaries

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2 May 1997

The Findings of the EnvironmentalScarcities, State Capacity and Civil Viol

Project: China, Indonesia and IndiaCHARLES VICTOR BARBER, WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE

JEFFREY BOUTWELL, AMERICAN ACADEMYOF ARTS AND SCIENCESELIZABETH ECONOMY, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

THOMAS HOMER-DIXON, PEACEAND CONFLICT STUDIES PROGRAM, UNIVERSITYOF TORONTOVALERIE PERCIVAL, UNITED NATIONS

VACLAV SMIL, DEPARTMENT OF GEOGRAPHY, UNIVERSITYOF TORONTO

[Editors Note: The following summaries are from the Project on Environmental Scarcities, State Capacity,Violence, a joint project of the University of Toronto and the American Academy of Arts and Scienceaddressed these studies.]

SUMMARYOF THE CHINA CASE STUDYby Elizabeth Economy

Since 1978 and the onset of reform in China, water scarcity in many regions of China has intenstrained economic development and rapid societal change without attention to the ramifications of theseformations for the environment and natural resource use have placed Chinas already threatened waterunder tremendous stress. Population and water use per capita are growing; the physical condition ofwater facilities is aging; competition between the potential uses for water is increasing; aquifers aredepleted; water pollution is rising; and the societal costs of subsidizing increased water usage are inc

Chinese residents currently face a shortage of 28.8 million cubic meters of water daily. AccordWestern expert, these shortages cost the Chinese economy between 5 billion yuan and 8.7 billion yuan1 (US $620million and US $1.06 billion) in 1990. The China case study examined the impact of growing wastate capacity. Perhaps surprisingly, it concludes that while water scarcity contributes to diminish stateit does so primarily in an indirect manner and over the long term. The more compelling story isand economic reforms are transforming the very nature of the state. This process, in turn, has impthe overall capacity of the state to develop and implement the policies neccesary to respond to waterthe PRC.

The reform process has ramifications for several characteristics of state capacity: the states legitimfiscal strength, its coherence and its reach. Frequently, the relationship between the reforms and thesea negative one. The reforms have engendered an overwhelming emphasis on economic growth, a devoauthority from central to provincial and local levels,2 an institutionally weak environmental protection bureau-cracy especially relative to other industrial and economic agencies, and corruption at all levels of th

bureaucracy. These trends all contribute to diminish the efficacy of the state. At the same time, thcontribute to enhance state capacity. Institutional innovation within the system of environmental protectioextended the reach of the state. Moreover, greater openness to the international community has enhfiscal strength.

The reform process also has a more direct impact on levels of water scarcity. Continued populatirising standards of living, and rapid industrialization intensify the problem of scarcity in water resourceter use per capita is growing, competition between the potential uses for water is increasing, and wtion is rising.

The picture that is painted by these trends is a complex one. The Beijing leadership recognizreforms have diminished state capacity as well as contributed to a growing range of natural resourcproblems. However, its legitimacy is rooted in the continued exponential economic growth that these

Environmental Change and Security Project ReportIssue 4 (Spring 1998): 94-99


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Wilson Center Meetings

have engendered during the past almost two decades.Thus, while Beijing is racing to redress the negativeinstitutional and environmental ramifications of thereforms through campaigns, exhortations, and newlaws, it is not willing (or in some cases not able) toimplement policies that might slow the pace of eco-nomic development, such as raising the price of water,increasing pollution discharge fees, or devoting suffi-cient state financial resources for local water conserva-tion or waste management projects.

In this scenario of overall diminishing state capac-ity and growing demand for resources, the impact of water scarcity on state capacity might be expected to be dramatic. However, it is not. In some respects, thepotential negative ramifications are mitigated by op-portunities presented through the transformation of state capacity by the reforms. Nonetheless, there areimportant signals that over the longer term, water scar-city may indeed significantly diminish state capacityin several key areas.

Both demand- and supply-induced scarcities of water are increasing demands on the state for new in-frastructure such as dams, canals, wastewater treatmentfacilities, and irrigation systems. This is placing greaterstress on the fiscal strength of the state. Beijing hasattempted to shift a greater portion of the burden of financing these projects on to the local and provincialgovernments as well as the international community.In many cases, however, the provinces lack the re-sources to make such substantial investments. EvenBeijing has been stymied by the overwhelming costs

associated with its desired river diversion project.response to the growing responsibility of local leato pay infrastructure costs, they have used Chinategration with the international community to turnthe international community for substantial fundingassistance for these infrastructure projects.

While the short-term implications of this behavappear relatively benign, there are potentially quserious longer range ramifications for state capacFirst, the autonomy of the state may be diminisha greater reliance on foreign lenders. These lendeonly provide financial aid but also insist on additpolitically sensitive measures such as pricing reforIn addition, a diminished role for Beijing in theing of projects and greater dependence on local soof funding also suggests a longer-term decline inreach of the state that will not be limited tomanagement issues. Local leaders, especially at thevincial level, have become increasingly vocal inopposition to some state policies. For exampleSichuan governers vocal response to Beijings inequate financial contribution for resettlement engendered by the Three Gorges Dam indicates a thrlegitimacy of the state. In its most extreme foloss of legitimacy and decline in the reach of tcontribute to social instability and violent demonsttions of the sort that have occured among thosefor resettlement or already displaced along the YanRiver.

Both demand- and supply-induced water scarcityresult in substantial interprovincial conflict. Cont

THE CASE STUDYOF BIHAR, INDIA

by Thomas Homer-Dixon and Valerie Percival

Despite robust economic growth in the last few years, India is beset by a daunting combinationPopulation growth stubbornly remains around 2 percent; the country grows by 17 million peoplwhich means its population doubles every 35 years. Demographers estimate thateven underoptimistic estimatesIndias population will not stabilize below 1.7 billion. Cropland scarcity andtion affect large areas of the country. While data on the state of Indias forests are of lowshortages, deforestation and desertification can be found over wide areas.

Resource scarcities in many rural areas, combined with inadequate opportunities for alternativployment, have produced rural-urban migration. The growth rate of Indias cities is nearly twicecountrys population. Their infrastructures are overtaxed: Delhi now has among the worst air p

any urban area in the world, power and water are regularly unavailable, garbage is left in the ssewage system can handle only a fraction of the citys wastewater.Indias recent urban violence was concentrated in the poorest slums. Moreover, it was not e

munal violence: Hindus directed many of their attacks against recent Hindu migrants from rural arapidly growing urban population also leads to evermore competition for limited jobs in governm business. Attempts to hold a certain percentage of government jobs for lower castes have causeconflict.

These pressures express themselves in a social environment already stressed by corruption andnal animosity. Political parties, including the Congress Party, increasingly promote the interestsnarrow sectors of society. The central government in Delhi and many state governments areceived as incapable of meeting the societys needs and have lost much of their legitimacy.


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ued population growth, as well as increasing demandsfrom industry and agriculture, contribute to diminishthe coherence of the state by engendering a growingnumber of interprovisional claims to these water re-sources. Rising pollution levels also result in growinginterprovisional disputes over the responsibility andcosts of treatment facilities and clean-up costs. Theseproblems are endemic with little prospect for immedi-ate resolution. Moreover, Beijing has yet to develop aneffective mechanism for resolving such conflicts.

Water scarcity and pollution also occasionally havetriggered violence in rural and urban areas. There isno evidence that these are more than isolated incidentswith limited ramifications over the long term. It isworth mentioning, however, the extreme scenario inwhich security continues to grow, especially in urbanareas, and a more sustained challenge to the state isposed. In continuation with a contraction in theeconomy and the continued spread of corruption andabuse of power at both the elite and local levels, a muchmore threatening form of urban civil violence, involv-ing migrant workers, unemployed state enterpriseworkers, grain-short urban dwellers, and disgruntledpeasants, might arise.

In the final analysis, water scarcity probably doesnot pose a substantial or direct challenge to state ca-pacity. Moreover, as provincial and local regions growwealthier, they may replace the center as the primaryinitiator and financial sponsor of environmental pro-tection policies. Thus, while state capacity may be di-minished in some respects, other elements of the statemay emerge to respond more effectively to regionalwater demands. In this context, water scarcity in China

should be considered a long-term threat to continuedeconomic growth and state capacity that has yet to beacknowledged fully by the Chinese leadership. Evenso, it remains a challenge that China may well meet asthe economic and political reform process evolves.

1 Vaclav Smil,Environmental Problems in China: Estimates of Economic Costs , East-West Center Special Reports, No. 5 (April1996): 55.2 This process is not uniformly negative for state capacity.

For more information on the Project on En-vironmental Scarcities, State Capacity, andCivil Violence, go to the Projects websiteat http://utl1.library.utoronto.ca/WWW/ pcs/state.htm

SUMMARYOF THE INDONESIA CASE STUDY

by Charles Victor Barber

Indonesia is the worlds fourth most populous na-tion, and the planets largest archipelago. Blessed witabundant natural resources and one of the earths greatest assemblages of biological diversity, Indonesia wasnonetheless among the poorest nations in the mid-1960s, with a per capita income of just $501 and itseconomy in shambles. Since coming to power following a spasm of civil violence sparked by an attemptcoup in 1965events that left as many as 500,0deadthe New Order regime of President Soehartohas utilized exploitation of the archipelagos rich natu-ral resourcesprimarily oil, timber, and mineralsto jump start and sustain a process of economic development that the World Bank has praised as one of best in the developing world. The economy grewnearly 8 percent annually in the 1970s, and despite

ternal shocks averaged 5.3 percent in the 1980s.capita income has risen from $50 in 1967 to $650and poverty has been cut from 60 percent to anmated 15 percent of the population.

The regime has, however, used natural resourcesas more than timber for economic growth. The deery of tangible development benefitsincreased foodproduction, roads, schools, health care, and the liketo a large segment of the populace, made possiblerevenues from resource extraction has helped amelio-rate long-standing social cleavages within Indonesianeconomy and society and cement allegiances to the rgime.

Natural resourcesand resource policieshavealso been used to strengthen various dimensions of thNew Orders states capacity. Natural resource rev-enues have provided a strong financial basis forstrengthening state power, while natural resourcespolicies have provided an important vehicle for pro- jecting New Order values and priorities throughoutsociety.

In this process, new conflicts have arisen betweenstate-led resource extraction activities and local com-munities deprived of their long-standing access to for-ests and other resources. Up until now, the regime been relatively successful in localizing, suppressing, orresolving these conflicts far short of the point whethey might, taken together, pose a threat to the regimcapacity or stability.

The states ability to contain conflict over naturaresources has depended, though, on particular circum-stances: abundant natural resources; continued eco-nomic growth and poverty reduction for many; an efficient and heavy-handed military intelligence anddomestic security apparatus; transformation of the elec-toral process into a state-controlled mechanism for re-inforcing regime leg it imacy; a quiescent and


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have created a wholly new class of educated, iningly mobile, urban, and informed people with greexpectations for political participation and less tolance for autocratic or corrupt behavior on the pgovernment officials and agencies.

The concentration of natural resource-based wealtin the hands of a small political-economic elite, inthe presidents family is very prominent, is under ging attack from many parts of society. The powconspicuous consumption of these elitesoften ethnChinese in league with members of the presidentsily and other regime figuresis increasingly unacceable to a general public long suspicious of the cowealthy Chinese minority; to the rising middle cwhich sees its own business prospects constrainedcronyism; and to elements within the military andvilian state elite itself who see the growing poweprofile of the Chinese conglomerates and the kidsobstacles to a smooth presidential succession, andpotential source of general social unrest and poliopposition.

President Soeharto, 75, has been in power1966, no clear successor is in view, and there isableor even testedmechanism for managing thcrucial political transition. The sudden death owife in May 1996 and a highly publicized tripmany for medical treatment a few months laterthese questions front-and-center. Soeharto is the lipin and the symbol who holds the New Ordegimeand hence the current stability and prosperof Indonesiatogether.

It is unclear exactly what the Indonesian statapart from the New Order regime, and it is e

unclear what the New Order without Soeharto willlike.As current trends and events play themselves

over the next decade, it seems unlikely that thecan continue to contain growing conflicts over naresources, continue to appropriate the resource renneeded to maintain the support of clients and threaucracy, or sustain the cohesion of the elite intand actors who constitute the power centers of tgime. With three-fourths of the nation claimed asforestalled and the pressures on those lands buildifor example, forest lands and resource conflictslikely to intensify far beyond the current situation

Indonesia holds the second largest tract of tropforests on the planet. Currently thought to cover92-109 million hectaresan expanse second onlyBrazilsthey blanketed more than 150 million haresover three-fourths of the nationas recently1950. In the Outer Islands, many forest areas ha been home to indigenous groups which gained tlivelihoods from forest farming, hunting, and gathing.

Since the late 1960s, these forestsand theon which they growhave played important roles

depoliticized peasantry and urban workforce; the con-tinuity of President Soehartos thirty-year rule; and asmall and politically quiescent middle class willing toaccept authoritarian politics in exchange for growingeconomic prosperity.

All of these conditions are changing rapidly in themid-1990s: Conflicts over natural resources are not aslocal as they once were, due to the globalization of communications and strengthened international hu-man rights and environmental advocacy networks. Theinternational development Zeitgeist has changed inthirty years from a single-minded focus on economicgrowth to sustainable development, with growingattention to environmental, social, and human rightsconcerns. It is no longer as acceptable to break a feweggs locally in order to make an omelet of nationaleconomic growth. And as Indonesia takes a higherprofile on the international stage (chairing the Non-Aligned Summit in 1993-1994 and hosting APEC in1994, for example), the government is more sensitiveto international opinion.

The natural resource base of the country is increas-ingly degraded, leaving less for the regime to exploit,and less for the growing rural population to seek itslivelihood from. Forests, for example, are declining byas much as 1 million hectares per annum, and Indone-sia is expected to become an oil importer early in thenext century. At the same time, while the relative shareof primary commodities in total GDP has declined from60 percent in 1970 to 39 percent today, and will likelyreach 17 percent by 2010, the absolute value added fromprimary commodities in total GDP has declined from60 percent in 1970 to 39 percent today, and will likely

reach 17 percent by 2010, the absolute value added fromprimary commodities has more than doubled over thepast twenty years, with nonrenewables (oil, LNG, min-erals) up 128 percent and renewables (agriculture,fishing, and forestry) up by 91 percent. The total valueof these sectors is expected to increase by 50 percent by2010. Thus, while the regime will continue to rely onnatural resources, it will do so in the face of growingabsolute scarcities, pressures to conserve, and increas-ing demand from growing rural populations.

Indonesias economy and society have changeddramatically since the 1960s, and the pace of change isaccelerating, leaving a transformed sociopolitical land-scape in its wake. The economy grew at nearly 8 per-cent annually in the 1970s, and despite external shocksaveraged 5.3 percent in the 1980s. The manufacturedgoods sector has grown by an average 11 percent an-nually since 1986. Per capita income has risen from$50 in 1967 to $650 today, and poverty has been cut bytwo-thirds, and life expectancy at birth has increased by twenty years (almost 50 percent). Fifteen percenturban in 1970, the countrys population is already 30percent urban today, and may reach 50 percent by 2020.The regimes impressive development achievements


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the political and economic strategies of the New Or-der. They have been a substantial source of state rev-enue, a resource for political patronage, a safety valvefor scarcities of land and resources in densely popu-lated Java, and a vehiclethrough the policies appliedto themfor penetrating New Order ideological, po-litical, security and economic objectives into the hin-terlands. In short, forest lands, resources, and policieshave been a key arena for the New Orders program of economic development, political control, and social andideological transformation.

Under these circumstances, it is not surprising thatforests have become the arena for increasing levels of conflict, sometimes violent, between the interests of local communities on the one hand, and those of thestate, its clients and agents on the other. Allocation of the huge resource rents derived from commercial for-est exploitationsuch as the $1.3 billion ReforestationFundhave also recently provoked disputes within theelite.

These conflicts have potential to erode state capac-ity in various ways, although only the community-levelconflicts have realistic likelihood of turning violentsome already have. Even short of violence, local forestconflicts are poisoning relationships between local com-munities and government agencies and increasing lo-cal resistance to both forest production and conserva-tion efforts. And conflicts within the elite over the dis-tribution of forest resource rents threaten to weakenthe coherence of power centers within the New Orderconstellation. As these conflicts grow, they are com-pounded by increasing absolute scarcity of forest re-sources and intensifying population pressures on the

forest frontier.The ability of the regime to respond to these snow- balling pressures and conflicts is limited by forest policychoices made over the past few decades. From nearlynothing in 1966, the timber and forest products indus-try has with the states active support grown into ahighly concentrated, wealthy, and well-connected po-litical and economic actor dependent on cheap rawmaterials, used to high levels of profit, and accustomedto passing the environmental costs of unsustainablelogging practices to local communities, the state, andsociety at large. The industry is now a significant fac-tor in forest policy-making and thus lessens the au-tonomy of the state to move policy in directions thatmight be more sustainable but would hurt the indus-try.

At the same time, just as consensus is growingamong forest management experts and many govern-ment policy makersnot to mention nongovernmen-tal organizations and donor agenciesthat sustainableforest policies must grant local communities greateraccess and more participation in management, thestates capacity to work with or even listen to local com-munities is severely constrained by three decades of

top-down development policies and the erosion of community management capabilities caused by thesepolicies.

Moreover, the New Orders capacity to adapt itspolicies to deal with these growing conflicts is weain contrast to the nimbleness of its macroeconomicpolicy-making in recent years. The choices and pocies of the New Order over the past three decadesveloped from the perceptions and experiences of itsleaders during the first twenty years of Indonesias independence, and the violent transition from Old Or-der to New. Those policies have served the interinterests of the state well over the past three decadAnd they have delivered sustained and broad-basedeconomic and social development to the majority ofIndonesia, although they have also been the cause ofgreat deal of oppression and suffering for some. Bthe regime now seems bereft of ideas, mechanisms, anskills to adapt to the rapid changes engulfing thechipelago in the late 1990s. Unless the dormant reseof political and social ingenuity is soon tapped, thimpressive development gains of the past three decadesmay prove fragile in the face of growing conflicts oforest and other natural resources, and the broader societal conflicts which they mirror.

And the challenges of the next few decades wrequire vast amounts of ingenuity to surmount. B2020, Indonesias population will likely rise from 18million to nearly 260 million, a 45 percent increase.percent of that population will be urban, up frompercent in 1990, putting pressure on Javas irrigated riclands, some 10 percent of which may be convertedmunicipal and industrial uses over the next two de

cades. Total GDP will increase by 320 percent overand fully 63 percent of it will come from manufacing and services by 2010. Demand for petroleum pructs by 2020 will expand nine-fold, and the demanfor electricity thirteen-fold. Proven oil reserves will bexhausted by about 2015 even at current rates oftraction, and the production of coal and natural gas whave skyrocketed. With rapidly rising demand, though,it is likely that Indonesia will be a net oil importeas soon as 2000.

In the forestry sector, as current deforestation ratescontinue, an additional 15 million to 32.5 million heares of forest will be lost by 2020. And the defor agricultural land, timber plantation sites, and coalmining will increasingly compete with logging, inten-sifying pressures and probably increase the deforesta-tion rate. If demand for wood continues to climbpresent rates, a serious timber shortage seems likely.And while the timber plantations are the cornerstoneof the governments strategy to bring supply in linwith demand, the bulk of current investment in timbeplantations are for stock to feed the new and rapidexpanding pulp and paper industry, not to replace timber now coming from the natural forests.


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To ameliorate growing scarcities of renewable re-sources, minimize the spread of scarcity-induced con-flicts, and protect the capacity of the state from ero-sion, the New Order must take its ingenuity gap se-riously, and take steps to close it. Failure to unfetterthe generation and delivery of ingenuity needed to dealwith the complex challenges of the next few decadeswill stunt the ability of both state and society to counterthe impacts of growing resource scarcity. These chal-lenges include intensifying social conflicts (some vio-lent), impediments to the continued growth of theeconomy, rising social dissatisfaction and seriousthreats to the legitimacy and overall capacity of theIndonesian state. Failures of ingenuity are likely toreinforce themselves: lack of creative state adaptationto increasing scarcity and conflict may in themselveseven further limit the states ability to respond effec-tively. As conflicts grow more severe, the state maycut itself off from innovative solutions that might oth-erwise arise from local communities and other elementsof civil society.

This need not be. Indonesias rich resources andincredible diverse cultures provide the basis for rapidand sustained increases in ingenuity equal to the chal-lenges of rising population and consumption, a fixedresource base, and growing scarcities. The history of Java, where nearly 100 million people65 percent of the populationlive on 7 percent of the countrys land,shows the potential of the Indonesian people for pro-

ductive social and technical adaptation to the growingscarcity (although other islands, with far poorer soils,could not support anything near Javas populationdensity). The portfolio subsistence strategies of manyOuter Islands peoplesin which reliance on a widevariety of crops and income sources secures the peoplagainst scarcities of any sourceprovide another im-portant example.

Nor is the New Order state apparatus itself berefof ingenuity by any means. The dramatic economrise of Indonesia since the 1960s, the major strides magainst poverty and illiteracy, and the deft handling oglobal economic turbulence in the 1980s amply illustrate the ability of this regime to produce ingenuity aact upon it. Anyone who has spent time working wofficials of the Indonesian government will attest thatthere are untold numbers of them bursting with innovative ideasboth visionary goals and rudimentarypracticalitieson how to better realize the goals of sutainable development, stability, and equity. If the com bined ingenuity of the state and society can beleashed from the outmoded and harmful structures,attitudes, and webs of special interests that have developed over the past thirty years, Indonesia will standa good chance of surmounting the challenges of rsource scarcity that all of humanity faces on the cof the twenty-first century.

1 The dollar amount ($) mentioned in this paper representU.S. dollars at the exchange rate as of May 1997.

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9 May 1997

Civilian-Defense Partnerships onEnvironmental Issues:

Past Lessons and Successes,Potential Pitfalls, and OpportunitiesKENT BUTTS, U.S. Army War Colleges Center for Strategic Leadership

SHERRI GOODMAN , Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Environmental SecurityMARC CHUPKA , Assistant Secretary of Energy for Policy and International Affairs

JONATHAN MARGOLIS , Senior Advisor for Regional Policy Initiatives, Department of StateWILLIAM NITZE , Assistant Administrator for International Activities, Environmental Protection Agenc

DOD ROLE /CONTRIBUTION /COMPARATIVE STRENGTHS /FUTURE PLANSSHERRI W. GOODMAN

The Department of Defense has a long history of working to protect the environment. Thereeight thousand environmental professionals working in the Department of Defense. Senator Inhothe Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Readiness, said last month that environmental issuesquality of life, military training, and readiness of our military facilities.

We now realize that there is a linkage between environmental degradation and resource stabilityworld. In his Earth Day remarks this year, Defense Secretary Cohen said, environmental protectionthe Defense Department mission, and environmental considerations shall be integrated into all of itsWe have evolved from perceiving environmental considerations as a strain on military activitiesthem as opportunities to serve as good stewards. From the top generals to the newest recruittoday makes environmental protection a matter of business.

At home we are committed to building partnerships with other agencies like State, EPA, Enercitizens and non-governmental organizations. One of the things that we are trying to bring to tability to work with the different militaries around the world. We have tried to reach out witproach, working closely with the unified commands within the Department of Defense: Southern Comthe Western Hemisphere, European Command for Europe and Africa, Pacific Command for the Aregion, Central Command for the Middle East, and then Atlantic Commands for the Atlantic areregionally or with individual militaries, DoDs environmental experts can help build institutional andtual capacity within these nations to address environmental issues.

We are working under the terms of our Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), with EPAleverage the resources that our agencies have. For example, there is an effort among Russia, NUnited States to bring U.S. environmental management techniques and methods to the Russian miticularly the Russian navy. The Russian navys activities include operations in the Kola peninsula,

far from the Norwegian border. As virtually any Norwegian will tell you, the threat Norway feetoday comes not from weapons, but from contamination by Russian fleets very close to the NorwThe Norwegian defense minister approached the U.S. Secretary of Defense in June 1994 and askengaging the Russian military on these issues.

In September 1996, Secretary of Defense William Perry and the Russian and Norwegian defensigned a Declaration on Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation (AMEC). Since then, the U.S.,and Russian militaries have combined their efforts to begin applying modern environmental managemniques to address military-related radioactive and non-radioactive problems in the Arctic. We aresupporting Russian efforts to use proper environmental methods in their submarine dismantlement procTo build trust and cooperation with the Russian military, we share information and provide trainiand education.



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We think that through global engagement, we canpromote democratization and very importantly, civil-ian control of the military. Our activities show greatpromise in fostering international security and regionalstability.

DOE ROLE /CONTRIBUTION /COMPARATIVE STRENGTHS / FUTURE PLANSMARC CHUPKA

Environmental problems vary from region to re-gion and in time span. Some problems are immediate,and some are longer term.

One environmental problem in particular directlyrelates to the stability in Russia and the Newly Inde-pendent States. Civilian nuclear reactors may affectthe health of local and regional populations. Every-one may recall the destabalizing effect of the Chernobylcatastrophe on the region and on the environment, thehealth of the people, and the government. Nuclearweapons clearly present an environmental securityproblem.

In Central and Eastern Europe, definitions of se-curity are expanding. Providing such services as cleanwater, healthy air, environmental protection, and eco-nomic support is essential to the countries collectivestrength and viability. Environmental components todevelopment become part of the security equation.

The Department of Energy has been engaged indismantling the nuclear legacy of the Cold War hereand abroad. We now know that environment and se-curity are linked. One of our major responsibilities re-lates to controlling nuclear weapons and materials.

Our focus on energy security traditionally concernsglobal oil markets as our nations main energy provider.To secure our energy sources, we must invest in cleanand efficient energy production.

The Department of Energy can make an impact inmany different areas by improving science and tech-nology. The DoEs enormous investment in high per-formance supercomputing has allowed us to keep ournuclear deterrent viable without actually testing weap-ons. These same computational capabilities help us tostudy weather patterns, the evolution of ecosystems,the dispersal of pollutants, and global climate change.

One project that we are working on involves im-proving nuclear safety in Russia. A major effort goesinto the transport of weapons-grade materials. UnderProject Sapphire, we moved about 600 kilograms of highly enriched uranium that we got out of Kazakhstanin 1994.

We are also focusing on the safety of nuclear facili-ties. Since Russian facilities that house high demandsubstances have sleeping guards, rusty padlocks, andfences with holes, we find ourselves in an incrediblydangerous situation. We are working with the DoDand the EPA on the AMEC treaty, and we are also work-

ing with officials from several Nordic countriessite in Estonia.

Our most extensive programs are geared towarimproving the safety of Soviet-designed nuclear retors. In the past five years, we have actuallyvolved in safety operations at twenty reactor sitessixty-four operating reactors in eight countries.have also been working in Poland and Hungaryduce emissions from coal power generating facilitincrease efficiency, improve waste water treatmentcilities, and clean-up some contaminated sites.

Our agencys ability to lead on some environmtal security issuesregional or globaldepends ocontinued support. I think the American peoplsupport our efforts, if we continue to reap benef both the environmental and security sides.

EPA ROLE /CONTRIBUTION /COMPARATIVE STRENGTHS / FUTURE PLANSWILLIAM NITZE

The idea behind the new cooperation on theronment (with the Department of Energy and thepartment of Defense) is that the definition of nasecurity has expanded to include conflicts causedenvironmental degradation.

From the EPAs perspective, environmental security can best be described as a process wherebylution for an environmental problem figures intotional security objectives. Each environmental activcomplements other major goals of this administratioWith the help of a participatory democracy, nonernmental organizations, open processes for resolvin

conflict, and laws and statements, we would likenhance environmental performance.The EPA mission statement asserts that EPA

work with other key agencies to minimize environmtal problems in the Ukraine as well as in othetries that may over time have significant negativepacts on U.S. security. The philosophy behindmission statement is to avoid border patrol soluti by making it more attractive for people to livestable conditions at home rather than to immigratthe United States and other developed countries.

Because human pressure on the environment hgrown, the environment has become a much moreportant component of what I call the civil societylenge. We have to work with investors andgroups to transfer environmentally-friendly technol-ogy that stimulates investment, builds jobs, promoeconomic opportunity, and improves the quality ofProperly conceived environmental security programswill be able to achieve all of these goals.

For example, the Murmansk Project grew outRussias noncompliance with the prohibition in tLondon Dumping Convention against the disposalradioactive material at sea. We managed to get a


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ment from the U.S. government to proceed in expand-ing Russias facility for treating low-level liquid radio-active waste in Murmansk. By transfering technologyand creating investment opportunities in Murmansk and across Northwest Russia, we have helped Russia begin to implement a broader radioactive waste man-agement strategy.

In the Baltics, we had a very strong environmentalrelationship both on the civil and military fronts. TheBaltics share development interests with Poland andthe Ukraine. The Poles actually have a developmentassistance program directed towards training the Ukrai-nians. In Estonia, we hope to up-grade a rare-earthmetals facility, so that the facility can supply valuablerare metals for defense and other uses.

When dealing with a contamination problem, weneed to convert defense facilities to other uses, trans-fer technology, create commercial opportunities for U.S.firms, and protect and create jobs in local economies.As we gain more confidence in environmental devel-opment, we will strengthen both regional and globalsecurity.

STATE DEPARTMENT PERSPECTIVESJONATHAN MARGOLIS

International environmental issues have wide-ranging political, economic, and social implications,and, therefore, increasingly are and should be an inte-gral part of the conduct of foreign policy. To meet thischallenge, the State Department is pursuing both global and regional strategies. This initiative is referredto as Environmental Diplomacy.

Global environmental problems, such as climatechange, the flow of toxic chemicals and pesticides, spe-cies extinction, deforestation and marine degradationrespect no border, and threaten the health, prosperity,and jobs of all Americans. They threaten our nationalsecurity. Often, no one country is responsible for theseproblems. Many nations have contributed to theircauses, and they can be addressed effectively only if the nations of the world work together, adopting andimplementing policies that are result-oriented. It is,therefore, in our national interest to ensure that the in-ternational community takes steps to prevent and/ormitigate the potential harmful affects associated withthese global environmental problems. We use diplo-matic efforts to negotiate framework agreements andconventions, and to work bilaterally with key allies toaddress these global problems.

Some environmental problems require cooperation by countries of a particular region to solve. Regionalissues include clean air and water, water scarcity, en-ergy, land use, and urban/industrial growth. By theirnature these transboundary issues involve multipleactors in a single region, and theres no clearly definedmechanism or institution to address these problems.

Water scarcity in the Nile River is an example ofgional environmental issue that can either lead to increasing tensions about that limited resources use, or be a potential source for regional cooperation and int egra tion . Usi ng t he Nile ex ample, th e St atDepartments role is to raise environmental issues andwork towards solutions in the foreign affairs commu-nity, such as discussion on how to manage a riversin collectively, efficiently, and effectively. The implementation of these policies is then made by U.S. tenical agencies working with their international coun-terparts.

The State Department will play a major role in ring the profile of global and regional environmentalissues. Our goal is to bring other governments boardespecially in the developing worldrecogniz-ing that they may have competing interests. Balancinthese competing interests and convincing countries thateconomic growth and sustainable development are notmutually exclusive is one of our major foreign policchallenges.

COMMENTARYON CIVILIAN-DEFENSE PARTNERSHIPSWORLDWIDE: LESSONS, SUCCESSES, POSSIBLE PITFALLS

KENT BUTTS

There is substantial potential for the type of civian-defense partnership that proved successful in theBaltics. The U. S. National Security Strategy explathe benefits through its strategy of shaping the international environment. This strategy recognizes thatenvironmental issues are useful for reducing tensionsamong regional states and promoting cooperation and

communication, often among formerly antagonisticcountries. Thus, U.S. military support to regional evironmental initiatives can be seen as a mission thpromotes global security and reduces the likelihood of U.S. involvement in regional conflict or costly humanitarian missions such as Somalia and Haiti.

Often, a civilian government will recognize that ilacks the technical resources or manpower necessaryto address an environmental issue. The military how-ever, rarely wants to assume nontraditional missions because such missions often divert scarce resourcesaway from operational readiness. Thus, an importantfirst step in such relationships may be convincing thmilitary that supporting environmental operations is beneficial. It is important to identify the degree ofoperative attitude present in the militaries and, whennecessary, to dedicate resources to convincing the mili-tary that civilian defense partnerships are in its ow best interest.

There are many regions and nations where civil-ian defense partnerships on the environment are logi-cal and necessary. However, one must be particularlsensitive to regional attitudes and interagency relationswithin the countries involved. Important questions


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include, What capabilities exist in the government orprivate sector for solving the environmental problemin question? In Zimbabwe for example, the U.S. Secu-rity Assistance Program, aimed at funding African mili-taries to perform biodiversity and conservation work,was thwarted by the fact that game-park managementwas the responsibility of the police, and U.S. laws pre-vented funding police activities. If sufficient govern-mental or private sector resources exist, encouragingthe military to take over environmental missions couldundermine private sector development.

Next, it is important to examine the reputation of the military. Is it oppressive? Is it feared or revered?In some countries in which I have worked, the militarywas a guarantor of the constitution and the people re-vered it. In such situations, involving the military incivil-military partnerships promoted governmental le-gitimacy. In many countries the opposite was the case.Nonetheless, the reputations and attitudes of the mili-tary can and do change; therefore it is important not tolet the past sins of a reformed military preclude thecreative use of that military to support a strugglingdemocratic state. For example, when the Marcos re-gime was in power in the Philippines, the military wasperceived as oppressive and supportive of a corruptgovernment. Today, under the Ramos regime, the mili-tary has a substantially different reputation and has been used repeatedly by the governments Departmentof Energy and Natural Resources to supplement its lim-ited manpower and technical capabilities. The Philip-pine military has supported the government by serv-ing as forest rangers, protecting rain forests from ille-gal logging, dedicating entire units to rainforest recon-

struction programs, building artificial reefs, and pro-tecting the complex 7,000 island marine habitat fromillegal fishing.

When developing a potential program to promotecivilian-defense partnerships in a region, the best sourceof information on the elements of such partnershipscan be found on the U.S. Embassy country team. TheEmbassy can review the appropriateness of the plan,recommend how to succeed in that country, and, per-haps, suggest other donor nations, NGOs, or regionalorganizations with which a civilian-defense environ-mental partnership might also work. In addition, theEmbassy would know how this program could be usedto support other U.S. interests in the region.

Civilian defense partnerships have the potential topromote military support to democracy and providetechnical and manpower support to resource-poor gov-ernments for solving environmental problems thatthreaten to undermine the health, welfare, andeconomy of the country. At the same time however,one must be on guard not to promote military involve-ment in environmental projects when this would pro-vide a rationale for retaining a bloated military or whensuch a role would provide disproportionate importance

to a military that does not fully support the concivilian democratic rule.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Comment: What are the estimates for the budgetthe State Department is seeking? Has there beeof support from Congress and private donors?

Comment: We have an entire program for nuclearproliferation. The details are a little fuzzy right but I dont have any worries about the security budget.

Comment: We are pooling our resources. We leour people, divide training and technical assistancand provide meetings and working groups. Wenot trying to clean up fully the Cold War legcause we do not have the resources. Tax payinvest just under 5 billion dollars a year for sWe also need to draw resources from other counWe want all the participating countries, including Nway and Russia, to contribute as a sign of themitment to address environmental protection.

Most of our budget is committed to core operin North America, including Mexico. We may hadditional 2 to 4 million dollars in next yearsfor environmental security. We need to do amarketing job, to get funds from other sourcesfederal government. The U.S. private sectorandcould include small or medium sized companieslooking for markets overseas and thus has an itive to contribute to defense. Perhaps foreign go

ments can also contribute funds.In the area of banishing nuclear materialsUnited States is uniquely a market provider. Wother people have created nuclear messes, our extise is needed. Radio-active waste management isonly a serious environmental project but also aleverage for the United States to use.

Comment: Please comment on the opportunities witthe Russian military for downsizing or the potenfor defense conversion.

Comment: The Russian military will always havstrong role. In the North Sea area, unfortunatelRussian military is rather unenlightened. Understaning the problems of the locals, and the implicatiwhat is going on, and dividing the resources necefor education training would pay great benefitswould certainly indicate to our allies in the northwe recognize their needs.

Comment: We do work with militaries of othertrialized nations, and we have technology or practthat we would like to import into our own count


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example, we are learning from the Scandinavian coun-tries about new technologies. We worked with theAustralians on clean up technology, and we try to bringthose technologies or practices back into our own work.Under NATO offices, the handbook on environmentalguidelines for the military sector has been shared withmany militaries around the world, helping developenvironmental programs in the military.

Comment: How will AMEC cope with Russias inabil-ity to deal with certain projects?

Comment: That poses a very difficult problem. Rus-sia lacks funds. How much money will the Russiansput up for their projects? We have signed some projectagreements already, and we are moving forward onthese projects. We are also working closely with theRussian navy.

In Russia, if you think youve made two steps for-ward, youve usually also taken one and a half steps back. So, we have to be patient. Russia will continueto be a priority. We need Russia because of the impor-tance of the Russian military.

To deal with the legacy of the Cold War, we willcontinue to work with countries. We have active en-gagements with Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hun-gary. The possibility might exist of having meetingswith China in the near future, and we are now consid-ering the Middle East as well.

Comment: Id like to know what the next steps are interms of priorities, regional issues, and areas of the

world where you may be focusing in the future?

Comment: What are our next priorities? One ofthings that we are going to do is to set up a renvironmental house program, placing foreign serviceofficers in various embassies around the world. Thsummer that program will actually join forces with thfirst six house operations in East Africa, CentraAmerica, the Middle East, Central Asia, East Asia, anSoutheast Asia. Our next step will be to start varinter-agency teams to actually carry out some of thsubstantive activities that we have proposed.

Comment: We have shut down or redeveloped someof the military bases we have overseas. What newvironmental and economic benefits have resulted?

Comment: Many of our activities overseas are advantageous to the U.S. We conduct health impact reseaon air pollution in China that produces results difficulto obtain in the United States. Scientifically, we hcleaned out our most obvious particulate and air pollution at a much lower cost. In Mexico, we hadQuality Management district try to build in El Paso.we continue to provide such assistance, El Paso ma be able to meet its own clean air goals. Activitnorthwest Russia solve environmental problems byhelping Russians manage radioactive waste.

Domestic leadership on global issues is strategi-cally important. We can finally break through to alevel of political consensus on global climate changeWe could indeed change the world.


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May 21, 1997

Findings of the Pivotal States ProjeJOHN BRESNAN , East Asian Institute, Columbia University

ROBERT CHASE , International Security Studies, Yale UniversitySUMIT GANGULY , City University of New York/Columbia UniversityEMILY HILL, International Security Studies, Yale University

PAUL KENNEDY , International Security Studies, Yale UniversityPETER SMITH , Latin American Studies, University of California at San Diego

Paul KennedyThe United States is the last remaining world superpower. For fifty years, the Cold War

overall structure for U.S. foreign policy, including its policies towards the developing world. TheCold War has led to a period of intellectual and political confusion. Most likely, the U.S.s strathe future will remain focused upon Europe, and NATO expansion in Russia, China and Japan.States will continue to have special strategic relationships with a small number of states: Israel,Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. And, the United States will keep a close eye on rogue states likNorth Korea, and Cuba.

The other 130 states in the world represent about two-thirds of the population of the globepercent of the member states of the United Nations. What should the sole remaining superpowertowards the majority of humankind, towards the developing world? The answer is the pivotal stWhile we do not believe that the United States should get involved everywhere on earth, we wouthe consciousness level of policymakers by establishing priority regions overseas. We are calling foStates to pay special attention to the fate of a number of countries in the developing world, counpivotal states.

Todays threats in countries like Turkey, Algeria, Mexico, Indonesia, and Egypt come not froaggressions but from internal social, demographic, and environmental pressures which strain the politcess. Should some of those pivotal states collapse, American lives, business interests, and sea cocould be threatened. In this fractured, post-Cold War world, non-military sources of instability camilitary consequences.

In focusing on pivotal states, we can make foreign policy more cost-effective, protect the gloment and achieve more effective arms control. We can also secure international understanding omatters like intellectual property rights, trade abuses, child labor, illegal immigration, and human rwe can improve health in the developing world. Finally, we can use the United Nations and oth bodies more effectively, ensuring U.S. allies, like Israel, Australia, Japan, and Italy, regional stability

The pivotalness of each state varies depending on geography and the extent of regional influecountry leverages. We enjoy challenges to the selection of the nine states designated as pivotal.

Such interest in pivotal states reflects an increased willingness to define U.S. strategy in thworld. What are our priorities? How can we explain them to a suspicious Congress? How canhelp foster stability in the developing world? Given the vastness of U.S. interests across the gltant to re-examine the purposes, the intellectual coherence, and the practical execution of American

Emily HillWhat is a pivotal state? Two years ago, we began to identify states in the developing world

states, precariously balanced between hegemony and stagnation. These states were rushing to deveattempting to stave off political and social chaos. In our view, pivotal states meet the following

First, pivotal states are modernizing states that face third world challenges. They are not basSomalia, Burundi, or Zaire. Prime examples of pivotal states include Mexico and Turkey. StandIstanbul, and you can imagine yourself in modern Europe but walk three blocks, and you knowthe developing world.

Second, a pivotal state is balanced precariously between success and failure. The future couldcontinued political, social, and economic reform, or harbor chaos and regression.



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Third, these pivotal states potentially have a sig-nificant influence on their regions, perhaps as enginesof economic growth, or as models of political liberal-ization.

Most importantly, these states are geo-strategicallyplaced. They are large and populous, with a growingmiddle class, and they are located in positions of im-portance to U.S. security, perhaps near some of theworlds hot-spots or along major maritime routes.

The point is not to split hairs about which state ispivotal but rather to use this model as a means to as-sess the strategic importance of different states in thedeveloping world. Right now, the following states have been designated as pivotal: Egypt, Turkey, Brazil,Mexico, South Africa, Indonesia, Algeria, India, andPakistan.

What does the existence of these pivotal statesmean for U.S. foreign policy? The pivotal states projectprovides a rigorous means to prevent instability andto promote prosperity in the developing world. Insteadof directing scarce national resources haphazardly tohumanitarian projects, the pivotal states strategy di-rects funds to the establishment of relations with par-ticular developing countries.

After the end of the Cold War, many legislatorsthought that less money was needed for foreign policy.As Sir Halford McKinder once noted, democracies failto think strategically in times of peace. The repercus-sions of rapid change in the developing world will af-fect American national interests. A pivotal states strat-egy will encourage policymakers to confront these chal-lenges directly, before they threaten American nationalsecurity.

Robert ChaseThe pivotal states idea is a device to get people talk-

ing about American priorities at the end of the ColdWar. Many people have thanked us for getting the dis-cussion started about where U.S. interests lie, but therehas also been some criticism. One group of peoplecalled it overly simplistic to choose nine states out of 130 as pivotal. Some people asked, What aboutAmericas responsibility to the poorest countries of theworld? Another group said that for diplomatic rea-sons, it did not make sense to list openly the countriesthat the United States prioritized. A fourth group saidthat development assistance could not help foster se-curity.

That there are so many contradictory ideas aboutthe pivotal states model suggests a lack of coherencyamong international experts in U.S. foreign policy. Thepivotal states project has invested effort in bringingpeople together to exchange ideas and to share theirexpertise.

The original article on pivotal states presented thenew strategy as a pragmatic re-focusing of Americanaid. By focusing AIDs scarce and diminishing re-

sources on a limited number of countries, U.S. resourcewould make more of an impact. However, overlast year, we have learned from country experts thaeven if USAID focused all existing resources on onnine countries, these countries would see few tangibleresults. They are not looking for development assitance but rather for American investment, technology,and trade.

If the United States handles primary responsibili-ties for a list of nine states, perhaps other multilateorganizations could be given primary responsibility fordealing with other countries. Another finding is thatis important to address issues that cut across nationa borders using a state-focused framework. The NationalSecurity Council would be the most appropriate bodyto affect this sort of policy review.

The pivotal states approach offers the United Statesan opportunity to reassess its policies, ensuring coher-ence and coordination.

CASE STUDYON INDONESIAJohn Bresnan

The American public knows little about Indone-sia, a country with the fourth largest population in tworld and the largest economy in Southeast Asia.population of Indonesia is very diverse. Eighty-sevepercent of the people are Muslim; 300 separate ethngroups exist, with no ethnic majority; and 250 difent languages are spoken. The location of Indonesiastrategicwith three thousand miles of water and is-lands stretching across all the sea lanes between thPacific and the Indian oceans.

Indonesia is regionally influential, a founding

member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nationsand the leading figure in the nations diplomatic afairs. The country played a critical role in the creof APEC and in the creation of the first security orzation in the history of the Pacific nations.

Indonesia is also globally significant, with the coun-try gaining leadership among Third World countries,and currently representing a major new interest for thIMF and World Bank.

The government of Indonesia has been authoritar-ian, successful in increasing the size of the economand effective in reducing population growth over thelast twenty years, with growth down to 1.8 percentyear. The economy has grown by an average of 6cent per capita in real terms over the last twenty-fyears.

As a result of the extraordinary economic growth,rapid social change is occurring. The governmentmaking an effort to stress education and to addrespoverty issues. So many people have benefited texpectations are extremely high. During the run-up tthe recent election, riots broke out. The country ithe early stages of a political transition, in a precaristate between rapid modernization and social stress.


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CASE STUDYON INDIASumit Ganguly

Why does India matter? It matters because onecannot afford to ignore a fifth of humanity. India isone of the ten leading emerging markets, and despitesome setbacks, India is clearly on the path towards eco-nomic liberalization. In India, democratic institutionshave survived. Since 1991, India has been growing atapproximately 5 percent per capita, and the projectionis that it will grow at 7 percent. In ten years, incomewill essentially double.

What about Indias longevity? There are a number of causes for concern, including ethnic-religiousconflict and overpopulation. India adds approximatelyeleven million people, the entire population of Austra-lia, to its population every year, with important conse-quences in terms of health, housing, and sanitation.However, India is not on the verge of crisis nor in im-mediate danger of collapse. In contrast, India hasachieved extraordinary integration; the 1997 electionshave improved the governments stability; and insti-tutional renewal in India has taken place. Indiaseconomy will continue to grow, particularly as institu-tions acquire a great deal of robustness.

On the part of the United States, India has beenthe subject of considerable neglect since the 1960s.Now, there are several ways that the United States canshow a renewed interest in India. The president should be swifter in terms of appointing an ambassador. TheNSC could use a full-time staff for South Asia, and aposition similar to assistant secretary in the State De-partment should be created. The Indian region would

also be enhanced by a presidential, or at least a vice-presidential, visit. No president has visited India sincePresident Carter, and now would be a good time todemonstrate American interest in India. Regional armscontrol, particularly within the Indian military and theU.S. military, would encourage nonproliferation. Con-tinued support of economic liberalization in India, per-haps by increasing access to American markets, wouldalso help stabilize the Indian economy.

CASE STUDYON MEXICOPeter Smith

The pivotal influence of Mexico is, in some ways,overshadowed by the presence, power, and influenceof the United States. However, Mexico is critical tothe United States because of bilateral links.

The future of Mexico is difficult to predict. Rightnow, Mexico has a checkerboard democracy, withfree and fair elections and democratic rule in some sec-tors, and authoritarianism in other sectors. In the lastfifteen years, there has been an escalation of violence,a string of high-profile political assassinations, and re- bellions in Chiapas and Guerrero. The traditional po-litical apparatus is in an advanced state of institutional

disintegration.One prediction for the future is that there wi

continued process of democratization in MexicMexicos political situation is undergoing considerablchange, and it may even be possible for an oppcandidate to win the presidential election in the2000 or the year 2006. For democratization tofree and fair elections must occur.

A less fortunate possibility for Mexicos future be a throw-back to authoritarianism, with an alli between reactionary elements within the PRI (thecalled dinosaurs), segments of the military, and lenforcement agencies. In fact the populistic dinosare not all old, retrograde, corrupt, right-wingerstheir opponents claim; only some of them fit thscription. If we start seeing social unrest in Mexand other metropolitan centers, we might conceiveauthoritarian response.

Alternatively, we may see an equilibrium oreasy balance between democracy and authoritarianismin Mexico over the next ten to fifteen years. Thmean perpetuation of the checkerboard pattern thatnow in place. Though Mexico has not collMexico is no Yugoslavia, Rwanda, or Zairetherconsiderable uncertainty about its future.

According to the World Bank, the Mexican plation is likely to be 108 million by the yearmillion by the year 2025, and 165 million by theof the decade. This growth may cause unemployand social agitation, leaving the state vulnerableauthoritarian repression.

There is no sign in the near future that Mgoing to employ its next generation, so an in

number of migrants may enter the United States.are trying to build triple fences in San Diego,the budget for border patrol, and carry out operalike Hold the Line. However, these policies pumigratory stream from one place to another but doto ameliorate it.

The United States will also continue to dealdrug trafficking. Mexico was thought to be thepoint for about 30 percent of cocaine imported inUnited States in the late 1980s, and 70 to 80the mid-1990s. Newly strengthened cartels represa source of major political corruption and have can escalation of violence. These problems witinue to complicate our relationship with Mexico.

U.S. policy is, in some ways, institutionally bureaucratically balkanized between trade, state,DEA, and INS, with each agency having its owntoward Mexico. We need a more coherent andpolicy, with a reconciliation of our policies ongration and trade. Right now, we have free fcapital and products, but in contrast, no free flolabor. What can we do to improve our policiesworker programs could be explored, and collaboratialong the border could be increased. As far a


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control policy is concerned, we could turn our atten-tion away from supply control to demand reduction.

President Clinton met briefly with opposition lead-ers, in the middle of a campaign swing, two months before an important mid-term election in Mexico. ThePRI saw this as a great opportunity to bolster its ownpolitical capital. Though we applaud Mexicos transi-tion toward democracy, we have to be careful aboutour alignment with the PRI and the ruling party.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Comment: Did you make any attempt to quantify thedifferent variables to lead to your pivotal states con-clusions?

Chase: Many of the definitions that make states piv-otal are very difficult to quantify. We have, however, been putting together matrices to evaluate the differ-ent dimensions that Emily put together. Quantifyingthe different variables is certainly a valuable idea, andwe are open to suggestions.

Comment: Do you agree that leadership in having afree market is one of the most important things thatthe United States can provide?

Kennedy: I clearly support economic integration, andopen markets, but as our individual state experts wouldcaution, the transition will not come easily. For ex-ample, as Egypt opens, bureaucratic and trade union backlash will result from the high levels of unemploy-ment that accompany societal restructuring. By fo-

cusing upon the nine pivotal states, we could head to-wards a more specific state-centered policy, which wecould use in conjunction with the general message of opening the world economy.

Comment: At the heart of the rationale for pivotal statesis bringing the new security issues onto the agenda,with non-military threats leading to military conse-quences. How can these issues lead to military conse-quences in any of the pivotal states?

Kennedy: Approaching an environmentally drivensocial threshold could cause tensions and instability.For example, Egypts population is growing by 600,000per year; the population is increasing from fifty-five toeighty-five million; and the people all have to fit in afive or six mile wide distance along each side of the theNile. Significant water depletion, and large-scale youthunemployment feed the Muslim Brotherhood. As en-vironmental and population pressures build, despitesome signs of modern reforms, the regime worriesabout its social fabric unraveling.

Comment: If you are talking about U.S. aid being a less

significant factor, when pivotal states need more invest-ment, technology and trade, rather than funding, whatexactly does a pivotal states strategy accomplish?

Kennedy: The pivotal states strategy asserts that aidneeds to be viewed in a global sense. The issupopulation, migration across borders, and environmen-tal pollution across borders should be dealt with oninternational scale, not just with U.S. funds.

Comment: On what basis was Ukraine excluded aspivotal state, since it seems to meet the profile?

Chase: My own research is on the Czech RepublicSlovakia, and I originally argued to include Ukraine.However, one of the elements of pivotalness is thegree to which events in that country have broad-reaching global effects. We argue that even if there wasrendous political instability in the Ukraine, the sur-rounding nations could act as buffers from the negative impacts. Russia overshadows Ukraine as a pivotal state in Eastern Europe.

Kennedy: I cannot separate the Ukraine problem fromthe Russia problem or the future of NATO expansionso I see the Ukraine as important to our foreign po

Comment: We are working with NGOs in the FormSoviet Union, and we keep hearing that the NGOsother parts of the world are making a huge differenI am curious to know if there are some general sments that you can make about the development othe NGO sector in the pivotal states?

Comment: The NGOs can do analytical work and pvide missing information. By institutionalizing theNGOs, we can gain a unique scientific perspective ananalysis, and input on policies. The NGOs humarights sector is building up pressure in developingstates, including India, Pakistan, and Indonesia.

Comment: Dr. Hill said that it is hard to think stracally in times of peace. A corollary is that ithard to talk about environmental and population prob-lems when the global market is at its most propitiopoint of the century. How do you emphasize theenvironmental issues in the midst of a global marke boom?

Comment: It is difficult to convince the American pulic that environmental problems pose security threats,especially since the economy is booming. Most envronmental problems are not instantly noticeable. Pol-lution does not immediately cause harm. But whenthreshold is reached, suddenly major effects becomenoticeable. For example, China has devastating locaair pollution problems; in the last year, they have


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nounced that 26 percent of deaths in China are respira-tory disease related. It takes a little time for that datato penetrate, but senior Chinese policy officials knowthat staggering public health problems require atten-tion. Chinas controlled media keeps environmentalproblems from making an impression on the public.In democracies, it is easier to ignite attention towardsresolving environmental problems.

Comment: In the Philippines it was suggested that en-vironmental drag was going to affect GDP, but insteadmarkets have opened up more. Is this a case of decoupling?

Comment: With respect to environmental drag, a hugeportion of the environmental effects of economicgrowth are exported. From the rational Chinese pointof view, since they do not pay the full price for theirpollution, they have less incentive to cut down. Theydo have terrible problems with respiratory disease, butthey drag the United States into paying for some of theother pollution costs. We need to resolve this external-ity problem. If we do not signal to these countries, if we keep paying for their economic growth, there is noreal impetus for action on their part.

Comment: What is the state of political security inIndia, and how does that relate to Indias status as apivotal state?

Comment: India is a patch-work quilt, with varyingstate capacity. Certain portions of that quilt have be-come rattled with disregard for the law and corrup-

tion in the government. The prime minister is on theverge of going to jail. There are also new securitythreats in Bangladesh. The changing demographic balance in Bangladesh contributes to ethno-religioustensions. Large numbers of people are infiltrating intoIndia across the Chinese border. Indian politicians arecolluding, so they can issue these people ration cardsto vote. If I were an Indian decision maker, I wouldinvest heavily in Bangladeshs economic development.That way people there would have opportunities toturn to at home and would not seek haven elsewhere.

Comment: What would be the most useful way to in-tervene in Mexico?

Comment: Working to stop internal institutional dis-integration in Mexico and the cocaine trade is key. Inthe old days, marijuana and heroin was transported by local cartels and dealers, but today the cocaine op-eration has dramatically transformed the economic andparamilitary situation. The first thing we need to do isto change our drug policy that does not, cannot, andwill not work. We need to focus on demand instead of supply.

Tensions in countries like Mexico arise from aidly rising population, food shortages, desertificationwater depletion, and pollution. Unmanaged urbization creates public health concerns for populatioespecially along the U.S. border. Pollution andexposure, and other public health problems arise fpoor management of the development process.

Environmental factors are rarely direct causfailure, but they do create social tensions, drive ufant mortality, and cause public health threats. Ctries like Canada, Mexico, and the Caribbean havpotential to spill their environmental problems onUnited States. Air pollution and waste can filterthe border into the United States. Emissions, cchange, ozone layer, f isheries deplet ion, an biodiversity issues cause global problems. These plems present the classic collective-action problem.

Comment: What are the most environmentally signcant countries?

Comment: The two most environmentally significcountries are China and Russia. Coal burningChina pumps emissions into the sky at unprecedenrates. By 2030, China alone will contribute 30of the emissions, doubling the greenhouse gasesatmosphere. Russia, as a source of fuel for a grother countries, also emits a large share of greengases. Brazil plays a huge role in environmentalems as a sequester of carbon dioxide. Braziests are a major place for reducing carbon, andare cut, or worse yet if they are burned, therereverse effect. Rather than absorbing carbon diox

we are seeing additional emissions. Brazil also ha biodiversity, an important resource.The pivotal states strategy helps determine how

address environmental problems by asking specifiquestions. Do environmental issues affect stategional stability? Is there potential for environmspill-over in the United States? Is this countryportant player in global-environmental issues? Macountries fit this criteria, but Mexico, Brazil,and Indonesia are all superpowers in the environmtal arena. The environmental dimension is keyin shaping environmental policy and in forming aotal states strategy.

Comment: If you added states to your list of nwere environmentally pivotal, which states would yadd?

Comment: I would add states with vast populationeconomic growth which cause environmental harmsuch as Thailand, Malaysia, and Nigeria. Howevethe environmental debate, the key set of countrieany particular issue might vary somewhat in thisset. If biodiversity is a high priority, Kenya m


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additional state. If saving whales ranks a priority, Nor-way should be included. The pivotal states model can be refined, depending on the particular issue.

Comment: My fear is that leaving China and Russiaoff the list does not acknowledge the need for atten-tion to global issues. For example, on climate change,we have heard from some senior Chinese officials who basically say that the United States should treat Chinaas a developing country when it comes to internationalenvironmental issues. China would like to get moretechnology, and more assistance to meet environmen-tal challenges. My fear is that by leaving them off aspivotal states, even though Russia and China will stillget a lot of attention with traditional issues, they willnot get much needed attention as developing countries.

Comment: I do not think that we should feel threat-ened by Russia and China in the midst of your globalenvironment accords. We started off with a list of ninestates essentially to provoke debate and to identify ourpriorities.

Comment: How does the pivotal states strategy pro-pose to address the issue of human rights?

Comment: The pivotal states strategy enables the fo-cus required for the promotion and application of hu-man rights standards. An effective policy has to pro-mote and support a human rights culture. Humanrights is about protecting the physical, intellectual, andspiritual dynamic of the human condition. As the Jour-nal of Human Rightsnoted, the application of small

amounts of targeted assistance to elect core value institutions, including NGOs, could promote humanrights. Such institutions often lay the grass rootsdevelopment in human rights groups, such as citizensgroups, womens organizations, educational groups,and institutions.

Much of the human rights programs success isowed to the promotion of standards, in the formpolicies, and mechanisms. Unfortunately, promotionhas been more successful in Geneva, New York, anLondon than in Islamabad, Jakarta, and Algiers.

However, the geometric rate by which global tele-communications are accelerating has become criticalto the promotion of human rights. Rapid transnationasignaling can accelerate the response of the UnitedNations Human Rights program to individual and com-munity needs.

How can human rights laws be applied in pivotastates? If the United States human rights policies ccentrate on select states, application of the law mig be more achievable.

I would also use human rights programming inpivotal states to promote neighboring state and regionalinitiatives. Pivotal states such as Pakistan, for examplcould serve as platforms for the promotion of humarights in neighboring states, such as Afghanistan. NexI would initiate concentrated human rights monitoredtrading in pivotal states, in close conjunction with citzen and grass roots organizations. Finally, governmentsponsored national human rights institutions, such asthe increasingly effective Human Rights Commissionof India, should be supportive and new human rightsorganizations should be promoted.


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30 September 1997

Bridging the Gap between the EU andU.S.: Attitudes, Analyses, and StrategieMICHAEL GRUBB , Energy and Environmental Program, The Royal Institute of International Affairs

Last year, in Geneva, the United States called for the Kyoto negotiations to establish leading bindifor the reduction of CO2 emissions. There are still considerable skeptics who question the seriousnessadequacy of these targets, but after years of debate, governments have largely gone beyond the whethehow.

The Kyoto Agreement on restraining CO2 emissions can be more efficient and environmentally effectivethrough the use of intergovernmental emissions trading. After an international agreement enters into forgovernment may reach agreement with another participating government to exchange part of its alloemissions, so that one may emit more and the other correspondingly less. The terms upon which tthe exchange would be a matter between themthe terms might involve monetary transfer, a non-mpolitical trade-off, or something in between such as debt cancellation.

Intergovernmental emissions trading increases economic and environmental efficiency. A country whhas higher abatement costs for reducing emissions can trade with a country that has lower abatemeTherefore, the cost of achieving a collective reduction in emissions is lowered. Intergovernmental etrading also allows for more flexibility in negotiating binding commitments. Countries such as Norway be as risk-averse towards an agreement, if the security exists that when target goals cannot be metgain more emissions can ease economic strains. Clearly, introducing the option of trading increases thness of countries to enter into an agreement. Countries can then ease the political problem of anegotiating among themselves to change individual emissions levels.

A significant part of my own efforts over the past year has been to persuade European and Japanments that emissions trading is a good thing. Key European policymakers came to accept that intergotal emissions trading is a practical proposition, and that it could have advantages. But one realconcern remained: could emissions trading become a means by which the worlds biggest and richestthe United States, could escape from having to take any significant domestic action? Specifically, if

established at Kyoto are relatively weak, could the United States buy in, at little or no cost, to stional quotas to avoid having to take any significant action at all?Against this background, the European Council of Ministers met in June and crafted a simple bu

compromise that called on countries to clarify their specific commitments. The European Union statedprepared to accept the logic of emissions trading, but only if clear benefits result, with greater effabling a stronger overall outcome.

The international trade in emission allowances (ITEA) model is an easy-to-use and transparent topredicts the outcome of intergovernmental trading and explores key themes related to defining commitmethe Kyoto negotiations. The costs to the European Union, the United States, and Japan were precompared under the following conditions: without trading of CO2 emissions, with trading of only CO2 emis-sions, without trading of all greenhouse gases, and with full intergovernmental trading of all greenhouThe data used came mainly from governmental submissions made available by the International Energy AThe results show that the costs to the major OECD countries associated with reducing domestic CO2 emissions by 5 percent from 1990 levels are the same as those arising from a flat-rate reduction of 13.9 peindustrialized countries, if that 13.9 percent reduction is implemented with the full flexibility of inclugreenhouse gas emissions with full intergovernmental trading. In other words, when costs are kept cfull intergovernmental trading of all greenhouse gases results in a net benefit of about 9 percent in

Technological developments can further reduce the cost of emissions reduction and help provideefficient electricity. For example, the United Kingdom owes its ability to reduce carbon dioxide outvances in the electricity sector. Around the world, improved technology has made possible the usetive energy sources. The use of wind energy was negligible in 1990, but capacity in Europe has gro25 percent annually. Wind energy capacity in Europe is now projected to exceed 6000 MW by therapid increase thereafter.



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The most valuable aspect of Kyoto is the creationof a structure which offers a first and simple step onthe road to defining appropriate commitments. De-veloping countries should be involved, but the respon-sibility for reducing emissions should reside with thecountries that cause the bulk of the problem, releasethe most emissions, and have the best technology.When those countries demonstrate seriousness of in-tentwhen they bring their own emissions down to

historic levelsthen a precedent for developing coutries to follow will be set. Therefore, the redKyoto is a pre-condition for negotiating with deveing countries. An important goal is to remove thtation of developing countries to being drawn intomitments and to make it attractive to those couto reduce emissions. Emissions trading offers aforward.

Wilson Center Fellows and Scholars

The Wilson Center has a long history of fellows and guest scholars coming to research and write on envipopulation and security issues. Here is a selection of recent and upcoming fellows and the Wilson Centersponsoring their stays. For more information on all Wilson Center programs and projects, visit our web sihttp://wwics.si.edu.

ASIA PROGRAM :

Dai Qing - Woodrow Wilson Center FellowFreelance Writer and Jounalist, Beijing, ChinaZhang Dongsun: The Fate of Chinas Leading Indepen-dent IntellectualSeptember 1998-May 1999

DIVISION OF U.S. STUDIES

Robert Fishman - Public Policy ScholarProfessor of History, Rutgers UniversityMetropolitics: What Washington Needs to Know About

the New Regional Politics of Cities and Suburbs:September 1998-June 1999

L ATIN A MERICAN PROGRAM :

Raul Benitez-Manaut - Guest ScholarResearcher of the Centro de InvestigacionesInterdisciplinarias en Ciencas y HumanidadesUNAM, MexicoMexican National Security at the End of the Century:Challenges and Perspectives

Charles Briggs - Woodrow Wilson Center Fellow

Professor of Ethnic Studies, University of California, SanDiegoInfectious Diseases and Social Inequality in LatinAmericaSeptember 1997-June 1998

K ENNAN I NSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED RUSSIAN STUDIES :

Theresa Sabonis-Chafe - Short-Term ScholarPh.D. candidate, Department of Political Science, EmoryUniversityPower Politics: National Energy Strategies of the NuclSuccessor States June-July, 1997

Viacheslav Glazychev - Guest ScholarPresident of the Academy of Urban Environment andProfessor, Moscow Architectural InstituteCultural Foundations for the Urban Environmental

Development July-August 1997

Tatyana N. Garmaeva - Guest ScholarRussian Academy of Sciences, Siberian Division, The BInstitute of Nature ManagementProblems of Sustainable Development and the Role ofInternational Cooperation in the Lake Baikal Region January-April 1998

Frances L. Bernstein - Research ScholarPostdoctoral Fellow, Department of History of Science,Medicine and Technology, Johns Hopkins University

Gender and the Politics of Public Health in the SoviUnionSeptember 1998-February 1999

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The Challenges ofFreshwater Resources into the

Next Millennium

AGENDAFraming the Debate: Scarcity versus Distribution

SANDRA POSTEL , Director, Global Water Policy Project

Framing the Debate: Allocating Benefits versus Allocating Water

EVAN VLACHOS , Associate Director, International Schoolfor Water Resources, Colorado State University

Water and Conflict ResolutionAARON WOLF , Assistant Professor,

Department of Geography, University of Alabama

Water and CivilizationJEROMEDELLI PRISCOLI, Senior Policy Advisor, Institute for

Water Resources, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Extreme Hydrological Events and Social Change:7,000 Years in the Nile Valley

FEKRI HASSAN , Professor, Department of Egyptology,University of London

Capacity Building for Integrated Water Resources Management

FRANK HARTVELT , Senior Water Policy Advisor,United Nations Development Programme

Changing International Legal Regimes for Water JOSEPH DELLAPENNA , Professor, School of Law,

Villanova University

The Indian-Bangladeshi Riparian Conflict and the Role of Incentives

SUMIT GANGULY , Professor, Department of PoliticalScience, Hunter College

History of Water Plans, Negotiations, and Agreementsin the Middle East

MIRIAM LOWI , Assistant Professor,Department of Political Science, College of New Jersey

Water Scarcity and Regional Security in the Middle East STEVE LONERGAN , Director, Center for Sustainable

Regional Development, University of Victoria

Water and the Role of Inc

Documents

Environmental Change and Security Program Report 4: Event Summaries