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What are the main obstacles for effective

environmental law?

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This essay will present the argument that the central problem facing the

international communities in devising and enforcing appropriate environmental laws is

due to two diametrically opposing philosophies which are inherently mutually exclusive,

that is: capitalism and environmental protection. It will be shown how the central pillar of

capitalism; private property, has juxtaposed itself into international norms as the

relatively modern concept of sovereignty and that this concept is the international legal

norm that is hindering with the macroscopic arena of formulating appropriate

international environmental protection.

Even when such agreements are made the microscopic application and

enforcement in national legal systems it is at ends with classical notions of competition

which drive firms to produce goods at the lowest possible cost in order to make

supernormal profits and on an international scale drive countries to compete for similar

ends. The result is that capitalists corrupt international environmental principles and law

and rarely apply them adequately. At the enforcement stage countries are unwilling to

enforce laws precisely because of maintaining the edge in competition.

Capitalism and environmental protection are joined in an awkward legal

unification which leads to ineffective environmental protection and poor realisations of

equity and the medium of international direction - the law is inherently bias towards

economic interests and thus needs to be reformulated in order to give effective protection

for our planet.

Sovereignty

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International law is inherently weak and cannot supply sufficient protection for

the environment for one main reason – sovereignty. The insistence on states on

maintaining sovereignty leads to legal formulation problems and an absence of

enforcement or sanctions for non compliance. While the international community has

tried to address the issue the reformations are merely rhetoric which demand national

implementing measures.

The concept of sovereignty is a macroscopic manifestation of private property.

Much like the owner of land whom can exploit resources of the land as he pleases - the

ruler of a sovereign state has the right to exploit their countries resources as they please.

As such sovereignty has become entrenched as a fundamental principle of international

law. The concept is mentioned in hundreds of treaties.1 Nevertheless, environmental

problems do not care for sovereign borders. Consequently the strict operation of a nation

state system is incompatible with environmental protection. Yet sovereignty is the most

fundamental particle of the International Law atomic structure; leading inexorably to the

conclusion that international law cannot sufficiently tackle environmental concerns in

isolation.

The Tuna Dolphin case2 in 1991 substantiates this claim where a GATT panel

held that a country can only control the consumption of a natural resource “only to the

extent that the production or consumption is under its jurisdiction”3 Earlier in 1962 The

UN General Assembly held “sovereignty over... resources must be exercised in the

interest[s] … of the well being of the people of the state concerned,”4 clearly a

1 See Philippe Sands, Principles of Environmental Law (1995), Vol. I p187-188 for examples.2

? GATT Case DS213

? Para 5.31 of Judgement4

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anthropocentric chauvinist viewpoint, in isolation from the environment as a whole. This

has lead some to question international law’s viability as Eco Vitality argue

“International Environmental Law is first and foremost international law: Its fundamental

unit is the state, not the ecosystem, its fundamental principle is national sovereignty, not

the conservation of nature.”5

The concept has been altered as a response to environmental concerns in recent

times. Principle-21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration is the embodiment of this. While

it does uphold sovereignty, it does specify responsibilities for states that they “do not

cause damage to the environment of other states”. As Sands has commented “Principle-

21 is the cornerstone of international environmental law.”6 It has limited sovereignty by

incorporating the much cited ‘good neighbourliness principle’. While only a principle it

has been referred to in the 1992 Baltic Convention, wholly incorporated in the 1972

London Convention, 1979 LRTAP Convention, 1985 Vienna Convention and Article.3 of

the 1992 Biodiversity Convention wholly re-enacted Principle-21 and in many more

treaties7. Principle2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration rehashed Principle-21 and is mentioned

in the preamble of the 1992 Climate Change Convention (CCC).

The sheer propagation of Principle-21 Stockholm to international agreements is

on a formalistic side very impressive. It should be noted though while the concept of

good neighbourliness has propagated the central tenet of the international legal system –

sovereignty remains; so does the dilemma of effective international environmental law.

? UNGA Res.1803(XVII)(1962)5

? http://www.ecovitality.org/badlaw.htm6

? Sands Op. Cit. p1867

? ibid p193

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As Morgenthau has pointed out8 there is a paradox, how can international law impose

constrains upon nations when sovereignty precludes a sovereign state being subject to

legal restraints? He concluded that sovereignty only incompatible with a strong and

effective system of international law but the concept is consistent with a weak and

ineffective legal order because “sovereignty is the very source of that decentralization,

weakness and ineffectiveness” 9 From Morgenthau’s lucid conclusions it is clear that even

though the principle emerging from Stockholm and subsequently adopted by international

instruments on the surface seems to resolve the paradox it is merely a Planckian step

forward and far greater institutional and ideological reforms need to be conducted for

effective protection.

We can conclude that sovereignty means international law is inherently weak in

formulation. The common criticism is that international agreements do not secure real

environmental protection because their design and operation ultimately effect national

interests over environmental stewardship.10 Further international law relies on states

bargaining and often they do not reach a consensus on anything but a lowest-common-

denominator basis which is unsatisfactory. This combined with the argument presented in

the introduction - that by the time protection envisioned in the principles and treaties

reaches national levels it is massively watered down and corrupted with capitalist profit

motives - there is little protection afforded to the environment. The actual time that these

8

? Thomas J. Cioppa, “The Sovereign-State System, International Law and Institutions, and Environmental Protection: Present Incompatibilities and Future Possibilities”, www.ciaonet.org/isa/cit01/9

? Morgenthau, H.J. and K.W. Thompson. 1985. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Peace and Power. 6 th ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf p329 cited in Thomas J. Cioppa Op Cit. fn810

? Thomas J. Cioppa Op Cit.

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agreements reach a consensus is also startling, Kyoto took two-and-a-half years of

negotiations11 to adopt. Even worse is the implementation time between adoption and

enforcement was over seven years. It is no wonder that Susskind concludes

“environmental protection strategies that made sense when they were first proposed

represent ‘too little, too late’ by the time they are implemented”.12 The remark turns out

to be startlingly prophetic because Kyoto overestimates Russia’s emissions and due to

Kyoto’s emissions treading scheme, other states can effectively ‘cheat’ the targets by

purchasing Russia’s ‘hot air’. Legally the parties have fulfilled the targets via a legal

mechanism but environmentally speaking they have cheated, the proverbial legal

‘loophole’ in effect. Additionally the benefits set for developing nations are actually

offset by the rise in developing nations emissions by 2012.13 Barret eloquently

summarises the argument “The Kyoto targets simply reflect what was politically feasible

at the time and not what is appropriate from an ecological standpoint”14 What is

distressing is that what was ‘political feasible’ meant the United States refused to sign.

One wonders how weak the goals would have had to be in order for America to be

signatory also.

Diametrically opposed – Capitalism and Environmental Protection? Sustainable

Developments plays match maker.

11

? Justine Thornton & Silas Beckwith Environmental Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd ed)., p5812

? Susskind, L.E. 1994. Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating More Effective Global Agreements. P14.13

? Thornton & Beckwith Op. Cit. p5814

? Barret, S., ‘Political Review of the Kyoto Protocol’ ((1998) 14 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 4, p20) Emphasis added.

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What Principle-21 has purportedly done for curtailing sovereignty, Sustainable

Development (SD) aims to do for the trade off between economic development and

environmental protection. In many ways it has done an outstanding job in doing so

however, its notions of equity have been corrupted by capitalistic economic formalism

which purports to uphold principles of SD but is not consistent with principles of inter

and intra generational equity. The classic lawyer may argue that SD is not hard-law and

should be left for the economists, ecologists and politicians to discuss but this argument is

typically myopic of lawyers who need to embrace a multidisciplinary approach in todays

globalised world. SD appears in hundreds of pieces of legislation in national countries

without definition therefore the actual jurisprudence forming it is of tremendous

importance to courts, when interpreting and Parliaments, when legislating with it. The

question posed asks about effective environmental law the principles of SD can either be

incorporated weakly or strongly, the later obviously affording more effective protection

to the environment. On two fronts then we are justified for delving deeper.

SD’s genesis was in the World Conservation Strategy (IUCN/UNEP/WWF 1980)

initially an ecocentric concept with little attention to economic growth. Seven years later

the Brundtland Report catalysed the notion so much so “that it has been taken up by

almost every international institution, agency and NGO”15 since. The essence of SD is the

much cited “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the

ability of future generations to meet their own needs”.16 For the first time economic 15

? Neil Carter , Understanding Sustainable Development, http://www.fathom.com/course/21701763/session1.html16

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development could be reconciled with environmental protection. SD underpinned the

agenda for Rio. Principle-1 and 3 enshrined inter and intragenereational equity and

Principle-4 brought environmental considerations into the core of international law in

terms of economic development. While these are only principles they have been given

legal effect everywhere from the Convention on Climate Change17 to the Polish

Constitution18, EC Treaty19 and many EU directives.20 However in none of these

instruments is a clear definition of SD. As a result there is a mass proliferation of

definitions of the concept - David Pearce et all provide over 40.21 Sadly it is due to its

vagueness rather than environmental protection goals that the concept has promulgated so

ferociously leading to not only ineffective environmental protection but poor realisations

of equity. As Lele has summerality put it:

“SD is a metafix that will unite everybody form the profit-minded industrials and risk minimising subsistence farmer to the equity-seeking social worker, the pollution-concerned or wildlife-loving First Worlder, the growth maximising policy maker, the goal-orientated bureaucrat and… the vote counting politician”22

SD satisfies those on the extreme left and extreme right purely because the extremes can

pick and chose what they wish to emphasise and ignore the rest.

? World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED). Our common future.: Oxford University Press, 1987 p. 43.17

? Article 318

? Article 519

? Article 2 & 620

? e.g. Directive 2002/96/EC, 2001/42/EC21

? David Pearce et all Blue Print for a Green Economy pp173-85 cited in Neil Carter Op. Cit. 22

? S. Lele, ‘Sustainable development: a critical review’, World Development Volume 19, No. 6 (1991), pp. 607-621

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In saying that two definitions of intergenerational equity have emerged: weak

sustainability reasons that future generations should have the same ability to create

wealth as we have and that future generations can be adequately compensated for loss of

environmental assets with alternate sources of wealth. Strong sustainability on the other

hand views the environment as offering more than economic potential which cannot be

replaced with man made capital thus future generations should not inherit a degraded

environment.

The weak reasoning is the prominent manifestation of intergenerational equity

emerging from SD in national policy and legislation however, it cannot be reconciled

with notions of equity because it involves the comodification of natural resources that are

currently freely available to all23. Comodofication necessarily attaches economic value on

things and since income and wealth distribution is far from equal how can weak

sustainability be consistent with intergenerational equity? Equity does not mean equal but

according to a Enviornmental Protection Agency it is rather “a concept of social

justice”24. Even by a weaker ‘social justice’ definition, commodication of the

environment is anything but. Yet the concept of intergenerational equity is cited

numerous soft law sources and at least one hard law convention.25 Schemes such as a cost

benefit anaylsis and internalizing externalities are the methods used to comodifiy

environmental goods and ostensibly give effect to principles of SD, but they are anything

23

? Sharon Beder, ‘'Costing the Earth: Equity, Sustainable Development and Environmental Economics’, New Zealand Journal of Environmental Law, 4, 2000, pp. 227-243 available online http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/sbeder/esd/equity.html

24 1993, Social Equity and the Urban Environment, Report to the Commonwealth Environment Protection Agency, AGPS, Canberra, p.2. cited in Sharon Beder Op. Cit.25

? Article 3 of CCC

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but equitable or even accurate for that matter. This is indeed a concern for International

Environmental Law because softlaw emerging from SD is corrupted by the time it

reaches national level into merely extending market values to incorporate the

environment into the wider economy leading to insufficient environmental protection and

inadequate help to developing countries. But why exactly is extending market values poor

for environmental protection?

The weakness of Economic Methods

The broad reasoning of neo-Keynsian economists is that environmental goods are

over used because they are not priced. If a price is attached then consumption will fall.

The second strand of thought is that economic activities causing damage to the

environment (externalities) are not correctly priced by the free market. Therefore

governments must intervene in the market to ‘internalize the externality’ and alter the

price according the true costs of production of that good. This is brilliant in theory and

indeed the whole basis of economics is allocation of scare resources to infinite wants, so

the environment would fit in nicely because it is indeed a scare resource. However, the

problem comes in quantification. Poor methods of valuation of the environment are used

because the price cannot directly be ascertained using the fundamental forces of supply

and demand. Valuation can be done via survey but whatever method used: interview,

travel cost, or hedonic pricing all methods are inequitable.26 The reason is obvious - the

price people attach to a good is determined by their wealth and income. Low income

26

? Sharon Bedder Op. Cit

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earners will attach a lower value to; say a park, than a high income earner. This does not

mean they value it any less in real terms. At an even more fundamental level how likely

is a person to give an accurate answer when they are not forced to part with their money?

These valuations are then used in cost benefit analysis. For example in Wisconsin, USA it

was established that preventing the extinction of striped shiner fishes would be worth

$12million/yr.27 If a project was determined to be of more value to the community than

$12million it would be deemed economically efficient to proceed with it and the losers

can be compensated28. Indeed environmental impact assessments combined with a cost

benefit analysis are major statutory planning tools and evidenced in EC legislation 29 and

various countries national legislation.30 Purportedly such measures ensure protection.

These legal sources and policies have fallen into an ‘economic formalism’ trap.

As Herb Thompson argues - before an economist can even construct a cost benefit table

they are confronted with immense difficulties of methodological fuzziness which is

“normally hidden away in the mathematical formalism which enthralls policy-makers”31

Methodological fuzziness is the fact that SD has not been defined in any legislation. He

goes onto argue “the apparent objectivity of a cost-benefit analyses is the result of

slapping arbitrary numbers on subjective judgments”. Even more damming is that

economic models require markets, this is impossible between generations because a

27

? Herb Thompson "Competitive Markets and the Environment: A Critical Examination of Orthodox Economics", with S. Avenell, Democracy and Nature, Volume 3, No. 3 (Issue 9), 1997, pp. 107-128. Available online http://www.aucegypt.edu/faculty/thompson/herbtea/articles/DandN.html28

? According to the Kaldor-Hicks compensatory principle. 29

? Directive 85/33/EEC as amended by 97/11/EC30

? US National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Canadian Environmental Assessment Act 199431

? Herb Thompson, Op. Cit.

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market does not exist. Missing markets “surely raise doubts about the abilty of market

analysis to achieve intergenerational equity”32 The fundamental philosophy of economics

prides itself on its positivistic predilection however, they spend much of their time

imagining perfect worlds and “the tautologies resulting form their models are then

offered … as prescriptions”33 for environmental problems. The politicians sap this up

because as Sharon Beder argues - it makes the environment an apolitical issue because it

lets the free market decide, not votes. This simply is not appropriate protection for the

environment and is a fundamental problem of formulating international law because once

the principles are formulated they are given effect via economic methods.

Developing Countries and Intragenerational Equity

The Bruntland report wrote “those who are poor and hungry will often

destroy their immediate environment in order to survive”34 Poverty

leads people to mismanage land and countries to industrialise at an

ecologically inconsistent rate leading to problems for present and

future generations. It has been reflected in international agreements35

as well as national legislation such as in the US,36 and other countries.37

32

? ibid33

? ibid34

? The World Commission on Environment and Development 1987, p2835

? Soft law: The Rio Declaration, Agenda 21 and harder law - 1968 African Convention, Convention on Biological Diversity and DC36

? Executive Order 12898 of 11 February 1994 referring to “environmental justice”37

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Here especially the international community ostensibly has helped

developing countries meet their environmental obligations and fully

recognized differing responsibilities in law

Equity has been maintained in formal declarations and normative instruments via

the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’. It is the

recognition “that the special needs of developing countries must be

taken into account”38 in international environmental law. Principle-7 of

Rio and Article-3 of the CCC take into account each states contribution

and ability to solve the problem. Stockholm Principle-23, Rio again in

Principles-6 and 11, 1972 London Convention,39 1992 Biological

Diversity Convention40, CCC again41 all recognise the principle. The

European Community too in the EC Treaty42.

The CCC is especially indicative to the approach taken because

the Convention divides countries into two main groups (1) those that

were rich OECD members consisting of 41 countries and (2) developing

countries consisting of 145 countries. The convention recognises that

(1) created more emissions and has more capability - both technically

? Penang Charter of the Indigenous-Tribal Peoples of the Tropical Forests, Baguio Declaration38

? Sands Op. Cit. p21739

? Article 2 of the 1996 Protocol to London.40

? Article 20(4) and preamble41

? Article 4(7)42

? Article 175(5)

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and economically - so they are required to take stronger measures and

provide technical and financial assistance to group (2) countries.43

Kyoto also has a ‘Clean Development Mechanism’44 where developed

countries finance developing nation’s projects to receive emission

reduction credits, in effect transferring finance and technology. This is

ingenious because for the first time there is an actual financial

incentive for developed countries to transfer wealth. Formally this is

strong evidence of intergenerational equity but as ever it is the

practical assistance offered that counts. Here the outlook is less

inspiring than the rhetoric in the law.

Many different bodies have been setup to provide assistance but due to word

constraints not all will be discussed45. Indicative of most approaches is the Global

Environment Facility (GEF) which channels finance from richer to poorer countries to

fund environmental obligations. Since 1991 the GEF has given grants to more than 1,300

projects in 140 countries totalling $4.5bn direct and $14.5bn in co-financing46. The GEF

is the largest body for channelling funds and is the financial mechanism for many

43

? Article 544

? Article 12 elaborated in the Marrakech Accords

45 1972 UNEP Environmental Fund (UNGA res. 2997(XXVII) (1972)) ;1990 The Wetlands Fund established for developing countries to implement the obligations under the 1971 Ramar Convention ; 1990 amendments to the Montreal Protocol established the Multilaterial Fund to provide financial and technical co-operation including the transfer of technologies (A10A)

46

? Neil Carter Op. Cit.

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different treaties47. The projects are implemented primarily through the World Bank,

UNDP and UNEP. But this is where the problem begins. NGOs are suspicious of the

close relationship between the WB and GEF48 and “complain of the incomprehensible

GEF procedures, WB procurement policies, and the lack of a comprehensive strategy of

the GEF secretariat.”49 NGO’s criticisms are significant; after all, they do not have

ulterior motives like political bodies. If they are saying this the impressive stats on

various funds websites may be actually fund concealed motives. While there is practical

assistance offered, it just pales in comparison to what is needed. $4bn as a percentage of

even developing countries GDP is but a drop in the ocean.

The EC too has financial resources available to its members. The LIFE

programme established in 199250 was purely an intra community funding program but

was amended51 and introduced LIFE-Third Countries for Mediterranean and Baltic Sea

countries. €38million went to LIFE-Third countries in 2000-200452 but this merely

accounted for 5% of the entire budget53 it can be hardly considered as lending assistance.

The EC also has the Cohesion Fund which co-finances projects concerned with the

environment54 to members states with a GDP less than 90% of the Community average.

47 UNFCCC, Caragena Biosafety Protocol, CBD, Stockholm POPs Convention and others48

? Charlotte Streck, “The Global Environment Facility - a Role Model for International Governance”, Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 1, Issue 2 p88 49

? ibid50

? Regulation No. 1973/9251

? Regulation No. 1404/9652

? http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/life/life/third_countries.htm53

? http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/life/life/historyoflife.htm54

? 1164/94 Article 3

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Even more obviously than with the financial mechanisms, the transfer of

technology for environmental protection is superseded by protection of private property

with the insistence at recognising intellectual property (IP) rights. The formal law

demands technology transfer yet enforces IP rights. Lending more evidence to the central

argument that international law’s core problem is capitalism. The BDC is most telling. It

encourages transfer of technology in Article 16(1) however, it states the transfer should

take place under terms “which recognise and are consistent with the adequate and

effective protection of intellectual property rights.”55 Agenda-21’s Chapter-34 also

promotes technology transfer but takes “into account the need to protect [IP rights].” The

central problem is IP rights have been established as an international norm for over a

century.56 The BDC in Article 22 attempts to establish supremacy of environmental

protection by overriding IP rights, if those rights “would cause serious damage [or] threat

to biological diversity”. This is clearly a manifestation of the precautionary principle but

the principle is not defined anywhere. It is unclear what would constitute “serious

damage”. So the provision in effect is a nullity.

Yet again we have law that is formally recognising environmental law principles

but is primarily concerned with protecting property. The formulation and drafting

problems presented thus far may be problematic but even those difficulties pale in

comparison to enforcement problems.

Enforcement

55

? Article 16(2)56

? e.g. recognised under the Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property and the Patent Cooperation Treaty. For a full list see Sands p747 at fn120.

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The EC provides an excellent case study for problems with enforcement. It has

been active formulating environmental legislation under its Environmental Action

programs and by 1996 passed over 200 pieces of legislation57. Its constituting treaties

make mention of environmental protection principles.58 However the wealth of legislation

passed is poorly enforced. It acts as a good case study because as with international

agreements which require implementing measures in national legislation, EC measures

also require implementing by Member States (MS). What we discover for the EC must

then apply elsewhere and acutely in developing countries where the legal and regulatory

framework is not as advanced as the EC.

Failure to implement measures is a serious problem. MS usually comply with

formal obligations to pass legislation purporting to give effect to directives. Thornton and

Beckwith argue that the discretion given to MS often circumvent the purpose of the

directive,59 the Commission themselves agree60 citing delegation problems which lead to

“decentralization of the implementation process [adding] considerably to the complexity

of the implementation of Community environmental policy”61 Directives adopted in the

1970s still pose continuing enforcement problems.62 Under A211EC it is the European

57

? COM(96)500 at Para 158

? A175 EC59

? Thornton and Beckwith, Op. Cit. p9860

? COM (96) 500 @ para 26. 61

? COM (96) 500 @ Para 962

? COM (96) 500 @ Para 6

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Commission’s responsibility to ensure compliance. But it is merely a formalistic exercise

making sure MS’s Statutes comply with directive provisions. At last resort A226

proceedings are initiated, the statistics on A226 proceedings for environmental law are

impressive63. But as the Commission have concluded “the procedure under Aritlce-169

[new-226] may be lengthy and formal, and … not designed with environmental law cases

in mind”. Why is this? Because the Commission only has standing to bring proceedings.

To their credit though, the third pillar of AARHUS which demands public access to

justice in environmental concerns is at a proposal stage.64 Legal provisions aside there is

limited staff in dealing with infringement complaints. Pre-enlargement there were only 18

lawyers responsible for infringements in 15 MS. And sadly there is no environmental

inspectorate to investigate breaches unlike with competition law.

Developing countries outlook is even bleaker but most of the evidence is

conjecture purely for reasons that there is no central authority that measures breaches.

Eco Vitality65 argue that developing countries have ulterior motives for ratifying treaties.

Ratification of environmental treaties is a precondition to obtaining trade advantages for

example NAFTA trade negotiations were derailed unless Mexico upgraded their

environmental protection. They did so merely be enacting legislation they had no

intention of enforcing. Economic assistance programmes require applicants to submit

documents demonstrating they have the appropriate legal framework; not enforcement

records. The creation of legislation mollifies “environmentalists without the need to

63

? Between 1976-2002 300 Environmental Law cases initiated under A226.64

? COM (2003) 62465

? EcoVitality, “Causes for Environmental Law Concern” http://www.ecovitality.org/badlaw.htm

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impose severe regulatory burdens on entrepreneurial activities”66. Economic expansion

over environment is a real problem for enforcement the rationale is obvious. Developing

countries want to step out of poverty, the only way they see of doing this is

industrialisation. Environmental law no matter what SD says is counter to speedy

economic growth. Unfortunately this is the crux of the problem and leads us to our

conclusion.

Conclusion

Economic expansion and profit motives are incompatible with environmental

protection because they inhibit environmental law at every single level. As has been

shown on the macroscopic level the formulation is hindered because of sovereignty. The

nation state system is incompatible with environmental protection because problems

transcend national boundaries. Even when such agreements are made they take far too

long - why is this? Because states are essentially in competition with one another – they

do not want to yield too much. Finally when the international negotiations are done what

we are left with is a comprise, heavily bias to capitalism leading to a broad unspecific

‘law’ that isn’t ecologically sufficient nor timely or even worthy of the tag ‘law’

When this poor compromise reaches national level it is again diffused in

implementation via inclusion of economic devices to realise some principles.

Enforcement is even a bigger problem, because capitalism requires firms and countries to

compete. Anything that hinders their competitive level is unlikely to be enforced

66

? ibid

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strongly. Even when those whom try to enforce environmental law they are confronted

with locus standi requirements that are inherently economically bias.

In the final analysis at every single level from devising to enforcement to transfer

of technology/wealth the main hindrance to international environmental law is capitalism.

Laws require consensus; unfortunately without a major catalyst international

environmental law is at ends with an already entrenched system of capitalist norms - both

internationally and nationally.

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Bibliography

Philippe Sands, Principles of Environmental Law 1st Ed (1995)

EcoVitality: Bad Law - http://www.ecovitality.org/badlaw.htm

Thomas J. Cioppa. ‘The Sovereign-State System, International Law and Institutions, and Environmental Protection: Present Incompatibilities and Future Possibilities’, www.ciaonet.org/isa/cit01/

Justine Thornton & Silas Beckwith Environmental Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd ed

Susskind, L.E. 1994. Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating More Effective Global Agreements

Barret, S., “Political Review of the Kyoto Protocol” ((1998) 14 Oxford Review of Economic Policy

Neil Carter , Understanding Sustainable Development, http://www.fathom.com/course/21701763/session1.html

World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED). Our common future.: Oxford University Press, 1987

S. Lele, "Sustainable development: a critical review", World Development Volume 19, No. 6 (1991)

Sharon Beder, 'Costing the Earth: Equity, Sustainable Development and Environmental Economics', New Zealand Journal of Environmental Law, 4, 2000, pp. 227-243 available online http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/sbeder/esd/equity.html

Herb Thompson "Competitive Markets and the Environment: A Critical Examination of Orthodox Economics", with S. Avenell, Democracy and Nature, Volume 3, No. 3 (Issue 9), 1997, pp. 107-128. Available online http://www.aucegypt.edu/faculty/thompson/herbtea/articles/DandN.html

Implementing Community environmental law: Commission Communication to Council and Parliament, COM(96)500 final of 22 October 1996

Charlotte Streck, “The Global Environment Facility - a Role Model for International Governance”, Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 1, Issue 2