Entity and Incremental World Views: Some Lessons from Learned Helplessness Theory and Research

Entity and Incremental World Views: Some Lessons from Learned Helplessness Theory andResearchAuthor(s): Christopher PetersonSource: Psychological Inquiry, Vol. 6, No. 4 (1995), pp. 307-311Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1448947 .

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COMMENTARIES

These dispositional factors may affect children's ability to focus on themselves or on what they are doing. Moreover, this may be related to the children's attributions. Although socialization factors cannot be excluded and have been found to impact on children's attributions and emotions (Alessandri & Lewis, 1993), dispositional factors as well may affect attributions, which, in turn, affect emotional behavior. If this chain, under further study, proves to be the case, then the causal connections among attributions-ways of thinking about things-and judgments, reactions, and emotions are more complexly related than we thought.

The way we think things work reflects the world views that we, as scientists, have. The idea of causality, either at one point in time or over time, is limited by these views. Which we choose to be the cause of the other is a function of our theories. This being the case, perhaps a more limited approach to the study of human behavior, including thoughts, feelings, and actions, is called for. As I have been struggling with this problem, I have come to the conclusion that we do not have sufficient information to argue for causal effects over time or causal effects within time. If, indeed, consis- tency of individuals or the relationship of cause over time or over situations cannot be demonstrated, then perhaps we must reconsider how we go about studying behavior. Here, Pepper's world view coincides with William James' (1890) contextualism and becomes particularly informative. What we may be able to demonstrate, especially idiographically, is the association of behavior-in-context. That association for individuals, along with some simple principles about association of situations or behaviors, may lead us to a more satisfactory idea than our current notions of causality.

Note

Michael Lewis, Department of Pediatrics, Institute for the Study of Child Development, Robert Wood Johnson Medical School, University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, 97 Paterson Street, New Brunswick, NJ 08903.

References

Alessandri, S. M., & Lewis, M. (1993). Parental evaluation and its relations to shame and pride in young children. Sex Roles, 29(5-6),335-343.

Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1975). Beyond boredom and anxiety: The experience of play in work and games. San Francisco: Jossey- Bass.

Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1990). Flow: The psychology of optimal experience. New York: HarperCollins.

DiBiase, R., & Lewis, M. (in press). Temperament and emotional expression: A short-term longitudinal study. Infant Behavior and Development.

James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology. New York: Holt. Lewis, M. (1992). Shame, the exposed self. New York: Free Press. Lewis, M. (1994, June). Self and self-conscious emotions. Paper

presented at the International Conference for Infant Studies, Paris.

Lewis, M. (in press). Altering Fate: Developmental models in social policy. New York: Guilford.

Lewis, M., Alessandri, S. A., & Sullivan, M. W. (1992). Differences in shame and pride as a function of children's gender and task difficulties. Child Development, 63, 630-638.

Lewis, M., Chen, D., Sullivan, M. W., & Alessandri, S. A. (1995). The development of shame and pride: Age, sex, and attribution differences among children. Manuscript in preparation.

Mandler, G. (1975). Mind and emotion. New York: Wiley. Pepper, S. C. (1942). World hypotheses. Berkeley: University of

California Press. Weiner, B. (1986). An attributional theory of motivation and emotion.

New York: Springer-Verlag.

Entity and Incremental World Views: Some Lessons From Learned Helplessness Theory and Research

Christopher Peterson University of Michigan

In their target article, Dweck, Chiu, and Hong de- scribe their research program on the consequences of people's implicit theories about the fixedness versus malleability of human attributes. In a variety of studies, they support their central claim that entity theorists, who believe that attributes do not change, differ sensi-

bly from incremental theorists, who believe that attributes can and do change. As Dweck et al. point out, their work shares a family resemblance with other cognitive approaches, including learned helplessness (Peterson, Maier, & Seligman, 1993). In this commentary, I draw on helplessness theory and research to

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suggest some matters for future consideration by those interested in implicit theories of human attributes. The helplessness tradition is now more than 25 years old, and it has been frequently criticized (e.g., Peterson, 1991). I believe that some general lessons have emerged from this scrutiny.

Measurement Lessons

An individual's tendency to be an entity versus incremental theorist is measured by a brief self-re- port questionnaire that asks a respondent the degree to which he or she endorses entity items. Only three questions are used, drawn from a given domain (e.g., intelligence, personality). They converge quite im- pressively, showing that this tendency, at least within a given domain, is unidimensional. Scores appear unconfounded by other variables such as social desirability.

So far, so good, but questions remain. Dweck et al. explain that they assess only agreement with entity items, as opposed to entity and incremental items, because respondents presented with both types of items often agree with both: "Incremental items are highly compelling." I accept their reasoning, supported in several studies, that disagreement with entity items means a greater likelihood of incremental thinking, but I do not think the measurement issue is closed.

Investigations of learned helplessness theory have been hampered by premature closure on methods. For example, the Attributional Style Questionnaire (Peter- son et al., 1982) has become a fixture in investigations of helplessness theory with human subjects, as has the "triadic design" in studies with animal subjects (Maier & Seligman, 1976). Legitimate questions can be raised about just what these operationalizations entail, and a great deal of time and energy has been devoted to measurement debates. Helplessness researchers of late have tried to devise additional research strategies (e.g., Peterson, Schulman, Castellon, & Seligman, 1992; Peterson & Ulrey, 1994; Peterson & Villanova, 1988). In retrospect, it seems that a more productive path would have embraced the need for multiple measures much earlier. So, if entity versus incremental thinking really represents discrete (and mutually exclusive) world views, it should be possible to measure these separately and demonstrate a strong inverse relation.

Along these lines, the wording of specific items should be carefully examined vis 'a vis the abstract interpretation of the constructs they purportedly measure. When "intelligence" items are juxtaposed with "morality" items, it can be seen that the former are all phrased in terms of personal control (you can't change this), and the latter in terms of impersonal control (it

can't be changed [by anyone or anything]). Does this make any difference? Perhaps not, but I am reminded of locus of control theorists who productively make this distinction in political domains (Gurin, Gurin, Lao, & Beattie, 1969): "Think globally, but act locally." In the language of the reformulated helplessness theory, these items may be inadvertently confounded by internality, globality, or both (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978).

The items used to operationalize entity versus incremental thinking should be phrased only in terms of the possibility of change. Control should not be dragged into measurement, because then interpretations and theorizing become clouded. Dweck et al. address the control-relevant consequences of implicit theories, but do their questionnaires as currently written result in a confounding of dependent and independent variables? Again, perhaps not, but this should be tested.

I have one more comment on measurement. Dweck et al. use cutoffs to designate entity versus incremental theorists. About 15% of subjects in the middle are thereby ignored. I see no good reason to do this, particularly when data are analyzed with correlational strategies. Somewhat different distributions of respondents apparently exist across samples, domains, or both, and the use of cutoffs limits generalizability. There is also a concomitant tendency to regard individuals in terms of a typology. I have adopted such usage in this response because it is seductive. But it is also misleading. Learned helplessness researchers, including me, have frequently been guilty of creating typologies out of continuous dimensions, speaking glibly of optimists and pessimists (e.g., Peterson & Bossio, 1991; Selig- man, 1991), but we should all be more precise.

Construct Validity Lessons

Dweck et al. are to be lauded for examining the relation of implicit theories to demographic variables and other psychological constructs. In general, implicit theories seem independent of these. But should they be in all cases? Granted the demonstrated consequences of implicit theories forjudgments of morality and the like, I found it curious that they bore no apparent relation to political affiliation or religious preference. What are political conservatism and religious fundamentalism if not belief systems about human fixedness? Perhaps the research here did not take a sufficiently fine-grained approach to measuring political and religious beliefs.

Learned helplessness researchers have belatedly begun to examine the link between helplessness constructs and sociodemographic characteristics (e.g., Haghighatgou & Peterson, 1995; Sethi & Seligman, 1993; Zullow, Oettingen, Peterson, & Seligman, 1988).

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Interpretable relations are found which establish the boundaries of helplessness theory. I suggest that future research into implicit theories explore such relations, not just to rule them out but to discover where and why they may exist.

Indeed, the present research program seems to de- mand cross-cultural studies. I think of Stevenson and Stigler's (1992) cross-national comparisons of elemen- tary education. Under the sway of Confucian thought, Asian parents, teachers, and students are apparently much more likely to adopt an incremental approach to education than their U.S. counterparts. The ideas of Dweck et al. clarify such findings, and analogous findings with their own methods would feed back and enrich their theorizing.

Cross-cultural comparisons might show what is de- sirable about entity theories. Dweck et al. carefully say that they make no value judgments about entity versus incremental theories, but virtually every consequence they examine places entity theorists in a negative light. Helplessness researchers have followed much the same path, in this case being explicit that helplessness is undesirable, but this is an oversimplification. There are circumstances in which giving up and letting go pay dividends (see Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982). If these are identified, then a fuller view is provided. The important lesson is that a researcher must look for these circumstances. Incremental theorists seem very much like liberal academic psychologists. But people like us represent just a single mode of being-in-the-world, and future research should examine others.

Perhaps one point of departure is the apparent cognitive efficiency associated with entity theories. In the appropriate setting, this efficiency may be associated with productivity and respect. In our investigations of cognitive style, Scott, Osgood, and Peterson (1979) identified a dimension termed evaluative centrality that, to some degree, captures the entity-versus-incremental contrast. At least in the United States, individuals with simple, highly general, value-laden schemas may be better adjusted and more highly regarded than other individuals. Consider political leaders in this country and others, whose popularity often seems to rise and fall in accordance with the simplicity of their message.

Theoretical Lessons

Theory and research in psychology obviously re- quire strategic focusing. But there are two associated risks. First is the possibility that critical factors outside a theory are ignored. Second is the more problematic possibility that critical factors inside a theory are not

sufficiently examined. Learned helplessness investigations can be criticized on both grounds, and again, theorists and researchers are now scrambling to correct these shortcomings (Peterson, Maier, & Seligman, 1993). Why not take a broader view before a line of investigation becomes firmly established?

Here are some of the extratheoretical considerations concerning Dweck et al.'s work to date. The first I have already mentioned, the link between implicit theories and perceived control. It might be of interest, after respondents are designated as entity or incremental theorists, to ask them why they hold the beliefs they do. Perhaps, as Dweck et al. imply, these beliefs are superordinate constructs, ungrounded grounders that have no further phenomenological justification beyond organ- izing other beliefs (Quine & Ullian, 1978). But it may also be that these beliefs are subsumed under still others, in particular ideas about control.

And it certainly is worth exploring the possibility that individuals differ with respect to how superordinate an entity or incremental theory is for them. After all, Kelly (1955) did not expect all people to have the same superordinate beliefs. Here is a substantive reason to study the excluded middles of samples; perhaps these individuals do not have a strongly held belief about human fixedness versus malleability. Might they therefore be more flexible than the research participants included in studies as currently conducted?

I also wondered about the role played by rumination. Helplessness researchers have discovered that pessimistic beliefs are most likely to have consequences for those who frequently think about them (e.g., Nolen- Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson, 1993; Zullow, 1991). Perhaps the laboratory investigations of Dweck et al. yielded stronger correlates than their questionnaire investigations because the laboratory setting fa- cilitated mindfulness; implicit theories became explicit.

Granted the portrayals of entity-versus-incremental theorists, I predict that rumination is not completely independent of these world views. Incremental theorists are probably more thoughtful, which means that they differ from entity theorists not only in terms of what they think but how frequently they think. So, the contrast of interest to Dweck et al. might be related to state-versus-action orientation (Kuhl, 1981).

This raises yet another extratheoretical question. In general, entity theorists seem more simple than incremental theorists. What is the relation, therefore, between implicit theories and cognitive complexity, attributional complexity (Fletcher, 1986), and/or psychological mindedness (Hall, 1992)? These individual differences may interact with implicit theories to affect outcomes. Perhaps constructs like these need to be

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incorporated into Dweck et al.'s theory, just as explanatory style was melded with the original helplessness theory (Peterson & Seligman, 1984).

Let me turn to the actual theory and research of Dweck et al. and what has been neglected to date. The theory is presented as one of cold cognition, but their studies document emotional aspects of implicit theories and, by implication, motivational aspects as well. I was impressed, so to speak, with the punitiveness of entity theorists. Perhaps this is an inherent component of their belief system, not a mere derivative. Dweck et al. trace the lineage of their work to Heider (1958) and Kelly (1955), but these theorists in turn were influenced by the psychodynamic formulation of Lewin (1935). Per- haps it is a mistake to streamline implicit theories by stripping away their associated feelings and motives.

Relatively neglected in research, though not in theory, is the claim that incremental theorists concern themselves more than do entity theorists with presumably malleable "psychological" mechanisms as explanations for behavior. I agree that incremental theorists look more frequently at mediators, because the relevant research shows that they do. But I am not convinced that these mediators are seen as malleable by research participants just because they are psychological in nature. Does not the research on adult development show that people's values and goals are highly stable (i.e., unchanging) across the lifespan? And one example given of a fluctuating psychological state ("he is desperate") might well exemplify a highly stable characteristic. It would be a good idea to check whether research participants agree with the researchers' interpretations.

The origins of implicit theories were not addressed by Dweck et al. As noted earlier, entity theorists seem to court trouble in many domains of life, so why would they ever arrive at this position in the first place? I can see why an entity world view maintains itself, but this is a different issue than why it originates. One can imagine that parental modeling, teacher modeling, or both provide one answer, although this just displaces questions about origins to a previous generation. One can also imagine that the consequences of these belief systems might also serve as their causes. Here we have a methodological lesson about third variables to control as well as a theoretical lesson about the likelihood of reciprocal determinism (Bandura, 1986).

Might it also be worthwhile to take into account how the individual values the personal attribute in question? There would seem to be consequences of implicit theories depending on whether one's intelligence is con- sidered high or low, whether people's moral actions are judged good or evil, or whether the world and its residents are seen as benevolent or cruel. Learned help-

lessness research invariably finds that beliefs about events have profoundly different effects depending on the desirability of the events, and I would be surprised if the same were not true about implicit theories like those of concern to Dweck et al.

The final issue I raise is whether Dweck et al. have exhausted the range of implicit theories. Formal philo- sophical systems do not divide simply into entity and incremental categories; other coherent world views also exist. Pepper (1942), for example, described phi- losophies as:

* Animistic (explanation in terms of vital spirits) * Mystical (explanation in terms of transcendent

forces) * Formist (explanation in terms of categories) * Mechanistic (explanation in terms of causes-and

effects) * Organic (explanations in terms of the unfolding

of an inner nature) * Contextualist (explanation in terms of entity-

context interdependence).

Entity theorists are formists, whereas incremental theorists are mechanists. But where are the others in the scheme of Dweck et al.? Perhaps they are in the excluded middle of their samples, or perhaps shoehorned into one end or the other.

Note that Pepper's system arrays belief systems by complexity; indeed, they seem to exist in a hierarchy. Pepper argued that these belief systems appeared at different times in the history of philosophy, building on and subsuming previous ones. Harris, Fontana, and Dowds (1977) explored the counterparts of these notions among everyday people, and this research de- serves to be integrated with that of Dweck et al. Perhaps there exists a developmental trend corresponding to Pepper's historical one.

Despite the issues I raised, I find the work by Dweck et al. systematic and provocative. The best lies ahead, I am sure, and I hope that my suggestions for change are taken in the spirit of incrementalism.

Note

Christopher Peterson, Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, 525 East University, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1109.

References

Abramson, L. Y., Seligman, M. E. P., & Teasdale, J. D. (1978). Learned helplessness in humans: Critique and reformulation.

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Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 87, 49-74. Bandura, A. (1986). Socialfoundations of thought and action. Engle-

wood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Fletcher, G. J. (1986). Attributional complexity: An individual dif-

ferences measure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychol- ogy, 51, 875-884.

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Haghighatgou, H., & Peterson, C. (1995). Coping and depressive symptoms among Iranian students. The Journal of Social Psy- chology, 135, 175-180.

Hall, J. A. (1992). Psychological-mindedness: A conceptual model. American Journal of Psychotherapy, 46, 131-140.

Harris, M., Fontana, A. F., & Dowds, B. N. (1977). The World Hypotheses Scale: Rationale, reliability, and validity. Journal of Personality Assessment, 41, 537-547.

Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: Wiley.

Kelly, G. A. (1955). The psychology of personal constructs. New York: Norton.

Kuhl, J. (1981). Motivational and functional helplessness: The mod- erating effect of state versus action orientation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 40, 155-170.

Lewin, K. (1935). A dynamic theory of personality. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Maier, S. F., & Seligman, M. E. P. (1976). Learned helplessness: Theory and evidence. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 105, 3-46.

Nolen-Hoeksema, S., Morrow, J., & Fredrickson, B. L. (1993). Response styles and the duration of episodes of depressed mood. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 102, 20-28.

Pepper, S. C. (1942). World hypotheses: A study in evidence. Berke- ley: University of California Press.

Peterson, C. (1991). Meaning and measurement of explanatory style. Psychological Inquiry, 2, 1-10.

Peterson, C., & Bossio, L. M. (1991). Health and optimism. New York: Free Press.

Peterson, C., Maier, S. F., & Seligman, M. E. P. (1993). Learned helplessness: A theory.for the age of personal control. New York: Oxford University Press.

Peterson, C., Schulman, P., Castellon, C., & Seligman, M. E. P. (1992). CAVE: Content analysis of verbatim explanations. In C. P. Smith (Ed.), Motivation and personality: Handbook of the- matic content analysis (pp. 383-392). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Peterson, C., & Seligman, M. E. P. (1984). Causal explanations as a risk factor for depression: Theory and evidence. Psychological Review, 91, 347-374.

Peterson, C., Semmel, A., von Baeyer, C., Abramson, L. Y., Metalsky, G. I., & Seligman, M. E. P. (1982). The Attributional Style Questionnaire. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 6, 287- 299.

Peterson, C., & Ulrey, L. M. (1994). Can explanatory style be scored from TAT protocols? Personality and Social Psychology Bulle- tin, 20, 102-106.

Peterson, C., & Villanova, P. (1988). An Expanded Attributional Style Questionnaire. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 97, 87- 89.

Quine, W. V., & Ullian, J. S. (1978). The web of belief (2nd ed.). New York: Random House.

Rothbaum, F., Weisz, J. R., & Snyder, S. S. (1982). Changing the world versus changing the self: A two-process model of perceived control. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42, 5-37.

Scott, W. A., Osgood, D. W., & Peterson, C. (1979). Cognitive structure: Theory and measurement of individual differences. Washington, DC: Winston.

Seligman, M. E. P. (1991). Learned optimism. New York: Knopf. Sethi, S., & Seligman, M. E. P. (1993). Optimism and fundamental-

ism. Psychological Science, 4, 256-259. Stevenson, H. W., & Stigler, J. W. (1992). The learning gap: Why

our schools are failing and what we can learn.from Japanese and Chinese education. New York: Summit.

Zullow, H. (1991). Pessimistic rumination in popular songs and newsmagazines predicts economic recession via decreased con- sumer optimism and spending. Journal of Economic Psychol- ogy, 12, 501-526.

Zullow, H., Oettingen, G., Peterson, C., & Seligman, M. E. P. (1988). Explanatory style and pessimism in the historical record: CAV- ing LBJ, presidential candidates, and East versus West Berlin. American Psychologist, 43, 673-682.

Implicit Theories and Achievement Behavior

Dale H. Schunk Department of Educational Studies

School of Education Purdue University

It is a pleasure to comment on Dweck, Chiu, and Hong's target article. Like so many of Dweck' s earlier works, this article makes a substantive contribution to the psychological literature on the role of self-perceptions in behavior. The article summarizes much research on the operation of implicit theories. The theoretical framework is well presented, and the research evidence is impressive.

In this commentary, I discuss the theory and research on implicit theories and raise some issues of concern. I conclude with some suggested directions for future research. To focus my discussion, I concentrate on the role of implicit theories in achievement behavior.

The central thesis of the Dweck et al. article is that people's implicit theories can affect their perceptions and behaviors by creating a framework that promotes

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Documents

Entity and Incremental World Views: Some Lessons from Learned Helplessness Theory and Research