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Mapping Hazard Zones, Rapid Warning Communication andUnderstanding Communities: Primary Ways to MitigatePyroclastic Flow Hazard

Citation for published version:Lavigne, F, Morin, J, Wulan Mei, ET, Calder, E, Usamah, M & Nugroho, U 2017, 'Mapping Hazard Zones,Rapid Warning Communication and Understanding Communities: Primary Ways to Mitigate PyroclasticFlow Hazard', Advances in Volcanology. https://doi.org/10.1007/11157_2016_34

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Mapping Hazard Zones, RapidWarning Communicationand Understanding Communities:Primary Ways to Mitigate PyroclasticFlow Hazard

Franck Lavigne, Julie Morin, Estuning Tyas Wulan Mei,Eliza S. Calder, Muhi Usamah and Ute Nugroho

AbstractProtection against the consequences of Pyroclastic Density Currents (PDCs)is almost impossible due to their high velocity, temperature, sediment loadand mobility. PDCs therefore present a challenge for volcanic crisismanagement in that specific precautionary actions, essentially evacuations,are required to reduce loss of life. In terms of crisis communication for PDChazards, there are three challenging questions that arise in terms of reducingrisk to life, infrastructure and livelihoods. (1) How do we accuratelycommunicate the hazardous zones related to potential PDC inundation?The areas exposed to PDC hazard are difficult to assess and to map. In termsof risk/crisis management, the areas considered at risk are usually those thatwere affected by PDCs during previous eruptive episodes (decades orcenturies ago). In case of “larger-than-normal” eruptions, the underestima-tion of the hazard zone may lead to refusals to evacuate in the “newly”threatened area. Another difficulty in assessing the PDC hazard zones relateto their transport processes that allow surmounting of the topography and insome cases across the surface of water. Therefore warning systems must beable to cover vast areas in aminimumof time. (2)Howdowe efficiently warnpeople in time? PDCs are extremelymobile and fast. It is therefore necessaryto raise the alert early enough before the onset of the first PDCs.A challenging question in terms of crisis communication is related to the

F. Lavigne (&)Laboratoire de Géographie Physique,Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Meudon,Francee-mail: franck.lavigne@univ-paris1.fr

J. MorinLaboratoire Magmas et Volcans,Université Clermont Auvergne, CNRS, IRD, OPGC,Clermont-Ferrand F-63000, France

E.T.W. MeiFakultas Geografi, Universitas Gadjah Mada,Yogyakarta, Indonesia

E.S. CalderSchool of GeoSciences, University of Edinburgh,James Hutton Rd, The Kings Buildings, Edinburgh,UK

M. UsamahPYDLOS, Universidad de Cuenca, Cuenca, Ecuador

U. NugrohoUniversitas Padjadjaran, Bandung, Indonesia

Advs in VolcanologyDOI: 10.1007/11157_2016_34© The Author(s) 2017

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type of tools used by the local authorities, modern and traditional tools bothof which have advantages and disadvantages. (3)Why are people reluctantto evacuate? Local inhabitants can be reluctant to evacuate during a crisisif traditional warning signs or signals they are familiar with are lacking, ifthey don’t receive both traditional and official warning, and because theymay lose their livelihoods. Thus a deeper understanding of the at‐riskcommunities and efficient dissemination of information are key issues inorder to reduce vulnerability in PDC hazard regions.

KeywordsPyroclastic density currents � Risk communication � Crisis management �Warning � Evacuation � Risk perception

1 Introduction

Pyroclastic Density Currents (PDCs) are rapidflowage phenomena that involve various pro-portions of volcanic gas and fragmented volcanicrock at high temperatures. PDCs encompassdense pyroclastic flows, which tend to be moretopographically controlled, and dilute pyroclasticsurges that are less topographically controlledand can surmount topographic obstacles, or tra-vel across the surface of bodies of water. Bothdense flows and dilute surges destroy almosteverything in their path and therefore protectionagainst the consequences of PDC inundation isalmost impossible. In some countries, anti-PDCbunkers have been built in high hazard proneareas to provide a safe shelter to a limited num-ber of people in the situation that they are unableto evacuate on time. It was demonstrated in 2006on Merapi (Indonesia) that they are not alwayseffective, as two people died trapped in thebunkers where they took refuge (Gertisser et al.2011). Moreover, hard engineering structuressuch as SABO dams may actually accentuate theavulsion process of PDCs, e.g. in 2006 and 2010at Merapi (Lube et al. 2011), or Tungurahua in2006 (Stone et al. 2014). Thus, PDCs present achallenge for volcanic crisis management in thatspecific precautionary actions are required toreduce loss of life.

The improvement of crisis managementcapabilities is based, on one hand, on PDCmonitoring and early warning systems as well asrobust communications that are not likely to becompromised for example by power failure and,on the other hand, on preparedness of stake-holders and population (MIAVITA Team 2012).

This chapter discusses three challengingquestions in reducing the risk associated withPDCs: (1) How should we accurately commu-nicate the hazardous zone related to potentialPDC inundation? (2) How should we efficientlywarn people in time? (3) Why are people often-times reluctant to evacuate and how should weimprove the propensity for people to accept andundertake evacuations?

These points are addressed through examples,mostly focusing on Merapi, and other Indonesianvolcanoes as well as other volcanoes around theworld. This chapter concludeswith a discussion onways to improve volcanic risk management inareas prone to PDC hazards.

2 How Can We Communicate PDCHazard Zones?

The areas exposed to PDC hazard are difficult toaccurately assess and to map. In terms ofrisk/crisis management, the areas considered at

2 F. Lavigne et al.

risk are usually those that were affected by PDCsduring the last decades or centuries. Scientists incharge of volcano monitoring often use a “ref-erence eruption”, the extent of volcanic depositsof which are used to gauge inundation extent forfuture eruption scenarios in operational hazardmaps. For instance, the “danger zones” mapsused in Indonesia for emergency planning areprovided by the Center of Volcanology andGeological Hazards Mitigation (CVGHM).These maps typically display two zones threat-ened by PDC hazard: the KRB III (KRB standsfor Kawasan Rawan Bencana in Indonesian orHazard Prone Area in English) encompassesareas located close to the summit, frequentlyaffected by dome-collapsed pyroclastic flows,lava flows, rock falls and ejected rock fragments.The KRB II is affected by less frequent andlonger runout pyroclastic flows, lahars, volcanicash fall, and ejected rocks. At Merapi forexample, the boundaries of hazard zone III and IIwere based, until 2010, on the distribution ofvolcanic products of the largest eruptions of the20th century. Therefore the maximum distance ofthe KRB II did not exceed 15 km, which was theapproximate maximum extension of the 1930,

1961, and 1969 PDCs. Since its first edition in1978 (Pardyanto et al. 1978, Fig. 8.1), the vol-canic hazards map has been widely disseminatedamong the communities at risk through the localauthorities and non-governmental organizations(NGOs). Although this map was updated fol-lowing the 2006 eruption (Mei and Lavigne2012), the contingency plan created in 2009 stilldid not consider a plinian or subplinian eruptionscenario such as the one that occurred in 1872.Several areas affected by the subsequent anddevastating 2010 PDCs, the length of which weresubstantially longer than expected (17 km fromthe summit), had not been included in the dangerzone. As a result 53 people who were resistingevacuation or who were late in the process ofevacuating were killed in Bronggang, a villagelocated 13.5 km to the south of Merapi, whendilute surges detached from their parent flows inthe adjacent Gendol River and entered the village(Jenkins et al. 2013). Among the survivors,several inhabitants who were unprepared forevacuation took a wrong evacuation route tooclose to the river (Mei et al. 2013). Since the2010 eruption, the hazard map has been revised(Fig. 8.1).

Fig. 8.1 The Merapi volcano hazard map designed by the Indonesian Center of Volcanology and Geological HazardMitigation (CVGHM) in 2002 (CVGHM 2002) and after its revision in 2011 (CVGHM 2011)

Mapping Hazard Zones, Rapid Warning Communication … 3

Although the local authorities are often awareof the worst-case scenario provided by the vol-canologists, they cannot use it for contingencyplanning, i.e. for risk management. Using theworst case scenario for a background hazard mapis actually impractical since many existing com-munities are established on deposits from largeeruptions, and an eruption is unlikely to reachworst case without some precursory activity.However, all possibilities should be discussedbetween volcanologists and authorities wellbefore a crisis, so that outline contingency plan-ning can be made if significant escalation doesoccur. Communities can live within hazard zones,if they are aware of the threat and there is goodplanning for evacuations in the event of anescalation. Maps are commonly adjusted as acrisis evolves, as shown in the cases of Merapi.During the 2012 Tongariro eruption crisis in NewZealand, Leonard et al. (2014) highlighted theimportance and complementary roles of threemap types for communicating volcanic hazardinformation: background hazard, crisis hazardand ashfall prediction maps. In developing haz-ard maps there are a range of key points to con-sider in terms of message, presentation and basisfor each map type. For example, perspective viewhas been shown to increase map readability andpublic self-location accuracy (Haynes et al.2007b; Nave et al. 2010). Following Leonardet al. (2014), PDC hazards need careful quantifi-cation through modelling. For rapid crisis PDChazard map zone development the critical factorsare (1) having access to and experience in runningflow models, (2) having those models testedagainst the past and expected future parameters ofa volcano and (3) having access to the computingresources needed to run enough scenarios in ashort (day to days) timeframe.

The main difficulty in communicating PDChazardous zones occurs when the hazard isalmost unknown, or has been forgotten by localpeople over time after a few generations, such ason the slopes of the Mount Pelée on the island ofMartinique before the 1902 eruption (Leone and

Lesales 2009). One day before the totaldestruction of Saint-Pierre by pyroclastic surges,a scientific expert from mainland France claimedthat “Saint-Pierre is not more threatened by thePelée volcano than Napoli by the Vesuvius vol-cano”. This scientist was not aware that dilutepyroclastic surges could occur at Mount Pelée(such as during the plinian eruption in 1300 AD),since these phenomena were not yet known(Lacroix 1904). Examples as this one arenumerous in volcanic areas. For instance, most ofthe villages of the northern and southeasterncoast of Lombok Island (Indonesia) have beenbuilt on pumice PDC deposits emplaced duringthe 1257 AD ultraplinian eruption of the Samalasvolcano (Lavigne et al. 2013).

3 How Do We Warn People in Time?

3.1 Difficulties in Providing TimelyWarnings

PDCs are extremely mobile, generally travellingat tens to hundreds of km/h. Therefore alerts needto be provided at least several hours before thefirst PDC occurs. Unfortunately, local popula-tions are not always warned by the authoritiesbefore an imminent eruption, for various reasons.In case of gravitational collapses of silicic lavadomes, which trigger ‘Merapi-type’ pyroclasticflows, warning people is not possible until theoccurrence of the collapse itself: reliable pre-cursory signals have not yet been identified, asobserved on Merapi on 22 November 1994(Abdurachman et al. 2000), although in somecases, the characteristics of seismic activity canchange leading up to a collapse e.g. at SoufriereHills (Cole et al. 1998). In some cases, theabsence of warning may be related to traditionalscepticism in technological predictions, whenlocal officials refuse to listen to the scientificforecasts and predictions at the very beginning ofa volcanic crisis (IAVCEI Subcommittee forCrisis Protocols 1999). Additional external

4 F. Lavigne et al.

drivers may prevent an alert by the localauthorities (the mayor in many cases), e.g. localelections, as observed at the beginning of the1902 eruption of Mount Pelée in Martinique(Lacroix 1904).

3.2 Modern Versus TraditionalWarning Tools

The type of tools used to communicate warningsby local authorities in times of crisis is critical toensuring an effective messaging. Modern toolslike sirens are increasingly used as “official”

warning systems on active volcanoes. In devel-oping countries, however, the areal distributionof sirens is not homogenous, e.g. around Merapiin Indonesia (Fig. 8.2). Based on a survey carriedout among 1969 people in shelters during the2010 eruption of Merapi, only 16% of the peoplewere warned by sirens before the PDCs totallydestroyed the slopes of the volcano (Fig. 8.3,Mei et al. 2013), whereas most people receivedevacuation alerts directly from the head of village(54%), or from neighbors (11%).

The warning signal may be also transmittedby a mobile system installed on the fire depart-ment’s vehicles (e.g. in France). In Japan, the

Fig. 8.2 Siren distribution around the flanks of Merapi, Indonesia. Source Lavigne et al. (2015), based on Mei et al.(2013)

Mapping Hazard Zones, Rapid Warning Communication … 5

J-Alert system, launched in 2007, aims to allowgovernment officials to address the populationdirectly via loudspeakers, e.g. in case of aneruption alert.

Other modern tools are widely used to warnpeople of imminent PDCs. Should a volcanicevent happen, local people considered at riskmay receive a warning message in the form ofSMS Text Message and/or Email onto their cellphones, smart phones or other electronic deviceslike iPads, Laptops, Desktop computers, etc.Usually, this type of warning message would bedistributed by Civil Defense Corps and includesall the hazards that could trigger an emer-gency situation, not only volcanic hazards, e.g.the app provided in Auckland (www.aucklandcivildefence.org.nz/Alerting/Get-the-Applications) or in Hawaii (http://www.hawaiicounty.gov/active-alerts). At TongariroVolcano in New Zealand, for example, an alert is

provided by the key scientific institution torelated agencies (e.g. Civil Defense and Emer-gency Management) and the media throughonline bulletins as well as direct communicationthrough its emergency network. This bulletin isalso accessible by the public via their networkwebsite and social media (Leonard et al. 2014).In Japan, real-time volcanic warning is availableto the public on the website (JMA 2015). Beyondvolcanic hazards, Japanese agencies send outSMS alerts to all registered mobile phones in thecountry (Pearson 2015).

Although modern tools are growing, tradi-tional tools are still considered as efficientwarning tools by local authorities, especially inremote areas. For example, the Indonesian ken-tongan (bamboo drum: Fig. 8.4a) is traditionallyused for warning the public, notably in ruralareas or during an emergency period duringwhich electricity might be cut off, meaning that

Fig. 8.3 The source ofwarnings during the 2010volcanic crisis of Merapi,Indonesia (adapted fromMei and Lavigne 2013)

6 F. Lavigne et al.

modern alert tools relying on electricity powermight be dysfunctional. Based on a field surveyat Merapi in 2002, over 70% of interviewedvillagers thought that the kentongan was anefficient warning system (Lavigne et al. 2008).Every kentongan code has its own meaning(Fig. 8.4b). In case of volcanic disaster, thekentongan is beaten repeatedly and continuouslywith the same tone. It indicates that peopleshould immediately evacuate to a pre-determinedlocation, which is usually a village hall. How-ever, many people among the young generationare not able to interpret the signals anymore.Therefore, the use of this tool is forbidden duringMerapi’s volcanic crisis in some municipalitiesor villages, e.g. in Sawangan and Selo on thenorth slope of the volcano (Mei et al. 2013).

3.3 Official Warning VersusCommunity-Based Warning

Local communities are still using natural warningsigns of various types, as exemplified on theslopes of Merapi: increase in rock fall noise,increase in fumarolic activity from the summit’scrater, the descent of monkeys or other wildanimals from the hills, ground shaking relatingto increased seismic activity, or lightning storms

caused by the emission of ash into the atmo-sphere. Local inhabitants can be reluc-tant to evacuate during a crisis if signals they arefamiliar with are lacking, and if they don’treceive both traditional and official warning of apossible eruption (Donovan 2010). Furthermore,some culturally accepted warning signs can cre-ate a false sense of security, and it can be astruggle for some to believe those based on sci-entific monitoring alone. Such problems relatedto traditional cultural beliefs were reported notonly in developing countries, but also in the USAat Mt. Kilauea in Hawaii (Gregg et al. 2004),Mount St. Helens (Greene et al. 1981), and inItaly at Mt. Etna and Mt. Vesuvius (Chester et al.2008).

The credibility of a given warning and thevalidity of past warnings and evacuations, bothinfluence the decision to evacuate. Social, eco-nomic and political forces may distort risk mes-sages, leading to public reliance upon informalinformation networks (Haynes et al. 2008), e.g.social networks. Therefore, local organizationsplay a key role in crisis communication, asexemplified at Merapi by the actions ofJalinMerapi (Jaringan Informasi Lingkar Mer-api, in English Merapi Circle Information Net-work), a local organization supported by severalNGOs working around the volcano. This

Fig. 8.4 The use of bamboo drums (kentongan) at Merapi, Indonesia. a kentongan at the entrance of a house on theWest slope of Merapi (Photo F. Lavigne, 2010). b Kentongan communication codes. Source Lavigne et al. (2015)

Mapping Hazard Zones, Rapid Warning Communication … 7

association was established in 2006 by threecommunity-based radio stations. During theemergency response period in 2010, JalinMerapiused various electronic media to quickly andaccurately convey important information anddata to support the decision making process.JalinMerapi information was transmitted througha website, social networks such as Twitter andFacebook, SMS, radio communications, tele-phone and through information posters in thefield. JalinMerapi was managed by a voluntarynetwork that operated 24 h a day during the 2010eruption (Mei et al. 2013). Thus, repetition ofwarnings through different sources of the evac-uation command-line increased the chances thatpeople heeded the warning.

Community-based volcano risk communica-tion is also exemplified by the existence of thelos vigias system in Tungurahua, Ecuador. Losvigias literally means watchmen, and comprisesorganised surveillance of the volcano made up oflocal community members from different villagessituated on the flanks of the volcano. The vigiassystem has been integrated into the official riskcommunication of Tungurahua managed by theVolcano Observatory of Tungurahua (Stone et al.2014).

4 Why Are People Reluctantto Evacuate?

Refusal to evacuate is one of the main issues involcanic crisismanagement, as exemplified duringthe 2010 eruption of Merapi (Fig. 8.5). Evacua-tions have traditionally been a difficult task to carryout because of people’s reluctance to leavetheir homes and land. Various reasons com-pound people’s reluctance to evacuate in case of avolcanic crisis related to PDC hazard, as exem-plified at Merapi (Mei and Lavigne 2013).

First, the principal reason for hesitancy is thatsome people do not believe that their lives areendangered by PDCs, or that PDCs are likely inthat locality. Thus differences in perception ofPDC management issues by local communities

and scientists or emergency planners may lead toa disruption of crisis management plans (John-ston and Ronan 2000; Ronan 2013). PDC hazardexperience may create an inaccurate localizedtemplate for future eruptions, giving local peoplea false sense of safety (Douglas 1985; Donovan2010). For instance, despite the efforts of offi-cials, scientists and concerned members of thepublic of Montserat, about 80 people were inZones A and B of the Exclusion Zone on 25June 1997 (Loughlin et al. 2002). Many hadbecome accustomed to the pyroclastic flows andhad become overconfident in their own ability tojudge the threat by observing repeated flows thathad gradually increased runout but remainedrestricted to valleys. Many people had contin-gency plans and believed that there would beobservable or audible warning signs from thevolcano if the activity were to escalate signifi-cantly (Loughlin et al. 2002). The feeling ofsafety is enhanced with the presence of concretestructures like Sabo dams, and by increasingdistance of the village from the crater. Thefeeling of safety felt by the local communitiesliving further than 15 km from Merapi crater in2010 was enhanced by the extent of the pyro-clastic flow hazardous areas delineated byCVGHM, which did not take into account thepossibility of a major explosive eruption (Meiet al. 2013). Therefore understanding how peo-ple perceive risk has become increasinglyimportant for improving risk communication andreducing risk associated conflicts (Haynes et al.2008).

Second, it is essential to consider the local andcultural factors in volcanic risk and crisis man-agement (Lavigne et al. 2008). During the 2010PDC of Merapi, the evacuation refusal of MbahMarijan (the volcano’s gatekeeper or Juru Kunci)and his followers led to the deaths of thirty-fivepeople in Kinarhejo, a village located only 5 kmfrom the summit, including the gatekeeper him-self. Before this disaster, evacuation refusalsalong the southern flank of the volcano weremostly conditioned by trust in the gatekeeper andthe feeling of being protected by his presence

8 F. Lavigne et al.

(Mei and Lavigne 2012), even though in 2010Marijan suggested to people not to follow hisdecision to stay in the village. Anotherwell-known disaster related to large PDCs waspartly due to evacuation refusals for culturalreasons: the 1963 eruption of Mount Agungoccurred at the time of a very rare and importantBalinese ceremony at Besaki Hindu temple,7 km away from the crater. The PDCs weretherefore interpreted as a punishment from thegods, leading to the death of more than 1000people. Careful communication and awarenessof potential culture clashes might aid

communication within and beyond the scientificcommunity (Donovan and Oppenheimer 2014).

Third, people may be reluctant to evacuateeven if they are aware of the danger. Economicpressure may explain people’s behaviour duringcrisis, since they often refuse to evacuate in orderto cultivate their crops, take care of their animalsand protect their goods. Evacuation can havesevere consequences on the economy of a villageor a city. During the 2007 volcanic crisis of Kelutvolcano in East Java, for instance, 77% of peopleliving in Sugihwaras, a village close to the craterdid not pay attention to the warning message

Fig. 8.5 Evacuation refusal during the 2010 eruption ofMerapi volcano, Indonesia. Refusal means that at leastone person in the village has been identified by the

village’s chief as being reluctant to evacuate after havereceived the warning. Source Lavigne et al. (2015)

Mapping Hazard Zones, Rapid Warning Communication … 9

issued by the government, and almost a half ofthe interviewees disregarded the order to evacu-ate (De Belizal et al. 2012). They chose to stay athome, hiding themselves in their own houses,closing shutters and turning off lights. Almosttwo third of those interviewed thought it wasdangerous to leave their houses and assetsbehind. They declared that they were afraid ofpotential looters, a common perception whichhas been deeply discussed in the literature (e.g.by Quarantelli 1984).

Some people refuse to evacuate until otherfamily members, and also pets, are safe. A studyconducted within the community living aroundMayon Volcano, the Philippines, reveals howcommunity members were not willing to stay atevacuation centers and preferred to stay withfamily members should an evacuation warningbe issued by the authorities (Usamah and Haynes2012). People may be reluctant to evacuate dueto the sanitary situation in evacuation centres,either actual or due to rumors spread by themedia. For instance, some people from Sugih-waras (Kelut) did not evacuate to the sheltersduring the 2008 volcanic crisis, because theyheard that they were insalubrious (De Belizalet al. 2012). The media asserted that infectiousdiseases were spreading in many camps becauseof the bad quality of the food. The newspapercondemned the organizations in charge of theevacuation centres. Rumours of such diseasesspread quickly and many people believed thatproblems occurred in every evacuation center.Such rumors have been largely covered by theliterature (e.g. Drabek 1999) and may increasepeople’s vulnerability.

5 Building Trust in Hazard and RiskCommunication to Ensure BetterResponses to Evacuations

Open and transparent communications betweenthe stakeholders before and during a volcaniceruption is a key point in improving crisis man-agement capabilities. In order to enhance these

capabilities, it is essential to consider the localand cultural factors in volcanic risk management.As pointed out by Haynes et al. (2008), specificdifferences between the public, authorities andscientists are often responsible for misunder-standings and misinterpretations of information,resulting in differing perceptions of acceptablerisk. Deeper understanding of the at‐risk com-munities is therefore a key issue in order to reducevulnerability in PDC hazard regions. Informationdissemination and education of the people at riskare also key factors in correcting the perception ofPDC threats, and therefore in improving crisiscommunication. Modes of communication shouldbe reviewed regularly in the context of socialchanges. The need for community participationand involvement in raising PDC hazard aware-ness is crucial. Risk communication is a dialoguebetween the communities and people giving thewarnings. The take-up of scientific advice ismuch more efficient when communication of thatadvice is founded on personal trust rather thanwritten on a report (Haynes et al. 2007a). As aresult, communication of PDC hazard directlybetween scientists and the public is very impor-tant, e.g. on Montserrat (Haynes 2005; Donovanand Oppenheimer 2014).

6 Conclusion: Improving CrisisManagement Capabilitiesfor PDC’s Risk Reduction

Crisis management capabilities may be improvedthrough a set of good practices that are theoret-ically well-established, but that remain difficult todevelop practically by the local stakeholders.

Among the good practices for raising PDChazard knowledge and public awareness, infor-mation related to this specific hazard should bewidely disseminated, through the members ofhazard mitigation offices from regional to locallevels, not only within the PDC hazard zones butalso involve villages and cities located tens ofkilometres away from the vent. PDC hazardinformation should be disseminated especially

10 F. Lavigne et al.

around dormant volcanoes, where volcanic riskperception is usually low.

Video footage is an effective tool for raisingPDC hazard knowledge. During the 1991 eruptionof Mount Pinatubo (Philippines), the dissemina-tion of a film from the French volcanologists M.and K. Kraft likely saved many thousands of lives.Recently, the World Organization of VolcanoObservatories (WOVO) provides video resourcesthrough VOLFilm, a Multilingual and multi-platform films database for resilience to risksfrom volcanic hazards (http://www.wovo.org/volfilm-multilingual-and-multi-platform-films-for-resilience-to-risks-from-volcanic-hazards.html).Dissemination of information also comprisescontinuous media slots on PDC risk prevention,preparedness andmanagement taking into accountgeographical specificities.

Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction(CBDRR) should be considered in integratingtop-down and bottom-up approaches and as achannel of information and actions betweenstakeholders. Indeed it fosters the participation ofthreatened communities in both the evaluation ofrisk (including PDC hazards, vulnerability andcapacities) and in the ways to reduce it. Com-munity participation and involvement in raisingPDC hazard awareness might be accomplishedthrough various ways: socioeconomic factorsshould be better integrated from daily life tostrengthen livelihoods; collaboration should bebased on actual collaboration between institu-tional and upper level stakeholders, local stake-holders, and communities. Several approachesmay be taken in order to gain more traditionalknowledge of and responses to PDC-relateddisasters, in the framework of a bottom-up dis-aster risk reduction programme. Dialoguebetween the communities and people giving thewarnings could be improved through participa-tory methods, e.g. participatory volcanic hazardmapping, community evacuation simulations,rural appraisal, focused group discussion orparticipatory three dimension mapping.

Efficient communication between scientificexperts on PDC hazard, authorities, the media,

local NGOs, and the population should beenhanced to improve crisis management. Infor-mation should be provided to people on time andusing simple and clear language, preferably tra-ditional language.

The need for community participation andinvolvement in raising PDC hazard awareness iscrucial, especially among specific stakeholders,e.g. recent immigrants or daily workers comingfrom outside the PDC hazard zones or women,who usually have a poorer knowledge of hazardsthan their husband or children. Local and culturalfactors should also be considered in risk andcrisis management, especially because PDChazard is often related to local myths. The 2010Merapi disaster suggests that religion is anessential element of culture and must be carefullyconsidered in the planning process, and notsimply dismissed as a symptom of ignorance orsuperstition. Participatory risk managementinvolving community leaders and their popula-tions is most appropriate to bridge tradition, localrealities and the implementation of risk man-agement policies and strategies.

To conclude, CBDRM eventually empowerscommunities with self-developed and culturallyacceptable ways of coping with crises due toPDC hazard.

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