English Harbour, Antigua: The Rise and Fall of a Strategic Military Site

English Harbour, Antigua: The Rise and Fall of a Strategic Military SiteAuthor(s): DAVID B. WEAVERSource: Caribbean Quarterly, Vol. 48, No. 4 (December 2002), pp. 1-11Published by: University of the West Indies and Caribbean QuarterlyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40654292 .

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English Harbour, Antigua: The Rise and Fall of a Strategic Military Site

by

DAVID B. WEAVER

Introduction

The post-Columbian incorporation of the Caribbean into the capitalist world economy is associated with dramatic transformations in the regional cultural geography, involving the establishment of export-based agricultural economies through large-scale land clearances, the introduction of exotic plant and animal species, forced human migra- tions, and the establishment of road networks, ports and other related services. While the nature of change in this agricultural system and its underlying causes have been investi- gated extensively , other elements of the post-Conquest cultural landscape remain ne- glected. Relatively little research, for example, has been conducted into the evolution of the military facilities which were required to safeguard and potentially extend such colonial investments. This paper focuses upon the English Harbour region of Antigua which accommodated one of the largest and most strategic British military sites of the eighteenth century Caribbean. The rise and fall of the English Harbour military complex is presented through a series of stages, each of which may be seen in broad terms as a reflection of changing patterns in the great power rivalries, and in narrower but related terms as the consequence of local and regional considerations.

Early Developments in the Military Landscape

Fundamentally, the military evolution of English Harbour can be understood as a manifestation of the shifting great power rivalries of the emergent post-Conquest capitalist world economy.3 These rivalries effectively began in 1 536, when Spain's regional monop- oly was first challenged by the upstart kingdoms of north-western Europe, and ended in

1814, when Great Britain attained a temporary position of global hegemony. Within this framework of accelerating English, French and Dutch involvement in the Caribbean, several distinct stages of confrontation can be identified. Initially, between 1536 and the

early 1600s, the French, English and Dutch were not yet powerful enough to challenge Spain on equal terms in the region, and were therefore limited to a policy of harassment and contraband trade, with privateers carrying out sporadic armed raids against Spanish property.4 Under such circumstances, the English were presented with few opportunities to itablish or fortify territorial bridgeheads in the region. By the 1620s, however, the

increasingly powerful states of north-western Europe were able to acquire territorial foot- holds in those parts of the Caribbean, essentially in the Lesser Antilles, which had not

actually been settled by a now declining Spain. Antigua was settled along with Montserrat

by the English in 1632, following earlier colonizations in St. Kitts and Barbados (1624),



2

and in Nevis (1628). The English presence in the north-eastern Caribbean islands, how-

ever, was challenged by the Dutch acquisition of St. Maarten (1631) and St. Eustatius

(1632), and more importantly, by the French acquisition of Guadeloupe and Martinique in 1635. Other islands to the south were not permanently settled during this era due mainly to the successful resistance of the Carib Indians.

On most English and French islands, the colonization process initially involved

European yeoman settlement and experimentation with a variety of export crops. By the latter part of the seventeenth century, this peasant-based system was effectively supplanted by the pervasive Implantation system" based on black slave labour and sugar production for the European market.6 The first successful sugar plantation in Antigua, "Betty's Hope", was established by Christopher Codrington in 1674, although the crop had been cultivated on the island as early as 1655.7 As Antigua and the other Lesser Antillean islands

developed into important agricultural peripheries during the latter half of the seventeenth

century, they also became more significant as military objectives in the wars which erupted sporadically among the rival European powers. In addition, most of the conflict involved in these early wars occurred within the Lesser Antilles because of their relative proximity to the European naval bases from which the competing fleets originated. The general strategy followed in the Caribbean during the seventeenth century, however, was not to acquire

enemy territory (given the limitations of available capital and the desire not to produce a

surplus of sugar), but rather to carry out raids with the intention of destroying or removing as much property as possible in order to gain a short-term advantage in the European sugar markets.

It was within this strategic context that the incipient military landscape of the

English Harbour area emerged. Ten years after the destructive French-Carib raid of 1666, the Antiguan government supplemented the defences of Falmouth Town, the capital, with a

simple defensive work, Fort Charles, on an islet in Falmouth Harbour . More significantly, the raid induced the Council of Antigua to consider the construction of a bastion at their

own expense for the protection of the white population and their property during future

attacks. The site identified as most appropriate for this purpose was the Monies Hill

promontory overlooking Falmouth Harbour. However, construction on this "deodand" (or defensive citadel), named Great George Fort, did not actually commence until the late

1680s, and it was not completed until 1705. 10 Four years earlier, the first small non-permanent British garrison was posted in Antigua.11 The size of the deodand is made

apparent in a 1724 report to the Council of Trade and Plantations by Governor Hart, who

describes its walls as enclosing eight acres of land.12 Further indications of the perceived defensive role and capacities of Great George Fort is provided by Governor Mathew in a

1734 letter to the same Council. The fortress on Monk's Hill is described as:

a retreat for women and children, and for ourselves

when we can keep the field no longer, a cover for our

best effects, a disappointment (sic) to the enemy that

come for plunder chiefly, and where H.M. sovereignty



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of this Island must be preserv'd to the last extremity.13

Mathew states that the fortress was particularly vital in protecting "the booty the enemy chiefly wants", namely the black slaves, who would be less likely to desert to the raiders if their children were kept within its walls. He further describes Monk's Hill as the chief arsenal on Antigua, accommodating thirty-three cannotLof various calibers which would be available to attack any landing party at Falmouth Harbour. Mathew's report also clarifies that the matter of expenses for repairs, etc. was the responsibility of the Antiguans themselves, who, for example, provided the salaries of a resident gunner and nine "montros- ses", or gunner's assistants.

The Dockyard Phase

The Caribbean arena in the eighteenth century was characterized by the escalating great power rivalry between England and France, and by the increasingly marginal status of Spain and the Netherlands, who were relegated to a supporting role during the five formal wars which occupied 45 years of the period. As the century progressed, and in contrast to the trend of the late 1600s, the French and British actively sought to acquire each other's sugar colonies, given the expansion in the available capital and in the European market for this product.

1 7 This change in strategy, combined with the increased military power of the combatants and the higher economic stakes, made it both necessary and possible for the

English to invest significant effort, over and above those investments provided by the islanders themselves, in the fortification of English Harbour and other strategic sites in the Caribbean, such as Brimstone Hill in St. Kitts. References to the strategic potential of

English Harbour itself were first made as early as 1671, when Governor Stapleton reported to the Council of Plantations that the site should be developed for military purposes, given its capacity for sheltering vessels and its fortuitous location facing the French raiding bases on Guadeloupe and Martinique.18 The earliest military construction on the harbour occurred in 1700, when Forts Berkeley and Charlotte were erected at its mouth in order to

intercept any French attacks upon Falmouth from the east.19 By 1705 it was reported that naval vessels were using Falmouth and English Harbour frequently,20 although no facilities were yet in place for their maintenance. The destructive French attack on St. Kitts in the

following year again pointed to the vulnerability of the small islands to French attack, prompting the Council of Trade and Plantations to urge the English government to post six

sloops to the Leeward Islands for patrol against the French.

The importance of these incipient defences was made manifest on July 6, 1712, when a French force unsuccessfully attempted to land on the south-eastern shore of the island. This event also prompted the Governor of Barbados to add his voice in urging the British military commanders to concentrate all available naval forces in the Leewards, and at Antigua in particular.22 However, it was not until 1725, as a result of the investigations of Captains Cooper and Del Garno of the British navy, that the authorities seriously considered the potential of English Harbour as a naval base. In that year, work began on the first simple dockyard at St. Helena, on the east bank of English Harbour. Subsequent lobbying by the Antiguan government and other prominent Antiguans involved both a



4

series of petitions designed to secure a permanent naval presence, and the passing of a law

allocating twenty acres of land "for the use of HM ships" . In addition, the Legislature undertook the construction of a fort at the entrance to English Harbour as an incentive for the British navy to establish a large dockyard within25. Partly as a consequence of these

initiatives, and in consideration of its own strategic motivations, the British navy began in 1743 to construct a major dockyard facility across the harbour from the St. Helena site.26 Almost all subsequent construction in the English Harbour area until 1780 occurred at the

Dockyard and its immediate vicinity, which acquired the wide range of services and infrastructure necessary to service a permanent squadron, including a wet dock, boathouses, masthouses, a naval hospital, a water catchment, troop and officers quarters, and a galley. Some indication of peak usage is provided by Southey, who noted that 1 8 warships carrying 608 guns, including the 80-gun Foudroyant, were based in English Harbour on July 12, 1762.27 Furthermore, it was estimated that between four and ten men-of-war with a

complement of 2.000 to 3,000 hands were typically in the harbour at any given time toward the end of the eighteenth century.28

The interrelated factors which led to the establishment and development of the

Dockyards will now be considered in detail. Of primary importance at a strategic level was the British decision in the 1740s to establish permanent naval bases at Jamaica and the Leeward Islands, in contrast to the French policy of sending a fleet directly from France each year. Permanent squadrons would allow for the continual harassment of enemy trade

and the maintenance of a continuous offensive threat against French possessions, while

providing convoy for English trade, and patrols against possible French raids. Site and

situation advantages favoured English Harbour as the location of this base. The situation of

English Harbour near the eastern extremity of the Leeward Islands was ideal for intercept-

ing incoming vessels from France, thus protecting the other Leeward Islands and possessions further west. At the same time, St. Kitts, Nevis and Montserrat could be accessed

readily simply by plying the prevailing tradewinds, which would also allow severely

damaged ships to retire to the sister naval base in Jamaica for repairs. As for site advan-

tages, the Harbour was commodious, and sufficiently deep to accommodate most contem-

porary naval vessels. English Harbour was also hidden by hills at its mouth , and offered

protection against the hurricanes to which the island was susceptible. Disadvantages included a narrow mouth which impeded navigation, and a depth which forced the largest naval vessels to reduce their loads. As well, English Harbour had a reputation as a death

trap during the hurricane season, on account of yellow fever carried by mosquitos breeding in the marshlands just to the east33 . Despite these shortcomings, the dockyards at English Harbour appear to have performed their role reasonably well, with at least one source

attributing the victory of the British over the French in the Caribbean arena of the Seven

Years War (1756-1763) to the strategy of permanent naval bases34 .

Economic and demographic factors associated with Antigua itself contributed to

the military build-up at English Harbour. A primary consideration was the immense

importance of eighteenth century Antigua and the other Leeward Islands as sugar produc-

ers, a status which the ongoing rhetoric of the Antiguan petitioners was quick to exploit. From 1715 to 1717, for example, the £403,394 in goods exported from the Leeward Islands



5

exceeded the £382,576 exported from all of the British North American colonies together . Antigua alone possessed some 300 sugar estates during the 1760s, with an average value of £10,000 . The British therefore did have a sound economic rationale for protecting Antigua from potential dangers, not all of which were external.

Slave insurrections constituted the main internal threat. The normal deterrent to slave uprisings in the eighteenth-century Caribbean was the maintenance of a militia comprised of resident whites. However, as in all other British West Indian islands, the available pool of white manpower declined steadily both in absolute and relative terms after the early 1700s. The white population of Antigua decreased from a peak of 5,200 in 1724 to 2,590 in 1770, while the slave population expanded during the same interval from 19,800 to 37,808, resulting in an increase in slave/white ratio from 3.8 to 14.6. Furthermore, the militia was widely deemed to be poorly trained and undisciplined.38 It was following the thwarted slave uprising of 1736, therefore, that the government of Antigua petitioned for a

permanent British garrison to protect the white landowners .

An additional and more unexpected threat came from the whites themselves, many of whom carried out or at least condoned illicit trade with non-British ships in contravention of the Navigation Laws. Admiral Horatio Nelson, the most famous personality to be associated with English Harbour, often clashed with the white Antiguan establishment over his zealous enforcement of the trade laws 40. Eric Williams maintains that "but for the British navy, it would have been impossible to prevent the British West Indies from joining the (American) Revolution"41 . Additional tensions within the white community were

engendered by the stratification of this group into divergent economic and social classes. Local governments in Antigua and the other Leeward Islands were dominated by a plantocracy which was resented and generally despised by the "poor whites", many of whom were of Catholic Irish descent and therefore viewed as unreliable by the authorities .

Shirley Heights In 1781, the newly arrived Captain-General of the Leeward Islands, Thomas

Shirley, induced the General Assembly of Antigua to approve a plan to fortify the eastern

heights above the Dockyards. Subsequent constructions were largely paid for from the

Treasury of Antigua, although these funds were approved with increased reluctance as costs escalated. After the Assembly in 1790 refused to allocate further funds for this purpose, the British Government invested £100,000 towards the completion of the complex, given that a renewal of hostilities with France appeared inevitable43. According to Nicholson, the

purpose of the complex was to effectively defend the Dockyards, to serve as a military depot, and to provide facilities where the troops could be acclimatized to West Indian conditions and held in reserve until required .

The decision to expand the military function of the area was sensible within the

context of events during this time. First, the British at that particular time were engaging the combined strength of France, Spain and the Netherlands, and were about to relinquish control over much of the American mainland. Within the Caribbean, only Jamaica, Bar-

bados and Antigua remained under British control following a major French offensive, and



6

it was justifiably believed that Antigua would be attacked next . While the Treaty of Versailles in 1783 temporarily eliminated the threat of further French incursions and essentially restored the pre - 1776 territorial status quo, a new threat was posed in 1784 by the establishment in Martinique of the first French permanent naval base in the region . As it turned out however, the only subsequent French assault upon English Harbour was a tragicomic 1803 expedition in which a force of 700 men on 13 schooners sent from Guadeloupe was scattered at sea by a single British frigate47 . In that year, approximately one thousand British troops were stationed in Antigua, though not all at English Harbour*

Some fifty structures were eventually constructed at Shirley Heights during the 1780s and early 1790s, reflecting both the strategic importance of the site and the availabil-

ity of capital to effect such an intensive level of development. Dominant among these structures were Fort Shirley, the Royal Artillery quarters, a canteen, the officers quarters, the powder magazine, and the barracks for the enlisted men. The last significant military structure to be constructed in the area was Dow's Hill Fort, completed in 1791. Revenues continued to be allocated for the maintenance of Shirley Heights until 1814, when the French threat collapsed entirely.

Decline

The major factors contributing to the decline of the English Harbour area as a

military complex were the attainment of British hegemony after 1814, and the relative decline of the Caribbean (and of the Leewards in particular) as an important economic

periphery50 . First to be abandoned were the small peripheral forts, some of which had

already become obsolete at a much earlier date. Fort Charlotte, for example, was decommissioned as early as 173051. Other forts remained "active" in name only, providing sinecures for fortunate individuals exempted from militia duty . The Antigua House of

Assembly proposed in 1827 that most forts on the island outside of Shirley Heights be abandoned. Ironically, though the deodand on Monk's Hill was described in the 1827 Statistical Report as being "totally useless to the colony"53 , and had already been obsolete for many years, this facility retained some kind of practical function longer than either the

Dockyards or Shirley Heights during this period of decline, serving as an important convalescent station for as long as the garrison remained on Antigua, and functioning when

required as an emergency barracks. In 1822, for example, Great George Fort housed soldiers from a troop ship bound for Jamaica which struck a reef off Antigua . Monk's Hill also functioned until 1923 as a signal station connecting English Harbour with the

capital city of St. John's 55.

The Dockyard continued to servç as a naval base until decommissioned in 1889,

although men-of-war apparently continued to use the facility until 189556 . During the

1840s, English Harbour was used as a port for passengers and mail, given the shallowness of the harbour at St. John's57 . A series of natural disasters, including ζ lightning fire in

181558 , a major hurricane in 1835, and a severe earthquake in 1843 caused serious

damage at the Dockyards which accelerated its decline. Technical change also rendered the

naval base obsolete, as the iron-hulled, steam-driven vessels which replaced sailing ships

during the late nineteenth century were too long and deep to use English Harbour, and too



7

technologically complex to be maintained and repaired at the Dockyards . In 1906, the Dockyards were handed over to the Antiguan government, after which they rapidly fell into disrepair .

The Shirley Heights complex was used to accommodate troops until 1854, when the last regiment left for reassignment in Trinidad . One major reason for retaining the garrison after 1814 was the continuing threat of a slave uprising. British troops were in fact commended by the Antigua House of Assembly for their role in suppressing the slave insurrection of 1831 63 . However, this threat evaporated after the abolition of slavery in 1833, and no further rationale existed for financing a garrison which continued to experience very high rates of attrition due to disease. The buildings accordingly were abandoned and gradually fell into ruin or were damaged by natural disasters. The only evidence of facilities here having undergone some form of functional adaptation was the temporary conversion of the Royal Artillery Quarters into a lunatic asylum during the 1920s .

By the 1940s, the dockyards and fortresses of English Harbour were essentially deserted, save for the presence of a full-time watchman, the occasional visitor and three small nearby villages. The sense of desolation and lost glory which must have pervaded the

place is effectively captured in the following narrative, written in 1949:

Capstans, for careening the men-o'-war, radiating long rotten beams, overhung the water's edge like enor- mous spiders too old to walk away... The galleried officers' quarters at the end of the spit had relapsed into a state of bam-like desolation... moldering nautical

gear and anchors eaten by rust... this was a queerly moving place, heavy with melancholy and the allu- sions of ancient fame .

Conclusion

The military landscape of English Harbour was an integral component of the broader cultural landscape which emerged in the smaller Caribbean islands following their

incorporation into the post-Conquest world economy after 1620. Essentially, the evolution of English Harbour through a number of distinct phases mirrored changing great power dynamics and core/periphery relationships centred upon agricultural exports. In the first

phase, the construction of a massive deodand on a height of land behind Falmouth Harbour between 1680 and 1705 reflected the defensive strategic considerations of the seventeenth

century, in which plantation-based settlements were subject to the continual threat of raids

by their rivals, and required a safe redoubt for the protection of person and property. The establishment of an increasingly sophisticated naval base at the Harbour itself between 1725 and 1780 constituted a second phase, during which Britain and France were engaged in a great power rivalry involving active attempts to acquire each other's territory. The

build-up at English Harbour, made possible because of the increased wealth of Britain and her sugar colonies, was intended in part to defend Antigua and the Leewards from external and internal threat, and in part to provide a new offensive arm to the British military



8

presence in the region. When the great power rivalry between Britain and France reached its climax between 1780 and 1814, Britain and the Antiguan elite in a third phase constructed and maintained a massive garrison complex at Shirley Heights to augment the naval base. Finally, a fourth phase entailed the decline of the English Harbour military complex (1814-1949), which became increasingly unnecessary following the attainment of British hegemony in the economically-declining region, and obsolete due to advancements in military technology.

As a postscript, it should be mentioned that English Harbour is currently experi- encing a fifth stage, during which the area has emerged as a major Caribbean tourist node. An ambitious restoration project has been underway for several decades to.restore many of the forts and military facilities as tourist attractions, while the Dockyards themselves have been restored to their original nautical function, though servicing not the battlecraft of a bygone era, but rather the pleasurecraft of the contemporary era.

NOTES

1 . See for example C. Saur, The Early Spanish Main, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1 966; B.C. Richardson, The Caribbean in the Wider World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992; D-Watts, The West Indies: Patterns of Development, Culture and Environmental Change since 1492, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987; A.W. Crosby, The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Con- sequences on 1492, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1972; D.R. Harris, Plants, Animals and Man in the Outer Leeward Isle, West Indies, University of California Publications in Geography, 1965; G.C. Merrill, "The Historical Record of Man as an Ecological Dominant in the Lesser Antilles", Canadian Geographer 3, 1958/1959: 17-22; E.R. Wolf and S.W. Mintz, "Haciendas and Plantations in Middle Amer- ica and the Antilles", Social and Economic Studies 6, 1957:380-412.

2. Among the few studies which examine some aspect of Caribbean military landscapes are D. Buisseret, "The Elusive Deodand: A Study of the Fortified Refuges of the Lesser Antilles", Journal of Caribbean History 6, 1973:43-80, and D. Buisseret, The Fortifications of Kingston, 1655-1914, Kingston, Jamaica, 1972.

3. Wallerstein' s World Systems Theory provides a useful framework for interpreting the shifting rivalries char- acteristic of the capitalist world economy which gradually emerged after 1450. See 1. Wallerstein, The Modern World System I. Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century, New York: Academic Press, 1974; 1 . Wallerstein, The Modem World-System II. Mer- cantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600-1750, New York: Academic Press, 1 980; 1 . Wallerstein, The Modern World System III - The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy, 1730-1840s, New York: Academic Press, 1989. For a world systems interpre- tation of the Caribbean, see Richardson, op. cit.

4. H. Blume, The Caribbean Islands, London: Longman, 1974.

5. These incipient colonization efforts were facilitated by the earlier Treaties of London (1604)and Antwerp (1609), in which England and the Netherlands acknowledged Spanish sovereignty only over those territo- ries, mainly in the Greater Antilles, which were effectively occupied by Spain. See Blume, op. cit., 66-67, Watts, op. cit, 131-173.

6. For a full discussion of the plantation system" see Pan American Union, Plantation Systems of the New World, Washington: Social Science Monographs, VII, 1959; L. Best, "A Model of Pure Plantation Econ- omy", Social and Economic Studies 17, 1968:283-326; G. Beckford, Persistent Poverty. Underdevelop- ment in Plantation Economies of the Third World, New York: Oxford University Press, 1972; S.W. Mintz, Caribbean Transformations, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974.

7. C. Jane, Shirley Heights: The Defence of Nelson 's Dockyard, English Harbour, Antigua: Reterence Library of Nelson's Dockyard, National Park Foundation, 1982:9.

8. Watts, op. cit., 240.



9

9. H. Multer, M. Weiss and D. V. Nicholson, Antigua: Reefs, Rocks and Highroads of History, St. Johns, An- tigua: Leeward Islands Science Associates, no. 1, no date.

10. Buisser op. cit., 53; Jane, op. cit., 1 1 . Similar motives during this same period prompted a common pattern throughout the region, with the establishment of other deodands in St. Kitts, Montserrat, Nevis, Guade- loupe, St. Lucia and Dominica. See Buisseret, op, cit.

11. Jane, op. cit., 11.

12. Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies, 1724-1726, no. 260viii,6152.

13. Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies, 1734-1735, no.314ii,214.

14. Ibid, 215-216.

15. Ibid, 214-215.

16. For a summary of these formal conflicts, including alliances, see Watts, op. cit, 240-258.

17. Blume, op. cit., 68.

18. D.V. Nicholson, untitled miscellaneous notes on Antiguan forts and cannons. St. John's, Antigua: Na- tional Museum of Antigua and Barbuda, no date.

19. Ibid

20. W. Ross, "English Harbour, Antigua" Canadian Geographical Journal 62, 1961 : 96.

21. Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies, 1706-1708, no. 1031, 499-500.

22. Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies, 1712-1714, no. 38, 25-26.

23. A. Aspinall, The Pocket Guide to The West Indies and British Guiana, British Honduras, Bermuda, The

Spanish Main, Surinam, The Panama Canal, London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 10th ed., 1954, 215.

24. Calendar of State Papers; Colonial Series America and West Indies, 1726-1727, no. 151,71. Contemporary petitions include Speaker of the Assembly George Thomas to the Lords Commissioner of the Admiralty on Feb.28, 1727; see Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies; 1728-1729, no.886L 472-473, and Agent of Antigua John Yeomans to the Council of Trade and Plantations in 1731; see Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies, 1731, no. 183, 105-106.

25. Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies, 1728-1729, no. 886i, 472-473.

26. D.V. Nicholson, "English Harbour and Shirley Heights", in Antigua and Barbuda Independence (R.Sand- ers, ed.), St. Johns, Antigua, 1981, 43.

27. T. Southey, Chronological History of the West Indies, vol 2, London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1963, (first published 1827), 354.

28. Ross, op. cit., 96-97. Ross cites Sir Kenneth Blackburne, a former Governor of the Leeward Islands.

29. R. Pares, War and Trade in the West Indies, 1739-1763, London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1963 (first published 1936), 287-288. Pares also points out several disadvantages of the permanent base strategy, such as the relatively poor condition of British ships confined for long periods in the Caribbean without access to the more comprehensive facilities of the European dockyards, and the ubiquity of poorly understood tropi- cal diseases, which resulted in a high mortality rate among military personnel. However, incoming expedi- tions from Europe could experience mortality rates of at least equal magnitude. Admiral Hosier's Caribbean expedition of 1726, for example, suffered 4,000 deaths over a two year period out of a contin-

gent of 4,750 personnel. See N.A.M. Rodger.. The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy, Glasgow: Fontana Press, 1986, 98.

30. According to Ross, op. cit., 95, "The harbour itself is small and narrow, a winding valley drowned by the sea several thousand years ago after the great continental ice sheets of our latitudes melted away. Cut neatly into the mountainous south coast of Antigua, it is almost invisible from seaward, and a stranger could sail within a quarter mile of the entrance without suspecting its presence.

31. Ross, op. cit., 96, notes that hurricanes struck Antigua in 1681, 1722, 1740, 1754, 1766, 1772, 1780, 181 1 and 1835. It is also likely that the hurricanes which struck Montserrat in 1707, 1737, 1744, 1747, 1756, 1786, 1792,1804, and 1827 also had some effect upon Antigua. See M.M. Wheeler, Montserrat, West In- dies: A Chronological History, Plymouth, Montserrat: Montserrat National Trust, 1988.

32. Pares, op. cit., 272



10

33. Rodger, op. cit., 99.

34. Blume, op. cit., 68-69.

35. Jane, op. cit., Toward the end of the eighteenth century, William Pitt the Younger estimated that four-fifths of all British overseas income came from the West Indies. Ibid

36. R.B. Sheridan, "The Rise of a Colonial Gentry: A Case Study of Antigua, 1730-1775", Economic History Re- view, Second Series 13, 1961:343.

37. Watts, op. cit., 313.

38. Pares, op. cit., 236.

39. Ibid, 254.

40. Ross, op. cit., 97.

41 . Ε. Williams, From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean 1492-1969, Thetford, Norfolk: An- dre Deutsch, 1983, 226.

42. Sheridan, op. cit, examines the domination of Antigua's plantocracy over the local Assembly and Council during the mid- 1700s. Richard Dunn indicates that the Irish constituted a significant proportion of the Lee- ward Islands white population during the late 1600s and early 1700s, and that they were liable to co-oper- ate with the French during times of invasion, given the mutual antipathy of the Irish and English. Unlike Montserrat or St. Kitts, the Irish never actually rose up against the English in Antigua, even though they constituted 26% ofthat island's white population in 1678. See R. Dunn, Sugar and Slaves: The Rise of the Planter Class in the English West Indies, 1624-17 IS, New York: W.W. Norton and Co. Inc., 1972, 1 18, 127. 134. For a chronoloev of Enelish-Irish relations in Montserrat, see Wheeler, op. cit.

43. Jane, op. cit., 15-22.

44. Multer, Weiss and Nicholson, op. cit.

45. Jane, op. cit., 15-17.

46. Watts, op. cit, 252-253.

47. C. Mitchell, Islands to Windward. Cruising the Caribbees, Toronto: D. Van Nostran Company, Inc., 1948, 120.

48. Ross, op. cit, 97.

49. See Jane, op. cit., for a description of the major facilities within the Shirley Heights complex.

50. The economic decline of the British West Indies, and particularly the smaller islands, is exemplilied by the relative decline of this region as a sugar producer during the eighteenth century. Williams (op. cit., 366) points out, for example, that the British West Indian share of regional sugar production dropped from 62% around 1815 to 18% in 1894, primarily because of the great increase in Cuban production. In addition, the large-scale diffusion of sugar production to Asia and other areas, competition from European beet sugar, the slow adoption of technological innovations, and the rescinding of preferential prices in 1846 all contributed to dropping prices for British West Indian sugar. See Richardson, op. cit., 60-62.

5 1 . Nicholson, untitled miscellaneous notes, op. cit.

52. Lanaghan, Antigua and the Antiguans, etc., London: Saunders and Otley, 1 844, 328.

53. Antigua House of Assembly, Minutes 1828-1831, 91.

54. Nicholson, untitled miscellaneous notes, op. cit.

55. Buisseret, op. cit., 55.

56. Aspinall , op. cit. ,215.

57. R. Baird, Impressions and Experiences of the West Indies and North America in low, ν nnaaeipnia:Lea ana Blanchard, 1850,33.

58. T. Southey, Chronological History of the West Indies, vol. Ill, London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1968 (first published 1827), 612-613.

59. Lanaghan, op. cit.



11

60. Ross, op. cit

61. Β. Dyde, Antigua and Barbuda: Heart of the Caribbean, London: MacMillan, 1986, 107.

62. Jane, op. cit.

63. Antieua House of Assembly, od. cit.. 521-522.

64. Jane, op. cit.

65. P. Fermor, The Traveller's Tree: A Journey through the Caribbean Islands, London: John Murray, 1950, 206-09.



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