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Emissions trading: The politics of design CAN EECCA General Assembly 21 February 2014 (Tbilisi) Sanjeev Kumar +32 499 539731 [email protected] (Skype) sanjeev.kumar.1973 www.changepartnership.org

Emissions trading: The politics of design

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Page 1: Emissions trading: The politics of design

Emissions trading: The politics of design

CAN EECCA General Assembly 21 February 2014 (Tbilisi)

Sanjeev Kumar+32 499 539731

[email protected](Skype) sanjeev.kumar.1973

www.changepartnership.orgwww.changepartnership.org

Page 2: Emissions trading: The politics of design

Contents

What is emissions trading?

Design elements

Politics of ETS

Post 2015

Page 3: Emissions trading: The politics of design

International carbon markets Clean

Development Mechanism

(CERs)

1. Annex 1 countries given Assigned Amount Units (AAUs). Tradable via Track II through proven emission reduction activities e.g. Green Investment Schemes

2. EU main market but large surplus. EU blocked Ukrainian & Russian credits entering EU 202020 targets.

Joint Implementati

on (ERUs)

Kyoto: AAUs

1. Available for transition countries who could benefit from emission reduction projects from Annex 1 countries.

2. Limited demand from EU.

3. Uncertain future due to post 2015 international treaty.

1. Credits made from emission reduction projects outside Annex 1 countries.

2. Annex 1 countries can use these allowances to meet domestic compliance requirements.

3. Many controversies. Possible evolution to sectoral crediting.

4. Demand from EU nearly over.

Page 4: Emissions trading: The politics of design

What is emissions trading?

Polluting installations compete to

reduce emissions

Cap on total volume of emissions within a given time period and from determined polluting sources.

Emissions turned into tradable permits

of 1 tonne CO2

Or buy allowances to cover their

emissions

Page 5: Emissions trading: The politics of design

ETS compared to other solutions?

Tax1. Certainty on price of tax.

2. No certainty on volume of emission reductions to be achieved.

3. Know cost of decarbonisation.

Regulation ETS1. Certainty on

emission limit.2. Everyone has to

meet it at the same time.

3. Know cost of decarbonisation.

1. Certainty on emission limit.

2. Everyone has to meet limit but at different times.

3. Don’t know cost of decarbonisation.

Page 6: Emissions trading: The politics of design

Contents

What is emissions trading?

Design elements

Politics of ETS

Post 2015

Page 7: Emissions trading: The politics of design

ETS design overviewScopeScope

Offsets/price control

Offsets/price control

Distributing allowances

Distributing allowances

Compliance rules

Compliance rules

VerificationVerification

TargetTargetPolitical commitment

Political commitment

Governance rules

Governance rules

Who? What?

Free vs buying them

ensure everyone takes part

ensure everyone takes part

Timeline

Too high vs too low

Trust in data

Trust in data

Page 8: Emissions trading: The politics of design

Design in detailTargetTarget

Target?Target?

Base year?Base year?

CO2e by a certain dateCO2e by a certain date

Crucial to ensuring target drives meaningful change

Crucial to ensuring target drives meaningful change

EU experience:

Target: Stabilise GHG emissions below 2,082 Million tonnes of CO2 (MtCO2) from 2005-2007 and reduce to 1,930 Mt CO2 between 2013-2020.

Base year: Originally 2005 but this data was not correct so changed to 2008 verified emissions (real emissions in ETS sectors). From this easy to measure actual reductions.

Base

EU experience:

Target: Stabilise GHG emissions below 2,082 Million tonnes of CO2 (MtCO2) from 2005-2007 and reduce to 1,930 Mt CO2 between 2013-2020.

Base year: Originally 2005 but this data was not correct so changed to 2008 verified emissions (real emissions in ETS sectors). From this easy to measure actual reductions.

Base

Page 9: Emissions trading: The politics of design

ScopeScope Sectors?Sectors?

Gases?Gases?

Who makes reductions?Who makes reductions?

CO2 only or other GHG gases?CO2 only or other GHG gases?

EU experience:

Sectors:- power generation, heavy industry and aviation because they are large point sources of GHG emissions. - installations covered not companies. Forces investment decisions within a plant rather than being hidden within a company. - Upstream system focused on producers of emissions. Not downstream approach on consumers which is unlikely to drive change. - Defining sectors problematic: What is a power generator? CHP generators power but is paper & pulp sector…

Gases: EU ETS started off which CO2 but now includes N2O and PFC

EU experience:

Sectors:- power generation, heavy industry and aviation because they are large point sources of GHG emissions. - installations covered not companies. Forces investment decisions within a plant rather than being hidden within a company. - Upstream system focused on producers of emissions. Not downstream approach on consumers which is unlikely to drive change. - Defining sectors problematic: What is a power generator? CHP generators power but is paper & pulp sector…

Gases: EU ETS started off which CO2 but now includes N2O and PFC

Page 10: Emissions trading: The politics of design

ComplianceCompliance EnforcementEnforcement

PenaltyPenalty

Ensuring everyone participates.Ensuring everyone participates.

Incentivises trading or emission reductionsIncentivises trading or emission reductions

EU experience:

Enforcement:- 2 test cases: Ireland and UK. Irish company did not want to take part saying ETS was unlawful. Irish court said that they were in breech of EU law and would face a prison sentence. UK court made similar stance but threatened large fine on company. - EU ETS has highest compliance rate than any other legislation in EU history.

Penalty: Automatic fine of 40 €/t CO2 (until 2007), 100 €/t CO2 (from 2008) for every tonne of CO2 that is not matched with an ETS allowance. This drives buying and selling of allowances

EU experience:

Enforcement:- 2 test cases: Ireland and UK. Irish company did not want to take part saying ETS was unlawful. Irish court said that they were in breech of EU law and would face a prison sentence. UK court made similar stance but threatened large fine on company. - EU ETS has highest compliance rate than any other legislation in EU history.

Penalty: Automatic fine of 40 €/t CO2 (until 2007), 100 €/t CO2 (from 2008) for every tonne of CO2 that is not matched with an ETS allowance. This drives buying and selling of allowances

Page 11: Emissions trading: The politics of design

Distributing allowances

Distributing allowances AuctioningAuctioning

EU experience:

Auctioning:- 100% allowances given for free during 2005-2007. Companies made mega windfall profits (money for doing nothing) and encouraged power companies to invest in coal!!- 2008-2012: Power sector in Germany and the UK given 10% allowances for free. Led to carbon price of about €30. - Difference between auctioning and selling allowances: Selling based on whatever price of ETS is on the day. Auctioning, if there is scarcity of allowances, means installations could bid up the price of allowances to much higher price. - From 2013 all power companies have to purchase ETS allowances from auctions.

EU experience:

Auctioning:- 100% allowances given for free during 2005-2007. Companies made mega windfall profits (money for doing nothing) and encouraged power companies to invest in coal!!- 2008-2012: Power sector in Germany and the UK given 10% allowances for free. Led to carbon price of about €30. - Difference between auctioning and selling allowances: Selling based on whatever price of ETS is on the day. Auctioning, if there is scarcity of allowances, means installations could bid up the price of allowances to much higher price. - From 2013 all power companies have to purchase ETS allowances from auctions.

Page 12: Emissions trading: The politics of design

Distributing allowances

Distributing allowances Free allocationFree allocation

EU experience:

Free allocation:- Grandfathering: Giving allowances based on historic emissions. Problem is that it incentivises increasing pollution in order to get more allowances. Also, rewards the most polluting and reduces benefits to installations that have reduced emissions. - Benchmarking: introduced from 2013. 80% free allocation for industrial installations based on 10% best performing in terms of GHG (not energy efficiency). This is the threshold applied to the whole sector so more polluting installations get less allowances for free.

EU experience:

Free allocation:- Grandfathering: Giving allowances based on historic emissions. Problem is that it incentivises increasing pollution in order to get more allowances. Also, rewards the most polluting and reduces benefits to installations that have reduced emissions. - Benchmarking: introduced from 2013. 80% free allocation for industrial installations based on 10% best performing in terms of GHG (not energy efficiency). This is the threshold applied to the whole sector so more polluting installations get less allowances for free.

Page 13: Emissions trading: The politics of design

Monitoring, Reporting & Verification

(MRV)

Monitoring, Reporting & Verification

(MRV)

Confidence buildingConfidence building

EU experience:

Free allocation:- Key for confidence in the whole scheme. Ensures each tonne of CO2 is the same. Installations really are measuring emissions in the same way across and between sectors and that stated emissions at the end of the year are real.- Companies will only buy and sell when this data comes out. - Yearly monitoring ensures liquid market (many buyers and sellers). Data realised every May. Indicates where the market was short (undersupplied increasing demand and price for allowances) or long (over supplied so price falls).

EU experience:

Free allocation:- Key for confidence in the whole scheme. Ensures each tonne of CO2 is the same. Installations really are measuring emissions in the same way across and between sectors and that stated emissions at the end of the year are real.- Companies will only buy and sell when this data comes out. - Yearly monitoring ensures liquid market (many buyers and sellers). Data realised every May. Indicates where the market was short (undersupplied increasing demand and price for allowances) or long (over supplied so price falls).

Page 14: Emissions trading: The politics of design

Price management

Price management International/domestic offsets or price ceilingInternational/domestic offsets or price ceiling

EU experience:

- Relationship with target (Cap) - EU originally added CDM/JI on top of ETS cap. Increased cap by about 1 billion allowances. Reason why there is a surplus today. - From 2013, CDM/JI only 49% of ETS requirement and limited only to projects from Least Developed Countries (LDCs). From 2020 onwards virtually no demand forecast from EU.- No price ceiling in practice but this issue coming back now in post 2020 context. Price floor being introduced now. - Provision for domestic offsets and desire but currently blocked by the European Commission.

EU experience:

- Relationship with target (Cap) - EU originally added CDM/JI on top of ETS cap. Increased cap by about 1 billion allowances. Reason why there is a surplus today. - From 2013, CDM/JI only 49% of ETS requirement and limited only to projects from Least Developed Countries (LDCs). From 2020 onwards virtually no demand forecast from EU.- No price ceiling in practice but this issue coming back now in post 2020 context. Price floor being introduced now. - Provision for domestic offsets and desire but currently blocked by the European Commission.

Page 15: Emissions trading: The politics of design

BiomassBiomass Impact on actual emission reductionsImpact on actual emission reductions

EU experience:

- biomass classed at GHG neutral. Big incentive to use biomass for coal-fired power generation. In real terms this increases GHG emissions and keeps coal-fired power generation capacity longer. Big mistake in EU ETS scheme.

EU experience:

- biomass classed at GHG neutral. Big incentive to use biomass for coal-fired power generation. In real terms this increases GHG emissions and keeps coal-fired power generation capacity longer. Big mistake in EU ETS scheme.

Page 16: Emissions trading: The politics of design

Domestic offsets

Domestic offsets Accounting trick or real emission reductionsAccounting trick or real emission reductions

- Likely to be an option for EECA region. Included in Kazakstan scheme.

- Not used in EU ETS at present. Controversial solution. Key block is that it puts pressure on governments to make up the shortfall in emissions taken out of their management and used for compliance in the EU ETS.

- Also, lack of certainty on marginal cost of abatement for these projects and whether they can be produced at scale. If they are, they increase the supply for allowances and therefore should reduce the price.

- Likely to be an option for EECA region. Included in Kazakstan scheme.

- Not used in EU ETS at present. Controversial solution. Key block is that it puts pressure on governments to make up the shortfall in emissions taken out of their management and used for compliance in the EU ETS.

- Also, lack of certainty on marginal cost of abatement for these projects and whether they can be produced at scale. If they are, they increase the supply for allowances and therefore should reduce the price.

Page 17: Emissions trading: The politics of design

Contents

What is emissions trading?

Design elements

Politics of ETS

Post 2015

Page 18: Emissions trading: The politics of design

Climate decision makersMerkelTusk

HollandeCameron

MerkelTusk

HollandeCameron

Van RompuyVan Rompuy

BarrosoBarroso

FaithFaith UnionsUnionsNGOsNGOs HealthHealth SkepticsSkepticsScienceScience EconomistsEconomists MediaMedia

Page 19: Emissions trading: The politics of design

Key players

SteelSteel RefineriesRefineries Paper & pulpPaper & pulpCementCement

Power generatorsPower generators

Envi ministries

Envi ministries

IndustryministriesIndustry

ministriesFinance

ministriesFinance

ministries

AviationAviation

International offsets

International offsets

NGOsNGOs

Developing countries

Developing countries

BanksBanks

Trade UnionsTrade Unions

Institutional investors

Institutional investors

Financial advisors

Financial advisors

AcademiaAcademia

Technology developers

Technology developers

EU ETS

FaithsFaiths

Health community

Health community

ScientistsScientists

EconomistsEconomists

GermanyGermany PolandPolandFranceFrance UKUK

MediaMedia

Page 20: Emissions trading: The politics of design

ETS narrative battlegroundCarbon leakageCarbon leakage

doesn’t incentivise decarbonisation

doesn’t incentivise decarbonisation

Needed to manage priceNeeded to manage price

OffsetsOffsets

Investment out of countryInvestment out of country

cost pass-throughcost pass-through

Competitors don’t have legislationCompetitors don’t have legislation

Windfall profitsWindfall profits

Industry viewIndustry view Our viewOur view

High electricity prices

High electricity prices

Burdens poorest consumersBurdens poorest consumers

186 countries legislate on climate

186 countries legislate on climate

Economy worse off in long-runEconomy worse off in long-runDomestic offsets incentivise investment

in other sectorsDomestic offsets incentivise investment

in other sectors

Artificial low price without externalities

Artificial low price without externalities

Right price needed for EE & RES

Right price needed for EE & RES

Makes industry uncompetitiveMakes industry uncompetitive

Page 21: Emissions trading: The politics of design

Contents

What is emissions trading?

Design elements

Politics of ETS

Post 2015

Page 22: Emissions trading: The politics of design

Global ETS development

2013

IETA 2013

Page 23: Emissions trading: The politics of design

Post 2015 confusion & chaos No clarity on what post 2015 will look like but key questions to guide thinking:

• World Bank Partnerships for Market Readiness: To continue to support establishment of carbon markets globally.

• Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Acts (NAMAs): Will these generate credits? Volume, transaction costs? Crowding out by REDD+ credits? what is the demand going to be like?

• CDM: What will happen to the CDM? Will it be reformed? will it be replace by NAMA credits? who will buy CDM allowances?

• Deforestation and degradation (REDD+): Strong financial and political lobby for REDD+ credits. EU ETS reform to be first major test for international take up. What will this do for non-REDD+ credits?

• Future of Kyoto Protocol Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) in new international treaty?

Page 24: Emissions trading: The politics of design

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