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ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION AND WORLD MIGRATION AS FACTORS IN THEMAPPING OF TODAY'S ADVANCED URBAN ECONOMY

Saskia Sassen

January 1, 2004

Mainstream representations of today's advanced urban economies capture only part of what thesecities are about. There are two sets of components that are typically left unaddressed. One ofthese is the global city dynamic and the second is the fact of multiple articulations between"backward" sectors and the most advanced sectors in these cities. Both components are a keyfactor in today's advanced urban economy. The weight, specific features, and modes ofarticulation of these two components vary considerably across the world's forty plus globalcities, including many that might best be described as having global city functions rather thanbeing full-fledged global cities. Thus, in all the global cities of the North, the weight of bothcomponents is significant, and a key feature of backward sectors is the presence of adisproportionate share of immigrants.

This paper examines these two underrepresented components in mainstream representations ofadvanced urban economies. To do so requires recovering a variety of microtrends that are oftenrendered invisible by aggregate data sets. It also requires novel ways of conceptualizing themeaning and role of economic globalization and of world migration in order to capture theirimplications for, and materializations in cities. This, in turn, raises a question as to the nature ofthe intersection, if any, between economic globalization and world migrations as they instantiatein global cities today.

THE NETWORK OF MAJOR AND MINOR GLOBAL CITIES: IMPLICATIONS FORNEW TRANSNATIONALISMS.

The new global political economy is not simply a function of power, nor is it simply the result ofan immanent tendency in capitalism towards imperialism. The new global structures need to beproduced, implemented, serviced, debugged. And the tendency towards globalization instantiatesin specific operating systems with their particular conditionalities for different historical periods.

It is against this context that I argue that one of the strategic working structures enabling theformation of a global political economy is the network of global cities. This network is astrategic infrastructure enabling the production and specialized servicing of components crucialfor the constituting of global corporate capital. We might think of this network of cities asmultiple microstructures getting deployed to serve the global (or imperial) macro structure.Secondly, this network is a key structure for social reproduction, both in a narrow sense --itselites and cadres need to live-- and a broader sense --the materializing of global corporate capitalas a social force.

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Much of the management and servicing of the global economy takes place in this network ofglobal cities, a network that includes secondary cities or regions that are better described ashaving a limited number of global city functions. As the global economy expands so does thenumber of cities in the network. When a country adopts the bundle of policies usually describedas neoliberalism, its major financial and business center articulates the national economy withglobal circuits --many circuits or a few, depending on the economy. In most countries theconstituting of this articulation is through financial exchanges and through specialized servicefirms that will tend to be foreign, particularly Anglo-American firms.

Each of these cities is a territorial concentration of the enormous mix of resources necessary forthe management and servicing of that articulation. The result is both a complex organizationalarchitecture and an expanding geography of centrality that cuts across the north-south divide.There are a limited number of major global cities at the top: New York, London, Tokyo (still),Paris and Frankfurt. Immediately below there are a large number of global north cities thatincludes most major European business and financial centers, and other major global north cities,such as Sydney and Toronto. Finally there are a growing number of global south cities thatfunction as key articulators between the global economy and the global south --Mexico, SaoPaulo, Seoul, Bangkok, Manila, Shanghai.

In terms of the power relations involved, the key feature is the absolute dominance of the USeither directly --through the US government and through major US firms-- or indirectly throughthe supranational system, especially the IMF and the World Bank. But this is not the onlyfeature. In my reading the fact that mostly each of these countries has some version of asovereign state, alters the geometry of this architecture. It entails a negotiation between thehegemonic power and each of these states, with conceivably considerable variance in the actualimplementation of the new regimes. In practice there has been little variance due to the mix ofoverwhelming power, the absence of viable political forces capable of contesting this power, andthe increasing articulation of particular fractions of capital in each of these countries with theglobal corporate project. Here the network of global cities has played a crucial role and enabledthe formation of a geography of centrality that partly cuts across the old North-South divide inthat it incorporates key corporate and political sectors from the global south. One question Ireturn to later is the ways in which this new, increasingly developed and institutionalizedgeography of centrality also constructs bridges for migrations, and, secondly, contains therequisite structures (e.g. labor demand) for their incorporation.

This new geography of centrality gets constituted through, and indeed needs, insertions in agrowing number of countries. It does not function in terms of a single country, not even thehegemon. Even as the governments and major firms of the US and UK are crucial in shaping keycomponents of the new geography of centrality and its institutional orders, this geography is notsimply an extension of these states. The global corporate project needs a network of reasonablyfunctioning financial and business centers--the work that gets done in these centers is crucial tomany strategic components of the global economy. Insofar as most of the world is organized interms of national states, it becomes a multi-state geography.

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The differential power of the countries involved materializes in a steep hierarchy with a fewglobal cities clearly at the top, a second layer of key centers, and then an amalgamation of citieswith different functions and weights depending partly on the character of their nationaleconomies. Further, within these cities there are also distinct power relations. These will not bethe same in first and third world cities. Today's global political economy does not need to becentered in a hegemonic state. It is a new type of configuration, highly networked, with globalspan, cutting across multiple frontiers, and involving multiple states and countries, yet onlypartly embedded in any of them.

Precisely because this new geography of centrality cuts across multiple national states there is aneed for reorienting national elites towards global projects. Elsewhere I refer to this type ofreorienting as the denationalizing of elites that are strategic to the global project. This involves akind of cultural work that takes place in multiple settings and is partial and specialized--it is not awholesale transformation. It goes along with various forms of embeddedness in each country'snational social, political and economic life. In this regard, global cities function as thick enablingenvironments: they allow top level local and foreign professionals and executives to develop asubculture for business practices and political claim-making that is global, even as they makepossible living ones broader personal lives in other environments, some national some "foreign."The possibility of developing such a subculture is actually a condition to ensure not only thefunctioning but also the social reproduction of key aspects of the global political economy. Thenetwork of global cities ensures lifestyles and subcultural practices that give these denationalizedelites a sense of themselves as a distinct "class" and a motivation to adhere to the rules of thegame.

In this context, I have argued that a particular type of migration we see today, increasinglyfeminized and constituted as the new serving classes, is a crucial factor in this reproductionprocess. This role gives immigration a whole new strategic agency. In the past, immigrants werea key urban workforce for the accelerated industrialization taking place in city after city. Today,this is barely the case in the cities of the global North. Immigration's strategic agency has partlyshifted from the sphere of production to that of social reproduction.

But there is a second type of dynamic that is set in motion through this combination of place-centered conditionalities. The partial embeddedness of global corporate capital and its associatedelites in the network of global cities brings together the elements for its formation and socialreproduction as a social force. This is not the subject here, and it would take a bit of elaboratingto explicate what I mean. But put very briefly, this possibility results from the strategic role ofglobal cities for the valorization of global corporate capital, together with the fact that it is in thespace of the city, more so than electronic markets or crossborder flows of trade, that capitalbecomes an agent embedded in thick environments. The combination of these two factorsgrounds global corporate capital and enmeshes it in the multiple environments and socialrelations that characterize a city and its geometries of work and daily life.

These cities become one of the concrete terrains where global corporate capital begins toconstitute itself as a class and where it gets engaged or is confronted by an amalgamation ofdisadvantaged workers that it needs in its firms and in its households. The competition for urban

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space as epitomized in anti-gentrification struggles and the heightened surveillance and policecontrol of the "unruly masses" are but two instances of these engagements. Elsewhere (2001:chapter 9; 2003) I have examined how the mix of disadvantaged who are part of the structuresthrough which global capital functions in these cities--whether in the sphere of work or in thehousehold and collective consumption apparatuses-- also emerge as a social force in this context.

RECOVERING PLACE AND WORK PROCESS IN GLOBAL CAPITALISM

Global capitalism is not inevitable: it needs to be produced, designed, serviced. It entails broadcomplex systemic, interactions and the formation of new factions of capital. There is a strongtendency in mainstream writing to see the global economy as a function of the existence ofTNCs. Although this is clearly a crucial factor, it is a fact that much global economic activity isnot encompassed by the organizational form of the transnational corporation. Nor is much of thisactivity encompassed by the power of such firms, a power often invoked to explain the fact ofeconomic globalization. Simply invoking power and telecommunications as explanations for theemergence of a global economy is not enough. Once we examine how this power is producedand why telecommunications matter, we get at a variety of work processes and places that falloutside the organizational form of the TNC. These work processes and places are critical for theproduction of that power and for the design and implementation of the global transactions ofthese firms. The spatial and organizational forms assumed by globalization and the actual workof running transnational operations have made cities one type of strategic place in the globaleconomy.

The iconic representation of economic globalization is perhaps the massive trend towards thespatial dispersal of economic activities at the metropolitan, national and global level. This isindeed taking place, but it represents only half of what is happening. Alongside this well-documented spatial dispersal of economic activities, new forms of territorial centralization oftop-level management and control operations have appeared. Centralized control andmanagement over a geographically dispersed array of economic operations does not come aboutinevitably as part of a "world system." It requires the production of a vast range of highlyspecialized services, telecommunications infrastructure, and industrial services. These are crucialfor the valorization of what are today leading components of capital. A focus on place andproduction adds to the common focus on the power of large corporations over governments andeconomies, a range of activities and organizational arrangements necessary for theimplementation and maintenance of a global network of factories, service operations andmarkets; these are all processes only partly encompassed by the organizational form of thetransnational corporation.

Elsewhere (2001) I have shown that when the geographic dispersal of factories, offices andservice outlets through cross-border investment takes place, as part of integrated corporatesystems, there is also a growth in central functions; we can see a parallel trend with financialfirms and markets. One way of saying it is that the more globalized firms become, the more theircentral functions grow --in importance, in complexity, in number of transactions. National andglobal markets as well as globally integrated operations require central places where the work ofglobalization gets done. Further, information industries require a vast physical infrastructure

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containing strategic nodes with hyper-concentrations of facilities. Finally, even the mostadvanced information industries have a work process--that is, a complex of workers, machinesand buildings that are more place-bound than the imagery of information outputs suggests.We can make this more concrete by considering some of the staggering figures involved in thisworldwide dispersal and imagining what it entails in terms of coordination and management forparent headquarters. For instance the fact that by the late 1990s there were almost half a millionforeign affiliates of firms worldwide, most of them belonging to firms from North America andWestern Europe. There has been a greater growth in foreign sales through affiliates than throughdirect exports: the foreign sales through affiliates were US$ 11 trillion by the end of the decadeand US$ 8 trillion through worldwide exports of goods and services. This has of course also fedthe intra-firm share of so-called free cross-border trade. The transnationality index of the largesttransnational firms shows that many of these have over half of their assets, sales and workforcesoutside their home countries. Together these types of evidence provide a fairly comprehensivepicture of this combination of dispersal and the growth of central functions.

This type of globalization of a firm's operations brings with it a massive task of coordination andmanagement. Much of this has been going on for a long time but has accelerated over thedecades and reached new thresholds in terms of numbers of firms involved and scope of thedispersal. Further, this dispersal does not proceed under a single organizational form --rather,behind these general figures lie many different organizational forms, hierarchies of control,degrees of autonomy. For instance, the globally integrated network of financial centers is oneform of this combination of dispersal and the growing complexity of central management andcoordination.

Of importance to the analysis here is the dynamic that connects the dispersal of economicactivities with the ongoing weight and often growth of central functions. By central functions Ido not only mean top level headquarters; I am referring to all the top level financial, legal,accounting, managerial, executive, planning functions necessary to run a corporate organizationoperating in more than one country, and increasingly in several countries. These centralfunctions are partly embedded in headquarters, but also in good part and increasingly so in whathas been called the corporate services complex, that is, the network of financial, legal,accounting, advertising firms that handle the complexities of operating in more than one nationallegal system, national accounting system, advertising culture, etc. and do so under conditions ofrapid innovations in all these fields. Such services have become so specialized and complex, thatheadquarters increasingly buy them from specialized firms rather than producing them in-house.These agglomerations of firms producing central functions for the management and coordinationof global economic systems are disproportionately concentrated in the network of global cities,with the highly developed countries at the top of this system.

The most powerful of these new geographies of centrality at the inter-urban level binds the majorinternational financial and business centers: New York, London, Tokyo, Paris, Frankfurt, Zurich,Amsterdam, Los Angeles, Sydney, Hong Kong, among others. But this geography now alsoincludes cities such as Sao Paulo, Buenos Aires, Bangkok, Taipei and Mexico City. Theintensity of transactions among these cities, particularly through the financial markets,transactions in services, and investment has increased sharply, and so have the orders of

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magnitude involved. The economic fortunes of these cities become increasingly disconnectedfrom their broader hinterlands or even their national economies. We can see here the formation,at least incipient, of transnational urban systems. To a large extent it seems to me that the majorbusiness centers in the world today draw their importance from these transnational networks.There is no such thing as a single global city--and in this sense there is a sharp contrast with theerstwhile capitals of empires.

Introducing cities in the analysis of global capitalism allows us to reconceptualize processes ofeconomic globalization as concrete economic complexes situated in specific places. Thiscontrasts with the more typical tendency to see place as neutralized by the capacity for globalcommunications and control. In my reading both are happening, but far too much emphasis hasgone to the neutralization of place and distance. The geography of global capital is lumpy.Further, a focus on cities decomposes the nation state into a variety of sub-national components,some profoundly articulated with the global economy and others not. It signals the decliningsignificance of the national economy as a unitary category --pace all the specifics and variabilityacross the world-- in the global economy and makes transparent the existence of multiplefractions of capital, some benefiting from economic corporate globalization and others not. Andeven if to a large extent the unitary character of the national economy was never a fulloperational reality and always more of a construction in political discourse, it has become evenless so in the last fifteen years.

PRODUCING COMMAND FUNCTIONS FOR WORLDWIDE OPERATIONS

Global cities are centers for the management, servicing and financing of, as well as the design ofinnovations for, international trade, investment, and headquarter operations. That is to say, themultiplicity of specialized activities present in global cities are crucial in the valorization, indeedovervalorization of leading sectors of capital today. And in this sense they are strategicproduction sites for today's leading economic sectors. This function is reflected in theascendance of these activities in their economies.

We need to unbundle analytically the fact of strategic functions for the global economy or forglobal operation, and the overall corporate economy of a country. These global control andcommand functions are partly embedded in national corporate structures but also constitute adistinct corporate subsector. This subsector can be conceived of as part of a network thatconnects global cities across the globe. For the purposes of certain kinds of inquiry thisdistinction may not matter; for the purposes of understanding the global economy, it does.

The high level of concentration of many of the specialized service firms we see in the leadingfinancial and business districts of these cities is the spatial expression of this logic. The widelyaccepted notion that agglomeration has become obsolete when global telecommunicationadvances should allow for maximum dispersal, is only partly correct. It is, I argue, preciselybecause of the territorial dispersal facilitated by telecommunication advances that agglomerationof centralizing activities has expanded immensely. This is not a mere continuation of oldpatterns of agglomeration but, one could posit, a new logic for agglomeration. Informationtechnologies are yet another factor contributing to the new logic for agglomeration. These

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technologies make possible the geographic dispersal and simultaneous integration of manyactivities. But the distinct conditions under which such facilities are available have promotedcentralization of the most advanced users in the most advanced telecommunications centers.

A focus on the work behind command functions, on the actual production process in the financeand services complex, and on global marketplaces has the effect of incorporating the materialfacilities underlying globalization and the whole infrastructure of jobs typically not marked asbelonging to the corporate sector of the economy. An economic configuration very differentfrom that suggested by the concept information economy emerges. We recover the materialconditions, production sites, and place-boundedness that are also part of globalization and theinformation economy.

Looking at cities as production sites for the leading service industries of our time, allows us torecover the infrastructure of activities, firms and jobs, that is necessary to run the advancedcorporate economy. The focus shifts to the practice of global control: the work of producing andreproducing the organization and management of a global production system and a globalmarketplace for finance, both under conditions of economic concentration. This allows me tofocus on the infrastructure of jobs involved in this production, including low-wage, unskilledmanual jobs typically not thought of as being part of advanced globalized sectors. In this regardit allows me to detect the presence and formation of social forces that find in the global city onemoment, a strategic one, of their dynamics.

NEW EMPLOYMENT REGIMES IN CITIES

Global cities are, then, a nexus where many of the new organizational tendencies come together.They are also the sites for a disproportionate concentration of all immigrants in the US, WesternEurope and Japan. The new employment regimes that have emerged in these cities havereconfigured the job supply and employment relations. Much analysis of advanced urbaneconomies (and of "post-industrial" society generally) posits a massive growth in the need forhighly educated workers and little need for the types of jobs that a majority of immigrants havetended to hold over the last two or three decades. This suggests sharply reduced employmentopportunities for workers with low educational levels generally and for immigrants in particular.Yet detailed empirical studies of major cities in highly developed countries show ongoingdemand for immigrant workers and a significant supply of old and new jobs requiring littleeducation and paying low wages.

What matters here so as to understand the features of advanced urban economies and thestructural character of immigrant incorporation, is whether this job supply a) is merely or largelya residual partly inflated by the large supply of low-wage workers, or b) is mostly part of thereconfiguration of the job supply and employment relations that are in fact a feature of advancedservice economies, that is to say, a systemic development that is an integral part of sucheconomies. There are no precise measures, and a focus on the jobs by themselves will hardlyilluminate the issue. We know generally what they are: low-wage, requiring little education,undesirable, with no advancement opportunities and, often, few if any fringe benefits. We need

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to understand what are the growth dynamics in advanced service economies, and, especially,what are its systemic outcomes in terms of labor demand.

One concrete way to proceed in such an inquiry is to examine the impact of the post-industrialreconfiguration in major cities on the potential and modalities for immigrant employment,particularly immigrants in jobs requiring fairly low levels of education and paying mostly lowwages. A key effort here is to expand the analytic terrain within which to place the immigrantemployment question, and to resist confining the examination of immigrant employment to thebackward sectors of the economy, as is often done.Three processes of economic and spatial organization I see as central to the question addressedhere are the following. One is the expansion and consolidation of the producer services andcorporate headquarters sector into the economic core of major cities in highly developedcountries. While this sector may not account for the majority of jobs, it establishes a new regimeof economic activity and the associated spatial and social transformations evident in major cities.

A second process is the downgrading of the manufacturing sector, a notion I use to describe amode of political and technical reorganization of manufacturing that is to be distinguished fromthe decline and obsolescence of manufacturing activities. The downgraded manufacturing sectorrepresents a mode of incorporation into the "postindustrial" economy rather than a form ofobsolescence. Downgrading is a form of adaptation to a situation where a growing number ofmanufacturing firms need to compete with cheap imports and the profit-making capacities ofmanufacturing overall are modest compared with those of leading sectors such astelecommunications or finance and her sister industries.

The third process is the informalization of a growing array of economic activities, whichencompasses certain components of the downgraded manufacturing sector; like the latter,informalization represents a mode of reorganizing the production and distribution of goods andservices under conditions where a significant number of firms have an effective local demand fortheir goods and services but cannot compete with cheap imports or cannot compete for space andother business needs with the new high-profit firms engendered by the advanced corporateservice economy. Escaping the regulatory apparatus of the formal economy enhances theeconomic opportunities of such firms.

Whether articulation and feedback effects exist among these different sectors is of importance tothe question in this chapter. If there is articulation among the different economies and labormarkets embedded in them it could be argued that we need to rethink some of the basicpropositions about the post-industrial economy, i.e. the notion that it needs largely highlyeducated workers, as well as about informalization and downgrading, i.e. the notion that thelatter two are just a third world import or an anachronistic remnant of an earlier era. Theargument here is that we are seeing new employment regimes in these services-dominated urbaneconomies which create low-wage jobs and do not require particularly high levels of education.Politically and theoretically this points to an employment context that is larger than that ofimmigrant related jobs, and is, indeed a systemic development in the advanced urban economy.

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High level business services, from accounting to decision making expertise, are not usuallyanalyzed as production or in terms of a work process. Such services are usually seen as a type ofoutput, i.e. high level technical knowledge. Thus insufficient attention has gone to the actualarray of jobs, from high-paying to low-paying, involved in the production of these services. Afocus on the work process in information industries brings to the fore the labor question.Information outputs need to be produced, and the buildings which hold the workers need to bebuilt and cleaned. The rapid growth of the financial industry and of highly specialized servicesgenerates not only high level technical and administrative jobs but also low wage unskilled jobs.

The concentration of producer services in major cities and the occupational and incomedistribution that characterizes these services have contributed to major changes in the job supply.The consolidation of this economic core of top level management and servicing activities needsto be viewed alongside the general move to a service economy and the decline of manufacturing.New economic sectors are re shaping the job supply. However, so are new ways of organizingwork in both new and old sectors of the economy. Components of the work process which eventwenty years ago took place on the shop floor and were classified as production jobs, today havebeen replaced by a combination of machine/service or worker/engineer. Activities that wereonce all consolidated in a single service retail establishment have now been divided between aservice delivery outlet and central headquarters. Finally, a large array of activities which werebeing carried out under standardized forms of organizing work a decade ago, are todayincreasingly characterized by informalization, e.g. sweatshops and industrial homework. Inbrief, the changes in the job supply evident in major cities are a function both of new sectors andof the reorganization of work in both new and old sectors.

The expansion of low wage jobs as a function of growth trends implies a reorganization of theemployment relation. To see this it is important to distinguish the characteristics of jobs fromtheir sectoral location. That is to say, highly dynamic, technologically advanced growth sectorsmay well contain, low wage dead end jobs. Furthermore, the distinction between sectoralcharacteristics and sectoral growth patterns is crucial: backward sectors such as downgradedmanufacturing or low wage service occupations can be part of major growth trends in a highlydeveloped economy. It is often assumed that backward sectors express decline trends.Similarly, there is a tendency to assume that advanced industries, such as finance, have mostlygood white-collar jobs. In fact they contain a good number of low paying jobs from cleaners tostock clerks.

The presence of a highly dynamic sector with a polarized income distribution has its own impacton the creation of low-wage jobs through the sphere of consumption (or, more generally, socialreproduction). The rapid growth of industries with strong concentration of high and low incomejobs has assumed distinct forms in the consumption structure which in turn has a feedback effecton the organization of work and the types of jobs being created. The expansion of the highincome work force in conjunction with the emergence of new cultural forms have led to aprocess of high income gentrification that rests, in the last analysis, on the availability of a vastsupply of low wage workers. High-price restaurants, luxury housing, luxury hotels, gourmetshops, boutiques, French hand laundries, and special cleaning services, are all more labor-intensive than their lower price equivalents. This has reintroduced--to an extent not seen in a

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very long time-- the whole notion of the "serving classes" in contemporary high-incomehouseholds. The immigrant woman serving the white middle class professional woman hasreplaced the traditional image of the black female servant serving the white master. All thesetrends give these cities an increasingly sharp tendency towards contestation and socialpolarization.(For a full discussion of data and the research literature please see Sassen 2001:chapters 8 and 9).

INEQUALITY IN PROFIT-MAKING AND EARNINGS CAPACITIES

Inequality in the profit-making capacities of different sectors of the economy and in the earningscapacities of different types of workers has long been a feature of advanced economies. Butwhat we see happening today takes place on an order of magnitude that distinguishes currentdevelopments from those of the post-War decades. The extent of inequality and the systems inwhich it is embedded and through which these outcomes are produced are engendering massivedistortions in the operations of various markets, from investment to housing and labor.

Two of the major processes lying behind the possibility for the increased inequality in profit-making and earnings capacities are an integral part of the advanced information economy a) theascendance and transformation of finance, particularly through securitization, globalization, andthe development of new telecommunications and computer networks technologies; and b) thegrowing service intensity in the organization of the economy generally which has vastly raisedthe demand for services by firms and households. Insofar as there is a strong tendency towardspolarization in the technical levels and prices of services as well as in the wages and salaries ofworkers in the service sector, the growth in the demand for services contributes to polarizationand, via cumulative causation, to reproduce these inequalities. (For a fuller development of thisargument see Sassen 2000).

The ascendance of finance and specialized services, particularly concentrated in large cities,creates a critical mass of firms with extremely high profit-making capabilities. These firmscontribute to bid up the prices of commercial space, industrial services, and other business needs,and thereby make survival for firms with moderate profit-making capabilities increasinglyprecarious. Among the latter, informalization of all or some of a firm's operations can emerge asone of the more extreme responses, further contributing to polarization in the urban economy.More generally, we see a segmentation between high profit-making firms and relatively modestprofit-making firms.

One of the key outcomes of this transformation has been the ascendance of expertise andspecialization in the organization of the economy. This ascendance of expertise in economicorganization in turn has contributed to the overvalorization of specialized services andprofessional workers. And it has contributed to mark many of the "other" types of economicactivities and workers as unnecessary or irrelevant to an advanced economy. As I have sought toshow at length elsewhere, many of these "other" jobs are in fact an integral part ofinternationalized economic sectors, but not represented as such nor valued (i.e. waged) as such.This contributes to create a vast number of both low-income households and very high incomehouseholds.

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Key issues are the types of jobs being created and the systemic tendencies organizing the servicesector as this sector is setting the terms of employment for today and tomorrow. Jobs andorganization are, clearly, overlapping and mutually shaping factors. However, they do notoverlap completely: the labor markets associated with a given set of technologies can, inprinciple vary considerably and contain distinct mobility paths for workers. But today sectororganization, types of jobs, and labor market organization, are all strengthening the tendenciestowards polarization.

Among the major systemic tendencies in the organization of the service sector contributing topolarization is the disproportionate grouping of service industries at either end of the technologyspectrum. The data for the U.S. are probably the most developed and also show the sharpestoutcomes of these tendencies. Europe's generally more elaborate regulatory net still preventsextreme outcomes.

Service industries that can be described as information and knowledge intensive have generateda significant share of all new jobs created over the last fifteen years in the U.S. and haveabsorbed a disproportionate share of college graduates. Most of the other jobs created in theservice sector fall at the other extreme. The two broad occupational categories projected by theBLS to increase are professional specialty occupations and service occupations. The US Bureauof Labor Statistics data and projections show that the incomes in these two occupations in the1990s were on opposite ends of the earnings spectrum, with earnings for service workers about40% below the average for all occupational groups.

In combination with what are the growth trends in industries and occupations this points to amaintenance and even increase in inequality in earnings, since most new jobs will be in lowpaying service jobs and some of the professional specialty jobs may raise their levels ofspecialization and pay. In contrast public-sector low-wage jobs, which are better paid and havemore fringe benefits, saw a fall in their share of all new jobs. The lowest paid hourly workers arepart-time workers in the labor-intensive service industries, followed by full-time hourly workersin knowledge and information intensive service industries. At the other end, the highest paidfull-time hourly paid workers are in knowledge and information intensive manufacturing,followed by all other manufacturing.

Casualization assumes a range of specific forms, some of which have been documented, and itraises a number of questions about the plausibility of others which still need to be studied. Interms of the organization of labor markets, we are seeing the formation of new types of labormarket segmentation emerging in the 1980s and continuing in the 1990s. Two characteristicsstand out. One is a shift of some labor market functions and costs to households andcommunities. The second one is the weaker role of the firm in structuring the employmentrelation. More is now left to the market.

The shift of labor market functions to the household or community is particularly evident in theimmigrant community. But it is part possibly of a more generalized pattern that deserves furtherresearch (see Sassen 1995). There is a large body of evidence showing that once one or a few

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immigrant workers are hired in a given workplace, they will tend to bring in other members fromtheir communities as job openings arise. There is also evidence showing great willingness on thepart of immigrant workers to help those they bring in with some training on the job, teaching thelanguage, and just generally socializing them into the job and workplace. This amounts to adisplacement of traditional labor market functions such as recruitment, screening and trainingfrom the labor market and the firm to the community or household. The displacement of labormarket functions to the community or household, raises the responsibility and the costs ofparticipating in the labor force for workers, even if these costs are often not monetized. Theseare all subjects that require new research given the transitions that we are living through.

As for the weaker role of the firm in organizing the employment relation, it takes on manydifferent forms. One is the declining weight of internal labor markets in structuring employment.This corresponds both to the shrinking weight of vertically integrated firms and the restructuringof labor demand in many firms towards bipolarity--a demand for highly specialized and educatedworkers alongside a demand for basically unskilled workers whether for clerical work, services,industrial services, or production jobs, as discussed in the preceding section. The shrinkingdemand for intermediate levels of skill and training has in turn reduced the need and advantagesfor firms of having internal labor markets with long promotion lines that function as training-on-the-job mechanisms. The decentralization of the large, vertically integrated manufacturing firms,including the offshoring of parts of the production process, has contributed to the decline in theshare of unionized shops, the deterioration of wages, and the expansion of sweatshops andindustrial homework. This process includes the downgrading of jobs within existing industriesand the job supply patterns of some of the new industries, notably electronics assembly. Further,part-time and temporary employment are growing at a faster rate than full-time employment. Inthe U.S., growing shares of service workers are in part-time jobs, and they are so twice as oftenas average workers; involuntary part-time employment has grown significantly over the pastdecade.

Yet another empirical referent for the casualization of the employment relation is the rapid riseof employment agencies that take over the supply of a growing range of skills and occupationsunder highly flexible conditions. The terms of employment have been changing rapidly over thelast fifteen years for a growing share of workers. In my reading, the overall tendency is towards acasualization of the employment relation that incorporates not only the types of jobs traditionallymarked as "casual" jobs, but also high level professional jobs which in many regards are notcasual. It might be useful to differentiate a casualized employment relation from casual jobs inthat the latter connotes such added dimensions as the powerlessness of the workers, a conditionwhich might not hold for some of the highly specialized professional part-time or temporaryworkers. This is a subject that requires more research.

A particularly revealing case is that of Japan, long one of the most structured and regulated of theadvanced economies. An important question to ask here is whether we can detect in Japan in the1980s, the crucial period for the emergence of the new service economy, the kind of growingcasualization of labor markets we have seen in the U.S. It deserves a somewhat detailedexamination because it provides a sharp focus on the matter of the dynamics in advanced

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economies that make possible and effective demand for immigrants. In Japan this is furtherunderlined by the absence of a history of employing immigrants.

Since the early 1990s it has become quite evident that unemployment has become a feature of theJapanese economy, often explained simply as a consequence of its financial and real estatemarket crisis--the collapse of the so-called bubble economy. But detailed research indicates thatin addition to these developments there were structural changes emerging precisely as part of thenew types of growth sectors and new trends in the organization of the economy, notably theascendance of services and the emergence of finance as a regime setting industry.

Given a widespread impression that decline only began with the bursting of the bubble economy,it is worth noting that already in the mid-1980s --a period of sharp economic growth-- averagereal earnings in Japan were beginning to fall and the manufacturing sector was losing its wage-setting influence. The growth of overall unemployment, though minor for Western standardsbegan already in the mid-1980s. Finally, with few exceptions, most of the service industrieswhich were growing, and in some cases continue to grow, have significantly lower averageearnings than do manufacturing and transport and communications.

We need to ask whether these conditions facilitated the initiation of a whole new phase in Japan,which began in the 1980s: the employment of unauthorized and authorized immigrants in acountry and society where this was not part of the cultural heritage. We cannot take for grantedthat the fact of a labor shortage ipso facto explains the incorporation of immigrants. My researchsuggests other mediating conditions must be present in order to facilitate their incorporation.During my fieldwork in one of the large daily laborer markets, it became clear to me that thesemarkets are a key mechanism for the incorporation of unauthorized immigrants into the Japaneselabor market; they also make it possible for immigrants to get a job without a labor contractor.Several of the return immigrants I spoke with had come by themselves and gotten jobs withoutcontractors.

In brief, these various dynamics contribute to explain why and how migrants can become aneffective labor supply in advanced economies with sharply different levels of development frommost countries of origin. One particular component, the informalization of work, is worthdeveloping as it illuminates some of the articulations between inequalities in earnings and profit-making capacities, and also illuminates the complex interactions between advanced, oftenglobalized, sectors and what are seen as backward sectors in advanced urban economies.

THE INFORMALIZATION OF WORK

One of the most extreme forms of the casualization of the employment relation, and of thechanges in economic organization generally, is the informalization of a growing array ofactivities, a development evident in cities as different as New York, Paris, London orAmsterdam.

Theorization about the informal economy has until recently been grounded in the incapacities ofless developed economies: the inability to attain full modernization of the economy, stop excess

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migration to the cities, implement universal education and literacy programs. Correspondingly,the growth of an informal economy in highly developed countries has been seen as an importthrough Third World immigrants and their propensities to replicate survival strategies typical oftheir home countries. Related to this view is the notion that backward sectors of the economy arekept backward or even alive, because of the availability of a large supply of cheap immigrantworkers. Both of these views posit or imply that if there is an informal economy in highlydeveloped countries, the sources are to be found in Third World immigration and in backwardsectors of the economy.

Rather than assume that Third World immigration is causing informalization, what we need is acritical examination of the role it might or might not play in this process. Immigrants, in so faras they tend to form communities, may be in a favorable position to seize the opportunitiesrepresented by informalization. But the opportunities are not necessarily created by immigrants.They are a structured outcome of current trends in advanced economies.

A central hypothesis organizing much of my research on the informal economy is that theprocesses of economic restructuring that have contributed to the decline of the manufacturing-dominated industrial complex of the post-War era and the rise of the new, service-dominatedeconomic complex, provide the general context within which we need to place informalization ifwe are to go beyond a mere description of instances of informal work. The specific set ofmediating processes I have found to promote informalization of work are a) increased earningsinequality and the associated restructuring of consumption in high income strata and in very lowincome strata, and b) the inability among the providers of many of the goods and services thatare part of the new consumption to compete for the necessary resources in urban contexts whereleading sectors have sharply bid up the prices of commercial space, labor, auxiliary services, andother basic business inputs. (Sassen 1998: Chapter 8).

One major trend is that the decline of the middle class, the growth of a high-income professionalclass, the expansion of the low-income population, have all had a pronounced impact on thestructure of consumption, which has in turn had an impact on the organization of work to meetthe new consumption demand. Part of the demand for goods and services feeding the expansionof the informal economy comes from the mainstream economy and the fragmentation of whatwere once mostly homogeneous middle-class markets (see also Mingione, 1995). And anotherpart of this demand comes from the internal needs of low-income communities increasinglyincapable of buying goods and services in the mainstream economy.

The recomposition in household consumption patterns particularly evident in large citiescontributes to a different organization of work from that prevalent in large, standardizedestablishments. This difference in the organization of work is evident both in the retail and in theproduction phase. High income gentrification generates a demand for goods and services thatare frequently not mass produced or sold through mass outlets. Customized production, smallruns, specialty items, fine food dishes are generally produced through labor intensive methodsand sold through small, full service outlets. Subcontracting part of this production to low costoperations, and also sweatshops or households, is common. The overall outcome for the jobsupply and the range of firms involved in this production and delivery is rather different from

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that characterizing the large department stores and supermarkets where standardized productsand services are prevalent and hence acquisition from large, standardized factories locatedoutside the city or the region are the norm. Proximity to stores is of far greater importance withcustomized producers. Further, unlike customized production and delivery, mass production andmass distribution outlets facilitate unionizing.

The expansion in the low income population has also contributed to the proliferation of smalloperations and the move away from large scale standardized factories and large chain stores forlow price goods. In good part the consumption needs of the low income population are met bymanufacturing and retail establishments which are small, rely on family labor, and often fallbelow minimum safety and health standards. Cheap, locally produced sweatshop garments, forexample, can compete with low-cost Asian imports, and the small immigrant-owned groceryshop can replace the large, standardized, and typically unionized super-market. A growing rangeof products and services, from low-cost furniture made in basements to "gypsy cabs" and familydaycare is available to meet the demand for the growing low-income population.

In any large city, there also tends to be a proliferation of small, low cost service operations madepossible by the massive concentration of people in such cities and the daily inflow of commutersand of tourists. This will tend to create intense inducements to open up such operations as wellas intense competition and very marginal returns. Under such conditions the cost of labor iscrucial and contributes to the likelihood of a high concentration of low wage jobs.

This would suggest that a good share of the informal sector is not the result of immigrantsurvival strategies, but rather an outcome of structural patterns or transformations in the largereconomy. Immigrants have known how to seize the "opportunities" contained in thiscombination of conditions, but they cannot be said to cause the informal economy.Informalization emerges as a set of flexibility-maximizing strategies by individuals and firms,consumers and producers, in a context of growing inequality in earnings and in profit-makingcapabilities.

It is then the combination of growing inequality in earnings and growing inequality in the profit-making capabilities of different sectors in the urban economy which has promoted theinformalization of a growing array of economic activities. These are integral conditions in thecurrent phase of advanced capitalism as it materializes in major cities dominated by the newadvanced services complex typically geared to world markets and characterized by extremelyhigh profit-making capabilities. These are not conditions imported from the Third World.

SUSTAINING MIGRATION: WOMEN AND THE SETTLEMENT PROCESS

One of the issues raised by these developments in advanced urban economies is that of thesustainability of these migrations flows. The reproduction of migration flows is stronglyinfluenced by the fact of settlement. And the extent of settlement, we now know is in turn deeplyinfluenced by the difficulty of circulation between country of origin and of destination. In acontext of increasingly intense transactions at the top and the lower levels of the economy, issettlement less likely and the formation of transnational households the emerging norm? A very

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recent literature has given us enormous insights into the dynamics of settlement and circulation.While it covers only part of the picture, it helps us understand some of the strategic elements. Letme briefly address these.

This new research literature shows us that in understanding settlement it is essential to introducethe fact of the differential outcomes that result from gendering. There is, to some extent, ajoining of two different dynamics in the condition of immigrant women. On the one hand theyare constituted as an invisible and disempowered class of workers in the factories and theservices of the receiving economy. On the other hand, the access to wages and salaries --even iflow-- the growing feminization of the job supply in highly developed economies, and thegrowing feminization of business opportunities brought about with informalization, does alter thegender hierarchies in which they find themselves.

The incorporation of women in the migration process strengthens the settlement likelihood(Georges 1990; Castro, 1986; Hondagneu-Sotelo 1995; Mahler 1997) and contributes to greaterimmigrant participation in their communities and vis a vis the state. This, in turn, furtherssettlement. For instance, Hondagneu-Sotelo (1995) found immigrant women come to assumemore active public and social roles which further reinforces their status in the household and thesettlement process. (See also Kibria 1993)

There is a large literature showing that immigrant women's regular wage work and improvedaccess to other public realms has an impact on their gender relations. Women gain greaterpersonal autonomy and independence while men lose ground. Women gain more control overbudgeting and other domestic decisions, and greater leverage in requesting help from men indomestic chores. Also, their access to public services and other public resources gives them achance to become incorporated in the mainstream society--they are often the ones in thehousehold who mediate in this process. It is likely that some women benefit more than othersfrom these circumstances; we need more research to establish the impact of class, education, andincome on these gendered outcomes.

Besides the relatively greater empowerment of women in the household associated with wagedemployment, there is a second important outcome: their greater participation in the public sphereand their possible emergence as public actors. There are two arenas where immigrant women areactive: institutions for public and private assistance, and the immigrant/ethnic community.Women are more active in community building and community activism and they are positioneddifferently from men regarding the broader economy and the state. They are the ones that arelikely to have to handle the legal vulnerability of their families in the process of seeking publicand social services for their families (Mahler 1995; Susser 1982; Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994).

In the next and final section I want to bring together some of these facts about women with themore negative conditions they are subjected to in the context of the global city.

TRANSNATIONALIZING THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY FOR IMMIGRANT WOMEN:GLOBAL CITIES AND GLOBAL SURVIVAL CIRCUITS

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In the day-to-day work of the leading sectors in global cities, a large share of the jobs involvedare lowly paid and manual, many held by immigrant women. Even the most advancedprofessionals will require clerical, cleaning, repair workers for their state-of-the art offices, andthey will require truckers to bring the software but also the toilet paper. Although these types ofworkers and jobs are never represented as part of the global economy they are in fact part of theinfrastructure of jobs involved in running and implementing the global economic system,including such an advanced form of it as is international finance.

High level corporate services, from accounting to decision making expertise, are not usuallyanalyzed in terms of their work process. Such services are usually seen as a type of output, i.e.high level technical knowledge. Thus insufficient attention has gone to the actual array of jobs,from high-paying to low-paying, involved in the production of these services. A focus on thework process brings to the fore the labor question. Information outputs need to be produced, andthe buildings which hold the workers need to be built and cleaned. The rapid growth of thefinancial industry and of highly specialized services generates not only high level technical andadministrative jobs but also low wage unskilled jobs. In my research on New York and othercities I have found that between 30% and 50% of the workers in the leading sectors are actuallylow-wage workers (2001: Chapters 8 and 9).

Further, the similarly state-of-the art lifestyles of the professionals in these sectors has created awhole new demand for a range of household workers, particularly maids and nannies. Thepresence of a highly dynamic sector with a polarized income distribution has its own impact onthe creation of low-wage jobs through the sphere of consumption (or, more generally, socialreproduction). The rapid growth of industries with strong concentration of high and low incomejobs has assumed distinct forms in the consumption structure which in turn has a feedback effecton the organization of work and the types of jobs being created. The expansion of the highincome work force in conjunction with the emergence of new lifestyles have led to a process ofhigh income gentrification that rests, in the last analysis, on the availability of a vast supply oflow wage workers. High-price restaurants, luxury housing, luxury hotels, gourmet shops,boutiques, French hand laundries, and special cleaning services, are all more labor-intensive thantheir lower price equivalents. This has reintroduced--to an extent not seen in a very long time--the whole notion of the "serving classes" in contemporary high-income households. Theimmigrant woman serving the white middle class professional woman has replaced thetraditional image of the black female servant serving the white master. All these trends give thesecities an increasingly sharp tendency towards social polarization.

Some of these issues are well illustrated in the emergent research literature on domestic service(see various chapters in Ehrenrecih and Hochshild 2003; Pharenas 2000; Ribas 2000; Cox 1997.)and in the rapid growth of international organizations catering to various household tasks.Immigrant women are a strong presence in this job market.

We are beginning to see the formation of global labor markets at the top and at the bottom of theeconomic system. At the bottom much of the staffing occurs through the efforts of individuals,largely immigrants, though we see an expanding network of organizations getting involved (aswell as illegal traffickers as I discuss in the second half of this chapter). For instance, Kelly

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Services, a Fortune 500 services company in global staffing, which operates offices in 25countries, now has added a home care division which provides a full range of help. It isparticularly geared to people who need assistance with daily living activities but also for thosewho lack the time to take care of the needs of household members who in the past would havebeen taken care of by the "mother/wife" figure in the household. More directly pertinent to theprofessional households under discussion here, are a growing range of global staffingorganizations whose advertised services cover various aspects of daycare, including dropping offand picking up, as well as in- house tasks, from child minding to cleaning and cooking. Oneinternational agency for nannies and au pairs (EF Au Pair Corporate Program) advertises directlyto corporations urging them to make the service part of their employment offers to potentialemployees to help them address household and childcare needs. Increasingly the emergentpattern is that the transnational professional class can access these services in the expandingnetwork of global cities among which they are likely to circulate. (See Sassen 2001: chapter 7).

At the top of the system several major Fortune 500 global staffing companies provide firms withexperts and talent for high level professional and technical jobs. In 2001, the largest of these wasthe Swiss multinational Adecco, with offices in 58 countries; in 2000 it provided firmsworldwide with 3 million workers. Manpower, with offices in 59 different countries, providedtwo million workers. Kelly Services, mentioned above, provided 750,000 employees in 2000.It is interesting that it is at the top and at the bottom of the occupational distribution thatinternationalization is happening; mid-level occupations, even though also increasingly handledthrough temporary employment agencies, have not internationalized their supply. The types ofoccupations involved both at the top and at the bottom are, in very different yet parallel ways,sensitive. Firms need reliable and hopefully somewhat talented professionals, and they needthem specialized but standardized so they can use them globally. And professionals want thesame in the workers they employ in their homes. The move of staffing organizations into theprovision of domestic services signals both the emergence of a global labor market and efforts tostandardize the service delivered by maids and nannies and homecare nurses.

The top end of the corporate economy --the highly-paid professionals and the corporate towersthat project engineering expertise, precision, "techne"-- is far easier to recognize as necessary foran advanced economic system than are truckers and other industrial service workers, or maidsand nannies, even though all of them are a necessary ingredient. Firms, sectors, and workers, thatmay appear as though they have little connection to an urban economy dominated by finance andspecialized services, can in fact be an integral part of that economy. They do so, however, underconditions of sharp social, earnings, and, often, sex and racial/ethnic segmentation. They becomepart of an increasingly dynamic and multifaceted lower circuit of global capital that partlyparallels the upper circuit of professionals and leading corporate service firms --the lawyers,accountants, and telecommunications experts that service global capital.

The immigrant women described above enter the migration process in many different ways. Forsome it is family reunion, others come on their own. Many features of these migration processeshave little to do with globalization. Here I am concerned with one specific set of processes whichI see as deeply linked to certain features of economic globalization today. These are migrationslargely organized by third parties, typically governments or illegal traffickers. These women

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wind up in work situations that involve a far broader range of worlds than the ones describedabove, though they also include those jobs. What they share, analytically so to speak, with thewomen described above, is that they also are taking over tasks we have associated with thedomain of the housewife.

The last decade has seen a growing presence of women in a variety of cross-border circuits.These circuits are enormously diverse but share one feature: they are profit- or revenue-makingcircuits developed on the backs of the truly disadvantaged. They include the illegal trafficking inpeople for the sex industry and for various types of formal and informal labor markets. And theyinclude cross-border migrations, both documented and not, which have become an importantsource of hard currency for governments in home countries. The formation and strengthening ofthese circuits is in good part a consequence of broader structural conditions. Among the keyactors emerging out of these broader conditions to give shape to these particular circuits are thewomen themselves in search of work, but also, and increasingly so, illegal traffickers andcontractors as well as governments of home countries.

I conceptualize these circuits as countergeographies of globalization. They are deeply imbricatedwith some of the major dynamics constitutive of globalization: the formation of global markets,the intensifying of transnational and trans-local networks, the development of communicationtechnologies which easily escape conventional surveillance practices. The strengthening and, insome of these cases, the formation of new global circuits is embedded or made possible by theexistence of a global economic system and its associated development of various institutionalsupports for cross-border money flows and markets. These counter-geographies are dynamicand changing in their locational features: to some extent they are part of the shadow economy,but it is also clear that they use some of the institutional infrastructure of the regular economy.

Crucial to the formation of a global supply of caretakers in demand in global cities is the fact ofsystemic links between the growth of these alternative circuits for survival, for profit-making,and for hard-currency earning, on the one hand, and major conditions in developing countriesthat are associated with economic globalization, on the other. Among these conditions are agrowth in unemployment, the closure of a large number of typically small and medium-sizedenterprises oriented to national rather than export markets, and large, often increasinggovernment debt. While these economies are frequently grouped under the label developing, theyare in some cases struggling or stagnant and even shrinking. (For the sake of briefness I will usedeveloping as shorthand for this variety of situations.) Many of these developments haveproduced additional responsibilities for women towards their households as men have lostearnings opportunities and governments have cut back on social services that supported womenand their family responsibilities.

One way of articulating this in substantive terms is to posit that a) the shrinking opportunities formale employment in many of these countries, b) the shrinking opportunities for more traditionalforms of profit-making in these same countries as they increasingly accept foreign firms in awidening range of economic sectors and are pressured to develop export industries, and c) thefall in revenues for the governments in many of these countries, partly linked to these conditions

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and to the burden of debt servicing, have d) all contributed to raise the importance of alternativeways of making a living, making a profit, and securing government revenue.

The variety of global circuits that are incorporating growing numbers of women havestrengthened at a time when major dynamics linked to economic globalization have hadsignificant impacts on developing economies, including the so-called middle- income countriesof the global south. These countries have had to implement a bundle of new policies andaccommodate new conditions associated with globalization: Structural Adjustment Programs, theopening up of these economies to foreign firms, the elimination of multiple state subsidies, and,it would seem almost inevitably, financial crises and the prevailing types of programmaticsolutions put forth by the IMF. It is now clear that in most of the countries involved, whetherMexico or South Korea, Ghana or Thailand, these conditions have created enormous costs forcertain sectors of the economy and of the population, and have not fundamentally reducedgovernment debt.

All of these conditions have emerged as factors in the lives of a growing number of women fromdeveloping or struggling economies, even when the articulations are often not self-evident orvisible --a fact that has marked much of the difficulty of understanding the role of women indevelopment generally. These are, in many ways, old conditions. What is different today is theirrapid internationalization and considerable institutionalization.

One effort analytically here--parallelling the analysis on the significance of "women andimmigrants" in the global city--is to uncover the systemic connections between, on the one hand,what are considered as poor, low-earning and in that regard low value-added individuals, oftenrepresented as a burden rather than a resource, and on the other hand, what are emerging assignificant sources for profit-making, especially in the shadow economy, and for governmentrevenue enhancement. Prostitution and labor migration are growing in importance as ways ofmaking a living; illegal trafficking in women and children for the sex industry and in laborers aregrowing in importance as ways of making a profit; and the remittances sent by emigrants, as wellas the organized export of workers are increasingly important sources of revenues for some ofthese governments. Women are by far the majority group in prostitution and in trafficking for thesex industry, and they are becoming a majority group in migration for labor. The employmentand/or use of foreign-born women covers an increasingly broad range of economic sectors, someillegal and illicit, e.g. prostitution, and some in highly regulated industries, e.g. nursing.

These circuits can be thought of as indicating the, albeit partial, feminization of survival, becauseit is increasingly on the backs of women that these forms of making a living, making a profit andsecuring government revenue are realized. Thus in using the notion of feminization of survival Iam not only referring to the fact that households and indeed whole communities are increasinglydependent on women for their survival. I want to emphasize the fact that also governments aredependent on women's earnings in these various circuits, and so are types of enterprises whoseways of profit-making exist at the margins of the "licit" economy. Finally, in using the termcircuits, I want to underline the fact that there is a degree of institutionalization in thesedynamics --they are not simply aggregates of individual actions.

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CONCLUSION.

An examination of globalization through the concept of the global city introduces a strongemphasis on strategic components of the global economy rather than the broader and morediffuse homogenizing dynamics we associate with the globalization of consumer markets.Consequently, this also brings an emphasis on questions of power and inequality. And it bringsan emphasis on the actual work of managing, servicing and financing a global economy. Second,a focus on the city in studying globalization will tend to bring to the fore the growing inequalitiesbetween highly provisioned and profoundly disadvantaged sectors and spaces of the city, andhence such a focus introduces yet another formulation of questions of power and inequality.

Third, the concept of the global city brings a strong emphasis on the networked economybecause of the nature of the industries that tend to be located there: finance and specializedservices, the new multimedia sectors, and telecommunications services. These industries arecharacterized by cross-border networks and specialized divisions of functions among cities ratherthan inter-national competition per se. In the case of global finance and the leading specializedservices catering to global firms and markets --law, accounting, credit rating,telecommunications-- it is clear that we are dealing with a cross-border system, one that isembedded in a series of cities, each possibly part of a different country. It is a de-facto globalsystem.

Fifth, a focus on networked cross-border dynamics among global cities also allows us to capturemore readily the growing intensity of such transactions in other domains --political, cultural,social, criminal.

These features open up a research agenda on questions of economic globalization that containsfar more specific objectives and allows for multiple technologies of research, includingethnographies, often not seen as viable for what is still largely represented as a macro-process.And they open a research agenda on immigration that begins to link it to major global dynamicsand does so through very specific, concrete and located conditions.

Global cities can articulate this type of research because they are one of the key terrains where amultiplicity of globalization processes assume concrete, localized forms. These localized formsare, in good part, what globalization is about. Recovering place means recovering themultiplicity of presences in this landscape. The large city of today has emerged as a strategic sitefor a whole range of new types of operations--political, economic, "cultural," subjective. It isone of the nexi where the formation of new claims, by both the powerful and the disadvantaged,materializes and assumes concrete forms.

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