Upload
others
View
13
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
L±n a^×Ñì@KS
ECONOMIC FOCUS
Bulletin of the Ethiopian Economic Association (EEA)
VOL. 6 NO. 3
January 2004
RR::YY 22002200 bbxx!!TT××eeÃÃ
bbzz!!HH XXTTMM
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
Assefa Admassie
GUEST EDITOR
Befekadu Degefe
EDITORIAL BOARD
Alemayehu Seyoum Alemu Mekonnen
Eyob Tesfaye Getnet Alemu
Gezahegn Ayele Ishak Diwan
Web Postmaster
Metasebia Zelalem
© Ethiopian Economic Association (EEA)
All rights reserved. No part of this publication can be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form without a written permission from the Ethiopian Economic Association.
kxzU°
Sl x!÷ñ¸ xStÄdR yx!T×ùà L¥T¿ xNÄND GN²b@ãC¼ xl¥yh# |†M ¬fs
TRg#M¿ BR¦n# gbyh# Economic Governance and Ethiopia’s
Development – Some Reflections Alemayehu Seyoum Taffesse
bì¼R xl¥yh# |†M {h#F §Y yts- xStÃyT
// wLÄY xM¦
l@lÖC
/Promoting Stability in the Horn of Africa
David Shinn/
P. O. BOX TELEPHONE FAX ADDIS ABABA
34282 234359/113670 234363 ETHIOPIA
E-mail Address: [email protected] Website: www.eeaecon.org
THIS BULLETIN AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS OF THE EEA ARE
SPONSORED BY FREIDRICH EBERT STIFTUNG OF GERMANY
(FES), EMBASSIES OF UK, SWEDEN, NORWAY, NETHERLANDS
AND THE AFRICAN CAPACITY BUILDING FOUNDATION (ACBF)
kxzU°
yx!T×ùà x!÷ñ¸KS ÆlÑÃãC ¥HbR yR:Y 2020 h#lt¾W z#R WYYT _R 21 qN 1996 ›.M
jM…LÝÝ
lz!H lh#lt¾W z#R ymjm¶ÃW M:‰F xQ‰b! çnW yqrb#T ì¼R xl¥yh# |†M ÂcWÝÝ
ì¼R xl¥yh# «Sl x!÷ñ¸ xStÄdR yx!T×åà L¥T& xNÄND GN²b@ãC´ b¸L R:S sðÂ
TMHR¬êE NGGR xDRgêLÝÝ ì¼R xl¥yh# Æqrb#T /úB §Y ì¼R wLÄY xM¦ xStÃyT
xQRbêLÝÝ yh#lt$M {/#F bz!H yLún x!÷ñ¸KS XT¥CN tµaLÝÝ
kz!HM bt=¥¶ yx!T×åà x!÷ñ¸KS ÆlÑÃãC ¥HbR qdM s!L bx!T×ùà yx»¶µN xMÆúdR&
xh#N bíRJ¬WN †n!vRs!tE yxlMxqF g#Ä×C mMHR yçn#TN Áv!D ¹!NN l¥Hb„ xƧT g#Ć
l¸mlk¬cW HBrtsB KFlÖC yxF¶µN qND btmlkt NGGR XNÄ!ÃdRg# UBø nbRÝÝ
PéØsR ¹!N GBÏCNN tqBlW «mrUUTN bxF¶µ qND ¥SfN´ b¸L R:S ¬HúS 29 qN 1996
›.M sð -”¸ NGGR xDRgêLÝÝ yRúcWM NGGR bz!H XTM qRÆ*LÝÝ
yx!T×ùà x!÷ñ¸KS ÆlÑÃãC ¥HbR b¸ÃzU©cW SBsÆãC Nq$ tú¬ð dUð lçn# xƧt$Â
lm§W HBrtsB kF Ãl xDÂöt$NÂ MSUÂWN ÃqRÆLÝÝ
Economic Focus
L±n a^×Ñì@KS
x!÷ñ EÃêE xStÄdR yx!T×eà L¥T
Vol. 6 No. 3 / January 2004 1 Ethiopian Economic Association
›=¢„T>Á© ›e}ÇÅ`“ ¾›=ƒÄåÁ MTƒ& ›”Ç”É Ó”³u?‹*
›KT¾G< Y¿U •ðc
TRg#M¿ BR¦n# gbyh#
ከሁለ አስቀዴሜ ይህን የርዕይ 2020 ውይይት መዴረክ ያዘጋጀውን የኢትዮጵያ ኢኮኖሚክስ ባሇሙያዎች ማህበር ከዛሬ በፊት በተዯረጉት ተከታታይ ውይይቶች አማካኝነት ስሊከናወነው ውጤታማ ተግባር እንኳን ዯስ አሊችሁ እንዴሌ ይፈቀዴሌኝ፡፡ የውይይት መዴረኩ ጠቃሚነት ተዯጋግሞ የተነገረና የተመሰከረሇት በመሆኑ ብዙ ማሇት ጊዜ መፍጀት ይመስሇኛሌ፡፡ እኔም በዚህ መዴረክ ሊይ ሃሳቤን አሰማ ዘንዴ ማህበሩ ስሇጋበዘኝ ከፍተኛ ምስጋና ሊቀርብ እወዲሇሁ፡፡
ዛሬ የምናገርበት ርዕስ፣ ኢኮኖሚያዊ አስተዲዯርና የኢትዮጵያ ሌማት፤ አንዲንዴ ግንዛቤዎች የሚሌ ነው፡፡ ንግግሬ ሶስት ክፍልች አለት፡፡ በመጀመሪያው ክፍሌ የንግግሬ እምብርት ስሇሆነው የኢኮኖሚ አስተዲዯር (economic governance) ምንነትና ባህርያት አንዲንዴ ነጥቦችን በማብራራት፣ በኢትዮጵያ የኢኮኖሚ አስተዲዯር ይዞታ ምን እንዯሚመስሌ ሇማሳየት እሞክራሇሁ፡፡ በጽሁፌ ሁሇተኛ ክፍሌ፣ በ2020 ዓ.ም በአገራችን ይሆን ዘንዴ የምመኘውን ርዕዬን አመሇክታሇሁ፡፡ በመጨረሻው ክፍሌም፣ በአሻጋሪ የምመሇከተው ይህ ርዕይ እውነታ ይሆን ዘንዴ፣ ኢትዮጵያውያን እንዯ ዜጋና እንዯ ህብረተሰብ ዯረጃ በዯረጃ እንፈጽማቸው ዘንዴ ይገባናሌ ብዬ የማምንባቸውን አንዲንዴ ተግባራት ነዯፍ ነዯፍ አዯርጋሇሁ፡፡
መነሻ ወዯ ዋናው ጉዲይ ከመዝሇቄ በፊት ዛሬ የምናገርበትን ርዕስ እንዴመርጥ ስሊነሳሱኝ ምክንያቶች መገሇጽ እፈሌጋሇሁ#፡፡ ስሇምናገርበት ጉዲይ ትክከሇኛውን አቅጣጫና የሚመጥን ስሜትን ሇመፍጠር ይረዲሌ ብዬ ስሊመንኩ ነው በዚህ አጭር ገሇጻ የምጀምረው፡፡
ባሇፈው ሰሞን፣ በኢትዮጵያውያን ዴሃ ህጻናት ህይወት ሊይ የሚያተኩርና ስሜቴን በእጅጉ የነካ፣ በእንግሉዝ ህጻናት አዴን ዴርጅት የተዘጋጀ አንዴ ድኩመንተሪ ፊሌም ተመሌክቼ ነበር፡፡ በርካታ ዴሃ ሰዎችን አውቃሇሁ፤ ከስጋ ዘመድቼም ብዙዎቹ የዴህነትን ህይወት የሚገፉ ናቸው፡፡ ብዙም የማያወሊዲ መካከሇኛ ገቢ ካሇው ቤተሰብ የተወሇዴኩ በመሆኔ፣ ብዙ ዴሃ ቤተሰቦች ከሚያጋጥሟቸው የኢኮኖሚ ችግሮች አንዲንድቹን በግብር አውቃቸዋሇሁ፡፡ እንዯ ማንኛውም ሰው እኔም በጎዲና ሊይ ከሚኖሩ ዴሃ ሌጆች ጋር ነጋ ጠባ እገናኛሇሁ፡፡ ነገር ግን ያንን ፊሌም እስካየሁበት ሰዓት ዴረስ ከዴሆች ሌጆች ጋር የነበረኝ ግንኙነት አንዴም፣ ብዙ ጊዜ እርዲታ/ምጽዋት በመጠየቅና ሽርፍራፊ ገንዘብ በመወርወር የሚገሇጽ የሰው-ሇሰው (person to person) ግንኙነት፤ አሌያም ስሇ ዴህነትና የኑሮ ሁኔታ (well-
being) በማዯርጋቸው ጥናቶች የተጠኝው ማህበረሰብ አንዴ ክፍሌ ሆነው በመገኘታቸው የሚገሇጽ ረቂቅ (abstract) ነበር፡፡ ያንን የዴሀ ሌጆችን የህይወት ገጽታዎች የሰነዯውን ፊሌም ካየሁ በኋሊ ነበር፣ ዴሃ ህጻናት ወገኖቻችን ሇመጀመሪያ ጊዜ፣ እንዯ ላሊው ጊዜ በቀጥታ ሳይማጸኑ፣ በራሳቸው አንዯበት አኗኗራቸውን፣ ፍሊጎቶቻቸውንና ተስፋቸውን በመግሇጽ ብቻ፣ የእርዲታ ጥሪ ሲያሰሙ ያስተዋሌኩት፡፡ ያ የሰማሁት የሌጆቹ የዴረሱሌን ጥሪ፣ መከሊከያና መሸፋፈኛ አዴርጌያቸው እኖር የነበሩትን ሌግስናን (ምጽዋትን) እና የማህበራዊ ጉዲዮች ተመራማሪ የሚመራባቸውን ምክንያታዊነትንና ገሇሌተኛነትን፣ በመዝሇቅ እውነተኛውን የዴህነት ገጽታና ትርጓሜ ገሌጾሌኛሌ፣ ዴሃ ሌጅ መሆን ማሇትም ምን ማሇት እንዯሆነ አስገንዝቦኛሌ፡፡
በዚያ የመገሇጥ አፍታ፣ እኔም ወሊጅ ነኝና መጀመሪያ ወዯራሴ ሌጆች፣ ቀጥልም፣ ሌጆቼ አዴገው ወሊጅ ሇመሆን ሲበቁ ስሇሚኖሩዋቸው ሌጆች አሰብኩ፡፡ እናም፣ ሌጆቼም እንኳን ባይሆኑ የሌጅ ሌጆቼ በፊሌሙ ሊይ ያየኋቸውን ሌጆች አይነት የችግር ህይወት እንዲይወዴቅባቸው የሚያስችሌ አስተማማኝ መከሊከያ መፍትሄ በአገራችን ውስጥ አሇ
________________________
* የኢትዮጵያ ኢኮኖሚክስ ባሇሙያዎች ማህበር ባዘጋጀው ርዕይ 2020 መዴረክ ጥር 21 ቀን 1996 ዓ.ም የተዯረገ ንግግር፡፡
Economic Focus
L±n a^×Ñì@KS
x!÷ñ EÃêE xStÄdR yx!T×eà L¥T
Vol. 6 No. 3 / January 2004 2 Ethiopian Economic Association
ወይ ብዬ ጠየቅሁ፡፡ ሇተዯሊዯሇ ማህበራዊ ኑሮ (decent opportunities) ዋስትና ያሇማቋረጥ የሚያዴግ ሕያው ኢኮኖሚ
(dynamic economy) እስከሆነና ይህ አይነቱ ኢኮኖሚ ዯግሞ
በኢትዮጵያ ገና እስካሊቆጠቆጠ ዴረስ የሌጅ ሌጆቼ በፊሌሙ ያየኋቸውን ዴሃ ሌጆች አይነት የመከራ ኑሮ እንዯማይጠብቃቸው የሚያረጋግጥ ሁነኛ ምክንያት የሇም ከሚሌ መዯምዯሚያ ሊይ ዯረስኩ፡፡
ሇመጀመሪያ ጊዜም፣ ዴህነት የተመናመነበት የበሇጸገ ህብረተሰብ ሇመገንባት ኢኮኖሚያዊ ጉዲዮቻችንን የምንመራባቸውና የምናስተዲዴርባ ቸው ሁኔታዎች ወሳኝ መሆናቸውን ትርጉም ባሇው መንገዴ ሇመገንዘብ ቻሌኩ፡፡ ሇሌጆቻችን ዴህነት የላሇበት የተሻሇ ዘመን ይመጣ ዘንዴ የአገራችንን ኢኮኖሚያዊ አመራር ይዞታ ሇማሻሻሌና እያንዲንዲችን በነፍስ ወከፍ፣ ሁሊችን ዯግሞ በጋራ በእጅጉ መጣጣር ይኖርብናሌ፡፡ በዛሬው መዴረክ የማዋያችሁ ሀሳቦቼና አስተያየቶቼ ከዚህ ግንዛቤ የመነጩ ናቸው፡፡ ጊዜ በጨመረ ቁጥር ሀሳብ እየበሰሇ፣ እየጠነከረና እየነጠረ ይሄዲሌና በዛሬው መዴረክ የማካፍሊችሁ የሀሳብ ነጸብራቆች (reflections) ወዯፊት የሚሻሻለና የሚያዴጉ ውጥን ሀሳቦች መሆናቸውን ሊስገነዝብ እወዲሇሁ፡፡
ዓሊማዎች ሇዛሬ ምሽት ንግግሬ ዓሊማ አዴርጌ የተነሳሁት፣ ስሇ ኢኮኖሚ አስተዲዯር በተሇይ ዯግሞ፣ በፖሉሲ አመራረጥ ሂዯት (the process of policy selection) ውስጥ ስሇሚዯረጉ የኢኮኖሚ አመራር ውሳኔዎች (economic management decisions) እና
ውሳኔዎቹ እንዳት እንዯሚከናወኑ ስርዓታዊና በእውቀት ሊይ የተመሰረተ ውይይት ሇመቀስቀስ ነው፡፡ እንዯሚታወቀው የፖሉሲ አመራረጥ ሂዯት በባህርይው ፖሇቲካዊ፣ ኢኮኖሚያዊና ማህበራዊ ገጽታዎች አለት፡፡ ውይይታችን ሁለንም ገጽታዎች ማካተት እንዲሇበት የማምን ቢሆንም፣ የኢኮኖሚክስ ባሇሙያ ነኝና አቅም በፈቀዯው መጠን አስተያየቶቼ በእጅጉ በኢኮኖሚያዊ ጉዲዮች ሊይ የተቀነበቡና የኢኮኖሚክስንና የኢኮኖሚስቶችን ሚና የሚያመሊክቱ ይሆናለ፡፡ እንዱያም ሆኖ በመረጥኩት ርዕሰ—ጉዲይ ዙሪያ የማነሳቸው ነጥቦችና የምሰነዝራቸው ሀሳቦች እንዯ ኢትዮጵያውያን ከፊታችን ስሊለን አማራጭ እዴልችና ስሇተጣለብን ግዳታዎች ሉያወያዩን የሚችለ ይሆናለ የሚሌ ተስፋ አሇኝ፡፡
የመረጥኩት ጉዲይ መጠነ ርዕዩ እጅጉን ሰፊና በርካታ ገጽታዎችም ያለት በመሆኑ፣ በተመረጡ ጭብጦች ሊይ ተወስኖ መናገርን ግዴ ይሊሌ፡፡ ስሇዚህ በዛሬ ምሽት ንግግሬ የኢኮኖሚ አስተዲዯር ቁሌፍ ገጽታዎች ከሚባለት ውስጥ በአንዲንድቹ ሊይ በማተኮር ሇውይይት መንዯርዯሪያ የሚሆኑ ሀሳቦችን ሇመሰንዘር እሞክራሇሁ፡፡
ዴፍረት ባይሆንብኝ፣ በንግግሬ መጨረሻም፣ እዚህ ቤት ውስጥ ያሊችሁ ሁለ፣ ስሇ ሌጆቻችሁ፣ የሌጅ ሌጆቻችሁ፣ ስሇአክስት አጎቶቻችሁ ሌጆችና ስሇትውሌዲቸው እጣ ፈንታ እኔ ራሴን ጠይቄው የነበሩትን አይነት ጥያቄዎች ራሳችሁን ትጠይቃሊችሁ ብዬ ተስፋ አዯርጋሇሁ፡፡ ተጨማሪ ዴፍረት ባይሆንብኝም፣ በጥያቄዎቹ አስገዲጅነት ምክንያትም የሚገባውን የሃሳብና የተግባር ጉዞ
ትቀጥሊሊችሁ የሚሌ ተስፋ አሇኝ፡፡ ግምቶች/ እውቆች
(Assumptions/Presumptions)
እንዯ ኢኮኖሚክስ ባሇሙያነቴ መሊምቶቼን/እውቆቼን በመዘርዘር መጀመር ተገቢ ይመስሇኛሌ፡፡ በማንኛውም መንገዴ ቢታሰብ የኢኮኖሚ አስተዲዯር ስርዓት (the pattern of economic governance) የአንዴን አገር ቁሳዊ ሀብቶች፣ የዜጎችን እምነቶችና ሌማድች፣ ስጋቶችና ምኞቶች፣ ችልታዎች፣ ዜጎች እንዯ ማህበረሰብ ቀዯም ባሇውና በአሁኑ ዘመን የተከተሎቸውን የውሳኔ አማራጮች (choices)፣ እንዱሁም በአገሪቱ ቁሳዊ ሃብቶችና በዜጎች እምነትና ሌማዴ ሊይ ተመስርተው የበቀለና በዘመናት ውስጥ የዲበሩ ሌዩ ሌዩ ተቋማዊ ስርዓቶች (institutional arrangements) ሁለ ያንጸባርቃለ ብዬ አምናሇሁ፡፡ የዝምዴናው ሀረግ ከላሊ ጎንም ሉመዘዝ ይችሊሌ፡፡ አንዴ አገር የሚከተሇው የኢኮኖሚ አስተዲዯር ስርዓት፣ በዜጎች እምነቶች፣ ሌማድችና ምርጫዎች፣ እንዱሁም በጠቅሊሊ ዯህንነታቸው (their well-being) ሊይ ተጽዕኖዎች ያሳዴራሌ፡፡
በተጨማሪም፣ እኛ ኢትዮጵያውያን በአንዴ የጋራ የኢኮኖሚ አውዴ (common economic space) ውስጥ ሆነን የነፍስ ወከፍና የወሌ ዯህንነታችንን ሇማሻሻሌ እንጣጣራሇን የሚሌ ግምት አሇኝ፡፡ አሁን በስራ ሊይ ካሇው፣ የኢትዮጵያ ህገ መንግስት መግቢያ /1987፣6/ የምቀነጭባቸው የሚከተለት ዏረፍተ ነገሮችም የዚህን ጉዲይ አስፈሊጊነት ያረጋግጣለ፤ ‹እኛ የኢትዮጵያ ብሄሮች፣ ብሄረሰቦች፣ ህዝቦች፣... ጥቅማችንን፣ መብታችንና ነፃነታችንን በጋራ እና
Economic Focus
L±n a^×Ñì@KS
x!÷ñ EÃêE xStÄdR yx!T×eà L¥T
Vol. 6 No. 3 / January 2004 3 Ethiopian Economic Association
በተዯጋጋፊነት ሇማሳዯግ አንዴ የኢኮኖሚ ማኀበረሰብ የመገንባቱን አስፈሊጊነት በማመን... ይህ ሕገመንግስት... ማሰሪያ እንዱሆነን... አጽዴቀነዋሌ፡፡›
ከፍ ብዬ የጠቀስኩዋቸው ነጥቦች የሚከተለት ዋና ዋና አንዴምታዎች ይኖሩዋቸዋሌ ብዬ እገምታሇሁ፤ ሀ) በአንዴ ወይም በላሊ መሌኩ፣
ሁለም ኢትዮጵያውያን ከኢትዮጵያ ሰሊምና ብሌጽግና ተጠቃሚ ይሆናለ፤
ሇ) በአንዴ ወይም በላሊ መሌኩ፣ ሇእነዚህ ግቦች መገኘት ሁለም ኢትዮጵያውያን አስተዋጽኦ ያዯርጋለ፤ የማዴረግ ግዳታም አሇባቸው፡፡ በላሊ አባባሌ፣ ሰሊምንና ብሌጽግናን የማስፈን ኃሊፊነት ሇአንዴ ወይም ሇላሊ የተመረጠ ቡዴን የተሰጠ መብት፣ ወይም በአንዴ ቡዴን ሊይ የተጣሇ ግዳታ አይዯሇም፤ ስሇዚህም፣
ሏ) ኢትዮጵያውያን ሁለ የዘመናችንና የመጭው ጊዜ የአገራችንን የኑሮ ዯህንነት አስተማማኝ የማዴረግ ሌዩ ሌዩ ኃሊፊነቶች አለብን፡፡
በመጨረሻም፣ ጠንካራና ውጤታማ የገበያ ኢኮኖሚ ስርዓት መገንባት የኢትዮጵያውያን የጋራ ርዕይ ነው የሚሌ እምነት አሇኝ ፡፡ ይህንንም ስሌ አብዛኞቹ ኢትዮጵያዊያን ትንሹም ትሌቁም የኢኮኖሚ እንቅስቃሴያቸው ከአንዴ ማዕከሊዊ ስሌጣን በሚሰጥ አመራር እንዱተዲዯር አይፈሌጉም ማሇቴ ነው፡፡
ኢኮኖሚያዊ አስተዲዯር፤ ጽንሰ ሃሳባዊ ማዕቀፍ (Economic governance - a conceptual
framework)
በዛሬ ንግግሬ ኢኮኖሚያዊ አስተዲዯር ስሌ የፖሉሲ ቀረጻ ሂዯት፣ በዚህም ሂዯት ውስጥ ተቀርጸው የሚወጡ ፖሉሲዎች፣ እንዱሁም የፖሉሲ አፈጻጸም ስርዓቶች ማሇቴ ይሆናሌ፡፡ ኢኮኖሚያዊ አስተዲዯር አንዴ ኢኮኖሚ የሚሰራባቸውን ተቋማዊና ህጋዊ ሁኔታዎች (environment) የሚያካትት እሳቤ ነው፡፡ በመሆኑም የአንዴ አገር ኢኮኖሚያዊ አስተዲዯር፣ የማክሮ—ኢኮኖሚ ፖሉሲዎችን (macroeconomic policies)፣ የመንግሥት ፋይናንስ ፖሉሲዎች (fiscal policies )፣ መንግስታዊ የኢኮኖሚ ዴርጅቶችን፣ የቁጥጥር ፖሉሲዎችንና (regulatory policies)) የፍትህ አካሊትን፣ የንግዴ ህጎችንና የህግ ተቋማትን በሙለ ያካትታሌ፡፡ ስሇዚህ በዛሬው ንግግሬ ውስጥ የኢኮኖሚ ፖሉሲ አቀራረጽና አተገባበር የሚሇውን ሀረግ የኢኮኖሚያዊ አስተዲዯርን ጽንሰ ሀሳብ ይተካሌኝ ዘንዴ ሌገሇገሌበት እወዲሇሁ፡፡ የኢኮኖሚ ፖሉሲ ሶስት ዋና ዋና ክፍልች አለት፡፡ እነዚህም፣ የኢኮኖሚ ግቦች፣ የኢኮኖሚ መሳሪያዎችና የኢኮኖሚ ሞዳልች ናቸው፡፡ ፖሉሲ አውጭዎችና መንግስታት ስሇኢኮኖሚ ግቦችና መሳሪያዎች ዘወትር በግሌጽ ሲናገሩና ሲያብራሩ፣ ሶስተኛውን ግን ብዙ ጊዜ ሸፋፍነው ያሌፉታሌ፤ ወይም ስሙንም ሳያነሱ ይቀራለ፡፡ የኢኮኖሚ ግቦች፡— የኢኮኖሚ ፖሉሲ በማውጣትና ፖሉሲውን በመተግበር ሉዯረስባቸው የታቀደ ዓሊማዎችና ታሊሚ ውጤቶች
ናቸው፡፡ ኢትዮጵያን በመሳሰለ ዴሃ አገሮች ጥቅሌ የኢኮኖሚ ግቦች ሁሇት መሰረታዊ ሰፊ አሊማዎችን ይይዛለ፡፡ እነዚህም1፣ 1. የማክሮ ኢኮኖሚ መረጋጋት
(macroeconomic stability)፣ ይህ ዓሊማ በኢኮኖሚ ሚዛን በተሇይም፣ የገንዘብ ክፍያ ሚዛን (the balance of payments)፣ በመንግስት በጀት በቁጠባና በኢንቨስትመንት ሚዛን (the saving-investment balance) ሊይ ያተኩራሌ፡፡ ሇማክሮ ኢኮኖሚ መረጋጋት ወሳኝ ሚና ከሚጫወቱ ጉዲዮች ዋና ዋናዎቹ፣ የመንግስት የበጀት ጉዴሇት፣ የገንዘብ አቅርቦት፣ የጥቅሌ ፍሊጎት ክፍልች (components of aggregate demand)፣ የብዴር መጠን (volume of credit)፣ የወሇዴ ምጣኔ፣ ምንዲዎችና ትርፎች (wages and profits)፣ የሸቀጥ ዋጋ፣ እና yW+/
ምንዛሬ ምጣኔ ዋጋ ናቸው፡፡ 2. እዴገትና ሌማት (growth and
development)፤ በአንዴ አገር ሌማት ሂዯት ባህርያት ሊይ ወሳኝ ሚና በሚጫወቱ ጉዲዮች ሊይ ያተኩራለ፡፡ የሌማት ሂዯትን ባህርያት የሚወስኑት ቁሌፍ ጉዲዮች የምርት መዋቅርና እዴገት፣ የዜጎች የስራ እዴሌና ኢንቨስትመንት ሲሆኑ በስራቸውም፣ የካፒታሌ ክምችት፣ ከገጠር ወዯ ከተማ ፍሌሰት (rural-urban migration)፣ የሠራተኛው ሕዝብ ቁጥር እዴገት፣ የምርታማነት መሻሻሌ፣ የንግዴ መዋቅር (trade structure)፣ የኢንቨስትመንት
1 Dervis, Kemal, Jaime de Melo, and
Sherman Robinson (1982). General
Equilibrium Models for Development Policy,
The World Bank, Washington D.C.
Economic Focus
L±n a^×Ñì@KS
x!÷ñ EÃêE xStÄdR yx!T×eà L¥T
Vol. 6 No. 3 / January 2004 4 Ethiopian Economic Association
ምዯባ (allocation of investment) እና የፍሊጎት መዋቅር (demand structure) የመሳሰለ ሁኔታዎችን ያካትታለ2፡፡
ከፍ ብዬ ያመሇከትኳቸውን ሁሇት ጥቅሌ ግቦች በቁርጥ የሚሇይ ዴንበር ከሌል መሇያየት ብዙ ጊዜ አስቸጋሪ ነው፡፡ በመጀመሪያ መረጋጋትና እዴገት/ ሌማት የተሳሰሩና ናቸው፤ ሇኢኮኖሚ እዴገት/ ሌማት መረጋጋት ወሳኝ ጉዲይ መሆኑ በሁሇቱ መካከሌ ሊሇው ዝምዴና መንስኤ ነው፡፡ ሁሇተኛ፣ አንዲንዴ የፖሉሲ መሳሪያዎች በሁሇቱም (በመረጋጋትና በእዴገት/በሌማት) ሊይ የሚያነጣጥሩና አወንታዊ ወይም አለታዊ ተጽዕኖዎች የሚያስከትለ ናቸው፡፡
የፖሉሲ መሳሪያዎች (Instruments)፡— የፖሉሲ ግቦችን ወይም ታሊሚ ውጤቶችን ሇማስገኘት በስራ ሊይ የሚውለ ዘዳዎች ናቸው፡፡ የአንዴ መንግስት ዝርዝር የፖሉሲ መሳሪያዎች በከፊሌ በራሱ በመንግስት ተቋማዊ ዴርጅቶቹ ሊይ ይመሰረታለ፡፡ በነጻ ገበያ ኢኮኖሚ የፖሉሲ መሳሪያዎች፣ የፋይናንስ አስተዲዯር ፖሉሲዎችን (የታክስ ዓይነቶችንና ዯረጃዎችን፣ የመንግስትን ወጭ መጠንና ስብጥር)፣ የስርዓተ-ገንዘብ (monetary) ፖሉሲን (የገንዘብ አቅርቦትን፣ የመጠባበቂያ ተቀማጭ ግዳታዎች (reserve requirements)፣ የወሇዴ መጠን ዴንጋጌን)፣ የውጭ ምንዛሬ ተመን ፖሉሲን፣ የኢኮኖሚ¸ ዘርፍ ፖሉሲን፣ እና ህጎችንና ዴንጋጌዎችን ያካትታለ፡፡
2 Dervis, Kemal, Jaime de Melo, and
Sherman Robinson (1982). General
Equilibrium Models for Development Policy,
The World Bank, Washington D.C
የኢኮኖሚ ሞዳልች (Economic Models)፡— የኢኮኖሚ ሞዳሌ፤ ኢኮኖሚው እንዳት እንዯሚንቀሳቀስ አወቃቀሩን፣ እንቅፋቶቹንና እዴልቹን ጨምሮ)፣ የፖሉሲ መሳሪያዎች ከፖሉሲ ግቦች/ታሊሚዎች ጋር እንዳት እንዯሚተሳሰሩና እነዚህን ስሇመሳሰለ ጉዲዮች ፖሉሲ አውጭዎችና አማካሪዎቻቸው ያሊቸውን አተያይ የሚጠቀሌሌ እሳቤ ነው፡፡ ይህ አተያይ፣ መነሻና መሰረት ያዯረጋቸውን የኢኮኖሚ ትውሮች (economic theorizing) እና ተግባራዊ ሌምዴ (empirical evidences) ጨምሮ በዝርዝር ሉሰፍር ይችሊሌ፡፡ ያሇበሇዚያም በግሌፅና በዝርዝር ሳይነገር በውስጠ ታዋቂነት ሉያዝ ወይም ያሇበቂ ትወራዊና ግብራዊ ይዘት እንዯነገሩ ተውተፍትፎ ሲገሇጽ ይችሊሌ፡፡ መንግስታት እጅግ በርካታ አይነት የኢኮኖሚ ፖሉሲዎችን ሉነዴፉ ይችሊለ፡፡ የኢኮኖሚ ፖሉሲ በአንዴ በኩሌ፣ መንግስት የተቀናጁ የኢኮኖሚ ግቦቹን ሇመምታት፣ በተሇይ የማክሮ—ኢኮኖሚያዊ መረጋጋትትን ሇማስፈንና የኢኮኖሚ እዴገትንና ሌማትን ሇማፋጠን ያስችሇኛሌ ብል የመረጣቸውን ቁሌፍ ስሌቶች ያመሇክታሌ፡፡ በላሊ በኩሌ ዯግሞ፣ የአንዴ አገር የኢኮኖሚ ፖሉሲ የተመረጠባቸው መንገድችና ሂዯቶች፣ የአንዴን አገር የኢኮኖሚ አስተዲዯር ስርዓት፣ ወይም የአንዴ አገር ኢኮኖሚ የሚሰራባቸውን ተቋማዊ ሁኔታዎች ባህርያትን ያንጸባርቃሌ፡፡ ስሇዚህም፣ የመንግስት ፖሉሲዎች የአንዴ አገር ኢኮኖሚያዊ አሰራርና እዴገታዊ ሇውጥ (evolution) ውስጥ ወሳኝ ሚናዎች የሚጫዎቱ የኢኮኖሚው መሰረታዊ ክፍልች ናቸው3፡፡
3 For a recent exploration of the impact of
policies and, more broadly, governance see
Ndulu and O‘Connell (1999), Collier and
የኢኮኖሚ ፖሉሲዎች የመጨረሻ ግብ የዜጎችን ኑሮና ዯህንነት (well-being) ማሻሻል መሆን አሇበት፡፡ ይህንን ማሻሻል ሇማምጣት ፖሉሲዎች በኢኮኖሚው ውስጥ ተዋናይ የሆኑት ክፍሎች (ግሇሰቦች፣ ቤተሰቦችና የኢኮኖሚ ድርጅቶች) የሚወስዷቸውን ውሳኔዎችና ምርጫዎች ተስማሚና ተገቢ በሆነ መንገድ ያስተካክለ ዘንድ በቀጥታም ይሆን በተዘዋዋሪ ማግባባት መቻል አሇባቸው፡፡ የእነዚህ ተዋንያን ምርጫ፣ ስሇዚህም የመንግሥት ፖሉሲዎች ውጤታማነት የሚወሰነው በግልጽ በሚታዩት የፖሉሲዎቹ ባህርያት ብቻ ሳይሆን፣ ስሇፖሉሲዎች የኢኮኖሚው ተዋናዮች በሚኖራቸው
ግንዛቤም (perception) ጭምር ነው፡፡ በአጭሩ ጥሩ የመንግሥት ፖሉሲዎች የአንድን አገር የኢኮኖሚ እንቅስቃሴ በማሳዯግ የዜጎችን የኑሮ ዯህንነት ያሻሽሊለ፡፡
ፖሉሲዎች የሚያስገኙት ፋይዳ የሚሇካው የፖሉሲዎች ጥራት ማረጋገጫ በሆኑት ትክክሇኛነት (correctness)፣ ተአማኒነትና (credibility) ውጤታማነት (effectiveness) ነው4፡፡
ፖሉሲዎች ትክክሇኛ (correct) ሉሆኑ ይገባሌ፤ ፖሉሲዎች ትክክሇኛ የሚባለት፣ ተቀባይ ካሊቸው የሕብረተሰብ ፍሊጎቶች (the ‘accepted’ needs of the society and its economy) ጋር የተጣጣሙ
Gunning (1999), and Kaufmann, Kraay, and
Ziodo-Lobat (1999, 2002). The first two
specifically analyse Africa.
4 On correctness see Stiglitz (1996), Tanzi
(2000), and World Bank (1997). On
credibility see, for instance, Brunetti,
Kisunko, and Weder (1998)
Economic Focus
L±n a^×Ñì@KS
x!÷ñ EÃêE xStÄdR yx!T×eà L¥T
Vol. 6 No. 3 / January 2004 5 Ethiopian Economic Association
ተገቢውን የመንግሥት ኢኮኖሚያዊ ሚና ያገናዘቡና የመንግስትና አቅም ጨምር በኢኮኖሚው አቅም ተግባራዊ ሉሆኑ የሚችለ ሲሆኑ ነው፡፡ ፖሉሲዎች ተአማኒ (credible) ሉሆኑ ይገባሌ፤ ፖሉሲዎች ተአማኒ የሚባለት ምክንያታዊና የሚዘሌቁበት አቅጣጫ የሚገመት እና እርስ በእርስ የተቀናጁና የተጣጣሙ (reasonably predictable) ፖሉሲዎች ውጤታማ (effective) ሉሆኑ ይገባሌ፤ ፖሉሲዎች ውጤታማ የሚባለት አመራረጣቸውና አተገባበራቸው ቀሌጣፋ (efficient) እና በበቂ ግሌጽነትና ተጠያቂነት ሊይ የተመሠረተ ሲሆን
እነዚህ ሶስት የፖሉሲ እርምጃ (policy interventions) ገጽታዎች አንዲቸው ከላሊቸው ጋር የማይፋቱ የኢኮኖሚ ፖሉሲ ጥራት ጥምር አመሌካቾች (joint indicators of the quality of economic policy) ናቸው፡፡ ከእነዚህ ባህርያት አንዲንድቹን ከፍ ብል ከተገሇጹት ላልች የፖሉሲ አሊባውያን (policy elements) ጋር በማቀናጀት፣ የኢትዮጵያን የኢኮኖሚ አስተዲዯር ገጽታዎች ሇማብራራት እገሇገሌባቸዋሇሁ፡፡
ኢኮኖሚያዊ አስተዲዯር በኢትዮጵያ
በዘመናዊትዋ ኢትዮጵያ ታሪክ ሇመጀመሪያ ጊዜ በወጉ የተነዯፈ ብሄራዊ የኢኮኖሚ ፖሉሲ በንጉሰ ነገስቱ ዘመን የወጣውና ከ1957-19615 የቆየው አንዯኛው የአምስት ዓመት የሌማት ዕቅዴ (The First Five-Year Development
5 All years are in Gregorian Calendar.
Plan) ነው6፡፡ ከእዚህ እቅዴ በኋሊም ሁሇተኛው (1963-1967) እና ሶስተኛው(1968-1973) የአምስት ዓመት የሌማት እቅድች ወጥተዋሌ፡፡ ሶስተኛውን የአምስት ዓመት የሌማት እቅዴ መሰረት በማዴረግ በንጉሰ ነገስቱ ዘመን የወጡት የኢኮኖሚ ፖሉሲዎች ባህርያት ሇማመሊከት እሞክራሇሁ፡፡ ሶስተኛው የአምስት ዓመት የሌማት ዕቅዴ በዘመኑ ከተነዯፉት ዕቅድች ሁለ ይበሌጥ የዲበረና ዘመናዊ የፖሉሲ ሰነዴ ነበር ማሇት ይቻሊሌ፡፡ በእኔ እምነት፣ ይህ ፖሉሲ በተጠየቁ (its logic)፣ በጥሌቀት (depth) እና በሽፋን (coverage) ረገዴ ከእርሱ በሁዋሊ ባለት ዘመናት ከተዘጋጁት ዕቅድችና ስትራቴጅዎች የማይተናነስ ነው7፡፡ የዚህን ዕቅዴ ሰነዴ በማነብበት ወቅት በጣም የተገረምኩበት ጉዲይ ቢኖር፣ እጅግ ብዙዎቹ ትንታኔዎች ባሇንበት ዘመንም ተቀባይነት ያሊቸውና ሉያገሇግለ የሚችለ መሆናቸው ነው፡፡ ተንታኞቹ የተከተለት የምርመራ ስሌትና ትንታኔያቸውን ያቀረቡበት ቋንቋ በቅርብ ዘመን ከወጡት ሰነድች ጋር በጣም ተመሳሳይ በመሆኑ፣ ይህ ሰነዴ ከ35 ዓመታት በፊት የተዘጋጀ መሆኑን እስከመርሳት ዯርሼ ነበር፡፡ ላሊ ላሊው ነገር ይቅርና ይህ ሰነዴ ከተዘጋጀበት ዘመን ወዱህ ባለት ዓመታት የኢኮኖሚያችን እርምጃ ምን ያህሌ ቀሰስተኛ እንዯሆነ ሇማየት የምትሹ አዴማጮቼ፣ ይህንን ሰነዴ ትመሇከቱት ዘንዴ ሊሳስባችሁ እወዲሇሁ፡፡
6 See Asfaw (1992) and Molla (1992). 7 Imperial Ethiopian Government (1968).
Third Five Year Development Plan, Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia.
ግቦች/ዓሊማዎች፤ ሶስተኛው የአምስት ዓመት የሌማት እቅዴ ግቦቹ አዴርጎ የነቀሳቸው ዓሊማዎች የሚከተለት ነበሩ፤ 1. የነፍስ ወከፍ ገቢን በዓመት 3
በመቶ ማሳዯግ፤ 2. በሁለም ጎን የተቀናጀ
ማበረታቻና ዴጋፍ በማዴረግ የብሄራዊው ኢኮኖሚ መዯሊዴሌ (mainstay) እና የአብዛኛው ኢትዮጵያዊ ኑሮ መሰረት የሆነውን ግብርናን ማሻሻሌ፤
3. ኢኮኖሚያዊና ማህበራዊ ሌማትን ከከተማ ማዕከሊት የበርካታው የኢትዮጵያ ህዝብ መኖሪያና የአገሪቱ የተፈጥሮ ሃብት መገኛ ወዯሆነው ገጠር ማስፋፋት፡፡
ሰነደ እነዚህን ዋና ዋና ጥቅሌ ግቦች ወዯ ዝርዝር አሊማዎች በመሸንሸን፣ በሌዩ ሌዩ ዘርፎች የሚጠበቁ ዝርዝር ክንዋኔዎችንና ታሳቢ ውጤቶችን አመሊክቷሌ፡፡ መሳሪያዎች፤ ሶስተኛው የአምስት ዓመት የሌማት ዕቅዴ ከፍ ብል የተመሇከቱትን ግቦች እውን ሇማዴረግ የሚያስችለ በርካታ ሌዩ ሌዩ የፖሉሲ ማስፈጸሚያ ስሌቶች/ መሳሪያዎችን የነዯፈ ሲሆን ከእነዚህ መካከሌ ከሌዩ ሌዩ ዘርፎች በተመረጡ የተወሰኑ ፕሮጀክቶች ሊይ የሚዯረግ አማሊይ የኢንቨስትመንት እቅዴ (impressive investment plan) አንደ ነው፡፡ የኢንቨስትመንት እቅደን በስራ ሊይ ሇማዋሌ ከሚያሰፈሌገው ገንዘብ ግማሽ ያህለ በግለ ዘርፍ ይሸፈናሌ ተብል ይጠበቅ ነበር፡፡ ሶስተኛው የአምስት ዓመት የሌማት ዕቅዴ፣ የግለን ዘርፍ ኢንቨስትመንት ሇማበረታታት ያስችሊለ ተብሇው የሚገመቱ የፖሉሲ እርምጃዎችና መሳሪያዎች
Economic Focus
L±n a^×Ñì@KS
x!÷ñ EÃêE xStÄdR yx!T×eà L¥T
Vol. 6 No. 3 / January 2004 6 Ethiopian Economic Association
በተግባር ሊይ እንዱውለ አሳስቧሌ፡፡ ሰነደ ነቅሶ ካወጣቸው የፖሉሲ መሳሪያዎች መካከሌ፣ ዝርዝር ይዘቱ ወዯፊት በኢንቨስትመንት ህግ የሚዯነገግ፣ በዘመኑ የንግዴና ኢንደስትሪ ሚኒስቴር በመባሌ ይታወቅ በነበረው ሚኒስቴር ስር በሚዯራጅ የኢንቨስትመንት ኮሚቴና የኢንቨስትመንት ማበረታቻ ቢሮ የሚተዲዯሩ የፋይናንስ ማበረታቻ እርምጃዎች (ከታክስ ነጻ ማዴረግን የመሳሰለ) አስፈሊጊነት አንደ ነው፡፡ የመንግስትን ኢንቨስትመንት በተመሇከተም ሰነደ ሇዓመታዊ የመንግስት በጀት አዘገጃጀት መሰረት የሚሆኑ ዓመታዊ ዕቅድችን ነዴፎአሌ፡፡ ኢኮኖሚያዊ ሞዳልች፤ ሶስተኛው የአምስት ዓመት ዕቅዴ የተከተሊቸው የኢኮኖሚ ሞዳልች በሚከተለት ሶስት አበይት መርሆች ሉገሇጹ ይችሊለ:: እነርሱም፤
1. የኢትዮጵያ ኢኮኖሚ የቆመበት መሰረት የግብርና ኢኮኖሚ እስከሆነ ዴረስ የግብርና ሌማት ቅዴሚያ ሉሰጠው ይገባሌ (በነገራችን ሊይ የፖሉሲው አርቃቂዎች ይህን እምነታቸውን ሇማስረገጥ የሚያቀርቧቸው አሃዛዊ ግምቶች (figures cited) ከሞሊ ጎዯሌ በአሁኑ ዘመን ከሚሰጡ አሃዛዊ ግምቶች ጋር ተመሳሳይ ናቸው)፤
2. የኢንደስትሪ ሌማት እጅግ አስፈሊጊ ነው፡፡ ኤክስፖርትን ማስፋፋት አስፈሊጊ ቢሆንም፤ በኢንደስትሪ ሇመሌማት ከውጭ የሚገቡ ሸቀጦችን በአገር ምርት መተካት (Import substitution) የተሻሇው ተመራጭ ስትራቴጅ ነው ፡፡
3. የትምህርት መስፋፋትና የዜጎች በሌዩ ሌዩ ክሂልች መሰሌጠን (በዘመናችን ቋንቋ ሰብአዊ ካፒታሌን (human capital) ማሳዯግ ሇአገሪቱ ሌማት እጅግ ወሳኝ ነው፤
የሚለት ናቸው፡፡
እነዚህ መርሆዎችና እምነቶች ዕቅደ በተነዯፈበት ዘመን የነበረውን የኢኮኖሚክስ አስተሳሰብ በጥቅለ የሚያንጸባርቁ ነበሩ፡፡
ፖሉሲውን ያረቀቁት የዘመኑ ሰዎች ሇፖሉሲያቸው ‹ትክክሇኛነት›፣ ‹ተአማኒነት› እና ‹ውጤታማነት› የሰጡት ትኩረት ሳይነሳ መታሇፍ የላሇበት ጉዲይ ነው፡፡ ፖሉሲውን የቀረጹት ባሇሙያዎች፡—
1. የፖሉሲ አቀራረጹ ተግባር የአገሪቱን ኢኮኖሚ በጥሌቀት/ጠንቅቆ ከማወቅ መመንጨት እንዲሇበት ተረዴተው ነበር፡፡ ጥራት ያሇው ስታትስቲክስን አስፈሊጊነት ከማጤናቸውም በሊይ፣ የተገሇገለበት መረጃ ችግሮች እንዲለበትና ሇወዯፊቱ ማዕከሊዊ ስታትስቲክስ ቢሮን ማጠናከር እንዯሚያስፈሌግም በግሌጽ ተገንዝበው ነበር፡፡
2. ዕቅደን ሇማሳካት የሚያስፈሌጉትን ተቋማዊ መሠረቶችን በአጽንኦት በመግሇጽ፣ በመንግስት ሌዩ ሌዩ መስሪያቤቶች መካከሌ ቅንጅት ሇመፍጠር የሚያስችለትን ጨምሮ የተሇያዩ ተጓዲኝ የማሻሻያ ሂዯቶች አመሊክተዋሌ፡፡
3. የሌማት ዕቅደ ይሳካ ዘንዴ፣ ህዝቡ በወጉ ሉያውቀውና ሉረዲው፣ እንዱሁም ሉቀበሇውና ዴጋፍ ሉሰጠው እንዯሚገባ ተገንዝበዋሌ፡፡ ይህንንም ከዕቅደ ሰነዴ መቅዴም/መግቢያ
የምጠቅሳቸው የሚከተለት ዏረፍተ ነገሮችን ያሳያለ፤
ውጤት ሇማስገኘት ዕቅደ የመሊውን ህዝቡ ዴጋፍ ሉያገኝ ይገባሌ፡፡ ይህን ዴጋፍ ሇማግኘት ቅዴመ ሁኔታ ህዝቡ ስሇዕቅደ ምንነት፣ ስሇዓሊማዎቹ፣ ስሇፖሉሲዎቹ፣ ከሁለም ይሌቅ ዯግሞ ዕቅደ በዕሇት ከዕሇት ኑሮው የሚኖረውን ፋይዲ/ ጠቀሜታ የሚኖረው ግንዛቤ ነው፡፡ የዚህ አይነቱ ግንዛቤ ሉኖር የሚችሇው ዯግሞ፣ ሰነደ ብዙሀኑ ህዝብ ሉረዲው በሚችሌ መሌክ ተዘጋጅቶ በንጉሰ ነገስቱ ግዛት ሲሰራጭ ነው፡፡
4. ዕቅደን የነዯፉት ባሇሙያዎች
በተጨማሪ፣ የሃብት ምንጮችን በተቀሊጠፈ ሁኔታ የመጠቀምን አስፈሊጊነትም አበክረው ገሌጸዋሌ፡፡
ሶስተኛው የአምስት ዓመት የሌማት እቅዴ እነዚህ ሁለ ጥንካሬዎች ቢኖሩትም ውጤታማ እንዲሌነበረ ብዙ ባሇሙያዎች ይናገራለ፡፡ ሇፖሉሲው ውዴቀት አስተዋጽኦ ያዯረጉ በርካታ አገራዊና አሇማቀፋዊ ምክንያቶች እንዲለ ቢታወቅም፣ ፖሉሲው ከራሱ የመነጩ ቴክኒካዊ ዴክመቶችም ነበሩበት፡፡ እነዚህ ችግሮች ዋና ዋና የሚባለትን ሁሇቱን ሇአብነት ያክሌ ማመሌከት ተገቢ ይመስሇኛሌ፡፡
1. ዕቅደ በኢትዮጵያ ኢኮኖሚ ሌዩ
ሌዩ ዘርፎች መካከሌ ስሊለ ውስጣዊ ትስስሮች (inter-linkages) እና ከእነዚህ
Economic Focus
L±n a^×Ñì@KS
x!÷ñ EÃêE xStÄdR yx!T×eà L¥T
Vol. 6 No. 3 / January 2004 7 Ethiopian Economic Association
ትስስሮች ጋር ስሇተቆራኙ እንቅፋቶች (constraints) በቲዎሪና በተግባራዊ ሌምዴ ትንታኔ የተገኘ እውቀትን መሰረት አሊዯረገም፤
2. ዕቅደ የተመሰረተበት ሀብተ-መረጃ (database) ዯካማ ነበር፡፡ ተግባራዊ ሌምድች ትንታኔ (empirical analysis) በገሊጭ አሀዞች (descriptive statistics) ሊይ ብቻ መወሰኑ የሀብተ-መረጃ ዯካማነትን ያመሊክታሌ፡፡
ከእነዚህ በተጨማሪም፣ የፖሇቲካ ስርዓት ሇውጥን አስፈሊጊነት አሇመገንዘብና ሇመሬት ስርዓት ሇውጥ በቂ ትኩረት አሇመሰጠት ሇሌማት ዕቅደ ውዴቀት ላልች መሰረታዊ ምክንያቶች ናቸው፡፡ ይህ ዕቅዴ እምብዛም የተጠያቂነትና የግሌጽነት ባህርይ ያሌነበረው ፈሊጭ ቆራጭ ንጉሳዊ አገዛዝ የእጅ ስራ በመሆኑ እነዚህን መሰረታዊ ሇውጦች አሇማካተቱ ብዙም አስገራሚ ሊይሆን ይችሊሌ፡፡ በእርግጥም፣ ሇፖሇቲካ ስርዓትና ሇመሬት ይዞታ ስርዓት ሇውጥ የተዯረጉ ትግልች የኋሊ ኋሊ ሇአገዛዝ ስርዓቱ መወገዴ መሰረታዊ ምክንያቶች ሆነዋሌ፡፡ የአጼው ስርዓት ሲወገዴ የኢትዮጵያን ፖሇቲካዊና ኢኮኖሚያዊ አስተዲዯር ጠቅሌል የተቆጣጠረው ወታዯራዊው ዯርግ ነበር፡፡ የዯርግ አገዛዝ መገሇጫ አበይት ባህርያት ጭካኔ የተሞሊበት ፖሇቲካዊ አፈና እና የተማከሇ የኢኮኖሚ አስተዲዯር ቁጥጥር ነበሩ፡፡ ይህ አገዛዝ በሀገሪቱ ከነበሩ የማምረቻ ተቋማት አብዛኞቹን፣ የፋይናንስ ተቋማትንና ታሊሊቅ ዘመናዊ እርሻዎችን በሙለ፣ ከመኖሪያ ቤቶችና ህንጻዎች ብዙዎቹን፣ እንዱሁም መሬትን ሙለ በሙለ በመንግስት ይዞታ
ስር አዴርጓሌ፡፡ አገዛዙ በመጀመሪያ ‹‹ብሄራዊ አብዮታዊ የምርት ዘመቻ›› (1978-1984)፣ በኋሊም በ ‹‹አስር አመት ጠቋሚ ዕቅዴ›› (ከ1984 ወዱህ) የተባለ የኢኮኖሚ ሌማት መርሃ ግብሮችን ነዴፎ ነበር፡፡ በዚህ አገዛዝ ዘመን ስሇ ነበረው የኢኮኖሚ አስተዲዯር አይነት አንዲንዴ ሀሳቦችን ሇመሰንዘር ያመቸኝ ዘንዴ የአስር አመት ጠቋሚ ዕቅዴን እመሇክታሇሁ8፡፡ ግቦች/ዓሊማዎች፤ የዯርግ አገዛዝ የኢኮኖሚ ሌማት ፖሉሲ የሩቅ ግብና ህሌም የሶሻሉስት ኢኮኖሚን መገንባት ነበር፡፡ የአስሩ አመት መሪ ዕቅዴ በዚህ ሩቅና ሰፊ ግብ የሚታቀፉ አያላ ዝርዝር የቅርብ ጊዜ ዓሊማዎችንና ታሊሚ ውጤቶችን አካቷሌ፡፡ ከእነዚህ ውስጥ አንዲንድቹ፡— 1. 3.5 በመቶ አማካይ ዓመታዊ
የነፍስ ወከፍ ገቢ እዴገት ማስገኘት፤ በተጓዲኝም በግብርና፡- የ4.3 በመቶ፣ በኢንደስትሪ፡- የ10.8 በመቶ፣ እንዱሁም በአገሌግልት ዘርፍ፡- የ6.9 በመቶ አማካይ የእዴገት ምጣኔ ማምጣት፤
2. የምግብ ዋስትናን ሇማረጋገጥና የግብርና ምርታማነትን ማሳዯግ፤ የህብረት ሥራን (co-operativisation) እና የመስኖ እርሻን ማስፋፋት፤
3. በተሇይ ወዯ አገር የሚገቡ ምርቶችን በሀገር ውስጥ ምርቶች በመተካት፣ ከጠቅሊሊ ብሄራዊ ምርት የኢንደስትሪውን ዴርሻ ወዯ 1/4 ኛ ማሳዯግ፤ የሚለት ናቸው፡፡
8 Provisional Military Government of
Socialist Ethiopia (1984). Ten-Year
Perspective Plan, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
መሳሪያዎች፤ የዯርግ አገዛዝ የኢኮኖሚ ፖሉሲው ዋነኛ ማስፈጸሚያ መሳሪያ አዴርጎ የመረጠው ማዕከሊዊ እቅዴን ነበር፡፡ በሃገሪቱ አብዛኛውን ዘመናዊውን የኢኮኖሚ ዘርፍ የሚወክለት ወዯ መንግስት ይዞታነት የተዛወሩ ኢንተርፕራይዞች ሇዚሁ ተግባር በተቋቋሙ የማዕከሊዊ መንግስት ሚኒስቴር መስሪያ ቤቶችና ኤጀንሲዎች ይተዲዯሩ ነበር፡፡ የግለን ዘርፍ እንቅስቃሴ ሇማዲከም ሲሌ ዘመናዊ ኢንተርፕራይዞችን ከመውረስ በተጨማሪ በላልቹም የኢኮኖሚ እንቅስቃሴዎች ሊይ አገዛዙ ጥብቅ የቁጥጥር ስርዓት ዘርግቶ ነበር፡፡ ከነዚህ የቁጥጥር ስሌቶች አንዲንድቹ፤
የሰዎች እንቅስቃሴንና የሸቀጥ
ዝውውርን/ የሚገታ የይሇፍ ፈቃዴ ግዳታና በዋና ዋና መተሊሇፊያ መንገድችና በሮች ሊይ የተቋቋሙ አያላ የቁጥጥር ኬሊዎች፤
ከሌካይ የታሪፍ ምጣኔዎች (prohibitive tariff rates)፣ ሰፊ የኮታ ጥልሽ (extensive
quota restrictions)፣ ረጃጅምና የተወሳሰቡ የንግዴና የስራ ፈቃዴ አሰጣጥ ዯንቦች፤
በእርሻው ዘርፍ የጉሌበት ቅጥርና ሽያጭን ሙለ በሙለ ማገዴ፤
አራሽ ቤተሰቦች ከገበያ በታች በሆነና በተቆረጠ ዋጋ የግብርና ምርቶችን ሇመንግስት እንዱያሰረክቡ የሚያስገዴዴ ቋሚ የሰብሌ አቅርቦት ኮታ፤ እና
የፋብሪካ ምርቶችና ሸቀጦች የራሽን እዯሊ፤ ናቸው፡፡
እነዚህና ላልቹ የዯርግ የቁጥጥር ስርዓቶች የዜጎችን ሰብአዊ መብቶች በእጅጉ ከመገዯባቸውና ከህጋዊ
Economic Focus
L±n a^×Ñì@KS
x!÷ñ EÃêE xStÄdR yx!T×eà L¥T
Vol. 6 No. 3 / January 2004 8 Ethiopian Economic Association
የኢኮኖሚ እንቅስቃሴዎች የሚገኙ ጥቅሞችንና ገቢዎችን ከማፈናቸውም በሊይ፣ ተገቢነት ሇላሊቸው ከፍተኛ አስተዲዯራዊ ወጭዎች፣ ሇሙስና በእጅጉ መስፋፋትና ሇህገወጥ የሸቀጦች ስርገትም (smuggling) መንስዔ ሆነዋሌ፡፡ የእዲው ተሸካሚ የሆነው ህብረተሰባችንም ሇቀሰስተኛ እዴገትና፣ እየከፋ ሇሚሄዴ ዴህነት ተዲርጓሌ፡፡ የኢኮኖሚ ሞዳልች፤ የአስሩ ዓመት መሪ እቅዴ የተከተሇው የኢኮኖሚ ሞዳሌ የዘመኑ አገዛዝ በሚከተሇው ሶሻሉስታዊ አመሇካከት የተቃኘና አመሇካከቱ የሚያቀነቅነውን የተማከሇ የውሳኔ አሰጣጥንና የሀብት ምንጭ ቁጥጥር (resource control) የሚያንጸባርቅ ነበር፡፡ የግለን ዘርፍና የግሌ ሀብት እንዯ ብዝበዛ መሣሪያ ተቆጥረው መዴከም እንዲሇባቸው ይታመን ነበር፡፡ ከእነዚህ መሰረታዊ ባህርያቱ በስተቀር፣ የአስሩ ዓመት መሪ እቅዴ የተመሰረተባቸው ግምቶችና እምነቶች በንጉሱ ዘመን ከነበረው ከሶስተኛው የአምስት ዓመት የኢኮኖሚ ሌማት እቅዴ ጋር በእጅጉ ተመሳሳይ ናቸው፡፡ ከእነዚህ አመሇካከቶችና እምነቶች መካከሌም፡-
1. ሇብሄራዊ ምርትና የስራ ኃይሌ
ስምሪት ከፍተኛ ዴርሻ የሚያበረክተው የግብርናው ዘርፍ ቅዴሚያ ሉሰጠው ይገባሌ፤
2. የኢንደስትሪ እዴገት ሇሀገር ሌማት ወሳኝ በመሆኑ፣ በተሇይ ከውጭ የሚገቡ ምርቶችን በአገር ውስጥ ምርቶች በመተካት ስሌት መበረታታትና መስፋፋት ይኖርበታሌ፤ የሚለት ይገኙበታሌ፡፡
በአገዛዙ የመጨረሻ ዘመናት የኢትዮጵያ ኢኮኖሚ የነበረበት የዯቀቀ/ የኮሰመነ ይዞታ በራሱ በቂ ምስክር ስሇሚሆን የዯርግን የኢኮኖሚ አስተዲዯር ባህርያት ሇመኮነን ብዙ ማስረጃዎችን መዯርዯር አስፈሊጊ አይመስሇኝም፡፡ የዯርግ አገዛዝ ከተከተሇው መጥፎ ሌማዴና መንፈስ አሁንም ገና ሙለ ሇሙለ አሌተሊቀቅንም፡፡ ኢትዮጵያውያን የታሪካችን አንዴ ምዕራፍ ከሆነው ከዚያ ክፉ ዘመን ሌንማራቸው የሚገቡን አያላ ጠቃሚ ሌምድችና ትምህርቶች ይኖራለ፡፡ ከእነዚህ ውስጥ ዛሬ ሇያዝኩት ጭብጥ እጅግ ሁነኛ ናቸው ብዬ የማስባቸው ሁሇቱ፣ ግሇሰቦችን የማበረታታትና
የማትጋት ባህርይ የላሊቸው የኢኮኖሚ ፖሉሲዎች ዘሊቂነት ያሊቸው የኢኮኖሚ መሻሻልችን ሉያስገኙ እንዯማይችለ፤ እና፣
የተማከሇ ቁጥጥርና ጫና (repression) የማያዛሌቅና ውል አዴሮ መውዯቁ/መወገደ እንዯማይቀር፤
መዘከር እወዲሇሁ፡፡ እነዚህን አይነት ባህርያት ያሎቸው ፖሉሲዎች፣ ማንኛውንም ህብረተሰብና አባሊቶቹን የሚያዲክሙና የሚዯቁሱ መሆናቸውን በእርግጠኝነት መናገር ይቻሊሌ፡፡ በእኛ አገር ሁኔታ ዯግሞ እነዚህን መሰልቹ ፖሉሲዎችና ጨካኝ የፖሇቲካ ጭቆናዎች በአስከፊ የኢኮኖሚ ዴቀትና የእርስ በእርስ ግጭቶች ያዲከሩን አዯገኛ መንገድች ነበሩ፡፡ እነዚህ ፖሉሲዎች በመጨረሻም በ1991 ዓ.ም ሇዯርግ ስርዓት መንኮታኮትና ሇኢትዮጵያ ህዝቦች ዳሞክራሲያዊ ግንባር (ኢህአዳግ) ወዯ ፖሇቲካ ስሌጣን መምጣት ምክንያት ሆነዋሌ፡፡
ከ1992 ወዱህ የኢህአዳግ መንግስት የመዋቅር ማስተካከያ መርሃ ግብር (structural adjustment program) በማውጣት ኢኮኖሚውን በገበያ ስርዓት መሌሶ በመቃኘት ሊይ አተኩሮ ቆይቷሌ፡፡ በዚህም ምክንያት መንግስት በኢኮኖሚው ውስጥ የነበረው ቀጥተኛ ተሳትፎ እየቀነሰ መጥቷሌ፡፡ ከዚህም በተጨማሪ፣ የታሪፍ ተመን ተቀንሷሌ፤ የፈቃዴ አሰጣጥ ዯንቦች ቀሇሌና ፈጣን ብሇዋሌ፤ የውጭ ምንዛሬ ቁጥጥር ሊሌቷሌ፤ የህብረት ሥራ ማህበር አባሌነትና የሰብሌ አቅርቦት ግዳታዎች ተቋርጠዋሌ፤ በላሊ በኩሌ ዯግሞ የግሌ ይዞታ
ማስፋፋት (privatisation) ተጀምሮአሌ፤ የግሌ ባንኮች ህጋዊነት አግኝተዋሌ፤ የወሇዴ ምጣኔ ተመን ቁጥጥር ተነስቷሌ፤ እንዱሁም የባንክ-ሇባንክ የገንዘብ ግብይት ተጀምሯሌ፡፡ ኢህአዳግ በስሌጣን ሊይ ከቆየባቸው የመጀመሪያዎቹ አመታት ውስጥ እነዚህ የማሻሻያ እርምጃዎችና እንዱሁም በነበረው ሰሊምና መሌካም የአየር ሁኔታ በአብዛኞቹ ዓመታት ፈጣን አማካይ እዴገት የነበረው የኢኮኖሚ ማገገም
(economic recovery) ታይቶ ነበር፡፡ በቅርቡ ግን በጦርነት፣ በዴርቅና በአሇም አቀፍ የቡና ዋጋ ውዴቀት ምክንያት የኢኮኖሚው እዴገት እንዯገና ቀሰስተኛ መሆን ጀምሮአሌ (እንዱሁም የጠቅሊሊ ብሄራዊ ምርት በ2002/2003 የበጀት አመት ቀንሷሌ)፡፡ በተጨማሪ በበኩላ እስካሁን የተዯረጉት የኢኮኖሚ ማሻሻያዎች በኢኮኖሚው አቅም ሊይ ሉያመጡ የሚችለት ማገገም ተሟጧሌ የሚሌ እምነት አሇኝ9፡፡ 9 See Easterly (2002) for some evidence on
the growth impact of policy reforms and the
limits thereof.
Economic Focus
L±n a^×Ñì@KS
x!÷ñ EÃêE xStÄdR yx!T×eà L¥T
Vol. 6 No. 3 / January 2004 9 Ethiopian Economic Association
መንግስት በትናንሽ እርሻዎች ምርታማነት እዴገትና የሰው ጉሌበትን በብዛት በሚጠቀም ኢንደስትሪ ሊይ የሚያተኩር ግብርና-መር የኢንደስትሪ ሌማት ስትራቴጅን ዏቢይ የሌማት መርሃ ግብሩ አዴርጎም ተቀብልአሌ ፡፡ የግብርና ምርታማነትን ሇማሳዯግ እንዯ ዋና ዘዳ የተመረጠው የኤክስቴንሽን መርሃ ግብርም በስፋት በተግባር ሊይ እየዋሇ ነው፡፡ የኢህአዳግ መንግስት እስከ ቅርብ ጊዜ ዴረስ ከቀዲሚዎቹ አገዛዞች የሚሇይበት አንዴ ባህርይ እቅዴን እንዯ ኢኮኖሚ ፖሉሲ መንዯፊያና መተግበሪያ ዋንኛ ብሌሀት የመገሌገሌን ሌማዴ መተው ነበር፡፡ ይሁን እንጂ ከ2002 ጀምሮ የኢትዮጵያ መንግስት ዴህነት ቅነሳን ዋና ግቡ ያዯረገ፣ የዘሊቂ ሌማትና የዴህነት ቅነሳ መርሃ ግብር (Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program) በመባሌ የሚታወቅ የሌማት ስትራቴጅ ይፋ አዴርጓሌ፡፡ ፕሮግራሙ የኢትጵያን ኢኮኖሚያዊ ችግሮች በዝርዝር የሚገሌጽና መፍትሄዎችን የሚያመሊክት ሰነዴ ነው፡፡ ዋና ዋና ዓሊማዎቹም በሚከተሇው አንቀጽ ውስጥ በተጠቀሱት ነጥቦች ይካተታለ፤
የኢትዮጵያ የሌማት ስትራቴጅ በገጠር ሌማት፣ በቁሳዊና ሰብአዊ ካፒታሌ መሻሻሌ፣ እንዱሁም የህዝቡን አቅም ሇማጎሌበትና የሰዎችን የኑሮ አማራጮች ሇማስፋፋት ስሌጣንን ወዯህዝብ በማውረዴ በሚያስችለ ተግባራት ሊይ በማተኮር ፈጣን፣ ሰፊ መሰረት ያሇውና ፍትሃዊ
ሌማትን መሻት ይኖርበታሌ [ከእንግሉዝኛው ቅጅ የተተረጎመ] ፡፡
ይህንን መርሃ ግብር መሰረት በማዴረግ፣ መንግስት በቅርቡ የበጀት አስተዲዯር ስርዓትን ያሌተማከሇ አዴርጓሌ፤ የፍትህ ስርዓትና የሲቪሌ ሰርቪስ ማሻሻያና እንዱሁም የአቅም ግንባታ መርሃ ግብሮችን እያካሄዯ ይገኛሌ፡፡ እነዚህ መርሃ ግብሮች መሌካም የተቋማዊ ግንባታ ጅምሮች ሲሆኑ ስሇአስገኟቸው ውጤቶች አስተያየት ሇመስጠት ጊዜው ገና ነው፡፡ ያም ሆነ ይህ የመርሃ ግብሮቹ ስኬት ትክክሇኛዎቹን ማትጊያዎች (right incentives) በመስጠት በኢኮኖሚው ውስጥ ሁነኛ ሚና ያሊቸው ክፍልችን እምነትና ተግባራት ሇማስሇወጥ በመቻሌ ወይንም አሇመቻሊቸው ሊይ የሚመሰረት ይሆናሌ፡፡
የኢትዮጵያ ኢኮኖሚ ይዞታ ከፍ ብዬ ያነሳኋቸው ሀሳቦች የኢትዮጵያ ህብረተሰብ ባሇፉት 40 ዓመታት በሌዩ ሌዩ የኢኮኖሚ አስተዲዯር ስሌቶች ውስጥ እንዲሇፈ ያመሇክታለ፡፡ የምግብ ጣዕም የሚታወቀው ሲቀመስ ነው እንዯሚባሇው ብሂሌ፣ ቁምነገሩ እነዚህ የተሇያዩ የኢኮኖሚ አስተዲዯር ፖሉሲዎች የህዝቡን ህይወት ምን ያህሌ አሻሽሇዋሌ፣ ሇውጠዋሌ ነው፡፡ ባሇፉት 40 ዓመታት የኢትዮጵያ ሰዎች አኗኗርና ዯህንነት ከዚያ ቀዯም ሲሌ ከነበረው ዘመን ምን ያህሌ ተሻሽሎሌ? በታዩ መሻሻልች እንጀምር፡፡ በነዚህ ዘመናት ውስጥ በትምህርትና በጤና ረገዴ የማይናቁ መሻሻልች
ተዯርገዋሌ፤ እየተዯረጉም ነው፡፡ በአንጻሩ ዯግሞ በነዚሁ ዘመናት የህዝቡ የምግብ ዋስትናና የስርዓተ ምግብ (nutrition) ዯረጃ በእጅጉ አሽቆሌቁሎሌ፡፡ ባሇፉት አራት አስርታት የነፍስ ወከፍ የሰራተኛ ምርት ውጤት (output per worker) የነበረበትን ዯረጃ መመሌከት ምናሌባት ሁኔታውን በተሻሇ መሌክ ሉያስረዲ ይችሊሌ፡፡ በተጠቀሰው ዘመን ነፍስ ወከፍ የሰራተኛ ምርት ውጤት ሁኔታ በኢትዮጵያ በሚከተሇው ሰንጠረዥ የተመሇከተውን ይመስሊሌ፡፡
Economic Focus
L±n a^×Ñì@KS
x!÷ñ EÃêE xStÄdR yx!T×eà L¥T
Vol. 6 No. 3 / January 2004 10 Ethiopian Economic Association
በነፍስ ወከፍ የሰራተኛ ምርት ውጤት
የነፍስ ወከፍ ምርት ዋጋ ምጣኔ በድሊር የዕዴገት ምጣኔ
1961-1970 1212.8 1.59%
1971-1980 1360.3 0.84%
1981-1990 1341.1 -0.65%
1991-2000 1246.7 1.18%
1994-2000 1300.6 3.47%
1961-2000 0.74%
ከሰንጠረዡ በግሌጽ እንዯሚታየው ባሇፉት ዘመናት ምርታማነትን በማሳዯግና ዯህንነታችንን በማሻሻሌ ያዯረግነው ርምጃ በጣም ትንሽ ነው፡፡ ይህንን ውዴቀታችንንም በሚከተለት እውነታዎች ማረጋገጥ ይቻሊሌ፤ ሀ. በዝናብ መገብና
በሌማዲዊ/ጥንታዊ ቴክኖልጂ ሊይ በተመሰረተ ግብርና ሊይ መመርኮዝ፤
ሇ. ዝቅተኛ የሰው ኃይሌ ሌማት፤
ሏ. ዝቅተኛ የካፒታሌ ክምችት (በ2000 ዓም በተዯረገ ቅኝት ከአፍሪካ በመጨረሻ ዯረጃ ሊይ የሚገኝ በነፍስ ወከፍ ሰራተኛ ዝቅተኛ የካፒታሌ ክምችት (stock capital per worker)፤
መ. መሻሻልች ቢታዩበትም ገና ከበቂ ዯረጃ ያሌዯረሰና ያሌዲበረ የመሰረተ ሌማት፤
ሠ. ሲቪሌ ሰርቪስንና የፍትህ ስርዓት ጨምሮ ዯካማ ተቋማት (ሇምሳላ የቢሮክራሲው የጥራት ዯረጃ ሲገመገም ከከፍተኛ የአራት ነጥብ ውጤት ብቻ ነው ያገኘው)፤ ሙስና እንዱሁም የባሇንብረትነት መብቶች አሇመከበር
አንዴምታዎች ከፍ ብየ የዘረዘርኩዋቸው ማስረጃዎች ኢትዮጵያውያን እንዯ ህብረተሰብ እስካሁን ዴረስ ዘሊቂ እዴገትና ሌማት ሊይ ሇመዴረስ ሳንችሌ መቆየታችንን ያስረግጣለ፡፡ ይህም፣ ትክክሇኛውን የኢንቨስትመንት ዯረጃና አቅጣጫ ያሇመከተሊችንና፣ በዚህም ምክንያት፣ ሇፈጣን የኢኮኖሚ እዴገት ተስማሚ የሆኑ የኢኮኖሚ ሌማት ተቋማት ሇመመሰረት ያሌቻሌን መሆናችንን ያመሇክታሌ፡፡ ውዴቀታችን ከአያላ ምክንያቶች ጋር የተያያዘ ሉሆን ይችሊሌ፡፡ በአንዴ ወይም በላልች ምከንያቶች የሚመጡ ነውጦች (shocks) (ሇምሳላ ተዯጋግመው የሚከሰቱ ዴርቆች፣ ጦርነቶች እንዱሁም አሇማቀፍ የገበያዎች ዋጋ መዋዠቅ) እና እነርሱ የሚያስከትለዋቸው የረጅም ጊዜ ችግሮች፣ እንዱሁም ከታሪካችን የሚመነጩ አያላ መሰረታዊ ችግሮች በኢኮኖሚ ሌማት ወዯኋሊ ሇመቅረታችን አስተዋጽኦ እንዲዯረጉ ይታወቃሌ፡፡ በዛሬው ንግግሬ ከእነዚህ በሚሇዩና ከኢኮኖሚ አስተዲዯር ጋር በሚያያዙ ላልች ምክንያቶች ሊይ ሊተኩር እወዲሇሁ፡፡ ይህንን የማዯርግበት ምክንያት፣ ከተጋረጡብን ሌዩ ሌዩ እንቅፋቶች መካከሌ በተሇይ እነዚህኛዎቹ
ሌንቆጣጠራቸው የምንችሌ በመሆኑና ይህንንም ካዯረግን እዴገታችንን ማፈጠን ስሇምንችሌ ነው፡፡ በዚህ መንፈስም፣ የመንግስት ፖሉሲዎች የታሇመሊቸውን ግብ ሳይመቱ ሉቀሩና ሉወዴቁ የሚችለባቸው ምክንያቶች ምን ምን እንዯሆኑ፣ እንዱሁም እነዚህን እንቅፋቶች ሇማስወገዴ ምን ማዯረግ እንዯሚኖርብን አንዲንዴ ነጥቦች አነሳሇሁ፡፡ የፖሉሲ ውጤት አሇማምጣት ምክንያቶች
ትክክሇኛነት
ፖሉሲዎች ትክክሇኛ የሚባለት፣ ህብረተሰቡ ይበጁኛሌ ብል
ከተቀበሊቸው ፍሊጎቶችና ከአገሪቱ ኢኮኖሚ አቅም ጋር ሲገናዘቡ፣
መንግስት በኢኮኖሚው ውስጥ ሉኖረው የሚገባውን ሚና የሚመጥኑ፣ እንዱሁም፣
ከኢኮኖሚውና ከመንግስት አቅም ተግባራዊ ሇመሆን የሚችለ፣
ሲሆኑ ነው፡፡
Economic Focus
L±n a^×Ñì@KS
x!÷ñ EÃêE xStÄdR yx!T×eà L¥T
Vol. 6 No. 3 / January 2004 11 Ethiopian Economic Association
እነዚህን የትክክሇኛነት መሇኪያ እንዳት ማሟሊት ይቻሊሌ፤ መጀመሪያ መንግስት የሚመረጥባቸው የፖሇቲካ ሂዯቶች ዱሞክራሲያዊና የአብዛኛውን ህዝብ ትክክሇኛ ፍሊጎት የሚያንጸባርቁ ሉሆኑ ይገባሌ፡፡ በሁሇተኛ ዯረጃም ስሇህዝቡ ፍሊጎት፣ ስሇኢኮኖሚው አቅምና ሉያጋጥሙ ስሇሚችለ እንቅፋቶች፣ እንዱሁም ስሇ መንግስት አቅም በምርምር ሊይ የተመሰረተና ቀጣይነት ያሇው እውቀት ሉኖር ይገባሌ፡፡ ሶስተኛም፣ በዚህ እውቀት ሊይ ተመስርቶ ቅዴሚያ ሉሰጣቸው በሚገቡ ጉዲዮች ዙሪያ ውይይቶችን አካሂድ ስምምነት ሊይ መዴረስ አስፈሊጊ ነው፡፡ ሀሳቤን የሚያሰረግጥሌኝ አንዴ ምሳላ ሊምጣ፡፡ ብዙ ጊዜ የመንግስት ባሇስሌጣናት፣ ‹‹ፖሉሲው ጥሩ ነበር፣ አተገባበሩ ነው መጥፎ››፣ ሲለ ይሰማለ፡፡ ዲሩ ግን፣ የፖሉሲ አቀራረጽንና የፖሉሲ አተገባበርን ነጣጥል መመሌከት ብዙ ጊዜ ከተሳሳተ አስተሳሰብ የሚመነጭ ነው፡፡ አንዴ ፖሉሲ ጥሩና ተፈጻሚነት ያሇው (feasible) ፖሉሲ እንዱሆን ነው ከተባሇ፣ በኢኮኖሚው ውስጥ ሁነኛ ዴርሻ ያሊቸው ቡዴኖች ፖሉሲውን ተመርኩዘው ስሇሚወሰደት እርምጃዎች (responses)፣ እንዱሁም ስሇላልች ወሳኝ ጉዲዮችና ሁኔታዎች ባሌተጋነኑና ምክንያታዊነት ባሊቸው ግምቶች ሊይ ተመስርቶ የተነዯፈ ሉሆን ይገባዋሌ፡፡ ስሇዚህም፣ ‹የፖሉሲ አተገባበር እንቅፋቶች መመንጨት ያሇባቸው አስቀዴሞ ባሌታወቁና ይዯርሳለ ተብሇው ባሌተገመቱ ውጫዊ ቀውሶች (unanticipated exogenous shocks) ምክንያት
መሆን አሇበት፡፡› የአተገባበር ችግሮች ከበዙና ተዯጋጋሚ ከሆኑ ግን የፖሉሲውን ተገቢነትና አስተማማኝነት በተመሇከተ ያለንን ግምቶች ዯግመን መፈተሸ ብሌህነት ነው፡፡ ስሇህብረተሰባችን ታሪክና ስሇ ኢኮኖሚያችን አሰራር ያሇን እውቀት ውሱንነት ሇብዙ ፖሉሲዎች አሇመሳካት አንደ ምክንያት መሆኑን መገንዘብ ያሻሌ፡፡ ከዚህም በተጨማሪ ያሇን ጥቂት እውቀትም፣ በወጉ ያሌተዯራጀና ያሌተሰነዯ በመሆኑ በአስፈሇገ ጊዜ እንዯ ሌብ ስሇማይገኝ በአግባቡ ሌንጠቀምበት አሇመቻሊችንም የችግሩ አንዴ ላሊ ገጽታ ነው፡፡
አመኔታ አመኔታ የሚጣሌባቸው ፖሉሲዎች ምክንያታዊና የሚሄደበት አቅጣጫ የሚገመት፣ እንዱሁም እርስ በእርሳቸው የተጣጣሙና የተቀናጁ ናቸው፡፡
yxmn@¬ CGR y¸mn=W
ymNG|T m\r¬êE tf_é
kçnW ”LN lm-bQ xlmÒL
ÆHRY nW፡፡ mNG|T
÷NT‰èCN y¸ÃSf{M êN¾
xµL nW፡፡ Slz!HM፣ ?UêE
g#LbT ym-qM äñ±l! §Y
tmSRè bGlsïC wYM
bDRJèC mµkL ytgrss#
HUêE SMMnèC XNÄ!kb„
ÃSgDÄL፡፡ HG xSkƶnT
|‰W yçnWN YHNN xµL HG
XNÄ!ÃkBR y¸ÃSgDdW l@§
xµL GN ylM፡፡ Slz!HM'
mNG|T ”Lk!ÄN mS-TM
xYCLM፡፡ qdM BlW yts-#
”L k!ÄñCM tGƉêE úYçn#
l!q„ YC§l#፡፡ bz!HM MKNÃT
mNG|T y±l!s! Wún@ãCN
‰s#M b!çN lmqLbS y¥YCL
mçn#N bx!÷ñ¸W WS_ h#n¾
DRš çcWN KFlÖC ¥úmN
YñRb¬L፡፡
አንድ ህብረተሰብ መንግስት በሻው ጊዜ ተነስቶ ያሻውን ማዴረግ እንዯማይችሌና ተጠያቂነት እንዲሇበት ማረጋገጫ መንገድችን መንዯፍ ያስፈሌገዋሌ፡፡ ይህን ከመሰለት ማረጋገጫዎች መካከሌ የሥሌጣን ክፍፍሌንና ገዯብን (checks and balances) የሚዯነግጉ ህገ-መንግስታዊ አንቀጾች ጥሩ ምሳላዎች ናቸው፡፡ የጠንካራ ሲቪሌ ማህበረሰብ ማበብ በመንግሥት ሊይ ተጨማሪ ገዯብ የሚያበጅና በዚያም ምክንያት የአመኔታ ችግርን የሚቀንስ ላሊው መንገዴ ነው፡፡ እነዚህ ተቋማት፣ መንግስት ፖሉሲዎችን እንዲይቀሇብስና በፖሉሲ ቅሌበሳ ሉከሰቱ የሚችለ ችግሮች እንዲይኖሩ ይረዲለ፡፡ መሌካም ስም ማግኘትም ላሊው መንግስት የህዝቡን ዘሊቂ አመኔታ እንዱያገኝ የሚረዲ ዘዳ ነው፡፡ በሌዩ ሌዩ ጉዲዮች ሊይ እርስ በእርስ የሚጋጩ/ተፃራሪ ፖሉሲዎች እንዲይቀረጹ መጠንቀቅና በሌዩ ሌዩ የመንግስት ክፍልች መካከሌ ውጤታማ ቅንጅት መፍጠር የህዝብን አመኔታ ሇማግኘት ላሊው ቁሌፍ ጉዲይ ነው፡፡ የሌዩ ሌዩ የፖሉሲ መስኮችና ጉዲዬች ገዯብ መወሰንና የአስፈጻሚ ክፍልችን ስሌጣንና ኃሊፊነት በግሌጽ ሇይቶ መዯንገግ በሌዩ ሌዩ የመንግስት አካሊት መካከሌ ቅንጅት ሇመፍጠር በጣም ጠቃሚ ስሌት ነው፡፡
በፖሉሲ አቀራረጽ ሂዯት ውስጥ ሚስጥር ማብዛት ወይም ግሌጽ አሇመሆን የተአማኒነትን ችግር ያባብሳሌ፡፡ ሚስጥራዊነት አሇመተማመንን በመፍጠር በፖሉሲ ጉዲዮች ሊይ የጋራ ስምምነት ሇመመስረት የሚዯረጉ ጥረቶችን ሂዯት ይገዴባሌ፡፡ የሀሳብ ሌዩነቶችን በማስፋት፣ አሸናፊውና
Economic Focus
L±n a^×Ñì@KS
x!÷ñ EÃêE xStÄdR yx!T×eà L¥T
Vol. 6 No. 3 / January 2004 12 Ethiopian Economic Association
ተሸናፊው ወገኖች መካከሌ መራራቅ/መቃቃር እንዱፈጠር ያዯርጋሌ፡፡ በተጨማሪም፣ የመረጃ እጥረት ያስከትሊሌ፡፡ የትክክሇኛና ወቅታዊ መረጃዎች እንዯሌብ አሇመገኘት ዯግሞ አዴሎዊና ከእውነት የራቁ መረጃዎች በፍጥነት እንዱሰራጩ፣ ሃሜትና አለባሌታ እንዱስፋፋ ያዯርጋሌ፡፡ ግሌጽነትና የጋራ ስምምነት አመኔታ የማጣትን ስጋትና አዯጋ ይቀንሳለ፡፡ በጋራ ስምምነት (consensus) ሊይ የተመሠረተ የፖሉሲ ቀረጻ ሂዯት አያላ ጠቀሜታዎች አለት፡፡ ከሁለ በፊት፣ ዱሞክራሲያዊና ግሌጽ በሆነ መንገዴ ስምምነት ሊይ መዴረስ በራሱ እንዯ አንዴ ውጤት ይቆጠራሌ፡፡ ሁሇተኛም፣ የሁለም ወገኖች ከስምምነት ሊይ መዴረስ፣ በባሊንጣነት ስሜት ከሚካሄደ እሰጥ አገባዎችና አሸናፊ ሆኖ ሇመውጣት ከሚዯረጉ ሙግቶች ይሌቅ የተሻለና ጥራት ያሊቸው ፖሉሲዎችን ሇመቅረፅ የሚረደ ግሌጽና ጠቃሚ ውይይቶች እንዱኖሩ ያበረታታሌ፡፡ በሶስተኛ ዯረጃም፣ ከቅን ሌቦና፣ ከብሌሀትና ከእውቀት ከመነጨና እንዯ ባህሌ ከተቆጠረ የጋራ ስምምነት የሁለንም ወገኖች የጋራ እምነትና ጥቅም ያሰከብራሌ፡፡ በአራተኛ ዯረጃ፣ እነዚህን መሰልቹ ውይይቶች ስሇህዝቡ ፍሊጎቶች፤ ምኞቶች፤ ስጋቶችና እዯርስበቶች (expectations) መረጃ መሰብሰቢያ ዘዳዎች ስሇሚሆኑ መንግስት ፖሉሲዎችን በመቅረጽና በመተግበር ሂዯት የሚያጋጥሙትን የመረጃ ችግሮች ሉያቃሌለ ይችሊለ፡፡ በአጭሩ በፖሉሲ ፓኬጆች ሊይ የጋራ ስምምነት መዴረስን ባህሌ ማዴረግ የፖሉሲዎችን ትክክሇኛነትና ተአማኒነት ያጠነክራሌ፡፡
የህዝብ አመኔታ በእጅጉ አስፈሊጊ የሚሆንበት ምክንያት በኢኮኖሚው ውስጥ የሚሳተፉ ክፍልች ፖሉሲዎች አይቀሇበሱም ብሇው እስካሊመኑ ዴረስ (በግሌጽ የሇውጥን አስፈሊጊነት እስካሊመኑ)፣ እምነታችውንና ተግባራቸውን ከፖሉሲዎች ጋር ሇማጣጣም ስሇማይጣጣሩ ነው፡፡ ‹‹ፈረስ ያዯርሳሌ እንጂ አይዋጋም›› እንዯሚባሇው ፖሉሲዎች በራሳቸው ብቻ ሇውጥ ማምጣት አይችለም፡፡ ሇምሳላ፤ መንግስት ትምህርት ቤቶችንና የጤና ተቋማትን ሉገነባ ይችሊሌ፤ ዲሩ ግን፣ ውጤት ሉገኝ የሚችሇው ወሊጆች ሌጆቻቸውን ወዯ ትምህርት ቤቶቹ ሇመሊክ ፈቃዯኞች ሲሆኑ፣ ሰዎችም በታመሙ ጊዜ እንዯ ወትሯቸው የሇመዶቸውን የፈውስ መንገድች ከመከተሌ ይሌቅ ወዯ ጤና ተቋማት ሄዯው ሇመታከም ፈቃዯኞች ሲሆኑ ብቻ ነው፡፡ እነኚህ ሇውጦች የሚመጡት ወሊጆችና ህዝቡ አዲዱሶቹ ነገሮች ሇእነርሱ መሌካም መሆናቸውን ሰሊመኑ ብቻ ሳይሆን እነዚህ አዲዱስ አገሌግልት ሰጭ ተቋማት እንዯሚያዛሌቋቸውና አገሌግልታቸው እንዯማይቋረጥ እርግጠኛ ሲሆኑ ጭምር ነው፡፡ ወዯ ኢትዮጵያ ሁኔታ ስንመጣ በበኩላ ሇአንዲንዴ ጅምር የፖሉሲ ተግባራት ህዝቡ የሚሰጠው ምሊሽ (response) መቀዝቀዝ መንስኤ በፖሉሲዎቹ ሊይ አመኔታ ማጣት ነው የሚሌ ጥርጣሬ አሇኝ፡፡ ይህንን ጥርጣሬዬን የሚያጎለ ምክንያቶቼን ሇጊዜው ሊቆያቸውና ስሇመሌካም የኢኮኖሚ አስተዲዯር ያሇኝን ርዕይ ሌዘርዝር፡፡
የእኔ ርዕይ በዚህ ህዝባዊ የውይይት መዴረክ ተገኝተው ርዕያቸውን እንዲመሇከቱን ያገሬ ሰዎች ሁለ እኔም በበኩላ በ2020 ዘመን ሰሊም የሰፈነበት፤ የሀሳብ፣ የእምነት፣ የአመሇካከት፣ ወዘተ... ሌዩነትና እኩሌነት የነገሰባት (pluralistic) እና የበሇፀገች ኢትዮጵያን ሇማየት እናፍቃሇሁ፡፡ በዚህ አይነቱ ህብረተሰብ ሁነኛ ባህርይና መሰረት የኢኮኖሚ አስተዲዲሩ ሁኔታ ነው ብዬ ስሇማምንም ይፋ (open)፣ ከሁኔታዎች ጋር እራሱን የሚያስማማ (flexible)፣ በተጠያቂነት (accountability)፣ እና ግሌፅነት (transparency) ሊይ የተመሠረተ ፖሉሲ አቀራረፅና አተገባበር ስርአት በሀገራችን ተገንብቶ ሇማየት እመኛሇሁ፡፡ በተሇይ ዯግሞ፤ 1. የፖሉሲ ውሳኔዎችን ተገቢነት
የማያረጋግጥ ግዳታና በውሳኔዎች ውጤትም ኃሊፊነት መውሰዴ በህግ የተዯነገገበትና በሁለም ክፍሌ ሊይ የሚተገበርበት፣ ከዚያም በሊይ ባህሌ የሆነበት፤
2. የፖሉሲ ውሳኔዎችና
ምክንያቶቻቸው ከነሱም ጋር የተያያዘው የተጠያቂነት ሥርዓት ሇህዝብ ግሌጽ የሆኑበት እንዱሁም ከፖሉሲ ጋር አግባብነት ያሊቸውንና ላልች መረጃዎች ህዝቡ እንዯሌብ በተሟሊና ወቅቱን በጠበቀ ሁኔታ የሚገኙበት፤
3. ሁለም ተጠቃሚ ወገኖች (Stakeholders) በሌዩ ሌዩ መሌኮች የሚሳተፉበት ፖሉሲ ከመቀረጹ አስቀዴሞና ተቀርጾ ከወጣ በኋሊ የሚዯረግ ምክንያታዊና ገንቢ ውይይትና፣ ከተሇያዩ ወገኖች የሚመጡ አስተያየቶችን
Economic Focus
L±n a^×Ñì@KS
x!÷ñ EÃêE xStÄdR yx!T×eà L¥T
Vol. 6 No. 3 / January 2004 13 Ethiopian Economic Association
ሇመቀበሌ ዝግጁነት፣ መዯበኛነትና ቀጣይነት ያሇው የውይይት መዴረክ በቋሚነት የሚከፈትበት ፤
4. ኢኮኖሚያዊ እውቀትና ምርምር ሞገስ የሚያገኙበት፣ በተቀሊጠፈ ሁኔታ በተግባር ሊይ የሚውለበትና በየጊዜው በሚዯረግ በቂ ኢንቨስትመንት እየተዯገፉ የሚዲብሩበት ስርዓት፤ እና
5. አዯገኛ የኢኮኖሚ ነውጦችን በአግባቡ ሇመቋቋም የሚያስችሌ የቅዴመ ማስጠንቀቂያ አቅም (pre-warning capacity) በወጉ የዲበረበት፤
ሁኔታ በኢትዮጵያ ተፈጥሮ ማየት እሻሇሁ፡፡
ምን መዯረግ አሇበት ከፍ ብዬ ያመሊከትኩትን ርዕይ ወዯ እውነታነት ሇመተርጎም በርካታ ነገሮች ያስፈሌጋለ፡፡ ከሁለም በሊይ ግን ሁሇት ጉዲዮችን ሇመሇወጥ መጣጣር ወሳኝ መሆኑን አምናሇሁ፡፡መሰረታዊ ሇውጥ ከሚያስፈሌጋቸው እነዚህ ነገሮች አንደ ኢኮኖሚያዊ ጉዲዮቻችንን የምንይዝበትና የምንመራበት መንገዴ ሲሆን፣ ላሊኛው ይህን መንገዴ በመወሰን ረገዴ ሁነኛ ሚና ያሎቸው ማህበራዊ ሌማድችና እምነቶች ናቸው፡፡ ከዚህ ቀጥዬ እነዚህን ጉዲዮች በአንጻራዊ ፋይዲቸው ዯረጃ ሳይሆን እንዯ አመጣጣቸው ሇማብራራት እሞክራሇሁ፡፡ መሇወጥ ያሇባቸው ሌማድቻችን፣ እምነቶቻችንና አመሇካከቶቻችን ፤ የግሌ ወይም የራስ ጥቅም (self-interest) በንግዴም ይሁን በመንግስት አገሌግልት፣ ወይም
በትምህርትና ምርምር ዘርፍ፣ ወይም በላልች ህጋዊ ሥራዎችና ተግባራት፣ የራስን ጥቅም መሻት ተገቢነት ባሇው መንገዴ እስከተፈጸመ ዴረስ ሉበረታታና ሉዯገፍ የሚገባው ጉዲይ መሆን አሇበት፡፡ ይህንን ጉዲይ ማንሳቴ፣ ማህበረሰባችን የላሊ ሰው ስኬት የማያስዯስተውና የሚያስከፋው መስል ስሇሚታይ ነው፡፡ ሇጊዜው ስሙን የዘነጋሁት አንዴ ጸሏፊ (ወንዴ መሆኑን ግን ርግጠኛ ነኝ)፣ የሚኖርበትንና የበቀሇበትን ህብረተሰብ፣ የገሇጸው ‹‹የእኛ ህብረተሰብ ሁሇት ነገሮችን አምርሮ ይጠሊሌ፣ ስኬትንና ውዴቀትን›› በማሇት ነበር፡፡ እኔም የእኛ ህብረተሰብ የዚህ ዓይነቱ ጥሊቻ (prejudice) የበዛበት ይመስሇኛሌ፡፡ የዚህ መሰለ ጥሊቻ የመጨረሻ ውጤት ዯካማነት ወይም ነፈዝነት የሚወዯስበት ሕብረተሰብ ነው፡፡ ይህንን ስሌ፣ ማህበራዊ ግዴየሇሽነትን (Laissez - faire) ማዴነቄና መዯገፌ አይዯሇም፡፡ የማህበራዊነትንና የጋራ ተግባራትን አስፈሊጊነት አምናሇሁ፤ ከሌክ ያሇፈ ራስ ወዲዲዴነትና ገዯብ የሇሽ የግሌ ጥቅምን መሻት በማህበረሰብ ዯህንነት ሊይ የሚያስከትሊቸውን አዯጋዎችንም እገነዘባሇሁ፡፡ አበው፣ ‹‹ዓሳውም እንዲይሞት፣ ባህሩም እንዲይዯርቅ›› እንዱለ፣ መፍትሄው ያሇው እመሀሌ ቤት ነው፡፡ ሰዎች ተገቢነት ባሇው ሁኔታ የግሌ ጥቅማቸውን ይሹ ዘንዴ የሚያዯፋፍሩ የማበረታቻ ስሌቶችን መቀየስ፣ ግሇሰቡ የማህበሩን ፍሊጎቶች ሳይጋፋ፣ ማህበሩ በፈንታው ግሇሰቡን ሳይበዴሌ፣ የግሌ ጥቅምና የወሌ ጥቅም ሳይጋጩ ጎን ሇጎን መራመዴ ይችለ ዘንዴ የሚረዲ ሚዛናዊ የፖሉሲ ስርዓት መገንባት፣ እንዱሁም ሸፍጠኞችና አጥፊዎች
የሚታረሙበትና ሇጥፋታቸው ተገቢውን ቅጣት የሚያገኙበት የፍትህ ስርዓት ማስፈን አስፈሊጊ ነው፡፡ እነዚህ ሁኔታዎች በተግባር እስካሌዋለ ዴረስ ግን እዴገትንና መሻሻሌን ማሰብ ዘበት ይመስሇኛሌ፡፡ ተግባሩ ከባዴና ውስብስብ ሉሆን እንዯሚችሌ ይታየኛሌ፣ ሆኖም ከባዴ ነውና አይቻሌም፣ ወይም ሩቅና አዴካሚ ነው ብሇን ሌንተወው አይገባንም፡፡ ሩቅ ተጓዥ የጉዞውን አስቸጋሪነት ተቀምጦ ከማሰሊሰሌ ይሌቅ፣ አስፈሊጊውን ነገር አዘጋጅቶ በጊዜ መንገዴ መግባት የተሻሇ ምርጫው እንዯሚሆን፣ እንዯዚህም ሁለ ፣ እኛም ወዯፊት ሇመራመዴ የምንችሇው፣ ችግሮቻችን ነቅሰን ሇማውጣት ስንችሌ፣ መፍትሄ ሉሆኑ የሚችለ ሌዩ ሌዩ አማራጮችን ሇይተን ማመሌከት ስንችሌና፣ በእነርሱ ሊይ ተወያይተን የተሻሇ ጥቅም የሚያሰገኙሌንን መምረጥና በተግባር ማዋሌ፣ ቀስ በቀስም ይህንን መሰለን አሰራር ሌማዴና ስርዓት ማዴረግ ስንችሌ ብቻ ነው፡፡ ስሇመንግስት ያሇን አመሇካከት
መንግስትን የማይመጠን ስሌጣን ያሇው አካሌ አዴርጎ የመውሰዴ ስር የሰዯዯ አመሇካከት በሕብረተሰባችን ውስጥ ያሇ ይመስሇኛሌ፡፡ ስሇመንግስት ከታሪካችን የወረስነው ይህ የተሳሳተ አመሇካከት፣ መንግስትን በአንዴ በኩሌ ግዙፍ በላሊ በኩሌ ዯግሞ ትንሽ እንዯሆነ በሚያገናዝብ
አተያይ መተካት ይኖርበታሌ፡፡ ከአንዴ ግሇሰብ አንጻር ሲታይ መንግስት ግዙፍ አካሌ ነው፡፡ ስሇዚህም በዚህ ግዙፍ አካሌ፣ የግሇሰቦች ሰብአዊ መብቶች
Economic Focus
L±n a^×Ñì@KS
x!÷ñ EÃêE xStÄdR yx!T×eà L¥T
Vol. 6 No. 3 / January 2004 14 Ethiopian Economic Association
እንዲይዯፈጠጡ አሁን ካሇው የበሇጠና የተጠናከረ የሰብአዊ መብቶች ማስከበሪያ ስርዓት
መዘርጋት ያስፈሌገናሌ፡፡
ሇአገራችን ከሚያስፈሌጋት የማህበረ-ኢኮኖሚያዊ መሻሻሌ አንጻር ስንመሇከተው ዯግሞ የመንግስት አቅም በጣም ትንሽ ነው፡፡ ይህንን እውነት ሇማስረገጥ የመንግስትን ዓመታዊ በጀት መመሌከት ይረዲሌ፡፡ በ2002 የበጀት ዓመት መንግስት 68 ሚሉዮን የሚገመተውን የአገራችንን ህዝብ ወቅታዊና የወዯፊት ፍሊጎቶች ሇማሟሊት ወጭ ያዯረገው ገንዘብ ከ20 ቢሉዮን ብር አይበሌጥም፡፡ ይህ የመንግስት ዓመታዊ ወጭ፣ መቶ የሚሆኑ የቤተሰቧን አባሊት ዓመታዊ የትምህርት፣ የጤና፣ እና ላልች መሰረታዊ የዯህንነት ፍሊጎቶች ሇማሟሊት፣ እንዱሁም፣ ሇቤተሰቡ የወዯፊት ኑሮ ዋስትና አስፈሊጊ የሆኑ ኢንቨስትመንቶችን በ30000 ብር ዓመታዊ በጀት ሇማስተዲዯር ዯፋ ቀና ከምትሌ አንዱት ባተላ እማወራ ጋር ይመሳሰሊሌ፡፡ በዚህ አይነት አነስተኛ በጀት በሚተዲዯር ቤተሰብና አገር
ውስጥ ዯግሞ የብዙ ሰዎች ፍሊጎቶች እንዯማይሟለ የታወቀ ነው፡፡ የእኛን ዓይነት የዴህነት ኢኮኖሚ ማስተዲዯር እጅግ አስቸጋሪ ነው፡፡ የአገርን ኢኮኖሚ ማስተዲዯር ቀርቶ፣ ብዙዎቻችን የየቤታችንን ጣጣ ሇመሸፈን ምን ያክሌ ውጣውረዴ እንዲሇብን የምናውቀው ነው፡፡ይህንን ስሌ፣ በመንግስት በኩሌ ሉከሰት የሚችሇውን ንዝህሊሌነት፣ አባካኝነት ወይም ላልች ኢ—ምግባራዊ ተግባራትን ይቅር ማሇት ተገቢ ነው ማሇቴ አይዯሇም፡፡ አጠንክሬ ሇመግሇጽ
የፈሇግሁት፣ ስሇመንግስት ኢኮኖሚያዊ አቅም ያለንን የተጋነኑና የተሳሳቱ ግንዛቤዎችን ማስተካከሌ እንዯሚያስፈሌግ ነው፡፡ ይህ ማሳሰቢያም ሇፖሉሲ ቀራጮች የሚከተለት አንዴምታዎች አለት፤ ፖሉሲ አዉጪዎች፣ በምርጫ ወይም በሹመት ህብረተሰቡ ውክሌናና ስሌጣን የሰጣቸው፣ የስሌጣን ውክሌና ዘመናቸው የተወሰነና ጊዚያዊ መሆኑንና፣ በተሇይም እነርሱም እንዯማንኛውም ሰው የሚሳሳቱ መሆናቸውን ሉገነዘቡ ይገባቸዋሌ፡፡ እነዚህ እምነቶች በህብረተሰባችን ውስጥ ገና ስር ያሌሰዯደ መሆናቸውን ታሪካችን ያሳያሌ፡፡ ከዚህም በተጨማሪ በሚቀርጿቸው ፖሉሲዎች ውሱን አቅም (limitations)
ምክንያት ህብረተሰባችን ያሇበትን የኑሮ ሁኔታ በፍጥነት ሇመሇወጥ ፖሉሲዎች ብቻ በቂ እንዲሌሆኑ ሉገነዘቡ ይገባሌ፡፡ ይህንንም በራሳቸው አንዯበት ሇህዝቡ በይፋ ሇመግሇጽ ፈቃዯኞች መሆን ይኖርባቸዋሌ፡፡ ይህንንም ማዴረጋቸው፣ ከሁለ በሊይ፣ መንግስትና የመንግስት ፖሉሲዎች ፍጹምና እንከን የሇሽ ናቸው ወይም መንግስት ሁሌጊዜ ትክክሌ ነው የሚሇው ስር የሰዯዯዯና የቆየ እምነት ስህተት እንዯሆነ ማህበረሰባችን እንዱገነዘብ ይረዲሌ፤ በመንግስት ተግባራትና ፖሉሲዎች ሊይ ሰዎች አስተያየት እንዲይሰጡና የተሰማቸውን እንዲይገሌጡ ሇጉሞ የሚይዛቸውን ፍርሃትም ያሰወግዲሌ፡፡ ፖሉሲ አውጭዎች፣ ፖሉሲዎች ውጤታማ የሚሆኑት የዜጎችን አመኔታና ዴጋፍ ሲያገኙ ብቻ መሆኑንም ማመን ይኖርባቸዋሌ፡፡
ስሇመንግስት ያለን አመሇካከቶችና እምነቶች መሇወጥ ሇዜጎች ያሇው አንዴምታ ምንዴነው?
ዜጎች የመንግስትን አቅም ውሱንነት በመገንዘብ የግሊችንንና የማህበረሰባችንን የኑሮ ዯህንነት በማረጋገጥ ረገዴ የሚኖሩንን ሚናዎች በአግባቡ መፈጸም ይኖርብናሌ፡፡ ሚናችንንና ተግባራችንን በአግባቡ ሌንወጣ እስካሌቻሌን ዴረስም ሁኔታዎች ሉሻሻለ እንዯማይችለ አምነን መቀበሌ ይኖርብናሌ፡፡ ከዜጎች ከሚጠበቁ ነገሮች መካከሌ፣ ታክስ መክፈሌ፣ በፖሉሲ ጉዲዮች ሊይ ገንቢ ውይይቶችን ማካሄዴ፣ ስራችንንና ኃሊፊነትን በቅንነትና በታታሪነት መወጣት፣ እንዱሁም የፖሉሲ አውጭዎች ኃሊፊነትና ተግባር አስቸጋሪ፣ አዴካሚና ፈታኝ መሆኑን መገንዘብ፣ ጥቂቶቹ ናቸው፡፡
ኃሊፊነትን መውሰዴ
አንዲንዳ፣ ኢትዮጵያውያን እንዯ ማህበር ክፉ የስሞተኛነት ባህሌ (blame culture) በእጅጉ የተጠናወተን መስል ይሰማኛሌ (ምናሌባትም ከዚህ በፊት ላልች ሰዎች ተናግረውት ሉሆን ይችሊሌ)፡፡ ብዙ ጊዜ ሇችግሮቻችን ላልች ወገኖችን ተወቃሽና ኃሊፊ እናዯርጋሇን፡፡ በሌማት ወዯ ኋሊ ሇመቅረታችን፣ ህብረተሰቡንና ባህሊችን በጅምሊ፣ ወይም የዘመኑን የአየር ሁኔታ፣ ወይም መንግስትን፣ አሇቆቻችንንና የተሳሳቱ ፖሉሲዎችን፣ ወይም ‹ስግብግብ ነጋዳዎችን›፣ ወይም ‹አርቀው የማያስቡ ገበሬዎች›ን፣ ወይም ግልባሊይዜሽንን ተጠያቂ አዴርገን እናቀርባሇን፡፡ መቼም ቢሆን፣ ሇመጣው ጥፋት ወይም ሇሆነው ነገር ‹እኔ› ኃሊፊነኝ ወይም
Economic Focus
L±n a^×Ñì@KS
x!÷ñ EÃêE xStÄdR yx!T×eà L¥T
Vol. 6 No. 3 / January 2004 15 Ethiopian Economic Association
‹እኛ› ኃሊፊ ነን ስንሌ አንሰማም፡፡ ከፍ ብዬ ከዘረዘርኳቸው መካከሌ ብዙዎቹ የችግር መንስዔ አይዯለም ወይም በእዴገትና በሌማት ተግባራት ሊይ አለታዊ ተጽእኖዎች አያሳዴሩም ማሇቴ አይዯሇም፡፡ እየተቃወምኩ ያሇሁት፣ ሇችግሮቻችን አፋጣኝና ዘሊቂ መፍትሄዎች እንዲንፈሌግ እንቅፋት ሲሆነን የኖረውንና አሁንም እየሆነን ያሇውን ኃሊፊነትንና ተጠያቂነትን ወዯ ላልች የመግፋት ሌምዲችንን ነው፡፡ ይህ ሌማዴ በሚያሰገርም ሁኔታ የተስፋፋና ስር የሰዯዯ ነው፡፡ ከተራ ቤተሰባዊ ህይወት እስከ ታሊሊቅ ህዝባዊ ውይይቶችና ምክክሮች ‹‹ላልች›› ሲወገዙ መስማት የተሇመዯ ነው፡፡ ከግሌ ኑሮዬ አንዲንዴ ምሳላዎችን መናገር ቢፈቀዴሌኝ፣ እኛ ቤት አንዴ ጥፋት የሚባሌ ነገር ከተፈጸመ፣ እንበሌ፣ ከመጻህፍቶቼ አንደን ከሚቀመጥበት ቦታ ፈሌጌ ባጣው፣ እኔ ነኝ ያነሳሁት የሚሌ ባሇመኖሩ፣ ጥፋተኛውን ማወቅ በእጅጉ አስቸጋሪ ነው፡፡ እያንዲንደ ሰው ሲጠየቅ ‹‹እኔ የሇሁበትም›› ሇማሇት ይፈጥናሌ፡፡ ሁኔታው ከተረጋጋና መጽሃፉ የተፈሇገበት ጊዜ ካሇፈ በኋሊ ግን አንደ ወይም ላሊው የቤተሰባችን አባሌ፣ ‹‹ኦ! ያ በቀዯም ተፈሌጎ የጠፋው መጽሃፍ ተገኝቷሌ፣ እንትኑ ውስጥ አስቀምጨው እንዯ ነበረ ረስቼ ነው፤›› ሉሌ ይችሊሌ፡፡ እነዚህን መሰልቹ ነገሮችም የእሇት ተእሇት ጨዋታ ከሆኑ ጊዜው ዋሌ አዯር ብሎሌ፡፡ ይህ ነገር የተፈጠረው እኔና ባሇቤቴ መጥፎ የቤተሰብ አስተዲዲሪዎች ስሇሆንን ነው ብዬ ሇማመን እቸገራሇሁ፡፡ የችግሩ ዋና መንስዔ ነው ብዬ የምጠረጥረው ኃሊፊነትን ወዯ ላሊ የማስተሊሇፍ፣ በላልች የማሳበብ ሌማዴ ነው፡፡
ላሊ ጠንከር ያሇ ምሳላ ሊምጣ፡፡ ጉዲይ ኖሯችሁ በሄዲችሁባቸው ስፍራዎች፣ ጉዲያችሁን ሇማሰፈጸም ማሟሊት ያለባችሁ መመሪያዎችና ህጎች ምን እንዯሆኑ፣ ወይም ስሇ መስሪያቤቱ አሰራር ያስረዶችሁ ዘንዴ የሚመሇከታቸውን ክፍልች ጠይቃችሁ ግሌጽና ቁርጥ ያሇ መሌስ ያገኛችሁባቸው አጋጣሚዎች ምን ያህሌ ትንሽ እንዯሆኑ ማስታወስ ትችሊሊችሁ፡፡ ይህ አይነቱ ሁኔታ በመንግስት መስሪያ ቤቶችም፣ በግሌ ዴርጅቶችም የተሇመዯ መሆኑ ዯግሞ ችግሩ ምን ያክሌ ስር የሰዯዯ እንዯሆነ ያሳያሌ፡፡ በሌዩ ሌዩ ምክንያቶች፣ ‹ሇምን› እና ‹እንዳት› ይዯባሇቁብናሌ፣ ወይም፣ አንዴ ነገር ሇምን ሆነ ተብሇን ስንጠየቅ መሌስ ስሇማይኖረን ቁጣ ይቀናናሌ፡፡ ኢትዮጵያውያን በወጉ የታሰበባቸውና ተሇይተው የታወቁ የህይወት ዓሊማዎች ሉኖሩን እንዱሁም የመንፈስ ዝግጁነትን ሌናዲብር ይገባናሌ፡፡ ከዚህም ጋር የኃሊፊነት ስሜትን ማጎሌበት ይኖርብናሌ፡፡ bXRG_ yMNñrW bxND
¥HbrsB (collective) WS_
Slçn k² ¥HbrsB XN-
q¥lN:: b² ¥HbrsBM kä§
¯dL XNwsÂlN¿ ngR GN
mRúT yl@lBN Ã ¥HbrsB
?Brtsb# b-Q§§M Yh#N
wYM l@§ y?BrtsB xµL
y¸ñrW bxB²¾W bWSÈCN
y¸gl[WM bXÃNÄNÄCN nW::
Slz!H ‰úCNN ClN y¥sBÂ
ymtGbR sÍ Ãl nÚnT xlN
ብü xMÂlh#:: YH nÚnT _rT
k¬klbT XÃNÄNÄCN X‰úCNN፣ bz!ÃM x¥µ"nT ¥HbrsÆCNN
ymlw_ ClÖ¬N Yf_‰L::
kz!HM GlsÆêE nÚnT፣ GlsÆêE `§ðnT YmnÅL::
አርበኝነት በበኩላ አርበኝነት አንዴን ሰው ከህብረተሰቡ ጋር በጠንካራ ስሜታዊ ትስስር የሚያቆራኝ፣ ግሇሰቡ ስሇህብረተሰቡ ባሇው አወንታዊ እምነት የሚወከሌና ሇዜጎች ዯህንነት የሚበጁ ተግባራትን ሇመፈጸም ግሇሰቡ በሚኖረው ፈቃዯኝነት የሚገሇጽ እሴት (value) ነው፡፡ አርበኝነት ብዙ መገሇጫ ባህርያትና ገጽታዎች ቢኖሩትም፣ አንዴ ሰው ሇቤተሰቡ ከሚያሳየው ቁምነገረኛነትና የቤተሰቡንና በተሇይም የሌጆቹን የአሁንና የወዯፊት ዯህንነት አስተማማኝ ሇማዴረግ ከሚፈጽማቸው ተግባራትና ከሚያዯርጋቸው ጥንቃቄዎች ይጀምራሌ ብዬ አምናሇሁ፡፡ አርበኛ መባሌ ያሇበት ማነው? ብሇን ስንጠይቅ፣ በእርግጠኝነት አፋችንን ሞሌተን የምንናገረውና በጣም የተሇመዯው መሌስ፣ የሃገራቸውን ለአሊዊነት ሇማስከበር በጦር ሜዲ የመጨረሻውና መስዋዕትነት የከፈለ ሲቪሌ ጀግኖችና ወታዯሮች ናቸው የሚሌ ነው፡፡ ይህንን መሰለን ጀግንነት የሚጠይቁ ሁኔታዎች እየቀነሱ መጥተዋሌ፡፡ የአርበኝነት ሰንጠረዥ ላልችንም ሙያዎችና ተግባራት መጨመር አሇበት ብዬ አምናሇሁ፡፡ ይህ ከሆነ ዘንዴ በእኛ ህብረተሰብ ውስጥ፣ ከሌፋታቸው ያገኙትን ትርፍና ጥሪት ወዯ ውጭ አገር ሳያሸሹ መሌሰው አገራቸው ውስጥ ሇኢቨስትመንት የሚያውለ ባሇሃብቶች፣ በውጭ አገር ትምህርታቸውን አጠናቀው የሚመሇሱ ሰዎች፣ የማህበረሰባቸውን ችግሮች ሇማመናመን አቅማቸው በቻሇ መጠን ዯፋ ቀና የሚለ ሰዎች አርበኛ መባሌ ያንሳቸዋሌን? ብዙ ነገሮች ባሌተሟለባቸው
Economic Focus
L±n a^×Ñì@KS
x!÷ñ EÃêE xStÄdR yx!T×eà L¥T
Vol. 6 No. 3 / January 2004 16 Ethiopian Economic Association
ትምህርት ቤቶች ትውሌዴን ሇማስተማርና ሇማሰሌጠን ቆርጠው የተነሱ መምህራንና የሚከፈሊቸውን ዯመወዝ bqE xlmçN ከቁብ ሳይጥፉ ኃሊፊነታቸውንና ግዳታዎቻቸውን በቅንነትና በታታሪነት የሚፈጽሙ የመንግስት ሰራተኞችስ በእኛ አገር ሁኔታ አርበኞች አይዯለም ማሇት ይቻሊሌን? ከኤች አይ ቪ/ ኤዴስ እና ከላልች ጠንቀኛ በሽታዎች የሚዋጉ፣ በተሇይ ቫይረሱ በዯማቸው ውስጥ መኖሩን ካወቁ በኋሊ ሇበቀሌና ሇበዯሌ ሳይሆን ላልችን ሇመታዯግና ሇማስተማር ቆርጠው የተነሱ ወገኖች፣ በምርምርና በፈጠራ ስራ ሊይ ተጠምዯው ሇሰው ሌጆች ህይወት አንዴ ተጨማሪ መሌካም ነገር ሇማስገኘትና እውቀትን ሇማስፋፋት ተግተው የሚመረምሩ ሳይንቲስቶች፣ ምርታቸውን ሇማሳዯግ ላት ከቀን የሚታትሩ ገበሬዎች፣ እነዚህና ላልች ሰዎች የአርበኝነት ተግባር አሌፈጸሙም ማሇት አይቻሌም፡፡ ከእነዚህ ከፍ ብዬ ከዘረዘርኩዋቸው ቡዴኖች በተነጻጻሪ አገራቸውን ትተው ሇመሄዴ ያቆበቆቡ ዜጎች ምን ያክሌ በርካታ እንዯሆኑ ከጥቂት ሳምንታት በፊት በዱቪ ማዕከልች የነበረው የዯራ ገበያና ሰሌፍ የሚመሰክር ይመስሇኛሌ፡፡ የዱቪ ቪዛ ሇማግኘት አመሌክተውና ተሳክቶሊቸው የሄደ የተዯራጀና የተዯሊዯሇ ኑሮ ይመሩ የነበሩ ሰዎችን አውቃሇሁ፡፡ ይህን ማሇቴ፣ እነዚህ ሰዎች የሚፈሌጉትን ነገር ሇመምረጥ ያሊቸውን ግሇሰባዊ መብትና ነጻነት መቃወም እንዲይመስሌብኝ እሰጋሇሁ፡፡ እኔ የላልችን ምርጫዎች አከብራሇሁ፡፡ Slz!HM xSrG˜ mÂgR
yMfLgW፣ btlY በአገራቸው ሇመቆየትና ወዯ አገራቸው ሇመመሇስ ቁርጠኝነት ያሊቸውን
ሰዎች ማህበrsÆCN ማKbRÂ
¥DnQ XNd¸ñRbT nWÝÝ
Xnz!H wgñC በአገራቸው ሇመኖር ወይም ወዯ አገራቸው ሇመመሇስ የወዯደት ላሊ ምርጫ ስሇላሊቸው የሚመስሊቸው፣ xg¶t$ MRÅ
§§cW lsãCê yMTs-W
እዴሌ የሊትም ብሇው የሚያምኑ ሰዎች l!ñ„ YC§l#፡፡ XnRs#
l@lÖCN úYçN ‰úcWN ZQ
xDRgW y¸mlkt$Â y¸zLû
mçN xlÆcW ብዬ አምናሇሁ፡፡
በእርግጥ፣ ከፍ ብዬ አርበኞች መባሌ እንዲሇባቸው የጠቀስኩዋቸው ክፍልች እንዯማንኛወም ሰው ወይም ማህበራዊ ቡዴን ዴክመቶች አያጡም፡፡ እnz!H እንከኖች tlYtW ሉታወቁና ktÒlM
l!¬rÑ YgÆL፡፡ የአንዲንዴ
እንከኖች መኖር፣ yXnz!HN
xRb®C êU y¸ÃÈ_LÂ
የታታሪና ቅን ዜጎችን ägS ZQ
xDR¯ lmmLkT የሚያበቃ
ምክንያት ሉሆን ግን ፈጽሞ
አይgÆም፡፡
በኢኮኖሚ አመራር ሊይ መዯረግ ያሇባቸው ሇውጦች
በሲቪሌ ሰርቪስ
መሌካም ውጤት ያሊቸው የኢኮኖሚ ፖሉሰዎችን፣ ህጎችንና ዴንጋጌዎችን ሇማቀዴና ሇመተግበር ከፍተኛ ጥራት ያሇው ሲቪሌ ሰርቪስ ያስፈሌጋሌ፡፡ ጥራት ያሇው ሲቪሌ ሰርቪስ ማህበራዊ አገሌግልቶችን ሇማስፋፋትና በተቀሊጠፈ ሁኔታ ሇማዲረስም አስፈሊጊ ነው፡፡ በአገራችን ጥራት ያሇው ሲቪሌ ሰርቪስ አስፈሊጊነት በተሇይ የዴህነት ቅነሳ ስትራቴጅ እና የምዕተ ዓመቱ የሌማት ግቦች ተግባራዊ መሆን ከጀመሩ ወዱህ እያዯገ መጥቷሌ፡፡ የሲቪሌ ሰርቪሱን ጥራት ሇማሳዯግ፣
የአሰራር ነጻነቱን ከፖሇቲካ ተጽዕኖና ጣሌቃ ገብነት ማሊቀቅ፣ ማበረታቻዎችን ማሻሻሌ፣ በብቃትና በውጤት ሊይ የተመሰረተ የቅጥርና የዯረጃ እዴገት ስርዓት መዘርጋት፣ ቅንነትን፣ ግሌጽነትንና ተጠያቂነትን ማበረታታት እንዱሁም የዘርፉን ሌዩ ሌዩ ክፍልች ማቀናጀት ያስፈሌጋሌ፡፡
በሲቪሌ ሰርቪስ ውስጥ ሉዯረጉ የሚችለ ማበረታቻዎች ከኃሊፊነት ስሜት፣ የሚመነጭ ሇውጥ የማምጣት ፍሊጎትንና ts¸nTN
mšTN እንዯሚያካትት መገንዘብ አስፈሊጊ ነው፡፡ የእኛን አገር በመሰለ ዴሃ አገሮች የሰራተኞችን ዯመወዝና ምንዲ በከፍተኛ መጠን ማሳዯግ በቅርብ ጊዜ የሚቻሌ ተግባር አይዯሇም፡፡ ስሇዚህም ላልች የማበረታቻ አይነቶችን በስፋት ሥራ ሊይ ማዋሌ አስፈሊጊ ነው፡፡
በዚህ ረገዴ፣ በቅርቡ በተጀመረው የሲቪሌ ሰርቪስ ማሻሻያ አንዲንዴ በጎ ጅምሮችን አመሊክቷሌ ፡፡ የኢኮኖሚ ጉዲዮች እውቀት ፖሉሲዎች የሚያስገኙት ውጤትና ዯረጃ የተመሰረቱባቸውን ቲዎሪዎች በጥሌቀት መርምሮ በመረዲት፣ በሰፊ የኢኮኖሚክስ እውቀትና ጥራት ባሇው መረጃ/ስታትስቲክስ መኖር ሊይ ይመሰረታሌ፡፡ ስሇዚህም፣ ፖሉሲ አውጭዎች ሇእውቀትና ሇስታትስቲክስ ተገቢውን ግምት ሉሰጡ ይገባቸዋሌ፡፡ ፖሉሲ አውጭዎች፣ ስታትስቲክስን የማጠናቀር አስቸጋሪነት፣ እንዱሁም እውቀት በብዙ ዴካም እንዯሚገኝ መገንዘብ ያስፈሌጋቸዋሌ፡፡ ከኤክስፐርቶች ጋር አዘውትሮ መወያየት ጠቃሚ መሆኑን መገንዘብ ይኖራባቸዋሌ፤
Economic Focus
L±n a^×Ñì@KS
x!÷ñ EÃêE xStÄdR yx!T×eà L¥T
Vol. 6 No. 3 / January 2004 17 Ethiopian Economic Association
ከውይይቶቹ የሚገኙ ፍሬ ነገሮችንም በተግባራቸው ውስጥ ቢገሇገለባቸው መሌካም ይሆናሌ፡፡
የእውቀትን ኃያሌነት፣ ትርጉም ያሇው ሇውጥ ሇማምጣት ፖሇቲካዊ ፈቃዯኝነት UR s!qÂJ የሚያስገኘውን ፋይዲ የዩጋንዲን ሌምዴ እንዯ ምሳላ በመውሰዴ ማሳየት እወዲሇሁ፡፡ የሙሴቬኒ መንግስት ስሌጣን እንዯያዘ ሰሞን በዩጋንዲ የምንዛሬ ተመን ማሻሻያ ማዴረግ ግዳታ ነበር፡፡ ያኔም፤ የመንግስት ባሇስሌጣናት በኡጋንዲ ሽሌንግ ሊይ የምንዛሬ ተመን ቅነሳ ከተካሄዯ የኢኮኖሚ ግሽበት ይጨምራሌ የሚሌ ስጋት ነበራቸው፡፡ በዚህም ምክንያት b1986 yx#UNÄ >LNG yMN²¶
êU mNG|T =Mé nbR፡፡ ቢሆንም በሇውጡ አስፈሊጊ መሆንና አሇመሆን ሊይ ውይይቶችና ክርክሮች እንዲይካሄደ አሌከሇከሇም፡፡ የክርክሩን መቋጫ ሇማበጀት የረደት Stephen Morris የተባሇ አንዴ የፒ.ኤች.ዱ ተማሪ በ1989 ያዘጋጃቸው ሁሇት ጥናታዊ ጽሁፎች ነበሩ፡፡ ወዯ ዝርዝር ነጥቦች ሳንገባ፣ በአጭሩ የMorris ጥናታዊ ወረቀቶች፣ የምንዛሬ ማስተካከያውን ተገቢነትና የዋጋ ግሽበትም እንዯማያስከትሌ የሚያመሇክቱ ነበሩ፡፡ ይህ ጥናት፣ በመንግስት ባሇስሌጣናት ዘንዴ ተቀባይነት በማግኘቱ ፖሉሲው በስራ ሊይ ሉውሌ ችሎሌ፡፡ ከዚያን ዘመን ወዱህም፣ በኡጋንዲ በፖሉሲ አቀራረጽና በኢኮኖሚ ምርምር መካከሌ ያሇው ትስስር ይበሌጥ እየተጠናከረ መጥቷሌ፡፡ አንዴ ጸሃፊ እንዲሇውም፣ ‹‹የኡጋንዲ ሌምዴ፣ ከኤክስፐርቶችና ከአዋቂዎች ጠቃሚ ትምህርትና አዱስ ሀሳብ ሉገኝ እንዯሚችሌ ግሌጽ ምሳላ ነው››፡፡ ዛሬ ኡጋንዲ የምትገኝበትን ዯረጃ እንመሌከት፡፡ ሞሪስ ዛሬ በየሌ ዩኒቨርሲቲ የኢኮኖሚክስ
ፕሮፌሰርና አለ ከሚባለ ዝነኛ ወጣት የኢኮኖሚክስ ተዋሪዎች (theoretician) አንደ ነው፡፡
አንዲንዴ ማሳሰቢያዎች /ፕሮፖዛልች እስካሁን ባነሳሁዋቸው ነጥቦች ሊይ በመመርኮዝ መዯረግ አሇባቸው ብዬ በማምንባቸው አንዲንዴ ጉዲዮች ሊይ ማሳሰቢያዎችን አቀርባሇሁ፡፡ ነጻና ገሇሌተኛ አማካሪ ካውንስሌ መመስረት በፖሉሲ ጉዲዮች ሊይ መንግስትን የሚያማክርና በስራ ሊይ የዋለ ፖሉሲዎችያመጧቸውን ውጤቶች የሚመረምር nÚÂ glLt¾
የአማካሪዎች ቦርዴ ማቋቋም ጠቃሚ ነው፡፡ ቦርደ የሚኖሩት ኃሊፊነቶችና ተግባሮች ወዯፊት በጥናትና MKKR ሊይ ተመስርቶ ሉወሰን ይችሊሌ፡፡ በእኔ አስተያት፣ ከፖሇቲካ ጋር ያሇው ግንኙነት ሲቀር የዩናይትዴ ስቴትስን የኢኮኖሚ አማካሪዎች ካውንስሌ እንዯ ሞዳሌ ብንከተሌ መሌካም ነው፡፡
አንዲንድች ይህን አይነቱ ሁኔታ የመንግስትን ስሌጣን ያዲክማሌ ብሇው ሉገምቱ ÃúúL፡፡ ይህ አመሇካከት ስሇመንግስት ስሌጣን ካሇ ጠባብ ግንዛቤና በእውነተኛ ስሌጣንና (real authority) በይስሙሊ ስሌጣን (nominal authority) መካከሌ ያሇውን ሌዩነት ካሇማወቅ የሚመነጭ ነው፡፡ እውነተኛ ስሌጣን አንዴ አካሌ ላልች አካሊት የእርሱን እምነቶችና ተግባራት ወዯውና ፈቅዯው እንዱቀበለና እንዱፈጽሙ ሇማዴረግ ባሇው ብቃት ይገሇጣሌ፡፡ መንግስት የኢኮኖሚ አማካሪዎች ካውንስሌን በአግባቡ ሉገሇገሌበት ከቻሇ የዜጎችን
እምነቶች፣ አመሇካከቶችና ተግባራት ወዲሰበው አቅጣጫ መምራት YrÄêL፡፡ ይህንን ሇማዴረግም፣ የፖሉሲ ውሳኔዎች በርካታ ሌዩ ሌዩ ወገኖችን የሚያሳትፉ እንዱሆኑ (greater inclusiveness)፤ y¦úBÂ የመረጃ ሌውውጦችን ማሳዯግና ማጎሌበት፣ bXnß!HM x¥µYnT የተሻለ
ፖሉሲዎችን እና ያተገባበር ስሌቶችን ሇመንዯፍ xStê{å
YñrêL፡፡
የግምገማ ጥናት (Stock-taking)
ስሇ ኢትዮጵያ ኢኮኖሚ እስካሁን ያሇውን እውቀት አሰባስቦ ሇማከማቸት መጣጣርና ሇዚህም ተግባር ቅዴሚያ መስጠት ላሊው ሉታሰብበት የሚገባ ብሄራዊ አጀንዲ ነው ብዬ አምናሇሁ፡፡ በዚህም ጥረት ውስጥ የመንግሰት መስሪያ ቤቶች፣ ምሁራን፣ የግለ ዘርፍ፣ ሲቪሌ ማህበራትንና ሇጋሽ ዴርጅቶች (donors) እንዱካተቱ ማዴረግ ጠቃሚ ውጤት ያስገኛሌ፡፡ በተሇይም፤
ባሇፉት 5 እስከ 10 ዓመታት ጊዜ ውስጥ በኢትዮጵያ ኢኮኖሚ ሊይ የተሰሩ ምርምሮችን ማሰባበሰብ፣ መሰነዴና ከምርምር ዘዳዎች፣ ከትንታኔና ከጠቀሜታ አንጻር መገምገም፤
የኢትዮጵያን ኢኮኖሚያዊ ምርምር አቅምና ይዞታ ከሰው ኃይሌ፣ ከተቋማዊ አዯረጃጀት፣ ከመረጃ አቅርቦት፣ ከቅሌጥፍና እና ከፋይናንስ አቅም አንጻር መገምገም፤
አስፈሊጊ ነው፡፡ እነዚህን ተግባራት ሇማከናወንም የኢትዮጵያ ኢኮኖሚክስ ባሇሙያዎች ማህበርንና የኢትዮጵያ ሌማት ምርምር
Economic Focus
L±n a^×Ñì@KS
x!÷ñ EÃêE xStÄdR yx!T×eà L¥T
Vol. 6 No. 3 / January 2004 18 Ethiopian Economic Association
ተቋምን (EDRI) ሌምድች መነሻ ማዴረግ ጠቃሚ ይሆናሌ፡፡ ይህን መሰለ ጥረት በተጓዲኝም፤
ዋና ዋና ገበያዎችንና ከገበያ ውጭ ያለ ተቋማዊ ስምምነቶችን (non-market institutional arrangements) ሇይቶ ሇማወቅና ምን ያህሌ ውጤታማ እንዯሆኑ ሇመገምገም፤
የሌማት እንቅስቃሴ ውጤት የሚወሰነው በነጠሊ ፖሉሲዎች ሳይሆን በሁለም ፖሉሲዎች ዴምር ውጤት በመሆኑ የመንግስትን ፖሉሲዎችና የማሻሻያ እርምጃዎችን በአንዴ ሊይ ሇመገምገም፤
የታሇመ መሆን ይኖርበታሌ፡፡ የኢትዮጵያ መንግስት ከቅርብ ጊዜ ወዱህ ከነዚህ ተግባራት ጋር ተዛማጅነት ያሊቸው አንዲንዴ ሙከራዎችን በማዴረግ ሊይ ነው፡፡
ብሄራዊ ፋውንዳሽን መመስረት በአገሪቱ ውስጥ የሚሰሩ ምርምሮችን የሚያስተባብር፣ ሇምርምርና ሇተመራማሪዎች ማበረታቻ የሚውሌ የገንዘብ ዴጋፍ የሚያፈሊሌግ ራሱን ችል የሚንቀሳቀስ ብሄራዊ ፋውንዳሽን መመስረት አስፈሊጊ ነው፡፡ በዚህ አንጻር የኢትዮጵያ ሳይንስና ቴክኖልጂ ኮሚሽን ሌምዴ በመነሻነት ሉያገሇግሌ የሚችሌ ነው፡፡
ማጠቃሇያ ሇንግግሬ መቋጫ ይሆኑኝ ዘንዴ አንዴ ሁሇት ፍሬ ሃሳቦችን ሇመጨመር እወዲሇሁ፡፡ ከዚህ ቀዯም ፕሮፌሰር መስፍን
እንዲለት ሁለ እኔም፣ የሇውጥና የመሻሻሌ ፍሊጎት ከተማሩና ባሇጸጋ ከሆኑ ዜጎች መምጣት አሇበት ብዬ አምናሇሁ፡፡ ከታሪክ እንዯምንማረው በብዙ አገሮች የመሰረታዊ ማህበረ-ኢኮኖሚያዊ ሇውጥ ሃሳብ አመንጭዎችና ጀማሪዎች እነዚህ የማህበረሰብ ክፍልች ናቸው፡፡ በተሇይ የእኛን አገር በመሳሰለ ዴሃ አገሮች፣ እንዱህ አይነቱን የተወሳሰበ ጉዲይ ሇማሰብና ሇማሰሊሰሌ ምቾቱ፣ ችልታውና መሳሪያው ያሊቸው፣ እንዱሁም ማህበrsb# የሚሻሻሌባቸውን መንገድች ፈሌጎ የማግኘት የስነምግባርና የዜግነት ግዳታ የወዯቀባቸው፣ እውቀታዊ በሆነ መንገዴ ማሰብና መተግበር የሚችለ የህብረተሰብ ክፍልች የተማሩትን ባሇሃብቶች ናቸው፡፡ bt=¥¶ MNM XNµ*N ymššL
húB knz!H wgñC b!núM፣ W-@¬¥ lmçn# ytqrWN
yHBrtsB KFL ¥útF yGD
nW፡፡ Slz!H kz!H bmnúT ngN
l¥ššL y¸bJ Bÿ‰êE
SMMnT mgNÆT ("a national consensus to inverse in the future") አማራጭ የሇውም እሊሇሁ፡፡ የመረጥኩት የምርምር ርዕሰ ጉዲይ ራስን በማወቅ (self-discovery) ሊይ ያተኮረ ነው፡፡ ይህም ራስን የማወቅ ጥረት፣ በአንዴ በኩሌ፣ የአገራችንን ህዝብ ማህበራዊና ኢኮኖሚያዊ ታሪክ፣ ሌማድችና እምነቶች፣ የህዝቦችን ምኞታቸውንና ችልታቸውን፣ ተስፋ የሚሆኗቸውን ነገሮችና የሚያሰናክሎቸውን ችግሮች አጥንቶና መርምሮ መዴረስን፤ በላሊ በኩሌ እኛን ራሳችንን (የተማረውንና ባሇሃብቶችን) እንዯ ሰው ሌጅና እንዯ ኢትዮጵያዊ ማወቅን ያካትታሌ፡፡ ከዚህ አይነቱ ጥረት የሚወጣው ግኝት፣ ህብረተሰባችንን ሇመሇወጥ ቁሌፍ
ጉዲይ ነው ብዬ አምናሇሁ፡፡ በእርግጥ ሇንግግር ቀሊሌ ነው፡፡ ሆኖም ‹‹ህሌም አሇ ተብል ሳይተኛ አይታዯርምና›› የሇውጥን አስቸጋሪነት በመፍራት ከተግባር ሌናፈገፍግ አይገባም፡፡ ስሇዚህም፣ ሇችግሮቻችን መፍትሄ ሇማግኘት ያሇን ብቸኛና ትክክሇኛ አማራጭ፣ ማሰብ፣ መመርመር፣ መወያየትና መመካከር mwsNÂ mtGbR
W-@T byg!z@W mgMgMÂ
mššL ÃlbTN ¥ššL YHNNM
LÂdRG yMNClW X¾
x!T×eÃWÃN ብቻ ነን፡፡ ስሇህብረተሰባችን ችግሮች መፍትሄ ሇመሻትም ይሁን በጉዲዩ ሊይ ሇመምከርና ሇመወያየት ባሰብን ቁጥር፣ በቪዱዮው የተመሇከትነው ሌጅ ንግግር ይዘነጋን አይመስሇኝም፡፡ ብዙም መሌካም ነገሮች ሰራን ወይም ምንም ሳንሰራ እስካሁን ቀረን፣ እያንዲንዲችን እንዯ ግሇሰብ፣ ሁሊችንም ዯግሞ እንዯ ህብረተሰብ፣ ስሇዚያ ሌጅና ስሇትውሌደ ህይወት የተናጠሌና የጋራ ተጠያቂነት አሇብን፤ ስሇ ሌጆቻችንና ስሇ ሌጅ ሌጆቻችን እጣ ፈንታም ከእኛ በስተቀር ኃሊፊ ሉሆን የሚችሌ ክፍሌ አይኖርም፡፡ አመሰግናሇሁ!
êb! mr©ãCN (References) bXNGl!Z¾W {h#F §Y Ãg¾l#ÝÝ
Economic Focus
L±n a^×Ñì@KS
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND ETHIOPIA‟S DEVELOPMENT
Vol. 6 No. 3 / January 2004 19 Ethiopian Economic Association
“But policy, as opposed to politics, is not (a) zero-sum (game). One of the hardest
tasks of economists is to explain this – a task made all the more difficult by much of
the political rhetoric.”
Joseph E. Stiglitz [Stiglitz (1998)]
I would like to begin by
congratulating and thanking the
Ethiopian Economic Association
(EEA) for organising the Vision
2020 Ethiopia discussion series. A
lot has been said about the nature
and usefulness of this forum and I
assume that these are by now well
understood.
I would also like to thank the EEA
for inviting me to speak at such a
forum. I feel greatly honoured.
The title of my talk is ―Economic
Governance and Ethiopia‘s
Development – Some Reflections‖.
It has three main parts. The first
part, after outlining my
understanding of the notion of
economic governance and its
determinants (at least for the
purpose of the talk), summarises the
state of well-being and economic
governance in Ethiopia. A statement
of my vision makes-up the second
section. The final section sketches
some of the things I believe should
happen in order to make that vision
a reality.
MMoottiivvaattiioonn
Before going any further, however,
let me briefly explain what
motivated me to tackle this issue
and the things that I take for
granted. I thought that would help
set the right perspective and tone for
the substance of my speech.
Recently, I watched a documentary
about Ethiopian children produced
by Save the Children UK. That
documentary had a profound impact
on me. I know many poor people; a
lot of my relatives are poor. I
myself come from a low middle-
income family and have a first-hand
experience of some of the economic
difficulties such families face. As
everyone else, I also have my share
of daily encounters with street
children. Until that day, however,
my interaction with poor children
was either person-to-person (usually
mediated by some cash transfer), or
in the abstract while doing research
on poverty and well-being. For the
first time, I watched children
themselves talk about aspects of
their own lives, their needs and
hopes, in short, their poverty
without directly asking for help.
Penetrating through my protective
shields of charity and abstraction,
their talk revealed to me what it
really means to be a poor child.
Being a parent, my thoughts
subsequently dwelt on my own
children and the children they will
hopefully have. I wondered whether
there are reasonable safeguards to
protect my grandchildren (if not my
own children) from being in the
same dismal state as the children in
the documentary. Since, broadly
speaking, the best guarantor of
decent opportunities is a dynamic
economy with sustainable growth,
and since such an economy is yet to
emerge in Ethiopia, I concluded that
there is really no reason why my
grandchildren will not face the same
predicament as the poor children in
the documentary.
I also realised, for the first time in a
really meaningful way, that how we
manage our economic affairs is
critical to the emergence of a
prosperous society in which such
poverty is very rare. Each and
every one of us should strive to
substantially enhance economic
management so as to ensure a better
EECCOONNOOMMIICC GGOOVVEERRNNAANNCCEE AANNDD EETTHHIIOOPPIIAA’’SS DDEEVVEELLOOPPMMEENNTT ––
SSOOMMEE RREEFFLLEECCTTIIOONNSS**
Alemayehu Seyoum Taffesse
______________________ * A Talk Prepared for the Vision 2020 Ethiopia Series organized by the EEA, January 30, 2004.
Economic Focus
L±n a^×Ñì@KS
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND ETHIOPIA‟S DEVELOPMENT
Vol. 6 No. 3 / January 2004 Ethiopian Economic Association
future for our children. What you
will hear today are some of my
reflections motivated by this
realisation. These reflections are
part of an ongoing thought process
and thus are subject to further
modifications as time goes.
AAiimmss
My main aim in this talk is to
motivate a systematic discussion
about economic governance,
focusing primarily on the ‗process‘
of policy selection – i.e. on how
economic management decisions
are arrived at. Clearly, this process
is political-economic and social in
nature. However, being an
economist, and recognising my
limitations thereof, I focus largely
on economic matters and highlight
the role of economics and the
economist. My hope is that what I
say will be sufficient to stimulate
some dialogue concerning the
opportunities and obligations facing
us as Ethiopians in the realm I
chose to talk about.
The area of discourse I have chosen
is rather wide in scope, thereby
necessitating some selective
treatment of themes. The themes I
dwell on are, I believe, critical, but
also reflect my knowledge and its
limitations.
In short I will reflect, mostly
informally and sometimes cursorily,
on some of the key aspects of
economic governance and provide
some, hopefully useful, suggestion
on the way forward.
At the end of the talk, I hope, rather
immodestly, that each one of you
will ask yourself the same questions
about the future of your children,
grandchildren, cousins and
nephews, as well as other members
their generations. I also hope, again
disregarding modesty, that, as a
consequence, you will embark on a
journey of thought and action.
AAssssuummppttiioonnss//PPrreessuummppttiioonnss
Being an economist, I will start by
stating my assumptions (or
presumptions).
I assume that the pattern of
economic governance, however
defined, reflects not only the
material resources of a country, but
also the norms and beliefs
associated with its citizens, their
concerns and aspirations, their
capabilities, their (current and past)
choices; and the various
institutional arrangements that have
evolved over time conditioned by
those resources, beliefs, norms and
choices. The line of causation also
goes in the other direction. The
pattern of economic governance
characterising a country influences
the beliefs, norms and choices of its
citizens and, ultimately, their well-
being.
I also assume that we Ethiopians
strive to improve our individual and
collective well-being in the context
of a common economic space. I
believe the following quote from
the current Ethiopian Constitution
captures that desire quiet well:
―Convinced that to live as
one economic community is
necessary in order to create
sustainable and mutually
supportive conditions for
ensuring respect for our
rights and freedoms and for
the collective promotion of
our interests; … Have
therefore adopted, … this
constitution as an instrument
that binds us in a mutual
commitment to fulfil the
objectives and the principles
set forth above.‖
Preamble to the Ethiopian
Constitution;
Then it follows that:
1. in one form or another, all
Ethiopians benefit from peace
and prosperity in Ethiopia;
2. in one form or another, all
Ethiopians can and should
contribute to the attainment of
these goals – in other words,
such contributions are not the
preserve and/or responsibility of
one or another select group; and
3. to a varying degree, all
Ethiopians are responsible for
the current and future well-being
outcomes in the country.
Finally, I assume that building a
well-functioning market economy is
a common vision. By that I mean
that most Ethiopians do not desire
their entire economic life to be run
administratively by some central
authority.
EEccoonnoommiicc GGoovveerrnnaannccee ––
AA CCoonncceeppttuuaall FFrraammeewwoorrkk
For my purpose I consider
economic governance to mean the
process of policy formulation, the
policies that are produced by that
process, and the pattern of policy
implementation. In other words, it
encompasses the policy
environment, and the related
administrative and legal structure,
under which an economy functions.
In this sense, macroeconomic
policies, microeconomic policies,
and fiscal policies; government
economic agencies, regulatory
policies and bodies; and business
Economic Focus
L±n a^×Ñì@KS
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND ETHIOPIA‟S DEVELOPMENT
Vol. 6 No. 3 / January 2004 Ethiopian Economic Association
law and legal institutions all form
parts of a nation‘s economic
governance. Below I use economic
policy formulation and
implementation as my shorthand for
economic governance.
Broadly, speaking, economic policy
has three main components. Two of
these – goals and instruments – are
commonly explicitly stated, while
the third – economic ‗models‘ – are
usually implicit or even
unarticulated.
Goals represent the objectives or
targets that are to be attained or
promoted via policy intervention. In
poor countries like Ethiopia, the
standard set of goals include two
broad categories:
1. Macroeconomic stability:
which largely focus on certain
balances in the economy, in
particular, the balance of
payments, the government
accounts and the saving-
investment balance. The
important variables included
are the government budget
deficit, the money supply, the
components of aggregate
demand, the volume of credit,
interest rates, nominal wages
and profits, prices of
commodities, and the exchange
rate. 10
2. Growth and development:
which largely focus on factors
that determine the nature of the
development process in a
country. The key variables
include the structure and
growth of production,
employment, and investment.
Factors such as capital
accumulation, rural-urban
migration, labour force growth,
10Dervis, Kemal, Jaime de Melo, and
Sherman Robinson (1982). General
Equilibrium Models for Development Policy,
The World Bank, Washington D.C.
changes in productivity,
structure of trade, allocation of
investment, and changes in the
structure of demand. 11
The operational distinction between
the two sets is not always
straightforward, however. First,
stability and growth/development
are related, that the former is a
necessary condition for the latter
being a key aspect of that
relationship. Second, some
instruments of policy are aimed at
affecting, or do affect, both stability
and growth/development.
Instruments are the means
deployed to achieve policy goals or
targets. The specific instruments
available to a government partly
depend on the specific institutional
setting. In a market economy, these
may include: fiscal policy (types
and levels of taxes, level and
composition of government
expenditure); monetary policy
(money supply, reserve
requirements, open market
operations, discount window (rate),
interest rate regulation
(ceilings/floors)); exchange rate
policy; sectoral policies; and laws
and regulations.
Economic „models‟ summarise the
views of policy makers and/or their
advisers about how the economy
works (including its structure,
constraints, and possibilities) and
thus how policy instruments are
linked with policy targets. Such
views can be articulated in detail
with an underlying economic
theorising and empirical evidence.
They can also be implicit or sketchy
and with insufficient economic
theoretic and empirical content.
11 Dervis, Kemal, Jaime de Melo, and
Sherman Robinson (1982). General
Equilibrium Models for Development Policy,
The World Bank, Washington D.C.
Governments adopt and implement
a wide variety of economic policies.
On the one hand, such policies
represent the key means at the
disposal of governments in their
effort to achieve interrelated
economic objectives – primarily
maintain macroeconomic stability
and promote economic growth and
development. On the other hand,
these policies, and the process via
which they are selected, constitute
the pattern of economic governance
in a country, and as such, a key
element of the institutional
environment within which a
country‘s economy operates.
Consequently, government policies
form an integral part of an
economy, as well as a critical
determinant of its functioning and
evolution.12
The ultimate aim of economic
policy should be to improve the
well-being of citizens, either
directly, or indirectly by inducing
economic actors (individuals,
households, businesses) to modify
their choices in desirable ways. The
choices of these actors, and thus the
effectiveness of government
policies, depend not only on the
explicit characteristics of such
policies but also on these actors‘
perceptions about them.
In short, good or appropriate
government policies enhance the
economic performance of a country
and, hence, the well-being of its
citizens. The extent to which they
can do so depends on three main
attributes which makeup the quality
12
For a recent exploration of the impact of
policies and, more broadly, governance see
Ndulu and O‘Connell (1999), Collier and
Gunning (1999), and Kaufmann, Kraay, and
Ziodo-Lobat (1999, 2002). The first two
specifically analyze Africa.
Economic Focus
L±n a^×Ñì@KS
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND ETHIOPIA‟S DEVELOPMENT
Vol. 6 No. 3 / January 2004 Ethiopian Economic Association
of policies:13
Policies need to be ‗correct‘,
i.e., policies should be
consistent with the ‗accepted‘
needs of the society and its
economy and the appropriate
economic role of the state, and
should be feasible relative to
the potentials of the economy
including the capabilities of the
government;
Policies need to be ‗credible‘,
i.e., policies should be
reasonably predictable and well
coordinated across the various
dimensions of their coverage;
and
Policies need to be ‗effective‘,
i.e., policies should be selected
and implemented in an efficient
manner and with a reasonable
degree of accountability and
transparency.
These attributes of policy
interventions are clearly
interdependent and constitute joint
indicators of the quality of
economic policy. Below, some of
these attributes are combined with
the elements of policy outlined
earlier to describe aspects of
economic governance in Ethiopia.
EEccoonnoommiicc GGoovveerrnnaannccee iinn
EEtthhiiooppiiaa
The First Five-Year Development
Plan of the Imperial regime, that
spanned the years 1957-196114,
represented the first genuinely
systematic expression of nation-
wide economic policy in modern
Ethiopia.15 That Plan was followed
by the second (1963-67) and third
(1968-1973) development plans. I
13
On correctness see Stiglitz (1996), Tanzi
(2000), and World Bank (1997). On
credibility see, for instance, Brunetti,
Kisunko, and Weder (1998). 14
All years are in Gregorian Calendar.
15 See Asfaw (1992) and Molla (1992).
will use the last one to briefly
illustrate the type of economic
policies pursued by the Imperial
regime.
The Third Five-Year Development
Plan was, perhaps, the most
sophisticated planning exercise
conducted up to that time. I, in fact,
believe that it even compares fairly
well with any of the plans or
strategies prepared since then in
terms of its logic, depth, and
coverage.16 Reading through the
Plan‘s document, I was also struck
by how much its analysis is still
valid. Indeed, its diagnosis and
language are so much like more
recent documents that I sometimes
forgot it was prepared 35 years ago.
I recommend it to anyone who
desires to see, among other things,
how slow our economic progress
has been in the interim.
Goals: The Third Five-Year Plan
identified the following main
objective:
1. to achieve a per capita income
growth of 3 percent per year;
2. to improve agriculture, the
mainstay of the national
economy and of the livelihood
of the majority of the Ethiopian
people, through an all-front,
more concerted encouragement
and assistance;
3. to extend economic and social
development from urban
centres to rural areas which not
only sustain the majority of the
Ethiopian people but also
provide most of the nation‘s
natural wealth.
These main goals were
disaggregated into very detailed
targets across a wide range of
sectors and activities.
16
Imperial Ethiopian Government (1968).
Third Five Year Development Plan, Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia.
Instruments: Towards achieving
these goals, the Plan envisaged a
variety of instruments including an
impressive investment plan mainly
in the form specific projects in
different sectors. Roughly half of
this investment plan was expected
to be financed by the private sector.
To encourage private investment,
the Plan proposed financial
incentives (such as tax exemption)
the details of which were to be
included in an Investment Law,
which in turn, were to be
administered by an Investment
Committee and an Investment
Promotion Office (located within
the then Ministry of Commerce and
Industry). As for public investment,
the Plan develops annual plans
which laid the basis for the
preparation of the annual
government budget.
Economic „models‟: Essential
premises of the Third Five-Year
Plan were:
1. agricultural development was a
priority since the Ethiopian
economy was predominantly
agrarian (by the way, the
figures cited about the role of
agriculture were roughly the
same as the ones we cite
today);
2. industrial development was
indispensable and the preferred
strategy to achieve it was
import substitution (though the
Plan also envisaged expansion
in exports);
3. education and skills formation
associated with it (in current
terminology human capital)
were critical for the country‘s
development.
All these were broadly consistent
with development thinking of the
period.
It is also interesting to observe the
Economic Focus
L±n a^×Ñì@KS
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND ETHIOPIA‟S DEVELOPMENT
Vol. 6 No. 3 / January 2004 Ethiopian Economic Association
concern displayed by the planners
of the day for the ‗correctness‘
‗credibility‘ and ‗effectiveness‘ of
their policies. They explicitly
1. recognised the need to base the
planning exercise on firm
knowledge about the economy.
They fully realised the
indispensability of good quality
statistics, the shortcomings of
the data they had, and the need
to further strengthen the
Central Statistical Office;
2. acknowledged the institutional
needs of the Plan and envisaged
a corresponding reform process
including coordination across
government agencies;
3. appreciated the need for public
understanding and support if
the Plan were to succeed. I
quote from the Preface of the
Plan document:
―To succeed, a plan requires
the solid support of the
population at large. The
primary condition for this
support is an understanding
by the people of what the
plan is: its goals, its policies,
and, above all, its relevance
to their daily life. Such an
understanding requires, in
turn, full dissemination of the
plan throughout the Empire
in a format that is intelligible
to the great masses of the
people.‖
4. emphasised the need to use
resources efficiently.
Despite these qualities most experts
agree that the Third Five Year Plan
did not succeed. A number of
domestic and international reasons
explain this failure. The Plan
suffered from a number of, rather
technical, weaknesses. To mention
two key ones:
1. It was not based on a
systematic and empirical
analysis of the inter-linkages
between different sectors of the
Ethiopian economy and the
constraints associated with
them.
2. The database underlying the
Plan was rather weak and partly
explains why empirical analysis
was limited to descriptive
statistics.
Absence of political reform and
insufficient attention to land reform
were two more important
explanations, however. The Plan
was a product of an autocratic
regime with little accountability and
transparency. Indeed, the pressures
for political reform and land reform
ultimately led to the downfall of the
regime.
The Imperial regime was succeeded
by the Derg regime. The Derg
regime was characterised by brutal
political repression and centralised
administrative control over the
economy. Most manufacturing
enterprises, almost all big hotels, all
financial institutions, all
commercial farms, a lot of
residential buildings, and all lands
were nationalised. Central planning
was introduced first in the form of
what were referred to as National
Revolutionary Development
Campaigns or Zemecha (1978-
1984) and subsequently in the form
of a Ten-Year Perspective Plan
(1984 onwards). I will use the latter
to illustrate the form of economic
governance during the period.17
Goals: The Derg regime aspired to
17
Provisional Military Government of
Socialist Ethiopia (1984). Ten-Year
Perspective Plan, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
ultimately build a socialist
economy. Within this broad aim, a
number of specific targets were also
set by the Ten-Year Perspective
Plan, including:
1. to achieve an average per capita
income growth of 3.5% per
year with corresponding growth
targets for agriculture (4.3%),
industry (10.8%), and services
(6.9%);
2. to improve food security and
raise agricultural productivity
through cooperativisation and
expansion of irrigated farming;
3. to increase the share of industry
to a quarter of national output,
mainly through import
substitution.
Instruments: Central planning was
the preferred instrument of the Derg
regime. Nationalised enterprises,
which meant almost the entire
modern sector, were directly run by
the central government through
ministries or agencies established
for the purpose. Partly to discourage
the private sector, other aspects of
economic life were also subject to
extensive controls. These include:
barriers to the movement of
people and goods enforced
through travel paper
requirements and numerous
check points;
prohibitive tariff rates,
extensive quota restrictions,
and long and complicated
licensing procedures;
complete ban on the sell and
purchase of labour in
agriculture;
compulsory grain delivery (or
‗quota‘) system under which
farm households were forced to
sell a part of their produce to
the government at prices fixed
Economic Focus
L±n a^×Ñì@KS
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND ETHIOPIA‟S DEVELOPMENT
Vol. 6 No. 3 / January 2004 Ethiopian Economic Association
below those ruling in the ‗free‘
market; and
administrative distribution (or
rationing) of goods.
Apart from highly restricting
individual rights and considerably
eroding incentives for legitimate
private economic activity, these
controls resulted in high and
unwarranted administrative costs,
considerable corruption, and
smuggling. These costs were
ultimately incurred by society in the
form of slow growth and increased
poverty.
Economic ‘models’: The Ten-
Year Perspective Plan reflected
the socialist orientation of the
government of the day, and the
corresponding pattern of
centralised decision-making and
resource control it advocated.
Private property and the private
sector were considered
exploitative and actively
discouraged. Despite these, the
Ten-Year Perspective Plan was
based on assessments that were
remarkably similar to the five-
year plans of the Imperial era.
These include:
1. agriculture, as the largest
contributor to national
output and employment,
should be given priority;
2. industrialisation, being
critical for development,
should be promoted mainly
through import substitution;
It is not very difficult to pass
judgement on the pattern of
economic governance practiced
during the Derg regime. The dismal
state of the Ethiopian economy at
the end of the period spoke for
itself. To some extent, we are still
constrained by the legacy of that
regime.
A large number of lessons need to
be learnt from that disastrous
episode in Ethiopian history. I will
mention only two that are most
relevant to my theme. The period
clearly showed that:
economic policies that are not
consistent with individual
incentives are unlikely to bring
about enduring improvements;
and
centralised control and
repression ultimately fail.
To be sure, both rake havoc to
society and its members. In our
case, such policies and brutal
political repression generated
disastrous economic outcomes and
led to civil conflict. As a
consequence the Derg regime
collapsed in 1991 and the Ethiopian
People‘s Revolutionary Democratic
Front (EPRDF) assumed power.
Since 1992 the EPRDF government
has focused on reorienting the
economy through market reforms,
including a structural adjustment
program. As a result the state‘s
direct role in economic activity has
declined. Tariffs have been cut,
quota constraints relaxed, licensing
procedures simplified, foreign
exchange controls eased,
compulsory cooperative
membership and grain delivery
discontinued, and privatisation
begun, private banks authorised,
and interest rates decontrolled and
an inter-bank money market
introduced.
These reforms, combined with
peace and favourable weather
conditions for most of the past
decade, produced economic
recovery with faster average
growth. The pace of economic
growth has slowed down
considerably in more recent years
(indeed national output fell in
2002/2003), partly due to war,
recurrent drought and the fall in
international coffee prices. I also
suspect that the economy might
have exhausted the potential for
recovery and growth induced by the
reforms implemented so far.18
The government has also adopted
agricultural development-led
industrialization as a central plank
of its development programme, with
a focus on productivity growth on
small farms and labour-intensive
industrialization. An extensive
extension program is being
implemented as the preferred means
of increasing agricultural
productivity.
Until recently, one important
departure from the past was the
abandonment of planning, at least as
an explicit mode of economic
policy formulation and
implementation. However,
beginning 2002 the Ethiopian
government has adopted a
development strategy centred on the
principal goal of poverty reduction.
This strategy is officially known as
Sustainable Development and
Poverty Reduction Program.
This Program is a detailed statement
of Ethiopia economic problems and
the solutions thereof. Its main aims
are summarised in the following
paragraph:
18
See Easterly (2002) for some evidence on
the growth impact of policy reforms and the
limits thereof.
Economic Focus
L±n a^×Ñì@KS
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND ETHIOPIA‟S DEVELOPMENT
Vol. 6 No. 3 / January 2004 Ethiopian Economic Association
―Ethiopia's development
strategy seeks to promote
rapid broad-based and
equitable growth by focusing
on rural development and
improvement in physical and
human capital, and
deepening the devolution
process to empower the
people and expand the
choices and control that
people have over their
lives.‖
In line with this Program, the
government has launched deeper
fiscal decentralisation, judicial and
civil service reform, and public
sector capacity building. All of
these are arguably good beginnings
at institution building. Being too
recent, however, to what extent they
will succeed remains to be seen.
One thing is certain, however. Their
success or failure ultimately
depends on whether they succeed in
modifying the beliefs and actions of
individual economic actors through
the right ‗incentives‘ broadly
defined.
TThhee SSttaattee ooff tthhee EEtthhiiooppiiaann
EEccoonnoommyy
The above reflects that the
Ethiopian economy, and its society,
have experienced different modes of
economic governance over the last
40 years or so. So what difference
did all these make - as the saying
goes ‗the proof of the pudding is in
the eating‘. Are their substantial
differences in the well-being of
Ethiopians compared to 40 years
ago?
Let us start with successes.
Considerable progress has been
made, and is being made, in
increasing access to education and
health during the period. In contrast,
food security and nutrition levels
seem to have declined over the
years.
Perhaps the best summary measure
progress is the level of output per
worker. The table below records the
pattern of change in output per
worker over the period in question.
The table clearly shows that we
have made little headway in raising
productivity and thus improving
well-being. This failure is clearly
illustrated by Ethiopia‘s:
a. dependence on rain-fed and
traditional-technology based
agriculture;
b. inadequate human capital;
c. low capital stock - with
Africa‘s lowest stock of capital
per worker in 2000;
d. undeveloped infrastructure that
is improving but need to get a
lot better;
e. weak institutions including
deficiencies in the civil service,
judiciary, corruption, and
property rights (for instance,
bureaucratic quality recently
received a score of 1 out of a
maximum possible score of 4).
IImmpplliiccaattiioonnss
The evidence points to the fact that,
as a society, we have so far failed to
achieve sustained growth and
development. It suggests that we
were not making the right choices in
terms of the pattern and level of
investments, and, partly due to this,
that we have yet to build the
appropriate institutions. Our failure
is likely to be related to many
factors. Shocks of one sort or
another (drought, war, international
price fluctuations) and their long-
term effects as well as our historical
legacy are very serious problems.
Below I focus on another set of
explanatory factors, namely, aspects
of economic governance. I do so
because that is the topic of my talk.
More importantly, however, my
focus is motivated by the belief that
from among the variety of
constraints we face these aspects are
the ones we have most control over
and thus with which we can make
headway at some speed.
I like to emphasise that the concerns
I raise do not relate to intentions.
Rather I focus on why even well-
intentioned government policies can
and do fail to achieve their
objectives and what can be done
about that.
SSoouurrcceess ooff PPoolliiccyy FFaaiilluurreess
Correctness
Correct policies are those which:
are consistent with the ‗needs‘ of
the society and its economy;
are consistent with the
appropriate economic role of the
state; and
are feasible relative to the
potentials of the economy
including the capabilities of the
government.
How do these requirements of
correctness are satisfied?
First, the political process that
selects governments need to be
genuinely democratic such that
elections reveal the broad
preferences of society. Second,
knowledge about the ‗needs‘ of
society, the potentials and
constraints of the economy, and the
capacities of the government has to
be systematically generated and
Economic Focus
L±n a^×Ñì@KS
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND ETHIOPIA‟S DEVELOPMENT
Vol. 6 No. 3 / January 2004 Ethiopian Economic Association
continually upgraded. Third, mainly
based on this knowledge, feasible
priorities have to be debated and
agreed upon.
One example illustrates my point. It
is rather common to hear officials
say that ‗The policy is good but its
implementation is bad.‘ ‗This
dichotomy between the formulation
and the implementation of a policy
is usually false.‘ If a policy is
deemed feasible, then it must have
been designed on the basis of
realistic assumptions regarding the
relevant circumstances including
the expected response of economic
actors. ‗Difficulties regarding
implementation should arise only
from unanticipated exogenous
shocks.‘ If implementation
difficulties are substantial and
frequent, it is wise to recheck the
judgements made regarding the
appropriateness and/or feasibility of
the policy in question.
I am convinced that a lot of policy
failures are related to our rather
limited knowledge of the history
and workings of our society and
economy. In addition, even existing
knowledge is scattered and difficult
to access, and thus, not effectively
deployed.
Credibility
Credible policies are those which
are reasonably predictable and well
coordinated (or consistent) across
the various dimensions of their
coverage
The problem of credibility arises
from the inability of the state to
irrevocably commit itself to a
course of action. This inability is
inherent in the nature of the state (or
government). The ‗government is
the primary enforcer of contracts. It
uses its monopoly on the legal use
of force to create the possibility of
private commitment. There is no
one, however, whose job it is to
guard the guardian. The government
cannot make commitments because
it always has the possibility of
changing its mind, and earlier
‗‗agreements‘‘ cannot be enforced.‘
As a consequence, it is always
necessary for the government to
convince economic actors that
reversals of policy decisions are
reasonably unlikely.
One common, and proven, way of
doing so is to establish a variety of
properly functioning credibility-
enhancing mechanisms. Checks and
balances built into constitutions are
the best example of such
mechanisms. Strong civil society is
another. Such institutions raise the
costs of some policy reversals such
that they become unlikely. Building
a good reputation in the relevant
matters is another important way of
gaining and sustaining credibility.
Effective coordination across
different parts and levels of
government is also a key tool for
enhancing credibility since it will
reduce the possibility of
inconsistent policy initiatives from
within the same government and at
the same time. Clear demarcation of
jurisdiction over different policy
areas or issues is essential for such
coordination.
Secrecy, or lack of openness and
transparency, in the policy making
process aggravates the credibility
problem. First, it hinders the
‗consensus-building process and
makes it more likely that outcomes
will lead to a greater divergence
between winners and losers.‘
Second, ‗by making information
scarce, it contributes both to the
perception and reality of
asymmetrical information, and puts
into play a dynamic which is more
likely to lead to biased and
unrealistic information.‘ Openness,
transparency, and consensus-
building can help reduce the
credibility problem.
Increased reliance on consensus in
the policy making process has a
number of advantages. First,
reaching consensus is a desirable
outcome in its own right, and doing
so in a democratic and transparent
way is a process that should be
cherished in its own right. Second,
consensus-building promotes open
dialogue aimed at achieving better-
designed policies rather scoring
victories in adversarial debate.
Third, if done systematically, fairly,
and regularly, it leads to the
emergence of commonly shared
beliefs and interests. Fourth,
dialogue towards a consensus can
also serve as an information-
gathering device on needs, interests,
and concerns, and as such it helps to
overcome some of the information
problems governments face in
formulating and implementing
policies. Therefore, the culture of
building consensus around policy
packages can enhance their
correctness and credibility.
Credibility matters because; unless
economic actors are convinced that
policies are irreversible (unless
circumstances clearly warrant
change) they would not modify
their beliefs and actions in a manner
consistent with the policies. And,
unless they do so, those policies
will not succeed in achieving their
objectives. In some sense policies
Economic Focus
L±n a^×Ñì@KS
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND ETHIOPIA‟S DEVELOPMENT
Vol. 6 No. 3 / January 2004 Ethiopian Economic Association
are like the horse in the Amharic
saying ‗the horse takes you to the
battle field, but it will not fight.‘ A
government may build modern
schools and health clinics. Success,
however, requires that families send
their children to those schools or
visit those clinics when sick instead
of some ‗traditional‘ substitute they
are used to. This shift will occur not
only if and when these families are
convinced that doing so is good for
them, but also if and when they are
convinced that the new facilities are
reasonably long-lasting (the schools
and clinics will continue to operate).
Coming to the case of Ethiopia, I
suspect that credibility problems
may partly explain lacklustre
responses to some policy initiatives.
I will come back to some of these
later on. Let me now describe
aspects of my vision.
MMyy VViissiioonn
Like everyone else who spoke
before me, I like to see a peaceful,
pluralistic, and prosperous Ethiopia
in 2020. Believing that a key
characteristic and foundation of
such a society is its pattern of
economic governance, I also like to
see an open, flexible, accountable,
and transparent system of policy
formulation and implementation.
More specifically, I would like to
see an environment in which:
1. justifying policy actions and
taking responsibility thereof are
institutionalised and standard;
2. policy decisions and their
rationale, the relevant data and
other information, as well as
the terms of accountability, are
provided to the public in a
comprehensive, accessible, and
timely manner.
3. rational and constructive
dialogue on economic policy is
institutionalised and regular.
Such dialogue should allow
participation by all stakeholders
in different forms; should occur
before and after the adoption of
policies; and should entertain
proposals from all quarters. The
recently established National
Private-Public Forum is a good
start.
4. economic knowledge and
analysis are valued, effectively
deployed, and continually
upgraded through efficient
investments;
5. capacity to provide early
warning of adverse economic
shocks, and thus that of
appropriately responding to
them, is well-developed.
EElleemmeennttss ooff WWhhaatt sshhoouulldd bbee
DDoonnee
The realisation of the vision I
outlined may require many things. I
believe, however, that changes in
two related areas are critical. These
areas are elements of the way we
manage our economic affairs and,
the latter‘s key determinants, our
norms and beliefs (that is
ourselves). I describe these below,
in an order that does not necessarily
reflect their relative importance.
Changes in norms and
beliefs or perspectives
Self-interest
The legitimate pursuit of self-
interest – be it in business, in the
civil service, in academia, or in any
other legal enterprise – should be
appreciated and encouraged. I bring
this up because we seem to be
somehow displeased about and
frown upon individual success.
Somebody (I forgot who, though I
remember it is a he) described his
own society as follows: ―Our
society dislikes two things most –
success and failure.‖ I think that our
society suffers from the same
prejudice. The end-result of such
prejudice is glorified mediocrity.
In saying so, I am not trying to
champion Lassiez Faire. I fully
recognise the need for collective
action as well as the dangers that
exclusive and unregulated pursuit of
individual gain poses to society.
The trick is to build an environment
within which the incentives for the
legitimate pursuit of self-interest are
in place, flexible mechanisms for
encouraging the coincidence of
individual and common interests are
designed, and misdemeanours are
appropriately discouraged and
punished. Otherwise, progress is
quiet unlikely.
This of course is easier said than
done. However, the only way we
can go forward is by thinking about
the problems, discussing the merits
of alternative solutions,
experimenting, and gradually
developing such a system.
Government
We have to revise our, usually
implicit, belief in the unlimited
powers of the state. The required
revision, I believe, has two parts.
Simply put the government is too
big and too small at the same time.
Seen from the perspective of a
single individual, the government is
too big. Hence, the value we give to
individual rights, particularly civil
rights, should be much higher than
they appear to get now.
Economic Focus
L±n a^×Ñì@KS
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND ETHIOPIA‟S DEVELOPMENT
Vol. 6 No. 3 / January 2004 Ethiopian Economic Association
Seen from the perspective of the
requirements of socio-economic
advancement needed in this
country, the government is too
small. To illustrate this rather
crudely, consider government
expenditure. In 2002 the Ethiopian
government spent about 20 Billion
Birr on the current and future needs
of a country with 68 million people.
A crudely analogous situation is:
one person with an annual income
of 30000 Birr managing a
household of one hundred people
providing for their education,
health, and security needs during
the year and invest some money for
future needs as well. It is very likely
that some needs of some people will
not be met.
My point is that it is not easy to
manage a poor economy such as
ours (think of how much effort is
required to manage our own
households). I am not trying to
excuse inefficiency and abuse – I
simply want to emphasise that we
have to adjust our expectations
about what the government can do.
What does that imply?
For policy makers this means that:
They need to genuinely realise that
their power emanates from society
via elections or appointments; that it
is always power temporarily
delegated to them; and, most
importantly, that they are human
beings with all the fallibility
which that entails. These are very
obvious and are usually proclaimed
by policy makers. I mention them
because our history makes me
wonder how deeply rooted these
beliefs are in our society.
They also need to fully appreciate
the limits to the impact of their
policies in terms of rapidly
changing our society‘s
circumstances in and by themselves.
Among other benefits, this would at
least minimise the frustration that
may be caused by the implicit but
unwarranted belief in the great
powers of the state and its policies.
At the same time, policy makers
should accept that the success of
their policies is highly dependent on
the responses of ‗citizens‘ to those
policies, which in turn are
motivated by ‗beliefs‘ and
incentives.
For citizens the main implication is
that, each of us should do his or her
bit by taking our place in society
seriously, otherwise things will not
improve. We have to pay taxes,
engage in constructive dialogue,
perform our respective tasks with
integrity, and genuinely appreciate
the difficulties of policy-makers.
Responsibility
I think we suffer from what I may
call the ‗blame culture‘ (may be
somebody else used this phrase
before, but I do not remember). It is
always something or someone else
which is responsible for our
difficulties. It is ‗society at large‘,
‗culture‘, ‗the weather‘, ‗wrong
policies‘, ‗the government‘, ‗greedy
businessmen‘, ‗myopic peasants‘,
‗globalisation‘, ‗superiors‘, the list
goes on. It is almost never ‗I‘ or
‗we‘. I am not denying that many
of these may be real problems with
considerable impact. What I am
objecting to is the manner in which
they are used to side-step
responsibility, and thus prevent
speedier solution to problems.
It is really amazing how widespread
this is. It ranges from mundane
household affairs to weighty public
discussions. Let me give you a
rather light-hearted example from
my daily life. Whenever something
goes wrong in our household, for
instance one of my books is
misplaced, it is rather difficult to
establish who is responsible. When
asked everyone answers automatically
‗It was not I‘, sometimes even
before knowing what he or she is
being asked about. The question is
completed or repeated and after a
while somebody says ‗Oh that, it
was I‘. This is so common that it
has become a kind of game we play.
Of course this may be because my
wife and I are bad household
managers, though I doubt it very
much. The main reason, I strongly
suspect, is this mindset to pass on
responsibility. Take another, more
serious, example. How frequently
have you got the answer ‗This is
how we work‘ or ‗It is the rules or
guidelines‘ when you ask why you
are supposed to meet some
(sometimes ridiculous) requirement
to get what you wanted. By the
way, this can happen both in public
offices as well as private
enterprises. For some reason we
tend to confuse ‗how‘ with ‗why‘ or
become worried and defensive
when asked ‗why‘ questions.
We need to develop a sense of
purpose with well-thought out aims
and instruments. Combined with
this we should develop a sense of
responsibility. Obviously, we live
within a collective, and as a result
we benefit from and are constrained
by that collective. Nevertheless, the
‗collective‘ – be it a society, a
community, or a specific group –
exists within and through each of
us. Hence, we have considerable
freedom to act independently and,
Economic Focus
L±n a^×Ñì@KS
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND ETHIOPIA‟S DEVELOPMENT
Vol. 6 No. 3 / January 2004 Ethiopian Economic Association
with some effort, change ourselves
and our collective for the better.
With that individual freedom comes
individual responsibility.
Patriotism
For me patriotism is strong
emotional link with one‘s society
represented by positive beliefs
about that society and expressed in
actions which enhance the welfare
of its members. I also believe that
patriotism starts at home – with
seriousness of one‘s purpose, its
pursuit in a legitimate manner, as
well as real care and concern about
the current and future well-being of
one‘s family, particularly children.
It then extends, in one form or
another, to the rest of society.
Who is a patriot according to this
understanding? Obviously, high on
the list are people (usually soldiers)
who pay the ultimate sacrifice and
fall on the battlefield in defence of
their society. Fortunately the
situations that demand such
sacrifices are rare and hopefully
getting even rarer. The list of
patriots should include many others,
as well. What about the
businessmen who reinvest their
profits within the country instead of
sending it abroad; and those who
return after studying abroad. What
about those who are grappling with
the country‘s problems in their
various capacities – the teacher who
strives to educate within inadequate
schools, the civil servant who
performs his/her duties with
integrity and to the best of his/her
abilities although the financial
returns for doing so are not high,
individuals who are fighting to
combat HIV/AIDS (particularly
those who have already tested
positive) and other illnesses;
scientists of one sort or another
researching and inventing; and
farmers trying to improve their lot.
The list goes on. To me all these are
patriots and need to be
acknowledged as such.
In contrast, thousands are trying to
leave the country as evidenced by
the roaring business DV centres had
during the last months of 2003. I
know of established people who
applied and got DV. Do not get me
wrong! I do not question these
persons‘ right to do as they did and
respect their choices. My point is
that we have to appreciate the
choices made by those staying or
coming back. Those who may claim
that these groups have no other
choice are insulting not only others
but also themselves that the country
has nothing to offer for people with
options. One wonders why they
themselves are still living in this
country – presumably for some
altruistic reasons.
Obviously, the patriots I mentioned,
like all patriots, have recognisable
shortcomings. These shortcomings
should be identified and, if possible,
corrected. However, that should not
be an excuse for not acknowledging
their good choices and deeds.
CChhaannggeess iinn AAssppeeccttss ooff
EEccoonnoommiicc MMaannaaggeemmeenntt
Civil service
A high-quality civil service is vital
to the designing of good economic
policies, including rules and
regulations, and their effective
implementation. It is also critical to
the efficient provision of social
services to the public. This
importance has increased further
with the onset of the PRSP process
and the centrality of the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs).
Upgrading the quality of the civil
service requires increasing its
autonomy from the political
sphere and from supervised
entities (independence). It also
demands improving incentives;
instituting meritocratic recruitment
and promotion; enhancing integrity,
transparency, accountability, and
better coordination within the civil
service.
In this regard it is important to
understand incentives in the civil
service broadly to include the
perception of making a difference
emanating from a sense of duty,
professional independence, as well
as power and influence. In a poor
country like ours it may not be
possible to substantially increase
wages and salaries in the short-run.
As a result these other types of
incentives need to be employed
more widely and more effectively.
Some progress seems to be
occurring in this direction through
the recently initiated civil service
reform.
Economic knowledge
The effectiveness of policies rises
with the extent to which they are
based on systematic explorations
and use of the relevant body of
economic knowledge and the best
statistics available. As a result
policy makers need to be more
appreciative of the benefits of such
knowledge and statistics. They
should also better realise the
difficulties in generating both and
acquiring the former. Similarly,
they need to be more prepared to
regularly interact with experts and
seriously consider the outcomes of
Economic Focus
L±n a^×Ñì@KS
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND ETHIOPIA‟S DEVELOPMENT
Vol. 6 No. 3 / January 2004 Ethiopian Economic Association
this interaction in making their
decisions.
I like to relate a story from
Uganda‘s experience to highlight
the power of knowledge,
particularly when it is combined
with the political will to make a
difference. After coming to power,
the Museveni government, perhaps
the president himself, feared that
devaluation of the Ugandan shilling
would increase inflation. As a result
it actually revalued the currency in
1986. But it allowed debate on the
issue to continue. What helped to
resolve the Ugandan debate was a
pair of papers written for the
Permanent secretary in 1989 by
Stephen Morris, then a young PhD
student who had been attached to
the Planning Ministry on a British
government fellowship. Without
going into details, let me say that
Morris showed that devaluation was
the correct policy. More
importantly, his papers convinced
the relevant policy makers, and the
policy was adopted. This link
between economic research and
policy making has since become
very strong in Uganda. As someone
concluded ‗the Ugandan story, …
gives as clear an example of
learning and innovation by a
protected technocracy as one can
find‘. Look where Uganda is
today!! By the way Stephen Morris
is now a full professor of economics
at Yale University and one of the
best young economic theoreticians
around.
Some specific proposals
Let me make some specific proposals.
Independent advisory council
Establish an independent advisory
council, which advises the
government on key policy matters,
and also assess the impact of
policies that are adopted. The exact
form and responsibilities should be
worked out in a systematic manner.
My preferred model is the council
of economic advisers in the US but
without the political ties of that
council.
Some may worry that such
arrangements may dilute the
authority of the government. This
however reflects a narrow
understanding of authority as
‗formal‘ or ‗nominal‘ rather than
‗real‘. Real authority is measured by
the effectiveness of an agent to
influence the relevant beliefs and
actions of other agents. Indeed,
efficient use of such arrangements
will enhance the effectiveness of the
government to nudge beliefs and
actions of citizens in the desired
direction. It does so by widening the
‗constituency‘ of policy decisions
through greater inclusiveness, better
communication, and improved
design and implementation.
National research foundation
Establish an autonomous national
research foundation which
coordinates research in the country,
solicit funds, and award grants. The
experience of the Ethiopian Science
and Technology Commission could
be built upon, in this regard.
Stock-taking
Launch a national effort in
economic knowledge stock-taking
and priority-setting. This effort
should involve government
agencies, academics, the private
sector, civil society organisations
and donors. The aim of such an
effort would be to reach ―... the
stage at which we know that we do
not know‖ via systematic:
cataloguing and review of
economic research conducted
about Ethiopia in the last 5-10
years (quality of methodology
and analysis, relevance,
effectiveness); and
review of economic research
capacity in Ethiopia
(manpower, institutional set-up,
data, other resources,
efficiency, funding).
It would be useful to build on the
experiences of EDRI, EEA, and
EARO. Subsequently, or in parallel,
the effort should initiate studies
aimed at:
identifying the type of
dominant market and non-
market institutional
arrangements and assess how
well they are functioning; and
assessing government policies
(including reform measures) as
a package, since it is not only
individual ingredients but also,
perhaps more importantly, the
combination of these
ingredients which determine
outcomes
There are some recent signs that the
Ethiopian government may be
thinking along similar lines.
CCoonncclluussiioonn
Let me close with a couple of
remarks.
I believe, like Professor Mesfin
before me, that the initiative should
come, and usually does come from,
the educated and the relatively rich
citizens of Ethiopia. This is so
because they are the only groups in
a poor society like ours that have
the necessary degree of comfort and
the requisite analytical tools, and
hence the responsibility, to
systematically reason and act.
Though the initiative comes from
these groups, enduring success
occurs only through and with the
participation of the rest of society.
Economic Focus
L±n a^×Ñì@KS
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND ETHIOPIA‟S DEVELOPMENT
Vol. 6 No. 3 / January 2004 Ethiopian Economic Association
Hence, on the basis of such
initiative, let us build ―a national
consensus to invest in the future.‖
In the spirit of the responsibility
described above, I have made some
specific proposals including a
research agenda. To a large extent
the research agenda I outlined
envisages a journey of self-
discovery – the systematic
discovery of our country‘s people
(their history, particularly economic
history; their norms and beliefs;
their aspirations and potentials; and
the incentives and constraints they
face) and ourselves (the educated
and the well-off) as human beings
and as Ethiopians. That discovery, I
believe is a key ingredient of the
effort to transform our society.
This, of course, is easier said than
done. However, as the Amharic
saying goes ‗Fear of dreams will not
stop us from sleeping.‘ The only
option we have is to continue to
think, investigate, constructively
discuss, and come up with some
workable solutions – a process that
needs to be continuous, dynamic,
and consonant with the changing
world we live in. No one else,
however well-intentioned, can do
this for us. We have to do it
ourselves.
Whenever each of us think about
our society‘s problems, whatever
possible solutions we come up with,
and whatever decisions we make,
let us remember the dreams of the
poor boy in the video clip we
watched. Whatever we do or do not
do, we are, individually and
collectively, accountable to him and
his generation – that is our children
and grandchildren.
Thank you.
RReeffeerreenncceess
Brunetti, Aymo, Gregory Kisunko,
and Beatrice Weder (1998).
―Credibility of Rules and
Economic Growth: Evidence
from a Worldwide Survey of
the Private Sector,‖ World
Bank Economic Review, Vol.
12, No. 3: 353–84.
Campos, Jose Edgardo, and Hadi
Salehi Esfahani (2000).
―Credible Commitment and
Success with Public Enterprise
Reform,‖ World Development,
Vol. 28, No. 2: 221-243.
Collier, Paul and Jan Willem
Gunning (1999). ―Explaining
African Economic
Performance,‖ Journal of
Economic Literature, Vol.
XXXVII: 64–111.
Dervis, Kemal, Jaime de Melo, and
Sherman Robinson (1982).
General Equilibrium Models
for Development Policy, The
World Bank, Washington D.C.
Easterly, William and Ross Levine.
(2001) ―It‘s Not Factor
Accumulation: Stylized Facts
and Growth Models,‖ World
Bank Economic Review.
______, (2003). ―Tropics, Germs,
and Crops: How Endowments
Influence Economic
Development,‖ Journal of
Economic Growth, 50, 1.
Imperial Ethiopian Government
(1968). Third Five Year
Development Plan, Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia.
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and P.
Ziodo-Lobat (1999).
―Governance Matters,‖ Policy
Research Working Paper No.
2196, The World Bank.
______, (2002). ―Governance
Matters II: Updated Indicators
for 2000/01,‖ The World Bank,
mimeo.
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and M.
Mastruzzi (2003). ―Governance
Matters III: Governance
Indicators for 1996-2002,‖ The
World Bank, mimeo.
Ndulu, Benno J., and Stephen A.
O‘Connell (1999).
―Governance and Growth in
Sub-Saharan Africa,‖ Journal
of Economic Perspectives,
Volume 13, Number 3: 41–66.
Reinikka, Ritva, and Paul Collier,
eds (2001). Uganda’s
Recovery: The Role of Farms,
Firms, and Government, The
World Bank, Washington, DC.
Stiglitz, Joseph (1998). ―The Private
Uses of Public Interests -
Incentives and Institutions,‖
Journal of Economic
Perspectives, Volume 12,
Number 2, Pages 3-22.
______, (1996). ―The Role of
Government in Economic
Development,‖ in: M. Bruno
and B. Pleskovic (eds.) Annual
World Bank Conference on
Development Economics, 1996.
The World Bank, Washington,
D.C.
Tanzi, Vito (2000). ―The Role of
the State and the Quality of the
Public Sector,‖ IMF Working
Paper, WP/00/36, International
Monetary Fund,
World Bank (2002). World
Development Indicators 2002,
The World Bank.
_______, (1997). World
Development Report 1997: The
State in a Changing World.
New York: Oxford University
Press.
Economic Focus
L±n a^×Ñì@KS
mLµM yx!÷ñ¸ÃêE xStÄdR
Vol. 6 No. 3 / January 2004 32 Ethiopian Economic Association
bQD¸Ã yx!÷ñ¸ mLµM
xStÄdRN b¸mlkT bxg‰CN ynbrWNÂ ÃlWN h#n@¬
m\rT b¥DrG äÃêE TNtÂ
b¥QrB R:ÃcWN XNDNU‰
§drg#N lì/R xl¥yh# |†M
Ãl"N xDÂöT kMSUÂ UR
l¥QrB XwÄlh#ÝÝ
bXn@ XMnT yì/R xl¥yh#
xq‰rB ytêÈlT nWÝÝ XNd
x!÷ñ¸ mLµM xStÄdRN Ãl
bXJg# sð R:S §Y tmSRè
R:YN ¥U‰T f¬" XNdçn
l¥ÂCNM SWR xYdlMÝÝ
MKNÃt$M ytlÆ }Ns(húïC SLèCN km-yq$M ÆšgR
bR:Y dr© XNÄ!gl} xDR¯
¥Sqm-# l@§ WSBSB tGÆR
bmçn# nWÝÝ
ì¼R xl¥yh# bGL} XNÄSqm-#T ÆlûT xSRT
xm¬T yx!T×eÃN x!÷ñ¸
y¸mlkt$ ytlÆ }Ns húÆêE
TNtÂãC' ymFTÿ xQÈÅãCÂ
±l!s!ãC Xytqys# tGƉêE
b!drg#M W-@¬¥ ÆlmçÂcW
xh#NM x!÷ñ¸ÃCN XJG xúúb!
dr© §Y Yg¾LÝÝ bm\rt$
DHnT ydµ¥ mêQ‰êE½
x!÷ñ¸ÃêE xStÄdR ¥Hb‰êE |R›T W-@T nWÝÝ YH W-@T
wYM DHnT ‰s# XDgTN
bmG¬T ÃlmrUUTN bmF-R
z§qEÂ xst¥¥" BL}GÂN XÃnq
CG„N ÃÆBsêLÝÝ Slz!HM nW
yx!÷ñ¸ mLµM xStÄdR DHnTN l¥SwgDM çn XDgTN
l¥Í-N wú" y¸çnWÝÝ
wd x-”§Y yxjNÄW n_ïC
kmGÆt& bðT Slx!÷ñ¸
mLµM xStÄdR -QlL Ãl# m\rt húïCN l¥Sqm_
XwÄlh#ÝÝ
Sl x!÷ñ¸ mLµM xStÄdR
SNnUgR Sl z§qE xst¥¥"nT ÃlW yx!÷ñ¸
|R›T xm‰RÂ xfÉiM §Y
¥t÷R YñRBÂLÝÝ YH }Ns
húB y¸ktl#TN q$MngéC
Ymlk¬LÝÝ
1 lx!÷ñ¸ÃêE XNQS”s@ Mc$ h#n@¬ l!f_„ y¸Cl# b¥Ké dr© y¸w-# yx!÷ñ¸ ±l!s!ãCN&
2 yx!÷ñ¸ XNQS”s@N y¸Ãbr¬t$ yNBrT Ælb@TnTN mBT ¥rUg_ êST mS-TN&
3 B”T ÃlW yq$__R |R›T (regulatory)&
4 yÑS ÃlmñR&& 5 w_ z§qEnT çcW
DHnTN y¸qRû ±l!s!ãC& 6 y¸w-# yx!÷ñ¸ ±l!s!ãCÂ
t²¥J mm¶ÃãCN l¥SfiM y¸Cl# B”T çcW tÌäC wzt... mñ„N Y=M‰LÝÝ
b¥N¾WM wQT ±ltEµêEÂ
x!÷ñ¸ÃêE mLµM xStÄdR
tnÈ_lW y¸¬† xYdl#MÝÝ
Slz!HM m¶ãC ±l!s! xW+ãC bx!÷ñ¸ g#Ä×C §Y b¸wSÄ*
cW XRM©ãC GL}nTÂ t-
ÃqEnT ÃlW xs‰R mktL
Y-bQÆcêLÝÝ kz!HM b§Y
bx!÷ñ¸ WS_ q$LF ¸Â
k¸Åwt$ mNG|¬êE ÃLçn# xµlÖC UR b_MrT bQNJT
mS‰T YñRÆcêLÝÝ
yx!÷ñ¸ mLµM xStÄdR bl@lÖC zRæC k¸ñ„ mLµM xStÄdéC tn_lÖ HLW l!ñrWM çn W-@¬¥ l!çN xYCLMÝÝ XRG_ kmLµM xStÄdR kÄ!äK‰s! UR btÃÃz# y¸ns# xk‰µ¶ n_ïC xl#ÝÝ
yì¼R xl¥yh#N }h#F únB
bXJg# kúb#" g#Ä×C xNÇ ymNG|T ±l!s!ãCN TKKl¾nT
tqÆYnT W-@¬¥nT lmlµT
yt-qÑbT SLT nWÝÝ bz!H
}h#ÍcW kx!÷ñ¸ UR btÃÃz#
Ãl#TN ymLµM xStÄdR
yt-ÃqEnT½ yGL{nT½ ytÌäC
Ãlm-ÂkR yHG |R›t$ DKmT ymNG|T ¸ÂÂ
yxQM WSNnT CGéC
xúYtêLÝÝ
kz!H bt=¥¶ l¬¶K lÆHL
y¸s-W xnst¾ GMT½
y±l!s!ãC w_nTÂ z§qEnT §Y
ÃlWN _RÈʽ yHG xSgÄJnT½
bxsfɸnT bt-ÃqEnT Ãl
yq$__R |R›T ¸²N XNÄ!h#M h#l#NM zRæC y¸ÄSs#
yx!÷ñ¸ÃêE XWqT ¥nS
mñ‰cWN xB‰RtêLÝÝ XSµh#N
bt-qs#T n_ïC Ñl# bÑl#
yMS¥¥ BçNM MNg!z@M
b!çN x¥‰+ húïCN b¥Qrb# XNÁT kxh#n# btšl mLk#
l!tgbR YC§L y¸lW
lWYY¬CN mnš ên¾W R:S
mçN YñRb¬L X§lh#ÝÝ
ì¼R xl¥yh# x!÷ñ¸ÃêE g#ĆC
§Y mdrG S§lÆcW WYYèCÂ
y±l!s! MRÅãC b¸mlkT
Ãnú*cW m\r¬êE q$MngéC
xl#ÝÝ YH m\r¬êE g#ÄY
XNÄl çñ GN bXn@ XMnT b¥N¾WM xgRÂ byT¾WM
¥Hb‰êE ÆH§êE h#n@¬
tqÆYnT çcW xD¥úêE ÆH¶
çcW (generic) yx!÷ñ¸
±l!s!ãC xl#ÝÝ Xnz!H
±l!s!ãC kGN²b@ b¥SgÆT
kxg‰CN t=Æ+ h#n@¬ UR
y¸ÈÈÑ ±l!s!ãCN mNdFÂ
¥SfiM ÃSfLULÝÝ
mLµM yx!÷ñ¸ÃêE xstÄdR
wLÄY xM¦*
_______________________
* yx!T×ùà xnSt¾ BDR q$-Æ tÌ¥T ¥HbR ê ÄYÊKtRÝÝ
Economic Focus
L±n a^×Ñì@KS
PROMOTING STABILITY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA
Vol. 6 No. 3 / January 2004 33 Ethiopian Economic Association
A Conflicted Corner of Africa
The Horn of Africa has been the
most conflicted part of the African
continent during the past half
century. Defined here as Ethiopia,
Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia,
Somaliland, Kenya and Uganda, the
root causes of conflict in the Horn
are numerous and sometimes
complex even within a single
dispute. They include ethnic,
language, regional and cultural
differences, arbitrary boundaries,
religion, ideology, competition for
scarce resources such as pasturage
and water, unequal sharing of
resources controlled by the state and
the sheer desire for power. The
importance of conflict on regional
economic development should be
obvious to everyone.
Except for peace between 1972 and
1983, Sudan experienced civil war
from 1955 until 2002 when the
Sudan People‘s Liberation Front
and the government reached a cease
fire agreement. Even today,
however, Sudan faces serious
problems in Darfur region on the
border with Chad and the dispute
with Egypt over the Halaib Triangle
is not resolved. Ethiopia confronted
an Eritrean secessionist movement
that began in 1961 and lasted until
the overthrow of the Derg
government in 1991 by the
Tigrayan People‘s Liberation Front,
its allied organizations and several
Eritrean groups, especially the
Eritrean People‘s Liberation Front.
An agreement to give Eritrea
independence resulted in cordial
relations between Ethiopia and
Eritrea until 1998 when Eritrean
troops entered Badme, a small piece
of territory administered by
Ethiopia. This led to major
hostilities until Ethiopia won a
military victory in 2000. Eritrea
has had less important differences
with Yemen (Hanish Islands),
Sudan (tit for tat support of
opposition groups) and Djibouti
(border issues). Djibouti
experienced periodic attacks by a
dissident Afar organization until the
mid-1990s.
Problems between Somalia and its
neighbors began soon after Somali
independence in 1960 when it
began to press irredentist claims
against Djibouti and parts of
Ethiopia and Kenya. There was
periodic conflict along the Somalia-
Kenya border, a conflict with
Ethiopia in 1964 and a major war
and occupation of most of
Ethiopia‘s Ogaden by Somalia in
1977-78. Somalia experienced its
own civil war beginning in the late
1980s. This led to the collapse of
Somalia in 1991 and the declaration
of an independent state by
authorities in Somaliland. Even
today there are occasional conflicts
between Ethiopia and groups in
Somalia, which remains a failed
state. Kenya has been relatively
free of strife but experienced
periodic ethnic conflict in its Rift
Valley region until the mid-1990s.
Tanzania invaded Uganda in 1978-
79 in a successful effort to
overthrow the Idi Amin regime. A
number of dissident groups have
operated in Uganda, the most
troublesome being the Lord‘s
Resistance Army, which has
received support from Sudan. For
their part, Uganda, Ethiopia and
Eritrea for many years supported
the Sudan People‘s Liberation
Movement against the government
in Khartoum. Uganda provided a
base of operation for the Rwandan
Patriotic Front that gained power
in Rwanda after the 1994
genocide. Uganda also sent
troops into the eastern Congo in
the mid-1990s. All of these
countries, except Somalia,
Somaliland and Djibouti, are Nile
Basin riparian states and, therefore,
part of the solution or problem in
reaching an agreement on the
sharing of Nile water before there is
a new regional conflict.
_________________________________ * Adjunct Professor, Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University.
PROMOTING STABILITY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA
David H. Shinn*
Economic Focus
L±n a^×Ñì@KS
PROMOTING STABILITY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA
Vol. 6 No. 3 / January 2004 Ethiopian Economic Association
The following remarks on
promoting stability in the Horn of
Africa, although sometimes critical,
are intended as constructive
criticism. They come from a friend
of the Horn of Africa. They do not
necessarily reflect the position of
the U.S. government; rather they are
those of a private American citizen
now working as a university
professor and writer on
developments in Africa. The
factors promoting stability
discussed below usually do not
apply in equal measure to all
countries in the Horn.
Build Democracy and
Transparency
The sooner that all of the countries
of the Horn of Africa develop
stronger democratic institutions and
establish an environment where
opposing ideas can be debated
freely in these institutions, the less
likely there will be new conflicts.
Democratic countries are simply
less threatening to their neighbors.
Democracies rarely attack or
undermine other democracies. This
does not mean that the countries of
the Horn should replicate precisely
the political systems existing today
in North America or among the
members of the European Union.
But some basic concepts must be
put in place without which there
will be no real democracy.
The political environment must
allow a responsible opposition to
compete for power on an equitable
basis. A responsible opposition is
one that operates within the
framework of a nation‘s constitution
and seeks power through legal
means. It is irresponsible if it tries
to achieve power through the use of
force or other extra-legal methods.
The opposition will also become
irresponsible if it succeeds in
reaching power through the
democratic process only to
disregard democratic principles
after that point.
An important part of this
democratic political environment is
regular, free and fair elections. But
elections alone are not the solution.
A vigorous, independent and
professional press must be allowed
to operate freely. There are, of
course, responsibilities that
accompany the private media. Of
all the countries in the Horn, Kenya
has the most open and professional
independent press. Ethiopia has
made noticeable progress in recent
years. The independent press is
increasingly outspoken, critical and
professional. On the other hand, the
perception of press freedom in
Ethiopia has been damaged as a
result of the draft press law and the
dispute between the government
and the Ethiopia Free Press
Journalists‘ Association. Eritrea
does not even have a viable
independent press while the
situation in Sudan has been
regressing recently and, in any
event, there is a long way to go
before it can be said to have a free
press.
Independent and professional
judicial systems are weak
throughout the region. Kenya and
Uganda, perhaps for historical
reasons, appear to have the best
developed judiciaries. In some
countries, such as Ethiopia, the
judicial system remains woefully
understaffed; this contributes
enormously to caseload backlogs.
As important as adequate staffing of
the institution is, there is an
equivalent need to inculcate within
the government and citizenry
respect for independence of the
judiciary. There must also be a
commitment by the government and
the population to abide by the spirit
and letter of the nation‘s
constitution.
All countries in the Horn are subject
to criticism on their human rights
practices, some much more than
others. This is an area where all
elements of society, led by the
government, must make a
commitment to reduce and
eventually eliminate human rights
abuses. Although human rights
organizations do not always get the
facts right, they should be
applauded for their efforts rather
than just vilified when governments
perceive that they are being overly
critical. Human rights should be a
matter of national policy. Ethiopia,
for example, passed legislation in
1999 to establish a national Human
Rights Commission and Office of
the Ombudsman. This was an
excellent initiative. Unfortunately,
the legislation has not yet been
implemented.
A critical element in the
development of democracy is the
strengthening of civil society
organizations. This includes
independent trade unions, chambers
of commerce, women‘s groups,
teacher‘s and lawyer‘s
organizations, student groups,
human rights councils, etc.
Eventually, these organizations can
make a major contribution to
creating an environment that
encourages democratic practices.
Except for Kenya and to some
extent Uganda, civil society is not
well developed in the Horn. The
sooner that civil society groups take
root throughout the Horn of Africa,
the greater the likelihood that real
democracy will follow.
All the good that can come from the
Economic Focus
L±n a^×Ñì@KS
PROMOTING STABILITY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA
Vol. 6 No. 3 / January 2004 Ethiopian Economic Association
building of these democratic
institutions and processes will be
destroyed if one insidious
practice—corruption—accompanies
them. To some extent, every
society, including the United States,
faces this problem. Corruption will
never disappear entirely, but
governments and the private sector
must remain vigilant constantly to
minimize the damage done by both
petty and grand corruption. Much
of Kenya‘s success with
democratization has been undone by
the pervasiveness of corruption in
the country. If Kenya does not
control this problem, its prospects
will not be good. Other countries in
the Horn need to take every legal
effort possible in their battle to
contain this disease.
There is often pressure, particularly
in the international donor
community and among opposition
political parties, to push for instant
democracy. There is no such thing
as instant democracy. But the trend
in any particular country must be in
a positive direction. If there is
constant, visible improvement in a
variety of areas, the international
community should be patient and
supportive. If the process stalls or
goes backwards, the international
partners should be outspoken in
their criticism. In any event, they
should aid the process by helping to
build democratic institutions such as
an independent judiciary and
parliament and help in the creation
of a pervasive and influential civil
society. They should also engage
governments—sometimes privately
and sometimes publicly—in a
policy dialogue on those issues
where they do not see eye to eye.
Reduce Ethnic Tension
One of the most difficult problems
to solve in the Horn is the question
of ethnic tension. Ethnic issues
often lead to, or at least contribute
to, conflict in the region. There are
as many reasons for conflict
between groups as there are
solutions to reducing tension. Some
of these differences are historical in
nature. Often they involve
disagreement over scarce resources,
especially land and water. Actual
or perceived lack of political power
by certain ethnic groups is also a
frequent reason for opposing
established governments.
Sometimes the conflict occurs
entirely within the borders of a
country such as the Kikuyu-
Kalenjin disputes over land in
Kenya‘s Rift Valley. Other ethnic
difficulties cross national
boundaries as historically has been
the case with Somalis from Somalia
agitating inside Ethiopia and Kenya.
It is not within the purview of this
paper to suggest solutions to these
numerous ethnic conflicts, whether
they are internal or cross border
disputes. Each case is to some
extent sui generis in any event. But
it is important to take whatever
steps a country can to reduce the
level of ethnic tension. For the
internal problems, equitable sharing
of political power and state
resources is probably the most
important measure a government
can take. For those ethnic conflicts
that cross international boundaries,
regional economic integration and
improved communication at the
local and national level are useful
ways to mitigate conflict. In this
connection, Ethiopia and Sudan
have put in place procedures and
institutions to improve
communication along the border.
The two countries have ambitious
plans to improve economic
integration along the northern part
of their border. At some point, this
would seem to be the most effective
way to repair the relationship
between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
End Support for Opposition
Groups
There is a long history in the Horn
of Africa whereby one country
supports an opposition group in one
or more of the neighboring
countries. This is a destabilizing
and self-defeating policy. It
inevitably leads to retribution by the
targeted country, which then
supports an opposition group in the
country that initiated the problem.
There is no question that this tit for
tat tactic only increases instability
throughout the region and that it
continues up to the present day.
Sudan and its neighbors offer a case
in point. Since the resumption in
1983 of the civil war in Sudan, three
of its neighbors—Uganda, Ethiopia
and Eritrea—have on various
occasions supported the Sudan
Pe op l e‘ s Li ber a t i on
Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and/or
the National Democratic Alliance.
For its part, Sudan has periodically
supported the Lord‘s Resistance
Army (LRA) in Uganda, the Oromo
Liberation Front (OLF) in Ethiopia
and Eritrean Islamic Jihad (EIJ) in
Eritrea. Ultimately, all of this
reciprocal support for another
country‘s opposition group resulted
in more conflict and increased
regional instability.
Joseph Kony‘s LRA in northern
Uganda graphically makes the
argument. For the past 17 years
Kony has opposed the Ugandan
government believing that he has
Economic Focus
L±n a^×Ñì@KS
PROMOTING STABILITY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA
Vol. 6 No. 3 / January 2004 Ethiopian Economic Association
spiritual powers to save the Acholi
people. He draws much of his
military support from several
thousand abducted child soldiers
and a couple hundred adult
commanders. Sudan began
supporting the LRA with small
quantities of arms in 1994 in
response to Uganda‘s assistance to
the SPLA. Sudan‘s goal was to
destabilize Uganda on its northern
border in order to obstruct the flow
of arms to the SPLA, which was
fighting Sudan‘s army. Following
efforts by the SPLA and the
government of Sudan to end the
civil war, both Sudan and Uganda
claim they have ended military
support respectively for the LRA
and SPLA. By 2003 Uganda and
Sudan were cooperating in tracking
down LRA forces operating out of
southern Sudan. This is a positive
development, but should the effort
to end the civil war in Sudan fail,
the tit for tat support of these two
groups would probably resume soon
thereafter.
The outbreak of conflict in 1998
between Eritrea and Ethiopia
changed alliances in the Horn.
Ethiopia, Uganda and Eritrea were
until that event aligned against
Sudan. Ethiopia fully normalized
relations with Sudan within a year
or two. Both Uganda and Eritrea
reestablished diplomatic relations
with Khartoum, although Eritrean-
Sudanese ties continue to be
strained. While the Ethiopian-
Eritrean conflict ended much of the
tit for tat support of opposition
groups involving Sudan, it set in
motion a new round of support for
opposition groups in Eritrea and
Ethiopia. Eritrea befriended the
OLF while Ethiopia began to
support opponents of the
government in Asmara.
Until it became a failed state in
1991, Somalia backed or permitted
the operation within its borders of
groups hostile to the government in
Addis Ababa. These groups
included the militant wing of the
Ogadeni National Liberation Front
and the Western Somali Liberation
Front. After the fall of the Siad
Barre government, the political
vacuum in Somalia resulted in new
threats. Due to the absence of a
national government and sometimes
with the connivance of certain
Somali factions, the fundamentalist
al-Ittihad al-Islami launched attacks
in the mid-1990s from Somalia
against Ethiopia. For a brief period
in the late 1990s, one of the Somali
political factions helped the OLF to
establish a base in Somalia. For its
part, Ethiopia attacked its enemies
across the Somali border and
continues to support its favorite
factions inside the country.
The solution, albeit difficult to
achieve, to ending these debilitating
and unproductive games is the full
normalization of relations among all
countries in the Horn followed by
greater political and economic
integration. Until there are
sufficient incentives at the
leadership level of countries in the
Horn to move in this direction,
nothing will happen. Through the
use of tangible incentives and
tough, frank discussions, the
international community can
encourage such a trend. Sudan and
the SPLM/A are well advanced in
achieving reconciliation and
bringing to an end one of the most
destructive civil wars on the
continent. Although the unity
agreement signed in late January in
Nairobi by Somali factional leaders
is encouraging, Somalia is still a
long way from achieving peace.
Continuing problems between
Ethiopia and Eritrea also seem far
from resolution.
Encourage Harmony among
People of Different Religions
The Horn of Africa is located on a
religious fault line. The populations
of Ethiopia and Eritrea are divided
about equally between Muslims and
Christians. Historically, internal
relations between the two religious
groups in both countries have been
cordial. On the other hand, Islamic
invasions from outside have left a
residue of ill feeling. There is a
significant non-Muslim minority in
Sudan, a factor that has contributed
to instability in that country. There
are significant Muslim minorities in
largely Christian Kenya and Uganda
that increasingly lead to tension in
society. Somalia, Somaliland and
Djibouti are almost entirely
Muslim.
It is imperative that governments
pursue policies that encourage
religious harmony in all countries of
the Horn. They can not afford to
add to their list of problems
growing hostility between Muslims
and Christians. It is also becoming
increasingly common for outside
extremist groups to manipulate
small numbers of indigenous
Muslims to support activities aimed
at harming established governments
or Western interests. So far, Kenya
has been the primary focus of these
efforts as evidenced by the 1998
bombing of the American embassy
in Nairobi and the 2002 attacks
against Israeli interests near
Mombasa. The increased use of
terrorism by radical Islamic groups
as a tactic to achieve political goals
is a real threat to the countries of the
Horn. An influx of extreme Islamic
influence from outside is not in the
interest of the region. At the same
time, it is important that Christian
groups not be overzealous as they
proselytize. It is not in anyone‘s
Economic Focus
L±n a^×Ñì@KS
PROMOTING STABILITY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA
Vol. 6 No. 3 / January 2004 Ethiopian Economic Association
long term interest if these efforts
result in serious disagreements with
Muslims or, for that matter, other
Christian groups.
Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda and,
especially Kenya, need to reach out
more to their Muslim communities
and ensure proportionate sharing of
power and resources.
Radicalization of these Islamic
communities will only undermine
stability. Somalia, Somaliland,
Djibouti and, especially Sudan,
need to be equally attentive to their
non-Muslim minorities. They also
should be alert to and take steps to
prevent the rise of radical Islam,
particularly where the agenda is to
encourage instability in the region.
This is a special problem for
Somalia, which still does not have a
government that controls all of the
country. It is one more reason why
the various political factions in
Somalia need to put their
differences behind them and make
compromises that will lead to a
national government. Finally, if all
the countries in the Horn become
more democratic there will tend to
be a tendency toward greater
harmony among people of different
religions.
There is also a role for the
international community.
Individual partner countries, most
of which are Christian, need to
improve their own understanding
about and outreach to Muslims in
countries where Islam is a minority
religion (Kenya and Uganda) or
where the leadership is
predominantly Christian (Ethiopia
and Eritrea) in a religiously divided
country. This should include
development assistance that is
targeted for areas largely inhabited
by Muslims. The international
community should also increase its
support for the Intergovernmental
Authority on Development‘s efforts
to achieve peace in Sudan and
Somalia. In the case of Somalia, it
may well require a different
approach than the one underway in
Kenya and tried on so many
previous occasions at conferences
outside Somalia. Whatever the
partner countries can do to enhance
religious tolerance in the Horn of
Africa will be time and money well
spent. It is in the interest of both
the countries in the Horn and the
wider international community.
Achieve Equitable Nile Water
Sharing
Equitable sharing of water in the
Nile basin is a critical element in
the long term stability of the region.
There are ten riparian states in the
Nile basin, but the most important
ones are Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt and
Uganda. Ninety-five percent of
Egypt‘s population depends on Nile
water. The Nile effectively is
Egypt‘s lifeline. All of the water
reaching Egypt flows through
Sudan, which also depends heavily
on it for irrigated agriculture.
Eighty-six percent of the water
reaching the Aswan Dam originates,
however, in Ethiopia. Most of it
comes from the Blue Nile and
Ethiopian tributaries that flow into
the Blue Nile; the remainder
originates from Ethiopian tributaries
that flow into Sudan‘s Atbara and
Sobat Rivers. Egypt and Sudan
signed agreements in 1929 and
1959 that divided the water between
the two countries. Ethiopia was not
even a signatory.
Agreement among the ten riparian
states on the use of this water
system has the potential to improve
significantly wider cooperation in
the region. Conversely, failure to
reach agreement will substantially
increase the prospect for instability
and regional conflict. Fortunately,
there are a number of positive
initiatives underway that give hope
for an agreement by the riparian
states on sharing of Nile water.
Potentially the two most important
adversaries over use of the water are
Ethiopia and Egypt. There appears,
however, to be a growing
understanding by both countries of
the need to resolve this issue. The
Egyptian Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs, Fayza Aboulnaga,
during a visit to Addis Ababa at the
end of 2003 described the bilateral
relationship as ―moving towards a
new era of mutual understanding,
mutual confidence and trust.‖
It is in the interest of the ten riparian
states to make the necessary
compromises so that equitable Nile
water sharing can take place. The
wider international community
should also provide strong political
support and reasonable financial
resources to ensure a successful
outcome. A peaceful resolution of
this potentially serious dispute
would constitute one of the most
important instances of conflict
prevention ever witnessed on the
African continent.
Reverse the HIV/AIDS
Pandemic
One of the major challenges to
stability and economic development
in the region is the HIV/AIDS
pandemic. According to UNAIDS,
the HIV prevalence rate for persons
in the 15 to 49 age group in Kenya
is 9.4 percent, Ethiopia 7.3 percent,
Uganda 5 percent and Eritrea 2.4
percent. Uganda, out of all African
countries, has had the greatest
success at lowering the national
prevalence rate from a much higher
Economic Focus
L±n a^×Ñì@KS
PROMOTING STABILITY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA
Vol. 6 No. 3 / January 2004 Ethiopian Economic Association
level. Nevertheless, Kampala
residents last year still faced 17
percent HIV prevalence, a sharp
decrease from its peak but an
unacceptably high rate. Although
the percentage of persons in
Ethiopia with HIV is not among the
highest on the continent, Ethiopia
has the third highest number of HIV
positive persons in the world after
India and South Africa. This is due
to Ethiopia‘s large population of 70
million. The prevalence rate in
Somalia, Somaliland and northern
Sudan is thought to be low but
growing. No one knows the
prevalence rate in southern Sudan,
but it is believed to be very high.
Djibouti is also thought to have a
high rate because its population is
concentrated in an urban port city.
In relative terms, Kenya may be the
most threatened country in the
Horn. Out of a total population of
about 30 million, more than two
million are thought to be HIV
positive. An estimated 1.5 million
Kenyans have already died from
AIDS. Life expectancy has dropped
by at least 13 years to
approximately 50 years. HIV/AIDS
reduced GDP by three-tenths of a
percent in 2000 and is expected to
have an even larger negative impact
in the future. More women than
men are HIV positive and
increasingly the epidemic is
becoming a serious gender and
development issue. Although the
Kibaki government has begun to
treat HIV as a major threat to the
economy, the implications for
Kenya‘s economic development
still could be horrendous. In
Malawi, for example, where the
problem is more severe, the World
Bank recently estimated that up to
half of the country‘s professional
workforce could die of AIDS by
2005.
In the Horn of Africa, the impact of
HIV/AIDS on the economy has
already been significant and has the
potential for being catastrophic if
HIV prevalence rates are not
reversed. The Ethiopian Economic
Association‘s Second Annual
Report on the Ethiopian Economy
appropriately emphasized this issue.
It noted that HIV/AIDS retards
growth, weakens human capital,
discourages investment and
exacerbates poverty and inequality.
In short, it increases instability
while a significant reduction in the
HIV rate would enhance stability.
The social, personal and economic
aspects of HIV/AIDS are now
generally appreciated throughout
the region. Only recently, however,
has the negative impact on security
forces become a consideration.
There is a high incidence of
HIV/AIDS in African armies.
According to UNAIDS, between 60
and 70 percent of the personnel in
South Africa‘s military are HIV
positive versus about 20 percent for
the entire adult population. Eleven
percent of Nigeria‘s peacekeepers
returning from Liberia and Sierra
Leone tested positive as compared
to about 5 percent in Nigeria‘s adult
population. An estimated 66
percent of Ugandan soldiers who
went to the Democratic Republic of
the Congo came back positive. The
International Crisis Group reports
that about 10 percent of Eritrean
soldiers are HIV positive. In
southern Africa, the prevalence
rates are already at the point where
they may destroy the security force.
A study of Ethiopia‘s army suggests
that the presence of HIV is about 6
percent or slightly below the rate for
the adult population. Ethiopia has
done a generally good job in dealing
with HIV in the armed forces and is
certainly an exception in this regard.
But this is no time for complacency
in Ethiopia and certainly not in the
other countries of the Horn where
the HIV rate in the military is
probably higher than in the general
population.
At least this is one problem where
the international community is
making a major effort to reverse the
damage. The United Nations‘
Global Fund, the World Bank,
European Union and bilateral
donors like the United States are
providing significant amounts of
financial and technical assistance.
Numerous non-governmental
organizations, foundations such as
Gates and Packard and even private
companies like Pfizer are also doing
their part.
Make Food Security a High
Priority
Most countries in the Horn do not
consistently grow enough food to
feed their populations. They
increasingly rely on imported food,
usually at little or no cost from
donor nations. This is not a
sustainable situation. It has been
said for decades that Sudan is a
potential breadbasket that could
feed much of the region. Yet Sudan
in recent years has barely produced
enough food for its own people.
Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti and
Somalia have structural food
deficits. Even in a normal crop
year, there is a need to import food
for five to six million Ethiopians.
During years of severe drought,
locusts and/or flooding they have
huge food deficits. Uganda and
Kenya usually grow enough food to
feed their populations, but even they
have had years when they had to
import food to meet domestic
requirements.
Economic Focus
L±n a^×Ñì@KS
PROMOTING STABILITY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA
Vol. 6 No. 3 / January 2004 Ethiopian Economic Association
Improved food security contributes
to political stability. Until conflict
ends in countries like Somalia it
will be difficult to achieve food
self-sufficiency. Sudan will never
be able to maximize agricultural
production so long as the civil war
continues. The entire region needs
to liberalize trade so that crop
surpluses in one country can flow
more easily to a deficit country.
Improved regional transportation
links, for example the road between
Moyale in Ethiopia and Isiolo in
Kenya, would also facilitate the
movement of agricultural goods.
Some countries need to take a hard
look at their agricultural policies.
In this regard, it will be instructive
to evaluate several years from now
the impact of Ethiopia‘s land
resettlement policy on food
production. So long as this remains
a voluntary program, minds should
remain open until enough time has
passed to assess its results. The
debate should continue, however,
on other aspects of land policy in
Ethiopia.
Partner countries and international
organizations have been highly
responsive to meeting emergency
food requirements in the Horn.
They have been much less effective
in helping to increase local food
production. Technical assistance
for the agricultural sector in the
Horn, an evaluation of the impact of
agricultural polices in developed
countries on the economies of poor
developing countries and a frank
agricultural policy dialogue
between the two are all in order.
Pay More Attention to
Population Planning
Closely related to food security is
the problem of high population
growth rates. Fast growing
populations result in more people to
feed. According to the Central
Intelligence Agency Factbook, the
estimated population growth rates in
2003 for countries in the Horn range
from a low of 1.27 percent in Kenya
to a high of 3.43 percent in Somalia.
The only country other than Kenya
with a low rate is Eritrea at 1.28
percent. The Factbook puts
Ethiopia‘s growth rate at 1.96
percent, although Ethiopia‘s
National Population Affairs Office
recently indicated that the growth
rate is 2.7 percent. Factbook
figures for Djibouti are 2.13
percent, Sudan 2.71 percent and
Uganda 2.96 percent.
Most countries in the Horn have
little unused arable land; these high
population growth rates are not
sustainable and they add to political
instability. The UNFPA, the United
Nations Population Fund, projects,
for example, that Ethiopia‘s
population will reach 170 million in
30 years. If this calculation is
correct, it would appear almost
impossible for Ethiopia to grow
enough additional food to support
that population. It is imperative that
governments, partner countries and
international and non-governmental
organizations work to reduce these
high growth rates in order to
diminish pressure on the land and to
provide a higher quality of services
for the existing population. This, in
turn, will promote stability in the
Horn.
Curb Production and Use of
Chat
Readers may be surprised to find in
an analysis of factors that promote
political stability a discussion of
chat. An amphetamine-like
stimulant banned in the United
States and much of Europe, chat is
chewed throughout the Horn and is
a scourge that has done irreparable
harm to most families and the
economy in Djibouti, Somalia and
Somaliland. An addictive substance,
its use is increasing elsewhere,
especially in Ethiopia. Chat reduces
economic productivity, results in
lost time, consumes a
disproportionate amount of
disposable income from those who
have little and results in health
problems.
Chat is a particular dilemma for
Ethiopia and Kenya, which grow it in
highland areas as an important cash
crop. Because of the sharp drop in
the price of coffee, increasingly
farmers are uprooting their coffee
bushes and replacing them with chat.
As a result, chat accounted for 12
percent of all Ethiopian export
income in 2002. Today you can find
significant quantities of chat in the
hills around Harar, Hararge, Bahir
Dar, Butajira and even Addis Ababa.
Until Ethiopian and Kenyan farmers
can be convinced to plant alternative
crops, it will be difficult to eliminate
production of this harmful product. It
may be even more difficult to stop
people from using it. No one has
found a way to end alcoholism and
cocaine use in industrialized societies,
but there are serious programs to limit
the damage they do.
In the meantime, chat production
tends to lead to increasing usage in
those areas where it is grown. What
may appear as a boon for Ethiopian
and Kenyan farmers is already
returning to haunt Ethiopian and
Kenyan society. There should be no
doubt about chat‘s direct contribution
to conflict. It contributes to the on-
going violence in Somalia where the
combination of a young militia
member with an AK-47 and a night of
chat chewing can be deadly.
Economic Focus
L±n a^×Ñì@KS
PROMOTING STABILITY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA
Vol. 6 No. 3 / January 2004 Ethiopian Economic Association
Although there are other more
pressing problems in the region, the
sooner the countries of the Horn work
together to curb this practice, the
greater will be the prospects for
stability.
Attack Poverty
The leadership throughout the Horn
of Africa seems to appreciate the
need to alleviate poverty and
probably understands that high
levels of poverty contribute to
conflict. As a region, the Horn is
poor. According to the CIA
Factbook, the percent of the
population that falls below the
poverty line in Ethiopia is 45
percent, in Djibouti and Kenya 50
percent and Eritrea 53 percent.
There are no statistics for Somalia
and Sudan, although it is safe to
assume that they would be high.
Only Uganda at 35 percent scores
reasonably well on this scale.
The World Bank has taken the lead
on this issue with its Poverty
Reduction Strategy model. The
Bank encourages donors to
coordinate in support of a strong
government-driven strategy with
wide civil society participation.
This strategy becomes very
difficult, however, where freedom
of speech and participation are
constrained and where the capacity
to implement poverty reduction
programs is weak. The Bank also
observes that civil war and
interstate conflict lead to a political
impasse and breakdown in decision
making that bring well intentioned
programs to a halt.
By their nature, poverty reduction
programs are long term. They
require the sustained support of the
international community and
intelligent national policies. If they
are to maximize prospects for
improving stability, they must also
have as their goal a reduction in the
gap between the rich and the poor.
And Finally There Are Special
Situations in the Horn
Much of the region will remain
subject to turmoil until there is an
end to Somalia‘s failed state status.
There have been numerous
attempts, most of them supported to
some extent by the international
community, to reestablish a national
government in Somalia. They all
failed and the current effort in
Kenya appears headed toward a
similar result. It is time to return to
a bottom up approach rather than
one which operates from the top
down, i.e. persuading Somali
faction leaders to accept a power
sharing formula. A bottom up
strategy that relies more heavily on
elders, clan leaders and civil society
organizations will take a long time.
But the top down approach has not
shown permanent success after a
dozen years of conferences outside
Somalia.
Ending the civil war in Sudan is
another major priority for stability in
the region. In spite of recent setbacks
in the reconciliation process, the
prospects remain good in the coming
weeks for signing a peace agreement
between the government of Sudan and
the SPLA. The hard part will begin
with implementation of the agreement.
It is important to include political
groups in the implementation phase
that were not signatories to the
agreement. In order to help insure
success, Khartoum must also find a
way to end the conflict in Darfur. All
of this will require enormous
international support and follow
through.
Ethiopia is the key to stability in the
Horn of Africa. With some 70
million people, it has by far the
largest population. It is the only
country that shares a border with all
the other countries except Uganda.
If Ethiopia is unstable, neighboring
countries will almost certainly be
impacted in a negative way. It is
also inevitable that there will be
continuing pressure for this land-
locked country with such a large
population to obtain improved
access to the sea. To some extent,
access can be expanded through
greater use of Port Sudan and
Berbera. But as long as the
Ethiopia-Eritrea border issue
remains unresolved, it will be
difficult to solve this problem.
Eritrea‘s Red Sea port of Assab is
the obvious outlet and a restoration
of cordial relations with Eritrea
would also bring the port of
Massawa back into the picture. It is
none too soon to consider the
possibilities. One could envisage,
for example, an internationally
guaranteed corridor from the
Ethiopian border to Assab and long
term use of Assab port by Ethiopia
in exchange for appropriate
compensation to Eritrea for use of
the corridor and port. In the grand
scheme of things, guaranteed access
to Assab for Ethiopia will play a
major role in helping to assure
stability in the Horn of Africa.