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essentials

the most vital element of US National security is not secure. The electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) is the range of all possible frequencies of electromagnetic radiation,

including radio waves, microwaves, gamma, X-ray, and infrared. Its impor-tance lies in the fact that virtually every technology used today needs to access and exploit the EMS, from cellular to Wi-Fi, to advanced military weaponry. The National security requirements are extensive, such as getting directions from a global positioning system, using radar to land a plane, flying a drone, finding and detonating an improvised explosive device, or simply communi-cating with a forward operating base.1 These technologies bring great capabili-ties and promise, but are accompanied by vulnerabilities based upon a depen-dency for reliable access to the EMS.

Challenges come in a variety of forms and combinations to make EMS depen-dency a particularly vexing problem. Dependencies span military operations, civilian infrastructure, critical govern-ment capabilities, the global economy and public safety. Furthermore, they are aggravated by a limited spectrum faced with seemingly endless requirements for more spectrum allocation.

The EMS is a maneuver space that transcends all operational domains; air, space, land, sea and cyber. The cyber

ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM (EMS)

The New Wave of Warfare – Battling to Dominate the Electromagnetic SpectrumBy Dr. J. Phillip London

domain, in particular, is defined by the physics of the electromagnetic spectrum, electronics, and the systems used to ac-cess and exploit their characteristics. Cyber is America’s center of gravity, enabling indispensable daily functions, like power generation, transportation, industrial processes, communications, lo-gistics, financial and legal transactions, as well as military operations includ-ing exploitation, attack and computer network defense, C5ISR and Electronic Warfare (EW). Cyber superiority is the prerequisite for effective operations in all domains, from tactical to strategic levels.

It is critically important for the US to achieve and maintain a dominant capability in the use of the EMS for military applications. Despite its ubiq-uitous importance, the spectrum’s role in national security has not been recog-

nized and acted upon, partially because of the United States’ confidence in its technological and military superiority. Potential adversaries are systematical-ly working to reduce that superiority by “developing and fielding Electronic Attack (EA) and cyberspace technolo-gies that are intended to significantly reduce the ability of DoD to access the spectrum and conduct military opera-tions.”2 Russia’s recently-demonstrated ability to disconnect Ukrainian forces in Crimea from their command and con-trol confirmed two disconcerting facts: the dexterity of Russia’s cyber warfare capabilities and that the US was no lon-ger the only country capable of doing this non-kinetically. Similarly, known in Chinese military doctrine as the “5th battlefield”, Chinese information opera-tions/cyber units are fully integrated

The electromagnetic spectrum is the distribution of electromagnetic radiation. Virtually every technology used today needs to access and exploit the EMS. (NASA)

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with EW to operate across the electro-magnetic spectrum.3

Increasing demonstrations by state (and non-state actors) show that the first battle of any future war will be for command of the air, space and the EMS. However, the US is neither adequately prepared to withstand and counter the growing threat, nor armed with suffi-ciently robust offensive capacity. The growing challenge for the US is to be able to successfully exploit the spectrum – as a capability and as a battlefield.

MANEUVERING ROOMAmerican defense, whether defined

by strategic paradigms, like cross-do-main dominance and air-sea-battle, or capabilities, such as drones and cyber at-tack, depends upon the ability to employ and exploit the EMS. “Electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) access is a prerequisite for modern military operations. DOD’s growing requirements to gather, ana-lyze and share information rapidly; to control an increasing number of auto-mated Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets; to com-mand geographically dispersed and mo-bile forces to gain access into denied areas; and to ‘train-as-we-fight’ requires that DOD maintain sufficient spectrum access.”4 The military, however, isn’t alone in their need for sufficient spec-trum support.

The exponential growth of modern conveniences, communications and technologies has crowded the spectrum. The electromagnetic spectrum is a com-petitive and managed space, with the American radio frequency spectrum al-located among federal and non-federal services, and governed by different orga-nizations.5 The greatest competition for spectrum access today comes from the global wireless broadband industry as it tries to meet the growing consumer de-mand for mobility and data. The conflicts are troubling Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Jonathan Greenert, “The Federal Communications Commission came to the Defense Department and said industry would like to purchase rights to some frequency bands to do broadband. We would need for you guys to move off this

band if we want to sell it. To me, I said this never is going to end.”6

The importance and urgency in re-solving these challenges is amplified by the need to train in, and through, the spectrum. “Our forces need to be able to deny adversary sensors the ability to track our ships, but if that fails, they need to be able to rapidly coordinate the optimal countermeasures across multiple ships and aircraft which will provide pro-tection to everyone in the line of fire.”7 As operations in the EMS evolve, new and specialized facilities for testing and training will be necessary. Also key to the concept of spectrum warfare is the ability

for commanders to understand the elec-tromagnetic environment; to ascertain and achieve the most advantageous elec-tromagnetic configurations; to determine which electromagnetic spectra are likely to be beneficial to an adversary; and to impose denial/disruptive conditions on the adversary. Such electromagnetic situ-ational awareness must become intuitive and automated, with awareness and tools to match.

The importance of spectrum manage-ment and the complexity of training throughout the spectrum present consid-

erable challenges. “DOD recognizes that the electromagnetic environment (EME) will be increasingly congested and con-tested wherever military operations oc-cur. DOD’s spectrum access will continue to be challenged by adversaries on the battlefield and debated in National and international forums where leadership will need to balance National defense, economic, and other National interests. DOD must be able to address these chal-lenges to provide spectrum access when and where needed by the warfighter.”8 What makes the EMS a leading National security priority is that others are already taking this challenge head on.

BLINDING THREATSWhile the electromagnetic spectrum

has always existed, its importance in battle only emerged in the last cen-tury. In 1904, a Russian telegraph op-erator jammed the radio of an attacking Japanese ship. By World War II, the dis-ruption of enemy radar and communica-tions was a common practice. During the Cold War, both super powers invested in exploitation of the EMS, but the United States was believed to be a generation ahead of any other country in develop-ing the electronic warfare equipment

A US Navy cryptologic technician monitors the electromagnetic spectrum of air and surface contacts in the combat information center aboard the guided-missile destroyer USS Ramage. (US Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Jared King/Released)

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and skills.9 In the early 1990s, the US military’s radio-frequency jammers were expensive and secretive technologies.

This dominance began to quickly erode with the decline of the old world order and rise of new technological innovation.

Through 12 years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US realized that technological superiority wasn’t nec-essarily a great advantage, as demon-strated by introduction of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Around 2002, al-Qaeda bomb-makers were making radio-controlled weapons by cramming radio frequency receivers and simple digital signal decoders into fluorescent lamps, and then connecting them to fir-ing circuits and Soviet-era munitions.10 An expanded number of threat actors have access to cheaper and more deadly weapons. “Inexpensive jammers, signal detectors, computer processors and radios make it easier for unfriendly states, ter-rorists, and criminals to manage their efforts while jamming our own ability to sense and communicate. Meanwhile, the number of users in the EM spectrum has grown dramatically over the last two decades. The result is an environment we struggle to sense, understand and use in warfare.”11

The struggle is further complicated by distance. Land-based conflicts where US forces create a physical presence offered some protection for military networks. But, those networks become increasingly vulnerable as security interests and op-erations move into new territory or as distances increase. A prime example is the challenge of the Asia pivot, from the sheer size of the region (mostly ocean) to the dependence on regional allies for America’s physical presence. “Things get much harder against Far East targets when we don’t have a dominating US military footprint in the region as we did with Iraq and Afghanistan. Command and control become even more exposed to attack, because we lack the resources on the ground to protect it. Also, without a physical footprint we rely even more greatly on unmanned systems.”12 This fact is not lost within the region.

In 2011, the former Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance stated that his greatest con-cern wasn’t a fighter jet or anti-ship bal-listic missile, but “‘China’s capabilities for non-kinetic combat, its potential to ‘develop capabilities to dominate in the electromagnetic spectrum,’ which…

A U.S. Army electronic warfare officer inspects a component of a counter radio-controlled electronic warfare (CREW) system at Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Jarred Woods, 1st Sustainment Command)

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Marine Corps Spectrum Maneuver WarfareOCTOBER 28-29 2015 | MCAS CHERRY POINT, NC

As the Marine Corps moves forward to reconfigure and refit to meet the vision of Expeditionary Force 21 it understands that freedom of movement in the electromagnetic spectrum and cyberspace is the key enabler to 21st century military operations, and one of the critical challenges when developing these capabilities is integrating and synchronizing EMS and cyberspace operations. Successfully integrating the F-35 Lightning II, current and planned UAS systems, and ground based EW and SIGINT platforms to employ game changing technologies will enable the MAGTF to take full advantage of vulnerabilities and opportunities in the EMS and Cyberspace to execute C3, maneuver, and kinetic and non-kinetic fires. This Marine Corps Spectrum Maneuver Warfare Conference will address the challenges of employing a system-of-systems approach to gain EMS and cyberspace superiority. Four sessions will provide information on the Marine Corps vision, emerging doctrine, future threat, capability requirements, the Cyber Electronic Warfare Coordination Cell and EW training. The conference will culminate with working groups that will address some of the challenges the Marine Corps faces as it moves forward in acquiring and integrating the capabilities required to provide EMS situational awareness, and synchronized operations in the EMS and cyber domain. The conference will also include tours of the ICAP III simulators and a flight line static display featuring the EA-6B, EA-18G, F-35 (TBD), RQ-7B and Marine Corps ground EW platforms. Register now!

R E G I S T E R N O W AT WWW.CROWS.ORG

EXHIBIT TABLES AVAILABLE! CONTACT SHELLEY FROST, FROST@CROWS.ORG, FOR MORE INFORMAT ION.

REGISTRATION

NOW OPEN!

www.crows.org

LtGen Jon M. DavisDeputy Commandant for Aviation Headquarters Marine Corps

BGen Loretta Reynolds (invited)

Principal Director OUSD Policy South/Southeast Asia

MGen H. Stacy Clardy (invited)

Deputy Director for Force Management, Application and Support, J8

KEYNOTE SPEAKERS

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could be ‘game-changing.’”13 Since the emergence of its first information war-fare units in the early 1990s, the driv-ing force in Chinese military strategy has been gaining leverage. The EMS is no exception. China “views EW as an ‘impor-tant force multiplier,’” particularly in its

goals to achieve information advantages. According to the Pentagon, China has already “begun to incorporate EW within other existing and emerging systems such as aircraft and armored ground.”14 Of note was how quickly the Chinese Air Force has been closing the capabilities gap. The Global Positioning System (GPS) is a prime example. “The Air Force takes the threat of a Chinese electromagnetic assault so seriously that it’s stepping up efforts to train its pilots how to fly with-out the aid of GPS, radar, or even radio communications. The Navy, meanwhile, is testing an antenna that will hope-fully allow drones to quickly reestablish links with GPS satellites in the wake of a significant jamming attack.” To protect their forces from similar vulnerability, China is expected to complete work on its own 35-satellite navigation system called Compass by 2020. Further Chinese developments include jamming systems that could neutralize radar-dependent guided weapons, such as air-to-air mis-siles and cruise missiles, “a weapon es-

sential to American naval might.” The Army would also feel the sting of such EMS capabilities, as unmanned ground vehicles and ground-based drones could be made inoperable by Chinese jammers.15 Recent statements concerning space and counter-space operations and capabili-

ties also reveal Chinese intentions to contest the US advantage in space and the EMS utilization associated with that advantage.

While China may be the United States’ greatest competitor in the electromagnet-ic spectrum, other countries and threat actors are willing – and able – to com-pete in this maneuver space. For example, “Russian-backed separatists in Ukraine and their state sponsors have ‘very defi-nitely’ been using advanced electronic warfare equipment.”16 The availability of $25 Chinese-made jammers online is just one example of the increasing accessibil-ity of EMS capabilities and tools to more non-state and individual threat actors. “The reality today is that the spectrum is a very busy place in wartime, and an adversary will migrate to whichever seg-ment the US is not controlling and exploit that vulnerability to their advantage.”17 To fight and win in today’s asymmetric threat environment, the US cannot afford to lose any advantages. Nor can it display any vulnerability.

RIDING THE WAVEAs early as 1973, a Soviet admiral pre-

dicted that “The next war will be won by the side that best exploits the elec-tromagnetic spectrum.”18 As the strate-gic concepts driving National security embrace cross-domain dominance, it has become clear that control of their operating space – the electromagnetic spectrum – is fundamental. “Command of the electromagnetic spectrum has come to be regarded as a crucial advantage in modern combat, in much the same way that command of the sea and command of the air are.”19 Access to, and dominance of, the EMS maneuver space can no longer be taken for granted.

The DOD’s 2013 Electromagnetic Spectrum Strategy emphasized access management and technology solutions for freeing up spectrum, driven by the growing demand for timely information at every level of the military. “Increasingly, lower echelons, including individual soldiers, require situational awareness information resulting in more spectrum-enabled network links. The growth in the complexity of modern military systems has similarly led to an increase in spec-trum requirements.”20 The new strategy is not enough to meet these demands. First, implementation requires new regulatory and policy initiatives. Second, existing technologies have to be adapted to new spectrum requirements. Third, funding is needed to retroactively build spectrum flexibility into older weapon systems. “Most new systems today are much more agile on the frequency side and in the electromagnetic spectrum as a whole, but some of the older, legacy systems, that’s where we have to work through on the implementation plan to see how we want to address those.”21

The next steps in the Pentagon’s spec-trum strategy will focus on “developing an implementation plan that includes a governance structure, a road map and ac-tion plan that will chart our way to meet-ing the strategy’s vision.”22 The Services have been making some headway. The Army has issued a doctrine for cyber electromagnetic activities. The Navy has been investing in both its defensive and offensive EMS capabilities, such as its

China is considered to be the biggest challenger to the U.S. across the spectrum. (DoD photo by D. Myles Cullen/Released)

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Inaugural Cyber Electromagnetic Activity 2015Synchronizing Cyber Electromagnetic Activities to Win in a Complex World

OCTOBER 6-8, 2015 / ABERDEEN, MD

The International AOC and APG Susquehanna Chapter of the AOC, under a co-sponsorship agreement with Army Team C4ISR APG, will hold the Inaugural CEMA 2015 Conference at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.

The theme for the inaugural CEMA 2015 event is “Synchronizing Cyber Electromagnetic Activities to Win in a Complex World.” The newly published Army Operating Concept emphasizes the importance of ready land forces and their significance to the joint and coalition fight, and recognizes the need for continued innovation to “Win in a Complex World.” Cyberspace operations, in conjunction with electronic warfare and electromagnetic spectrum operations are identified in the Army Operating Concept as one of the seven core Army competency areas critical to shaping the operational environment and winning decisively. Equally new is the concept of Cyber Electromagnetic Activities, or CEMA, which is outlined in the first doctrinal field manual of its kind that integrates and synchronizes cyberspace operations, electronic warfare (EW), and spectrum management operations (SMO). The CEMA 2015 event will allow for an exchange of ideas, concepts and information, and provide a venue to address these new and emerging concepts and a framework to discuss ongoing and future research and development to set the conditions for innovation and success.

Attending the CEMA 2015 event will also provide the Army and DoD Electronic Warfare and Cyber communities of interest an opportunity to meet with and discuss the current and emerging Electronic and Cyber Warfare requirements with Coalition partners, industry technicians, engineers, and scientists and other Government agencies and learn from their successes.

There are a number of keynote and breakout sessions, along with hands-on product demonstrations that will offer a combination of current and emerging requirements, engineering theory and practical operations of the latest electronic warfare and offensive cyber capabilities.

R E G I S T E R N O W AT WWW.CROWS.ORG

AGENDA(subject to change)

Monday October 5, 2015 (invitation only)

AFTERNOON Session 1: Cyber Electro-Magnetic Activity

(CEMA) Cell User Session (invitation only)

Tuesday October 6, 2015MORNING Session 2: Trends in Electromagnetic Spectrum

Capabilities (Unclassified)

AFTERNOON Session 3: Threats, Capability Gaps, and

Requirements (Classified Rel FVEY)

Wednesday October 7, 2015MORNING Session 4: Cyber EW Convergence (Unclassified)

AFTERNOON Session 5: Technology Trends and Challenges for

Cyber EW Convergence (Classified Rel FVEY)

Thursday October 8, 2015MORNING Session 6: Tactical Cyber Operations and

Concepts (Classified Rel FVEY)

Session 7: Team C4ISR Leadership CEMA Panel (Classified Rel FVEY)

K E Y N O T E S P E A K E R S

MG Stephen Fogarty, USACommanding General, Cyber Center of Excellence

MG Bruce Crawford, USA (invited)Commanding General CECOM & APG

Mr. Jay Kistler (invited)ASD (RDE) Electronic Warfare

Mr. Mike McConnellFormer Director National Security Agency and Director of National Intelligence

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Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP), the Next Generation Jammer (NGJ) program, as well as “new weapon programs that use directed en-ergy and electromagnetic forces to cut costs.”23 The Marine Corps has invested in tactical programs that combine the ability to network signals intelligence from multiple sources with a compact electronic system and jam communica-tions. The Air Force is examining how to modernize aircraft and self-protection systems for electronic warfare. In May 2015, the Air Force also confirmed that it had developed with Boeing an elec-tromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapon called

CHAMP using high-energy bursts, fire multiple times, pinpointing and blacking out only essential targets without caus-ing collateral damage.24 However, success in generating warfighting capabilities and unified joint employment strategies which regain US dominance in the EMS maneuver space will take focus and fur-ther investment.

On the broader front, EMS dominance requires coordinated effort across all American government agencies and com-mercial users. Worldwide reporting of the Stuxnet virus demonstrated how highly protected infrastructure is vulnerable to manipulation and destruction. In the

US, over 85% of critical infrastructure is owned by the private sector, and it is not highly protected. A sense of urgency is needed to be properly protected.

The first battle of any future war will be for command and dominance of space and the EMS. Yet the US is nei-ther adequately prepared to counter the growing threat, nor armed with suffi-ciently robust capabilities. As America’s strategic focus shifts away from con-flicts in which it held an overwhelming technological advantage to operations in Anti-Access and Area Denial envi-ronments (A2AD), against adversaries who command both economic heft and sophisticated technologies, superior-ity can no longer be taken for granted. “To command this new environment, EM-cyber operations will need to be-come an inherent element of how we operate and fight in every situation, all the time. America’s key military advan-tage for the past 20 years has been its ability to sense and create a picture of our surroundings and use that picture to control the air, sea, and undersea domains…That will not be the case in future conflicts.”25 The United States urgently needs new methods to deliver C4ISR, EW, and other kinetic and non-kinetic effects in a contested, full-elec-tromagnetic spectrum EW/cyber warfare environment. The ability to anticipate, plan for, and execute operations against enhanced adversaries’ capabilities – ex-ploiting opponents’ vulnerabilities while compensating for America’s own – will be paramount.

“In the near future, if the US tech-nological edge continues to erode, US forces may not be able to employ their sensors, or use their computers and com-munication links effectively in combat, exposing the vulnerability of heavy em-phasis on such systems in current mili-tary doctrine. Adversaries have proven they can use electronic technologies to elude destruction by US forces while delivering potent blows against America and its allies.”26 China and Russia have clearly demonstrated that EMS invest-ments have paid off. Without persistent senior leadership attaching a higher priority to EMS dominance, the US will

The Pentagon’s EMS strategy aims to balance access management and the development of capabilities in a shared-access environment.

4th Annual AOC Pacific ConferenceOCTOBER 6-8, 2015 / ABERDEEN, MD

THIS CONFERENCE IS BEING HELD WITH U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND UNDER A CO-SPONSORSHIP AGREEMENT WITH AOC.

The co-sponsored symposium consists of two days of unclassified presentations and panel discussions, followed by a classified working group at Camp H.M. Smith. This working group will be open to US, Australia, Canada, Great Britain and New Zealand (FVEY) nations only.

This year’s event, in association with USPACOM, will cover the role of Information Operations, Electronic Warfare (EW), Cyber Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA), EM Spectrum Operations (EMSO), other Information Related Capabilities (IRCs) and AOC mission areas, with specific operational and conceptual focus on the emergent threats and challenges posed by Hybrid Warfare. As in previous Pacific events the Symposium will include Global Allies and Partners from around the Pacific region, who will present their unique perspectives. The symposium continues 22 October with a classified working group at the SECRET REL FVEY at HQs U.S. Pacific Command at Camp H.M. Smith. The agenda and instructions for attendance for the classified working group will be coordinated through official military channels with PACOM J39.

The purpose of the symposium is to bring together government, military, industry, academia, small business and other stakeholders for discussions on the operational challenges facing the practitioners of these IRCs, and to explore possible technological and tactics/procedural solutions. To stimulate wider interest and inquiry into these issues, the symposium and related activities and events will be open to registration by government, industry and academia representatives without regard to their AOC membership status (both AOC Members and non-members may register) except that access of foreign and any other persons may be restricted as necessary in accordance with applicable laws and regulations.

KEYNOTE SPEAKERSGEN Vincent K. Brooks,Commanding General, U.S. Army Pacific (Invited)

Admiral Michael Rogers,Commander USCYBERCOM, US (Invited)

Lt. Gen. Robert Elder,USAF (Ret.) - Past AOC President (confirmed)

Maj Gen Max Tsung-Chi Yu, Political Warfare Division, Taiwan Ministry of Defense, ROC (confirmed)

Dr. Paul Zablocky,Director, I&IW Directorate, CERDEC, US (confirmed)

SPONSORSHIPS AND TABLE TOP

DISPLAYS AVAILABLE!

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a o C e s s e n t i a l s : e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c s p e c t r u m ( E M S )have trouble riding the next wave of warfare. Time is of the essence and the time for aggressive action is now. a

Dr. J. Phillip “Jack” London is Executive Chairman and Chairman of the Board of

CACI International Inc. He previously served as President and Chief Executive Officer (1984-2007).  A retired US Navy captain, London served 12 years active duty as a naval aviator and 12 years reserve duty as a designated Naval Aeronautical

Engineering Duty Officer and commanding officer of aeronautical engineering reserve units with the Naval Air Systems Command. He is a graduate of the US Naval Academy, the US Naval Postgraduate School, and George Washington University.

ENDNOTES1 Patrick Tucker, “How the Army Plans to Fight a War Across the Electromagnetic Spectrum,” DefenseOne, February 26, 2014,

http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2014/02/inside-armys-first-field-manual-cyber-electromagnetic-war/79498/.

2 “Electromagnetic Spectrum Strategy 2013; A Call to Action,” Department of Defense, February 20, 2014, http://www.defense.gov/news/dodspectrumstrategy.pdf.

3 Brendan Koerner, “Inside the New Arms Race to Control Bandwidth on the Battlefield,” Wired Magazine, February 18, 2014 http://www.wired.com/2014/02/spectrum-warfare/; Joshua Phillip, “Chinese Military Gets Trained on Electronic Warfare,” Epoch Times, October 18, 2013, http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/322299-chinese-military-gets-trained-on-electronic-warfare/.

4 “Electromagnetic Spectrum Strategy 2013; A Call to Action,” op.cit.

5 Thomas Kidd and Mark Rossow, “Spectrum Isn’t Like ‘Other Natural Resources’,” Chips, October-December 2010, http://www.doncio.navy.mil/chips/ArticleDetails.aspx?ID=2347.

6 Jeanette Steele, “Navy in 2014: Undersea drones, Arctic, Marines on new ships; Chief of Naval Operations discusses his to-do list, touches on Barrio Logan debate,” San Diego Union-Tribune, February 1, 2014, http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2014/Feb/01/chief-nava-operations-greenert-agenda-2014/.

7 Office of Naval Research, “Jam Session: New ONR Technology Helps Sailors on the Digital Frontier,” August 5, 2014, http://www.onr.navy.mil/Media-Center/Press-Releases/2014/Electronic-Warfare-Battle-Management-RIMPAC.aspx.

8 “Electromagnetic Spectrum Strategy 2013; A Call to Action,” op.cit.

9 “Electronic Warfare, The Changing Face of Combat,” Association of Old Crows, May 24, 2011, http://www.myaoc.org/EWEB/images/aoc_library/Government_Affairs/AOC%20report.pdf.

10 Noah Shachtman, “The Secret History of Iraq’s Invisible War,” Wired, June 14, 2011, http://www.wired.com/2011/06/iraqs-invisible-war/all/1.

11 Adm. Jonathan Greenert, “Wireless Cyberwar, the EM Spectrum, and the Changing Navy,” Breaking Defense, April 3, 2013, http://breakingdefense.com/2013/04/adm-greenert-wireless-cyber-em-spectrum-changing-navy/.

12 Koerner, op.cit.

13 Robert Haddick, “Forget about China’s missiles and stealth fighter; worry instead about ‘non-kinetic’ combat,” Small Wars Journal, January 19, 2011, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/forget-about-chinas-missiles-and-stealth-fighter-worry-instead-about-non-kinetic-combat.

14 Mark Pomerleau, “DoD report cites China’s focus on cyber as a weapon of wartime,” Defense Systems, May 14, 2015, http://defensesystems.com/Articles/2015/05/14/DOD-report-China-cyber-EW-space-UAVs.aspx?p=1.

15 Koerner, op.cit.

16 Joe Gould, “Guided-Bomb Makers Anticipate GPS Jammers,” Defense News, June 1, 2015, http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/air-space/2015/05/31/guided-bomb-makers-gps-jammers-battlefield-spoof-munitions-laser-jdam/28117951/.

17 “Electronic Warfare, The Changing Face of Combat,” op.cit.

18 Koerner, op.cit.

19 Loren Thompson, “Raytheon Prevails Again in Jammer Contest,” Forbes, January 24, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2014/01/24/raytheon-prevails-again-in-jammer-contest/.

20 Amber Corrin, “DOD launches new spectrum strategy,” Federal Computer Week, February 20, 2014, http://fcw.com/articles/2014/02/20/dod-spectrum.aspx.

21 George Leopold, “US Spectrum Warfare Strategy Stresses Flexibility,” Defense Systems, November 1, 2013, http://defensesystems.com/articles/2013/11/01/spectrum-warfare.aspx.

22 “Press Briefing on Release of Department of Defense Electromagnetic Spectrum Strategy,” February 20, 2014, http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5374.

23 Yasmin Tadjdeh, “ Navy To Focus on ‘Affordable Technology,’” National Defense, April 8, 2014, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=1468.

24 Rich Smith, Boeing Unveils Amazing, Slightly Terrifying New Electromagnetic Pulse Weapon, Motley Fool, May 24, 2015, http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2015/05/24/boeing-unveils-electromagnetic-pulse-weapon.aspx.

25 Adm. Jonathan Greenert, “Imminent Domain,” Proceedings, December 2012, http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-12/imminent-domain.

26 “Electronic Warfare, The Changing Face of Combat,” op.cit.