Eligibility Reply Declaration of Eric Jones ISO Reply to ... · 13. Neumark and Brann argue that because Stockton police officers transferred to Departments located in cities like

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DECLARATION OF ERIC JONES IN SUPPORT OFCITY’S REPLY TO OBJECTIONS TO STATEMENT OFQUALIFICATIONS UNDER SECTION 109(C)

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MARC A. LEVINSON (STATE BAR NO. 57613)[email protected] C. HILE (STATE BAR NO. 57299)[email protected] W. KILLEEN (STATE BAR NO. 258395)[email protected], HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP400 Capitol Mall, Suite 3000Sacramento, California 95814-4497Telephone:Facsimile: (916) 329-4900

Attorneys for DebtorCity of Stockton

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SACRAMENTO DIVISION

In re:

CITY OF STOCKTON, CALIFORNIA,

Debtor.

Case No. 2012-32118

D.C. No. OHS-1

Chapter 9

DECLARATION OF ERIC JONES INSUPPORT OF CITY OF STOCKTON’SREPLY TO OBJECTIONS TO ITSSTATEMENT OF QUALIFICATIONSUNDER SECTION 109(C) OF THEUNITED STATES BANKRUPTCYCODE

Date: February 26, 2013Time: 1:30 p.m.Dept: CJudge: Hon. Christopher M. Klein

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- 2 -DECLARATION OF ERIC JONES IN SUPPORT OF

CITY’S REPLY TO OBJECTIONS TO STATEMENT OFQUALIFICATIONS UNDER SECTION 109(C)

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I, Eric Jones, hereby declare:

1. I am the Chief of Police in the City of Stockton, California (“the City” or

“Stockton”). I make this declaration in support of the City’s Reply to Objections to Statement of

Qualifications Under Section 109(c). On June 28, 2012, I executed a declaration in support of the

Statement of Qualifications the City filed on June 29, 2012 (the “June Declaration” or “June

Decl.”).

2. I have reviewed the declarations, reports, and qualifications of David Neumark and

Joseph Brann, filed by the so-called Capital Markets Creditors on December 14, 2012. I attended

the deposition of Brann on January 24, 2013. While Brann was a police chief in the early 1990’s,

neither Brann nor Neumark appear to have much, if any, knowledge about the City of Stockton’s

crime situation, police practices, or history. By contrast, I have served in the Stockton Police

Department (“the Department” or “SPD”) in some capacity for over 19 years. In March 2012, I

was named Chief of Police. Before that, I served as an Assistant Chief from September 2011 to

March 2012, and as Deputy Chief from March 2008 to September 2011. Prior to that, beginning

in 1993, I assumed increasing levels of responsibility within the department as a Police Officer,

Training Officer, Sergeant, Lieutenant, and Captain. I hold a Bachelor’s degree in Criminal

Justice from California State University, Sacramento. In 2007, I earned a Master of Public

Administration Degree from National University. I am a member of the California Police Chiefs

Association and the International Association of Chiefs of Police, hold certificates from the

Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, and am a member of the FBI’s National

Academy Law Enforcement Executive Development Association.

Crime in Stockton

3. By comparing 2011 crime rates to rates in the early 1990’s, Brann paints a

misleading picture of crime in Stockton. Brann Report, at 4-5. In the early 1990’s, crack-cocaine

gang wars significantly contributed to Stockton’s crime rates, particularly its murder rate. Those

wars ended, and between 1993 and 1998, Stockton’s murder rate fell. Its murder rate fell again

between 2006 and 2008. By contrast, its murder rate increased every single year between 2008

and 2012. Also, Stockton’s police staffing was lower in 1990 than it was for the rest of the

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decade. Brann takes neither Stockton’s complete crime data nor its relative staffing into account

in his analysis of crime trends in Stockton. Without accounting for context, it is inappropriate

and irrelevant to compare crime rates in the early 1990’s to crime rates today.1

4. If Brann chose a more relevant year as a baseline, such as 2007, before the cuts in

compensation, benefits, and budgeted sworn officers occurred, he would see crime is increasing

in Stockton.

5. Even accepting Brann’s 1990 baseline for homicide, in 2012, Stockton

experienced a record-setting 71 homicides, which translates to the same 0.24 homicides per 1,000

residents that he calculated as having occurred in 1990. Brann Report, at 4. At no point in

between 1990 and 2012 did Stockton ever come close to 0.24 homicides per 1,000 residents. By

Brann’s own deposition testimony, crime rates have been declining significantly over the last 20

years in the United States and California in particular. Brann Dep., pp. 184:24-185:9; 185:23-

186:17. The fact Stockton’s murder rate is the same today as it was approximately 20 years ago

speaks to how unique and dangerous Stockton is compared to other cities in California, and

demonstrates Stockton’s need for experienced, high-quality police officers.

6. In my experience, the best statistical indicator for the City’s property crime levels

is likely auto-theft data, because, historically, nearly 100% of auto-thefts are reported. The fact

that between 2011 and 2012 auto-thefts increased by 49% shows the real depth of the City’s

property crime problem. I also believe that property crime rates are much worse than the

statistics show. Beginning in 2009, there was a shift to mandatory online reporting of property

crimes in the City. With this shift came a dramatic decrease in reported property crimes. I

believe the reason for this is that when people see all they will get from online reporting is

information for filing an insurance claim, they exit the system. Brann admitted in his deposition

that he was unaware of this change in property crime reporting. He also admitted he did not take

the change into account when analyzing the City’s crime rates. Brann Dep., p. 198:4-17.

//

1 Stockton violent and property crime data from 1985-2011 is publicly available at http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/. Atrue and correct copy of the publicly available data is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

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Retention and Recruitment Problems

7. In the June Declaration, I testified that Stockton had 441 sworn officers in fiscal

year 2007-08, and 343 sworn officer positions in 2012. I also testified that only 320 of those 343

positions were filled as of June 28, 2012. June Decl., ¶¶ 5-6. Thus, Brann mischaracterized my

testimony when he quoted me as stating Stockton’s “officer per thousand ratio of 1.17 is the

lowest in California for cities with populations above 250,000.” Brann Report, at 5. He used the

number 343 to calculate his 1.17 figure, when he should have used 320, the number of sworn

officers that I stated the Department had at the time. Using 320 would have led to a smaller

officer-per-thousand figure, 1.07.

8. There are two primary reasons why, in June 2012, the Department was unable to

fill its budgeted sworn officer positions. The first reason was constant attrition. Even brand new

officers were leaving the Department at a rapid pace for other police departments offering better

compensation and benefits. The second reason was a low-quality applicant pool. Both Brann and

Neumark are, for the most part, correct in stating the number of officer applicants we have had

since 2008. However, the number of applicants standing alone matters little when none or barely

any are qualified. A large portion of the applicants to the Department over the past few years

have failed background checks or were running from problems in other departments to anywhere

they could. As a dangerous city, Stockton cannot afford to compromise its police hiring standards

and allow these unqualified applicants to protect its residents and businesses.

9. As of February 13, 2013, the Department is still unable to fill its 343 budgeted

sworn officer positions for the same two primary reasons discussed above. The Department’s

headcount remained in the 320’s throughout January 2013, and only recently got up to 330, where

it is today.

10. Both Neumark and Brann incorrectly rely upon an article stating that 1,300

applicants participated in a physical agility test for the Department in support of their arguments

that the Department is not having recruitment problems. Neumark Report, at 21; Brann Report at

18. The article’s facts are wrong. The number 1,300 captures the number of applicants who

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RSVP’d to the physical agility test. Less than half that number actually showed up. Many were

quickly disqualified.

11. Both Neumark and Brann make much of the fact that the Department hired

roughly 70 new officers in 2012. Neumark Report, at 20; Brann Report, at 18. Using this figure

to argue the Department is in good shape in terms of hiring is off-base for two reasons. First,

despite these hires, the Department still cannot reach its budgeted number of sworn officers. As a

consequence, drawing attention to this figure actually emphasizes how many officers the

Department has been losing. Second, hiring roughly 70 new officers in one year—something the

Department had no other choice but to do—is dangerous for a city like Stockton, which needs not

just officers, but experienced officers. Neither Neumark nor Brann takes into account the danger

to public safety and the Department itself of having too many new officers on the force.

12. Brann calls into doubt the fact that the Department has difficulty recruiting

qualified lateral candidates. Brann Report, at 16. To do this, he cites the 164 lateral transfer

applications the Department received in 2011 and 2012. Even though he correctly notes, “[i]t

appears that the SPD did not elect to hire any of these lateral transfer candidates,” he states the

fact they applied “is an indication of interest by lateral candidates.” Id. Brann has no knowledge

of the quality of these applicants, and if he did, he would see why the Department hired none of

them. Simply put, each applicant was unqualified. Brann fails to appreciate the idea that the

number of applicants does not matter if none of them are qualified.

The Reasons Officers Left

13. Neumark and Brann argue that because Stockton police officers transferred to

Departments located in cities like Oceanside, CA and Monterey, CA, they did not leave Stockton

for monetary reasons, but because they wanted lifestyle changes. Neumark Report, at 8; Brann

Report, at 13. I do not believe this is the case, and believe that monetary reasons are at least

significant factors in why these officers left. As I stated in my deposition, I conducted exit

interviews with the officers who transferred out of the Department in 2012 while I was Chief.

Neumark and Brann did not take part in any of these interviews. All of the officers told me that

monetary issues were the primary reason they were leaving. Since fiscal year 2008, many of

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these officers experienced cuts in their pay and benefits as high as 20% and 30%. The

Department had very few officers leaving to other departments before these cuts happened. Since

my deposition, I was able to reflect on the exit interviews I conducted. I specifically recall 20 of

these interviews. All 20 of the officers I interviewed told me they left for monetary reasons.

Many had difficulty paying bills. Others worried about retirement. And even more just wanted

financial stability, something they believed the Department could not offer them.

14. On January 23, 2013, I attended a Stockton Police Department alumni dinner. At

that dinner, I spoke with six former Stockton officers individually who transferred to different

agencies in 2012. All six reiterated what they told me in their exit interviews: they left because of

cuts in their pay and/or benefits.

15. As Chief of Police, it is my job to keep a pulse on department morale. I frequently

communicate with my officers on many issues, including the City’s current financial situation and

the bankruptcy case. One of the most frequently expressed concerns by my officers regards

compensation and benefits, and how the City’s financial situation will affect them. During these

conversations, many of my officers have said they will depart to another agency if the

Department’s PERS contract is broken. Others have stated that they will leave the Department if

any additional compensation or benefits cuts occur, no matter how slight.

Officers-per-thousand

16. Brann states “it is a fallacy to attempt to establish a causal relationship between

crime and police staffing levels.” Brann Report, at 7. I disagree, and other reports disagree as

well. For example, the University of California Berkeley report, “The Effect of Police on Crime:

New Evidence from U.S. Cities, 1960-2010” finds a link between staffing levels and crime. And

this is a contemporary report published on November 11, 2012. There is also a 2010 RAND

Research Center on Quality Policing report, “Hidden in Plain Sight: What Cost-of-Crime

Research Can Tell Us About Investing in Police” that summarizes contemporary research also

finding such a link. Additionally, San Jose’s Independent Police Auditor, Judge LaDoris Cordell,

stated she believes San Jose’s rising crime and homicide rates are due to cuts in police staffing.

Mike Colgan, San Jose’s Police Auditor Blames Officer Cuts For Rising Homicide Rate, CBS SF

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BAY AREA, Dec. 12, 2012, http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2012/12/12/san-joses-police-auditor-

blames-officer-cuts-for-rising-homicide-rate/ (“Believe me, if you are intent upon burglarizing,

breaking into cars or even shooting people and you know that there aren’t going to be the number

of police officers out there that there used to be, you become emboldened. You become

brazen.”).

17. Brann cites an International City/County Management Association (“ICMA”)

report commissioned in 2010 by the City to suggest that Stockton may not be utilizing its police

force efficiently. He admits to not having studied Stockton’s police officer utilization, despite

saying he was asked to study it in his declaration. Brann Dep., pp. 50:25-51:3; Brann Decl., ¶ 2.

Had he studied the Department’s police utilization data, he would have seen that the ICMA report

was outdated the moment it was published and that it did not take into account the cuts in staffing

that occurred as ICMA was studying the Department. Since the ICMA report, we have

restructured the entire Department, reduced the amount of calls to which we respond, eliminated a

narcotics unit, and taken various other steps to ensure the efficient utilization of our resources.

Unlike the departments Brann refers to on page 8 of his report, we do not use sworn officers as

dispatchers or staff them at construction projects. We have also civilianized many aspects of the

Department to ensure that sworn officers are only used in enforcement and criminal investigation

roles.

18. Despite Brann’s claims to the contrary, the Stockton Police Department’s officer-

per-thousand ratio is low and indicates the Department needs more officers. As I cited in the June

Declaration, a 2006 report commissioned by the City authored by Dr. Anthony Braga, Senior

Research Fellow at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, recommended

the City reach 2.0 officers per 1,000 residents. This figure is almost double our current officer

per 1,000 ratio. Unlike Brann, Braga spent substantial time studying crime and policing in

Stockton specifically. His conclusion that Stockton needs more officers is thus more informed

than Brann’s. Also, the City hired criminal justice consultants David Bennett and Donna Lattin

for its “Marshall Plan,” which contains findings and recommendations on the topic of reducing

violent crime in Stockton. Although the consultants are still finalizing their written report, they

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http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2012/12/12/san-joses-police-auditor-blames-officer-cuts-for-rising-homicide-rate/

http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2012/12/12/san-joses-police-auditor-blames-officer-cuts-for-rising-homicide-rate/



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presented their findings to the Department on February 8, 2013. During that presentation, they

indicated that Stockton needs to budget for and hire 590 officers to effectively address its crime

problems rather than the budgeted number of 343 it currently has. A true and correct copy of the

consultants’ Marshall Plan presentation is attached hereto as Exhibit B (see pp. 28-29).

Officer Experience

19. Brann asserts there is “no evidence” to support the contention that less experienced

officers are less effective in combating a rising violent crime rate than are more experienced

officers. Brann Report, at 19-20. In my experience, this assertion could not be further from the

truth. Having too many inexperienced officers is dangerous to the community and the officers

themselves. Inexperienced officers are more likely to be involved in vehicle chases, vehicle

crashes, and shootings. There has been a 400% increase in shootings directed at our police

officers since 2008 when our proportion of inexperienced officers began to climb. One of these

shootings occurred on January 5, 2013. Inexperienced officers are also more likely to be involved

in criminal cases being thrown out of court for reasons such as the mishandling of evidence.

Stockton needs more experienced officers than it currently has given its current and historical

crime profile. It is detrimental to public safety in Stockton to have too many inexperienced

officers.

20. Neumark suggests his calculation that officer experience increased in Stockton

from 10.2 to 10.9 years of experience from 2008 to 2012 “contradicts any claim that past

compensation cuts have led to a ‘mass exodus’ of experienced police officers.” Neumark Report,

at 17. I disagree with this claim for two reasons. First, there has been a mass exodus of

experienced officers since 2008. Brann even acknowledges these departures in his report when

he says, “the departure of 21 officers with 10+ years of experience to other agencies over a five

year period is a source of concern.” Brann Report, at 12. Second, calculations regarding average

experience are not an appropriate measure of the experience of a police force. A more

appropriate measure here is the percentage of officers with less than one year of experience.

Brann agrees with me that “rookie officers[] clearly are not where you want them to be yet.”

Brann Dep., p. 146:1-3. The percentage of Stockton police officers with less than one year

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experience has increased from 2008 to 2012 from 6% (26 officers) to 14% (46 officers). This

change demonstrates the Department has become less experienced since the cuts in compensation

and benefits beginning in 2008.

The Infeasibility of Outsourcing Police Services to the County

21. I reviewed Robert Bobb’s recommendations for the City to save money by

outsourcing City policing services to San Joaquin County. Bobb Report, at 25-26. Outsourcing

would be infeasible and imprudent for both agencies and the residents they serve, for a number of

reasons that reflect real, tangible differences between the two agencies.

22. The SPD and the San Joaquin Sherriff’s Office (“S/O”) have different policies,

procedures, and practices, ranging from the handling of evidence and asset forfeiture items, to

pre-booking procedures, to the use of lethal and non-lethal weapons. Reconciling these

differences would require a substantial investment in time and resources.

23. Communication methods and radio codes are different between the two agencies.

Also, the two agencies use different channel frequencies and different codes for broadcasting

information. Furthermore, the Computer-Aided-Dispatch system that SPD uses is not compatible

with the S/O patrol vehicle computer equipment. Overcoming these technological barriers would

be costly.

24. The two agencies have separate dispatch centers for receiving 911 calls and

dispatching field units. The logistics of SPD receiving City calls for service and then dispatching

calls to S/O units would be extremely problematic and could create the need for additional

dispatch staffing in the SPD Dispatch Center. The cost here would be non-trivial.

25. Numerous support and follow-up functions would be impacted by outsourcing to

the S/O including determining which agency would handle background information for the

officers or deputies, which agency’s evidence technicians would handle evidence or crime scene

processing, which agency’s detectives would be involved in cases, and which agency would

ultimately be responsible for on-going cases in courts of law. Resolving these issues would take

time and resources.

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Stockton California

Marshall PlanA Violence Reduction Strategy

David Bennett Consultingin association with

Donna Lattin8 February 2013

Agenda•• IntroductionIntroduction -- (8:00(8:00 -- 8:15)8:15)

•• Overview (Overview (Bennett & LattinBennett & Lattin)) -- (8:15(8:15 -- 9:00)9:00)

•• Local Violence Data (Local Violence Data (Stewart WakelingStewart Wakeling)) -- (9:00(9:00 -- 9:40)9:40)

•• Police Department Issues (Police Department Issues (Chief JonesChief Jones)) -- (9:40(9:40 -- 10:05)10:05)

•• Panel Discussions (Panel Discussions (Peacekeepers & ClPeacekeepers & Clientsients)) -- (10:05(10:05 -- 10:45)10:45)

•• Recommendations (Recommendations (Bennett & LattinBennett & Lattin)) -- (10:45(10:45 -- 11:30)11:30)

•• Final Remarks (Final Remarks (City Manager, Bob DeisCity Manager, Bob Deis)) -- (11:30(11:30 -- 11:45)11:45)

•• Public Comment (11:45Public Comment (11:45 –– 12:00)12:00)

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Marshall Plan Committee MembersMarshall Plan Committee Members

1. Mayor Anthony Silva, City of Stockton1. Mayor Anthony Silva, City of Stockton

2. Councilmember Elbert Holman, City Council2. Councilmember Elbert Holman, City Council

3. Bob Deis, City Manager3. Bob Deis, City Manager

4. Rev. Wayne Bibelheimer, Quail Lakes Baptist Church4. Rev. Wayne Bibelheimer, Quail Lakes Baptist Church

5. Bobby Bivens, President, Stockton/San Joaquin NAACP5. Bobby Bivens, President, Stockton/San Joaquin NAACP

6. Mick Founts, Superintendent of Schools, San Joaquin County Office of Education6. Mick Founts, Superintendent of Schools, San Joaquin County Office of Education, p , q y, p , q y

7. Peter Fox, Public Defender, San Joaquin County7. Peter Fox, Public Defender, San Joaquin County

8. Kevin Hatano, Program Coordinator, Operation Ceasefire8. Kevin Hatano, Program Coordinator, Operation Ceasefire

Marshall Plan Committee Members …Marshall Plan Committee Members …

9. Stephanie James, Chief Probation Officer, San Joaquin County9. Stephanie James, Chief Probation Officer, San Joaquin County

10. James Jimenez, Interim CEO, San Joaquin County Hispanic Chamber of 10. James Jimenez, Interim CEO, San Joaquin County Hispanic Chamber of CommerceCommerce

11. Eric Jones, Stockton Police Chief11. Eric Jones, Stockton Police Chief

12. Sovanna Koeurt, Executive Director, Asian Pacific Self12. Sovanna Koeurt, Executive Director, Asian Pacific Self--Development & Development & Residential Assoc.Residential Assoc.

13. Dr. Steve Lowder, Superintendent, Stockton Unified School District13. Dr. Steve Lowder, Superintendent, Stockton Unified School District13. Dr. Steve Lowder, Superintendent, Stockton Unified School District13. Dr. Steve Lowder, Superintendent, Stockton Unified School District

14. Steve Moore, San Joaquin County Sheriff14. Steve Moore, San Joaquin County Sheriff

15. Brett Morgan, Judge, San Joaquin County Superior Court15. Brett Morgan, Judge, San Joaquin County Superior Court

16. Jose Rodriguez, Executive Director, El Concilio16. Jose Rodriguez, Executive Director, El Concilio

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17. Benjamin Saffold, Downtown Stockton Alliance17. Benjamin Saffold, Downtown Stockton Alliance

18. Pastor Glen Shields, Progressive Community Church18. Pastor Glen Shields, Progressive Community Church

19. Vic Singh, Director, Behavioral Health Services, San Joaquin County19. Vic Singh, Director, Behavioral Health Services, San Joaquin County

20. Ger Vang, CEO, Lao Family Community of Stockton, Inc.20. Ger Vang, CEO, Lao Family Community of Stockton, Inc.

21. Carlos Villapudua, Supervisor, San Joaquin County Board of Supervisors21. Carlos Villapudua, Supervisor, San Joaquin County Board of Supervisors

22. Doug Wilhoit, CEO, Greater Stockton Chamber of Commerce22. Doug Wilhoit, CEO, Greater Stockton Chamber of Commerceg , ,g , ,

23. James Willett, District Attorney, San Joaquin County23. James Willett, District Attorney, San Joaquin County

24. Ralph Womack, City of Stockton, Operation Peacekeeper24. Ralph Womack, City of Stockton, Operation Peacekeeper


Former membersFormer members

25. Ann Johnson, former Mayor, City of Stockton25. Ann Johnson, former Mayor, City of Stockton

26. Carl Tolivar, former Superintendent of Stock Unified26. Carl Tolivar, former Superintendent of Stock Unified

StaffStaff

Christian Clegg, Assistant to the City ManagerChristian Clegg, Assistant to the City Managergg, y ggg, y g

Connie Cochran, Public Information OfficerConnie Cochran, Public Information Officer

Karen Costa, Executive Assistant to the City ManagerKaren Costa, Executive Assistant to the City Manager

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PROJECT GOALPROJECT GOALDevelop a Violence Reduction PlanDevelop a Violence Reduction Plan

Stop, Interrupt, and Prevent Gun Violence & Stop, Interrupt, and Prevent Gun Violence & HomicidesHomicides

LOCAL TRENDS IN LOCAL TRENDS IN VIOLENCEVIOLENCE

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StocktonStockton’’s Recent Dramatic Increase in s Recent Dramatic Increase in Homicides since 2008Homicides since 2008

80

20

30

40

50

60

70

Hom

icides

0

10

20

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

YEAR

* Source: Data: FBI Uniform Crime Reports; Stockton City Police via CrimeMapping.com; (accessedMay 14, 2012)* Source: Data: FBI Uniform Crime Reports; Stockton City Police via CrimeMapping.com; (accessedMay 14, 2012)

20 Year Low20 Year Low

Stockton’s High Homicide Rate is Chronic

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Operation Ceasefire (1997Operation Ceasefire (1997 --

There is Evidence that the Ceasefire Program Reduced Homicides in the Past (1997 - 2002)

Operation Ceasefire (1997Operation Ceasefire (19972002)2002)

(Braga 2008)(Braga 2008)

1212

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Stockton Homicide Rate Has Not Tracked Violence Rate since 2006

Number of Police Officers & Homicides

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Stockton Hotspots

Violent Crime Victims: San Joaquin YouthViolent Crime Victims: San Joaquin YouthHomicide Victim Profile (Age 10Homicide Victim Profile (Age 10 –– 24)24)

•• WhereWhere–– Street (52%)Street (52%)

–– Inside (home of victim or other residence) (33Inside (home of victim or other residence) (33%)%)

–– Vehicle (10%)Vehicle (10%)

–– Other (5%)Other (5%)

CircumstanceCircumstance•• CircumstanceCircumstance–– 19% drive19% drive--by shootingsby shootings

–– 3030--50% linked to argument between victim & perpetrator50% linked to argument between victim & perpetrator

** Violence PolicyCenter Report, 2010Violence PolicyCenter Report, 2010

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Stockton Hotspots (November 5, 2011 - May 5, 2012)

(Homicides)(Homicides) (Shootings into Occupied Dwellings)(Shootings into Occupied Dwellings)

Local Findings:

•• High violence is CHRONIC by only recently ACUTEHigh violence is CHRONIC by only recently ACUTEHigh violence is CHRONIC by only recently ACUTEHigh violence is CHRONIC by only recently ACUTE

•• No relationship between total violent crime & No relationship between total violent crime & homicideshomicides

•• Homicide trends in Stockton donHomicide trends in Stockton don’’t follow those of the t follow those of the State (State (locallocal issues drive trends)issues drive trends)

•• Hot Spots can be identified and are discrete but Hot Spots can be identified and are discrete but disperseddispersed

•• Evidence that past Ceasefire program reduced Evidence that past Ceasefire program reduced violenceviolence

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WHAT DO WE KNOW WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT VIOLENCE?ABOUT VIOLENCE?

What do We Know About Violence?What do We Know About Violence?

•• Violence is learnedViolence is learnedViolence is learnedViolence is learned

•• Violence is contagiousViolence is contagious

•• Violence is not inevitableViolence is not inevitable

•• Violence can be stoppedViolence can be stopped

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Risk Factors for ViolenceRisk Factors for Violence

•• AntiAnti--social normssocial normsAntiAnti social normssocial norms

•• Availability of gunsAvailability of guns

•• School failureSchool failure

•• Having been a victim of violenceHaving been a victim of violence

Family violenceFamily violence•• Family violenceFamily violence

•• Lack of positive role modelsLack of positive role models

Hot Places – Violence is Concentrated

30,000 street segments in Seattle (4-5% accounted for 50% of crime incidents each year over 14 years)

• FINDINGS:

Crime is not a moving target

Prediction accuracy for future crime is higher for places than people

No evidence of displacement after focus on Hot Spots - a diffusion of good effects

Chronic, truant juveniles and Hot Spots overlap

(Weisburd 2012)(Weisburd 2012)

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Most violent youth desist

Gang involvement increases criminal activityGang involvement increases criminal activity -- onlyonlyGang involvement increases criminal activityGang involvement increases criminal activity onlyonlywhile in gangwhile in gang

Of youth convicted of serious felony offenses, only Of youth convicted of serious felony offenses, only 8%8% continued on continued on into the adult criminal justice systeminto the adult criminal justice system

(Pathways to Desistance Project)(Pathways to Desistance Project)

WHAT DOESNWHAT DOESN’’T WORK T WORK TO REDUCE VIOLENCETO REDUCE VIOLENCE

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Relative Effectiveness of CrimeRelative Effectiveness of Crime / Violence/ ViolenceReduction ProgramsReduction Programs

-- Ceasefire / Ceasefire ReCeasefire / Ceasefire Re--entryentry-- Hospital InterventionsHospital Interventions-- HOPE Probation Violation ProgramHOPE Probation Violation Program

3030 –– 50% Reduction50% ReductionHOPE Probation Violation ProgramHOPE Probation Violation Program

-- Street Outreach WorkersStreet Outreach Workers

-- Aggression Replacement Therapy Aggression Replacement Therapy -- High Risk Youth Crime PreventionHigh Risk Youth Crime Prevention-- Big Brother / Big SisterBig Brother / Big Sister-- MultiMulti--Systemic Family TreatmentSystemic Family Treatment

-- Supervision & Treatment and Supervision & Treatment and CognitiveCognitive

-- Neighborhood Disorder ReductionNeighborhood Disorder Reduction

2020 –– 30% Reduction30% Reduction

1010 –– 20% Reduction20% Reduction

Average RecidivismAverage RecidivismR d ti %R d ti %

-- Incarceration alone / Supervision onlyIncarceration alone / Supervision only-- GREAT Gang Education ProgramGREAT Gang Education Program

-- Scared StraightScared Straight-- Boot CampBoot Camp-- Intensive Supervision (no services)Intensive Supervision (no services)-- Juvenile Detention (all but High Juvenile Detention (all but High

Violent)Violent)

NOREDUCTIONNOREDUCTION

Increase Rate ofOffendingIncrease Rate ofOffending

Reduction ~ 10%Reduction ~ 10%

NYC Crime Reduction ExperienceNYC Crime Reduction Experience

Percent Drop in Crime (1991 –2000)

Challenges Assumptions aboutChallenges Assumptions aboutCrime/Violence Reduction:Crime/Violence Reduction:

-41%50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%NewYork City U.S.

2000)Crime/Violence Reduction:Crime/Violence Reduction:

•• No change in povertyNo change in poverty

•• No change in drug useNo change in drug use

•• 32% drop in prison commitments32% drop in prison commitments

•• Not explained by change in Not explained by change in demographicsdemographics

-80%90%

80%

70%

60%g pg p

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What Doesn‘t Work - Moving Individuals(Moving On Project)(Moving On Project)

WHAT DOES WORK TO WHAT DOES WORK TO REDUCE VIOLENCEREDUCE VIOLENCE

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Characteristics of What Works

•• Targeted Targeted –– high risk persons, high risk persons, places, situationsplaces, situations

•• Changes Behavior/NormsChanges Behavior/Norms

•• Clear and consistent messagesClear and consistent messages

•• Community engagement and moral Community engagement and moral voicevoice

•• Connect to servicesConnect to services

•• Consequences are swift & certainConsequences are swift & certain

•• Capacity of System to Capacity of System to RespondRespond

Two Approaches to Crime Control:Two Approaches to Crime Control:(Closing an Outdoor Drug Market)(Closing an Outdoor Drug Market)

1. Traditional (1. Traditional (‘‘The Hard WayThe Hard Way’’))••1000 officers1000 officers••6 months6 months••17,000 felony arrests17,000 felony arrests

Outcomes:Outcomes:Dried up drug marketDried up drug marketDried up drug marketDried up drug marketOverwhelmed CourtOverwhelmed CourtSuccess at great costSuccess at great cost

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2. Strategic: Ceasefire Model (The 2. Strategic: Ceasefire Model (The ‘‘Smart WaySmart Way’’))

Two Approaches to Crime Control:Two Approaches to Crime Control:(Closing an Outdoor Drug Market)(Closing an Outdoor Drug Market)

••Data analysis to target Data analysis to target ‘‘influential playersinfluential players’’••Warn in advance of consequencesWarn in advance of consequences••Communicate that their success is importantCommunicate that their success is important••Involve the CommunityInvolve the Community

••Small number of arrestsSmall number of arrests

Outcomes:Outcomes: Dried up Drug MarketDried up Drug MarketRequired little or noRequired little or noadditional resourcesadditional resources

THE PLANNING THE PLANNING APPROACHAPPROACH

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A Targeted System-Based Violence Reduction Strategy

Hot PersonsHot Persons Hot PlacesHot Places Hot SituationsHot Situations

Stop ViolenceStop Violence

Prevent Prevent Vi lVi lViolenceViolence

Build CapacityBuild Capacity

A SystemsA Systems--Based Approach to Violence Based Approach to Violence ReductionReduction

CITY OF CITY OF STOCKTONSTOCKTON

POLICEPOLICE

PreventionPrevention

Problem Problem SolvingSolving

ArrestArrestJail booking & Jail booking &

PrePre--Trial Trial ScreeningScreening

IncarcerationIncarceration

PrePre--TrialTrial

CourtsCourts

State PrisonState Prison

JailJail

ProbationProbation

DiversionDiversion

Parole / Parole / ProbationProbation

ProsecutionProsecution

PrePre TrialTrialReleaseRelease

Not GuiltyNot Guilty RevocationRevocation

PeacekeepersPeacekeepers Community (Schools Community (Schools –– Faith Based Faith Based –– Other Non Profits Other Non Profits –– Mental Health Mental Health –– Alcohol/Other Drugs (AODS)Alcohol/Other Drugs (AODS)

DismissedDismissed

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Stockton California

Marshall Plan

•A Violence Reduction Strategy

•David Bennett Consulting

•in association with

•Donna Lattin•8 February 2013

RECOMMENDATIONSRECOMMENDATIONS

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Our first recommendation has been Our first recommendation has been funded by the City and is under funded by the City and is under

development …development …

Operation CeasefireOperation Ceasefire

The SweepReentry

Jail/Prison

DATA & DATA & DATA & DATA & AnalysisAnalysis

--Hot SpotsHot Spots--Hot individualsHot individuals--Gang mappingGang mapping--Case/Incident Case/Incident

reviewreview--Monitoring & Monitoring & trackingtracking--EvaluationEvaluation

The Call-in

-- The ServicesThe Services-- Community Community ‘‘Moral Moral

VoiceVoice’’

OutreachOutreach

-- Probation Services Probation Services for High Violent (adult for High Violent (adult & youth)& youth)

-- PeacekeepersPeacekeepers

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The Stockton Violence Reduction PlanThe Stockton Violence Reduction Plan

1.1. Stop Violence: CeasefireStop Violence: Ceasefire--like Modelslike Models22 I t t Vi lI t t Vi l2.2. Interrupt ViolenceInterrupt Violence3.3. Change the Norms / Reclaim the NeighborhoodsChange the Norms / Reclaim the Neighborhoods4.4. Address NonAddress Non--group Violencegroup Violence5.5. Capability to Identify High Risk / Violent IndividualsCapability to Identify High Risk / Violent Individuals6.6. Prevent ViolencePrevent Violence77 Address TraumaAddress Trauma7.7. Address TraumaAddress Trauma8.8. Ensure System Capacity to Respond to ViolenceEnsure System Capacity to Respond to Violence9.9. Create a fair, humane and evidenceCreate a fair, humane and evidence--based Systembased System10.10.Sustain Violence Reduction EffortsSustain Violence Reduction Efforts

A Good Foundation From Which to Build•• EvidenceEvidence--based Probation & Mental Healthbased Probation & Mental Health•• Progressive Police ChiefProgressive Police Chief•• Sherriff incorporating evidenceSherriff incorporating evidence--based practicesbased practices•• New law enforcement collaborationsNew law enforcement collaborations•• Funding for new initiatives: Ceasefire, Violence Court, Violence Funding for new initiatives: Ceasefire, Violence Court, Violence

Probation Unit, Warrant Task Force, etc.Probation Unit, Warrant Task Force, etc.•• A superb Victim Services ProgramA superb Victim Services Program•• SJCOE SJCOE -- A culture of innovationA culture of innovation•• Community Initiative Community Initiative -- Ceasefire LifelineCeasefire Lifeline•• Excellent Community, Court, and University prevention programsExcellent Community, Court, and University prevention programs•• Involved business communityInvolved business community•• Politicians with passion to fix problemPoliticians with passion to fix problem

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The Roundtables The Roundtables (What We Heard from You)(What We Heard from You)•• People Change People … ItPeople Change People … It’’s all about relationshipss all about relationships

•• We need to better coordinate our servicesWe need to better coordinate our services

•• Sharing Information Sharing Information –– We must address the We must address the ‘‘digital dividedigital divide’’

•• Schools need help connecting kids in need with services (A Schools need help connecting kids in need with services (A Principal)Principal)

•• We need to establish mentor programsWe need to establish mentor programs

•• We need Community AmbassadorsWe need Community Ambassadors

•• We need a coordinated, neighborhood level response to We need a coordinated, neighborhood level response to homicidehomicide

Stop Violence - Hot Persons(Boston Re(Boston Re--entry Initiative)entry Initiative)

Hot Hot PersonsPersons

Hot Hot PlacesPlaces

Hot Hot SituationSituation

ss

Stop Stop ViolenceViolence xx

Prevent Prevent ViolenceViolence

Build Build CapacityCapacity

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Reducing Probationer Failure Reducing Probationer Failure (The HOPE Program)(The HOPE Program)

G t t h d f f ilG t t h d f f il




ss




Get out ahead of failureGet out ahead of failure

•• Target most difficult High Risk probationer, including violent, Target most difficult High Risk probationer, including violent, domestic violence, & sex offendersdomestic violence, & sex offenders

Judicial Warning Hearing:Judicial Warning Hearing:•• Communicate rules, consequences, & encourage complianceCommunicate rules, consequences, & encourage compliance•• Monitor & make treatment available (random drug tests)Monitor & make treatment available (random drug tests)( g )( g )•• Swift but short Jail sanctionsSwift but short Jail sanctions

Outcomes:Outcomes:•• Significant reductions in drug use & reSignificant reductions in drug use & re--arrestarrest

Hot People Hot People –– Seriously Mentally Seriously Mentally IllIll

Mentally ill are involved in 4% of violent crimesMentally ill are involved in 4% of violent crimes




ss




•• Mentally ill are involved in 4% of violent crimesMentally ill are involved in 4% of violent crimes

•• 11 times more likely to be victims of violence11 times more likely to be victims of violence

•• Targeted Prison ReTargeted Prison Re--Entry with wraparound services Entry with wraparound services achieves significant reductions in violence & crimeachieves significant reductions in violence & crime

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2323

•• Ceasefire (35Ceasefire (35 -- 55% reduction)55% reduction)

Stop Violence Stop Violence –– Hot PeopleHot PeopleHot Hot

PersonsPersonsHot Hot

PlacesPlaces


ss




Ceasefire (35Ceasefire (35 55% reduction)55% reduction)

•• Ceasefire ReCeasefire Re--entry (35%+ reduction)entry (35%+ reduction)

•• Probation HOPE (27% reduction)Probation HOPE (27% reduction)

•• Seriously Mentally Ill Offender Program (reduction)Seriously Mentally Ill Offender Program (reduction)

•• Family unit Probation for multiFamily unit Probation for multi generational violentgenerational violent•• Family unit Probation for multiFamily unit Probation for multi--generational violentgenerational violentfamiliesfamilies

Hot Places Hot Places –– Blight & Disorder Blight & Disorder (Cincinnati Neighborhood Enhancement (Cincinnati Neighborhood Enhancement Program)Program)




ss

Stop Stop ViolenceViolence

Prevent Prevent ViolenceViolence xx


Coordinated 90Coordinated 90--day disorder blitzday disorder blitz

••Target Hot Spaces (crime, code violations, disorder calls, indicators of Target Hot Spaces (crime, code violations, disorder calls, indicators of blight)blight)

••Identify local stakeholders (City & Community Team)Identify local stakeholders (City & Community Team)

••Create list of improvements (crime prevention information,Create list of improvements (crime prevention information,Create list of improvements (crime prevention information,Create list of improvements (crime prevention information,neighborhood cleanups, code neighborhood cleanups, code enforcement, vacant property enforcement, vacant property inspection, etc.)inspection, etc.)

••9090--day followday follow--up and closeout press up and closeout press conference / 1conference / 1--year followyear follow--upup

Image source: http://www.soapboxmedia.com/devnews/nepaward0603.aspxImage source: http://www.soapboxmedia.com/devnews/nepaward0603.aspx

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Cincinnati Neighborhood Enhancement Cincinnati Neighborhood Enhancement ProgramProgram Outcome:Outcome:

•• Reduced crime in focus areas up to 3 years afterReduced crime in focus areas up to 3 years afterReduced crime in focus areas up to 3 years afterReduced crime in focus areas up to 3 years afterimplementation of Strategic 90implementation of Strategic 90--day Disorder day Disorder ResponseResponse

Hot Situations Hot Situations (Hospital Response Program)(Hospital Response Program)

•• PeerPeer--based hospital intervention program for violentlybased hospital intervention program for violently




ss




PeerPeer based hospital intervention program for violentlybased hospital intervention program for violentlyinjured youthinjured youth

•• Goals:Goals:Reduce RetaliationReduce RetaliationReduce reReduce re--injuryinjuryDecrease arrest ratesDecrease arrest rates

O t 50% d ti i i lO t 50% d ti i i l•• Outcomes 50% + reductions in violenceOutcomes 50% + reductions in violence

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Hot Situations Hot Situations (Hospital Response Program)(Hospital Response Program)




ss




““Without this program family & friends means Without this program family & friends means retaliation. They stand by the bed of someone who is retaliation. They stand by the bed of someone who is shot and make a plan to go get the guy who put him shot and make a plan to go get the guy who put him there to show how much they respect him.there to show how much they respect him.”” (Sherman (Sherman Spears, coSpears, co--founder of Caught in the Crossfire Program)founder of Caught in the Crossfire Program)

Images: http://www.youthalive.org/caughtImages: http://www.youthalive.org/caught--inin--thethe--crossfire/crossfire/

High Risk Persons High Risk Persons -- PreventionPrevention

•• Youth Accountability Board + MentorsYouth Accountability Board + Mentors




ss




Youth Accountability Board MentorsYouth Accountability Board Mentors

•• High Risk Afterschool program + Mentors (Becoming High Risk Afterschool program + Mentors (Becoming a Man Program)a Man Program)

•• Expanded opportunities Expanded opportunities ((YouthbuildYouthbuild + Business + Business Mentors)Mentors)Mentors)Mentors)

Images: http://www.youthImages: http://www.youth--guidance.org/ourguidance.org/our--programs/bprograms/b--aa--mm--becomingbecoming--aa--man/man/

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Prevent Violence Oregon High Risk Youth Prevention Program




ss




•• ID High RiskID High Risk•• Entry point: School /Juvenile Justice (60 / 40%)Entry point: School /Juvenile Justice (60 / 40%)•• Offer range of programsOffer range of programs

• Most effective interventions:-- MentorsMentors-- School engagementSchool engagement

•• IncreaseIncreased recidivism when targeting d recidivism when targeting low risklow risk

Prevent Violence - High Risk Situations (Address Trauma)

•• Boys with an incarcerated father are 40% more likely to act outBoys with an incarcerated father are 40% more likely to act out




ss




•• Boys with an incarcerated father are 40% more likely to act outBoys with an incarcerated father are 40% more likely to act outaggressively aggressively

•• Chronic stress can affect brain development and the immune Chronic stress can affect brain development and the immune system. system.

•• Chronic stress can create a state of Chronic stress can create a state of ‘‘High AlertHigh Alert’’

Research• Research

-- Sensitive and supportive careSensitive and supportive care--giving can buffer the effects of stressgiving can buffer the effects of stress

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A Targeted System-Based Violence Reduction Strategy

Hot PersonsHot Persons Hot PlacesHot Places Hot SituationsHot Situations

Stop ViolenceStop Violence-- CeasefireCeasefire-- Ceasefire (ReCeasefire (Re--entry)entry)-- Mentally Ill ReMentally Ill Re--entryentry

-- Outreach WorkersOutreach Workers-- Ceasefire/LifetimeCeasefire/Lifetime

-- Hospital ResponseHospital Response

Prevent Prevent Vi lVi l

-- Prevention ProgramPrevention Program-- Mentors +Mentors +-- School AftercareSchool Aftercare

-- Neighborhood Disorder Neighborhood Disorder Reduction TeamsReduction Teams--NeighborhoodNeighborhood

-- Address TraumaAddress Trauma

ViolenceViolence -- Youth Accountability Youth Accountability BoardBoard

AmbassadorsAmbassadors

Build CapacityBuild Capacity-- More PoliceMore Police-- ‘‘One Empty BedOne Empty Bed’’-- PrePre--TrialTrial

-- Community Corrections Community Corrections Center (CCC)Center (CCC)

Philosophy Philosophy -- Do No Harm:Do No Harm:-- End Zero Tolerance End Zero Tolerance --schoolschool-- ReRe--examine juvenile examine juvenile remand remand


1.1. Stop Violence: CeasefireStop Violence: Ceasefire--like Modelslike ModelsCeasefireCeasefireHOPE ProbationHOPE ProbationCeasefire ReCeasefire Re--entryentry

2.2. Interrupt Violence:Interrupt Violence:HospitalHospital--based peer interventionbased peer interventionStreet outreach workers (Peacekeepers)Street outreach workers (Peacekeepers)

3.3. Change the Norms / Reclaim the NeighborhoodsChange the Norms / Reclaim the Neighborhoods9090--day Hot Spot Disorder blitzday Hot Spot Disorder blitz

4.4. Address NonAddress Non--group Violencegroup ViolenceSeriously mentally ill reSeriously mentally ill re--entryentryImprove response to domestic violenceImprove response to domestic violence

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Violence Reduction Plan (continued …)Violence Reduction Plan (continued …)

5.5. Capability to Identify High Risk / Violent IndividualsCapability to Identify High Risk / Violent IndividualsDevelop PreDevelop Pre--trial risk tool (intrial risk tool (in--progress)progress)Validate Probation risk toolValidate Probation risk toolApply risk tool across the system (Courts, Jail, and ReApply risk tool across the system (Courts, Jail, and Re--entry)entry)Fund Police data softwareFund Police data software

6.6. Prevent Violence:Prevent Violence:Keep kids in school: Youth Accountability BoardKeep kids in school: Youth Accountability BoardAttach high risk youth to supportive adults and opportunities (Becoming a Attach high risk youth to supportive adults and opportunities (Becoming a Man Program; YouthBuild)Man Program; YouthBuild)

7.7. Address Trauma:Address Trauma:Counseling + MentorsCounseling + Mentors

8.8. Ensure System Capacity to Respond to ViolenceEnsure System Capacity to Respond to Violence

9.9. Create a Fair, Humane and EvidenceCreate a Fair, Humane and Evidence--based Systembased System

10.10.Sustain Violence Reduction EffortsSustain Violence Reduction Efforts

ENSURE CAPACITY TO ENSURE CAPACITY TO RESPOND TO VIOLENCERESPOND TO VIOLENCE

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System Capacity System Capacity (Law Enforcement)(Law Enforcement)

Support Dr BragaSupport Dr Braga’’s Recommendation for 2 Polices Recommendation for 2 Police




ss



Build Build CapacityCapacity xx

Support Dr. BragaSupport Dr. Braga s Recommendation for 2 Polices Recommendation for 2 PoliceOfficers per 1000: Officers per 1000:

••CurrentCurrent -- 344344

••Recommended Recommended -- 590590

DESIGNING AN DESIGNING AN EVIDENCEEVIDENCE--BASED BASEDCRIMINAL JUSTICE CRIMINAL JUSTICE

SYSTEMSYSTEM

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Traditional System NewPunishment Focus • Behavior Change focus

Creating an EvidenceCreating an Evidence--Based SystemBased System

• Throw Wide Net / Zero Tolerance • Targeted risk-based intervention

• Severe response • Swift & short

• Sporadic & delayed responses • Certain & immediate responses

• Focus on individuals • Violence: Focus on groups

• Exit Custody without a plan • Step-down from Jail/Prison with support

• Family & Community rarely involved • Family & Community involved

• Jail overcrowding undermines System Integrity • ‘One Empty Bed’ strategy

Step Violent Offenders to the Community from Custody (The Community Corrections Center – A New Paradigm)

•• High Violent exit with job High Violent exit with job search skills, mentor, and search skills, mentor, and continued treatmentcontinued treatment

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Community Corrections CenterCommunity Corrections Center(Success Rate)(Success Rate)

87 percent of admissions successfully87 percent of admissions successfully•• 87 percent of admissions successfully87 percent of admissions successfullycompleted programcompleted program

•• Unsuccessful:Unsuccessful:

•• 9% rules violation9% rules violation

•• 3% walk away/escape3% walk away/escape

•• 1% new crime1% new crime

Washington County, OR Jail

Jail Treatment Participants (3 years before and 3 years after Jail treatment)

Washington County, OR Jail

Jail Treatment Participants (3 years before and 3 years after Jail treatment)

N = 940 Arrests FelonyConvictions

PersonConvictions

Percent Reduction 45% 53% 61%

NOTE:NOTE: A high percentage of the inmates also accessed the CCCA high percentage of the inmates also accessed the CCC

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Policies that Support Better Offender Policies that Support Better Offender OutcomesOutcomes

•• CaliforniaCalifornia’’s system is a failures system is a failureCaliforniaCalifornia s system is a failures system is a failure

•• One of highest prison return rates in nation (67.5% One of highest prison return rates in nation (67.5% within 3 years)within 3 years)

•• Realignment (AB 109): LetRealignment (AB 109): Let’’s not repeat failures of the s not repeat failures of the State at the local levelState at the local level

Realignment IssuesRealignment Issues

•• No change in Sentencing PoliciesNo change in Sentencing PoliciesNo change in Sentencing PoliciesNo change in Sentencing Policies

•• Funding formula based on past use of PrisonFunding formula based on past use of Prison

•• No outcome data requiredNo outcome data required

•• No State standardsNo State standards

No provision for PreNo provision for Pre Trial ServicesTrial Services•• No provision for PreNo provision for Pre--Trial ServicesTrial Services

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ENSURE CRIMINAL ENSURE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM CANJUSTICE SYSTEM CANJUSTICE SYSTEM CANJUSTICE SYSTEM CAN

DELIVER SWIFT & DELIVER SWIFT & CERTAIN CERTAIN

CONSEQUNCESCONSEQUNCESCONSEQUNCESCONSEQUNCES

The Current System is BrokenThe Current System is Broken

•• A 1A 1--year sentence = 45 days in Jailyear sentence = 45 days in JailA 1A 1 year sentence 45 days in Jailyear sentence 45 days in Jail

•• High number of overcrowding releasesHigh number of overcrowding releases

•• Only 10% of inmates who start Jail treatment finishOnly 10% of inmates who start Jail treatment finish

•• 47% probationers are on warrant status47% probationers are on warrant status

Majority of Jail beds are occupied by PreMajority of Jail beds are occupied by Pre TrialTrial•• Majority of Jail beds are occupied by PreMajority of Jail beds are occupied by Pre--TrialTrialdefendantsdefendants

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System Integrity System Integrity ((‘‘The One Empty BedThe One Empty Bed’’ Strategy)Strategy)

•• Fund Core ProgramsFund Core Programs•• Detox resourcesDetox resources•• FullFull--service Preservice Pre--Trial ProgramTrial Program

•• Create System Efficiencies: Same Justice SoonerCreate System Efficiencies: Same Justice Sooner

•• Ensure EvidenceEnsure Evidence--Based Policies: RealignmentBased Policies: Realignmentgg

System IntegritySystem Integrity(Pre(Pre--Trial)Trial)

•• Risk & violence should Risk & violence should dictate release, not dictate release, not having $$ in pockethaving $$ in pocket

•• Need comprehensive PreNeed comprehensive Pre--Trial services programTrial services program

Goals ViolenceGoals Violence•• Goals: ViolenceGoals: Violenceprotection, achieving protection, achieving ‘‘One OneEmpty BedEmpty Bed’’, and fair & , and fair & equal justiceequal justice

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DEVELOP CRIMINAL DEVELOP CRIMINAL JUSTICE MASTER PLANJUSTICE MASTER PLAN

Criminal Justice System Master PlanCriminal Justice System Master Plan

•• The Violence Reduction Plan should be part of aThe Violence Reduction Plan should be part of aThe Violence Reduction Plan should be part of aThe Violence Reduction Plan should be part of alarger System Master Planlarger System Master Plan

DataData--Based Management of offenders across the criminal Based Management of offenders across the criminal justice systemjustice system

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SUSTAIN VIOLENCESUSTAIN VIOLENCE--REDUCTION EFFORTSREDUCTION EFFORTS

Create an Office of Violence PreventionCreate an Office of Violence Prevention

•• Collect & analyze dataCollect & analyze dataCollect & analyze dataCollect & analyze data

•• Recruit & train outreach workersRecruit & train outreach workers

•• Recruit mentorsRecruit mentors

•• Support Community blight reduction effortsSupport Community blight reduction efforts

Develop new crime education initiatives: involve youthDevelop new crime education initiatives: involve youth•• Develop new crime education initiatives: involve youthDevelop new crime education initiatives: involve youth

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A Systems Violence Reduction PlanA Systems Violence Reduction PlanCITY OF CITY OF

STOCKTONSTOCKTON

POLICEPOLICE



ArrestArrestJail booking & Jail booking &

PrePre--Trial Trial ScreeningScreening


PrePre--TrialTrial

CourtsCourts


JailJail

ProbationProbation

DiversionDiversion



PrePre TrialTrialReleaseRelease



DismissedDismissed

A Systems Violence Reduction PlanA Systems Violence Reduction PlanNew: Community Resource TeamNew: Warrant FocusNew: Camera Rom Operator

CITY OF CITY OF STOCKTONSTOCKTON

POLICEPOLICE



ArrestArrest Jail bookingJail booking


Release bond / Release bond /

CourtsCourts


JailJail

ProbationProbation

Diversion



New: Camera Rom OperatorNew: Enforcement CollaborationsNew: Community Advisory BoardNew: Project CeasefireAdd: 200+ OfficersAdd: Fund Data Analysis SoftwareAdd: Disorder/Code TeamAdd: Sustain & expand Ceasefire (DomesticViolence, etc.)

own own recognizance)recognizance)



DismissedDismissed

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1.1. Stop Violence: CeasefireStop Violence: Ceasefire--like Modelslike ModelsCeasefireCeasefireHOPE ProbationHOPE ProbationCeasefire ReCeasefire Re--entryentryCeasefire ReCeasefire Re entryentry

2.2. Interrupt Violence:Interrupt Violence:HospitalHospital--based peer interventionbased peer interventionStreet outreach workers (Peacekeepers)Street outreach workers (Peacekeepers)

3.3. Change the Norms / Reclaim the NeighborhoodsChange the Norms / Reclaim the Neighborhoods9090--day Hot Spot Disorder blitzday Hot Spot Disorder blitz

4.4. Address NonAddress Non--group Violencegroup ViolenceSeriously mentally ill reSeriously mentally ill re--entryentryImpro e response to domestic iolenceImpro e response to domestic iolenceImprove response to domestic violenceImprove response to domestic violence

5.5. Capability to Identify High Risk / Violent IndividualsCapability to Identify High Risk / Violent IndividualsDevelop PreDevelop Pre--trial risk tool (intrial risk tool (in--progress)progress)Validate Probation risk toolValidate Probation risk toolApply risk tool across the system (Courts, Jail, and ReApply risk tool across the system (Courts, Jail, and Re--entry)entry)Fund Police data softwareFund Police data software

Violence Reduction Plan (continued …)Violence Reduction Plan (continued …)

6.6. Prevent Violence:Prevent Violence:Keep kids in school: Youth Accountability BoardKeep kids in school: Youth Accountability BoardAttach high risk youth to supportive adults and opportunities Attach high risk youth to supportive adults and opportunities (Becoming a Man Program; YouthBuild)(Becoming a Man Program; YouthBuild)(Becoming a Man Program; YouthBuild)(Becoming a Man Program; YouthBuild)

7.7. Address Trauma:Address Trauma:Counseling + MentorsCounseling + Mentors

8.8. Ensure System Capacity to Respond to ViolenceEnsure System Capacity to Respond to ViolenceAdd Police OfficersAdd Police Officers‘‘One Empty BedOne Empty Bed’’: Pre: Pre--Trial Services; Detox; System efficienciesTrial Services; Detox; System efficiencies

9.9. Create a fair, humane and evidenceCreate a fair, humane and evidence--based System:based System:Community Corrections CenterCommunity Corrections Center

1010 S stain Violence Red ction EffortsS stain Violence Red ction Efforts10.10.Sustain Violence Reduction EffortsSustain Violence Reduction EffortsOffice of Violence PreventionOffice of Violence Prevention

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What WeWhat We’’ve Done & Where Weve Done & Where We’’re Going re Going -- HANDOUTSHANDOUTS

NEXT STEPS …NEXT STEPS …

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EinsteinEinstein

InsanityInsanity:: doing the same thing over and doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different over again and expecting different resultsresults

Clint Eastwood (Super Bowl 2012)Clint Eastwood (Super Bowl 2012)

“…..It’s half“…..It’s half--time in America (Stockton)….. We time in America (Stockton)….. We

find a way through tough times, and if we can’t find a way through tough times, and if we can’t

find a way, then we’ll make one. All that matters find a way, then we’ll make one. All that matters

now is what’s ahead, how do we come from now is what’s ahead, how do we come from

behind How do we come together It’s halfbehind How do we come together It’s halfbehind. How do we come together ….. It’s halfbehind. How do we come together ….. It’s half--

time America (Stockton) and our second half is time America (Stockton) and our second half is

about to begin.”about to begin.”

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Voltaire (Famous French Voltaire (Famous French Philosopher)Philosopher)

“No problem can withstand the assault of “No problem can withstand the assault of

sustained thinking.”sustained thinking.”

Deis (Nobody)Deis (Nobody)

“N bl ith t d th lt“N bl ith t d th lt“No problem can withstand the assault“No problem can withstand the assault

of sustained thinking of sustained thinking and then sustained and then sustained

execution”execution”

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Next StepsNext Steps

Written report and presentation to Written report and presentation to p pp pProject Sponsor (City Council)Project Sponsor (City Council)

Conversation with communityConversation with community

If okay, how does the City pay for it’s If okay, how does the City pay for it’s role?role?role?role?

Bankruptcy CheckBankruptcy Check--InIn

Execution (When & How)Execution (When & How)

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Documents

Eligibility Reply Declaration of Eric Jones ISO Reply to ... · 13. Neumark and Brann argue that because Stockton police officers transferred to Departments located in cities like