Eighteen African Guideposts

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Eighteen African GuidepostsAuthor(s): Helen KitchenSource: Foreign Policy, No. 37 (Winter, 1979-1980), pp. 71-86Published by: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLCStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1148160 .

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EIGHTEEN AFRICAN GUIDEPOSTS by Helen Kitchen

A cacophony of discordant voices from var- ious Washington power bases continues to confuse Americans-not to mention Afri- cans, Soviets, and Cubans-about the direc- tion and objectives of U.S. policy in Africa. On issues ranging from A for Angola, to M for Morocco, to Z for Zaire, the image con- veyed through both media and diplomatic channels is one of personal and factional squabbling within and between the Execu- tive and Legislative branches. What makes the squabbling more troubling is that it is not over details, but over basic perceptions of the very nature of African political dynamics and the centrality of Africa in Soviet-Ameri- can relations. Between those who dismiss the Soviet-Cuban presence as irrelevant and those who view East-West competition in Africa in simplistic geopolitical terms, there exists a discouragingly small band that sees the ap- pearance of the USSR, East Germany, and Cuba in Africa as a challenge of nuanced complexity.

It is from the latter perspective that the following 18 working principles for an Afri- ca policy are proposed. These guidelines de- rive from an assumption that there may come a time when Africa policy is no longer held hostage to the cliches and contradictory cur- rents that now block serious and coherent decision making. Thus, they cut across one or more of the tenets of every interest group that is concerned with particular aspects of the African relationship; these groups are often constrained by pressures that are only marginally related to Africa or to the U.S. national interest.

HELEN KITCHEN is editor of African Index and executive director of USSALEP, a private, interracial associa- tion of Americans and South Africans.

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These working principles are not offered in order of importance, and they are not in- tended to add up to a comprehensive Africa blueprint. They are calculated to further- directly or indirectly-the congruent interest of the United States and the Organization of African Unity (oAu) in reducing the prospect that external powers will lead the African continent or any part of it into a degree of clientism that becomes a new form of quasi- colonialism or resource monopoly. Paradoxi- cally, an appreciation for the nuanced complexity of Africa and of Soviet goals there is more conducive to the formulation of inter- nally consistent policy guidelines than are either of the simplistic views of the continent.

1. Recognize the "consistent inconsistency" of African political rhetoric and Afri- can political actions. American policy makers should not make life more difficult for Afri- can leaders by assuming that rhetoric equals fact, especially on issues involving southern Africa, relations with the former colonial powers, African unity, human and political rights, and economic ideology. As a distin- guished African noted recently, there is a "consistent inconsistency" between what African politicians must say for the record and the pragmatism with which they often act-particularly when economic realities are involved. Hence the close interdependence of Marxist Mozambique and South Africa, the staying power of Gulf Oil in Angola through the darkest days of U.S.-Angolan relations, the serving of Rhodesian beef to the heads of state assembled for the 1977 OAU summit in Gabon, and the fact that the United States is Algeria's largest trading partner.

While moderate is a term of opprobrium in Africa, it remains true that most governments and movements-military or civilian, avowedly Marxist or ideologically eclectic- are essentially middle-class establishments. They are concerned, above all, with integrat- ing elements of the methods, experiences, and resources of others that seem to fit parochial needs. This is not hypocrisy; rather it is a pragmatic adjustment to the limitations im-

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posed by history, location, demography, available economic and human resources, and other sober facts of life.

2. Do not base U.S. policy on expectations that the Soviet Union and its allies should be excluded from a political role in Africa. The United States must accept the following realities: that African states, with the exception of Rhodesia, were granted unequivocal independence; that the Soviet Union is a global power; that Fidel Castro is the formally designated leader of the Third World's associa- tion of nonaligned nations for 1979-1982; that, to date, neither the Soviet Union nor Cuba has run roughshod over any legitimate African government in establishing its presence; and that neither has insisted upon formal military alliances in any of its associations. When asked to do so, the Soviets have dismantled their presence in several countries in which Moscow had made major commit- ments of resources and prestige-Ghana (1966), the Sudan (1971), Egypt (1975), Somalia (1978), and now Guinea. The image of Africans as the passive victims of major foreign powers in the pattern of the nine- teenth century is obsolete. It is the Africans themselves who are now responsible for the introduction of foreign powers-most notably, the Soviet Union and Cuba, but also France-into African internal and regional conflicts.

3. Analyze what leads the Soviets and their partners to be cautious. The record, including that of Angola, shows that Soviet policy in Africa is both opportunistic and cautious, involving close attention to signals and re-evaluation of the terms of the game at each step of the way. Some factors that impel Soviet caution: concern about the vulnerabil- ity of their own nationals to attack (as in Angola and Mozambique); recognition that the Cuban mystique would be seriously af- fected by conflict with an African host or by a major military defeat when acting in support of an African host; any situation in which Cuban and Soviet historical prefer- ences do not mesh (the Eritrea secessionist

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movement in Ethiopia being the most notable thus far); any situation in which the signifi- cant leverage on the protagonists clearly rests with others, such as the key role of the front- line states in relation to the civil war in Zim- babwe; entanglements that risk becoming quagmires, especially in light of the Ethio- pian experience. The vital importance of Cuba to the Soviets-the tail-wagging-the- dog syndrome-could become a great vulner- ability; on a personal level, for example, Rus- sians are far less adaptable and acceptable in Africa than Castro's envoys.

4. Develop a greater sensitivity to U.S. actions or behavior that is likely to goad the Soviet Union and its allies into retaliative demonstrations of power. Some students of Soviet behavior in Africa believe that the ignominious defeat of Soviet-supported forces in the Congo in the 1960s has been an underrated factor in explaining the massive Soviet-Cuban support for the Popular Move- ment for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in Angola in 1975. According to this line of analysis, the key development that raised the stakes was the decision of the United States in mid-1974 to renew its material support of Holden Roberto's National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) after a six-year interruption. For two reasons, the psycho- logical impact of this assistance was out of all proportion to the relatively small dollar amounts involved: (1) the FNLA was the one of the three competing liberation movements then possessing the largest military force and manifesting the greatest inclination to follow a military rather than a political strategy; and

(2) Roberto used the aid for highly visible purposes, notably jeep transport and the pur- chase of both a television station and Luanda's largest daily newspaper. How could the Soviets be certain that this was not the opening stage of a Congo-level intervention ? How crucial was the American failure to recognize at once that Soviet strategists might draw an analogy between Angola and the Congo and to recognize the extent to which Soviet honor could be seen to be on the line?

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There are some present-day examples of anti-Soviet maneuvers that could boomerang. Any overt American effort to play the China card could lead the Soviets into offsetting initiatives. Moreover, the formation of anti- Soviet "federations," believed to have direct or indirect U.S. sponsorship, would almost certainly set counter actions in motion.

5. Re-establish American credibility. The word credibility has taken on a new meaning in Washington policy-making vocabulary in recent years-that statements on African issues should, as far as possible, be designed to please specific African leaders and groups. There is nothing wrong with wanting to make people feel good, but the United States should be careful about sending false mes- sages to Africa. It is better to give more than is promised than to promise more than one can deliver.

Three examples warrant attention. In April 1977 a nationwide NBC television audience saw President Carter talking with Vice President Walter Mondale, suggesting that Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Na- tional Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski help Somalia. ("Tell Cy and Zbig that I want them to move in every possible way to get Somalia to be our friend.") This tele- phone instruction gained international media coverage, setting in motion a drama of high expectations and ultimate letdowns in Mogadishu that could have been avoided. Similarly, some of the rhetoric associated with the 1978 visit to the Sahel by the president's mother created an illusion that the White House was about to give serious and personal attention to a mini-Marshall Plan for the economic development of the region. For a variety of domestic reasons, including the increasing difficulty of moving even rou- tine foreign aid legislation through the Con- gress, it was predictable in advance that there could be no delivery on what some of the content of this visit seemed to promise.

More seriously, official and quasi-official rhetoric implying a U.S. commitment to the achievement of American-style majority rule

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in South Africa creates expectations among some blacks there that the United States would support revolution in that country. If the United States is no more prepared to act in South Africa than it was in Hungary in 1956-and there is good reason to think that the American public is not thinking along those lines-then caring Americans, official and nonofficial, must be wary of en- couraging violence. Change must come in South Africa, and there is much that Ameri- cans and America can do to further the cause of human dignity in that society. But whose interest does apocalyptic change serve? South Africa is a situation that requires the United States to confront both the limits and the responsibilities of power.

6. Strengthen the in-government capacity to put current developments in historical context. One of the most disturbing aspects of the trend toward a "dialogue of the deaf" on Africa policy is the tendency to box and label individuals, alliances, and countries on the basis of their current external associations. In a May 1978 visit to Washington, former British Prime Minister James Callaghan ob- served, "There seem to be a number of Christopher Columbuses setting out from the United States to discover Africa for the first time. It's been there a long time."

Although this predilection to pluck Afri- can personalities out of historical context is particularly evident in the perceptions of Rhodesian politics as pontificated in the Con- gress, it is noteworthy that no officer now serving in the State Department's Office of Southern African Affairs has had prior experience in the country or countries for which he is now responsible.

It takes some steeping in the labyrinthine politics of Zimbabwe to make sense of the fact that some of today's radicals are yester- day's (and will perhaps be tomorrow's) moderates, and today's key moderates were yester- day's radicals. It is not simply a matter of knowing the academic facts. To understand why Rhodesia is more complex than a Dodge City morality play is to be more empathetic

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and less cynical about the Rhodesian tragedy. In the case of South Africa, a sense of the

country's complex history and sociology is crucial to evaluating the tentative movements of the present government toward redefining the society. Americans, in both government and academe, increasingly have opinions about South Africa. There is, however, a frightening lack of interest in employing the techniques of the Kremlinologist to South African developments. This reflects a dangerous kind of head-in-sandism about the most important power in a regional tinderbox.

The Department of State needs an office patterned on the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) of the 195 Os-a unit that left "current intelligence" and "morning brief- ings" to the operating bureaus and the executive secretariat. The INR of that era rarely had more than a token presence at the secretary's staff meetings and considered it a major tacti- cal victory when some of its career analysts' heretical thoughts were debated by the policy planning staff (e.g., "Islam is not a barrier to communism," "neutralism is the wave of the future," "the French cannot win in Algeria").

The basic responsibility of such a unit would reflect its original mandate: to lay out trends; to ascertain and describe basic forces and movements; and to define the possible long-term outcomes of alternative policy courses available to all the players in a given situation. The success of such a service de- pends on its leadership; its relative isolation from the overheated atmosphere of the day- to-day policy-making process; and its staffing by people who expect to spend their profes- sional lives honing their understanding of a particular society or region. While a good case can be made for the dangers of over- identification with one's area of responsibility in the implementation of policy, the policy- making process is well served by some kibitzers with long memories and an empathy for the suffering of people that goes beyond criti- cism of their responses.

7. Recognize what the United States should not do in Africa. What the United

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States does least well, and should restrain it- self from doing in Africa, is to meddle in the internal politics of those countries whose complex dynamics are beyond the will or the patience of Americans to assimilate as real. The United States is inclined in such situa- tions to blow hot and cold; that is, to try too hard to please and placate, in the end allow- ing the client-patron relationship to be turned upside down. Zaire, Angola, Rhodesia, Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana, and Idi Amin's accession to power in Uganda demonstrate the perils of overt or covert participation in chief-making and chief-dethroning without in-depth analysis of the historical and regional context.

The reason that Namibia came close to becoming America's most striking diplomatic success in Africa in 1978 was because this was a situation in which the United States had a clear sense of objectives, obligations, and national interests. Equally important, the Americans directly involved had an understanding and a relatively balanced respect for the interests and concerns of all of the regional protagonists. Where the United States does not have this clear sense of priorities, and it does not in many parts of Africa, it should feel under no obligation to stir the pot.

8. Lead from American strengths, not weaknesses. But what is the United States to do about the expanding Soviet role? The evi- dence suggests that flailing one's arms at Mos- cow is not a rewarding exercise. The United States should accept that highly centralized states such as the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba can undertake a kind of audacious gamesmanship in Africa that is both alien to and politically impossible in a free, demo- cratic, and open society. The preoccupation with the prospect of "loss of confidence in the United States" occurs in direct ratio to America's loss of confidence in its own worth, values, and priorities.

In Africa, American priorities should focus on diplomatic and economic rather than military options. In particular, the United States should redouble its quiet efforts to encourage,

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with appropriate technology, wisdom, and patience, the development of the national, regional, and continental political and economic institutions that eventually could en- able African governments and leaders to func- tion without imported crutches.

The U.S. contribution-through both bilateral and multilateral official channels, together with the encouragement of American private initiatives-should draw on the most respected embodiments of "the American way." These include visionary pragmatism, the application of technology and science to improve the human condition, the circum- vention and amelioration of nature's injus- tices, and the forging of links between rural and urban societies in order to form a mutu- ally respectful relationship. In sum, the long- run focus of the American effort should be -as the military focus of the communist nations clearly is not--on initiatives that enhance and nurture Africa's self-reliance.

9. Decide whose hand is on the tiller. No student of the U.S. Constitution would deny the congressional mandate to enact laws, to decide how money is dispensed in operating the government, to approve treaties with other nations, and to approve or reject the appointments of senior officials nominated by the president. But members of Congress are neither elected to take responsibility for, nor staffed to deal with, the range of inter- locking considerations involved in the day- to-day execution of foreign policy.

The partisan involvement of members of the Legislative Branch in passing African power struggles fetters policy making and policy execution in that part of the government-the Department of State-tradition- ally designated as the primary agency for the conduct of U.S. relations with other governments. The case of Rhodesia is the most striking example of direct and ostentatious congressional involvement in the internal affairs of a foreign political entity, at a level of intensity out of proportion to the importance of that country to the overall American relationship with Africa.

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Some observers argue that the current de- mocratization of foreign policy is a reaction to the excesses of an imperial presidency that led us into the tragedy of the Vietnam war. A more cynical school of thought attributes much of the congressional interest and instant expertise on ad hoc African issues to the in- tense competition for upward mobility among the growing army of young activists in Capitol Hill staff positions.

Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. (R.- Maryland) addressed the problem in The New York Times: "Obviously we have reached a dangerous state of affairs when neither friend nor foe can say with any cer- tainty what United States policy is toward the world's other great nuclear power. As a United States Senator with a specific consti- tutional responsibility to give 'advice and consent' on treaties, I am particularly concerned about the President's failure [to make his foreign policy clear to the American people and to the people of his foreign policy establishment]. The President of the United States is not a referee. He is the team captain. He must have a grand strategy and he must execute it."

10. Black pressure groups should be wary of the Israeli model. If the prolonged lack of American concern for what is now known as the Third World can be traced in part to the fact that the U.S. foreign policy establishment was, for so many years, comprised almost exclusively of white male Protestants, then it must also be agreed that Middle East

policy making has been significantly shaped since World War II by ethnic pressure groups with strong emotional and historical attach- ments to the area. Operating with particular effectiveness on behalf of Israel, and of Greek interests in the Greek-Turkish-Cyprus dis-

pute, these groups have used the narrow focus of congressional politics and logrolling techniques to force foreign policy conditions and restrictions upon the Executive Branch.

These constituencies recently have been joined by several loosely connected Afro- American groups targeted at lobbying both

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the Legislative and Executive branches of the government on selected Africa issues (e.g., southern Africa, a larger share of aid for black Africa, self-determination for the western Sahara). The best-known coordinat- ing organization, TransAfrica, has closely studied the techniques of the powerful Israeli lobby, and seeks to expand its leverage by mobilizing black voters at the grassroots level.

It is important to differentiate between ethnicity considerations in domestic politics and the communal lobbies that focus nar- rowly on U.S. relations with a particular foreign country or region. The ethnic com- munalism that developed in the American Midwest and East in the early twentieth century sought to buffer the shock, but also to further the process of assimilation into the American melting pot; thus, Irish, Polish, Jewish, and other ethnic politics at the state and local levels is by now as American as apple pie. Communal lobbies primarily or exclusively concerned with narrow foreign policy issues, on the other hand, are a reac- tionary development in that they represent a retreat from this nation's historic commitment to equality and one nation indivisible.

Afro-Americans have an important and unique educational role to play in shaping U.S. relations with Africa, but it is in their best interest, in Africa's best interest, and in America's best interest that they play this role as concerned American humanists.

1 1. Emphasize to Africans and Africanists that the single most positive element in the economic development of Africa is trade with the West. The emphasis given by the media to Soviet and Cuban military aid obscures the fact that communist nations represent less than 5 per cent of Africa's foreign markets, provide miniscule amounts of economic assistance, and are minor factors in the development of Africa's ability to stand on its own. Too little is made of the contrasting fact that the most positive element in African economic development is the market for its goods offered by the West.

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The Soviet Union and other communist nations have a poor track record in the field of economic cooperation with Africa. Under the guise of cooperation, Soviet and East German official negotiators drive harsh bar- gains with their client states. They seek not only exclusive economic relationships in many instances, but also extraordinarily profitable contracts. In Guinea, for example, the Soviet contract price for bauxite was one- third that offered by the West. Having failed to learn their lesson from Guinea's increasing disenchantment, the Soviets recently nego- tiated a fishing agreement with Mozambique that is alleged to allow the Soviets to exploit the country's richest fishing areas-with a small payment (in fish) to Mozambique.

12. Encourage durable links of trust between American business and African nations. According to 1979 International Mon- etary Fund figures, Africa constitutes a market for Western goods equivalent to Latin America and 41 per cent greater by value than the entire roster of communist nations. The fact that Africa is fragmented into 51 different national markets does not constitute either economic or political justification for the failure of American economic policy makers to press for the expansion of Ameri- ca's market share in the continent.

In increasing numbers, American political personages are making trade-oriented pil- grimages to China, yet only former U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young has had the political courage to head a major trade mis- sion to Africa. This is despite the fact that U.S. trade with China in 1978 ($1. 1 billion) was less than 5 per cent of its trade with Africa ($22.8 billion); indeed, it was less than America's trade with each of five of Africa's 51 states (Nigeria, Libya, Algeria, South Africa, and Egypt). Where European governments send ministerial-level delega- tions to promote major contracts with Afri- can governments, American support of its business community in Africa is usually con- ducted by a first-assignment commercial officer in the local embassy.

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The forging of durable links of trust between American business and African nations should be accorded a high level of priority and respectability in any U.S. policy concerned with moderating the spread of Soviet and other communist client relationships. An African nation that has made long-term com- mitments to use American passenger aircraft and parts and has purchased American tele- communications equipment or has built up a profitable American market for its products is going to want to find ways of maintaining a correct relationship with the U.S. government, whatever ideological rhetoric may go out over the national radio.

13. Do not be afraid to show the flag. There should be no ambivalence about the importance of maintaining or enhancing the U.S. Navy's ready presence in the Indian Ocean and of maintaining or enhancing the U.S. Air Force's long-range military airlift capacity for emergency deployment. Castro's call at the 1979 Nonaligned Conference in Havana for an end to the American presence in the Indian Ocean (so that this increasingly important seaway could be transformed into a "zone of peace") is simply empty rhetoric. Both the Soviet Union and France now have, and constantly maintain, more ships in the Indian Ocean than does the United States. U.S. global strategy, together with the energy requirements of the Western industrial nations and Japan, call for a substantial Ameri- can naval presence in these waters. The Afri- can continent lies within this larger envelope of U.S. strategic concerhs, yet remains free to work toward its own political solutions. U.S. military sales to Africa should be approved or disapproved on the basis of worldwide, rather than specifically African, criteria.

As for continental Africa, there may be a special role for the U.S. Navy distinct from its Indian Ocean presence. The enthusiastic welcome given Britain's Queen Elizabeth II when she toured central and east Africa en route to the 1979 Commonwealth Confer- ence in Zambia is a timely reminder that Afri- cans are uplifted, rather than intimidated, by

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symbolism and pageantry on appropriate oc- casion. Without detracting from the unique aura of Britain's Royal family, a case can be made that the formal presence and reciprocal courtesies of which the U.S. Navy is capable can be considered an equivalent American opportunity. Providing the U.S. Navy with major ships that can make ceremonial port calls to African nations could signal an important and benign policy investment-a reminder of the kind of power the United States represents but has chosen not to use in Africa.

14. Discourage South Africa from becom-

ing involved militarily beyond its borders. The one development most likely to generate new opportunities for the communist nations to extend their military role in Africa would be a decision by South Africa to do what it did in 1 975-send its forces into a neighbor- ing country in support of either a threatened sitting government or a contender for power. It should be an American diplomatic priority to help Prime Minister P. W. Botha's government comprehend the Pandora's box such an action would open up. This is one of several reasons for keeping official and un- official lines of communication open with the

republic's military and political leadership. The 1975 South African intervention in

Angola quickly unraveled Pretoria's carefully nurtured effort at detente with black Africa. Moreover, it greatly reduced the chances for peaceful socio-political change within South Africa. The intervention was undertaken in part because South Africa believed that it had the blessing of the United States and that the South African forces were backstopping U.S. support of anti-MPLA armies.

The Ford administration did not merely fail to anticipate that Congress, still trau- matized by the Vietnam experience, would block the funds required to provide continu- ed support for the American client in Angola. More serious was the failure of Washington strategists to recognize that Africans have had more experience with racism than with communism. In African

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eyes, an overt intervention of South Africa in a black power struggle would be perceived as a threat of an entirely different order than would assistance invited in by one side or the other from the Soviet Union or Cuba.

15. Open diplomatic relations with An- gola, with no strings attached. The decision to recognize the government that has been in power in Angola for four years is long overdue. The conditions Washington appears to have placed on recognition-the reduction of the Cuban presence and steps toward "internal conciliation" with the still-dissident National Union for the Total Independence of Angola-are likely to postpone, rather than hasten, Angola's evolution. The United States should work with Angola to develop its capacity for self-reliance and nationhood, and not simply demand that it occur.

16. Let VOA become the voice of Ameri- cans. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and, alas, even the U.S. Armed Forces Radio (AFR) are more effective spokesmen for the West than the Voice of America (VOA). The VOA tries too hard to educate; it is too obviously focused on specific "ethnic" tar- gets; and it is often too boring to succeed in its well-intentioned efforts to impart the spirit of America to Africa. What gives the BBC and AFR their credibility is that foreign listeners have the sense of eavesdropping on broadcasts clearly aimed at the standards and tastes of the broadcasters' own countrymen. In other words, the best means of conveying the American way of looking at the world is to allow others to experience it.

17. Do not forget old friends. Immediate- ly after France's President Valery Giscard d'Estaing announced that he would visit Guinea in December 1978 to mark the ceremonial end to 20 years of "misunderstand- ing," he embarked on a five-day visit to the Ivory Coast. This stands in contrast to the 1978 diplomatic flap created to persuade Carter to make a three-hour "refueling" stop in Monrovia during his visit to "newly in- fluential" Nigeria. If the United States is to be respected in Africa, it needs good relations

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with oil-rich Nigeria and with the front-line states, but not to the exclusion of old friends. Friendship is infinite.

18. Recognize there are no quick fixes for Africa's instability. The United States will be in a better position to shape a positive policy toward Africa if it accepts that there is no quick fix-Marxist or otherwise-for the continent's instability. Although the name of Karl Marx is often invoked by African politicians for one purpose or another, the fact is that Marx never analyzed African society or an Africa-like situation. Moreover, no Afri- can who calls himself a Marxist has yet demonstrated how the problems of a single African country could be resolved in a Marx- ist context.

Some of the most effective imagery devised to convey the nature of the political uncer- tainty of contemporary Africa comes from Princeton scholar Manfred Halpern, who portrays Africans as being in the midst of an era of "great breaking" of the containers that once gave order to their lives. These broken containers or "sacred vessels" include the

tightly organized tribal structures, the small kinship groups, Islam, Christianity, and the simple us-against-them nationalism of the late colonial period. If Americans were to perceive Africa in these terms, there would be more empathy and optimism and less cyni- cism about the limited commitment of Afri- cans to the new institutions and relationships that serve as experimental substitutes for the sacred vessels of earlier times.

U.S. policy makers and kibitzers need to recognize that the fate of any African country will not be determined by the outcome of any single crisis or the rise or fall of any particular "pro-Soviet" or "pro-Western" leader. Africa must travel a long road as it seeks out its ultimate postcolonial and post-neocolonial identity. It is a road that will be crisscrossed by many experimental short cuts that will dead-end and be abandoned. American policy should be based on the premise that Africa is not about to be won--or lost-by anybody.

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Documents

Eighteen African Guideposts