EnviroMentor - American Society of Safety · PDF fileof the country’s central Gulf of Mexico ... AMERICAN SOCIETY OF SAFETY ENGINEERS ... Blues master Guitar Gabriel gave a

As the 11th storm of the 2005 Atlantichurricane season, Hurricane Katrinawill be remembered as one of the

most deadly and destructive storms to everstrike the U.S. Katrina devastated portionsof the country’s central Gulf of Mexicocoast from southeastern Louisiana to theFlorida panhandle. Its high winds andimmense size created storm-surge condi-tions that caused widespread damage andloss of life. This article presents anoverview of the disaster, the current statusof New Orleans and the Gulf Coast, les-sons learned, plans for the future andfeedback from SH&E professionals whoparticipated in the relief efforts.

Katrina’s Path of DestructionHurricanes are defined as strong stormsthat form at sea and have wind speedsgreater than 74 miles per hour. The largesize of these storms makes it easy forweather centers to locate and track them,but their winds, tidal surges and flashfloods can wreak unforeseen devastation.

Since 1995, tropical cyclone activity inthe Atlantic basin has been higher thanusual. Hurricane Katrina, the deadliestU.S. hurricane in 77 years, first developedas a tropical depression in the southeast-ern Bahamas on Aug. 23, 2005, thenstrengthened into a tropical storm. As thestorm moved across south Florida andnorth to the central Gulf Coast, it grewinto a Category 5 hurricane. With thesehigh wind speeds over Gulf waters, the

hurricane increased in size but weakenedto a Category 4 before making landfallthree times.

Hurricane Katrina first made landfallon Aug. 25, 2005, between HallandaleBeach and North Miami Beach, FL, withwinds reaching 80 miles per hour. More

Hurricane Katrina: An OverviewBy Jolinda Cappello

AMERICAN SOCIETY OF SAFETY ENGINEERS www.asse.org

EnviroMentorENVIRONMENTAL PRACTICE SPECIALTY NEWSLETTER

On behalf of the Environmental Practice Specialty, the Council on Practicesand Standards (CoPS) has compiled a series of articles that address the emer-

gency response to hurricanes Katrina and Rita, two powerful storms that ravagedthe Gulf Coast in 2005. Although many months have passed since the hurricanesstruck, we continue to feel the impact of their destruction. Thousands of GulfCoast residents remain displaced, much debris has yet to be cleared from theregion, and many SH&E hazards are still present throughout the most heavilydamaged areas. The actual death toll of these storms may never be confirmed.

As a Florida resident living on the coast for most of my life, I have witnessedfirsthand the devastating effects hurricanes can have on coastal communities. Wewill never forget the heartbreaking images last year’s stormsleft behind, but we will also never forget the extraordinaryefforts of those SH&E professionals who contributed to hur-ricane relief efforts. With their support, survivors of Katrinaand Rita have begun to rebuild and recover.

The articles in this special issue outline the hurricanes’development and extent of destruction, the emergency responseplans followed at the state, national and federal levels, the cur-rent condition of the Gulf Coast and input from SH&E profes-sionals who have lent their expertise and resources to help givethose affected by the storms a second chance.

We have much to learn from the 2005 hurricane season, butI believe that these articles can provide us with a roadmap forimproving future emergency response operations during natu-ral disasters. These articles also show what can be accom-plished when SH&E professionals work together in times of need. It is this solidarityand cooperation that makes me proud to be a part of the SH&E profession.

Vice President, Councilon Practices & Standards

than five inches of rain fell across a largeportion of southeastern Florida. On themorning of Aug. 28, 2005, Katrinaachieved maximum wind speeds of morethan 170 miles per hour. Despite the addi-tion of drier air and an opening of the

continued on page 4

2 Special Issue: Lessons Learned from Hurricane Season 2005

In This IssueHurricane Katrina: An Overview 1

Katrina completely devastated many communities along the country’s Gulf Coast region.Those returning to these area and those helping rebuild it face many hazards and musttake precautions to prevent further tragedies.

Rebuilding the Big Easy: Transitioning from Critical InfrastructureReconstruction to IT Infrastructure Development in New Orleans 3Hurricane Katrina, while devastating in its consequences, continues to serve as anincredible learning experience, demonstrating the ways in which technology can beemployed to save lives and raise standards of living.

New Orleans: Six Months Later 10A firsthand view of the devastated areas and the continuing disruption to “normal life”faced by residents in the Gulf Coast region.

When Is Conservation a Safety Issue? 18Can future natural disasters can be mitigated through consideration of the environmentas a safety and health tool?

Civil Engineers Respond to Katrina 19Groups like ASSE and the American Society of Civil Engineers have responded to theneeds of the hurricane-damaged areas by offering assistance and expert guidance.

Hard Times in the Big Easy: Sprint Nextel’s Response to Hurricane Katrina 20Lessons learned and shared by one company affected by Hurricane Katrina.

The Incident Management System & EPA’s Experience in Louisiana 22EPA personnel responded to areas affected by the hurricanes of 2005. Their operationswere guided by the agency’s use of the Incident Command System model.

Emergency Management: Riding Out Hurricane Rita 24The impending arrival of Hurricane Rita allowed a Houston, TX hospital to test itsemergency response/preparedness plans.

ABOUT THIS ISSUEEnviroMentor Editor: Judy L. Freeman Co-Editor: Rennie Heath, Manager, ASSE Practice SpecialtiesCo-Editor: Jolinda Cappello, ASSE Communications SpecialistManaging Editor: Tim Fisher, Director, ASSE Practices & Standards

Blues master Guitar Gabriel gave agood summary of recovery efforts inNew Orleans since the onslaught of

Hurricane Katrina. “Came so far,” hesaid. “Got a long way to go.”

While there has been significantprogress in the reconstruction effort, theamount of work left to do is astounding.To date, a major challenge to reconstruc-tion is coordinating the efforts of groupsin the private and public sectors involvedin the process, as well as creating a cen-tralized authority for redevelopment proj-ect oversight. An effective recovery efforthinges upon project coordination broughtabout through the creation of a centralizedgoverning body with project oversight andprogress monitoring as their sole priority.From a human perspective, gaining con-sensus in standard protocol is one barrierto complete collaboration in the recon-struction effort; however, from a logisticalperspective, technology holds great prom-ise for fostering collaboration betweencontractors and government agencies.

There are many technological applica-tions that can be employed as a means ofstimulating the reconstruction process aswell as fostering collaboration betweenthe private and public sectors. Rapidassessment and temporary infrastructuretechnologies offer a convenient, afford-able, and immediate means of providingneeded utilities while laying the ground-work for long-term planning. These typesof technologies have the potential to serveas catalysts for further development andthe eventual repopulating of the city.

Communication(Infrastructure) Is KeyDue to the extensive flooding and windsin New Orleans from Hurricane Katrina,much of the communications infrastruc-ture was submerged and/or destroyed.Technicians were unable to access sitesneeding repairs or replace fuel for backupgenerators supporting systems after com-mercial power went out. The first step ina cohesive reconstruction effort is the

implementation of a temporary communi-cations infrastructure. This is a crucialstep in that in order for contractors andgovernment agencies to coordinate theirefforts they first have to be able to com-municate effectively.

With terrestrial systems renderedlargely useless by storm winds and floodwaters, many rescue organizations turnedto satellite-based networks as a means ofcommunication. The utility of portablerugged satellite-based systems becameapparent during initial stages of the NewOrleans reconstruction effort, and wereextremely helpful in enabling interagencycommunications.

In the months after the storm, much ofthe terrestrial infrastructure has been rebuiltor redirected. Many of the fiber trunks thatsupported the local phone and data serviceproviders have been re-laid across thenorth shore of Lake Pontchartrain and nowconnect to the city with redundant access.Business services continue to be restoredalong these fiber trunks and many of theflooded switching faculties are beingbrought back online as power is madeavailable. Cellular service has also gottenprogressively better as power has beenrestored to the service towers, or portabletemporary units have been installed toincrease coverage zones and bandwidth.

Sequencing the ReconstructionAfter the implementation of temporarycommunications infrastructure, there arethree major steps involved in a successfulreconstruction effort: clean up (includingdebris removal and purifying the city oftoxic residue caused by the flood waters),utility and basic infrastructure restoration(including ensuring that sewer systems areworking and that there is clean water, elec-tricity, etc.), and finally, rebuilding/recon-struction (including assessing the currentinfrastructure to determine whether thesystems can be repaired or if they need tobe rebuilt altogether).

In practice, these are integratedprocesses and require a great deal of coor-

dination and synchronization. Sequencingof events and extensive and continualproject planning is necessary to ensurethat the reconstruction process is carriedout efficiently in an orderly manner.

The importance of proper sequencingof reconstruction efforts is cited in aCongressional Quarterly report publishedin early October 2005. The article empha-sizes the interdependency of groupsinvolved in reconstruction efforts by high-lighting the process involved in repairingphone services: “In order to restore tele-phone service to the storm-stricken areas,phone companies must wait for the powerand electricity to be restored to homeswhich cannot happen without an inspec-tion by the city of New Orleans.”

Without central oversight and sequenc-ing of initiatives, the reconstruction processbecomes a log-jam with isolated projectslimiting, and in some cases hindering,efforts to rebuild the city. Critical infra-structure reconstruction in New Orleansincludes rebuilding and repairing hundredsof miles of sewer, gas, water, phone, andelectric lines. In order to rebuild and/orrepair these amenities, it is crucial thatdebris removal be coordinated with accom-panying reconstruction efforts. While sim-ple in theory, the sheer magnitude of debrisscattered throughout New Orleans has leftreconstruction workers overwhelmed. TThe best approach thus far has been toassign contracts by zone so that companiesare attached to debris removal in a certainnumber of city blocks and are responsiblesolely for their designated territory.

From these initial efforts, it can beconcluded that a holistic approach toproject management, one that factors inthe interdependency of the different tasksinvolved in the reconstruction, wouldincrease productivity as well as result ingreater project continuity. The establish-ment of a centralized authority to overseeand assist with the coordination of differ-ent projects involved in the reconstructionwould help maximize the efficiency of

Rebuilding the Big Easy:Transitioning from Critical Infrastructure Reconstructionto IT Infrastructure Development in New OrleansBy Gary Higgins

continued on page 27

EnviroMentor 3

eyewall to the south and southwest,Katrina remained a powerful Category 4storm before reaching landfall on themorning of Aug. 29, 2005, first inPlaquemines Parish, LA, then along theLouisiana and Mississippi border a fewhours later.

As Katrina made landfall on Aug. 29,rain fell at more than 1 in. per hour, andthe hurricane’s central pressure at thatpoint reached 920 millibars—the third-lowest central pressure on record for U.S.land-falling storms. Hurricane-force windsextended up to 190 miles from Katrina’scenter, while tropical storm-force windsextended for approximately 440 miles. Insoutheastern Louisiana, recorded windspeeds exceeded 140 miles per hour. Thesehigh winds, coupled with a 30-foot stormsurge, devastated coastal Louisiana,Mississippi and Alabama, and causedextensive damage to the Florida panhandle.

The AftermathIn the end, those cities that suffered thebrunt of Hurricane Katrina’s fury includ-ed the major commercial ports of NewOrleans, LA, Gulfport, MS, and Mobile,AL. Katrina destroyed countless homesand businesses, and disrupted utility, fooddistribution, healthcare and communica-tions services along the Gulf Coast.While more than 200,000 people evacuat-ed to other states to escape the highfloodwaters, more than 1,400 perished,and thousands remain missing.

New Orleans ranks as the city hit hard-est by Katrina. Since New Orleans sitsmainly below sea level between theMississippi River and Lake Ponchartrain,a system of levees and floodwalls protectsthe city from flooding. However, duringKatrina’s storm surge, these levees andfloodwalls failed, inundating 80% of thecity in as much as 20 ft of water. Thesebreaches were responsible for most of thefatalities in New Orleans. The storm surgealso submerged large areas of Biloxi andGulfport, MS, as well as Mobile, AL.

In Louisiana alone, Katrina left rough-ly 60.3 million cubic yards of debris in itspath, but among all of the affected GulfCoast states, the storm generated 60 to 90million tons of solid waste. Millions ofpeople lost power, and oil production inthe Gulf of Mexico decreased by 1.4 mil-lion barrels per day as a result of dam-

aged storage tanks and fourmajor oil spills in Louisiana.Heavy flooding closed airports,bridges and highways, whilemore than 100 ships, boats andbarges along the Gulf Coasteither sank or washed ashore. InLouisiana, Mississippi andAlabama, the storm shut downmore than 1,000 water systemsand 530 sewagetreatment plants,leaving many with-out drinking water.

Status ofNew OrleansAlthough severalmonths have passedsince Katrina sweptthrough the GulfCoast, much workmust be done beforethe region is restoredto its pre-hurricanestate, especially inNew Orleans. Only asmall percentage ofthe city’s previousresidents have returned; of those whohave, many live without electricity, hotwater or cooking gas. Meanwhile, otherresidents are still missing.

Just more than half of the debris inLouisiana has been removed, and govern-ment organizations such as EPA continueto monitor contamination levels in waterand soil.

Hurricane Cleanup HazardsAfter a hurricane, SH&E professionals,utility workers, firefighters, law enforce-ment, military and emergency medical per-sonnel, as well as federal, state and localgovernment representatives normally con-tribute to the cleanup efforts, during whichtime they can encounter numerous SH&Ehazards. In fact, many consider the periodimmediately following a hurricane to bemore dangerous than the actual storm.

Flooding, wind damage, solid debris,depressions, drainage openings, grounderosion and displaced animals can createphysical hazards for workers, including:

•animal bites;•building collapses;•confined spaces;•dangerous road conditions;•electrocution;•falling and flying objects;

•falls fromheights;

•fire;•motor vehicle and

machine accidents;•slips, trips and

falls.In addition, long

hours spent workingin difficult and oftenunfamiliar environ-ments may causeworkers to sufferfrom exhaustion, heatstress, dehydrationand musculoskeletal injuries, while thedemands of recovering human remainscan add to workers’ mental stress.

Post-hurricane conditions can also cre-ate serious environmental hazards.Floodwaters can contain sewage, toxicchemicals, oil, pesticides, fertilizers, bac-teria, lead, asbestos, household cleaningsolutions and flammable liquids, whichcan all contaminate air, water, soil andsediment. For example, sediment samplesthat EPA collected in New Orleans afterKatrina showed elevated levels of arsenic,dichloro-diphenyl-trichloroethane (DDT),dieldrin, diesel and oil-range organics,

Hurricane Katrina: An Overviewcontinued from page 1


(Top) The force ofthe breach in the17th Street Leveein New Orleanspushed this houseinto the middle ofthe street.(Bottom) Upper-and middle-classresidential areanear the 17thStreet Levee inNew Orleans, sixmonths afterHurricane Katrina.

heavy metals, heptachlor epoxide, petro-leum hydrocarbons and polynuclear aro-matic hydrocarbons.

Flooded sewers, a lack of wastewatertreatment, human and animal waste, andcarcasses also contributed to high levelsof fecal coliform bacteria in the sedimentsamples. Besides harmful contaminants,workers may come into contact withexplosive gases, carbon monoxide andmold, and they may be more susceptibleto acute respiratory illnesses.

Lessons Learned fromHurricane KatrinaTo better prepare for other large-scale nat-ural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina,the U.S. government is currently workingto reform national emergency plans andthe Federal Emergency ManagementAgency (FEMA). OSHA has also devel-oped informative materials such as fact-sheets and “quick cards” to helpemployers and workers more effectivelyaddress the SH&E hazards associatedwith hurricane recovery. It is hoped thatthese measures will lead to improved dis-aster site management, which means saferoccupational conditions for relief workers.

However, those involved in disasterrelief operations can learn much from theresponse to Katrina. Following are recom-mendations for protecting workers beforeand during hurricane relief efforts, and forcontrolling some of the most commonSH&E hazards workers may face.

Health Screenings& Hazard EvaluationsBefore deploying any personnel to hurri-cane relief areas, employers shouldensure that workers are in good healthand have all required immunizations,including those which protect against thehazards of working with displaced ani-mals. Evaluations should be conducted atthe disaster site before workers arrive inorder to identify hazards and determinewhether the site is stable.

Personal Protective EquipmentRelief workers should wear proper PPEwhen working among debris and contam-inated floodwaters. This equipment mayinclude:

•comfortable and form-fitting light-weight clothing;

•durable, waterproof and cut-resistantwork gloves;

•earplugs or other hearing protectiondevices;

•goggles;•hardhats;•NIOSH-approved respirators;•safety glasses with sideshields or full

faceshields;•soft hats;•watertight boots with a steel toe,

shank and insole.First-aid supplies should also be readi-

ly available at the disaster site so thatworkers can treat minor cuts and burns.

Confined Space EntryAfter a hurricane, damaged and collapsedbuildings can create hazardous confinedspaces that restrict workers’ entry andexit. For safe confined space entry, work-ers should:

1) Consider all confined spaces haz-ardous.

2) Determine whether entry is neces-sary or whether the work can be per-formed from outside the confined space.

3) Ensure that trained workers controlutilities, electrical services and alternativeenergy sources before entering the con-fined space.

4) Test atmospheric conditions beforeentry and monitor them throughout.

5) Ensure that the structure is stablebefore entering a confined space.

6) Post warning signs to identify con-fined spaces.

7) Wear proper PPE.8) Use proper ventilation to maintain

adequate atmospheric conditions in thespace.

9) Wear appropriate respirators and betrained in their use.

10) Have an attendant present outsidethe space.

11) Use a safe method to communicatewith the attendant outside the confinedspace.

12) Exit the space immediately if anunsafe condition develops.

13) Never enter a confined space toattempt an emergency rescue unlesstrained in safe confined space entry andrescue procedures, and equipped with theproper tools and PPE.

Addressing Burning DebrisDisaster sites with large amounts ofdebris may allow burning. It must only beperformed in accordance with all local,state and federal regulations and emer-gency orders and under the supervision of

trained officials. The adverse healtheffects of working near burning debrisinclude smoke inhalation, which cancause eye and respiratory tract irritationas well as acute and chronic lung illness-es. High heat and humidity may causeworkers to suffer from extreme exertionand heat stress, particularly among thosewho have a low tolerance to hot workareas, and accidental contact with flamesand hot surfaces can inflict severe burns.Most of these illnesses and injuriesdepend on the type of material burned,the substances present in the smoke, dura-tion of exposure, type of PPE worn, andworkers’ health and susceptibility.

To protect themselves when workingnear burning debris, workers should:

1) Plan the burn to minimize impact.2) Only burn debris that local, state

and federal authorities allow.3) Avoid respiratory and dermal expo-

sures to smoke and flames by using respi-ratory protection and PPE.

4) Have means to keep themselvescool.

Worker Safety in a Power OutageElectrocutions frequently occur duringhurricane relief operations when portablegenerators are in use. If the generators areof the wrong size or are not installed oroperated correctly, they can transmitpower back to the electrical lines. This“backfeed” can injure or kill workers. Toprevent electrocution, workers should:

1) Treat all power lines as “hot.”2) Conduct tests to determine whether

high voltage exists in the power lines.3) Use low-voltage testing equipment

to determine the presence of low voltage.4) Always shut off the main circuit

breaker.5) Access or repair power lines only

when wearing PPE.6) Have only trained and qualified

electricians install portable generators.

Mold Cleanup RecommendationsStanding floodwaters, high humidity andwet surfaces can all contribute to moldgrowth after a hurricane. If these moisturesources are not eliminated, mold canspread and sicken hurricane victims andrelief workers.

To reproduce, mold creates spores.When these spores come into contactwith damp surfaces or materials, they

continued on page 6

EnviroMentor 5

digest them to grow and survive. Itemssuch as cloth-upholstered furniture, foods,insulation, paper and wood products, ceil-ing tiles and carpeting usually attractmold growth in post-hurricane conditions.If mold grows indoors as a result ofexcessive moisture or water accumula-tion, it can cause allergic reactions, infec-tions, asthma, respiratory inflammation,eye and skin irritation and flu-like symp-toms in those who are exposed to it.

Although mold spores cannot be com-pletely eradicated from an indoor envi-ronment, they can be controlled. JamesMorris, ASSE Region VI Vice President,recommends throwing away contaminat-ed disposable/replaceable items. Anyitems that cannot be discarded should bedecontaminated and dried thoroughly.EPA suggests using water and detergentto clean mold off hard surfaces and alsooffers the following recommendations forsafe and effective mold cleanup:

1) Identify and correct the moisturesource to prevent further mold growth.

2) When determining the size of themoldy area, look for hidden mold (e.g.,behind drywall and wallpaper, under car-peting and padding).

3) Check the inside of air ducts and airhandling units.

4) Avoid direct contact with mold-con-taminated surfaces.

5) During mold cleanup, wear a respi-rator and proper PPE.

6) Clean and dry any damp or wetitems within 24 to 48 hours to preventmold growth.

7) Clean all tools after mold cleanup iscompleted.

8) Choose a qualified remediationmanager for medium- or large-sized moldproblems.

9) Consult state and local mold expertsfor guidance.

Business ResumptionSafety ChecklistBefore hurricane-affected businesses canresume operation, SH&E professionalsmust inspect them to ensure that they areclean, safe and structurally sound. To helpSH&E professionals conduct these inspec-tions, ASSE offers the following guidelines:

1) Air quality assessment. Testing forchemical and toxic agents may be neces-sary to make sure the atmosphere in the

business is safe and poses no hazards toemployees.

2) Electrical safety. Check electricalsystems, computer cables and telecom-munications equipment to ensure thatthere is no danger of exposure to electric-ity. Wiring inspections should be conduct-ed from the outside in to ensure that allwiring and connections do not short outas a result of water damage from rain orfirefighting operations.

3) Emergency planning. Employeesshould have a clear path of egress foremergency evacuation of employees, andfire extinguishers should be checked fordamage and serviceability. All damagedor faulty fire extinguishers should bereplaced immediately.

4) Emergency procedures. After a dis-aster, businesses should create a new emer-gency plan and distribute it to employeesupon returning to work. This plan shoulddesignate a place for employees to meetonce they have evacuated the building or atelephone number they can call to ensurethat everyone is accounted for.

5) Existing federal guidelines. Consultagencies such as FEMA and NIOSH,which provide guidance materials for busi-ness resumption after natural disasters.

6) Health and sanitation. Inspect andtest the general facility sanitation systemsfor toxic agents that may pose healthrisks to employees. Any unused fooditems should be discarded. If the businesshas a kitchen, inspect oven hoods andother ventilation devices to ensure theyare unclogged and working properly.

7) Interior and exterior exposures.For interior spaces, ensure that no wall orceiling materials are in danger of falling. Ifsuch exposures exist, the business is notready for occupancy. Check for crackedwindows and outside building materials, asthese could fall onto pedestrians.

8) Lighting. Ensure that employee andemergency lighting is operational and atadequate illumination levels.

9) Machine inspections. Inspect thecondition of drain, fill, plumbing andhydraulic lines on processes andmachines. Hydraulic and gas lines shouldbe evaluated and tested for hazards.

10) Mainframes. In facilities withmainframe computer applications, checklines and cabling for chiller systems toprevent chemical leak-out.

11) Office furniture. Inspect all officefurniture and equipment to ensure that

they are level, stable and can withstandexpected loads and usages.

12) Power checks. If the business hasno onsite access to electricity, do not usefueled generators or heaters indoors.Check the business for gas and sewerleaks, and if needed, contact local utilitiesfor information on power, gas, water andsewer usage.

13) Protection equipment. Fire andsmoke alarms should be cleaned and test-ed before building occupancy is allowed.Thoroughly inspect firefighting systemssuch as sprinkler equipment as well.

14) Removal of solid and hazardouswaste. Broken glass, debris or other mate-rials with sharp edges should be safelygathered and disposed of immediately. Ifhazardous waste is involved, evaluate dis-posal methods prior to cleanup to ensurethat it can be disposed of properly.

15) Safe entry. Contact the propergovernment agencies to get approval toresume occupancy of the building. Do notenter a facility or building unless theproper clearances have been attained.

16) Structural integrity. Evaluate thebuilding’s the structural integrity beforebuilding occupancy is allowed.

17) Surfaces. Ensure that flooring sur-faces are free from potential slip, trip andfall hazards.

18) Ventilation. Check vents, stacksand chimneys checked to ensure thatwater heaters and gas furnaces are opera-ble and free from dust and debris. Beforeenergizing and pressurizing heating, ven-tilation and air conditioning (HVAC) sys-tems, inspect and test all system lines.Cold air should be blown through HVACsystems first to help prevent mold growthin duct systems.

Progress after KatrinaAlthough it will take years to rebuild theGulf Coast, much progress has beenmade. During the last several months, 78million cubic yards of debris have beenremoved, and nearly half of Louisiana’shighways, as well as 91% ofMississippi’s highways, have beenrepaired. Eighty-five percent of gas pro-duction and 76% of daily oil productionin the Gulf region has also been restored.

Further proposed improvements to theGulf Coast, which are currently pendingbefore Congress, include the following:

1) Addition of permanent floodgatesand pumping stations to the outfalls of



interior drainage canals at 17th St. and atLondon Ave. in New Orleans.

2) Armoring of levees at critical areasthroughout the entire hurricane protectionsystem.

3) Storm-proofing of interior pumpingstations.

4) Addition of two navigable flood-gates to protect the Inner HarborNavigation Canal.

5) Incorporation of nonfederal leveesin Plaquemines Parish into the federalsystem.

6) Initiation of wetlands restorationprojects in the Gulf Coast region.

Since Hurricane Katrina damaged 60%of the levees and floodwalls and 48% ofthe pump stations in the Gulf Coast, theU.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)has been instrumental in helping to repairthe region’s flood control systems. USACEis repairing the levees as part of the LakePonchartrain and Vicinity HurricaneProtection Project. Pending projectsinclude the West Bank and VicinityProject; Southeast Louisiana FloodDamage Reduction Project; and remainderof the Lake Ponchartrain project.

Currently, USACE is repairing andbuilding the protection system to author-ized design heights. It plans to finish thiswork by June 2006 and to correct designand construction flaws, repair nonfederallevees, and achieve authorized designheight, strength and stability for the entirelevee system by September 2007.

Throughout the Katrina recovery oper-ations, USACE referred to its Safety andHealth Requirements manual as a guide-line. This manual outlines several estab-lished safety practices that apply not onlyto response activities after natural disas-ters, but also to large-scale emergenciesin general. Key recommendations madein the manual include the following:

Control of Hazardous Energy1) Before employees perform any serv-

icing or maintenance on a system wherethe unexpected energizing, startup orrelease of kinetic or stored energy couldoccur and cause injury or damage, thesystem should be isolated in accordancewith the standards given in Section 12.

2) Employees should be trained so thatthey understand the purpose and functionof hazardous energy control proceduresand have the required knowledge andskills for the safe application, use and

removal of ener-gy controls.

ElectricalWork

1) All electri-cal wiring andequipment shouldbe of a type thatis listed by anationally recog-nized testing lab-oratory.

2) All electri-cal work shouldcomply withapplicableNational Electrical Safety Code, NationalElectric Code and U.S. Coast Guard regu-lations.

3) Only qualified personnel with veri-fiable credentials who are familiar withapplicable code requirements should per-form electrical work.

Emergency Recovery Operations1) Immediately after a natural disaster

or large-scale emergency occurs, alert aqualified SH&E professional to help planand execute the response and recoveryefforts.

2) Safety and occupational healthoffices in the geographic location inwhich the disaster or emergency occursshould temporarily staff additional safety,industrial hygiene and medical personnelas necessary.

3) Safety and health personnel shouldmanage the safety and health aspects ofemergency response and recovery opera-tions, advise on safety and health issuesand provide quality assurance for contrac-tor employees.

4) Before beginning any work, safetyand health briefings and orientationshould be conducted.

Fire Prevention & Protection1) Facilities and project sites should

have a fire prevention plan that includes:

•a list of the majorworkplace fire haz-ards;

•potential ignitionsources;

•types of fire sup-pression equipmentor systems appropri-ate to control fire;

•assignments of responsibilities formaintaining equipment and systems;

•personnel responsible for controllingfuel source hazards;

•housekeeping procedures;2)The fire prevention plan should be

used to brief employees and first respon-ders on fire hazards, materials andprocesses to which they are exposed andon emergency evacuation procedures.

Hazardous Substances,Agents & Environments

1) All operations, materials and equip-ment should be evaluated to determinewhether any hazardous environments oragents are present or can be released intothe work environment.

2) Trained individuals should useapproved and calibrated testing devices tomeasure hazardous substances, agentsand environments.

3) NIOSH sampling and analyticalcontinued on page 8

EnviroMentor 7

(Top) Bridge on U.S.90 near Gulfport-Biloxi, MS, is still indisrepair.(Bottom) Damagedstructure nearGulfport-Biloxi, MS.

methods, OSHA-required or otherapproved methods should be used.

4) Engineering controls, work practicecontrols and PPE programs should be usedin this order to control exposures to hazard-ous substances, agents and environments.

Machinery & Mechanized EquipmentInspect all machinery and mechanizedequipment to ensure that it meets appro-priate safety standards.

Personal Protective Equipment1) Once supervisors conduct hazard

evaluations at disaster sites, they shouldselect PPE for employees to use to pro-tect themselves from identified hazards.

2) Employees should use all PPE thatmay be required to maintain their expo-sure within acceptable limits.

3) Employers should train employeesin the proper type, use and wear of PPEas well as in its limitations, care, inspec-tion, testing, maintenance, useful life,storage and disposal.

4) Employees may use rubber gloves,sleeves, blankets, covers and line hose asneeded for work on energized facilities.

5) Exposures (by inhalation, ingestion,skin absorption or physical contact) to anychemical, biological or physical agent thatexceed specified American Conference ofGovernmental Industrial Hygienists orOSHA limits are prohibited.

Safe Access & Fall Protection1) Safe access should be provided to

all work areas.2) Employees exposed to fall hazards

should be protected by standard guardrail,catch platforms, temporary floors, safetynets, personal fall protection devices orthe equivalent when:

•on accessways (excluding ladders),work platforms or walking/working sur-faces from which they may fall 6 ft;

•on accessways or work platforms overwater, machinery or dangerous operations;

•on runways from which they may fall4 ft. or more;

•installing or removing sheet pile, h-piles, cofferdams or other interlocking mate-rials from which they may fall 6 ft or more.

3) Employees who might be exposed tofall hazards should be trained by a quali-fied person in the safe use of accesswaysand fall protection systems and in therecognition of hazards related to their use.

SanitationEmployers must establish and maintainbasic sanitation provisions for employeesduring emergency response and recoveryoperations. These provisions include:

•an adequate drinking water supplythat comes only from an approvedpotable water system;

•state or local government-approvedtoilet facilities;

•sanitary washing facilities.

Welding & Cutting1) Welders, cutters and their supervi-

sors should be trained in the safe opera-tion of welding and cutting equipment,safe practices and respiratory and fireprotection.

2) All welding equipment should beinspected daily.

3) Workers, those in the welding areaand the public should be shielded fromwelding rays, flashes, sparks, moltenmetal and slag.

4) Employees who perform welding,cutting or heating operations should wearPPE that is appropriate for any hazardspresent.

5) All welding and cutting equipmentand operations should comply with thestandards and recommended practices ofANSI/American Welding Society Z49.1.

6) All welding, cutting and heatingoperations should be ventilated so thatexposures to hazardous concentrations ofairborne contaminants are within accept-able limits.

7) Welding, cutting or heating opera-tions that involve or generate potential

toxic substances should be performed inaccordance with appropriate standards.

SH&E Professionals’PerspectiveSeveral ASSE members lent their SH&Eexpertise to Hurricane Katrina reliefefforts. While their experiences broughtthem great personal reward, they agreethat the response to the hurricane couldhave been handled differently.

Member Ron Ross of Chevron Texacoserved as a liaison between Chevron andthe Gulf Coast communities, and helpedthe American Red Cross and Civil Defenseto address community members’ safety andhealth concerns. “For the first few days, wedid not have time or resources at our dis-posal—we were actually cut off from theoutside world. All the plans we had inplace for communicating to different areasdid not work. We did not have working e-mail, landline phones or cell phones. Butwe just moved forward in what we hadbeen trained to do,” says Ross.

Emergency communication in the daysafter the storm was a challenge for mem-ber Michael Parker as well. Parker, anenvironmental health and safety managerat Exide Technologies in Baton Rouge, isalso the president of the ASSE’s GreaterBaton Rouge Chapter, the largest chapterin Louisiana. “We received numerouscalls from members who wanted to helpwith the relief efforts. Many of them hadtried to get in touch with FEMA directlybut received no return calls. I then tried tocall and e-mail FEMA to let them knowthat our members wanted to volunteer, butI also received no response,” notes Parker.

However, ASSE members did not letthese initial setbacks discourage themfrom contributing to the relief efforts. Forexample, Parker worked with his localchurch to help those in need. “Over thecourse of 30 to 60 days, we collectedmoney and supplies for the relief efforts,served 1,800 meals per day and housedhundreds of chainsaw crewmembers. Iworked in the church’s accumulationwarehouse to assist in the receipt, stack-ing, sorting and loading of supplies andclothing. I also made calls to solicit forcleaning supplies,” Parker explains.

Member Jim Smith, a Florida residentwho is Vice President of ASSE’s Councilon Practices and Standards, worked withASSE to create a response team and todistribute response information. Having



The eye of Hurricane Katrina hit PassChristian, MS, and left no completestructure standing.

lived through several hurricanes himself,Smith made sure to personally participatein the Katrina relief efforts. “Our familysupported charities and assisted in loadingsupplies to the affected areas,” he says.

Based on their specific experiences,these members felt that the overall emer-gency response to Katrina lacked effectivecoordination and communication.According to Parker, “The state, local andfederal governments had plenty of opportu-nities to improve communication, trans-portation and emergency response, whichmight have prevented a major portion ofthe catastrophe. And to some degree, thelocal, state and federal governments knewin advance that if a hurricane of this mag-nitude were to hit New Orleans directly, itwould engulf the city. Yet none of themmade plans to have mass transit and driversevacuate people from homes and hospitals.

“Charitable organizations, churchesand other individuals from across thenation did more for people in a shorterperiod of time than the local, state andfederal governments did in the initial daysafter the storm,” he adds.

Smith predicts that studies of the re-sponse to Katrina will show deficienciesamong state, local and federal govern-ments. “When you compound the deficien-cies from the first responder/governmentagencies with one of the largest areasimpacted by natural disasters (in terms ofgeographical size/range) and with the fail-ure of a major dike in a low-lying area, alarge-scale disaster ensues. Many agenciesare not prepared to deal with that,” he says.

Despite the shortcomings in the emer-gency response, the members treated theirindividual experiences as learning oppor-tunities. Parker learned that people shouldnot rely solely on local, state and federalgovernments for their emergency evacua-tion needs. “Develop an emergency planwith your family and friends, and thenreview and practice it,” he recommends.Smith advises that those living in hurri-cane-prone regions should always keepenough food, water and supplies on handto last for at least ten days.

To improve response efforts to futurelarge-scale natural disasters, the membersoffer several suggestions, most of whichrequire the involvement of SH&E profes-sionals. Ross recommends a “better net-work plan,” while Parker calls for moregovernment responsibility. “State, localand federal governments must be held

accountable for adequate planning, prepa-ration, communication, transportation andsupplies and for prudent spending of taxdollars to protect low-lying areas like NewOrleans,” he maintains. “Governmentagencies should also ensure that industrySH&E professionals with emergencyresponse experience are involved in theplanning and emergency drill process,”Parker concludes.

Smith suggests that first responders inthe Gulf Coast region look to the successof emergency response programs in stateslike California, Florida and New York.“Each year, there is potential for a naturaldisaster to strike these states, so their gov-ernments and public are generally pre-pared. But FEMA needs an overhaul,”says Smith. He also recommends:

•upgrading standard building codes forconstruction;

•improving public hurricane sheltersand evacuation plans;

•improving state and local governmentneeds to better manage natural disastersand first responders;

•making emergency management needsa top priority within state governments thatare more vulnerable to disasters;

•changing legislative mindsets;•working together with mutual aid

agreements;•registering citizens with special needs•implementing a state emergency plan

that uses all state government resources torespond to natural disasters;

•establishing a communication systemin which all first responders can commu-nicate by radio frequency;

•building strategically located emer-gency operations centers.

ConclusionNatural disasters like Hurricane Katrinacan test all facets of the human spirit, yetthey can help government agencies, com-munities and SH&E professionals betterplan and prepare for similar potentialevents. An approach that combines estab-lished safety practices and recommenda-tions with new lessons learned may bethe first step toward improving futureemergency response procedures.

ReferencesASSE. “American Society of Safety

Engineers Offers Business ResumptionSafety Checklist in the Aftermath ofHurricane Katrina.” Des Plaines, IL:ASSE, Aug. 31, 2005.

ASSE. “American Society of SafetyEngineers Offers Mold Clean-Up Tips.”Des Plaines, IL: ASSE, Sept. 16, 2005.

Callimachi, R. “Despite Mardi Gras,New Orleans Still Struggling.” AssociatedPress. Feb. 25, 2006.

Centers for Disease Control and Pre-vention (CDC). http://www.cdc.gov;http://www.bt.cdc.gov.

EPA. “Mold Resources.” EPA. http://www.epa.gov/mold/moldresources.html#Floods/Flooding.

Federal Emergency ManagementAgency (FEMA). http://www.fema.gov

Freeman, J.L. “Sediment Stew inNOLA.” EnviroMentor. Winter 2006.

Freeman, J.L. “Toxic Soup in NOLA.”EnviroMentor. Winter 2006.

Hsu, S. “House Report Cites Hurri-cane Failures.” Washington Post. Feb. 16,2006.

Morris, J. “Considerations for Moldand Moisture Response in Schools.”

National Institute for OccupationalSafety and Health (NIOSH). http://www.cdc.gov/niosh.

National Satellite and InformationService—National Climatic Data Center.http://lwf.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/research/2005/katrina.html.

National Weather Service ForecastOffice—New Orleans/Baton Rouge,Louisiana. http://www.srh.noaa.gov

OSHA. “Hurricanes and Tornados.”Washington, DC: U.S. Department ofLabor, OSHA. http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/emergencypreparedness/guides/hurricane.html.

OSHA. “OSHA Tools Help SustainWorker Safety During Hurricane RecoveryEfforts.” Washington, DC: U.S. Depart-ment of Labor, OSHA, Oct. 13, 2005.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers(USACE). “U.S. Army Corps of EngineersHurricane Relief Support and Levee RepairBackground Information.” Washington,DC: USACE, Sept. 3, 2005.

U.S. Department of the Army. Safetyand Health Requirements. Manual No.385-1-1. Washington, DC: U.S. Depart-ment of the Army, U.S. Army Corps ofEngineers, Nov. 3, 2003.

U.S. Department of Homeland Securi-ty. “Progress Made: A Six-Month Updateon Hurricane Relief, Recovery and Re-building.” Washington, DC: Departmentof Homeland Security, Office of the Fed-eral Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuild-ing, Feb. 28, 2006.

EnviroMentor 9

Six months after Hurricane Katrinaand five months after Hurricane Rita,the Gulf Coast, particularly New

Orleans, continues to struggle either toreturn to normal or to adjust to a new def-inition of normal. While much informa-tion has come out of this disaster, most ofit has been about housing shortages andconditions. Much less has been publishedto help SH&E practitioners plan for thefuture. The authors traveled to the GulfCoast to assess the current recoveryefforts and to seek lessons learned.

Local GeographyMuch has been made of New Orleans’svulnerability due to its geographic posi-

tion at the base of the Mississippi Riverand on the hurricane-prone Gulf Coast.Immediately to the north of the city isLake Ponchartrain, one of the largest bod-ies of water in the country. Much of thecity’s most valuable real estate sits on thenorthern boundary of the city on theshores of Lake Ponchartrain, which iswell below sea level.

Canals crisscross the land running fromLake Ponchartrain to the Mississippi andacross bends of the river. The levees thatline the lake, the Mississippi and all of thecanals as protection for the city have beenridiculed, and all levels of governmenthave been blamed for their failure.

In An Unnatural Metropolis, WrestingNew Orleans fromNature, Craig E.Colten, Carl O. SauerProfessor ofGeography atLouisiana StateUniversity (LSU),reminds us that sinceits establishment as acity, New Orleans hasfought rising waterlevels. The develop-ment of new neigh-borhoods has meantincreasing compro-mises with sea levels.

At a time ofextraordinarily highlevels of water in theMississippi River andGulf of Mexico, NewOrleans’ position as avirtual island sur-rounded by leveesmade this storm pre-dictable. Destructionof barrier island pro-tection, wetlands andnatural habitats hascontributed to thecity’s vulnerability.

At the time of ourvisit, a coating ofmud and lake-bottomsediment covered thestreets and the debristhat lines them.

Homes in these areas, many of them sub-stantial, middle-class brick structures, areuninhabitable or destroyed. Those thatremain standing are covered with a thicklayer of mud throughout. Mold covers thewalls to the flood lines. Flood lines arepresent on buildings at high and standingwater levels throughout the area.

The BreachesWhen the incident occurred, levels inLake Ponchartrain swelled, and wind andwater battered the levees. Storm surgesheaved the bottom of the lakebed againstthe levees. Breaches occurred along the17th St. Canal levee at the mouth of thelake and at the London Ave. Canal levee.The force of the water drove the homes atthe breach sites down the sludge- andwater-filled streets and devastated homesacross a large area.

In addition, a breach along theIndustrial Canal destroyed the neighbor-hood of the Lower Ninth Ward. At thiswriting, it remains uncertain whether abarge hit the levee in this area and createda breach or if a breach in the leveeallowed the barge to float onto land. Theforce of the storm in this neighborhoodclearly exceeded other areas. Here, houseswere not simply moved from their foun-dations, they were flung haphazardly ontop of one another and on top of cars.Cars were thrown in random heaps. In oneplace, several homes that previously linedthe street now stand in a semi-circle.

The exteriors of homes, even thosewith minor damage, have Xs painted onthem along with the date of the inspec-tion, the inspector’s initials, the numberof dead found within and the number ofdead animals or hazardous contents. Inthe Lower Ninth Ward, many homes werenot marked until Oct. 29, 2005, and somewere not marked at all. The week afterour visit, three bodies were found in thecity, two in the Lower Ninth Ward.

According to the American Society ofCivil Engineers (ASCE), the first leveesin New Orleans were built in the 1890s,but the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers(USACE) designed the modern levee sys-tem in the late 1950s. Today, the mainstem levee system, comprised of levees,


With most newsletter articles, it is important to be thor-ough as well as accurate. However, when covering

Hurricane Katrina, thorough is impossible. In this specialissue, we have only begun to outline the issues that must beexamined at multiple levels for many more years to come.Furthermore, if we are indeed in an increased hurricanecycle, there is fear that the past may only foreshadow evengreater disasters this year and in the future.

What went wrong? Far too much. Our mistakes stillcause us heartbreak. We have just started to chronicle themhere. Lack of communication. Planning exercises forgotten.Failure to comply with SH&E regulations. Previous lessonslearned and the safety and health needs of emergencyresponders ignored.

What went right? Plenty. Heroes, sung and unsung,emerged from the disaster to help their fellow citizens.Healthcare workers and emergency responders worked tire-lessly to care for the sick and injured. Environmental pro-fessionals took ground samples before the floodwaters werepumped back into Lake Ponchartrain. Engineers made sug-gestions for strengthening levees and for repairing andreconstructing bridges and overpasses almost immediately.Many public sector workers never stopped. Pictures of ordi-nary people using their own boats to rescue the helplessand homeless are indelibly etched in our minds.Communities across the country welcomed the homeless.

We learned that we are more resourceful than wethought we might ever need to be in this country, and wealso learned that SH&E professionals are a critical part ofproactive disaster preparedness. With their guidance andexpertise, SH&E professionals can help the country avoidthe same mistakes in the future.

Jeff Camplin Judy FreemanEnvironmental Practice EnviroMentorSpecialty Administrator Newsletter Editor

New Orleans: Six Months LaterBy Rennie Heath and Judy L. Freeman

floodwalls and various controlstructures, is 2,203 miles long.Approximately 1,607 miles liealong the Mississippi River,and 596 miles lie along thesouth banks of the Arkansasand Red rivers and theAtchafalaya Basin.

The levee system in andaround New Orleans is com-posed of two separate arrange-ments: the Mississippi RiverLevees (MRL) and the LakePontchartrain and VicinityHurricane Protection Levees(LPV). Significantly, the MRLis designed to protect from riverflooding and it is an entirely federal proj-ect under the control of the MississippiRiver Commission. LPV provides stormsurge protection and is subject to a multi-tude of local levee boards. Also, thedesign criteria for MRL are the maximumprobable flood, a very high standard,whereas the LPV is designed for the stan-dard project hurricane, which is roughly aCategory 3 hurricane. Katrina cameashore as a Category 4 storm.

In examining who is responsible forthe levees, ASCE determined that they“are constructed by the federal govern-ment and are maintained by local inter-ests, except for government assistance asnecessary during major floods.” USACEand local levee and drainage districts peri-odically inspect for maintenance. TheLouisiana levee system has evolved overmany generations, with projects construct-ed by USACE under local sponsorship.Each parish (county) has a levee district, apolitical subdivision of the state organizedfor the purpose and charged with the dutyof constructing and maintaining levees.

It seem that everyone—and no one—isin charge of the New Orleans levee sys-tem, with duties and responsibilities forbuilding and maintaining them dispersedover a host of authorities.

In its “Policy Considerations for theFuture,” ASCE says, “The results areclear: New Orleans has not been floodedfrom the river for almost 100 years. NewOrleans sustained widespread flooding in1965 (Betsy) and 2005 (Katrina) fromhurricane storm surges. These project dis-tinctions and the results of the hurricanesbolster the need to federalize the manage-ment of all levees and to raise the stan-dard of protection. Federal and state

local agency or levee district; 3) a nation-al levee safety review board that wouldhave the power to monitor the implemen-tation of the levee safety program; and4) an interagency committee on leveesafety composed of federal executivebranch heads to oversee levee safety pro-grams. ASCE urges that the levee safetyprogram be “designed and carried out to”:

•ensure that new and existing leveesare safe by encouraging the developmentof technologically and economically fea-sible programs and procedures for hazardreduction related to levees;

•support acceptable engineering poli-cies and procedures to be used for leveesite investigation, design, construction,operation and maintenance and emer-gency preparedness;

•promote the establishment and imple-mentation of effective levee safety pro-grams in every state based on statestandards;

•develop and support public educationcontinued on page 12

EnviroMentor 11

lawmakers must arrive at a consensus forthe future that emphasizes the creation ofan overarching state levee authority withthe sole power to regulate, authorize,design, build and maintain Louisiana’slevee system. Because the federal govern-ment has invested heavily in the leveebuilding program, the Corps ofEngineers, accountable to the Presidentand Congress, must have real and sweep-ing supervisory powers over the statelevee programs, including the power toveto a state or local project, to ensure thatthe levees are located, built and main-tained in the national interest.”

ASCE’s recommendations includeenactment by Congress of a “nationallevee safety program” to be modeled onthe National Dam Safety Program. At aminimum, this legislation would includerequirements for 1) regular safety inspec-tions, possibly every 5 or 10 years, of alllevee systems in the U.S.; 2) a nationalinventory of levees built, funded or main-tained by any federal government, state or

projects to increase public acceptance andsupport of state levee safety programs;

•develop technical assistance materialsfor federal and state levee safety programs;

•develop methods of providing techni-cal assistance related to levee safety tononfederal entities;

•develop technical assistance materials,seminars and guidelines to improve thesecurity of levees in the U.S.

USACE has assembled a team, theInteragency Performance Evaluation TaskForce (IPET), to review the performanceof the New Orleans and southeast Louisi-ana hurricane protection system followingHurricane Katrina. Drawn from federal,state and local government, academia andprivate industry, team members areassessing the causes and cures of thelevee failures.

A preliminary report has determinedthat “the 17th Street Canal floodwall col-lapse is attributed to high water bendingthe wall landward, opening a crack thatallowed hydrostatic pressure to reach thebottom of the sheet piling. Second, weak-ness of the clay layer beyond the edge ofthe levee caused the levee to fail.”According to IPET Director Ed Link,“Both forces were necessary to move thewhole landward side of the levee withinthe clay layer and cause the failure.”

The authors visited the site of thebreaches. At that time, both the 17th St.levee and the London Ave. levee wereleaking. Sheet pile was driven into the lev-ees, but only to a depth of 25 ft. Peat in thearea was found underground to a depth of40 ft. Colten indicates that a great depth ofmud is found below the mud.

Levees continue to be a major concernthroughout the city and surroundingareas. Even as work has continued, leaksare visible everywhere, except in theLower Ninth Ward, which is above sealevel. The Industrial Canal levee breach isstill being investigated. The authors sawworkers—wearing no PPE—secure thehuge barge that may have been the culpritin this breach.

PreplanningIt has been widely publicized that 50parish, state, federal and volunteer organi-zations conducted a 5-day exerciseknown as “Hurricane Pam” that eerily

mirrored the events of Katrina. LouisianaOffice of Homeland Security andEmergency Preparedness issued a pressrelease on the exercise, which stated,“Hurricane Pam brought sustained windsof 120 miles per hour, up to 20 inches ofrain in parts of southeast Louisiana andstorm surge that topped levees in the NewOrleans area. More than one million resi-dents vacuated and Hurricane Pamdestroyed 500,000-600,000 buildings.”

The exercise used realistic weather anddamage information developed by theNational Weather Service, USACE, theLSU Hurricane Center, and other stateand federal agencies to help officialsdevelop joint response plans for a cata-strophic hurricane in Louisiana. “Wemade great progress this week (during theexercise) in our preparedness efforts,” saidRon Castleman, FEMA regional director.“Disaster response teams developed actionplans in critical areas such as search andrescue, medical care, sheltering, tempo-rary housing, school restoration and debrismanagement. These plans are essential forquick response to a hurricane, but theywill also help in other emergencies.”

“Hurricane planning in Louisiana willcontinue,” said Colonel Michael L.Brown, deputy director for emergencypreparedness, Louisiana Office ofHomeland Security and EmergencyPreparedness, following one segment ofHurricane Pam. “Over the next 60 days,we will polish the action plans developedduring the Hurricane Pam exercise. Wehave also determined where to focus ourefforts in the future.” A partial summaryof the action plan is as follows.

Debris •A storm like Hurricane Pam would

result in 30 million cubic yards of debrisand 237,000 cubic yards of hazardoushousehold waste.

•Existing landfills have available stor-age space and hazardous waste disposalsites. A plan for prioritizing debrisremoval was also outlined.

Sheltering •The plan identifies the need for about

1,000 shelters for a catastrophic disaster.It also identifies 784 shelters and devel-oped plans for locating the remainingshelters.

•Shelters would likely remain open for100 days. The planners expect that the

group will identify enough resources andstaff to support 1,000 shelters for 100days and to include shelterees in sheltermanagement.

•State resources were deemed ade-quate to operate shelters for the first 3 to5 days. The group focused on how federaland other resources would replenish sup-plies at shelters.

Search & Rescue •A plan for transporting stranded resi-

dents was developed. •Planners identified lead and support

agencies for search and rescue and estab-lished a command structure that willinclude four areas with up to 800searchers.

Medical •The process reviewed and enhanced

existing plans, and the group determinedhow to implement existing immunizationplans for tetanus, influenza and other dis-eases likely to be present after a majorhurricane.

•They determined how to resupplyhospitals throughout the state that wouldface heavy patient loads.

•The plan also includes patient move-ment details and identifies probable loca-tions, such as state university campuses,where individuals would receive care thenbe transported to hospitals, special needsshelters or regular shelters as necessary.

Schools •It was estimated that 13,000 to 15,000

teachers and administrators would beneeded to support affected schools. Thegroup acknowledged the role of localschool boards and developed strategiesfor use by local school officials.

•Staffing strategies included the use ofdisplaced teachers, retired teachers, emer-gency certified teachers and others eligi-ble for emergency certification. Displacedparaprofessionals would also be recruitedto fill essential school positions.

•Facility options for increasing studentpopulation at undamaged schools and pri-oritizing repairs to buildings with lessdamage to assist in normalizing opera-tions were also considered.

•Placement or development of tempo-rary schools near temporary housingcommunities built for hurricane victimswas also included.

The Hurricane Pam scenario focusedon 13 parishes in southeast Louisiana.

New Orleans: Six Months Later continued from page 11


Representatives from outside theprimary parishes participatedsince hurricane evacuation andsheltering involve communitiesthroughout the state and inArkansas, Mississippi and Texas.

While many emergencyresponders rose to the occasion, itmay be surmised that either inat-tention to the details of the planand lack of follow-up to refine itspoints, disregard for the plan onceit had been completed or a failureto accept the reality of the poten-tial severity of the crisis led to cat-astrophic consequences.

School buses served as onesad reminder of such failures.Seen during the flood on nation-al television with only their topsshowing, hundreds of thesebuses still sit idle and ruined. Itis unknown whether thisresource was considered duringpre-planning.

Clearly, evacuation sites, sup-plies, sanitation and securityplanning did not result in ade-quate response.

Accounts of the StormThose to whom we spoke feltthat the true heroes of this catas-trophe are threefold:

•Healthcare—Doctors, nurses,paramedics, helicopter pilots andcrews, ambulance drivers andemergency medical technicians,fire personnel, police, chaplainsand religious personnel, medicalexaminers and toxicologists.

•Rescuers—Those from Louisiana,Mississippi and elsewhere who quicklyand tirelessly brought their boats to theflood-stricken neighborhoods and rescuedmore people and animals than were everseen or discussed in the media coverage.

•News Crews—Not necessarily thefaces seen on camera, but the technicians,assistants and camera people whobrought people’s problems and pleas forhelp to those who could actually respond.

Emergency response workers were onthe ground in New Orleans as the stormhit. However, the most comprehensiveview of the chaos of this event came dur-ing our nearly day-long visit at AcadianAmbulance Service with past ASSEPresident Gene Barfield, quality, safety,

health and environmental manager, andtwo Acadian staff members, ScottSaunier, business development manager,and Mark Trahan, AIS Training Centermanager. Acadian provides ambulanceand helicopter rescue services to most ofLouisiana, including New Orleans.

Like those we met have said, there wasa sense of foreboding in the air on Aug.28, 2005, throughout the entire GulfCoast area. Many locals had been throughhurricanes Camille and Betsy, and theystarted to prepare for a hurricane ofpotentially enormous proportions. Katrinahit with a vengeance and veered some-what east of New Orleans before headingtoward southwest Mississippi and east-ward from there along the Gulf Coast. Itwould spare almost no one or no town.

Then the inevitable happened—the leveesgave way.

Acadian had fully staffed its communi-cations center, and requests for help wereimmediate and constant all day Saturday,Sunday and Monday. Although NewOrleans is a major city, it is not that large,but the surrounding towns in Louisianaand Mississippi could not handle Katrinaalone since much of their land and airservices were already at capacity.

Early on Tuesday, Aug. 30, 2005, wordbegan to spread that a levee had breached.Acadian Ambulance is headquartered inLafayette, LA, so chair and CEO RichardZuschlag, and the operations coordinatorheaded to the firm’s office in Gretna, LA,which is much closer to New Orleans and


EnviroMentor 13

•Primary and secondary schools wereclosed.•Dillard University was closed.•Louisiana State University DentalSchool was closed.•Delgado Community College wasbarely open.•Loyola University and the Universityof New Orleans were open on a lim-ited basis with water damage stillprevalent.•Home schooling and charter schoolshad been established.•Some hospitals were still closed—only 400+ beds out of 2.400+bedswere available.•Only two hospital emergency roomswere available.•Libraries in ruins; books destroyed.•Piles of cars and small trucks.•Interstates full of pickup truckspulling small front-end loaders head-ed for New Orleans and Mississippi.•Completely dark neighborhoods inNew Orleans as we drove in on I-10at 7:00 p.m.•US 90 bridges out between OceanSprings and Biloxi and Bay St. Louisand Gulfport, MS.•Contractors traversing the streets ofravaged middle- and upper-middle-class neighborhoods; no contractorsroaming in the Ninth and LowerNinth wards.•Leaks in the levees as USACErepaired them.

•No electricity in middle- and upper-middle-class neighborhoods on oneside of 17th St. in Orleans Parishand full electricity and residential/commercial activity on the other sideof 17th St. in Jefferson Parish.•Debris and personal possessionsstrewn everywhere.•Houses off their foundations and sit-ting in the streets.•Residents’ backyards and patiosusurped to repair and strengthen lev-ees.•Stop signs instead of stop lightswhere there was no electricity—acci-dents waiting to happen, especially atnight.•Few FEMA trailers.•Blue tarp on roofs everywhere.•Uprooted and fallen trees.•Slick sediment that made walkingtreacherous.•The smell of mold in every house.•Water lines 6 to 20 ft high instructures.•Ruined furniture inside structures.•Oil-line marks for blocks at theMurphy Oil Co. spill.•Sediment- and mold-covered clotheshanging in front hall closets.•Only one house extant for the first12 blocks from the Industrial Canalbreach in the Lower Ninth Ward.•Only one worker in New Orleanswith a Tyvek suit, hardhat and full-face respirator.

•Not one complete residential struc-ture in Pass Christian, MS.•A newly erected chain link fencearound a moderately damaged, non-electrified neighborhood that hadbeen built on and next to a haz-ardous waste landfill property former-ly owned by local elected officials.This meant that residents could notreturn to claim their possessions.•More reopened commercial establish-ments that were part of a chainthan those that were independentlyowned small businesses.•Many major businesses still closed.•Food lines of some 50 cars inSt. Bernard Parish on a Saturdayafternoon.•Common Ground collective’s outdoorsoup kitchen, clothing tent, tool“library,” young volunteers.•GrayLine Tour bus near the 17thAve. Levee breach•The village tent city in Gulfport, MS,with portable toilets at one end andan outdoor shower at the other.•Almost no one at home or workingnear their homes in affected neigh-borhoods.•Re-opened landfill with no obviousability to track MSDS or whetherloads were solid waste, mixed wasteor hazardous waste.•A pharmacy operating out of atrailer in the parking lot of a closeddrug store.

Six Months Later: What We Saw on the Gulf Coast

to augment Acadian’s seven AirMed heli-copters. The airlift then moved the sickand injured to the I-10 Causeway locationfor triage and further evacuation. Othersfrom the Superdome waited for schoolbuses to pick them up, as did people at theCauseway facility who did not require fur-ther medical assistance.

Although their stories were told calmlyand dispassionately, thanks to the distanceof time, they are still told through the lensof their memories. Saunier’s were coloredby the destruction of his own home byHurricane Rita. “Seventy percent of thepopulation is not prepared for evacuationuntil the day of the storm,” he says. “Youcouldn’t sell a generator until the day ofthe storm.” But he reflected that peopledid leave when Hurricane Rita was on itsway. “We learn from our mistakes.” Thosewho toiled during these days repeatedlynoted that they felt the majority of thosewho stayed behind did so because theywere elderly, ill or lacked the physical orfinancial resources to leave.

For example, some evacuations ofinfants from area hospitals were accom-plished with the aid of chicken boxes.One helicopter pilot recalls carrying 20chicken boxes containing newborn babiesfrom a hospital in New Orleans to BaylorUniversity Hospital in Waco, TX.

Saunier also remembers crowds ofpeople at their tenuous staging area onthe I-10, looking for transportation, waterand basic necessities. One child sticks inhis memory, a little girl who wantedwater. He recounts with difficulty that hehad been required to deny her so hewouldn’t initiate rioting for the smallamount of water he had.

The National Guard’s equipment wasin service in the Iraq war effort. We weretold that military amphibious vehicles,which could have been used in the flood-ed areas, were also in Iraq. When militaryequipment did arrive, it often came withits own risks. For example, military heli-copters have a night shield to make theminvisible in battle. These helicopters usedthe Acadian property in Lafayette forstaging. Acadian helicopters, landing onthe same property, had to hope that theywere not landing on top of a night-shield-ed military helicopter.

Evacuation sites in nearby BatonRouge and Lafayette filled quickly. Thismeant that as rescue workers grew moretired, their trips became longer and more

I-10 at the Causeway (across LakePonchartrain), where they established atriage and transport station.

Following the flooding in the city, theydetermined that the best available stagingareas were some of the bridges of I-10,which run east and west around the cres-cent that shapes the city. They shuttledevacuees who were brought in by heli-copter, boat and ambulance to BatonRouge non-stop by their own vehiclesand helicopters. The sheriff of NewIberia, LA, sent armed deputies and amobile command center so that furtherradio communication was possible. Staffin Acadian’s communication centermanned 100 telephone lines for 10straight days, 24 hours each day. Theyalso received information and requests viae-mail and text messaging.

Acadian held the contract for the aidstations at the Superdome, which servedas the evacuation center for residents whocould not leave the city. By Monday,many of the 25,000 looked out from thevarious vantage points within the domeand felt that they had dodged a bullet.Acadian staff was still on duty to takecare of about 500 special needs patientswho were categorized as “walk or can’twalk.” When the roof began to peel away,things became a bit dicey. When thepower and restrooms failed, peoplebecame very restless. Acadian transporteda man who, as reported on the news net-works, had jumped from the upper level.As the ambulance returned, the crewnoticed that water had risen within thecity. In fact, they became stranded on theon-ramp to the Superdome when waterwashed over the grill of the vehicle.

When the people inside the Superdomeheard about the flooding, conditions dete-riorated rapidly. The heat and humiditycaused myriad problems, sick peoplebecame worse, diabetic- and kidney-relat-ed problems increased, dementia escalatedamong the elderly, the stench becameunbearable, and dehydration set in. ByWednesday, the bottled water supply inthe Superdome had to be rationed ad didmeals. A disaster medical assistance teamset up in the arena next to the dome.

Finally, through the efforts of Zuschlagand elected Louisiana officials, more heli-copters were dispatched to the Superdome

arduous. Exhaustion is a problem in everylengthy post-disaster rescue operation, butsolutions are seldom suggested.

Communications & UtilitiesAccording to Barfield, the most criticalproblem associated with emergencyresponse is communications. In this situa-tion, no established emergency communi-cation system was in place. Signal towerswere down throughout the areas, andthere were problems with radio coordina-tion, system mismatches and varioustechnical problems at all levels. Much ofthe National Guard’s communicationsequipment had been diverted to opera-tions in Iraq. A national cable networkbought half the available bandwidth forthe duration of the response period,meaning that video feed could be sent fornewscasts, but emergency response per-sonnel had little ability to talk to oneanother. Lack of telephone and electricalservice persists to this day in much of theaffected areas of the city.

Respiratory ProtectionVarious accounts indicated minimalFEMA presence for about 3 days. OnceFEMA arrived, agency personnel assumedcharge, while rescuers who were alreadyon the ground continued the activitiesalready underway under new command.

Early emergency response personneland OSHA employees recall efforts toprovide respirators to those who followed.FEMA personnel, focused intensely onthe response to the primary crisis, barredOSHA’s and others’ efforts to distributerespirators. Apparently, FEMA saw respi-ratory protection as addressing a long-term and chronic risk, deeming itsecondary to the immediate crisis beforethem. Tensions reportedly remain highbetween employees of both agencies.

As noted, mold is present in thousandsof homes in the Gulf Coast area, particu-larly in New Orleans where the worstflooding occurred. Water lines are visibleon the outside—and inside—of manyhomes. The odor is still intense. Manyworkers have developed upper respiratoryinfections and a chronic cough that hasbeen dubbed the “Katrina Cough.”

We also were told that eventually, atleast in Mississippi, workers abruptlywent from wearing no protection whenentering contaminated buildings to wear-ing full-face respirators and Tyvek suits.During their week’s visit, the authors saw



extent of contamination in the area, provid-ed written and photographic documenta-tion of response activities, oversaw theremoval activities and collected split sam-ples (10% of sediment samples) for qualityassurance/quality control (QA/QC) frommonitoring locations sampled by Murphy’scontractors. Murphy collected sedimentand air samples in areas identified by theEPA as contaminated. Between 15 and 30summa canisters were placed in homes for24-hour air sampling. EPA also oversawMurphy’s plan for cleaning up oil frompublic areas, including roads, median stripsand sidewalks up to one foot of privateproperties, playgrounds and parks.”

Representatives from EPA, USCG, theLouisiana Department of EnvironmentalQuality (LDEQ), ATSDR, Murphy Oil andthe Governor’s Office established proce-dures and action levels for clean up of soilin the public areas. EPA has documentedMurphy’s sampling activities and collected10% splits of sediment samples. Murphyhas collected 963 interior and exterior sedi-ment samples from 563 residences.

It was determined that cleanup of pub-lic areas would include removal of oil-stained areas. Soil samples were thentaken to ensure action levels were met.The action level is LDEQ risk evalua-tion/corrective action program (RECAP)residential soil standards for high publicuse areas:

•total petroleum hydrocarbon (TPH)oil range organics—1,800 mg/kg;

•diesel range organics—650 mg/kg.According to the EPA OSC, St.

many demolition workers in com-promised work sites, but few ofthese workers wore a respirator.

Six months after the storm, thetask of removing debris, demolish-ing buildings and disposing of bothis underway. The authors saw nodust suppression being used in anyof the demolition activities and wit-nessed many demolition projectssurrounded by clouds of dust.

Hazardous building materialsare being demolished along withthe buildings. Little to nothing hasbeen done to identify or removelead or asbestos. These materialsare being sent to landfills withoutsegregation.

The EnvironmentalAftermathPast issues of EnviroMentor have includ-ed reports on levels of surface contamina-tion following deposition of sediments.While samples collected from varioussources reveal comparable analytical data,consensus has not yet been achievedamong the agencies and organizationsinterpreting the data. The differences arearticulated with one interpretation analyz-ing individual test results from isolatedsamples and specific constituents, whilethe other side has attempted to assesscumulative risk from the sum of theresults from individual samples.

While flooding occurred in chemicalwarehouses and petrochemical manufac-turing sites, resulting dispersion of allmanner of chemicals occurred. Theimpact from these releases has also notbeen completely assessed.

One situation expected to be direturned out to be of much less concern.Many gas stations, as expected, hadunderground storage tanks popping upout of the ground in the flood. However,since gasoline was so scarce as peoplefled the city, most of the tanks wereempty. Thus, releases of gasoline fromthis source were less than expected.

The Murphy Oil SpillOne release that may have proven worsethan initially anticipated was the spill fromMurphy Oil Co.’s Mereaux Refinery inChalmette, St. Bernard’s Parish. Accordingto the U.S. Department of Health andHuman Services’Agency for ToxicSubstances and Disease Registry

(ATSDR), “Hurricane Katrina lifted anddislodged a 250,000 barrel abovegroundstorage tank (Tank #250-2) at the NewOrleans Murphy Oil Refinery. At the time,the tank contained 65,000 barrels of mixedcrude oil1 and released approximately25,110 barrels (1.05 million gallons).Thereleased oil has affected approximately1,700 homes in an adjacent residentialneighborhood, an area of about 1 squaremile. Several canals have also been affect-ed” (http://www.bt.cdc.gov/disasters/hur-ricanes/katrina/murphyoil).

The EnviroMentor reported in its Fall2005 edition the following observationsfrom Wilma Subra: “The residential areasadjacent to the refineries were devastatedfrom wind and flood water damage. Theentire area around each refinery is cov-ered with oily refinery sludge. The odoris extremely intense.”

In another press release, Centers forDisease Control stated, “On Sept. 4,2005, Murphy notified the EPA Region 6Response and Prevention Branch aboutan oil spill at the Murphy Meraux facility. . . and requested assistance. EPA and theU.S. Coast Guard (USCG) agreed todivide responsibility for the spill. EPA isoverseeing Murphy’s cleanup of oil inresidential properties and propertiesaccessible to the public (e.g., parks,school yards, roads, highway medianstrips, sidewalks.). EPA is also assistingwith the treatment and remediation of oil-impacted canals for clean-up levels thatwill be determined by key stakeholdersand regulatory authorities.

“EPA identified and characterized the continued on page 16

EnviroMentor 15

Murphy Oil Sediment Results Exceeding MSSLs

Sample ID Analyte Units Result MSSLT0629-051011-01-SS01-N Diesel Range Organics mg/kg 977 650T0681-051011-01-SS01-N Diesel Range Organics mg/kg 1,270 650T0496-051012-01-SS01-N Diesel Range Organics mg/kg 1,290 E 650T0630-051012-01-SS01-N Benzo(a)pyrene mg/kg 0.125 J 0.062

Dibenzo(a,h)anthracene mg/kg 0.0881 J 0.062T0681-051012-01-SS01-N Diesel Range Organics mg/kg 17,400 E 650

Oil Range Organics mg/kg 15,900 1,800T0496-051014-01-SS01-N Diesel Range Organics mg/kg 1,760 650



Oil Range Organics mg/kg 4,240 1,800T0629-051010-01-SS01-N Diesel Range Organics mg/kg 818 650

Bernard Parish officials required that theresponsible party (RP) sample every prop-erty in the spill area before determining ifthe property could be reinhabited. Positivehits above the LDEQ Media-SpecificScreening Level (MSSL) for the firstround of splits are listed in the tablebelow. The Superfund Technical Assis-tance and Response Team (START) con-tractor in Dallas, Texas validated theresults and referred to the Region 6 RiskAssessment Group in the EnvironmentalUnit. A risk assessment is performed, andcomparisons are made to established stan-dards and screening levels. The riskassessment is then forwarded to theHeadquarters (HQ) Risk AssessmentGroup in the HQ Environmental Unit. TheRegion 6 risk evaluation is included in thescreening level risk evaluation section.

Chemicals in environmental media thatexceeded EPA and DEQ standards in-cluded the following. Visit www.bt.cdc.gov/disasters/hurricanes/katrina/murphyoil for additional information.

•heavy metals;•arsenic;•cadmium;•chromium;•semi-volatile organics;•benzo(a)anthracene;•benzo(b)fluoranthene;•indeno(1 ,2,3-c,d)pyrene;•benzo(a)pyrene;•dibenzo(a,h)anthracene;•gasoline and diesel range organics;•volatile organic chemicals;•n-Butylbenzene;•sec-Butylbenzene;•isopropyltoluene;•1,2,4-trimethylbenzene;•1,3,5-rimethylbenzene;•isopropyltoluene;•1,2,4-trimethylbenzene.OSC and START contractor personnel

gathered information regarding the oilspill, provided written and photographicdocumentation of response activities andidentified and characterized the extent ofthe spill in the surrounding residentialarea. START-2 personnel were assigned toidentify the affected areas and to classifythe level of contamination. A house-to-house visual survey was conducted fromthe street to roughly characterize the lev-els of oiling on the properties in the affect-

ed area. (Due to legal access questions,property areas not visible from the streetor public sidewalk were not surveyed.)

Three levels of oiling were estab-lished—heavy, moderate, light and/or“bathtub ring.” Heavy was defined as aproperty where more than 50% of the yard,sidewalks and home were covered withproduct. Moderate was defined as a proper-ty where roughly 50% of the yard and side-walks were covered with product. Lightwas defined as a property where a smallpercentage of product was visible on hori-zontal surfaces or a “bathtub ring” of visi-ble product band approximately three to sixinches wide was seen on the residence withno visible oil in the yard, home or on thesidewalks. At the time of the press release,1,385 properties in the area of the Merauxfacility had been oiled by the spill. Ofthose, 985 homes were classified as light,286 as medium and 114 as heavy.

Sediment sample results collectedfrom the inside and outside of propertieslocated in the area affected by theMurphy oil spill were analyzed. The sam-ples represent a subset of the total num-ber of samples collected at the site and donot include any indoor air samples.However, based on the available data,CDC was able to define a few publichealth hazards. The analytical data con-firmed the widespread impact of oil sub-stances on properties located within theMurphy oil spill site. Levels of diesel-and oil-related organic chemicals in sedi-ment samples exceeded several health-based comparison values (including theLDEQ levels for residential exposures).Exceeding the health-based screeninglevel may not pose a health hazard asexposure is not certain. These healthscreening levels are established to protectpeople from touching or accidentallyingesting soils. Therefore, the levelsmeasured indicate that soils should not beroutinely touched or accidentally ingest-ed. Children’s behaviors, such as hand-to-mouth behavior, increase their exposureto contaminants in soil. Pets increase apet owner’s exposures to soil. Therefore,children and pet access to contaminatedareas should be restricted or controlled.

A complete assessment of exposuresrequires an understanding of the locationswhere samples were collected as well as anunderstanding of the frequency of humancontact with those soils and the extent towhich people would contact those soils. At

this time, much of the data are unavailable.Additionally, indoor air sample results

were unavailable at the time the authorswrote this report. Since petroleum prod-ucts are known to volatize, some volatilesare expected in the air, but none havebeen reported so far. Toxic airborne pollu-tants also tend to be more volatile, butsince there have been so many warm daysafter the oil spill, most of the harmfulpollutants have volatilized. Therefore, theoutdoor levels of volatiles are expected tobe low. Some volatiles may be trappedinside homes or other buildings, but theseairborne levels should drop over time.

Field sampling staff reported that soiland sediment samples collected before Oct.16, 2005, represent outdoor samples, andthose after Oct. 16, 2005, represent indoorsediment samples. EPA’s review of rawdata revealed elevated levels indoors aswell as outdoors. Some chemicals exceedhealth comparison guidance values.

Contact with oil and petroleumresidues can cause skin rashes in people.Subsequent exposure to sunlight increasesthe effect. Contact dermatitis may devel-op if a sensitive person touches petroleumproducts. Children who spend longerperiods outdoor in the sunlight may havemore severe rashes. Children have alsobeen known to develop face rashes aftertouching petroleum residue with theirhands and transferring some residue tothe skin on their face.

ATSDR categorizes areas affected byvisible oil contamination from the MurphyOil Spill as a public health hazard for nor-mal residential use due to the potential forskin contact and accidental ingestion of oilresidues. ATSDR categorizes the affectedarea as an indeterminate public health haz-ard for air contamination due to the lack ofair quality data. In the absence of air data,it is not possible to assess inhalation expo-sures to airborne volatiles that have evapo-rated from the petroleum product andremain trapped inside buildings. CDCoffers the following recommendations:

1) Reinhabiting homes with visible oilcontamination is not recommendedbecause of the potential for skin exposureto oil substances. If people choose to reen-ter the affected area before remediation,they should take precautions to avoid con-tact with oil substances. Sensitive individ-uals, including children and people withrecently healed or open wounds, shouldavoid all exposure to oil substances.



2) Because children are more likely tobe exposed to contaminated soil, localofficials should consider restricting chil-dren from entering areas containing oil-related waste.

3) Residents may be exposed to soilcontaminants from contact with theirpets; therefore, local officials should con-sider restricting pets from entering oil-contaminated areas.

4) ATSDR endorses Louisiana ’s guid-ance to protect people from exposure tooil substances who choose to reenterproperties before clean-up and remedia-tion activities are completed. This protec-tive guidance recommends the following:

•Protect your skin from contacting oil.•Use oil-resistant gloves (oil may dis-

solve latex gloves, so use a differenttype).

•Keep arms and legs covered. •Wear coveralls or clothing that can be

left at the oil-contaminated residence.•If oil gets on skin, immediately wash

with soap and water.•Wear boot covers or leave work boots

at the oil-contaminated residence.•Open doors and windows to ventilate

the oil-contaminated residence.•Do not transport oil-contaminated

items from the oil-contaminated resi-dence to non-contaminated locations.

•Workers who clean up oil-contaminat-ed property should wear appropriate pro-tective clothing. Petroleum products candegrade some synthetic materials and fab-rics, so oil-resistant protective footwear,gloves and clothing should be used.

The following are identified in thepublic health action plan:

•ATSDR will coordinate the distribu-tion in St. Bernard Parish of fliers thatprovide the Louisiana protective guidancelisted above.

•ATSDR will evaluate additional envi-ronmental and indoor air sample results,if provided by Murphy Oil Co., and willprovide findings to the public

As of the authors’ visit, it appearedthat the refinery’s property, canals andsome streets in the area had receivedattention. EPA had released Murphy OilCo. from further responsibility. The resi-dential properties in the area, with fewexceptions, were still uniformly coatedwith dried crude sludge. A class-actionsuit has been filed on behalf of 10,000homes in 6 square miles for cleanup ofthese properties.

Details of Current ConditionsWe saw the partially open DelgadoCommunity College whose studentswrote newsletter articles for the practicespecialty newsletters in exchange for hav-ing their registration fees paid for lastyear’s PDC in New Orleans.

Many public schools were closed, somewith major damage, but few were beingrepaired. The damage to many school andpublic neighborhood libraries and theirbooks is irreparable. Water damage to elec-tronic equipment in these same facilities ismassive and likely irreparable as well.

Destruction is the most descriptiveterm of the day; however, this also meansthe potential for new construction and, ofcourse, the opportunity to reconstruct andrehabilitate is everywhere. It extends frominterior walls, floors, substructures andceilings to exterior foundations and roofs.New construction will be necessary forhundreds of buildings that were literallytorn from their foundations.

Safety and environmental health is anenormous concern as the stability andintegrity of buildings and their supportsystems is questionable in most struc-tures. Unoccupied structures that appearto have no electric and some water dam-age may in fact be quite dangerous. Ifowners are unable to adequately surveytheir damage and leave rotting supportsand mold-covered walls, who knowswhat the consequences will be?

We saw few FEMA trailers in relation tothe devastation and need in the area (morethan $300+ million were spent for them).Some were on concrete blocks in floodplains and none were seen in areas abovesea level, such as the Lower Ninth Ward.Of course, if your house does not haveelectricity, it is hard to hook up a trailer.From the early days of the “recovery” (atleast in New Orleans), the city would notallow individual generating systems.

After talking with contractors workingin the Gulfport/Biloxi area, communicationwith non-English-speaking workersappears to be another major problem.Hundreds of Hispanics have come fromMexico and Central America to find work.Adherence to SH&E standards is oftenlimited or nonexistent. It is unclearwhether OSHA inspectors have been inthese areas. Fall protection, ladder usage,lockout/tagout, confined spaces,slips/trips/falls, training, eye protection,respiratory protection and PPE are a few

examples of areas that need attention.Electrical work alone must be hazardous toanyone as exposed wiring is everywhere.

The substructure of streets and sewersin areas flooded by the levee breachesand the overflowing of Lake Ponchartrainwill require close examination of theirintegrity. Weakened sewer lines couldburst during a heavy rain and certainlywith another hurricane. As we now know,USACE cannot guarantee the integrity ofrepairs and reconstruction.

There is an overwhelming need forSH&E consultants in all parts of the affect-ed areas of Louisiana and Mississippi.

RecommendationsWith hurricane season upon us, planning,repair and reconstruction seem to be pro-ceeding in earnest.

•The consequences of approaching ahurricane season without full, Category 5levee protection must be considered.

•More effective evacuation proceduresshould be developed.

•More attention must be given to resi-dents who do not evacuate prior to thestorm.

•Strategies must be developed on howto quickly reach residents who aretrapped in their homes.

•Lines of authority must be consideredbefore a natural disaster.

•Communications systems must bemodernized, and systems should be madeconsistent.

•Attention must be paid to the risks oflong-term illness, and respirators shouldbe made mandatory.

•ASSE should consider joiningASCE’s recommendation for a nationallevee safety program.

Rennie Heath is ASSE’s manager of practice spe-cialties. She spent five days at the end of Feb-ruary viewing the damage in both Mississippiand Louisiana, especially in New Orleans.

Judy L. Freeman is special projects director,Gabriel Environmental Services Inc., Chicago.She has been the Editor of EnviroMentor for thepast 7 years and will be the AssistantAdministrator of the Environmental PracticeSpecialty as of July 2006. She has been trackingthe Hurricane Katrina story since it occurred,including a recent visit to the devastated region.Her previous articles may be found in theEnviroMentor, Vol. 5, Nos. 1 and 2.

EnviroMentor 17


SH&E practitioners often distinguishtheir reach to include only environ-mental management from a plant

floor perspective. To some, environmentalmanagement is still considered a fairlymarginal part of the safety profession.Ecology, while generally respected as adiscipline, is simply not considered partof the SH&E discipline. And perhaps,there is just a hint that those disciplinesare a little softer and associated with “treehuggers” and “bird and bunny lovers.”

It may be that the language used toaddress environmental management hasthrown us off. “Protecting Mother Earth”and “our fragile ecosystem” sound likephrases spoken by greenies as they haultheir gear into a tree house. The linkagesare not readily apparent between wetlandserosion, global warming or habitatdestruction and safety. And clearly, pro-tecting baby harp seals and whales havelittle to do with shopfloor safety.

Many natural disasters occur becauseof grand cycles of the earth. Beyond ourawareness of months, seasons and years,many of these cycles, which involve theplanet’s tilt or its orbit vis à vis the sun,require 20,000, 40,000 and 120,000 yearsto complete—far outside of our control.

The entire breadth of environmentallaw has been developed to protect naturalresources and public health. Modernmanufacturing has evolved to accept thenecessity of secondary containment orproper hazardous waste shipping. Outsideof the regulatory framework, we may nothave enough time, knowledge or inclina-tion to consider how our activities todaymay affect the ecosystem. Our planet isnot fragile, but we really do not knowhow our activities can affect its health.

From time to time, the forces of naturehave the power to humble even the tough-est plant floor safety practitioner. WithHurricane Katrina, we were remindedagain that some situations are beyond ourcontrol. Grass fires in Texas and Okla-homa. Mudslides in California.

Emergency response personnel workto ensure that these situations are handledas safely as possible.

Property protection engineers, thosewho deal with fire, flood and wind, incor-

porate their understanding of natural lawinto their design and site maintenance.This is, for the most part, done routinelyand according to standards that reflectlessons learned long ago.

Strategic thinking about the “what ifs”of disaster can help to bring such situa-tions into perspective—and hopefullycontrol. For example, siting and designconsiderations can help to ensure that afire in a chemical warehouse does notcreate run-off that contaminates the localdrinking water supply.

“What if” we had the power to reducean incident’s furor or to avoid an incidentaltogether? We do not, really, not entirely.Nature does not bend to the laws ofhuman beings. But this article asks read-ers to reconsider how and whether futurenatural disasters can be mitigated throughconsideration of the environment as asafety and health tool. This involvesincorporating an awareness of natural lawand considering the impact of pushingagainst it.

Hurricane Katrina has given us the“perfect storm” to consider a model foraddressing these questions.

SitingNew Orleans’ previous mayor, MarkMorial, criticized the city’s founders forselecting a site with so many inherentproblems. In his book, An UnnaturalMetropolis, Wresting New Orleans fromNature, published in early 2005, Craig E.Colten tried to predict the impact of ahurricane on the city. “Should a Class 5hurricane blow water over the lakefrontlevees, the city could find itself underwater for months. Evacuation would faceserious bottlenecks due to the limitednumber of escape routes across the water-logged terrain—and some of those raisedhighways could be over-topped by storm-driven waves. Recent popular accountspaint a dire picture and suggest that fed-eral authorities might not be willing tomake the investment necessary to save acity that cannot afford to protect itself.Global warming and sea level rise makethis grim forecast all too likely.”

Because of its unique siting, NewOrleans faces monumental issues in deal-

ing with floods, garbage disposal,drinking water quality, termites andmosquitoes.

Barrier Island ErosionThe U.S. Geological Survey’s websiteincludes this quote from Dr. Jeffrey H.List, “The barrier islands of Louisianaare eroding at an extreme rate. In places,up to 100 feet of shoreline are disappear-ing every year. Though it has long beenassumed that this erosion was due tothe area’s rapid rate of relative sea levelrise, recent studies by the U.S. GeologicalSurvey show that other coastal processes,such as the longshore redistribution ofsediments, are responsible for thiserosion.”

In fact, the very levees that protect thecity may have contributed to its sinking.The Mississippi River has over timedeposited silt at its mouth, forming theDelta. The erection of levees has blockedthis deposition, allowing it to occurupstream but not in the city. As barrierislands continue to erode, their benefit asa buffer to calm a hurricane before it hitslandfall is also diminished.

Contributions from UpstreamHere is another environmental platitude:“All of us live downstream.” For NewOrleans, this is particularly true. Thosewho live upstream from New Orleanshave a new responsibility to consider notonly the quality but also the volume ofwater we send down stream.

This may seem a bit esoteric. Federallaw mandates that our water treatmentsystems have a responsibility to maintaindownstream waters in a drinkable condi-tion. But over-development in Midwestsuburban cities contributes to increasedrun-off into streams and rivers, whicheventually makes its way into theMississippi River to New Orleans.

In discussing contamination of theMississippi River Colten wrote,“Ultimately, the fact that New Orleansrelied on the river for its drinking waterprompted an environmental stance andthereby altered protections offered water-

When Is Conservation a Safety Issue?By Judy L. Freeman


As a professional engineer working inthe safety and risk managementfield, it is important to share with

my colleagues and other ASSE membersthe civil engineers’ perspective of theHurricane Katrina damage zone. Thisrecovery effort will be enormous for theAmerican Society of Civil Engineers(ASCE) and ASSE, as well as for all ofthe professional engineering organiza-tions and affiliations and local and nation-al chapters.

The devastation caused by the hurri-cane has caused extreme hardships andirreparable harm to hundreds of thou-sands of Americans. These hardships andharms can only be mitigated throughcareful concerns and acts of assistancefrom those with the ability to help. Insupport of the relief efforts during thecoming months, ASCE and its 137,000members will be in regular consultationwith government agencies and non-governmental organizations to coordinateits response.

Obviously, the immediate focus is onhumanitarian assistance, including finan-cial aid, but engineer services are alsoneeded. ASCE has begun to address itsresponse plan as follows:

•Resources are available to provideassistance to those affected by virtue oftheir geography and the whim of theweather.

•ASCE has deployed technical assess-ment teams to the field and will be con-sulting with technical experts in thedisaster area.

•ASCE is working with its affiliatedsocieties to determine the needs of theprofessional community in the affectedareas, and is assisting efforts to return adevastated community to productivity anda normal way of life.

•ASCE is actively involved in damageassessments and in leading efforts forimmediate, temporary and permanentrepair of necessary infrastructure.

•ASCE experts are responding to pub-lic and media inquiries.

•ASCE serves as an information clear-inghouse to help members obtain infor-mation on the welfare of other membersand to help the public obtain informationon recovery efforts.

•A library of journal articles onresponse efforts and the mitigation of hur-ricane events will bemade available at nocost to the profes-sional community.

ASCE has an oath,similar in spirit to theHippocratic Oath,that draws on the eth-ical guidelines ofmajor engineeringsocieties. An excerptfollows:

As an engineer, Ipledge to practiceintegrity and fairdealing, tolerance andrespect and to uphold the dignity of myprofession, conscious always that my skillcarries with it the obligation to serve

humanity by making the best use of theearth’s precious wealth. As an engineer, Ishall participate in none but the bestenterprises. When needed, my skill andknowledge shall be given without reser-vation for the public good. In the per-formance of duty and in fidelity to myprofession, I shall give my utmost.

To learn more about ASCE and itsefforts in the Hurricane Katrina disasterareas, visit www.asce.org.

A.E. “Skip” Osborn, P.E., M.ASCE, is a seniorrisk engineer for Zurich Construction RiskServices in Carrollton, GA.

Civil Engineers Respond to KatrinaBy A.E. “Skip” Osborn, P.E., M.ASCE

ways in general and the Mississippi inparticular. By the 1970s, state and federallaws safeguarded the river, not just as anavigable waterway or fish habitat, but asthe drinking water source for more than amillion residents in the lower valley witha variety of rules and regulations that sup-plemented traditional legal protection.”

How these broad issues affect the in-plant safety and health manager may notseem immediately obvious. Beyond the

Conservation as a Safety Issuecontinued from page 18

platitudes, an environmental ethosdemands that we all recognize ourresponsibility to the environment—bothinside and outside of the workplace.

Judy L. Freeman is special projects director,Gabriel Environmental Services Inc., Chicago.She has been the Editor of EnviroMentor for thepast 7 years and will be the AssistantAdministrator of the Environmental PracticeSpecialty as of July 2006. She has been trackingthe Hurricane Katrina story since it occurred,including a recent visit to the devastated region.Her previous articles may be found in theEnviroMentor, Vol. 5, Nos. 1 and 2.

EnviroMentor 19

Learn more about ASSE’s practicespecialties at www.asse.org.

Even 2 weeks after it made landfall andmore than 70 miles inland, HurricaneKatrina’s destructive force was evident.

Driving through Baton Rouge, large treeswere uprooted or snapped in two, signswere battered, and utility crews worked torepair infrastructure in the 95-degree heat.

Located a few miles southeast of thecity, the Greater Baton Rouge StateFairgrounds has cancelled its annual statefair. The reason? The Federal EmergencyManagement Agency (FEMA) and anumber of companies were using the spa-cious area as a staging ground for therecovery efforts in New Orleans. Amongthose companies was Sprint Nextel Corp.,created from the merger of Sprint andNextel Communications, which closedjust 18 days before Hurricane Katrinamade landfall along the Louisiana andMississippi Gulf Coast.

Sprint Nextel’s command post, dubbedSprint City by employees, could best bedescribed as a pseudo-M.A.S.H. unit, com-plete with a mess tent, showers, approxi-mately 40 RVs and a helicopter, which wasused for initial damage assessments.

Even before Katrina made landfall,Sprint Nextel was positioning itsresources for recovery. Four days aheadof time, the newly merged companybegan pre-staging assets in Shreveport,La. As the hurricane approached, thebusiness continuity office made sure allessential personnel were aware of theirrole. Within three days of the hurricaneslamming into the Gulf coast, SprintNextel had its camp up and running.

“Within 72 hours, we had operationalstaging in place to handle up to 300 peo-ple,” said Greig Fennell, director, busi-ness continuation, Sprint Nextel. “Wewere able to pull in resources from allover the United States.”

The company estimated that the stormwill cost $150-200 million net of expect-ed insurance proceeds, with the bulk ofexpenses due to damages to its networkinfrastructure, retail operations, as well asbilling relief for impacted customers. Thescope of the expected expenses made thisa high priority recovery effort.

“It’s pretty close to a worst-case sce-nario,” said Fennell. “It is the largestescalation we’ve had in a long time. Ourwireless and long distance networks werereally impacted. The only thing worsewould be a major earthquake in LosAngeles or San Francisco.”

The damage Sprint experienced,including cell sites, switches, retail stores,etc., out of service, was enormous.Damages to the Nationwide Sprint PCSNetwork, the Nextel National Network,its long distance network, and local tele-phone services were spread across a90,000 square mile three-state region thesize of Great Britain.

From Sprint City, Fennell and his crewof business continuity teams handled thedeployment of repair teams into theaffected areas. Each morning a seeminglyendless stream of trucks headed into NewOrleans, returning at night. The SprintNextel business continuity office set upan incident command structure (ICS) atSprint City to coordinate the enter-prisewide recovery, and ensure the com-pany’s employees responding to thedisaster were safe and well cared for.

Per pre-approved protocol, Fennellassumed the role of overall “incident com-mander,” while appropriate SMEs from allparts of the newly formed company filledtheir Sprint City ICS roles of security offi-cer, safety officer, communications officer,logistics officer, etc. This structureallowed for clear authority and safe, effi-cient operations. Twenty-four hour doc-tor/nurse support on-site for vaccinations,medical support and daily situationalhealth procedures, catering, showers, toi-lets, WAN/LAN, mobile command center,access to company jets for re-supply andemployee rotation. All of this showed top-level management commitment to SprintNextel’s employees and customers.

The network operations BCP team metevery night to determine what wasrepaired during the day and what shouldbe a priority the following day. Eachmorning they updated headquarters aboutthe progress and sent out technicians.Complicating the recovery, from the start,

was the violence and health concerns inthe city.

“We weren’t able to deploy our techni-cians for the first two days,” said Fennell.“We saw the coverage on CNN and hadto ask, ‘How safe is it to deploy ouremployees into New Orleans?’”

Fennell explained that Sprint Nextelhad a normal corporate policy of notdeploying armed guards even in retailstores. “We needed to protect our peopleand we had to change that policy due tothe circumstances,” he said. Fennellworked with senior executives and it wasdetermined that the technicians wouldneed to have armed guards when workingin certain areas in the city.

While all of this was being accom-plished, the two formerly separate com-panies were putting the finishing toucheson a merger, which became official onAug. 12. In fact, the merger may havecontributed to the high-level of prepara-


Hard Times in the Big Easy:Sprint Nextel’s Response to Hurricane KatrinaBy Kevin C. Miller

Some Lessons Learned•Ensure that all essential personnel

have a copy of the business continu-ity plan before they evacuate.

•Hurricanes will affect an entireregion, not just one business. Ensurethe scope of the business continuityplan considers the impact of aregional disaster. When choosingalternate sites, make sure that theyare located far enough away fromareas of likely destruction.

•Communicate with employees,vendors, customers, and other inter-ested parties before the storm arrives.Let them know how to get in touchwith the organization afterwards.Give them several alternate means todo so (e.g., cell phone, 800 number,website, e-mail, text messaging).Companies that used an emergencynotification system to alert theiremployees ahead of HurricaneKatrina were able to account for themfaster and begin recovery sooner.

EnviroMentor 21

tion. The two business continuity officeshad been meeting since June, and in Julythey conducted a tabletop exercise withthe newly formed enterprise incidentmanagement team and the senior man-agement from the two companies. Fennelland Lou DiSerafino, then director of theNextel’s business continuity office, effec-tively partnered in pulling the two busi-ness continuity programs together for theexercise. The scenario—a hurricane mak-ing landfall in Florida. Based on theresults of that exercise, they were able tobuild an incident response plan for thesoon-to-be merged companies.

“We were preparing for the hurricaneseason throughout the summer. Bothteams recognized early on that we neededto have a plan in place if we were to suc-cessfully make it through November,”said DiSerafino, now director of enter-prise risk management, Sprint Nextel.“Our teams came up with scenarios thatnot only worked in a blueprint, but cameto life when the moment called for it.”

“The incident response plan was ourNo. 1 priority based on the fact that wewere entering hurricane season,” saidFennell. “We looked at the processes andteams from each company, compared and

contrasted them, and found the gaps. WhenKatrina hit, the exercise was still fresh ineveryone’s mind. We were ready to go.”

According to Fennell, since many ofthe post-merger details and responsibili-ties were still being ironed out, theKatrina response had two members formost recovery team positions. As therecovery proceeded, everyone’s rolesbecame more clearly defined.

One area where there was no overlapwas the Sprint Nextel emergencyresponse team (ERT), which was essen-tial in providing a means of communica-tion to first responders affected byHurricane Katrina with mobile phones.The ERT’s mission

was to provide personnel, equipment,and infrastructure to enhance and assistthe responding agencies. They’veresponded to 19 presidentially declareddisasters in the last three years. The ERTwas one of the first groups to arrive inLouisiana for Sprint Nextel.

There will be many changes to thecompany’s future planning efforts basedon the Katrina experience. For example,Fennell noted that it was difficult to pur-chase equipment, supplies, and servicesneeded for recovery. Since power and

telecommunications were down in muchof the region, corporate credit cards werenot practical and with many banks closed,cash was rare. The solution was to havecertain employees travel with cash intothe devastated areas.

“The most difficult thing is stayingahead of the curve from a logistical stand-point,” said Fennell. “Ice, blankets and tow-els were flown in because local resourcesfor such items were stretched thin.”

Other issues that arose included main-taining continuity as personnel wererotated in and out of the recovery effortand locating suitable facilities for therecovery. As they proceeded with therecovery, the command center was movedto a warehouse located closer to NewOrleans on Sept. 17. Now called SprintCity 2, the 25,000-square-foot warehouseenabled them to house technicians andcut the commute time considerably.Fennell expected to continue the recoveryeffort for the remainder of the year.

“Sprint Nextel is committed to servingour communities in every way that wecan and people are the most importantasset,” said Fennell. “If we can’t providethem with the proper environment to dotheir work, then we failed.”

Kevin C. Miller has been a communicationsand journalism professional for 14 yearsincluding five years as a spokesman and jour-nalist for the U.S. Coast Guard. He has beenpublished in magazines and newspapers inter-nationally and is currently the public relationscoordinator for Strohl Systems, a global leaderin the business continuity planning softwareand services market. He can be reached at(800) 634-2016 or [email protected].

Reprinted with permission of Disaster RecoveryJournal.

•Begin the process of findingusable, alternate properties outside ofthe region now. Engage the organiza-tion’s real estate division in theprocess. Empty warehouses andoffice space on the outskirts of thedisaster area will be at a premiumfollowing the hurricane.

•Have plans in place to rotate per-sonnel on the recovery teams.Include procedures for keepingnewly arriving recovery team mem-bers informed, onsite rules, and waysto recognize individuals for superiorperformance.

•If you have conducted previousbusiness continuity exercises, makesure you are familiar with the lessonslearned in them. More than likely,you will be using that knowledge tohandle this and any future recoveries.

Reprinted with permission of DisasterRecovery Journal.

•Place sensitive electronic equip-ment and vital records on highground before evacuating.

•Airports/local transportation maybe shut down. Be prepared to recoverwithout out-of-town personnel.

•Stockpile food, potable water,fuel, and medical supplies for thecommand center.

•Be prepared to set up on-site day-care for employees who have noother options for childcare.

•Prepare a checklist of all systemsand furnishings within your buildings.

•Keep this list in a secure, offsitelocation.

•Have a camera ready to photo-graph all damage for insurancepurposes.

•Ensure the organization hasaccess to cash. Many supplies andservices may need to be purchased inthe aftermath to speed the recovery.If power and communications sys-tems are damaged, corporate creditcards may prove useless.

Z10 Is Here

and ASSE has it.ANSI/AIHA Z10

Occupational Health and SafetyManagement Systems

Call ASSE at (847) 699-2929or visit www.asse.org/fr3388.htm.

Editor’s Note: Douglas C. Sharp spent twomonths in Louisiana with EPA during theresponse to hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Heserved two, 2-week rotations as one of nineassistant safety officers under the IncidentCommand System. Sharp served another 2weeks as assistant safety officer from Jan. 17,2006, to Feb. 2, 2006, and immediately servedas the command safety officer from Feb. 3,2006, to Feb. 17, 2006, during which time thenine assistant safety officers reported to him.

Sharp worked out of the unified incidentcommand post, initially at the LouisianaDepartment of Environmental Quality head-quarters in Baton Rouge until late September,when it moved to the campus of LouisianaTechnical College in Metairie. During his tourof duty, Sharp performed safety inspections ofa wide range of field operations and at almostall EPA hazardous waste collection sitesthroughout the state. He was part of a team oftwo safety professionals who performed theinitial facility safety inspection of theLouisiana Technical College facility before itwas occupied by personnel from Baton Rouge.He was the principal author of the occupantemergency plan for the new command post inMetarie, and he was also responsible for pro-viding the daily safety orientation briefing fornewly arrived personnel.

Following a series of wildfires in south-ern California in the 1970s, a groupcomprised of federal, state and munici-

pal fire authorities called FirefightingResources of California Organized forPotential Emergencies (FIRESCOPE)determined that response problems werefar more likely to result from organization-al inadequacies such as nonstandard termi-nology, nonstandard or nonintegratedcommunications, or a lack of consolidatedaction plans rather than a lack of resources.Efforts to address these problems resultedin the development of the Incident Com-mand System (ICS) model as an effectiveincident management tool appropriate forall types of fire and other emergencies.

The ICS organization is built on fivemajor components, which can be modi-fied as necessary to expand or contractthe response dependent on the needs. Thefive main components are:

•incident command;•planning;•operations;

•logistics;•finance/administration.On March 1, 2004, in accordance with

Homeland Security Presidential Directive(HSPD)-5, Management of DomesticIncidents, DHS Secretary Tom Ridgeannounced the National Incident Manage-ment System (NIMS) requiring all federaldepartments and agencies to adopt thebasic tenets of the ICS. In December 2004,Secretary Ridge delivered the NationalResponse Plan (NRP), which was built onthe NIMS template and was designed toalign federal capabilities and resources intoa unified, all-discipline and all-hazardsapproach to domestic incident manage-ment.

EPA’s Responseto the HurricanesAt 6:10 a.m. Monday, Aug.29, 2005, HurricaneKatrina made landfall at thecentral portion ofPlaquemines Parish justsouth of the small town ofBuras as a Category 4storm amid reports thatwater had already breachedthe levee systems in NewOrleans. Proceeding northinto Mississippi, the stormwreaked a path of utterdestruction and set in motion a chain ofevents that ultimately claimed approxi-mately 1,200 lives, displaced hundreds ofthousands of people and resulted in morethan $80 billion in damage. By 10:00p.m. on Aug. 30, 2005, approximately80% of New Orleans was under water.

At that time, EPA had a total of 45 per-sons engaged in various aspects of disasterresponse, including assistance with rescueefforts, air, water and sediment samplingand aerial surveillance of debris fields.These numbers grew daily as more EPApersonnel and persons employed under theagency’s Superfund Technical AssessmentResponse Teams (START) and Emergencyand Rapid Response Services (ERRS) con-tracts were deployed to the area.

The early weeks were exceedinglychallenging due to lack of food, waterand available housing for EPA and otherresponders. The situation was compound-ed daily by the unfolding chain of eventsthat included gunshots fired at helicoptersand rescue crews, and the discovery ofmultiple chemical and oil spills. Oneexample is the approximately 1 million-gallon oil spill released from the MurphyOil refinery on Sept. 3, 2005, into thealready flood-destroyed neighborhoodadjacent to it. This resulted in the oilingof approximately 1,800 houses. By theend of September 2005, EPA, as the leadfederal agency, along with its partners,the Louisiana Department of Environ-mental Quality (LDEQ) and the U.S.Coast Guard (USCG), had produced sig-


The Incident Management System &EPA’s Experience in LouisianaBy Douglas C. Sharp, CSP, OHST, CIE

EnviroMentor 23

nificant results under every ICS compo-nent, including the added “EnvironmentalUnit” designed for accumulation of datafrom all environmental investigations.

During the first month after Katrinamade landfall, EPA and its partners:

•assisted in the rescue and relocationof hundreds of people;

•conducted hundreds of house-to-house environmental assessments;

•assessed the status of hundreds ofdrinking water and wastewater systems;

•established household hazardous andindustrial waste collection areas;

•tested thousands of gallons of potablewater delivered by tank truck;

•responded to reports of hundreds ofsmall-to-large chemical spills;

•obtained hundreds of air, water andsoil samples;

•established methods and locations torecover and dispose of white goods (e.g.,refrigerators, air conditioners);

•inspected hundreds of undergroundand aboveground storage tank locations;

•conducted aerial and ground recon-naissance to locate tens of thousands ofcontainers;

•relocated the Unified Command Inci-dent Command Post from Baton Rougeto Metairie including housing for morethan 200 EPA personnel in 78 trailers;

•committed hundreds of START andERRS contractors to the response efforts,bringing the total combined strength of theEPA labor force to more than 500 persons;

•added areas impacted by HurricaneRita, which struck the western portion ofLouisiana on Sept. 23, 2005, to the reconand recovery efforts.

Despite these efforts, by the end ofSeptember—one month after the first hur-ricane—EPA and its partners had onlybegun to scratch the surface of whatremained to be accomplished. As the daysstretched into weeks and weeks intomonths, the effectiveness of ICS wasproven again, especially since EPAemployees were generally on site for only2 or 3 weeks before being replaced byother volunteers from the agency.

All concepts of ICS were used on adaily basis. For example, all personnel notin leadership positions reported their dailymovements and accomplishments bypreparing and submitting a Unit Log(Form 214) to their unit or section leadereach night before departing the incidentcommand post. Each unit or section leaderwould then edit the information derivedfrom each log into a daily situation report(SITREP) from that unit or section. Eachof these SITREPS would then be submit-ted daily to the planning section chief whowould use them to create the situationreport for the overall incident response forthat day, which the incident managementteam (IMT) used to track progress.

Another major component of the ICSemployed by the IMT is the incidentaction plan (IAP). This document followsthe format prescribed by the ICS and fea-tures several types of standard ICS forms,which concisely describe the location andnature of each project or operation, theidentities and contact information for allmanagement representatives, the numberand nature of the workers on site, a briefdescription of the work assignments andspecial information such as specific safe-ty hazards or precautions. IAP alsoincludes a current organizational chart forthe IMT, an updated medical plan show-ing the location and contact informationfor all medical and rescue services in theareas as well as other useful informationlike weather reports and road conditions.

The effectiveness of the ICS enabledEPA and its partners to efficiently manageand document practically every aspect ofthis enormous, complex and unprecedent-ed disaster response. At the peak of thiseffort in December 2005, the combinedEPA, LDEQ, USGS and contractor work-force comprised approximately 1,500 per-sons operating in 33 separate locationsdispersed throughout the hurricane-impacted areas of the southern half ofLouisiana. Although work continues as ofthis writing, the information in the sidebarabove, derived from the EmergencySupport Function #10 SITREP #88 anddated Feb. 13, 2006, is indicative of theprogress made in the months sinceHurricane Katrina struck.

SourcesHurricane Central. www.weather.com.ESF #10 SITREP #88, 2/13/06National Incident Management Sys-

tem. http://www.dhs.gov.National Response Plan. http://www

.dhs.gov.911dispatch.com.Region VI Regional Response Coordi-

nation Center FEMA-3212-EM-LASITREP #01 and #02.

Douglas C. Sharp, CSP, OHST, CIE, has been anEnvironmental Scientist with the EPA Office ofRadiation and Indoor Environments NationalLaboratory (RIENL), Center for EnvironmentalRestoration, Monitoring and EmergencyResponse (CERMER), Las Vegas, NV, since May2004. He was among a team of US EPA person-nel from throughout the country that were dis-patched to the Gulf Coast region in response toHurricane Katrina.

ACTION QUANTITYWater Samples Analyzed 649Sediment Samples Analyzed 1,210Air Samples Analyzed 5,510Ammunition, Fireworks, Flares

and Gun Powder Recovered 21,855 lbFire Arms Recovered 370Schools Assessed for

Hazardous Conditions 324 Schools Requiring

Removal Activities 108Electronic Goods

Recovered for Disposal 305,211White Goods 313,266Freon Recovered 277,686 lbHazardous Waste

Recovered for Disposal 10,710,410 lb55-Gallon Drums

Recovered for Disposal 32,243Propane Tanks Recovered

(>100 lb) 30,543Propane Cylinders Recovered

(<100 lb) 37,801Other Large Containers

Recovered 4,947Small Containers (Household

Quantities) Recovered 2,092,765Informational Fliers Distributed 46,690

Just a few weeks after HurricaneKatrina ravaged the Gulf Coast,Hurricane Rita made its way toward

Houston, Texas. Mayor Bill Whiteordered Galveston Island and other at-riskareas to evacuate. He ordered all “non-essential” city employees to stay putunless they resided in an evacuation zone.

However, our planning had begun inearnest on September 20, 2005 whenweather forecasts predicted that HurricaneRita would make landfall in the Houstonand Galveston areas. During our weeklysupervisors’ meeting, the hospital’s CEO,asked, “Should we have evacuated ourhospital? It looks as though Hurricane Ritais moving full-speed toward Houston.” Weall agreed that it was too late to evacuateeven if we wanted to because all ofHouston’s highways and roads were bot-tlenecked, as 2.5 million Houstoniansheaded north or south in accordance withthe volunteer evacuation plan.

We also agreed that we needed tomobilize our available resources such aspersonnel, food, water, safety equipmentand utilities. Fortunately, the hospital wasnot part of the mandatory evacuationzone. The first step in implementing thehospital emergency response plan was toschedule a meeting with all managers,supervisors and physician staff.

The hospital security officer consultedwith the Houston Emergency Planningoffice about riding out the hurricane ver-sus evacuating to an alternate site. Theoffice contact had reviewed our emer-gency plan, including the hazard risk vul-nerability rating, and informed thesecurity officer that the hospital was locat-ed in a flood-free zone. He also informedour security officer that if Hurricane Ritawere to hit Houston as a Category 5storm, all areas would be vulnerable andwould suffer devastating destruction.However, he reassured our security officerthat unlike New Orleans, Houston doesnot have levees that may add to flooding.

Response Plan Review During the first meeting on Sept. 20,2005, the hospital administrator and his

leadership staff reviewed our hospital’s(referred to hereafter as ABC Hospital)hurricane emergency response plan.

PurposeIn the event of a hurricane, ABC Hospitalis responsible for ensuring the safety ofpatients and staff. To properly prepareand respond to a hurricane disaster, thefollowing plan would be put into effect.

GuidelinesABC Hospital’s primary decision is toremain in the hospital should a hurricanethreaten the Houston area. The decisionto completely evacuate would be madewhen ordered by the Houston EmergencyManagement Department and/or deter-mined by the hospital administrator andsafety officer. It would be based on theseverity of the approaching hurricane.

Procedure for EvacuationA) The National Disaster Medical

System or Area Emergency Managementwill contact the officer if the decision ismade to evacuate. Evacuation plansshould proceed. The policy on disruptionof service will be used.

B) All patients who have safe areas toevacuate to and have family or are able tocare for themselves should be dischargedonce the hurricane notice is given by themedical staff in collaboration with theAdministrator who will ensure thatpatients are safe for transfer or discharge.

C) The City of Houston Office ofEmergency Management Service willrecommend an evacuation facility.Transportation during evacuation or trans-fer will be arranged by ABC Hospital incollaboration with community firstresponders and may include seven ABCHospital-owned vans.

PreparationsDetermination of PatientDischarge & Staffing

1) Upon notification of the impendingstorm, the administrator will schedule ameeting to discuss and review proceduresto be followed.

2) The chief nursing officer and med-ical director will be responsible for noti-fying all physicians to determine thenumber of patients that can be dis-charged. These numbers will be suppliedto the CEO and facility director.

3) A determination will be made as tothe number of staff needed to help in anevacuation and/or care for patients by theclinical staff in collaboration with thestaff scheduling office.

4) Notification of Familiesa) The medical records and social work

departments shall help the nursing staff tonotify all families of patients who havereceived physician permission to discharge.

b) Discharged patients may drive theirown vehicles at their physician’s discretion.

c) Marketing will update the websiteto include the status of the storm, deci-sions to remain or evacuate and patients’whereabouts.

5) Staff Notificationa) Program directors and department

managers will notify staff. Current plansshall be explained to them at that time.

b) Should a decision be made toremain at the hospital, families of thestaff will be allowed to accompany themto the hospital. A list of the number ofpeople expected to come to the hospitalwill be forwarded to the administrator,call center, facility director, nurse man-agers and safety manager.

6) Suppliesa) The dietary department maintains

food supplies for 2 weeks under normaloperations. The dietary director willinventory food supplies and will makenecessary arrangements for additionalfood supplies and accessory supplies suchas cups, paper plates, etc.

b) In the case of evacuation to___________________, the dietary direc-tor will make necessary arrangements inconjunction with _____ for shipment ofadditional supplies for our patients.

7) Pharmacya) The pharmacy shall maintain an ade-

quate supply of medicine for the remainingpatients and staff. Arrangements shall bemade by the pharmacy director to obtain

Emergency Management:RIding Out Hurricane RitaBy Aruna Vadgama, RN, MPA, CSP, CPE, COHN-S, CPHQ, CHRM, SRN


any additional medications necessary aswell as additional first-aid supplies.

b) All medications and first-aid sup-plies will be under the supervision of theinternal medicine physician, pharmacydirector and infection control nurse.

8) Purchasinga) The purchasing manager will help

all departments to expedite purchaserequests for additional supplies.

9) Integrated Servicesa) The director of facilities and the

safety manager will coordinate effortswith the maintenance staff and security tosecure the building, including boardingand taping of windows, securing suppliesand shutting down plant equipment.

b) The safety manager and call centersupervisor will maintain contact withemergency management to monitor thestorm’s activity. All information bothinternally and externally will be forward-ed to the administrator and facility direc-tor. The administrator, facility director,chief nursing officer and safety managerwill hold meetings as necessary withmanagement staff to update informationand ensure proper planning.

10) Forms Useda) Unit staffing formb) Patient evacuation planc) Evacuation summaryd) Purchasing checkliste) Maintenance checklistf) Manual medical records, medication

records, etc.11) The hurricane plan has been devel-

oped to delegate responsibilities duringthe anticipated hurricane’s approach. Atvarious hours before landfall, certainresponsibilities and procedures have beenformulated as follows:

a) 60 hours to landfall;b) 48 hours to landfall;c) 30 hours to landfall;d) 24 hours to landfall.

60 Hours Prior to LandfallThe administrator and facility directorwill meet to delegate authority and coor-dinate the hurricane plan.

Safety Manager1) Ensure that all portable phones are

charged and operational.2) Ensure that all personnel have emer-

gency equipment ready and operational.

Maintenance1) Pick up plywood from storage or

from a proper facility.

2) Organize supplies needed to securethe building.

3) Fuel all company vehicles.

Housekeeping1) Check linen needs. If low, notify the

linen service and order linens plus 50linen bags.

2) Take inventory of cleaning suppliesand trash bags.

3) Order additional trash bags andcleaning supplies.

Dietary Purchasing1) The dietary director will inventory

all food and paper supplies and determinewhether additional orders are necessary.

2) Call the supply store and have addi-tional items on standby.

48 Hours Prior to LandfallNursing/Adjunctive Therapy

1) Talk with employees to determinehow many employees will be needed toassist in patient care and evacuation. Alsodetermine how many family memberswill accompany employees to the hospitalfor refuge. Department heads will beresponsible for filling out staffing formsand delivering them to the administration.

Maintenance1) Complete assignments of 60-hour

checklist.

Dietary1) Call in order and destination of

delivery.2) Delegate responsibilities to dietary

employees.

Chief Nursing Officer1) Meet with the medical director and

physicians to determine the number ofpatients to be discharged.

2) Meet with the administrator andfacility director to determine staffingneeds.

3) Determine medication needs.4) Obtain additional first-aid supplies.

Living Units1) Complete unit patient evacuation

plan forms for each patient and the evacu-ation summary, and return it to the safetymanager.

Purchasing1) Order needed supplies.

Administration1) Contact_______________ for

receipt of patients should evacuation bedeclared.

30 Hours Prior to LandfallNursing

1) Finalize staffing needs, completethe staffing sheet and submit it to theadministration and director of facilities.

Living Units1) Finalize and update the patient

evacuation plan form and submit it to thesafety manager.

2) Finalize/update the evacuation sum-mary and submit it to the safety manager.

Safety Manager1) Determine who will drive vehicles.2) Meet with maintenance and house-

keeping staff.3) Meet with the administration and

director of facilities to finalize plans.4) Ensure that all vehicles are properly

supplied with emergency equipment.

Maintenance1) Seal up equipment rooms.

24 Hours Prior to LandfallChief Nursing Officer

1) The designated nurse manager andstaff will accompany patients to thereceiving hospital and will assist in themanagement of patient direct-care staffand patient care.

2) Patient belongings and originalmedical records will be transported withthe patients. It is essential that all patientsbe accounted for.

3) Ensure that patients are in properlocations.

Administrator, Vice President of Nursing,Director of Facilities & Safety Manager

1) Remain in the hospital until allevacuations are completed.

Vehicle Drivers1) Pick up patients at the main

entrance and at the gate between thegymnasium and school.

2) An evacuation form for each patientwill be given to the driver before leavingthe hospital facility.

Integrated Services Personnel1) After all have vacated the hospital,

all systems should be shut down per thecontinued on page 26

EnviroMentor 25

policy on disruption of services should becompleted.

Arrival at the Receiving Hospital1) Headcounts will be taken upon

arrival. Key personnel will meet to discussscheduling and patient care. Admini-stration will make all attempts to set upcommunications through the Red Crosswith patient families as well as families ofstaff. The accommodations and care ofpatients will then come under the jurisdic-tion of the hospital administrator.

Remaining with the HospitalThe following area has been designatedas a safe area in case of a hurricane ortornado.

1) Inner hallways and main lobby ofBuildings A and B.

2) All other personnel must be evacu-ated to the gymnasium.

Implementation of HurricaneReadiness Plan: Contingencies During the first meeting on Sept. 20,2005, and twice each day thereafter, eachelement for the hurricane plan wasreviewed in detail. Although MayorWhite had asked nonessential personnelto either stay home or evacuate, ABCHospital management decided that everyemployee is considered essential staff ifpatients plan to stay in the hospital.

Internal & External CommunicationThe first priority was to establish commu-nication channels with the HoustonEmergency Management Departmentstaff to understand the severity of the hur-ricane and its path. The hospital safetymanager had established an excellentrelationship with the department’s staff.He was in constant contact with them andkept hospital management staff informedvia e-mail. He sent hurricane maps withupdates on wind force and impact to theHouston and Galveston Areas. The ABCHospital security manager was in con-stant contact with the city’s emergencymanagement staff as well.

Expected Building OccupancyAt the start of the meeting, the hospital’scensus was 98 patients. The administrator

felt it necessary for patients to make aninformed choice about whether to ride outthe hurricane or to be discharged andreturn to ABC Hospital once the hurri-cane had passed. The program/unit direc-tors were asked to review patients’options with them. Seventy-nine decidedto stay at the hospital—a specialized clin-ic where approximately 60% of patientsare not Texas residents. Only ninepatients chose to leave the hospital andreturn to their homes. Staff assisted thesepatients with discharge planning, airreservations and transportation to the air-port.

All new admissions were stopped.Admission department staff contacted allpatients who were scheduled to be admit-ted and informed them that their admissionhad been postponed until further notice.

Staffing EffectivenessThe administrators required that all man-agement staff identify the their staff’savailability and the length of time theywould be willing to stay at the hospital toprovide care and services to in-patientswho had decided to remain. They wereasked to develop a list of available employ-ees and the duties they could perform. Forexample, the health information manage-ment staff, the hospital administration staffand finance personnel could communicatewith patients’ families, provide telephonecoverage, operate the switchboard, cookand serve food, and help clean. Likewise,all other functions were asked to develop alist of available staff and where they couldbe of assistance.

The next time we met, we were pre-sented with contingencies that were notpart of the hurricane emergency responseplan. The nursing and medical staffwould be available to work if they couldbring their family members and pets.

The Hurricane ArrivesOn Friday, Sept. 22, 2005, ABC Hospitalhad 79 patients, 79 nursing staff mem-bers, 28 family members and 25 pets. Weassigned a lead person to coordinate fam-ily members’ check-in, assignment oftheir sleeping arrangements and theirmeal schedules.

Normally, the hospital uses badgeswith individual pictures to identify staffand physicians. However, the informationtechnology (IT) department took picturesof all patients and identified them in blue.

They identified all visitors in red.Everyone returned the badges to designat-ed staff after the hurricane ended so as tosustain the continuum of the post-hurri-cane safety and security processes.

Another person coordinated all petsboarded at the hospital. The hospital’sschool area was designated for this. Onefamily member who had a boarded pet vol-unteered to walk dogs, as did severalyoung patients. At 9:30 p.m. just beforeHurricane Rita was to pass throughHouston, patients went outside to enjoy thewarm evening. Additionally, everyone whobrought pets to the hospital was instructedto bring cages for their pet’s safety.

All family members were instructed tobring minimal personal belongings aswell as sleeping bags, mattresses andbedding supplies.

The Houston Emergency ManagementDepartment staff had instructed the hospitalto inform staff to share rides and to keep aminimum number of vehicles on the hospi-tal premises in order to prepare for worst-case scenarios. During our meeting, thehuman resources department developed azip code map of all volunteer staff who hadagreed to work through the hurricane.Management and staff volunteered to pickup staff, family members and pets.

The schedule for managing humanflow was as follows:

1) All staff who had volunteered towork were to be on the premises by noonon Friday, Sept. 22, 2005. All family mem-bers were to report no later than 6:00 p.m.

2) Visitors were housed in the hospitalgymnasium. They slept in one corridor ofthe patient area.

3) Each unit’s nursing staff managedthe dining room flow. Patients werescheduled 30 minutes apart starting at4:30 p.m. Staff and visitors were stag-gered between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. Theunits and the command center werestocked with snacks and breakfast itemsto prepare for worst-case scenarios. Theadministration refrigerator was alsostocked with breakfast and lunch items.

4) To account for all occupants, the ITdepartment was to develop a manifest ofeveryone who was on the premises andidentify their locations.

Building Safety & SecurityThe facilities department was responsiblefor securing resources for patients’ living


Emergency Management continued from page 25


individual projects, contributing to thegreater effort as a whole.

After the storm, during the initialstages of the recovery effort, the magni-tude of the devastation was overwhelmingfor those responsible for recovery andplanning. Many of the initial projectswere carried out in isolation, which incertain instances, hindered the overallprogress of the remediation and recoveryeffort. As different organizations beganfocusing on specific areas and privatesector service companies began restoringtheir service areas, many activities wereforced to coordinate as a function of busi-ness preservation and cost control.

For example, telephone and cablecompanies are working with debrisremoval companies to ensure that theirrepairs follow behind debris cleanupefforts. Due to this effort, recentlyrepaired junction boxes were not dam-aged by the following cleanup effort,which otherwise would have created aneed for additional repair activity andincreased cost and service delay. Minimalefforts such as these can maximize theefficiency of reconstruction initiatives.

The Role of Technologyin Project ManagementThere are many examples of technologiesthat, when employed with a heightenedfocus on project coordination, can help tomaximize the collective progress of indi-vidual contractors and government agen-cies. For example, CAD drawings of theNew Orleans sewer system can be pulledfrom online data stores and comparedwith GIS images to help determine theareas that are most severely damaged,what kind of damage contractors arelooking at, and what obstacles stand inthe path of repair/reconstruction efforts.Those contractors responsible for debrisremoval could then go in and removeanything obstructing access to sewer linesso that breaks could be repaired and pipescould be cleared.

Similarly, technologies that offer rapidassessment of utilities can speed recon-struction efforts. An article in theFebruary 2006 issue of Public CIOdemonstrates how rapid assessment tech-nologies were utilized with great successduring the initial stages of the reconstruc-

tion process. The author of the articlecites an example of when New Orleanscity officials had a six-week deadline todetermine whether it was safe for resi-dents to return to 110,000 homes. In thisexample, “[IT vendors] offered technolo-gy to automate permitting and inspec-tions. A Wi-Fi network was constructedbased on mesh technology, and ruggednotebooks complete with GPS capabili-ties were used as system hubs. Internalteams wrote code to automate the GPSlinkup with the GIS database, effectivelymapping all aspects of the effort.

Within a rapid timeframe and out oftotal devastation, one of the most state-of-the-art inspection and permitting systemsin the country was created.” Another poten-tial cutting-edge technology that could beof similar assistance are sensor systemsthat can be run through the miles of sewerlines to detect for breaches, back-up, andcontamination. Devices like these allowworkers to target and organize reconstruc-tion efforts around the sections of the citythat are in the greatest need of repair, andin doing so, aid in synchronization ofefforts. Rapid assessment technologies alsoallow reconstruction workers to determinewhat systems can be salvaged and whatsystems need to be entirely rebuilt in anefficient manner, helping to save time,money, and valuable resources.

Reconstruction’s Rolein RecoveryThe speed at which the city of NewOrleans will be able to fully recuperatefrom its losses depends on whether thecity’s residents, currently dispersed alongthe Gulf Coast and throughout the country,decide to return. To date, three-quarters ofthe city’s 460,000 residents have yet to goback to their former homes. It is a Catch22 in that while standards of living need tobe acceptable in order to entice the city’sresident’s to return, many businesses aswell as the federal government are under-standably hesitant to invest in the areawithout the assurance that people willeventually take back their former neighbor-hoods. Businesses that do make the leapand reopen are doomed to failure if there isnot a sufficient population to support them.

The situation is time sensitive as wellin that the longer the reconstructionprocess is drawn out, the more comfort-able those who are dispersed will becomein their temporary residencies.

The implementation of infrastructurethrough technological applications servesas a catalyst for further development andultimately the repopulation of NewOrleans’ neighborhoods. Technology hasthe power to radically alter short-term andlong-term standards of living for thosereturning to the city. The Katrina disasterwas bittersweet in that while it reducedmuch of the Gulf Coast Region to rubble;it also exposed the extent of plight ofmany of New Orleans’ underdevelopedneighborhoods. Rebuilding many of thecity’s low-income areas back from scratchprovides the opportunity for Internetaccess and WiFi networks to be incorpo-rated, resulting in increased access to edu-cational tools and workforce development.

It also provides the opportunity to put inplace disaster warning and emergencycommunications that can be used to pre-vent another disaster situation like thatresulting from Hurricane Katrina.Subsequently, many organizations and gov-ernment agencies have been looking at theplanning for the reconstruction and howtechnology can be infused. Recently someprivate organizations have also joined inthe development initiatives by hiring urbanplanners and regional architects to provideoptions for the overall rebuilding of NewOrleans. Several of the local medical facili-ties have teamed with facilities from otherstates to incorporate best practices in theirreconstruction planning.

ConclusionThe extent of damage caused by HurricaneKatrina puts the reconstruction effort intoperspective as there has never before beena need for a response of such magnitude.Considering that Hurricane Katrina is theworst natural disaster to have struck theU.S. in recent history, federal and localagencies had virtually no experience todraw from during the initial response. Theearly stages of the reconstruction processinvolved a drastic learning curve.

The take-away will ultimately deter-mine whether the reconstruction effortwas a failure or a success. Responseworkers are already drawing from the ini-tial stages of the reconstruction process togain a better idea of what has been doneright and what needs to be improved, andcan use this insight to tailor current initia-tives. Considering that many of the sys-tems and solutions being employed are

Rebuilding the Big Easy continued from page 3


EnviroMentor 27


2004-06Environmental

Practice SpecialtyOfficersADMINISTRATOR

Jeffery C. Camplin, CSP [email protected]

ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR

Mary Ann Latko [email protected]

NEWSLETTER EDITOR

Judy L. [email protected]

AWARDS & HONORS CHAIR

Douglas C. Sharp, CSP, CIH, [email protected]

CONFERENCES & SEMINARS CHAIR

Thomas S. Butler Jr., [email protected]

MEMBERSHIP DEVELOPMENT CHAIR

Open

NOMINATING CHAIR

Thomas S. Butler Jr., [email protected]

STAFF LIAISON

Rennie [email protected]

the hospital with the following importantsupplies:

•IV pumps and infusion solutions likeglucose, water and saline;

•suture trays;•intubation trays;•emergency cardiac resuscitation

equipment;•first-aid supplies;•Ipecac;•tetanus toxoid;•Ambu bags, automated external defib-

rillators and oxygen tanksIn addition, the pharmacy director

scheduled staffing for the pharmacy cov-erage and ensured that enough medica-tion supplies were in stock for aminimum of 5 days.

ConclusionEven though Hurricane Rita never reachedHouston, it provided the best venue forimplementing hurricane preparedness prac-tices at healthcare facilities that evacuatedand at those that rode out the storm. Itproved that emergency preparedness canencourage team-building among staff andmobilize the community to respond to thecommon goal of managing a disaster.

Aruna Vadgama, RN, MPA, CSP, CPE, COHN-S, CPHQ, CHRM, SRN, is the director of qualityresources at the Menninger Clinic in Houston,TX. She is also Administrator of ASSE’s Health-care Practice Specialty. Vadgama may be con-tacted at [email protected].

emerging technologies, the full extent oftheir capabilities has yet to be realized.Application in real-life crisis scenarios iscrucial to mastery of the technology andrealization of its limitations.

Hurricane Katrina, while devastatingin its consequences, continues to serve asan incredible learning experience, demon-strating the ways in which technology canbe employed to save lives and raise stan-dards of living.

Gary Higgins brings more than 20 years ofexperience in the federal information technolo-gy market to his role as senior vice presidentand chief technology officer of Apogen Tech-nologies. Prior to joining Apogen in 2002,Higgins held corporate management positionsat SAIC and The Boeing Co.

Reprinted with permission of Disaster RecoveryJournal.

areas and medical records, the IT depart-ment and the library.

Command CenterThe library was chosen as a commandcenter because it was in the middle of thebuilding. Its windows were boarded up toprevent hurricane damage. The IT depart-ment was to outfit the library with a tele-vision, a computer, telephones and abattery-operated radio in case the electric-ity shut down.

UtilitiesAlthough the hospital had a generator, wedecided to conserve energy, as theHouston Emergency ManagementDepartment had informed the communityto be prepared to have no electricity forup to 5 days. The temperature was in the90s, and if the hospital lost electricitywith the emergency power, the unitswould be hot while only their center corewould be cool. So we planned to housepatients in the middle of the units if apower outage occurred.

The hospital does not approve of can-dles, but we purchased several pillar can-dles to prepare for a potential poweroutage. Designated staff were to managecandle safety, but fortunately, we did nothave to use any candles. Staff had alsobrought personal camping lamps to pre-pare for any power outages.

Food & WaterThe chef informed management that thehospital had a 3-day supply of food tofeed about 150 occupants. However, hefelt that we needed to have more water,so the purchasing manager was instructedto buy water bottles.

Based on hurricane preparedness listsreferenced, we filled bathtubs with waterin case the municipal water supplybecame unavailable. This water would beused for bathing and for flushing toilets.

Medical Emergency ProvisionThe Houston Emergency ManagementDepartment informed our security man-ager that community first responderswould not respond to medical transfers ifwind speeds were greater than 50 milesper hour during the hurricane.

After consulting with our internalmedicine physician, we decided to stock

Emergency Management continued from page 26

Rebuilding the Big Easy continued from page 27

Networking doesn’talways require

an outlet.

ASSE’s Practice Specialties.One goal.Shared Interests.Proven Solutions.

Call ASSE Customer Service847.699.2929 • www.asse.org

Documents

EnviroMentor - American Society of Safety · PDF fileof the country’s central Gulf of Mexico ... AMERICAN SOCIETY OF SAFETY ENGINEERS ... Blues master Guitar Gabriel gave a