EMINENT DOMAIN CITY OF MANILA v. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILAThe Charter of the city of Manila authorizes the taking ofprivateproperty forpublicuse. Suppose the owner of the property denies and successfully proves that the taking of his property serves no public use: Would the courts not be justified in inquiring into that question and in finally denying the petition if no public purpose was proved? Can it be denied that the courts have a right to inquire into that question? If the courts can ask questions and decide, upon an issue properly presented, whether the use is public or not, is not that tantamount to permitting the courts to inquire into the necessity of the appropriation? If there is no public use, then there is no necessity, and if there is no necessity, it is difficult to understand how a public use can necessarily exist. If the courts can inquire into the question whether a public use exists or not, then it seems that it must follow that they can examine into the question of the necessity.The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a public character. The ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany, and not follow, the taking of the land.(Morrisonvs.Indianapolis, etc. Ry. Co., 166 Ind., 511; Stearnsvs.Barre, 73 Vt., 281; Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co.vs.Toledo, Ry. etc. Co., 72 Ohio St., 368.)Thegeneral powerto exercise the right of eminent domain must not be confused with the right to exercise it in aparticular case. The power of the legislature to confer, upon municipal corporations and other entities within the State, general authority to exercise the right of eminent domain cannot be questioned by the courts, but that general authority of municipalities or entities must not be confused with the right to exercise it in particular instances. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority.The necessityforconferring the authorityupon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domainis admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question which the courts have the right to inquire into.

REPUBLIC v. PLDTFacts:Joint appeals heard and CFI decided a permanent mandatory injunction for PLDT on the interconnection of telephone facilities owned and operated by the said parties.Republic of the Phils is a political entity exercising govt powers thru its branches and instrumentalities, one of which is Bureau of Telecommunications.Powers: (a)To operate and maintain existing wire telegraph and radio-telegraph offices, stations, and facilities, etc.; (b) To investigate, consolidate, and negotiate for operate and maintain wire-telephone or radio-tel communication service throughout the Phils.PLDT is a public service corporation holding a legislative franchise (Act 4326), to install, operate, and maintain a telephone system throughout the Phils and electrical transmission of messages to other countries.RCA Communications, Inc. is an American corp. authorized to transact business in the Phils and is the grantee by assignment by the legislative franchise to operate a domestic station and reception of long distance wireless msgs. 1933- PLDT and RCA entered a contract (tel messages from U.S received by RCA will be transferred to PLDT). The contract was later terminated in 1958.1947- Govt rented trunk lines of the PLDT to enable govt offices to call private parties. GTS subscribers could make a call to PLDT subscribers and v.v1958 Plaintiff entered an agreement with RCA for a joint overseas tel service whereby the Bureau would convey radio-telephone overseas calls received by RCAs station. PLDT then complained to the bureau that the latter violated the conditions of the contract as regards Private Branch Exchange (rented trunk lines had used to serve private persons, in competition with the business of PLDT RESULT: isolation of Phils from the rest of the world (except U.S) due to severance of PLDT connection.ISSUE: Should PLDT be restrained to sever tel connections with the govt as such would isolate Phils from the rest of the world?HELD:Parties cannot be coerced to enter an agreement. Freedom to stipulate such terms and conditions is the essence of our contractual system. But, the court a quo erred that even if Republic cannot compel PLDT, the Republic in the exercise of its sovereign power of EMINENT DOMAIN require the telephone company to permit interconnection s.t the payment of JUST COMPENSATION to be determined by the court.POWER OF E.D - results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated ppty. It is unquestionable that real ppty, through expropriation, may be subjected to easement of right of way. Private ppty is subjected to a burden of public use and benefit.Art. XIII, Sec. 6 The State may transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of JC. Therefore, there is no reason why the State may not require a public utility to render some services in the general interest, provided JC is paid therefor.Note: Since this relationship has been maintained for a long time and the public has patronized both telephone systems, it is NOT now at liberty to unilaterally sever connection of trunk lines.DECISION: PLDT is compelled to continue servicing the Govt system upon such terms and JC. REMANDED.

PEOPLE v. FAJARDOFACTS:Appeal from decision of CFI convicting Juan F. Fajardo and Pedro Babilonia for violating Ordinace No.7 of Baao, Cam Sur for having constructed w/o permit from the mayor a bldg that destroys the view of the public plaza. During the incumbency of Fajardo as mayor, they passed an Ordinance in its Sec.3: If said bldg destroys the view of the Public Plaza, it shall be removed at his expense.He and his son-in-laws request was denied for the reason among others that the proposed bldg would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza. But still the defendants proceeded the construction of their place of residence WITHOUT a permit. HELD: The Ordinance fails to state any policy, or to setup any standard that would guide or limit the mayors action; no condition for its grant is expressed; standards are entirely lacking.The ordinance confers the mayor ARBITRARY and UNRESTRICTED POWER to grant or deny the issuance of the building permits invalid power.DANGER of such Ordinance: it makes possible an arbitrary discriminations and abuses in its execution, depending upon no conditions whatever.The Ordinance is UNREASONABLE and OPPRESSIVE since it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use THEIR OWN PPTY hence, it amount to TAKING W/O J.C.The State may not, under the guise of police power, PERMANNENTLY DIVEST owners of the beneficial use of their ppty and practically CONFISCATES SOLELY to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community.Thus, to legally achieve result, municipality MUST GIVE appellants, J.C.RESTRICTION v. TAKINGThe former cave the owner s.t the burdn of pymt of taxation and the latter would relieve him of that burden.NOTE: Zoning limits the ppty w/o J.C. Use of ppty is an element of ownership therein. If it be public benefit that ppty remain open and unused, then certainly the public and not the private individuals, should bear the cost of reasonable compensation for such ppty.*Ordinance is NULL and VOID. No absolute showing that municipal council had either est.limits for the kind of bldg to be constructed.REPUBLIC v. VDA. DE CASTELLVIFACTS:Plaintiff filed a complaint for E.D against Carmen M. Vda de Castellvi, judicial administratrix of the late Alfonso de Castellvi over a parcel of land in Pampanga and of Maria Toledo Gozuns ppty.Republic alleged that FMV of the ppty of the parties was not more than P2k/ha.or P259, 669.10.CONTENTION OF DEFENDANT: Total MV should be: P11,389,485.00 (or P15/sqm v. govts P.20/sqm), and that the AFP and PAF despite repeated demands are illegally occupying her ppty.However, the RTC ordered that the Republic be placed in the possession of the land.MOTION TO DISMISS by Gozun: some of the lots are already for sale to the general public and others for expansion sites of already completed subdivisions.Reckoning point of taking? From the time of the special lease agreement with Castellvi, Republic has given the rights and privileges to buy the ppty should the lessor wish to terminate the lease?2 ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS IN TAKING:1. Entrance and occupation by the condemnor upon the private ppty for more than momentary or limited period2. Devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all the beneficial enjoyment of the pptyCONTENTION OF CASTELLVI: FIRST AND SECOND ELEMENTS ARE WANTING, no rights and privileges are conferred to buy the premises value at the time of the occupancy.BACKGROUND: Since 1947, PAF had occupied their ppty with a contract of lease (75.93 has of land)CONTRACT is from JULY 1, 1952- JUNE 30, 1953 (monthly rentals of P458.58)renewable from year to year FAIR VALUE= Value as of the time of occupancy fair wear and tear depreciation.Heirs of the lessor, however, refused to continue leasing the ppty, despite desire by AFP to renew the contract, because the heirs wanted to subdivided the land and sell to the general public.ANSWER OF AFP: It would be difficult to vacate the ppty because of the facilities and permanent installations worth P500K. NO OTHER RECOURSE BUT TO EXPROPRIATE SAID PPTY by Presidents recomm.TAKING:1. The expropriator must enter a private pty2. Entrance to ppty mut be for a momentary period. Momentary means lasting but a moment; of but a moments duration; lasting a very short time; transitory; a limited period (In an express provision of the contract, the lessee shall undertake to return the premises in substantially the same position)3. Entry into the ppty shd be under warrant of color of legal authority (Republic entered as a lessess)4. The ppty must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected. (Used by the AFP)5. Utilization must be to oust the owner and deprive him of all the beneficial enjoyment of the ppty (utilization of the same did not oust Castellvi and deprive her of all the beneficial enjoyment of the ppty as shown by the renewal of contractERGO, the TAKING of Castellvis ppty cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when it commenced the lease.ALSO, the 2 elements of taking as cited by Castellvi were not met. Also, the COURT did not sustain Republics contention that a year-to-year basis or renewal means permanent right to occupy. This is devoid as legal provisions say that a lease on a determinate time ceases upon the dayfixed, without any demand.SC: Neither can we see how a right to buy the land could be merged in a contract of lease without any agreement to that effect.WHY is the Republic asserting that its taking must be reckoned from the very moment of its lease? This is a deceptive scheme so much so that the value of ppty is lower than the present depriving the owner of the TRUE AND FAIR MV of the ppty.WHAT WAS IN THE CONTRACT: the lessee would have a right and privilege of paying the lessor what it would fairly cost to put the premises in the same condition.Hence, the value of the ppty should not be reckoned in 1947 due to costs of installations the AFP need to pay the lessor.SEC. 4 RULE 67, RULES OF COURT: the JUST OMPENSATION is to be determined from the DATE OF THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT.Note: Thus, the reckoning point for propoer determination of JC should be as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for ED was filed same with Toledo-Gozun ppties.City of Manila v. Corrales, in determining value of the land expropriated:What is the worth of ppty in the market considering its valuable uses? The owner of the ppty has the right to determine value of the ppty. It must show advantage that his ppty possess. In this case, the land is available for a proposed subdivision plans as residential lots.WHAT IS THE J.C? Republics Contention: should still be P.20/sqm (value in 1949; sugarlands) in connection with an expropriation proceeding in Republic v. Narciso cannot be sustained..Circumstances taken into consideration: Strategc location: theres national road fronting them (lowest price to be awarded is P10/sqm; near Basa Air base; near first calss town of Floridablanca Ocular inspection, find similarities with other lands in Pamapanga SC: P5/sqm would be a fair valuation of the ppty. WHY? The Court taken into consideration the resolution of the provincial Committee on Appraisal of the province of Pampanga that Castellvis ppty can be sold between P3-4 while Toledo-Gozuns P2.5-3 (fixed the same price considering also that Phil peso has gone down in 1959)Payment of interest: 6% p.a on the value of her land minus provisional value depositedRULING: Republic has to pay Castellvi: P3M+ as J.C minus deposits*Necessity must be of public character

AMIGABLE v. CUENCAFACTS:Without prior expropriation, the govt used a portion of Victoria Amigables lot for the construction of Mango and Gorordo aves. ISSUE: May the appellant sue the govt under this expropriation?HELD:In MInsiterio v. City of Cebu, thru J. Fernando: where the govt takes away the ppty from a private landowner for public use w/o legal process of expropriation , the proper party may maintain a suit against the govt.THE DOCTRINE OF GOVT IMUNITY CANNOT SERVE AS AN INSTURMENT FOR PERPETRAING INJUSTICE ON A CITIZEN.Note: Considering that no annotation in favour of the govt appears at the back of the Certificate of title and has not executed conveyance, defendant remains owner of the lot. ONLY AVAILABLE RELIEF: JUST COMPENSATION What is the basis of JC? The value of the land at the time of the takingPPI v. COMELECFACTS:COMELEC Resolution 2772 OR THE COMELEC space free print space not less than page in a newspaper of general circulation.COMELEC then sent letters to Phil Star, Malaaya, Business World, and the Phil Times Journal, all mems of PPIPPI asks that said Resol was unconstitutional on the ground that it prohibits govt from taking ppty for public use without JC and violative of freedom of speech, of the press, and expression.To compel print media companies to donate Comelec space amounts to TAKING of private personal ppty for public or purposes.Sec. 2 failed to specify frequency of such compulsory donation. The extent of the taking is NOT INSUBSTANTIAL. The monetary value of the compulsory donation may be very substantial indeed.THRESHOLD REQUISITES FOR LAWFUL TAKING:1. Necessity of the taking it has not been said that PPI was unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to COMELEC for election purposes. NOTE: If the owner is willing to sell and aprties agree to the price and other conditions of the sale no need for judicial action. BUT, when there is unwillingness or cannot agree to the conditions, then it is necessary for the govt to exercise its COERCIVE POWER.2. Legal authority to effect the takingSec. 2 of the COMELEC Resol does not provide constitutional basis compelling publishers to donate hence NOT a valid exercise.RULING laid down by the Court is based on the THEORY of DEMOCRATIC GOVT: the economic costs of informing the public of those seeking for office is most appropriately distributed thru taxation rather than cast solely on one small sector, i.e., print media enterprises.SEC.2 of the Resol is a BLUNT and HEAVY INSTRUMENT that purposrtsm without showing of existence of a national emergency or other imperious public necessity, indiscriminately and without regard to individual businesses.NO ATTEMPT MADE TO SHOW REAL AD PALAPABLE OR URGENT NECESSITY for the taking of print space.RULING: Sec. 2 is null ad voidSUMULONG v. GUEREROFACTS:NHA filed an expropriation proceeding for expropriation of parcels of land covering 25 hectares including the lots of Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia Balaoing valued by the NHA at P1/sqm.LIMITATIONS OF E.D:1. Art. IV, Sec. 9 Property shall not be taken for public use w/o J.C2. Art IV, Sec. 1 (Art. III now) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty , and ppty w/o due process of law, nor shall ay person be denied the equal protection of laws.

1. PUBLIC USE Accdg to petitioners, Socialized housing as defined in PD 1225 for the purpose of condemnation proceedings is not public use since it will benefit only a handful of people.a. Socialized Housing - the construction of dwelling units for the middle and lower class members of the society, including the construction of the supporting infrastructure and facilities.Note: The public use reqt of E.D is a flexble and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. The Constitution made it incumbent upon the State to establish ,maintain and ensure adequate social services incliuding housing (Art. II, Sec. 7, 1973 Consti)*Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, th environment, and general welfare.Thus, socialized housing = public use. The expropriated lots by NHA are for the eexpansion of Bagong Nayon Housing Project for low-salaried govt employees. b. Size of ppty area of the land and NOT the number of people who stood to be benefitted.The Stewardship concept private ppty is held by an ndividual onlya s a trustee for the people in general its real owners.2. JUST COMPENSATIONIt means the full and fair equivalent for the lsos sustained,.3. DUE PROCESSIt is violative of due process to deny th owner he opportunity to prove the valuation in the tax docs is unfair and wrong, Also before a writ of ossession was issued by the Court in exprop proceedings, ff must occur:1. There must be a complaint sufficient in form ad substance2. JC must be made on the basis of judicial discretion3. Deposit reqt under Sec. 2, Rule 67 must be complied withRULING: Provision of such decree is unconstitutional. REMANDED to determine compensation. NOTE: CHECK this site: http://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/2012/03/sumulong-vs-guerrero-no-l.html

MANOZCA v. CAPetitioners inherited piece of land located at P. Burgos, Taguig, M.M, with an area of about 492sqm. When the NHI ascertained the site to have been the birthplace of Felix Manalo, INC founder, it passed Resol 1 that land to be a national historical landmark.ISSUE: WN the public use reqt of E.D is extant in the attempted expropriation by the Republic of a 492 sqm land so declared by National Historical Institute as a national landmark (NHI)HELD: E.D need not be clothed with any constitutional gear to exist; instead provisions in our Constitution are meant to regulate.E.D is: the highest and most exact idea of ppty remaining to the govt . a right to take or reassert dominion over ppty within the stae for public use or to meet a public exigency. Limitation: public use with just compensation. WHY? TO SAFEGUARD AGAINST POSSIBLE ABUSE and so to protect individual whose ppty the power is sought to be enforced.GUIDELINES in exprop ( Guido v. Rural Process Admn):a. The size of the landb. Large no.of people benefitedc. Extent of social and economic reformPublic use mtg a public need or exigencyAccdg to Black: Public use is one which confers some benefits or advantages to the public. It is not confined to actual use of the public. It is measured in terms of RIGHT of public to use proposed facilities for which cobndemnation is sought. Public use, in restricting exercise to take private ppty, means a USE concerning the whole community as distinguished from particular individuals. There must be a great public want (not necessary that each and every individual is personally and directly affected by it) Public use is NOT always = to use by the public (not a street or park concept) Whatever is beneficially employed is public use. (Sena v. Manila Road Co.)Note: Constitution a dynamic instrument and one that is not narrowly or pedantically to be construed so as to enable it to meet adequately whatever problems the future has in storeWHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF EXPROP NOW? To recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Phils.RULING: PETITION DENIED.

REPUBLIC vs. LIMGR no. 161656, June 29, 2005

FACTS:In 1938, the Republic instituted a special civil action for expropriation of a land in Lahug, Cebu City for the purpose of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. The said lots were registered in the name of Gervasia and Eulalia Denzon. The Republic deposited P9,500 in the PNB then took possession of the lots. Thereafter, on May 1940, the CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as just compensation. The Denzons appealled to the CA but it was dismissed on March 11, 1948. An entry of judgment was made on April 5, 1948.In 1950, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the National Airports Corporation a claim for rentals for the two lots, but it "denied knowledge of the matter." On September 6, 1961, Lt. Cabal rejected the claim but expressed willingness to pay the appraised value of the lots within a reasonable time.For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on September 20, 1961, the Denzons successors-in-interest, Valdehueza and Panerio, filed with the same CFI an action for recovery of possession with damages against the Republic and AFP officers in possession of the property. (up to this point, there was no JC)On November 1961, Titles of the said lots were issued in the names of Valdehueza and Panerio with the annotation "subject to the priority of the National Airports Corporation to acquire said parcels of land, Lots 932 and 939 upon previous payment of a reasonable market value".On July 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio, holding that they are the owners and have retained their right as such over lots because of the Republics failure to pay the amount of P4,062.10, adjudged in the expropriation proceedings. However, in view of the annotation on their land titles, they were ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor of the Republic.They appealed the CFIs decision to the SC. The latter held that Valdehueza and Panerio are still the registered owners of Lots 932 and 939, there having been no payment of just compensation by the Republic. SC still ruled that they are not entitled to recover possession of the lots but may only demand the payment of their fair market value.Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to Vicente Lim, herein respondent, as security for their loans. For their failure to pay Lim despite demand, he had the mortgage foreclosed in 1976. The lot title was issued in his name.On 1992, respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title with the RTC against the petitioners herein. On 2001, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Lim, declaring that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the lot with all the rights of an absolute owner including the right to possession. Petitioners elevated the case to the CA. In its Decision dated September 18, 2003, it sustained the RTC Decision saying: ...This is contrary to the rules of fair play because the concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment for the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just"...Petitioner, through the OSG, filed with the SC a petition for review alleging that they remain as the owner of Lot 932.ISSUE: Whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its failure to pay respondents predecessors-in-interest the just compensation therefor pursuant to the judgment of the CFI rendered as early as May 14, 1940.HELD:One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no person shall be deprived of his private property without due process of law; and in expropriation cases, an essential element of due process is that there must be just compensation whenever private property is taken for public use. Accordingly, Section 9, Article III, of our Constitution mandates: "Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." The Republic disregarded the foregoing provision when it failed and refused to pay respondents predecessors-in-interest the just compensation for Lots 932 and 939. The Court of Appeals is correct in saying that Republics delay is contrary to the rules of fair play. In jurisdictions similar to ours, where an entry to the expropriated property precedes the payment of compensation, it has been held that if the compensation is not paid in a reasonable time, the party may be treated as a trespasser ab initio.As early as May 19, 1966, in Valdehueza, this Court mandated the Republic to pay respondents predecessors-in-interest the sum of P16,248.40 as "reasonable market value of the two lots in question." Unfortunately, it did not comply and allowed several decades to pass without obeying this Courts mandate. It is tantamount to confiscation of private property. While it is true that all private properties are subject to the need of government, and the government may take them whenever the necessity or the exigency of the occasion demands, however from the taking of private property by the government under the power of eminent domain, there arises an implied promise to compensate the owner for his loss.There is a recognized rule that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. So, how could the Republic acquire ownership over Lot 932 when it has not paid its owner the just compensation, required by law, for more than 50 years? Clearly, without full payment of just compensation, there can be no transfer of title from the landowner to the expropriator. SC ruled in earlier cases that expropriation of lands consists of two stages. First is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise. The second is concerned with the determination by the court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed In Republic v. Salem Investment Corporation, we ruled that, "the process is not completed until payment of just compensation." Thus, here, the failure of the Republic to pay respondent and his predecessors-in-interest for a period of 57 years rendered the expropriation process incomplete.Thus, SC ruled that the special circumstances prevailing in this case entitle respondent to recover possession of the expropriated lot from the Republic.While the prevailing doctrine is that "the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property. After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it takes property from private persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation. In Cosculluela v. Court of Appeals, we defined just compensation as not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the property owner but also the payment of the property within a reasonable time. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just."