Emergence and Intelligibility

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Emergence and IntelligibilityAuthor(s): G. Watts CunninghamReviewed work(s):Source: International Journal of Ethics, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Jan., 1929), pp. 148-166Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2377743 .

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EMERGENCE AND INTELLIGIBILITY

G. WATTS CUNNINGHAM

nHE purposeof the presentpaper s to consider woquestionsin connection with the conceptionof emer-

gent evolution and the basal issue which their dis-

cussion raises. The questions are: (i) In preciselywhat sense

may the theory of emergencebe said to be a new theory? and

(2) Is the theory, as new, logically explanatoryor only a neat

confession of ignorance wholly without explanatory signifi-

cance? The basal point at issue is the nature of explanation,

and what, in the end, we are to understandby intelligibility.

i. In answer to the question as to what in the theory of

emergence s new, one may certainly say, negatively, that in-

sistence upon the appearance of the novel does not in itselfconstitute this novelty. In somesense the progressiveappear-

ance of the novel has all along been admitted in principle by

both mechanisticand finalistic theories. For it has by them

been generally taken for granted that out of the original

causes (however interpreted) have come phenomena which

in the beginningwere not explicitly present. At least tacit rec-

ognition of this is characteristicof even the primitive mythsof creation,as it is of the speculationsof the Greek physicists

from Thales on; and it has tended to becomemore and more

crucial in the later evolutionary stories. The difference be-

tween earlier and later stages in the temporalseries has gen-

erally been accepted as a matter of course,at least as a point

of departurefor furtheranalysis; and it has been so accepted,

I take it, for the reason that primafacie it is the most evidentfeature of the advent of phenomenain time. Mere insistence

upon the appearanceof the novel, then, is itself not novel; all

of the modernevolutionary views, and all of the moreancient

views in so far as they are concernedwith the same set of phe-

nomena, have seen that there appear in the temporal series

148



EMERGENCE AND INTELLIGIBILITY I49

characteristicswhich could hardly be ascribed to it "in the

beginning." So we must look elsewhere for the differentiaof

that view whichnowadaysis called the view of emergence.Looking elsewhere, one might expect to find the unique

characteristic of the theory in the peculiar nature of that

which is supposedto emerge. But here, again, one is doomed

to disappointment.

With referenceto the nature of the emergent,there seem

to be two possibleviews. On the one hand,one may hold that

the emergent s of the natureof a term; on the otherhand,one

may seek the emergentamongrelations. Accordingto the first

view, some constituent or entity (variously describable n de-

tail) under certain conditions appearsde novo in the series;

according o the second view, that whichthusappears s not an

entity, but a novel orderor arrangementof the old material.

Adapting the terminologyof Broad to the present context, Ishall call the first view "substantial"emergence,and the sec-

ond "structural"emergence.

It is no part of the presentpurposeto enter upon a critical

considerationof the relativeclaimsof these two views of emer-

gents. But I wish to stay long enough to direct attention to

their importance. Whether either of the views, or neither, is

to be accepted is of coursea questionwhich can be answeredonly by an appeal to the relevant facts. My suggestion here

is simply that the point at issue is a basal one and underlies

other questionsof far-reaching mportso far at least as a phi-

losophy of mind is concerned. The real significance of the

whole doctrine of "personalism,"for instance, seems to be

boundup in it; the questionwhether finiteindividualspossess

a substantive or an adjectival mode of being is in the endequivalent to the question whether a "person"is to be con-

ceived in accordancewith the principlesof substantial or of

structuralemergence.And for my part I am inclinedto think

that the issue might gain in clarity if it were discussedunder

this second formulation.





EMERGENCE AND INTELLIGIBILITY I5I

clinging to it to make difficult a satisfactory interpretationof the law of pre-establishedharmonywhich, in consequence,

always tends to proveeither too muchor too little for the pur-poses for which it is used in the system. Hegel's famous criti-

cism of Spinoza, to the effect that what is needed in the refor-

mationof the Spinozisticsystem is that Substancebe changed

into Subject, may fairly be interpreted as a demand that the

substantialistside of Spinoza'smetaphysics be so modified as

to bringit into harmonywith the structuralist eaningsof his

ethics. It is, of course,debatable to what extent Hegel himself

succeeded in accomplishingthis end through his dialectical

procedure;but it seems clear that in intent at least he was an

out-and-out structuralist, as the tradition to which his influ-

ence in British and Americanthought contributedhas tended

progressivelyto make explicit. And there seems to be no dif-

ficulty in tracing the same antagonism between essentiallysubstantialist and structuralistviews in many currents of re-

cent thought, and, if I am not mistaken,in tendenciesthat at

first glance do not appear to have any connectionwith that

whichgoes by the name of emergentevolution.

Despite what has beensaidbefore,however,there is some-

thinguniquelycharacteristicof the theory of emergencewhich

makesit an anachronism o speak of any classicalphilosopheras an advocateof that theory. The novelty of the view, I take

it, lies in the logical status which it assigns to the emergent

however described-the status, namely, of unpredictability.

Lloyd Morgan'sstatement of the basal point is as concise as

any: "The point of emphasisis this. Let there be three suc-

cessive levels of naturalevents, A, B, and C. Let there be in B

a kind of relation which is not presentin A; and in C a kind ofrelation, not yet presentin B orA. If then onelivedandgained

experienceon the B-level, one could not predict the emergent

charactersof the C-level,becausethe relations,of which theyare the expressions, are not yet in being. Nor if one lived

on the A-level, could one predict the emergent characterof



I52 INTERNATIONALJOURNALOF ETHICS

b-events,becauseex hypothesis hereare no suchevents as yet

in existence. What, it is claimed,one cannot predict, then, is

the emergent expression of some new kind of relatednessamong pre-existing events. One could not foretell the emer-

gent character of vital elements from the fullest possible

knowledgeof physico-chemicalevents only, if life be an emer-

gent chord and not merely due to the summation,however

complex, of constituent a-notes. Such is the hypothesis ac-

cepted under emergentevolution."' And in this emphasislies

the uniquenessof the hypothesis. The principlehere stressed

by Morgan is, of course, ndependentof his structuralist nter-

pretationof the emergentandholds for the substantialistview

as well. It is the markof the theory of emergence,both sub-

stantialist and structuralist,and sets it off sharply from the

older views. For the theory of emergence,then, the emergent

iswholly

novel, unpredictableon the basis of even the com-

pletest possible knowledgeof that whenceit emerges; until it

appearsit is by hypothesisnonexistent,and cannot, therefore,

be foreknown. And the theory logically stands or falls, pre-

sumably,with this its crucialprinciple.

2. It is agreedamongthe advocatesof the theory, as I un-

derstandthem, that insistence uponthe appearanceof the un-

predictablynovel in the evolutionaryseries involves us in nological difficulties. Such insistence does indeed, they tell us,

force us to assumea peculiarcognitiveattitude called by some

the attitude of "naturalpiety;" but this attitude, we are as-

sured,is nothingmore occult thana willingnessto accept facts

as we find them and to admit that such acceptanceis what we

mean by understanding. If unbiased observation shows us

that the absolutely novel does actually appear from time totime,and fromstage to stage, in the courseof nature, there for

the emergent evolutionist is an end of the matter; so far, that

fact we know,and it is all we know and all we need to, or can,

know. Our loyal attitude to all emergents, as Morgan con-

2Emergent RvaOution,p. 5-6. The italics are all in the original.



EMERGENCE AND INTELLIGIBILITY I53

stantly remindsus, must be that of humbleacceptance; con-

fronted by them, we can only "consider and bow the head."

There are some impious ones amongst us, however, who standstiff-necked before such a pious admonition. They are prone

to believe that the attitude of natural piety is nothing more

than an impotent nod of sanguine approval of precisely those

phenomena which are most perplexing, and that in moments

of logical storm and stress it appearsto serve us only because

it is blind to the real problems presented by the sundry trou-

blesome stages of the passing show. They may even unkindly

suggest that this attitude, when made vocal, reverentlydeliv-

ers itself of the oracularstatement that nature is really what

nature really is-a statement which presumably no one has

ever thought of denying, but which also no one hitherto has

ever seriously mistakenfor an explanatoryprinciple. What is

wanted, on their side, is that one open one's eyes and look

abroadbeyondthat whichis set down,as it were,at one's feet;

not observation alone, but explanation as well, is demanded,

and it is precisely explanation which, in their view, natural

piety fails to give.

In such a debate the point at issue turns upon the nature

of intelligibility. And with the statement of this point we are

brought to the chief concernof the present discussion-and,it may as well be added, to the cruxof a theory of knowledge.

I wish to considerit here on the basis of the two assumptions

that underlie the points of view before opposed. The first of

these assumptions is that categories are descriptive and de-

notative; the second assumption s that categories are explan-

atory. Pushed further,these assumptionsresolve themselves

into the theses, on the one hand, that the criterion of intelli-gibility is the orderof existences and, on the other, that intel-

ligibility is the criterionof that order. The thesis of the pres-

ent paper,a very simple and a very old thesis, is that each of

these assumptionsis correctin what it explicitly affirmsand

erroneous n what it implicitly denies. Categories are descrip-



I54 INTERNATIONALOURNALOF ETHICS

tive and they are explanatory, but in the end descriptionand

explanation are one; intelligibility is a characteristic of the

order of existenceandit is a characteristicof intelligence, butthere is in this no merely circular statement. The develop-

ment of this thesis musthere follow its own more or less inde-

pendent course;in conclusionwe shall returnbrieflyto inquire

how the resultsmeanwhile attained bear upon the concept of

emergence.

The firstconsiderationto be noted is that before thinking

can take place at all thereis something thought about, and the

object of thought is (ideally) the controlling factor in the

thought-situation. In whatever sense thought may be crea-

tive, it certainly cannot be said to be so in the sense that it

produces its own object. Its object is there as a datum which

is not created, but found; and this datum exerts a determining

influence, since the necessity of thought has its habitat there.That thought is acquiescenceunder compulsion is a thesis in

whichwe arein the endcompelledto acquiesce. To the extent

that thought cuts itself free from this compulsion, to that ex-

tent it tends to depart fromits own nature and to fall away

into mere"imagination"and, carried far enough, into inanity.

The position here stated is foundational. The directionin

which its proof may be foundis pointed by a rigorousanalysisof the actual procedureof intelligenceitself. Suchan analysis

would disclose, I take it, that prima facie all our judgments

areinterpretationsof objectivesituations and that, in the end,

every hypothetical judgment has its categorical aspect. The

necessity of thought lies in the situation with which thought

deals; andapart fromthis objectivereferencethe necessityof

thought is a meaningless,because empty, phrase. Of course,

in its first formulationthe controlling situation may be hypo-

thetical, a matter of postulates and assumptions;but as such

it still controls, and beyond there is always a context within

which postulates move and whichgives to them the significa-

tion whereby they are amenableto critical considerationand



EMERGENCE AND INTELLIGIBILITY 35

evaluation. Possibility never wholly loses touch with actual-

ity, or, if it does, it is entirely fruitless for intelligence; it is

vain and void, and vain because void. On this point Leibniz'spersistent efforts to give a specific formulationto his principle

of the sufficientreason are especially enlightening and, to my

mind, decisive. Prepossessed as he is by the view that suffi-

cient reason is entirely independent of existence and "must

needs be outside of" the sequence of contingent things, he

nevertheless finds himself driven at last to hold that the prin-

ciple "must be in a substancewhichis a cause of this sequence,or which is a necessary being, bearingin itself the reason of

its own existence, otherwisewe should not yet have a sufficient

reason with which we could stop."3And this is to say that the

necessity of thought is in the object which it itself does not

create; for the point here is independentof Leibniz'speculiar

view of "substance"andits relation to the order of contingent

things.

There would seem to be, then, no possibility of ultimately

sunderingthe order of thought from the order of existence.

Sucha bifurcationinevitably ends in ruin; for in last analysis

it leads back to the identificationof the object of thought with

thought itself, and so to the impalpable void. The object

which compels thought is the objective of thinking, and thislies in the orderof existents sinceit cannot lie in thought itself.

There is here no intention to maintain a blank identity be-

tween the object of thought (the object in thinking) and the

total objective situation under the compulsionof whichthink-

ing functions. On this point it would appear that the epis-

temologicaldualist has something importantto say, and I at

least wouldnot wish to be committedto the view that his po-sition whollylacks foundation;otherwise I see no escape from

scepticismand, ultimately, fromsolipsism. But it still remains

true that any epistemological dualism which postulates a

chasm between the two orders is inextricably enmeshed in

8Principles of Nature and of Grace,sec. 8.



156 INTERNATIONALJOURNALOF ETHICS

the difficultiesagainst which, in differentways, Spinoza and

Kant alike inadvertentlybut forcefully warn us. The object

of thought is that which compels thought, and that cannot beother thanan other to thoughtitself-an otherwhich thought

accepts and which attaches to the existential order.

And with this conclusion,I presume,we are committedto

the view that the categories are, and must be, primarilyde-

scriptive and denotative. We are not free to think as we

please; what we think is determinedby the orderof existence.

"It thinks in us," we must hold, is morenearly the correctac-count of the cognitive situation than is the customary "I

think;" and the "it" is a jealous master. That on this point

there is agreement n principleamongthinkersso radically at

odds otherwiseas are Bosanquet, Dewey, and Russell marks

a very significantmeeting of extremes; and the denial of it

constitutes what I (under correction) understandto be the

main weakness of the so-called "new idealism" advocated by

the Italian school.

Thus it would appearthat we must admit the truth of the

contention that things as they are constitute the criterion of

intelligibility. What is intelligible and what is not connot be

determinedapart from the givensituation; in the abstractand

without referenceto the given, there is no meaning to be at-tached to the notion of intelligibility. And what the given

compels us to affirm,that we must hold is the intelligible as-

pect of the situation in question; and it is intelligiblebecause

we are compelled to affirm t. Whether the moon is made of

green cheese has no intelligibility in abstraction from the

meaning of the proposition; but meaning is meaningless ex-

cept as in some importantsense a descriptionof an objectivesituation with characteristicsof its own. Thus it is precisely

this situation which must determine the intelligibility of our

proposition. What is intelligibleis what has meaning,andit is

intelligible in precisely the sense in which it has meaning;

what is unintelligible s what hasno meaning,and its unintelli-



EMERGENCEAND INTELLIGIBILITY I57

gibility is precisely identical with its meaninglesscharacter.

But what has orlacksmeaning,andwhat meaningit has or inwhat sense it is meaningless,the object alone can tell us. In-telligibilityis of the object'smaking,not ours. If the situationin nature should force us to hold that "The moon is made ofgreen cheese" it is a meaningfulproposition, then ipso factothe propositionwouldbe for us a thoroughly ntelligibleprop-ositionandwouldbe so accepted. Sincethe situationdrivesus

to hold that such is not the case, it is to us unintelligible andabsurd to hold that suchis the case. The criterionof intelligi-bility is nature'srevelationof herself, and our categories areconsequently denotative. This, I understand,is the basis onwhichrests the attitude of naturalpiety.

Andthis principle s of far-reachingmport. Forone thing,if for a moment I may dwell on the point, it runs deep in a

theory of value. Of course the principlehas no relevancyhereif valuationsare to have no cognitionalor reflectiveelement,as if in valuing one is not thinking, or in thinkingone is notvaluing. But the question still remains whether this is thecase,and formy partI fail to see that it is. Onthe contrary, twould seem that in the end we must hold that there is noschismbetweenvaluingandknowing. After all, arenot valua-tionsbelief-attitudes? Is not truthitself a value? Is therenota logic of ethics or of aesthetics as there is of "science"? Wemay call these valuationsby whatevernamewe please-"lik-ings," "interests," "preferences." But to conceive them as"subjective"and arbitrarywhims is a ruinouserror;basicallyit sets us straight on the road to an atomistic view of mindwhichthreatens

bankruptcy,andit

leaves us in the endcaughtin the clutches of a practical relativism. To escape this suchsubjectivity and arbitrarinessmust be denied; and such a de-nial must be foundedupon a universalityin valuationswhichreflectionalone can supply. But an adequateanalysis, I takeit, woulddisclose the unity hereimplied. Andherewith we arebroughtto the admissionthat valuationspartakeof thenature



I58 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS

of the criterion of intelligibility. They have their readings n

existential situations, and are as subject to the principles of a

critical analysis and appreciationas are scientific hypotheses-which, indeed, do not differ essentially from them. That

things are good orbad,beautifulorugly, is as little the expres-

sion of idle and unguided fancy as that they are round or

square, vital or dead. Either this, or a view of valuation as in-

trinsically non-intellectual,with whateverconsequences (dis-

astrous,I must think), sucha view entails.

But of more direct concern to our immediate purpose is

the consideration hat the principlebefore us discloses the fu-

tility of a certain type of argumentwhichat times is supposed

to have considerableweight. That argument s broadly as fol-

lows: since it is possible that things may be conceivedother-

wise than as we in fact do and must conceive them, it follows

that there is reason for holding that in fact they are quiteother thanwe can conceive. An exampleof this sort of reason-

ing is found in the rathercommoncontention that, since it is

conceivablethat our sense-organsmightbe differently consti-

tuted andconsequentlygive us quite different mpressions,we

may reasonably conclude that as they really are things are

blankly unintelligible to us. The fallacy of the argument,of

course,lies in the surreptitious ntroduction of a notion of in-telligibility at variancewith the principlepreviously outlined.

For the argument tacitly assumesthat there is a sort of con-

ceivability in termsof which we can logicallycondemnall cat-

egories to the status of merely phenomenological points of

view; and this is equivalentto the assumptionthat something

may be conceivedin a purelya priorimannerand may also be

seen to be foundational. But this is a mistakenassumption, fthe principlethat nature alone may tell us what is conceivable

is allowedto stand.

There is, however, an aspect of the cognitive situation

which gives a semblance of validity to the preceding argu-

ment. And that is the dual nature of the object of thought,



EMERGENCE AND INTELLIGIBILITY 159

which lies at the bottom of the distinction between "appear-

ance" and "reality" and which stands at the center of many of

the traditional epistemologicalcontroversies. Turning our at-tention to this aspect of the situation, we find ourselves face

to face with the truthcontained n the thesis that intelligibility

is the criterionof things as they are. The distinction, I take it,

cannot be denied; the question concerns rather the meaning

of the distinction.

Natural piety will not serve us here, at least not in the

sense in which natural piety means simply accepting out-of-

hand the revelation of nature. For the peculiarity of the situa-

tion with which we are confronted is that nature presents no

clear-cut revelationof herself. She speaks a various language;

she tells us that we cannot confidently put our trust in mere

appearances,and yet appearancesarein some sensehermien;

she bids us penetrate to her real essence,and

at the same timethe voice she offers for counsel would seem not infrequently to

be the voice of Jacob. And so we are in a quandary. Mere

willingnessto follownature'slead, however intense ourpiety,

is of little avail when nature declinesto speak without equivo-

cation. Where, then, are we to look for an interpreter?

This question brings us to thepartingof the ways between

two quite radically different theories of knowledge. On theone side lies the way of intuitionismin its various forms; on

the other side lies the way of intellectualism. Whichoneshould

take is, of course,a long storythatcannotherebe entered upon.

There are those who insist that the road of intuitionismis a

pleasantroad with easy grades; my own conviction, however,

is that it either leads to an impasse or returnsfinally to the

other way, and that it is better to take the road of inferenceat the beginning. Doing this, we are to hold that natureis at-

tained through ntelligence; that nature really is what intelli-

gence revealsher to be.

But are we not here at once caught in a vicious circle?

Whatnaturereally is, we have already insisted,is the criterion





EMERGENCE AND INTELLIGIBILITY I 6i

might summarilybe stated as follows: There is alwaysan ob-

ject of thought, and this object is terms-in-relationswhich

may be either accepted as given or regardedas unstable.Fromthese theses there follow twoquite distinctmeanings

of the intelligible. By the intelligiblewe may mean the object

of thought accepted as immediatelygiven; in this sense every-

thing which we ordinarilyspeak of as a "fact," whether"real"

or "illusory," s intelligible. But we may mean by the intelli-

gible the object of thought as mediately given, that is, as that

which may be thought; in this sense the planet Neptune, for

instance, was intelligible before it was ever thought. In short,

we may mean by the intelligibleeither that which is (psycho-

logically) thought or that which is thinkable.

Returning to our dilemma with this distinction in mind,

we can see a way out. When we say that the real determines

intelligibility, what we primarilymeanis that what is thoughtis dependent on what is immediatelygiven; we cannot create

our ideas out of nothing, but our ideas must run with fact.

When, on the other hand, we say that what is real is deter-

mined by intelligence, what we mean is that the immediately

given is not all there is of the object of thought, that the datum

originally and directly presented demands correctionin the

light of its implicative context, and that this light is revealedonly throughthe processes of intelligence. And when this dis-

tinction is bornein mind we can see that it is no merely circu-

larstatement to say that what is needed to correct ntelligence

is moreintelligence. That which is knownor thought is, so far,

intelligible simply because it is thought; things are such that

the thought is possible. But that which is actually thought is

not necessarily what under the circumstances ought to bethought; immediate intelligibility may stand in need of cor-

rection by a deeper and mediated intelligibility which spells

out the fartherreachesof the situation. "To be intelligible is

to be" and "to be is to be intelligible" are both true and ex-

press basic characteristicsof the cognitive situation. But they



i62 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS

are not simply convertiblepropositions,since intelligibility is

a matter of degrees, and the degree contemplatedby one of

the propositions s not identical with the degreecontemplatedby the other. Onlyin those instanceswhere existenceandreal-

ity coincide could the two propositions be said to fall to-

gether.

With this second functionof intelligence in mind,we may

say that the categories areexplanatoryrather thanmerelyde-

scriptiveand denotative. They aresupplementaryandcorrec-

tive; they lead beyondthe immediately presented out into thecontext, and they may modify it in consequence. The "bent-

ness" of the staff in the pool is, thus, explainedby the laws of

optics. Andit is precisely this vision of the farther look which

natural piety unaidedseems unable to give us; on this score

it is open to the charge of incompetency. But it is not to be

forgotten that even in these farther reaches of thought's vi-

sion it is still the object which controls. The nexus thus ex-plored is not of thought's making, and explanation is still iii

an importantsense historical and denotative. What is needed

to explain the bentness of the staff is, after all, simply a more

complete descriptionof its nature; the laws of optics are its

laws. Explanationis of a piece with description,and there is

no sharpbreakbetween them; the differencebetween them is

a differencewhich in the end is arbitrary. They are only de-

grees of intelligibility, and natural piety may be explanatory

if it is pious enough.

Summarizing,we may say that the categories of thoughtare primarily descriptive and denotative in the sense that

what we are to thinkabout the world remains for the worldto

tell us and is notof

ourown arbitraryand unguided choice:we thinkas we must, andwe must think as the world dictates.

This does not mean,however, that the insight of the first look

is to be taken as nature's final word. It happens, on the con-

trary, that this insight often demandscorrection,and this can

be had only throughthe processesof inferencewhich lead be-

yond. Here we may say, if we please, that our categories be-





I64 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS

other than merelydenotative it is headed towardruinin a vi-

cious intellectualism; and neither view seems to squarewith

the principlebefore restated. Again, Croce'sdoctrineof the

"pureconcept"can stand only if this principleis denied; and

the sameholds true of the new idealism,at least to the extent

that its foundationsultimately lie in that doctrine. Bradley's

wholesalecondensation of relationsas self-contradictoryand

sterile, upon which rests his view of the Absolute with its

hauntingyet bafflingdeeps,I can makenothingat all of unless

the principlehereunderconsideration s definitelyset aside-a principle to which he seems committed at the beginning.

And essentially the same inconsistency would seem to lie at

the bottom of Bosanquet'scontention that from the point of

view of the Absolute there is an intelligibility in finite centers

of experiencewhich hardly attaches to them per se.4 And, in

general, the absolutistic treatment of the whole temporalor-

der andthe reductionof it to merely phenomenological ignifi-cance in the end raises the sameissue.

This, however,is not the occasionto follow the fortunesof

ourprincipleall aroundthe intellectual horizon. The present

concernis with the theory of emergence,and so I turn to ask

how the principle bears on the concept of emergents. That

which emerges,we are told, is absolutely novel in the sense

that it is unpredictablebefore the event: that which is abso-lutely and unpredictably novel, so the criticism runs, ipso

facto falls beyond intelligenceand is consequentlysheermys-

tery. What, then, is the relationbetween the predictableand

the intelligible? This is the questionwhich remainsbriefly to

be considered n the light of the precedingconclusions.

By predictability (if, to avoid cumbersomecircumlocu-

tions, I may be permitted to use the term) I understandthe

state of anything'sbeing predictable; that which is predicta-

4Note Bosanquet'sdiscussionof finite personsin the second Lecture of The

Value of Destiny of the Individual,and the implicationsof the statement"Wecan-not expect to give a reason or the schemeof the universe," n p. 6i. The point here

wouldseem to be that self-centerednesss an "imperfection,"espitethe fact that itappears neradicable. Cf. Pringle-Pattison's emarkson the point in LecturesXIV

and XV of The Idea of God.



EMERGENCE AND INTELLIGIBILITY i65

ble has what I shall call the characteristicof predictability,

and that which is not predictable lacks predictability. But

there are two sorts of prediction,and consequentlytwo typesof predictability; and these shouldbe distinguished,since the

question at issue concernsonly one type. We sometimessay

that X is predictable when we mean merely that adequatein-

vestigationandanalysisof the situationwould disclose that X

is now, and perhaps always has been, the case; in this sense

the planet Neptune was predictablebefore it was discovered

throughthe telescope. This sort of predictabilityis as charac-teristic of a mathematical system as it is of the material uni-

verse, and one could say that, before it was known, the rela-

tion between the diameter and the circumferenceof a circle

waspredictable. But there is anothersortof prediction,name-

ly, foresight,on the basis of what now exists, into that which

does not now exist but will exist in the future. In this sense of

the term,X is predictablewhen by conditions now given, butnot involving the presentexistence of X, X's futureeventual-

ity is determinate; examplesof this sort of predictability are

eclipses of sun or moon in the future, which the astronomer

may foretell at pleasure. This meaning of predictability in-

volves time, and so differs from the other meaning in whichtime plays no part. This is the type of predictability with

whichourpresentdiscussion s aloneconcerned,and our ques-

tion is whether predictability in this sense is always charac-

teristicof the intelligible.

It seems clear that predictability logicallypresupposes n-

telligibility and is impossible apart from it. The Laplacean

calculator,forinstance,who is to foreseethe futureof the ma-

terialuniverseas an open bookwould of course be blind with-out complete knowledge of the detailed nature of that uni-

verse in cross-sectionat the momenthis previsionoccurs; and

even with thatknowledgehis previsionwould be possible only

providedthe status quo implicates all situations that are to oc-

cur in the course of the future. This is to say that predicta-

bility is characteristiconly of systems, and that the predic-



i66 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS

table falls within the intelligible. But the question before us

is whether the two fall together, whether the intelligible is

ipso facto predictableand the non-predictable s unintelligible.I see no reason for holding that such is the case, but on the

contrary the main contention of the present discussion sup-

ports the opposite conclusion.

Suppose there is a system of such a nature that its basal

character s modifiedby the passage of time, its future being

precisely its growing-pointand what it is being in a very real

sense what it is becoming. In such a system, I take it, predic-tability would have no place, since the very nature of the sys-

tem would do violence to the basal demand of prediction-

the demand,namely, that time be treated as negligible. Here,

as Bergson has I think rightly maintained, to foretell would

be to forelive. But I see no reasonto hold that such a system

would necessarilybe unintelligible. It would certainly be in-

telligible if it were foundfor the reasonthat it was found, andit would be intelligible precisely as found; nor would its intel-

ligibility be lessened by the fact that prediction could not

move within it. What special terms of description we should

in detail apply to it the system alone could inform us; and our

explanation of it would perforce wait upon description. But,

having got such terms, the system would be intelligible to us

in the only sense in which intelligibility has for us a meaning.

The emergent evolutionist claims that he finds systems

which are precisely of this sort-systems that are dynamic

and woven throughtime. Whetherhe does actually find them

is a question of fact upon which we do not here enter. If he

does find them, he is well within his logical rights when he

holds that there are emergentswhich, though non-predictable,are nevertheless intelligible. Certainly there is no justifica-

tion for throwingthe conceptof emergenceto the outer dark-

ness of the absurdmerely because its advocates in the zeal of

their natural piety look upon prediction as a sin against the

emergent.

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Emergence and Intelligibility