Employment of Reserves in Operational Art

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Re:x?rves

11'1

t h e

O p e r a t i o n a l . D e f e n s e

h Y

Majmr

Iblar-k.

L. Hanrm

I n f a n t r-y

S c h o o l of Fldvarced i 1 l t a r y S t i ud ~ ie e

U.

S.

Rrrny Comrtiand an d Genera1

S t a f f 001

leg^:

Fort L e a v e n w o r t h , K a n s a s

1 Q R p r i l

1986

Approved for publ ic re lea se; di st r ib ut ion is unl imited



School o f Qdvanced Military Studies

MononraDh RDaroval

Narne

o f

Student: Mark L. Hanna. Infantrv.

Title o f Monograph: mlnvrnent

q f

Reserves i n t h e Oaerational Defense.

Rpproved

by :

,

LTC F Monograph Director

(L.TC

Richard M. Swain. Ph. D.)

Director, School o f

COL Richard Hart Ginnreieh, MQ) Qdvanced Military Studies

Director, Graduate Degree

(Phi1ip f Brooks, Ph D. Programs

FIccept ed

t h i s

day of

1986.



R6STRRCT

Employment

of

Reserves in the Operational Defense,

by

Major Mark

L. Hanna,

USR, 32

pages.

This

s t u d y is

an analysis

of

how best to employ operational

reserves to counter an enemy operational offensive and developing

penetration. The study addresses the question of whether

reserves should be employed

a s

they become available to limit and

then reduce the enemy penetration; or whether they should

be

marshaled and built up, allowing the penetration to continue, and

then committed in

a

decisive counterstroke. Classical theury

concerning defensive operational art and employment of reserves

is

analyzed, including works of Clausewitz, Jomini, and Sun Tzu.

Historical analysis compares and contrasts employment of

operational reserves

by

the Qermansa in the

1943

Kharkov campaign

and the Rllies in the

1944

firdennes campaign. Finally, RirLand

Battle doctrine

is

analyzed in

light

of conclusions drawn from

the theoretical and historical analysis.

The

study

concludes that the optimum employment of operational

reserves involves allowing the penetration

to

develop while

marshaling and concentrating one’s reserves for a decisive

counterstroke against the flanks and rear of successive portions

of the enemy forces. Theoretical and historical analysis

supports this

conclusion. Historical analysis also

shows

that

many factors may be present to mitigate

t h i s

theoretically

correct employment. These include terrain, relative tactical

ability, strategic goals, risk, command structure, and command

style of

the

operational commander. The

study

further concludes

that RirLand Battle doctrine for the operational defense is well

in line

with

the theoretical and historical conclusions.



Tab

1

e o f Cork erst

Se c t ion I . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

I 1

Theory of the Operational Defense

. . . . .

I 1 1. Historical Clnalysis . . . . . . . . . . . .

I V The

Doctrinal Defense

V

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Erndrlot es

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Bi

hl

iography

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .



SECTION

I -

INTRODUCTION.

The purpose of t h i s s t u dy is to determine how best to employ

operational reserves to counter an enemy operational offensive

and developing penetration. Unless the enemy has seriously

miscalculated, one or more developing penetrations will be the

natural result

o f

an operational offensive. For the purposes o f

t h i s s tu dy , operational reserves are defined to be

multi-

divieional forces that are uncommitted at the time of the enemy

offensive or

made

available

by

withdrawal from less threatened

sectors. The creation as well as employment of these reserves

will be addressed in the course of the paper.

The operational defense involves a dilemma concerning the

employment of reserves to counter a developing enemy penetration.

Should reserves be employed as they become available to

limit

and

then reduce the “bulge” or should they

be

marshaled and

built

up,

allowing the penetration to develop, and then committed in a

concentrated counterstroke? Fillowiny a penetration to develop

can involve considerable risk, while committing forces as they

become available may be premature, piecemeal, and indecisive.

This dilemma was faced

by

the German Rrmy between the Donets and

Dnieper rivers during the

winter of

1943

and

by

the Clllied Rrmy

in the Rrdennes in Dsrcember 1944. In both cases operational

reserves were created from uncommitted forces and by economizing

in less threatened sectors. In the Firdennee, the FIllieS

committed these reserves as they became available to

S t G p

the



p e n e t r a t i n g f o r c e s a nd t h e n g r a d u a l l y r e d u c e t h e b u lg e . Th e

Germans, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , a l l o w e d t h e S u v i e t p e n e t r a t i o n t o

c a n t i n u e w h i l e m a r s ha l i n g a nd c o n c e n t r a t i n g t h e i r r e~ i e r v e sf u r a

d e c i s i v e c o u nt e r s t r - ok e . T h e se c a ni p ai gn s i 1 l u s t r a t e

two

d i f f e r e n t

m e t h o d s f u r e m pl o y i n g u p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e s t o c o u n t e r a n e nemy

u p e r a t i o n a l p e n e t r a t i o n .

T h i s s t u d y s h u u l d d e v e l o p i n s i g h t c o n c e r n i n g how t o

c o u n t e r a n enemy p e n e t r a t i o n a n d what c u n d i t i u n s a n d

f a c t o r s

1 i r n i t a n d g o v e r n t h e o p t i o n s fob, en p lo y me n t o f u p e r a t i u n a l

r e s e r v e s .

T he s t u d y s h u u l d

a l s o

c o n t r i b u t e t o u n d e r s t a n d i n y

o p e r a t i o n a l

a r t

by i l l u s t r a t i n g how i t f u n c t i o n s l i n k i n g t a c t i c a l

a c t i v i t i e s

t o

s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e s

i n

t h e o p e r a t i o n a l d e f e n s e .

.The U.S. Flrmy's b i y g e s t c h a l l e n g e i r r t h e d e f e n s e of W e s t e r n

E u ro p e a g a i n s t a l a r g e scale? Warsaw

Pact

a t t a c k . 'The c r e a t i o n

a n d e m p l o y m e n t

of

o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e s w i l l b e c r u c i a l

to

s u c h

a

d e f e n s e .

T he s t u d y

is

c o n d u c t e d i n t h r e e p a r t s .

P a r t

one is

an

a n a l y s i s of c l a s s i c a l t h e o r y c o n c e r n i n g o p e r a t i o n a l a r t i n t h e

d e f e n s e . W he re n e c e s s a r y , c u r l d i t i o n s u f m od er n warfare a r e

c o n s i d e r e d a nd a p p l i e d t o q u a l i f y c o n c l u s i o n s

from

t h e c 1 as s i c :a l

a n a l y s i s . T h i s a n a l y s i s c o n c e r n s t h e n a t u r e a nd p r i n c i p l e s

of

t h e

o p e r a t i o n a l d e f e n s e a nd e s t a b l i s h e s

a

f r a n i e w o rk f o r t h e

h i s t o r i c a l a n a l y s i s c o n du c t ed i n p a r t

two.

P a r t

t w o

is a n

a n a l y s i s of how d e f e n e i v e o p e r a t i o n a l a r t was c o n d u c t e d i n t he

1943 Khat-kov and

1 344

F l rd e n n e s c a m p a i g n s . Em pl o ym e nt

o f

a p e r a t

i o n a l

r e s e r v e s are c om pa re d a nd c o n t r a s t e d t o g e t h e r w i t h



t h e f a c t o r s a nd c o n d i t i o n s t h a t a o v e r n e d e mp lo ym en t

c u n . i i d e r a t i o n e i n t h e t w o c a m pa i gn s . P a r t t h r e e is a n a n a l y s i b

o f c u t - r e n t

U.

5 . d o c t r i n e c o n c e r n in g d e f e n s i v e

soperat

i o n a l art i i l

l i g h t o f c o n c l u s i o n = d r a w n from p a r t s one arid t w o .

3



SECTION

I 1

.

THEORV OF- THE OPERQTIONOL

DFFENSE

'The d e f i n i t i o n s o f t a c t i c s s t r a t e g y and o p e r a t i o n a l a r t i n

F M

100--5 m a t i o n s , s e r v e as a p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e f o r s t u t i y i r i y

t h e t h e o r y o f t h e o p e r a t i o n a l d e f e n s e . R c c u r d i n g

t o

F M 100.--5,

i n i l i t a r y s t r a t e g y is t h e a r t and s c i e n c e o f e mp lc ry ii ?g t h e a r m e d

.Fot-ces

of a

n a t i o n

or

a l l i a n c e t o s e c u r e p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s b y t h e

d p p l i c a t i o n

or

t h r e a t

o f

f o r c e .

''I

S t r a t e g y a s t a b l i s h e s g a a l s i r l

t t i ea t e r s

r m f

war

a n d L h e a t e r s

o f

a p e r a t i o n s .

T a c t i c s

is

t h e

a r t

b y w hi ch c o r p s

a rd

sma l le r u n i t s t r a n s l a t e p o t e n t i a l c o m b a t p u w e r

i n t o v i c t o v i o u s b a t t l e s and e n g a g e m e n t s .

m

O p e r a t i n n a l art;

o c c u p i e s t h e g r o u n d be.tw eer, t a c t i c s and s t r a t e y y , u s i n g t a c t i c a l

e n g a g e m e n t s and b a t t l e s t o a c c o m p l i s h s t r a t e g i c g o a l s t h ro ug t i t h e

d e s i g n , o r g a n i z a t i o n , a n d c o n d u c t ~ f

and

m a j o rampaignc;

o p e r a t i o n s . a

l h e s e d e f i n i t ions are

w e l l

g rc ju nd ed i n c l a s s i c a l t h e o r y

drd

t h e l e s s o n s o f m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y a p p l i e d t o moder-n c o n d i t i o n s .

T h e w i - i t i n g s o f t w o t h e o r i s t s , J o r ni n i a n d C l a u s e w i t z , p r o v i d e

rm>re i n s i g h t i n t o t h e n a t u r e

o f

t h e o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l o f

w a r .

The c o n c e p t o f o p e r a t i o n a l a r t car8 be d e r i v e d

from

Jom.i .ni ' li

d e f i n i t i o n s

o f

s t r a t e y y

and

g r a n d

t a c t i c s .

S t r a t e g y , a c c u r d i n y

t o Jumini , i n v o l v e s m a n e uv e r i ng armies t o d e c i s i v e p o i n t s i n t h e

zone o f o p e r a t i o n s . G ran d

t a c t i c s

i n v o l v e s m a n e uv e r i ng t h e a r iny

o n t h e b a t t l e f i e l d , in ak in y d i s p o s i t i o n s and c t m b i n a t i ons , a r d

b r i n g i n g t h e f o r c e s i n t o a c t i o n . O n c e t h e f o r c e s a r e c o i n n i i t t r d

t o a c t i o n ,

t a c t i c s

w i n s t h e b a t t l e . T h e g o a l s t h a t t h e s e

b a k t l r f i e l d v i c t o v i e s

a r e

m e a n t

t o

s e r v e

are

d e t e t m i r l t d b y J.

4



higher level #of war which Jomini called grand strategy.

Clausewitz' theory on levels of war is oriented more on ends

and means as opposed tu Jomini's orientation on activities.

Clausewitz identified two levels of war, tactics and strategy.

His description of strategy includes the concept of operational

art. Rccurding to Clausewitz, tactics concerned the use of armed

forces tu win the engagement and strategy the use of engagements

to attain the object of the war. Where tactics includes the

planning, organization and activities directed toward winning

engagements between opposing arnied forces, stratepy involves

courdinating and sequencing engagements tu best accomplish the

ub.ject of the war.O

Conditions of modern warfare have placed impetus un

identifying the operational level of war distinct from tactics

and strategy. The appearance of mass armies corflbined with the

dispersal necessitated

by

the lethality of niudern weapons has

extended the width of the battlefield. Rir for-ces and

mechanizat ion have entended its depth and increased i t 6 tenipu.

W i t h tactical engagements occuring

in

number, inteneity and

frequency never imagined by Jumini or Clausewitz, i t is crucial

to identify and practice a distinct operational level

of

war to

coordinate and sequence these engagements toward the strategic

goals of the war ov theater.

Modern conditions have also blurred the dividing line

between tactics and operational art. The increased dispersal o f

forces and tempo of modern battle have forced a decentralization

~ f tactica cuntrol and maneuver so that even commanders at



company and battalion level

must

sequence and coordinate tactical

engagements to attain a higher objective. The fundamental

principles and doctrinal concepts that guide t h e practice

o f

soperat ional art apply equally to modern tactics.

What is unique and distinct about operational art

is

that i t

is directly concerned with attaining

the

strategic goal of the

war or theater. Or, to

put i t

another way, operational art uses

tactical engagements to produce t h e

military condition which

achieves the strategic goal. While commanders at a lower leve'l

coordinate arid sequence engagements to accomplish a higher

tactical objective, the operational level commander is directly

concerned

with

creating the military condition that accomplishos

the strateuic goal.

The dominant characteristic of t h e theoretical defense i s

that it

must

include affensive action. Clausewitz describes

this

as the shield of well--directed He further describes the

defense as being permeated with pronounced elements of the

offensive and t h e counterattack as an essential feature of the

defense in both tactics and strategy. Jomini places similar

emphasis on the offensive character of a proper defense and

includes

the

concept of offense within the defense in the

province of grand Sun

T z u ' s

concept of the defense

includes using what he calls t h e normal and extraordindry

forces to meet the attack. The normal force confronts the enemy

while the extraordinary force attacks the flank to wrest the

initiative. a The durninant characteri~.t c and thread uf

continuity

in

classical theory concerning the defense is

its

c



of fens ve

d

imens 1on.

I t is

the offensive dimension that allows the defender to

exploit the advantages of the defense. Clausewitz described the

defense

as

the stronger form of war at both the tactical and

strategic (operational) levels. Clausewitz felt that the defense

had a natural superiority

in

the means to achieve tactical or

strategic success. These include surprise, benefit o f terrain,

and concentric attack.

l o

The superiority of the defense

in

there

means

is

derived primarily from

its

Offensive dimension. Jomini

does not concede superiurity to the defense,

but

he does describe

the advantages of an active defense wherein the defender awaits

his adversary on a prepared field with resources in hand and able

to .]udge where and when to strike and take the initiative." Sun

Tzu seems to agree with the superiority

auf

the defenfae in

describing how a weaker force can iflake itself invincible in the

defense while awaiting the attacking force's weak point or moment

of vulnerability and then seek victory in the counterattack.

=

Onother factor that aids the defense is the diminishing

force of the attack as

it

progresses. Clausewitz describes the

force of an attack which gradually diminishes frum the effects c t f

attrition, fatigue and dispersal required to protect rear areas

and

LOCs.

Eventually a point

is

reached where the remaining

strength

is

just enough to maintain a defense. This, Clausewitz

describes as the culmination point of the attack. Jomini make:;

a similar point when he points out that an offensive campaign may

become defensive before

it

ends.

l 4

'The advantage of the defense at both tactical and

7



o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l s

l i e s i n

t h e u p p o r t u n i t y t o l a u n c h s u r p r i s e ,

c o n c e n t r i c

o r

f l a n k i n g a t t a c k s

frorn

a

f a v o r a b l e t e r r a i n p o s i t i o n

a g a i n s t a n enemy f o r c e t h a t h a s b e e n a t t r i t e d , d i s p e r s e d , a n d

f a t i g u e d ( p h y s i c a l l y o r l o g i s t i c a l l y )

f r o m

t h e e x e r t i o n s o f its

o f f e n s i v e . C l a u s e w i t z d e s c r i b e s t h e d e f e n d e r ' s a d v a n t a g e i n t h e

o p p o r t u n i t y t o make f l a n k i n g a t t a c k s a s

w e l l

as t h e f r e qu e ri . t

o p p o r t u n i t y t o a t t a c k a p o r t i o n o f t h e en em y f o r c e w i t h t h e b u l k

o f

one 's own. n J or ni ni p o i n t s a u t t h e m u r a l e f f e c t of t h e

c o u n t e r a t t a c k a g a i n s t a n enemy

whu

h a s b ee n a t t r i t e d a n d

d i so r -y a n iz v d by t h e d e f e n s e . S a x e d i s c u s s e s t h e use #of

r - ed o ub t s, o r g a n i z e d f o r a1 1 . -a ro u nd d e f e n s e , t o d i s r u p t an enemy

a t t a c k ,

s e t t i n g u p

a

s u c c e s s f u l c o u n t e r a t t a c k .

O per-a t i o n a l r e s e r v e s , as d e f i n e d i n t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n ,

a r e

t h e f o r c e s w h i c h w i l l b e u s e d t o c o n d u c t t h e o p e r a t i o n a l

c o u n t e r a t t a c k . C l a u s e w i t r p r o v i d e s

some

t h e o r e t i c a l i n s i g h t i n t o

t h e diler fl rf la of w h e t h e r or n o t o n e c a n

a l lo w

a n e n e m y ' s

o p e r a t i o n a l p e n e t r a t ior l t o c o n t i n u e i n o r- d er t o m a r s h a l a n d

d e p l o y o n e ' s r e s e r v e s i n

a

d e c i s i v e c o u n t e r s t r o k e . F o r c e s

# o p e r a t i n g a g a i n s t t h e en e m y 's f l a n k a n d r e a r

a r e

n o t a v a i l a b l e tns

t i i s f r o n t a n d

a r e

o.F nu v a l u e i n i s c n la t iu n , a c c o r d i n g

t o

C;lausewi tz . l a

H e

also d e s c r i b e s t h e c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s i n

d e f e n s e of a t h e a t e r : t h a t of d i s p e r s i n g o n e ' s f o r c e s

trio

r e . t a i n

yruund

v e r s u s c o n c e n t r a t i n g t he m f o r a d e c i s i v n c o u n t e r a t t a c k . l..R

P e r h a p s t h e

most

t e l l i n g p o i n t is C l a u s e w i t z ' c a u t i o n t h a t

u nc om mi t te d s t r a t e g i c r e s e rv e s h a v e nu v a l u e once t h e d e c i s i v e

s t a g e

of

t he b a t t l e is r eached. ' T hu s, t h e c r a a t i u n and

e ni pl oy ni er rt o f o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e s mu st b e b a l a n c e d a g a i n s t t h t . ?

a



requirements of defending other sectors

o f

the theater and

maintaining a coherent mobile defensive force in contact

with

the

enemy penetrating format ions. Finally,

the

counterstroke muet be

launched before the decisive phase of the battle has passed and

the enemy has attained

h i s

ob.jective.

In consideriny theoretical principles which can serve as

guidance for employing the operational reserve, the one principle

that stands out above all others

is

the law of concentration.

Clausewitz describes keeping onE?'s forces concentrated as the

highest and simplest law of strategy.-' Jomini's fundamental

principle of war is to maneuver

so

as to engage fractions of a

hustile army

with

the

b u l k

of one's own.--

I

basic tenet of

Sun

T z u is to engage a fraction

uf

the enemy's strength

with

the bulk

of your own.*=

I

more contemporary military theorist, Liddell

Hart, states that all of the principles of war can be condensed

inbo the concept of concentrating strength against weakness.

'The law of concentration applies equally to tactics and

operationdl art. The difference lies in the selection of the

decisive point against which to concentrate. In operational art,

t h i s

point muet

b e

directly related to the statcagic goal of the

war or theater. In strategic planning, Clausewitz emphasizes the

importance of identifying a center of gravity in the opposing

belligerent. This, he describes as the

h u b

of all power and

movement, on which everything depends." This is the point

ayainst which to concentrate maximum force.-'

The disadvantage of the operational counterattack aagainst an

enemy penetration is that the target is limited to the enemy

9



f o r c e w i t h i n t h e d e v e l o p i n g p e n e t r a t i o n . I f t h i s i s n o t t h e

c e n t e r of g r a v i t y of t h e en e m y ’ s t h e a t e r w a r e f f o r t t h e n i t may

b e

move

a p p r o p r i a t e t o e m pl o y t h e o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e rv e e l s e w h e r e .

Howeve r , i t

is

s t i l l a p p r o p r i a t e t o a t t a c k t h e enem y p e n e t r a t i n g

f o r ce i f o n e ’ s own c e n t e r o f g r a v i t y is s e r i o u s l y t h r e a t e n e d . I f

o n e ’ s s t r a t e g i c g o a l is t h e a t e r d e f e n s e , t h e n a n enemy f o r c e

c o n d u c t i n g

a n

o p e r a t i o n a l p e n e t r a t i o n is a n a p p r o p r i a t e

o p e r a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e . O l a u s e w i t z s t a t e s t h a t i n d e f e n s e o f

a

t h e a t e r , t h e c e n t e r

of

g r a v i t y

is

w he re t h e g r e a t e s t

c o n c e n t r a t i o n of enemy t r o o p s is f o u n d .

T h e

essence

o f o p e r a t i o n a l a r t is f o u n d i n a s s e s s i n g t h e

c o n t r i b u t i o n

o f

o n e ’ s t a c t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s a nd e n g a g e m e n t s t o w a r d s

t h e s t r a t e g i c g o a l of t h e t h e a t e r . I d e a l l y , t h e o p e r a t i o n a l a n d

s t r a t e g i c r e s u l t s a t t a i n e d w i l l b e

more

t h a n t h e s i m p l e sum of:

t h e

t a c t i c a l

p a r t s . One way

t o

a c c o m p l i s h t h i s is t o c o n c e n t r a t e

o n e ’ s f o r c e

a g a i n s t o n e o r t w o c r i t i c a l a nd v u l n e r a b l e p o i n t s .

E x a m p l e s

of

t h i s

a r e

M a c F lr t he r ’ s I n c h o n l a n d i n g i n

Korea

a n d t h e

G e r m a n

p a n z e r b r e a k . t h r o uQ h a t S e d a n i n t h e 1940

B a t t l e oF

F r a n c e .

I n t h e o p e r a t i o n a l d e f e n s e , a c r i t i c a l p o i n t may b e t h e b a s e ,of

p e n e t r a t i o n , w h e re t h e

e n t i r e

enemy f o r c e c a n b e c u t o f f . R

s e c o n d m e t h o d o f a t t a i n i n g d e c i s i v e o p e r a t i o n a l r e s u l t s

is

t u

e m p l o y o n e ’ s f o r c e s so t h a t t a c t i c a l successes b ec om e e a s y a n d

m u l t i p l y q u i c k l y . I n t h e o p e r a t i o n a l d e f e n s e , t h i s c o u l d b c d o n e

by c o n c e n t r a t i n g

one ‘ s

o p e r a t

i o n a l

r ese rve6

t o

a t t a c k p a r t i o n s of

t h e enemy p e n e t r a t i n g f o r c e s s u c c e s s i v e l y i n t h e f l a n k a nd r e a r .

T h e essence of t h e o p e r a t i o n a l d e f e n s e is t h e em pl oy me nt u f

# on e’ s o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e s t o w a r d s a t t a i n m e n t of t h e s t r a t e g i c

0



rough the cumulative effect of the resulting tactical

enyagements.

I

developing enemy operat ional penetrat iun offers

excellent opportunities for exploiting the advantages

o f

the

defense which lie

in

its uffeneive dimension.

R s

a framework for.

analyzing historical case studies on the employment of

operational resmrves, we must analyze the tactical and strateyic

considerat ions in each case. We

must

than address operat iunal

considerat ions and analyze huw we1 operat iunal reserves were

employed to exploit the advantages

o f

the defense in translat

i n y

tactical engagements into attainment of the theater strategic

goal.

1 1



SECT I

ON I 1 1 -

HXSTORICFIL

RNAC

Y 6 1 S

This

section will analyze and compare the employment of

operational reserves in two campaigns which involved reaction to

a developing enerfly operational penetration. This problem

confronted the German Rrmy between the lower Donets and Dnieper

rivers from January-March of

1943

and the allied armies in the

Rrdennes area of Belgium during December and January of

1944.

The t wo campaigns will be described briefly. R comparison and

analysis of how operational reserves were created and employed

follows.

On

19

November

1943

the Soviet Red Rrmy began a huge

offensive that overran two Rumanian Armies and encircled the

German Sixth Flrmy in Stalingrad. During the rest of Nuvemher and

December, the Russians reinforced the ring around Stalingrad and

defeated Qerman relie f efforts. In January

1943

leaving one

front o f seven armies to besirqe Stalingrad, the Russians

continued their offensive to the west. By the end of January,

the Russian offens ive had destroyed the Hungarian Second Rrniy and

defeated and driven back the German Second Flrmy, opening

a

200

mile gap in the Oernian lines between Voronezh and the bend of the

Don River. In early February, the Russians poured across the

Donets River, threatening to cut off Manstein’s Rrmy Group South

from crossings on the Dnieper River and destroy

it

against the

Sea of Azov. Manstein allowed Russian tank columns to continue

their penetration, allocating only minimal forces to slow their

advance. While the penetration developed, Manstein marshaled

12





withdrawing his southern wing to the M i u s river line. Leaving

Hrmy Detachment Hollidt to hold this line as an econoniy of force

measure, Manstein withdrew the First and Fourth Panzer Hrrni,es and

concentrated them in position to forni the southern pincer of hi6

counterattack. In the north, he concentrated the SS Panzer

Co r p s , which had been railed

in

from Western Europe, as the

northern pincer. He left Rrmy Detachment Kempf in an ecanorfly o f

force defense auainst three armies of the Soviet Voronezh front

east of Poltava. While these reserves were deployed and

concentrated, the Soviet penetration continued, coming

dangerously close to Dnieper River crossings at Dnepropetrovsk

and Zaporozhye and actually cuttinq Hrmy Group South’s

main

rail

supply line near Stalino. In mid-February Manstein launched his

reserves in a concentrated counterstroke

with

the results

described above.

*-

The opportunity for creating mobile operat ional t-eset’ves was

better for Bradley and Eisenhower. nlthough Bradley had rm atmy

group reserve and Eisenhower had orlly the refitting X V I I I

Hirborne Corps at SHFIEF, there were plently of uncommitted

or

l i g h t l y committed armored divisions in the subordinate army

areas. Uncommitted arrtiorod divisions included the

7th,

1 0 t h

n

5 t h ab

well as the armored division and three armor brigades

o f

British

X X X

Corps. Rdditionally, the end, 3rd, 4th, and

6 t h

Hrmored Divisions were only l i g h t l y committed and the lith

Hrmored Division was available in Because they were

on the strategic offensive, and t h u s not

hat-d

pressed in other

14



sectors, the Flllies were able to withdraw divisions from other

sectors of the line much more easily than was Manstein. The

H1 lied infantry divisions were almost completely motorized. This

gave them the ability to move and concentrate much more quickly

than Manstein's footmobile infantry

with

horse drawn transport.

Eisenhower and Bradley had a much greater potential capability

for creating mobile operational reserves than

d i d

Manstein.

Fls

already noted, the forces created were, for the most part,

employed as soon as they became available, plugging gaps in the

north and mounting a limited counterattack in the eouth. Once

the German offensive had been contained, a gradual Flllied

counteroffensive forced the Germans out of the "bulge" and back

into the Siegfried line.*'

I t appears that Manstein achieved better results in

comparison to the Fillies in the Flrdennes. Rather than

concentrating against one or two decisive points, the essence

o f

Manstein's operat iunal art consisted of disposing and employing

h i s

forces so that they were repeatedly concentrated against the

flanks and rear of fragments

o f

the Soviet forces.

ls

a result,

victorious tactical engagements came easily and multiplied

quickly. Fllthough outnumbered approximately seven to one, he

succeeded

in

de6trQying the bulk of

3+

Soviet' armies and

reestablished a strong defensive posit ion from which the Germans

were able to make a strong

b i d

to recapture the strategic

initiative in the summer of

1943.

W h y

didn't the Flllies employ Manstein's "backhand blow"

15



technique in the Wdennes? Eisenhower's init ial react ion was to

avoid piecemeal commitment and launch a decisive counterstral.te.

ls late as

18

December, two days into the German offensive,

Eisenhower was planning a deep attack converging

can

Bonn

and

Cologne on the Rhine river.'' However, these init ial react ions

gave way to the m w e cautious operations as described above. 6

cornparisor1 of considerat ions corlcerning operational reserve

employment provides some insiyht into this quest ion.

The first consideration

is

the strategic goal which the

operational employment of reserves seeks to attain. Fllthouyh

strategic goals were erratic and urclear under Hit ler, the

isolation and destruct ion of Hr-my Group South which was

threatened by the Soviet offensive would have

had

catastrophic

strategic consequences Tor Germany. Manstein himself states h i s

strategic goal

a6

prevent iny the isolat ion and destruct ion of the

German southern wing.=* The best way to do t h i s was to defeat

and destroy as many of the attacking Soviet forces as possible.a"

Fur the Hllied Flrmies in December

1944

the immediate strategic

goal was a broad advance to the Rhine, destroying as many German

forces west of the Rhine as possible.'. By coming out #of the

Siegfried line and throwing all available forces into the

Rrdennes "Bulge, the Germans presented the Flllies with a golden

Opportunity to accomplish a ma.jor strategic goal. Eisenhower-

recognized t h i s and states that his Objective in the Ardennes

counteroffensive was the destruction of German forces in the

"bulge. Thus, the operat iorlal objective for both Manstein andIa7

16



the Rlliem warn the destruction of the attacking enemy forces.

In deciding whether or not to allow an enemy penetration to

continue from the operational standpoint, the element of

strategic risk

must be considered. In Manstein’s case, the

Dnieper- river crossings and the Sea of Flzov coast were

both

approximately 100 miles from the Soviet penetrations on the

Donets river. Seizure of these Soviet objectives would have

isolated the two armies and two army detachments of Flrmy Group

South and could have led to their destruction

with

catastrophic

strategic consequences for the Qermans. The Soviet offensive

reached to within 20 miles of ma.jor crossings an the Dnieper and

cut Manstein’s railroad s u p p l y line approximately 70 miles north

of the Sea of Flzov.a~ In the case of the Qerman Flrdennes

offensive, the objective of Flntwerp was about 125 miles from the

start point. Siezure of Flntwerp

by

the Germans would have split

Flmer-ican and British forces, isolating the British and disrupting

s u p p l y

for both

the

Flmericans and British. Tha Meuse river lay

approximately 50 miles from the German start point. Flt Liege,

on

the Meuse and directly in the path of the German offensive, the

Flllies had established a huge swpply d u m p which could have

sustained the German advance if captured.*- The risks involved

i n

allowing the enemy penetration to continue were substantial

fur both Man6teln and the fillies.

.The first tactical consideration to address is terrain. I n

Manstein’s area of operations, rolling hills and open spaces

offered ouod trafficability to large armor formations while the

17



ground was frozen. With no defensible terrain on their flanks,

Russian tank culurnns were extremely vulnerable to concentrated

panzer attack.5. The situation in the Flrdennes was much

different. The difficult terrain which slowed the German

offensive and allowed relatively sniall elements to delay much

larger forces also hindered Flllied counterattacks. To delay

comniitting forces in order to

build

operational reserves may have

allowed the Germans to shore u p and fortify their flanks while

continuing the drive on Flntwerp. The Flrdennes ter'rain

did

nnt

favor a

swift,

decisive, backhand blow.

Flnother important considerat ion ie the condition of the

attacking enemy force. Eisenhower and Bradley were faced with

relatively fresh, rehabilitated enemy divisions initially

organized in depth

with

re6erves at army and army group

In Manstein's case, the Russian forcee that drove across the

Dorlets river

i n

January

1943

had been attacking eince November

with

only a shurt pause. They were already tired, attrited and

uperat ing on extended s u p p l y 1 ines. Flddit ional ly, there were

little or no frunt operational reservee left and nu skrateyic

reserve at STFlVKFl.4' Thus Manstein had a much mure invit r q

target fur an operational counteroffenaivc.

Flnother important tactical consideration is the relative

tactical effectiveness of oppusinQ units.

I n

the case csf the

German units

o f

Flrniy Group South, Manetein had a decided

arlvarltage over his Russian adversaries. Early fiphting along the

Don and Chir rivers had denlonstrated Qerman tactical superiovity



in niobi le engagements. Russian corflmanders of lower level units

showed a lack of initiative and poor judgment

in

r-eacting to

unforeseen situations.4P

Flt

a higher tactical level, the

Husjsians had shown poor courdinat ion

in

the timing of their tank

corps attacks and poor cooperat ion with infantry divisions.

Ewndley and Eisenhower d i d not have this advantage of tactical

superiority. Rlthoccgh experienced Rmerican units were more than a

maCch for the green German Volksgrenadier divisions, the German

parszer format ions and parachute divisions were formidable

tactical opponents.

One

of

the most important considerat ions

at

the operational

level is the opportunity for deception. In the winter of 1‘343

the Soviet command was convinced that the German Rrmy Group South

w a s

a beaten force, incapable o f launching the type of blow that

Manstein wae preparing. This enabled Manstein to gain almost

complete ejurprise for his operational counteretruke. On the other

hand, the German for-ce attacking in the Rrdennes, in December

1’344, was Iunder no illusions a6 to the strength and mobility of

Nllied forces north and south o f the Clrdennes. Thus, the

cuur terstroke was expected and could be prepared for in advance...

‘The only surprise the Rllies could spring was

in

the speed of

ttieir reaction, which was at odds with taking the time to

concentrate a decisive force.

We must also consider the differing command styles of

IEisenhowet’ and Manstein. Eisenhower operated as the head of a

heavily layered coalit ion command structure. H i s

urders and



directives usually consisted of broad guidance and sett iny

priorities while allowing subordinate commanders a great deal of

latitude in execution. His decieions were frequently questioned

and drew protests from both Rmerican and British commanders.

Rlthough Eisenhower wanted Patton to concentrate six divisions in

the southern attack on the bulge, even i f it meant a delay, his

orders were sufficiently general to allow Patton t o attack w i t h

only three divisions and feed t he rest in piecemeal.*'

Eisenhower also had an extremely difficult tinre prodding

Montgomery into a vigorous attack in the north. In contrast,

Manstein was in f u l l command o f Rrmy Group South in every sense

uf t h e

word. He had a sumewhat different coalition problem

t h a n

did Eisenhower a s most of hie Italian, Hungarian, arrd Rumanian

divisions had ceased to exist

by the time the Russians crossed

the Donets river. Rt any rate, Eisenhower usually hesitated to

take risks and make controversial decisions. Manstein

did

not.

Theoretically, the best response to an enemy operational

penetration

is

to concentrate one's reserves for a decisive

counterstroke into the flank and rear of penetrating enemy forces

which may be disrupted, dispersed, and overextended. I n reality,

many factors may mitigate this theoretically ideal employment o f

operational reserves.. These include ability and willingness to

take risks, terrain, relative tactical ability, condition and

disposition of friendly and enemy forces, the style of the

commander and nature of the command structure. Rll of these

factors affected Manstein's and Eisenhower's different responses

20



t o an enemy operational penetration. Perhaps the

bippsst

diff eren ce betwmen Eisenhower’s and Manstein’s situations

was

the

style and structure of their commands.

21



SECTION I V - THE D_OCTRINAL D E F E M

Current

U.S.

Army defensive doctrine

in

FM

100-5,

Operat ionq, is we1

1

grounded

in

classical theory and the lessons

of military history applied to modern conditions. FlirLand Elat.tle

doctrine recognizes the defensive as the potentially stronger,

though less decisive, form

o f

war and the importance of its

offensive dimension. c1 euccessful defense must contain reactive

and offensive elements and an effective defense

is

never purely

passive. The essence af the defensive advantage lies in the

ability to launch surprise #offensive blows from unexpected

directions against an attacking enemy that has been attrited,

disrupted, and disorganized by static and mobile elements of the

defense. &si

RirLand Rattle doctrine also recognizes the importance of

identifying the enemy’s center of gravity in the operational

defense. The center of gravity may include critical

f i y h t

ing

units, command or- support facilities, politically significant

areas, or allied units.‘+7 It should be noted that by virtue

cnf

being un the defensive, opportunities to strike the enemy’s

center of gravity may be limited until conditions permit going

over to the offensive on the strategic and operational levels.

ls

discussed above,

t h i s

is

especially true when reacting tu an

enemy operationdl penetratiun where the target is limited to

those enemy forces in the penetration area. It should also be

noted, however, that modern airpower and long range indirect iire

and target acquisitiun systems expand opportunities for striking

the enemy’s center uf gravity, ever1 from an oporaticwal or

.,

.-



strategic defensive posture.

FM

100-5

also discusses the importance of accurately sensing

the enemy's culminating point or that time when he has exhausted

his

offensive potential. One objective o f the defensive rampaign

is to hasten the attackers arrival at that point, at which time

the defender can switch over to the attack himself.--

FM

100-5

notes the importance of holding operational

re6erves in depth in order to exploit tactical success and to

sieze the #operational initiative.** Here we should note

Clausewitz's caution on the pointlessness of retaining strategic

or

uperational reserves beyond the decisive point o f the battle.

Forming operational reserves in advance of the battle usually

invcnlves a choice between allowing one'5 subordinate units to

retain stt-ong tactical reserves or consolidating available forces

intcl an operational reserve. Flllowing strang reserves to be

retained

by

subordinate units niay produce piecemeal, indecisive

commitment while higher level reserves may nut arrive at the

decisive point in time.

Rs

discussed in the the historical

section of

this

paper, i t

is

poesible

to

create operationdl

reserves after the battle is under way by using uncommitted

or

1

ight

ly committed format ions, by economizing

in

less critical

areas or by withdrawing forces to shorten defensive sectors.

Flrl important point in

FM

100-5 is the importance of planniny

to deal

with

the enemy's operational reserves.ac' This

is

especially true of Warsaw Pact forces advancing in echeloned

formations. I n this situation, attacking an enerny penetrating

force in the flank and rear niay do nothing more than expose one's

23





SECTION

V -

CONCI 1161ON

The optimum employment of operational reserves against a

developing enemy operational penetration involves allowing the

penetration to develop while marshaling and concentrating one's

reserves for a decisive counterstroke against the flanks and rear

o f

succeeeive portions

of

the enemy force. This response

rflaxirflizes the inherent advantages of the defense in launching

surprise, concentric attacks from unexpected directions against

an enemy force that has been attrited, disrupted, and dispersed

through the exertions of its attack and the toll taken

by

defenders.

I t

is necessary to maintain a mobile delaying force in

contact with the enemy t o slow and limit h i 5 penetration, monitor

his force locations and p ro gr em , and divert

h i s

attention from

the main effort. This

is

what Clausewitz meant in stating that

forces attacking the enemy flank and rear are not available to

h i s front and have no value in isolation.

I t is

also necessary to

conduct deep operations to delay and disrupt following format ions

o f an enemy force advancing in echelons.

The dominant characteristic and thread of continuity in

classical theory concerning the defense

is its

offensive

dimension. The attacking force weakens as the attack progreeses

and becomes vulnerable to attacks from the flank and rear. In

countering an enemy operational penetration, the operational

ob.jective

will

normally be the penetrating enemy forces.

Theoretically, the best course of action ie to concentrate one's

reserves eo as to attack fractions o f the weakened enemy force



successively from the flanks and rear.

Historical analysis of the Kharkov and Clrdennes canipaiqns

supports

t h e theoretical conclusion. In employing the

theoretically corvect response, Manstein achieved superior

operat iunal results.

Historical analysis also shows, however, that many .factors

can be present in any given situation to restrict an ,operational

ccmimander's ability to employ

h i s

operational t-eserves in the

manner desct-ibed above. Strategic considerations include the

structure and nature of the command, strategic goals and

restrictions and the degree of acceptable

risk,

in allowing an

operat ional penetration to cant inue. Tactical considerat ions

include terrain, relative effectiveness of tactical units and

cnrldit ion and disposit ion of friendly and enemy forces.

IJperat ional considerat ions include the opportunity for

operational deception and the leadership and command style of the

asperat ional commander.

ClirLand Battle defensive doctrine

a6

described

in

F M

100-5

is well grounded

in

sound classical theory and the lessons ,of

history applied tcr modern conditions. The concepts of doctrinal

defense in F M 100-5 are well in line with the theoretical and

historical conclusions described above,

to

include the

limitations that strategic objectives and coalition command

structure may place

on

the operational commander.

F M 100-,5

should note, however, that i n

many

situations it may not be

appropriate to maintain a standing operational reserve.

Such a



reserve may danierously weaken ongoing operations and may not be

in position for timely employment. When needed, operational

reserves can usually be Created by economizing in le66 threatened

or less crit ical sectors, withdrawing to shorten defensive

sectors, or transferring forces from another theater.

27



ENDNOTES

1.

U.S.

Rrmy Command and General Staff College, FM 100-5 (Final

Draft), Ooerat ions, p. 2-2.

2. u p.

2-3.

3. LpLEF p. 2-2.

4.

Baron de Jornini, The Art o f War (Westport, Connr Greenwood

Press, originally published 1862), pp.

61-63,

162.

5. Carl von Clausewitz,

On

War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard

and Peter Paret (Princeton8 Princeton University Press, 1976),

pp. 128-130, 140-143, 177.

6

I p.

357.

'7.

u pp.

370, 524, 600.

8. JQmini,

pp. 63,

66-67.

9. Sun Tzu,

Art o f

War, trans.

S.

B. Qriffith (London:

Oxford, l802), p.

91.

10.

Clausewitz, pp. 360,

,772.

11. Jomini, pp.

66-67.

12. Bun Tzu,

p. 85.

13. Clausewitz, p. 528.

14. Jomini, p. 66

15.

Clausewitz, pp.

364, 460,

466.

16. Jomini, p.

167.

17.

Maurice de Saxe, gevewies on the Qrt o f War, ed. and trans.

Brig. General Thomas R. Phillips (Harrisburg, Pa8 Military

Service Pub1 ishing Company, 1953), pp.

110-114.

18.

Claueewitz,

p.

460.

1'3. w p. 486.

20. U

p.

211.

el. u p.

204.

22. Jomini,

p.

63.

28



E3. Sun Tzu,

p.

98

24. B.

H. Liddell Hart, Btrateov (London: Faber and Faber, Ltd.,

1 9 5 4 ) .

p.

334.

25. Claueewitz, pp. 595-596.

26. 86.

.

27. Description of Kharkov campaign in t h i s paragraph compiled

from the following: David M. Glantz, From the

Don

to th e D n e D r i

@

Studv o f Soviet Ooerations. pe ember

1942-

A u o ust

1943,

unpublished manuscript,

pp. 101-170; U.S.

Military academy,

West PQint atlas

o f Amsr

ican Wars: Volume

11 1900-1954

(New

York: Praegar,

1972)

pp.

34-36;

James

L.

Stokesbury,

A

5

hort

Hiratorv

n W W I L

(New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc.,

1 9 8 0 ) , pp. 239-244;

Erich von Manstein, Lo Victnr

ies (Chicagor

H. Regnery, 1 9 5 8 ) ,

pp.

367-442.

28.

Russell F. Weigley, Ueen ho we r’ s

L

ieutenantn:

Th

e Cammiion

o f France and Qarmanv 1944-1945 (Bloomingtoni Indiana University

Press,

1 9 8 1 ) , pp. 445-574.

29.

Glantz,

pp. 143-1631

Manstein,

pp. 402-437.

30.

Weigley,

pp. 458, 494, 502, 504, 510;

George

6 .

Patton, Jr.,

War

as I

Knew

I t

(Bantam,

1 9 8 0 ) , pp. 181, 187.

31. Weigley, pp. 445-574.

3Z.

Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade

in

Eu

rooe (New Yorkn De Capo

Press,

1 9 4 8 ) , p. 345.

33.

Weigley,

p. 497.

34.

Manstein,

p. 373.

35. m

36. Walter Bedell

Smith,

Einenhower’e Six Grsat Deci sionm (New

York: Longman’s, Green and Company,

1 9 5 6 ) , p.

88

37.

Weigley,

p. 497.

38. Paul Carrell, Scorched Earth: The Russian-Qerman War.

1943- 1944 (New Yorkr Bal lant ine, 1 9 6 6 ) , pp. 202-205.

39. Weigley,

p.

473.

40.

Hugh M. Cole, The Ardsnnes:

Ba

ttle of the Buloe (Washington:

U.

S.

Government Printing

f f

ice,

1 9 6 5 ) , p. 71.

41.

Qlantz,

p.

105.

29



42. F. W. von Mellenthin, pan zer Battleer I 5 t q d y g f the

Emalovmen t o f Armor in the Second World War (New Y o r k i

Ballantine, 1956) ,

p.

Z23.

43 u

p.

221.

44. Glantz, pp. 104

16t3.

45.

Weigley,

pp.

500 501.

46. FM 100-5, pp.

a-i--8-2.

47.

u

p. 9-2.

48.

u

p. 9-3.

49.

J .

p.

8-10.

50.

u

pp.

9-4

9-6.

51. m p. 9-2.

30



RIPLIOGRRPHY

B

Bradley, Umar

N.

0 Soldier's Story. New York.: Henry Halt and

Company, 1951.

Care1

1

Paul. Scorched Earth: 'The Russian-German War.

J943-1944. New York: Ballant ine,

1966.

Clausewitz, Carl vun. On War. E:dited and tra nsl ate d

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Documents

Employment of Reserves in Operational Art