Mareike Heuer

History Internal Assessment

In which way did Ostpolitik provide a change in West German foreign policy in regards to East Germany?

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Table of contents

A. Plan of Investigation ………………………………. 3

B. Summary of Evidence …………………………….. 3

C. Evaluation of Sources ……………………………... 4

D. Analysis ……………………………………………. 4

E. Conclusion ………………………………………… 6

F. List of Sources………………………………………………6

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Mareike Heuer 0791-011Beijing World Youth Academy

Internal Assessment

In which way did Ostpolitik provide a change in West German foreign policy in regards to East Germany?

A Plan of the investigation

This investigation seeks to evaluate the change in West German foreign policy in the period

from 1969 to 1974 analysing the central document of the West German policy in regards to

East Germany, the Basic Treaty of 1972, and in particular Heinrich August Winkler’s

interpretation of Ostpolitik in his study “Germany. The Long Road West. Volume 2: 1933-

1990”. Following Winkler’s analysis, this investigation will focus on the political aspect and

the international policy at that time.1 In B, the main source will be put in the broader context

of German foreign policy since 1955 and the other main treaties of Ostpolitik presenting in

which way Brandt’s new approach constituted a dramatic change in Germany’s foreign

policy. After the evaluation of the Treaty and Winkler’s broader interpretation of Ostpolitk in

part C, they will be analysed in part D under the focus of the importance of US foreign policy

for the Ostpolitik leading to a conclusion of the central question in E.

B Summary of evidence

The dramatic change of German foreign policy in the period from 1969-1974 can only be

understood in the context of German foreign policy since 1955 when West Germany officially

became a sovereign state and the main doctrine of West German policy, the Hallstein

Doctrine, was formulated. It declared that “every country which has diplomatic relations with

the GDR will not be allowed to have diplomatic relations with the FRG”2. West Germany was

regarded as the only legitimate state presenting Germany as a whole.3 Proving successful in

1957, when West Germany cut off its ties with Yugoslavia who had officially recognized East

Germany as a separate state, East Germany was forced to tie its alignment with the USSR.

But there was another side to the Hallstein Doctrine, which prevented an open policy towards

other East European states.4 The Warsaw Pact states had recognized the GDR in 1949-50

1 This focus is justified by the leading question and the purpose of this investigation. To take other aspects into consideration such as economic or social aspects of the question would go to far.2 Winkler, 1813 In this regard it was impossible to hold any talks with the East German government. Chancellor Adenauer wanted to prevent international recognition of East Germany as a separate state accepting the fact that West Germany could not establish diplomatic relations to those communist countries which had officially recognized East Germany as a separate state. Winkler,181.4 Löwenthal, 691.

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and therefore West Germany was refrained from establishing diplomatic relations with those

countries.

In the meantime during the 1960s, the relations between the two superpowers had changed.

After the Berlin crises in 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy started to promote a

new approach in US foreign policy towards the USSR looking for a way of cooperation. In a

speech at the American University of Washington in June 1963, Kennedy emphasized to

look for a strategy of peace between the USA and the USSR. The leading opposition party of

West Germany, the Social Democrats, who opposed the Hallstein Doctrine, developed a new

foreign policy concept “Change through Rapprochement”5. It sought to recognize East

Germany as a sovereign state by putting aside the idea of German unification for the near

future.6 The main idea was that changes in East Germany could only be made in a long term

through numerous little steps which were necessary for the reunification of both German

states emphasizing on stronger cooperation with the goal of dismantling the status quo in the

long run.

This concept became a political reality after Brandt had been elected Chancellor in 1969. He

immediately began talks with leaders from East Germany and East European countries

meeting with the East German prime-minister Willi Stoph. These talks were the first direct

talks between top German politicians since 1948 taking place in West and East Germany in

1970. Even so Brandt refused to recognize East Germany as a sovereign state,

communication lines were opened.

After policy goals were made with the United States, Brandt entered negotiations with the

USSR in which both countries renounced the use of force. The FRG agreed to make no

territorial claims recognizing the borders in Eastern Europe.7 TheTreaty with Moscow was the

first treaty of the Ostpolitik signed on August 12th 1970. It followed the Warsaw Treaty four

month later with a similar content towards Poland. This policy was backed by the USA who

had started negotiations about the status of Berlin leading to the Agreement on Berlin on 3rd

September 1971 with France, England and the USSR, marking a relaxation of tension in

East-West relations, in particular since it guaranteed civil communications between West

Berlin and the FRG8. It was the Treaty with East Berlin (Basic Treaty) however that proved to

be the central and controversial document of Ostpolitik.9 Both states had committed

5 This new approach was first formulated on the 15th July 1963, when Egon Bahr, a leading Social Democrat and an adviser of Willy Brandt gave a lecture at the Protestant Academy in Tutzing, which was called „Change through Rapprochement“. 6 Schöllgen, 171.7 FRG negotiators, however, insisted that such agreements did not alter the West German position on future reunification of the country and that the responsibilities of the Four Powers in Germany remained unchanged by the treaty.8 Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin.9 Winkler, 312.

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themselves in the treaty to develop normal relations on the basis of equality. Recognizing

each other’s independence and sovereignty as well as territorial integrity, both sides agreed

to exchange permanent missions in Bonn and East Berlin avoiding the pivotal question of

German unification. Brandt faced tough opposition. Many of his conservative critics feared

that by neglecting the goal of unification he was selling out to the Communists.10 When West

and East Germany became members of the UN in 1973, the new reality of two German

states had become a fact. West Germany had lost his right to be the only sovereign speaking

for Germany as a whole and therefore the Hallstein Doctrine was abolished. This new policy

of direct talks, negotiations and treaties with the USSR, Poland and GDR and later on with

Czechoslovakia in December 1973 was backed by the USA.11 In this regard, Brandt’s

approach “Change though Rapprochement” led from a foreign policy of isolation of the GDR

to a policy of cooperation and legal recognition overcoming the Cold War situation between

the two German states which had dominated their relation under the Hallstein Doctrine.

C Evaluation of the sources

The Basic treaty was the most controversial of all treaties signed during Ostpolitik and has to

be seen in the context of the other treaties. Its purpose was to regulate the relationship

between the two Germanys on a mutual agreement that would make it possible to facilitate

regulations concerning the improvement of having economical, cultural and political

exchanges with de facto recognition to the GDR. Instead of embassies permanent legations

were opened in both German states as it was stressed in supplementary text leading the way

open to a later reunification.12 Its value lies in the fact that numerous improvements followed

the treaty such as the “Besucherregelung”, which allowed West German Citizens to visit East

Germany and also facilitated family reunions for East German Citizens aged over 60 years to

travel to West Germany. However, the limitation lied in the unresolved question of German

unity leading to the concept of two German states within one German nation. East Germany

stressed the idea that it had become a sovereign state, while West Germany continued to

claim that the German question was not resolved finally.

10 To cite one example, Bavaria filed a suit in the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe to prevent the treaty's implementation, but the court held the treaty to be compatible with the provisions of the Basic Law. Winkler, 313.11 Winkler emphasizes on this point. Without the consent of the Nixon administration, so Winkler, the Ostpolitik would not have been possible. Winkler, 285.12 Weber/Pfändtner, 262.

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Winkler’s13 leading question is, why Germany, much later than Great Britain and France,

became a national state and even later a democracy. It is under this perspective that he

focuses on the Ostpolitik. His two volumes of Germany.The Long Road West which were

published 10 years after the German reunification are a major source for modern German

history. The value of this book is that Winkler argues clearly under a central question, leaving

room for critical remarks. He analysis the Ostpolitik in the second volume (279-290 and 296-

314) mainly in the context of international politics rejecting the idea that it was mainly a

European or German question. Arguing this way, Winkler is convinced that external factors

dominated German foreign policy at that time and that the Ostpolitik was not a reaction to the

changes within the German society.14

The purpose of this source is the argument that Ostpolitik lead to a new political reality in

Germany and Europe. By recognizing the political sovereignty, both German states became

more independent in their political decisions and it seemed a new reality had come true: a

Europe with two German states. Winkler focuses on the importance of the US foreign policy

under Kennedy and Nixon to show that Ostpolitik depended heavenly on the changes of US

foreign policy.15 In this regard Ostpolitik has to be studied mainly in the context of

international politics rather than in the context of German or European history. The limitation

of Winkler’s analysis may lie in a too one sided focus on US policy as the main factor of the

Ostpolitik. Historians like Jürgen Kocka strengthen the point that the events of 1989 and in

that regard the Ostpolitik should be seen in the context of historical continuities in European

history.16 Winkler’s point of view is linked to his conviction that the Western Alliance under the

guidance of the USA is the best solution to the German question leaving little room for

alternative analysis of the Ostpolitik in the framework of a European history.17

D Analysis

The dramatic changes of German foreign policy from 1969-1974 have to be put into the

context of the German foreign policy since 1955. The Hallstein Doctrine was a typical

13 Heinrich August Winkler is a Professor of Contemporary History at the Humboldt University in Berlin since 1991. He has also been a German Kennedy Memorial Fellow at Harvard University; a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C.; a fellow of Berlin’s Institute for Advanced Study (Wissenschaftskolleg), a guest of the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, Paris, and the Institute for Advanced Historical Studies in Munich (Historisches Kolleg München).

14 In this context Weber/Pfändtner argue that Brandt started his talks with the East German government without the consent of the four Allies. Weber/Pfändnter, 261.15 However, there are many other historians, such as Hans Ulrich Wehler who don’t focus as much on the policy of the US, but more on German policy as they see outer circumstances as not so important when it comes to Ostpolitik. 16 Stefan Berger, 17.17 Such an approach can be found in the articles of the Deutsch-Polnisches Jahrbuch 2005. The articles in this volume treat the Ostpolitik as a European question.

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approach of foreign policy during the first period of the Cold War until the Berlin and Cuba

Missile Crises. Germany and Berlin which had been the major battleground of the Cold War

in Europe were the division line between West and East. Adenauer’s intention was clear from

the beginning: integration of FRG into the Western world renouncing to the immediate

reunification of Germany. The changes of international politics in particular of the US

administration under President Kennedy made this policy unreasonable.18 In this context a

new approach of German foreign policy could be formulated. The new concept “Change

through Rapprochement” reflected much better the intentions of the Kennedy administration

than the Hallstein Doctrine.

There is no serious disagreement about the fact that “Challenge through Rapprochement”

abolished the Hallstein Doctrine. Even revisionist historians like Hillgruber during the period

before the German Reunification did not put this fact into question.19

Concerning the question in which way it came to this change in German foreign policy, many

historians in recent years emphasize on the external factors. While Winkler strongly focuses

on Kennedy’s state visit to Germany in 196320 emphasizing the importance of US foreign

policy during the whole period of the Ostpolitik, historians like Görtemaker argue that

Ostpolitik became an engine of change in 1970 and has to be seen from that year on in the

context of European policy. The immediate impact was not only the improvement of inner

German relations but that this policy resulted directly in the Conference on Security and Co-

operation in Europe beginning in November 1972 and ending in August 1975.21 Ostpolitik in

that regard developed much more into a European policy leading to the Helsinki agreement

giving space for human right activists in East Europe.22

The Ostpolitik overcame the Cold War mentality between the two German states, but did not

resolved in any way the German question. This policy was in the interest of the US foreign

policy and in this regard is as much their product as a new approach by Chancellor Brandt.23

It was in both interests that the Hallstein Doctrine was abolished leading to a policy of

cooperation between the two German states.

18 Winkler, 217.19 Hillgruber, 178.20 Winkler 216-217.21 Görtemaker, 37.22 This discussion is going on depending on the political conviction of the historians. Historians like Winkler are convinced that German foreign policy depends on US foreign policy, while historians like Görtemaker emphasize more the European context of German foreign policy since the Ostpolitk.23 It is therefore that Winkler is cautious about the impact of this policy on the later German reunification. At the end of his book, Winkler writes that during the 1980s the idea of a reunified German state was out of sight Winkler, 652.

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E Conclusion

When it comes to the question in which way Ostpolitik provided a change in West German

foreign policy in regards to East Germany, the answer seems to be clear. The improving

relations between the two German states following the Ostpolitik and the Basic Treaty

overcame years of a non dialogue between the two German sides and little improvements for

family affairs and visiting rights took place. It helped to overcome the Cold War mentality.

“Change through Rapprochement” was therefore a dramatic change in the way that German

foreign policy towards Eastern Europe focused on dialogue instead of isolating the GDR. The

Basic treaty recognized the existence of two German states and made therefore an end to

the Hallstein Doctrine. Winkler’s analysis supports this idea by making clear that Ostpolitik

opened a new chapter of dialogue between the two German states. By putting the Ostpolitk

in the context of American foreign policy, Winkler makes clear, that West German foreign

policy depended heavily on American policy.

Words: 2000

F List of sources

Bahr, Egon, "Wandel durch Annäherung" ["Change through Rapprochement"], speech delivered on July 15, 1963, at the Evangelical Academy in Tutzing (http://germanhistorydocs.ghi- dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=81)Berger, Stefan, Historians and nation-building in Germany after reunification, August 1995 (http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2279/is_n148/ai_17474757/pg_18)Deutsch-Polnisches Jahrbuch 2005. Polish-German Annual 13/2005. (http://www.ceeol.com/aspx/issuedetails.aspx?issueid=770ded1f-d6e3-4f6b-9986- cca69865ae17&articleId=54e09275-1640-43a7-995a-5af8bfa8c9e1)Görtemaker, Manfred. 1994. Entspannung und Neue Ostpolitik (Détente and New Ostpolitik), in: Informationen zur politischen Bildung, 4.Quartal 1994, S.34-41. (Informations about political education. 1.Quarter 1994, 34-41).Görtemaker, Manfred. 1994. Vom Kalten Krieg zur Ära der Entspannung. (From the Cold War to the policy of detente), in: Informationen zur politischen Bildung, 4.Quartal 1994, S.26-33). (Informations about political education. 1.Quarter 1994, 26-33).Grundlagenvertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der DDR, 21.Dezember 1972, in: Informationen zur politischen Bildung 4.Quartal 1994, p.39. (The Basic Treaty, in: Informations about political education. 1.Quarter 1994).Hillgruber, Andreas. 1980. Deutsche Geschichte 1945-1975. Die deutsche Frage in der Weltpolitik. Frankfurt-Berlin-Wien. (German history 1945-1975. The German question in the perspective of world history. Frankfurt-Berlin-Vienna 1980). Le Quintrec, Guillaume und Peter Geiss. 2006. Histoire/Geschichte. Europa und die Welt seit 1945. Leipzig (Guillaume Le Quintrec and Peter Geiss, History. Europe and the World since 1945. Leipzig 2006).Löwenthal, Richard. 1974. Vom Kalten Krieg zur Ostpolitik, in: Die zweite Republik. 25 Jahre Bundesrepublik Deutschland – eine Bilanz, hrsg. Von Richard Löwenthal und Hans- Peter Schwarz. Stuttgart. (From the cold war to the Ostpolitik. The Second Republic. 25 years history of the German Federal Republic – a resume. Edited by Richard Löwenthal and Peter Schwarz, Stuttgart 1974). Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin - Berlin 3 September 1971 (http://www.ena.lu)Schöllgen, Gregor. 2001. Willy Brandt. Die Biographie. Berlin/München 2001. (Willy Brandt,

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the biography. Berlin/Munich 2001).Weber, Jürgen/Pfändtner, Bernhard. 1995. Vom Zweiten Weltkrieg bis zur Gegenwart, Bamberg. (From the Second World War to the Present, Bamberg 1995).Winkler, Heinrich August. 2000. Der lange Weg nach Westen, Zweiter Band, Deutsche Geschichte vom „Dritten Reich“ bis zur Wiedervereinigung. München 2000. (Germany. The Long Road West. Volume 2: 1933-1990, Oxford University Press.)

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