Edu v Ericta and Pelaez v. Auditor General

8/8/2019 Edu v Ericta and Pelaez v. Auditor General

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EDU V. ERICTA

Facts:

Petitioner Romeo Edu, the Land Transportation Commissioner issued Administrative Order no. 2, which took

effect on April 17, 1990, which provides as follows:

"No motor vehicles of whatever style, kind, make, class or denomination shall be registeredif not equipped with reflectors. Such reflectors shall either be factory built-in-reflector commercialglass reflectors, reflection tape or luminous paint. The luminosity shall have an intensity to bemaintained visible and clean at all times such that if struck by a beam of light shall be visible 100meters away at night." 35 Then came a section on dimensions, placement and color. As to dimensionsthe following is provided for: "Glass reflectors — Not less than 3 inches in diameter or not less than 3inches square; Reflectorized Tape — At least 3 inches wide and 12 inches long. The painted or tapedarea may be bigger at the discretion of the vehicle owner." 36 Provision is then made as to how suchreflectors are to be "placed, installed, pasted or painted." 37 There is the further requirement that inaddition to such reflectors there shall be installed, pasted or painted four reflectors on each side of

the motor vehicle parallel to those installed, pasted or painted in front and those in the rear end of the body thereof. 38 The color required of each reflectors, whether built-in, commercial glass,reflectorized tape or reflectorized paint placed in the front part of any motor vehicle shall be amberor yellow and those placed on the sides and in the rear shall all be red. 39

"Non-compliance with the requirements contained in this Order shall be sufficient cause torefuse registration of the motor vehicle affected and if already registered, its registration maybesuspended in pursuance of the provisions of Section 16 of RA 4136; [Provided], However, that in thecase of the violation of Section 1(a) and (b) and paragraph (8) Section 3 hereof, a fine of not less thanten nor more than fifty pesos shall be imposed. 40 It is not to be lost sight of that under Republic ActNo. 4136, of which the Reflector Law is an amendment, petitioner, as the Land TransportationCommissioner, may, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, issue

rules and regulations for its implementation as long as they do not conflict with its provisions.41

It islikewise an express provision of the above statute that for a violation of any of its provisions orregulations promulgated pursuant thereto a fine of not less than P10 nor not less than P50 could beimposed. 4

Respondent Galo on his behalf and that of other motorist filed on May 20, 1970 a suit for certiorari andprohibition with preliminary injunction assailing the validity of the challenged Act as an invalid exercise of thepolice power, for being violative of the due process clause. This he followed on May 28, 1970 with amanifestation wherein he sought as an alternative remedy that, in the event that respondent Judge Erictawould hold said statute constitutional, Administrative Order No. 2 of the Land Transportation Commissioner,now petitioner, implementing such legislation be nullified as an undue exercise of legislative power. There wasa hearing on the plea for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction held on May 27. 1970 where both

parties were duly represented, but no evidence was presented. The next day, on May 28, 1970, respondentJudge ordered the issuance of a preliminary injunction directed against the enforcement of suchadministrative order.

Issue: WON there has been undue delegation of legislative power which as a result suchAdministrative Order issued in furtherance of the delegated power is null and void.

Held:

It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not delegateits legislative power to the two other branches of the government, subject to the exception that localgovernments may over local affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority underthe Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in allits term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an



undue delegation of legislative power the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of themeasure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done,who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed be the onlyway in which the legislative process can go forward. A distinction has rightfully been made between delegationof power to make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionallymay not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to exercised under and inpursuance of the law, to which no valid objection call be made. The Constitution is thus not to be regarded asdenying the legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability.

To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard , which implies at the very least that thelegislature itself determines matters of principle and lay down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, its mapsout its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which thelegislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out.Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelinespromulgate supplemental rules and regulations.

The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. Thestandard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purposeof the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety.

It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together with the Land Transportation Code. Republic ActNo. 4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as to the stress and emphasis on public safety which isthe prime consideration in statutes of this character. There is likewise a categorical affirmation Of the power of petitioner as Land Transportation Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations to give life to andtranslate into actuality such fundamental purpose. His power is clear. There has been no abuse. HisAdministrative Order No. 2 can easily survive the attack, far-from-formidable, launched against it byrespondent Galo.

PELAEZ V. AUDITOR GENERAL

Facts:

During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant toSection 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin. 1 Soon after the date last mentioned, or on November 10, 1964petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action,for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as hisrepresentatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executiveorders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.

Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has been impliedlyrepealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Respondent maintains thecontrary view and avers that the present action is premature and that not all proper parties — referring to the officials of the new political subdivisions in question —have been impleaded. Subsequently, the mayors of several municipalitiesadversely affected by the aforementioned executive orders — because the latter have taken away from the former thebarrios composing the new political subdivisions — intervened in the case. Moreover, Attorneys Enrique M. Fernando andEmma Quisumbing-Fernando were allowed to and did appear as amici curiae .

The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:

Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the provisions of

this Act or by Act of Congress.



Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same Section 3:

All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall come under the provisions hereof.

Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected, a new barrio may be created or the name of anexisting one may be changed by the provincial board of the province, upon recommendation of the council of the

municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is stipulated. The recommendation of the municipalcouncil shall be embodied in a resolution approved by at least two-thirds of the entire membership of the saidcouncil: Provided, however, That no new barrio may be created if its population is less than five hundredpersons.

Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios may "not be created or theirboundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "uponpetition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality ormunicipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." Petitioner argues, accordingly: "If the President, under this newlaw, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios , since barrios are unitsof municipalities?"

Issue: WON there has been a valid delegation of legislative power thereby Sec. 68 of Revised Administrative Code is valid.

Held:

Although 1a Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution,enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, thatsaid law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by thedelegate 2 — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which thedelegate must conform in the performance of his functions. 2a Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, thedelegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without theaforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate hasacted within or beyond the scope of his authority. 2b Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only tomake the law, but, also — and this is worse — to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to beattained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and

balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our Republican system.

Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of thepower to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented bythe President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to.

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Edu v Ericta and Pelaez v. Auditor General