EC Competition Policy Newsletter v2 n1 · 2019. 8. 16. · Liberalisation and State Intervention 31 Most important recent developments ... slow down the telecoms sector has thrived

EC COMPETITIONPOLICYNEWSLETTER

Editor:Chris Jones

InformationOfficer:P. Alevantis

Address:European Commission,C150, 00/158,Wetstraat 200, rue de la LoiBrussel B-1049 Bruxellestel. +322 2957620fax. +322 2955437

Electronic Mail:

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Internet: [email protected]

ISSN:

1025-2266

number 1volume 2Spring 1996

c o m p e t i t i o n p o l i c y

NEWSLETTERPublished quarterly by the Competition Directorate-General of the European Commission

Competition policy in the TelecomsContents

1 Competition policy in the Telecomssector, by Alexander SCHAUB

Opinions & Comment8 Le Livre vert sur la révision du

règlement relatif au contrôle desconcentrations, par Eric Cuziat

10 Technology transfer: the newregulation, by Chris Mitropoulos

13 Telecoms sector soon fully open tocompetition: the central role of theE u r o p e a n Commiss ion , b yC. Hocepied

Anti-Trust Rules18 Most important recent developments20 Other relevant press releases21 Court Judgements

Mergers27 Summary of the most important recent

developments, by John Fells30 Press releases and Judgements

Liberalisation and State Intervention31 Most important recent developments

State Aid33 Summary of the most important recent

developments, by H. Mørch36 Press Releases and Judgements

International Dimension ofCompetition Policy38 Summary of the most important recent

developments, by S. Depypere,T . J a k o b , B . C a r t o n a n dY. Scaramozzino

41 Russian Competition Law, byI. Kokovikhine

INFORMATION SECTION

44 DG IV Staff List46 Documentation56 Coming up ...57 New procedure for the dissemination

of Merger decisions57 More Information

57 CASES COVERED IN THIS ISSUE

Sector

by Alexander SCHAUB,Director General for Competition, European Commission

Telecommunications is one of thelargest and most profitable economicsectors in the world. At a time whennearly all large industrial and servicecorporations faced general economicslow down the telecoms sector hasthrived. Where telecoms services (data,long distance and mobile) have beensubjected to the greatest level ofcompetition is where the greatestrevenue growth and new employmenthave been created. In those countriesin the EU and around the world withthe longest experience of liberalisation,it is also evident that telecomsemployment by new service suppliersoffsets jobs shed by incumbent PTOsas they take on the productivity gainsof new technology.

At the same time, the increasinglystrong link between efficient telecomsservice and the whole national economyis shown in the growing reliance whichbusiness in general places on telecoms.Over the last ten years the ratio ofbusiness telecoms links to employeeswas around one to nine, now it is morethan one to three. The benefits tobusiness of telecoms competition are ofcourse well known. However, it isimportant to underline that figures fromaround the world show that residentialusers also see significant benefits whencompetition is introduced.

The information sector todayrepresents 450 bn ECUs (600bn US$)in the European Union alone. It ispredicted that we will be facing a 3trillion dollar worldwide market bythe end of the 90s.

THREE KEY INGREDIENTS :CONVERGENCE, DIGITALI-ZATION, COMPETITION

The new information sector is beingfundamentally re-shaped by theconvergence of the telecoms sectorwith information technology and the"content industries" of televisionbroadcasting and publishing. Thisposes decisive and unprecedentedchallenges for public policy at bothnational and EU level, as we run up tofull telecommunications liberalisationby 1998.

There is massive potential for growthin Europe especially in the market forbroadband services to the home.Compared with the US where 35% ofhouseholds are equipped with PCs, weare still below 20% - though growingrapidly. Over 60% of US homes arelinked to cable networks; in Europe sixof the Member States have less than25% of households passed, and threehave no cable network to speak of yet.

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The impulse of market players topick up the slack between potentialand market penetration is remarkablyrapid. As we speak a wave of megamergers and joint ventures are beingformed in Europe. Much of these arespurred on by developments inmultimedia services and applications.This is characterised by the verticalintegration of content producers andvarious distributers and carriers, andalso a horizontal convergencebetween the telecoms, cable andcomputer networks.

Competition will be amplified by theentering of digitisation in thetelevision sector which may havesimilar effects in the television sectorin the nineties as the introduction ofd ig i t a l i s a t ion had i n t hetelecommunications sector in theeighties. Its first consequence isfurther multiplication of channels andsupply. A second is convergence withtelecommunications and softwareservices, in the context of theInformation Society concept.

The resulting new opportunities ofpackaging of offerings across sectors,particularly in fields like video-on-demand, special interest offerings andon-line services is leading torepositioning and alliances acrosstechnologies and markets in the movetowards multi-media.The mediasector is undergoing substantialrestructuring in Europe as in theUnited States.

These developments have led to adramatically increased role of EUcompetition law for the sector. Weare in favour of commercial initiativeand partnerships when they are in theinterests of the Information Society.But alliances must have a competitivenot an anti-competitive logic behind

them. With this in mind we havetwo general conditions:

The first is that such a powerful andradical revolution in telecoms as weare experiencing must be overseen bycompetition safeguards: basicprinciples which need to be asflexible and global as the moves andthe players themselves

The second is that the markets mustbe liberalised before we can allowtheir dominant players to join forces.We cannot risk that markets such asdigital interactive TV, or globalmobile satellite systems, are sewn upby defensive commercial movesbefore they are even opened tocompetition. New gateways must beopened to avoid gatekeepersstrengthening their positions.

COMPETITION POLICY INTHE TELECOMS SECTOR : A"THREE PRONGED"APPROACH

Competition policy in the telecommssector follows a " three pronged"approach:

1. Lifting government restrictions onmarket entry (Article 90).

2. Setting down minimum rules offair play which must be ensured bynational governments (Article 90).

3. Controlling the behaviour andagreements of dominant players(Article 85 and 86, Mergerregulation).

On March 13, 1996 the Commissionadopted the final directive needed tocomplete the first of these "prongs".It implements into EU law the

commitment to full competition in theEU telecommunications market by 1stJanuary 1998. The directive fixes thedate for full liberalisation into EUlegislation and sets out deadlines forprogress in national implementation inpreparation for this goal. A crucialfactor in achieving this was therecognition that competition, in thepresence of the necessary regulatorysafeguards provided by the OpenNetwork Provision (ONP) framework,will enhance the provision ofuniversal service as well as promotingeconomic growth and employmentboth within and outside the telecomssector. In line with the broaderinterests of global information societycoordination, adoption of this new EUlegislative framework came just fourweeks after final agreement in the USof the 1996 Telecoms Act which fullymodernises US telecoms regulationsand market structure.

In addition to the 1998 date foropening up the markets in voicetelephony and public networkinfrastructure, the full competitiondirective accelerates the liberalisationin all other areas. As of July 1 of thisyear use of all alternativeinfrastructure (such as the telecomsnetworks of railways, energy andwater companies which are currentlyonly authorised for restricted "in-house" purposes) must be liberalisedfor carriage of commercial telecomsservices. This provision excludespublic voice telephony service whichmay be reserved to the nationaltelecoms organisation until 1998.

Alongside the lifting of governmentrestrictions, the directive also setsdown broad competition principles asregards the appropriate nationalregulatory frameworks for the post1998 environment. This concerns, in

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particular, interconnection, licensingand financing of universal service.Such regulatory instruments must betransparent, non-discriminatory andas least restrictive of competition aspossible whilst still achievingimportant policy goals of publicservice, interoperability and use oflimited resources such as spectrumand rights of way.

The harmonisation requirements ofMember State rules in these areas fallunder the EU's ONP (Open NetworkProvision) framework which isconcerned with open and efficientaccess to, and use of, the publictelecoms networks and services.ONP Council and Parliamentlegislation in these areas, issuedunder Article 100A, is currentlyunder discussion but a review clausein the directive ensures that theArticle 90 framework will be fullycoordinated and coherent with theONP framework. In the meantime,before implementation of ONP rulesis achieved and/or in areas wheretheir application is limited, the rightsof new entrants to liberalised marketentry under the terms of Treatycompetition rules will not becompromised.

The full competition directiverepresents the last hurdle in the seriesof directives in the telecoms sectorissued under Article 90 (amendingdirective 90/388), phasing outGovernment restrictions and protectedmonopolies across the EU.

DEADLINES FOR MEMBERSTATES

The absolute deadlines for MemberStates to notify measuresimplementing liberalisation (ie taking

into account derogations whereapplicable for countries with lessdeveloped or very small networks)are now as follows:

August 1995: satellite services andequipment;

July 1996: transmission capacity onalternative networks;

October 1996: use of cable networks;

November 1996: mobilecommunications;

January 1998: public voice telephonyservice and public network provision.

The second "prong" of competitionpolicy noted above concerns theestablishment of minimum rules offair play. The deadlines fornotification and publication of termsand conditions for the multi-operatorenvironment are:

January 1997:- notification of any licensing or

declaration procedure for the provisionof voice telephony and/or public

networks to the Commission.- notification of national universal

service schemes to the Commission;

July 1997:- publication of all licensing or

declaration procedures;- publication by telecoms organisations

of terms and conditions forinterconnection;

- ensuring that adequate numbers areavailable for all telecoms services.

PRIORITY ON THEIMPLEMENTATION

Having completed the first stage ofthe Article 90 framework, formal

adoption of the liberalisation measuresby the Commission, DG IV will nowdevote increasing attention andresources t o t he t ask o fimplementation, ensuring complianceand policing the deregulated sectors.

The clear calender set out above mustbe strictly adhered to and DG IV willmaintain a tough stance int his area.With this in mind we will startinfringement procedures with MemberStates immediately the date indicatedhas passed if a target notification orpublication has not been achieved.The infringement procedure followedis set out in Article 169 of the Treatywhich enables the Commission, wherenecessary, to bring Member Statesbefore the European Court of Justice.Failure to implement a subsequentCourt judgement will ultimately resultin fines. Strict discipline does not, onthe other hand, mean pursuingunnecessary "red tape": we willgenerally close the formal procedureas soon as the tardy implementingmeasure has been adopted in theMember State concerned.

Implementation problems concerningthe actual content of Member Statemeasures (ie whether they aresufficiently in line with the principlesset down in the directive) is obviouslymore complex than the clear cutquestion of dates and deadlines. Fora start we must take into account thevaried legal traditions and legislativepractices in the Member States, aswell as the diverse historical andactual market structure of theirtelecoms industries. In this contextwe rely, to a certain extent, on theexperience and feedback of marketparticipants to inform us of thepractical details of non-complianceand remaining barriers to marketentry. It should be noted that such

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input from market players does not inpractice represent a formal complaintsince any legal negotiations arebetween the Commission and theMember State government and doesnot directly involve the undertakingsconcerned.

Alternatively, market entrants mayseek to ensure compliance with ourdirectives through bringing problemsor disputes to the national courts ofthe Member States concerned.Starting proceedings at national levelmay in fact be the most rapid andeffective path to pursue given thegreater resources available and theproximity to the point of effect. Provisions in Article 90 directiveswhich are sufficiently clear andprecise, such as a date for liftingrestrictions, have "direct effect" inthe member states. This means theycan be directly translated intodecisions or orders of the courts visa vis government regulations or thebehaviour of undertakings. Even incases where the text of a directive isnot so precise as to warrant directeffect the national court is anyway ina position to grant compensation to aparty which has suffered from non-implementation.

CONTROLING "DOMINANTPLAYERS"

The third "prong" of competitionpolicy in telecoms, mentioned above,is controlling the behaviour andagreements of dominant players inthe context of deregulation.

Timing is critical. We must ensurethat markets are not foreclosed by thedefensive strategies of the dominantincumbent players before effectivecompetition has had a chance to

"bite". The next five to ten yearswill demand particular attention asthe ex-monopolists repositionthemselves and adjust their behaviourto the new commercial environment.Competition policy dictates that weallow normal "performance based"competitive behaviour on the part ofdominant companies, whilstpreventing defensive and anti-competitive behaviour. Thedistinction between the two is bothcomplex and dynamic, dependingupon, inter alia, the state of de-regulation, the structure of themarket, intent of the dominant playerand effect on actual and potentialcompetitors.

Two key areas are (i) strategicalliances and (ii) discrimination asregards terms, prices and conditionsof access to networks. Generally onecan expect that the first of these willbe dealt with under the provisions ofArticle 85 (for cooperative jointventures) and the merger regulation(for concentrations betweenenterprises in separate markets). Thesecond of these will tend to comeunder the scrutiny of Article 86(abuse of a dominant position). Thiswill both complement and underscoretelecoms specific regulation asconcerns access to public networkswhich is harmonised under Article100A in the ONP framework.

Alliances

On the one hand, the situation(market, technology and regulatory)is changing all the time so we cannotgive out clear rules in advance towould be investors as to what willand what will not be problematicfrom a competition point of view.On the other hand recent decisions

over the past year or so shouldprovide a certain amount of guidanceas to the way the Commission'sapplication of Treaty Articles 85 andMerger regulation, is actually workingin this area.

Three important cases, Holland MediaGroup, Media Services GmBh andNordic Satellite Distribution, provedto be unacceptable agreements in theirnotified form. There was, in essence,one basic reason: they all involvedthe strengthening and/or creation ofdominant positions:

In the HMG case we concluded thatthe venture would lead to a strongdominant position on the TVadvertising market in the Netherlandsand to the strengthening of Endemol'sdominant position on the Dutch TVproduction market. In the MSG caseit was concluded that the venturewould aggravate or extend dominanceon all three relevant markets:administrative /technical services,provision of film/programme contentand cable infrastructure. The NordicSatellite agreement would haveprovided NSD with a "gatekeeper"function for the supply of satellite TVchannels to the Nordic market. Thiswas particularly problematic given theinvolvement of Kinnevik - a contentprovider holding strong interests inTV programming, magazines andnewspapers.

Although dominant positions poserisks to consumers and competitors,this clearly does not mean thatalliances "caught" by the EUcompetition rules will always bedisallowed. Often the benefits ofagreements will be seen tocounterbalance the potential risks, and/ or such benefits will be judged to bethe legitimate advantages of normal


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competitive strategy. This was thecase, for example, with the BT-MCIagreement which was given the go-ahead in 1994. Furthermore,agreements may be modified, orconditions (such as the regulatorysituation) changed in such a way asto cause the Commission toreconsider its position. Both theNordic Satellite group and the MSGparties are re-notifying new venturesto us this year in the hope that the re-vamped agreements will beacceptable as either cooperative jointventures or concentrations.

The well known Atlas-Phoenix caseis a good example of the way thatchanges in regulatory conditions andcommercial terms allows theCommission to re-assess the pros andcons of an agreement. The initialarrangements raised serious concernswith respect to the home markets ofFrance Telecom and DBPT wherethey hold legal and de facto dominantpositions. In response to this boththe parties and the nationalgovernments concerned have nowundertaken certain new commitments.The parties amended the agreementso that the domestic French andGerman public data networks wouldnot be included in Atlas, so that non-discriminatory access to thesenetworks would be ensured and sothat cross subsidisation would beavoided. The governmentscommitted to liberalisation of use ofalternative network infrastructure byJuly 1996. On this new basis, theCommission has indicated that it isready to take a positive view of theAtlas-Phoenix agreements.

I hope that an understanding of thelogic behind cases such as these willencourage investment in competitiveand innovative alliances and re-

structuring, as well as discouragingdefensive agreements aiming atmarket distortion and foreclosure.Real synergies between telecoms andbroadcasting, and really globalservice offerings are benefits whichshould be promoted. But this willalways be weighed against the risksof extending dominance and harmingcompetition.

Discrimination regarding access tonetworks

In the broadest sense "access" referssimply to: access to and from thecustomers of network operators,whether these are end users orwholesale service providers.

Telecom operators in a dominantposition as regards basic networkinfrastructure (in particular customerconnections, switching andinterexchange transport) are underspecial obligations to both customersand other service providers. Article86 prohibits the abuse of a dominantposition in particular concerningunfair conditions of trade,discrimination and tying practices.Where an abuse on the part of atelecom operator is explicitlycondoned or even dictated bynational regulations or governmentdecisions then the case will involve abreach of both Article 86 (directed atthe telecoms undertaking) and Article90 (directed at the Member State)

With respect to the application ofthese general principles to accessmarkets in the telecoms andmultimedia sector, decisions taken bythe ECJ and the EuropeanC o m m i s s i o n a l r e a d y g i v econsiderable guidance. They are to acertain extent generalisable in the

form of a hierarchy of factors aboutthe nature of the network operator(dominance, vertical integration,control of essential facilities)representing cumulative "check list",with a concomitant hierarchy of dutiesand obligations (concerning non-discrimination, unbundling andtransparency).

It is essential that the conditions ofaccess upon which other marketplayers rely, are now clarified to thegreatest extent possible. To this endwe announced last year thepublication of a Commission Noticewhich will give guidance as to theapplication of Treaty competitionrules to access to telecom networks ina multi-operator liberalisedenvironment. This will achieve threemain tasks:

* To set out access principlesstemming from EU competition lawrelating to a large number of actual orpotential Commission decisions inorder to create greater marketcertainty and more stable conditionsfor investment and commercialinitiative in the telecoms and multi-media sector.

* To define and clarify therelationship between competition lawand sector specific secondarylegislation harmonised under theArticle 100A framework (in particularthis relates to the relationship betweencompetition rules and ONPlegislation).

* To open the way for the applicationof competition rules in a consistentaway across the converging sectorsinvolved in the provision of newmultimedia services, and in particularto access issues and gateways in thiscontext.


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ACCESS PRICING AND NON-DISCRIMINATION

The issue of access pricing and non-discrimination will be perhaps thekey competition issue in this contextover the next few years.

This is made particularly complex inthis period of flux, where the nationaloperators need to be allowed toundergo progressive tariff reforms inorder to align their prices withunderlying costs and so preparethemselves for the challenge ofcompetition.

Competition policy must certainlyencourage fair price differentialsbased on underlying costs. This is inthe interests of commerciallysustainable competition and ofconsumers. It includes, wherejustified by cost, flexible pricingarrangements for different types ofusers as well as the margin betweenwholesale and retail prices uponwhich many service providers willrely. On the other hand we will keepa close watch to prevent unfair pricediscrimination in the form ofexcessive or predatory pricing. Inparticular abuses under Article 86 willinclude pricing strategies not based oncosts and which are designed to "lockcustomers in" and "lock competitionout". This will often involve cross-subsidisation from monopolyoperations to those where competitionhas been introduced. Greateraccounting transparency andaccounting separation on the part ofvertically integrated incumbenttelecom operators will be veryimportant to adequately assess thesetype of cases.

The Commission has alreadylaunched an own initiative

investigation in this area concerningthe new charges set by DeutscheTelekom AG (DT) for providingvoice services to business customers.In addition the Commission has alsoreceived a complaint (January 1996)from all the major competitors of DTin the recently liberalised areas ofnetwork and business voice servicesin Germany (CNI, RWE, Telliance,Plusnet, Meganet, Viag Intercom,Worldcom). These companies arguethat this new tariff scheme should notbe approved by the Germanauthorities since it would drive theirnew business out of the market. Theyrequest "interim measures" (rapidaction) representing an insurance thatthe government will preventapplication of the new tariff.

The complaint itself emphasises thatthe proposed tariff change constitutesan abuse of a dominant position in theform of predatory pricing anddiscrimination. It also underlines thatthe discount scheme is designed tolock-in DT's existing customers andthat this threatens to prevent thegrowth of efficient and undistortedcompetition in the business servicessector. The investigation will assesswhether the public telecom operatoris abusing its dominant position withthe result of unfairly eliminating newcompetition in that part of thebusiness market which has recentlybeen liberalised.

The proposed scheme would allowDT to grant large-scale rebates (up to43% on ordinary voice servicetariffs), depending on the package andvolume of voice services provided toa business customer. The rebateswould cover currently still reservedservices (voice telephony) as well asalready liberalised services (eg closeduser group communications).

A number of telecommunicationsorganisations in the European Unionare currently considering major reformof their tariffs in preparation for fullliberalisation of telecoms markets in1998. The Commission encouragesthe rebalancing of tariffs in so far asthis reflects commercial adaptation tocompetitive conditions. However,until full liberalisation is achieved theCommission must pay close attentionto the effects and motivations of tariffreforms.

Currently competition is growing inthe recently liberalised markets such asbusiness and data services, while otherareas, such as access to end customersand public voice telephony, willmostly remain closed until 1998. Inthis run up period there is a risk thatincumbent telecom operators mayrestructure tariffs in such a way as toexploit the difference betweenincreasing price elasticities in thecompetitive markets and the lowerprice elasticity (due to absence ofcompetition) in the latter. This couldharm the new suppliers of liberalisedservices, by "price squeezing" themout of the market. Even if theincumbents are forced to also offerdiscounts in the monopoly markets thisdoes not ensure against the abuse ofdominance to eliminate competition.

A NEW EUROPEAN TELECOMSREGULATOR, OR BETTER USEOF EXISTING INSTITUTIONS ?

One of the central aims of EUliberalisation and competition in thetelecoms sector is to encourage thecreation of an EU wide single marketin telecoms services. This has raisedthe issue of whether there will be aneed for a telecoms regulator at EUlevel in order to oversee, in particular,


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the transborder issues. DG IVcommissioned an intensive study in 1995-96 to consider this important institutionalissue ("The Institutional framework for theregulation of Telecommunications and theapplication of EC Competition rules"(1995), Forrester, Norall and Sutton,available through the Office for OfficialPublications, see page 47).

The study examined the current situationand found that cooperation betweenNational Regulatory Authorities (NRAs),National Competition Authorities (NCAs)and the Commission is seriously limited.It also confirmed the Commission'sfinding in its Communication on theimplementation of 90/388, that theindependence of certain NRAs is stillquestionable. Most agree that over timecompetition rules will emerge as thedominant regulatory tool, but there isdisagreement as to the timing of thisevolution. The study also revealed that,from the market players point of view itseems parties seeking redress foresaw thatthe Commission's competition directorateis likely to emerge "as the principalregulator of conduct on the liberalisedtelecoms market", since they could notrely on national authorities whose powersof investigation are confined. On theother hand it was also recognised thatsome sort of pan-European authority,alongside this, could play a key role inrespect of frequency management,numbering and essential requirements.

The study considers various optionsincluding an independent European Tele-coms Authority, a European TelecomsInstitute (carrying out specific tasks forthe Community institutions) andconsolidation of existing committees andbodies at EU level. The 2nd option isfavoured (in conjunction with the third).However the strongest recommendation ofthe study is to concentrate in theimmediate term on closer and moreeffective cooperation and coordination ofNRAs, NCAs and the Commission withina strong framework merging regulatoryand competition law functions. Existinginstitutions and the frameworks for co-

operation between them represent a hugeamount of untapped potential from thepoint of view of institutional efficiency.

Liberalisation (lifting restrictions)certainly implies a burst of regulatoryactivity, including strong pro-competitionrules. A key question is whether the latterneeds to be telecoms specific or not.Under conditions of market convergencebetween telecoms, media, information andbroadcasting it would seem unwise tomake rigid regulations based on outdatedsectorial divides. Some say the answer isto promote regulatory integration.However, the longer term solution isclearly increasing reliance upon generalcompetition rules. In the shorter termmore focused and "ex-ante" guidelines areneeded. In any case improvedcooperation and coordination betweenregulatory authorities and competitionauthorities is essential.

LOCAL, NATIONAL, EU WIDE ORINTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY ?

The other key issue is that of theappropriate "level" authority: local,national, EU wide or international(WTO)?

The simple answer is that, according tothe principle of subsidiarity, it dependson the issue. For example, town andcountry planning and environmentalissues tend to be regulated at the mostlocal level. Highly political issuesconcerning culture, content and universalservice will always have a nationalaspect. Issues with a clear EU dimensioninclude the internal market andcompetition issues (especially those witha transborder effect). Market access,including foreign direct investment, totelecoms markets for third countries or inthird countries is increasingly a GATSissue.

The core problem is, again, one ofcoordination and cooperation betweenthese levels in order to increaseefficiency and minimise uncertainty for

market players.

Staying on track for the 1998 fulltelecoms competition deadline is ofparamount importance and we must not letattention and energy be deferred from thisgoal. As has been discussed above, oncethe gates are opened to competitionfocused pro-competition regulation will benecessary in order to ensure fair play andcontrol distortions caused by the extremedominance of the incumbent telecomoperators. However, ultimately we aremoving towards broader and more flexiblepro-competition rules and guidelines inorder to reflect the development of themarket in terms of restructuring,convergence and increasing competition.This underlying development must guidethe post 1998 regulation of competitiveconditions, and any accompanyinginstitutional reforms.

So, for the moment we will focus onstrengthening the existing framework.The current system is flexible andbalanced, but needs strengthening. Thismeans, inter alia,

* Increasing resources, information andcoordination vis a vis follow up of Article90 directives and harmonisationframework as well as the arbitrationmechanisms.

* Clarifying the complementaryrelationship between application ofCompetition Rules and Harmonisationdirectives especially in the area ofinterconnection and access to essentialfacilities.

* Issuing maximum ex-ante guidance tothe market vis a vis application of theTreaty Articles to relations betweenmarket players (access agreements andalliances) in the telecoms sector.

These represent practical and immediatesolutions to many of the legal andinstitutional issues which need to beaddressed, and this is where our energieswill be devoted in the coming year.


OPINIONS AND COMMENTSIn this section DG IV officials outline developments in Community competition procedures. It is important torecognise that the opinions put forward in this section are the personal views of the officials concerned. Theyhave not been adopted or in any way approved by the Commission and should not be relied upon as astatement of the Commission's or DG IV's views.

Le Livre vert sur la révision durèglement relatif au contrôle desconcentrations

par Eric CUZIAT, DG IV-B

La Commission a adopté le 31janvier dernier un Livre vert sur larévision du règlement relatif aucontrôle des concentrationsd'entreprises (Règlement du Conseil(CEE) n° 4064/89 du 21 décembre1989). Ce livre vert constitue laseconde étape de l'exercice derévision qui a débuté en 1995 par unevaste enquête sur l'application durèglement auprès des Etats-membres,des institutions communautaires, dumonde des affaires et de lacommunauté juridique. Une largeconsultation a été engagée sur la basedes orientations présentées dans cedocument par la Commission, quisouhaite pouvoir adopter un projet demodification législative avant l'été.

Le Livre vert s'inscrit dans le cadrede l'article 1(3) et des articles 9 et 22du règlement qui prévoientrespectivement une révision desseuils de contrôlabilité et desmécanismes de renvoi entre laCommission et les Etats-membres.Toutefois, la Commission a saisil'opportunité de cette révision pourproposer un certain nombred'améliorations afin d'optimiser lefonctionnement du contrôlecommunautaire des concentrations, etqui ont trait notamment à la questiondes notifications multiples dansl'Union, à l'harmonisation du contrôledes entreprises communes, à

l'acceptation des engagements depremière phase et à la méthode decalcul du chiffre d'affaires pour lesétablissements financiers et de crédit.

LA RÉDUCTION DES SEUILSDE CONTRÔLABILITÉ

La Commission propose de réduireles seuils de contrôlabilité à 2milliards d'écu (seuil mondial) et 100millions d'écu (seuil communautaire),comme elle en avait d'ailleurs fixél'objectif chiffré dès 1990 dans son19e rapport sur la politique de laconcurrence. En revanche, ellepropose de maintenir la règle des 2/3en l'état.

La Commission est convaincue de lanécessité de réduire les seuils dans lamesure où leur niveau jugé tropélevé, ne permet pas de satisfairepleinement à deux objectifscommunautaires fondamentaux, àsavoir l'application du principe desubsidiarité et la réalisation dumarché unique.

La Commission considère en effetque pour des opérations deconcentration "dont l'effet sur lemarché s'étend au-delà des frontièresnationales d'un Etat-membre",l'intervention communautaire sejustifie en raison des objectifs du

contrôle des concentrations et desmoyens dont dispose la Commissionpar rapport aux Etats-membres. Or,au travers de l'enquête effectuée en1995, la Commission a constaté quel'ensemble des opérations ayant deseffets transfrontaliers significatifsn'entrent pas dans le champd'application du règlement, comptetenu du niveau actuel des seuils decontrôlabilité. Elle a ainsi identifié uncertain nombre de concentrationsd'intérêt communautaire qui ontéchappé à son contrôle et dénombréplusieurs secteurs économiquesd'importance qui pour des raisonsstructurelles sont soustraits dans unel a r g e mesure à l ' e x a m e ncommunautaire.

Par ailleurs, la réalisation du marchéunique suppose un soutien àl'intégration des marchés au traversnotamment d'une évaluation rapide etuniforme des concentrations ayant deseffets transfrontaliers significatifs dontle cadre idoine est fourni par leguichet unique communautaire quipermet une simplification desprocédures administratives et uneunicité du processus décisionnelgarantissant un degré élevé de sécuritéjuridique. Or, la Commission a pumesurer avec le concours des Etats-membres qu'un nombre nonnégligeable d 'opérat ions deconcentration, en dessous des seuils,étaient notifiées auprès de plusieursautorités nationales de contrôle,disposant d'une législation spécifique.Il existe en effet actuellement onzesystèmes nationaux de contrôle desconcentrations dans l'Union dont huitsont à régime de notificationobligatoire. Les entreprises soumisesà ces notifications multiples ne


OPINIONS AND COMMENTS

bénéficient donc pas des avantagesdu "guichet unique" communautaire.

De ce double constat, la Commissionconclut à la nécessité de réduire lesseuils afin de mieux couvrir lesopérations qui sont légitimement desa compétence et de permettre auxentreprises européennes qui procèdentà des restructurations pour s'adapterau marché unique, de bénéficier d'uneprocédure uniforme. Dans l'hypo-thèse d'une baisse des seuils auxniveaux proposés, la Commissionprévoit une augmentation de 60 à 80affaires par an.

LES MÉCANISMES DERENVOI (ARTICLES 9 ET 22)

Dans son Livre vert, la Commissionn'envisage aucune modificationimportante des mécanismes de renvoientre elle-même et les Etats-membresdans la mesure où l'applicationrigoureuse des dispositions actuellesqui allient respect du principe desubsidiarité et sécurité juridique pourles entreprises a reçu une très largeapprobation des milieux concernés.Quelques améliorations techniquessont toutefois proposées au débat,notamment en ce qui concernel'article 22.

LA QUESTION DESNOTIFICATIONS MULTIPLES

Si une majorité qualifiée ne pouvaitêtre réunie au Conseil pour voter laréduction des seuils, la Commissionest d'avis qu'il convient, à tout lemoins, de résoudre le problème desnotifications multiples dans l'Unioneuropéenne. La solution est claire :attribuer une compétence exclusive àla Commission dès lors que plusieurs

systèmes nationaux sont impliquésdans le contrôle d'une opération deconcentration. En revanche, laprocédure à mettre en place pour yparvenir soulève un certain nombred'interrogations. Elle se doit, en toutétat de cause, d'être simple et deconstituer une amélioration de lasituation actuelle.

Le schéma simplifié de la procédureserait le suivant.

Les parties à l'opération ayantconstaté le caractère notifiable de leurprojet auprès de plusieurs autoritésna t iona les no t i f i e ra i en t l aconcentration auprès de laCommission. Cette dernièreconstaterait que l'opération constitueune concentration au sens de l'article3 du règlement et que des seuilsplanchers en chiffre d'affaires sontatteints. Les Etats-membresconcernés vérifieraient que l'opérationaurait été notifiable auprès de leurautorité de contrôle sur la base desseuils fixés par leur législationnationale. Si les Etats-membresconfirment l'analyse des partiesnotifiantes, la première phase del'examen serait engagée. En cas dedésaccord avec les assertions desparties, les Etats-membres pourraientdéclarer l'opération non-notifiableauprès de leur autorité de contrôle eten informeraient la Commission dansun délai donné (deux semaines, parexemple). Dans cette hypothèse, laCommission déclarerait l'opérationsans dimension communautaire.

Malgré le caractère sommaire decette description, le lecteur nemanquera pas de s'interroger sur lenombre adéquat d'autoritésimpliquées, sur le caractèreobligatoire ou facultatif de lanotification, sur la prise en compte

des systèmes nationaux à notificationvolontaire, sur l'association des Etats-membres à la procédure, surl'attaquabilité des décisions adoptées,sur les aspects pratiques de laprocédure : extension de la premièrephase, contenu du formulaire C/O,problèmes linguistiques. Commission,Etats-membres et autres intéressés onteu déjà l'opportunité de discuter cesquestions et la plupart d'entre ellessont en voie de résolution.

LE TRAITEMENT DESENTREPRISES COMMUNES

Nombre de participants à l'enquêtepréliminaire de 1995 ont fait valoir àla Commission leurs préoccupationsquant au traitement différencié desentreprises communes qui entrent dansle champ d'application du règlementsur les concentrations et bénéficienten conséquence des procédures qui luisont propres et celles qui, considéréescomme des coopérations entreentreprises, tombent sous le coup del'article 85 du traité et du règlementd'application n° 17/62.

C'est pourquoi la Commission adécidé d'ouvrir sur cette question untrès large débat et a proposé à laréflexion des lecteurs du Livre vert unéventail de six options que l'on peutregrouper en deux catégories. Lesoptions du premier groupe se limitentà apporter des solutions procéduralesaux problèmes soulevés notammentquant aux délais de traitement et aurenforcement de la sécurité juridique.Les options du second groupeconduisent à soumettre les entreprisescommunes coopératives de naturestructurelle c'est-à-dire celles pourlesquelles l'accord aboutit à un réelchangement de la structure desentreprises concernées et du marché



en cause, au test de substance et à laprocédure du règlement sur lesconcentrations.

La Commission reste à ce stadeouverte quant à la détermination del'option la mieux appropriée pourrésoudre les disparités dans letraitement des entreprises communes.

AUTRES AMÉLIORATIONS

La Commission suggère enfin uncertain nombre d'améliorations quidoivent permettre d'optimiserl'application du règlement. Il est

proposé de donner une base juridiqueexpresse à l'acceptation desengagements présentés par lesentreprises dès la première phased'examen et d'établir à cette occasiondes modalités procédurales propres àassurer la transparence et laconsultation en temps utile des Etats-membres et des tiers intéressés.

Pour tenir compte des observationsdes représentants du secteur bancaire,la Commission a ouvert égalementune réflexion sur la méthode decalcul du chiffre d'affaires desétablissements de crédit et autresétablissements financiers. Pourl'essentiel, il s'agit de substituer le

produit bancaire à la base de calculactuelle qui repose sur le dixième desactifs.

La période de consultation sur leLivre vert s'est achevée le 31 mars1996. La Commission s'attache àprésent à traiter l'ensemble desinformations qu'elle reçoit. Undocument de synthèse sera publiédans le courant du printemps.

C'est toutefois dans les propositionsformelles de la Commission auConseil que cet exercice trouvera sonaboutissement.

At the end of January this year, the

Technology Transfer: the newRegulation

by Chris MITROPOULOS, IV-A-2

Commission finally adopted the newblock exemption on technologytransfer agreements (CommissionRegulation EC No 240/96). The newregulation came into force on 1stApril 1996 and remains in force fora period of ten years. It is the resultof a long consultation process withMember States, the other institutions,representatives of industry and otherinterested parties. The objectives ofthe new rules together with theirsubstantive provisions are outlinedbelow.

ENCOURAGINGTECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

The new rules reflect theCommission's aim of encouraging thedissemination of technical knowledgein the Community and promoting themanufacture of technically moresophisticated products. It sees therole of technology transfers asessential in strengthening thecompetitiveness of European industrywithin Community and worldmarkets. To this end, the Commissionis already encouraging international

cooperation in research anddevelopment through programmessuch as Esprit, Drive and BriteEURAM. In this regard, the new rulesshould be viewed as an importantback-up measure.

SIMPLIFYING THE RULES

Simplifying the way technologytransfers are handled under thecompetition rules contributes to theCommission's aim of encouraging thedissemination of technology. The newblock exemption replaces the blockexemptions on patent licensing(Regulation (EEC) No 2349/89) andon know-how licensing (Regulation556/89). The first of these wasadopted in 1984. It expired in 1994,but has been extended on severaloccasions due to the delays inadopting the present regulation. Thelatter was adopted in 1988 and would



have continued until the end of 1999,but is repealed in the new regulation.The overlap between the two formerregulations meant that in the case ofmixed patent and know-howagreements, undertakings wereunsure as to which regulation appliedand the Commission was oftenaccused of not providing clearguidance on the matter. Under thenew regime, know-how licences,patent licences and mixed agreementsare treated together under a singlelegal instrument. The harmonisationof the new rules reduces thedisparities which existed between theold regulations and creates greaterlega l ce r t a in ty . The newarrangements also reflect commercialreality in that agreements for thetransfer of technology are morecommonly mixed.

FOCUSING ON ECONOMICSTRENGTH

In addition, the old regulations drewno distinction in terms of theeconomic strength of the partiesconcerned. Under the old regime,automatic exemption was availableeven to dominant firms, which bysecuring exclusive licences, couldsucceed in monopolising a productmarket and prevent access to newtechnology by outsiders. At the sametime, the restrictions which theCommission black listed in the oldregulations (in order to counter thereal danger of abuse) had adetrimental effect on firms whoserelatively weak market positionmeant that they did not in any wayhinder the interpenetration ofmarkets. Such firms are given morelenient treatment under the newregime. The issue which was offoremost concern to industry was the

obligation envisaged by theCommission that licensingagreements be individually notified(thereby loosing the benefit ofautomatic exemption), where thelicensee had a significant marketposition (over 40%). Followingseveral written consultations and apublic hearing, the market sharethreshold test has been dropped as acondition for benefitting from theblock exemption, but remains animportant factor in the Commission'sappraisal of its withdrawal (seebelow).

SCOPE

The regulation applies to pure patentlicensing or know-how licensingagreements and to mixed patent andknow-how licensing agreements,including those agreementscontaining ancillary provisionsrelating to intellectual property rightsother than patents, such as trademarks and copyright. It applies onlywhere a l icensee actuallymanufactures products or providesservices or has products or servicesprovided for him. Therefore, resaleagreements or sale agreements styledas a licence do not qualify for theblock exemption, as is the case withcertain joint venture agreements andagreements between members of apatent or know-how pool.

The main features of the newregulation are developped in thefollowing few paragraphs.

THE WHITE LIST

Article 1 lists eight restrictiveobligations which would ordinarily becaught by Article 85(1), but which

are exempted by the regulation and,therefore, do not need to be notifiedto the Commission. These include thecommon territorial restrictionsassociated with technology transferagreements. Such restrictions includean obligation on the licensor not tolicense other undertakings to exploitthe licensed technology in the licensedterritory or to exploit such technologyin the licensed territory himself; anobligation on the licensor not to putthe licensed technology on territory ofthe licensor or on territories which arelicensed to other licensees. Suchterritorial restrictions are considered toimprove the production of goods anpromote technical progress in thatthey make the holders of patents orknow-how more willing to grantlicences. Licensees are in turn moreinclined to undertake the investmentrequired to manufacture and put anew product on the market. In thisrespect the regulation confirms theMaize seed doctrine.

Certain time limits have been placedon the restrictions which may beexempted depending on the type ofagreement and the type of restriction.For pure patent licensing agreements,the territorial restrictions in questionare allowed for as long as the productis protected by parallel patents. Forpure know-how agreements,protection is generally limited to tenyears from when the product is firstput on the market. In mixedagreements, exemption for restrictionsis either limited to the duration of thepatents or ten years, whichever islonger.

The degree of territorial protectiongranted to the contracting parties ismore far reaching than that granted tolicensees in their respectiverelationships. In the case of the



former, export bans are permitted forthe duration of the agreement. In thecase of the latter, export bans canonly be imposed for a five yearduration from the date on which theproduct was first marketed in theCommunity. After this period, alicensee can only be protected againstactive sales on the part of otherlicensees.

OTHER LAWFULOBLIGATIONS

In addition to the white list, Article 2provides a list of clauses which aregenerally not restrictive ofcompetition and whose inclusion inan agreement does not affect itsexemption. These include theobligation on the licensee not todivulge the know-how communicatedby the licensor; the obligation on thelicensee not to grant sublicences; theright of licensors to terminate theagreement in the event of the licenseechallenging the validity of the patent,secret or substantial nature of thelicensed know-how or the obligationfor licensees to use their bestendeavours to manufacture andmarket the licensed product. This is along, but not exhaustive list ofclauses normally found in licensingagreements, which if found to fallwithin Article 85 (1) should becovered by the regulation.

THE BLACK LIST

The black list contains clauses which,if contained in an agreement, wouldpreclude it from benefitting from theexemption. These include restrictionson the selling prices of the licensedproduct or the quantities to bemanufactured or sold. Suchrestrictions seriously limit the extent

to which the licensee can exploit thelicensed technology and quantityrestrictions particularly may have thesame effect as export bans (Articles3 (1) and (5)). Other unlawfulrestrictions include a ban onexploiting competing technologies,customer restrictions betweencompeting manufacturers, obligationson licensees to assign improvementsto the technology concerned andterritorial restrictions for a longerduration than those exempted.

The restrictions listed in Article 3 arerestrictive and not capable ofbenefitting from the block exemption.Such obligations may only obtainexemption by an individual decisionwhich takes account of the marketposition of the undertakingsconcerned and the degree ofconcentration on the relevant market.It should be noted here that the blacklist is significantly reduced incomparison with previous IPlicensing regulations.

OPPOSITION PROCEDURE

Article 4 of the regulation contains a"reduced" opposition procedure, bywhich exemption is granted toagreements containing obligationsrestrictive of competition which arenot covered by the white or blacklist, provided that such agreementsare notified to the Commission andthat the Commission does not opposethe application of the exemptionwithin four months (as opposed to sixpreviously). The opposition procedureapplies to agreements which containpreviously outlawed clauses, such asobligations on the licensees toprocure from the licensor goods orservices which are not essential for atechnically satisfactory exploitation of

the licensed technology or forensuring that the production of thelicensee conforms to the qualitystandards that are respected by thelicensor and other licensees.

Industry has complained that blockexemptions act as straight jackets:often, amending an agreement so thatit falls within the confines of aregulation can make it more anti-competitive. It is believed that areduction in the number of blacklisted clauses, an extension of thepermissible restrictions and anopposition procedure coveringpreviously outlawed clauses willpromote the contractual freedom ofthe parties and allay industry'sconcerns of an interventionistapproach.

"EX POST CONTROL" WHEREA LICENSEE EXCEEDS 40%MARKET SHARE

As mentioned, the new regulation nolonger contains the controversialmarket share ceiling of 40 %, which,if exceeded, would cause the loss ofa u t o m a t i c e x e m p t i o n . T h eCommission, which invested muchpolitical capital in the market sharethresholds, conceded that thequantative techniques required forassessing market share were costlyand difficult to apply, especially whenthe technology was new and it wasdifficult to know how effective itwould be. It, therefore, compromisedand dropped the necessity forautomatic notification whenever theaforementioned threshold wasreached. It reasoned that its mainconcern, namely to ensure a broaderdissemination of new technologies,could be achieved by less rigidmethods.



However, market shares for alicensee which are of the ordermentioned, will continue to be animportant factor in the generaleconomic assessment which must bemade by the Commission whendeciding whether to withdraw thebenefit of the block exemption. TheCommission's aim is to preventagreements where the licensedproducts are not faced with realcompetition in the licensed territoryand it considers this to be the casewhere the licensee's share of themarket exceeds 40% of the wholemarket for the licensed products, andof all the products or services whichcustomers consider interchangeable orsubstitutable on account of theircharacteristics, prices or intended use.

The decisions by which theCommission withdraws the benefit of

automatic exemption are onlyeffective from the date of thedecision itself. In order to protectthemselves from unexpectedwithdrawal of the block exemption, itis suggested (Recital 27) that theparties may notify agreementsobliging the licensor not to grantother licences in the territory, wherethe licensee's market share exceeds oris likely to exceed 40%.

CONTINUITY OFAGREEMENTS IN FORCEBEFORE 1ST APRIL 1996

The new block exemption enteredinto force on the 1st of April 1996and applies until the 31st of March2006. The patent licensing regulation,

for which the last extension expiredon the 1st of January 1996 wasextended until the entry into force ofthe new rules and the know-howregulation was repealed on the 1st ofApril 1996. Thus agreements whichare already in effect on the 31st ofMarch 1996 and which comply withthe two former regulations are able tocontinue to benefit from an exemptionfor the entire duration of the newregulation.

In short, the new regime reduces thedisparities which existed between theold rules, promotes the contractualfreedom of the parties and meetscompetition concerns by keepingcheck on those undertakings whosesizeable market share may allow themto monopolise a market and preventsmaller undertakings from enjoyingthe fruits of technology transfer.

Telecoms sector soon fully open tocompetition : the central role of theEuropean Commission

by C. HOCEPIED, DG IV-C-1

With the adoption, at the end ofDecember 1995, of Parliament andCouncil Directive 95/62/EC on theapplication of ONP to voicetelephony and, on March 13 1996, ofDirective 96/19/EC amendingDirective 90/388/EEC with regard tothe implementation of fullcompetition in telecommunications

markets (OJ No L 74, 22.3.96), thefirst package of measures requiredfor implementing, in EU law, thecommitment to full competition inthe EU telecommunications marketby 1st January 1998 is now in place(there are a number of furthermeasures, notably the interconnectionand general licensing directives,

which are currently being discussed inthe European Parliament and Council).

The first of the two Directives setsout the scope of universal service, theburden of which may be shared withnew entrants. The second Directivefixes the date for full liberalisationand sets out deadlines for the nationalimplementation of measures preparingfor this goal. The package reflectsthe recognition in the Union thatcompetition, in the presence of thenecessary regulatory safeguardsprovided by the ONP framework,enhances the provision of universalservice as well as promotingeconomic growth and employment



both within and outside the telecomssector. On 13 March 1996, theCommission also issued a detailedcommunication setting out theapproach of the Commission asregards the future provision ofuniversal service in the Union.

The adoption of a Directive is inpractice only the first stage of a longprocess. To the extent that theirnational legislation is not yet in linewith the Directive, Member Statesmust amend it accordingly. The taskof the Commission is to ensure thatall Member States effectivelyimplement the provisions of theDirective at the same pace. Wherecertain Member States fail to take thenecessary measures, the Commissionmust initiate infringement procedureswhich can ultimately include bringingthe relevant Member State to theCourt of Justice.

Directive 96/19/EC entered into forceon 11 April 1996. DG IV has alreadyinitiated informal contact with therelevant departments of the MemberStates' ministries to assist them,where necessary, in the drafting ofthe measures required to implementthis crucial directive in each of theirnational legislations. The task is noteasy given the complexity and thenumber of obligations contained inthe Directive.

LIBERALISATION OFALTERNATIVEINFRASTRUCTURES

Article 2(2) of Directive 90/388/EEC,as amended by Directive 96/16/EC,requires Member States to abolishbefore 1 July 1996 all regulatory

restrictions on the establishment ofnetwork infrastructure for theprovision of services to closed usergroups and on the use of authorisednetwork infrastructure for theprovision of already liberalisedtelecommunications services. In lay-terms, this means that, as of July 1stthis year, the use of all alternativeinfrastructures (such as the telecomsnetworks of railways, energy andwater companies which are currentlyonly authorised for restricted "in-house" purposes) must be liberalisedfor the carriage of commercialtelecoms services. This does not,however, imply the granting of way-leaves to the undertakingsestablishing such networks. Themeasures adopted to ensure the liftingof such restrictions must also benotified to the Commission before 1July 1996.

LIBERALISATION OF VOICETELEPHONY

The same Article of the Directiveallows Member States to maintain thecurrent special and exclusive rightsregarding the provision of voicetelephony and new publictelecommunications networks until 1January 1998. The measures taken toabolish these rights must, however,be communicated to the Commissionbefore 11 January 1997. This meansthat the appropriate legislation mustbe passed before that date, althoughit may contain transitional provisionsregarding the date of abolition of theremaining special and exclusiverights.

The abolition of special rights meansin particular that any limitations onthe number of undertakingsauthorised to supply voice telephony

or to establish or provide publictelecommunications networks must belifted, except where justified by thelack of available spectrum. It impliesalso that any authorization proceduremust be based on objective,proportional and non discriminatorycriteria. The new article 4d ofDirective 90/388/EEC, providesfurther for the obligation on MemberStates not to discriminate betweenp r o v i d e r s o f p u b l i ctelecommunications networks withregard to the granting of rights of wayfor the provision of such networks.Where the granting of additionalrights of way is not possible due toessential requirements, Member Statesshall ensure access at reasonableterms to existing facilities establishedunder rights of way which may not beduplicated.

As regards both the dates of 1 July1996 and 1 January 1998, Ireland,Portugal, Greece and Spain shall,according to the Directive, be grantedupon request an additionalimplementation period of up to fiveyears and Luxembourg one of up totwo years, provided it is needed toachieve the necessary structuraladjustments.

Contrary to Article 4 of Directive96/2/EC, Directive 96/19/EC does notset out a deadline for requesting sucha derogation. Application forderogations must be made before 11January 1997, but for reasons of legalcertainty it is advisable that they aremade as soon as possible.

The application will have to include adetailed description of the plannedadjustments and a precise assessmentof the timetable envisaged for itsimplementation. Once received, the



Commission will publish a notice inthe Official Journal asking the otherMember States and all otherinterested parties to comment duringa period of one month. TheCommission will then take areasoned decision on the principle,the implication and the maximumduration of the additional period tobe granted.

LICENSING INSTEAD OFEXCLUSIVE AND SPECIALRIGHTS

The Directive acknowledges thatMember States may make theprovision of telecommunicationsservices as well as the establishmenta n d t h e p r o v i s i o n o ftelecommunications infrastructuresubject to licensing, generalauthorization or declarationprocedures where necessary to ensurecompl iance with essentialrequirements.

As regards already liberalisedservices, such procedures, if any, hadto be notified to the Commissionbefore the dates set out in directives90/388/EEC, 94/46/EC, 95/51/EC or96/2/EC, to allow it to assess whetherthese procedures are based onobjective, non-discriminatory,transparent and proportionate criteria.Member States must, for the samereason, continue to inform theCommission of any plan to changeexisting procedures.

As regards the provision of voicet e l e p h o n y a n d o f p u b l i ctelecommunications networks, theDirective requests Member States tonotify no later than 1 January 1997,

any envisaged licensing ordeclaration procedure. TheCommission must verify thecompatibility with the Treaty of thesedrafts, before their implementation,and in particular the proportionalityof the obligations imposed and thatthere is a possibility to appeal againstany refusal. In recital 10, theDirective specifies that individuallicensing procedures are only justifiedas regards the provision of voicet e l e p h o n y , p u b l i c f i x e dtelecommunications networks andother telecommunications networksinvolving the use of radiofrequencies. In all other cases, ageneral authorization procedure or adeclaration procedure suffices toensure compliance with the essentialrequirements. Member States whichstill apply individual licensingschemes for already liberalisedtelecommunications services musttherefore amend their regulation andnotify to the Commission themeasures taken for that purposebefore 11 January 1997. TheDirective in particular requests theabolition of the sets of public-servicespecifications adopted under Article3 of the original Directive90/388/EEC for the provision ofpacket- or circuit-switched dataservices. The relevant individuallicensing procedures may be replacedby declaration procedures or generalauthorizations.

Under Article 6 of Directive90/388/EEC, Member States mustensure that any fees imposed onproviders of voice telephony andpublic telecommunications networksas part of authorization proceduresare based on objective, transparentand non-discriminatory criteria andthat such fees as well as the criteriaupon which they are based, and any

changes thereto, are published in anappropriate and sufficiently detailedmanner so as to ensure easy access tothat information.

The Directive, as modified byDirective 96/19/EC, furthermorerequests Member States to ensure, nolater than 1 July 1997, that :- the mentioned licensing ordeclaration procedures for theprovision of voice telephony and ofpublic telecommunications networks,are published;

- the allocation of numbers is carriedout by a body independent of thetelecommunications organisation, thatadequate numbers are made availablefor new entrants and, more generally,that numbers are allocated in anobjective, non discriminatory andtransparent manner. This does notprevent the required dialling ofadditional numbers to call a subscriberof one network from another network;

ENSURING ACCESS TO THENETWORKS OF THE FORMERMONOPOLIES

It is not sufficient to abolish legalmonopolies. Access to the marketwill only be possible if positive actionis taken to ensure that new entrantscan interconnect with the networks ofthe former monopolies. The Directivetherefore provides that:

- t h e t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n sorganizations should publish the termsand conditions for interconnection.Member States must ensure thatmeasures adopted for this purpose donot prevent the negotiation ofinterconnection agreements regardingspecial network access and/orconditions meeting specific needs.



This obligation must be maintainedfor five years after the effectiveabolition of the exclusive rights forthe provision of voice telephony andthe underlying network. TheCommission will review whether thisobligation must continue, if, beforethe end of this five year period, theParliament and the Council adopt theONP-Interconnection Directive.

- the telecommunications organi-zations should implement a costaccounting system with regard to theprovision of voice telephony andpublic telecommunications networksidentifying the relevant cost elementsfor pricing interconnection offerings.It should reflect, for each element ofthe interconnection offered, the basisfor that cost element, in order toallow monitoring that the pricingincludes only elements which arerelevant, namely the initialconnection charge, conveyancecharges, the share of the costsincurred in providing equal accessand number-portability and ofensuring essential requirements and,where applicable, supplementarycharges aimed to share the net cost ofuniversal service, and provisionally,imbalances in voice telephony tariffs.The cost accounting system must alsomake it possible to identify when atelecommunications organizationcharges its major users less thanproviders of voice telephonynetworks. It should also bemaintained during the five yearsfollowing the date of effectiveliberalisation of voice telephony andthe underlying networks.

Moreover, the Directive requestsMember States to adopt measuresensuring that, from 1 July 1997 on,where negotiations betweentelecommunications organisations and

new entrants in the voice telephonyor public telecommunicationsnetworks markets do not lead to anagreement within a reasonable timeperiod, a settlement can be obtained,upon the request of either party andwithin a reasonable time period,establishing the necessary operationaland financial conditions andr e q u i r e m e n t s f o r s u c hinterconnection.

DIRECTORY SERVICES

The new article 4b inserted inDirective 90/388/EEC provides forthe abolition by the Member States ofall exclusive rights in their territoryregarding the establishment andprovision of directory services,including the publication ofdirectories and directory enquiryservices. Measures taken for thispurpose must be notified to theCommission before 11 January 1997.

FINANCING UNIVERSALSERVICE

Where Member States envisageintroducing a scheme to share the netcost of universal service obligationsentrusted to the telecommunicationsorganizations, it must notify therelevant draft to the Commissionbefore 1 January 1997 (CertainMember States, such as Germany andthe Netherlands, have alreadyannounced that they would notintroduce such a mechanism in theinitial stage). The Commission willunder the new article 4c inserted inthe aforementioned Directive, byDirective 96/19/EC, assess whetherthe scheme :

(a) applies only to undertakingsproviding public telecommu-nications networks ;

(b) allocates the respective burden toeach undertaking according toobjective and non discriminatorycriteria and in accordance withthe principle of proportionality.

As stated in the framework of theCouncil meeting of 21 March 1996,the Commission interprets Article 4 cof the Directive (as well as Article5(1) of the common position on theONP Interconnection Directive) asallowing contributions only to beimposed on voice telephony providersin proportion to their usage of publictelecommunications networks, for thefollowing reasons:

- according to the principle ofproportionality contributions must, asemphasized in recital 16 of theCommission Directive, seek only toensure that market participantscontribute to the financing ofuniversal service. The scope ofuniversal service, burden of whichmay be financed through universalservice mechanisms, is set out inParliament and Council Directive95/62/EC on the application of ONPto voice telephony;

- the principle of non discriminationopposes financing mechanisms foruniversal service obligations whichlead either to double contributions tothe cost of universal service in thesame Member State or to allu n d e r t a k i n g s i n t h ete lecommunica t ions marketssubsidizing the voice telephonyoperators. Contributions musttherefore be limited to services withinthe scope of the universal servicedefinition.



The same Article of Directive 96/19/ECrequests Member States to allow theirtelecommunications organisations torebalance tariffs which are not in linewith costs before 1 January 1998.Member States may, however, adoptspecial provision to soften the impact ofre-balancing, where these are necessaryto guarantee the affordability of thetelephone service during the transitionalperiod. Member States which considerthat the rebalancing cannot be completedbefore this deadline, must, according tothe Directive, forward to theCommission, before 11 January 1997, areport containing a precise timetable forthe phasing out of the remaining tariffimbalances. This report should specifythe net costs which are insufficientlycovered by the tariff structure and thejustifications for, if this is envisaged,such costs being reapportioned amongall voice telephony providers.

In this context, Directive 96/19/ECannounces that the Commission will,within three months after the adoptionby the European Parliament and theCouncil of the ONP-InterconnectionDirective, assess whether furtherinitiatives are necessary to ensure theconsistency of both Directives. Possibleoverlap between the CommissionDirective 96/19/EC, which is already inforce, and the proposal for a 100aDirective does not, in any circumstances,justify delays in the implementation ofthe obligations set out in Directive96/19/EC.

ACCOUNTING TRANSPARENCY

Finally Directive 96/19/EC inserts a newarticle 8 in Directive 90/388/EEC,providing for the obligation for MemberStates to ensure that in the authorizationschemes for the provision of voicetelephony and public telecommunicationsnetworks, where such authorizations are

granted to undertakings benefiting fromexclusive or special rights in areas otherthan telecommunications. Suchundertakings will have to keep separatefinancial accounts as concerns activitiesas providers of voice telephony and/ornetworks and other activities, as soon asthey achieve as they achieve a turnovermore than ECU 50 million in therelevant telecommunications market.Contrary to Article 2 of Directive95/51/EC (lifting restrictions on the useof cable television networks), noderogation can be requested to thisobligation. The relevant measuresadopted for this purpose must becommunicated to the Commission, underArticle 2 of Directive 96/19/EC, not laterthan nine months after this Directive hasentered into force, i.e. before 11January 1997.

MONITORING THEIMPLEMENTATION BY THEMEMBER STATES

To facilitate the task of the Commission,Member States were asked to indicateclearly, when providing information onthe implementation of the Directive, withregard to the various provisions ofDirective 96/2/EC, the correspondingnational measures already existing orwhich have been adopted to implementthe Directive together with details oftheir publication. Within some months,the Commission will so have acomprehensive view on the (formal)implementation of each provisionthroughout the Community. As regardsthe actual administrative practice in theMember States, the Commission mustrely on press articles and complaints toget a full picture.

The nine month time period for thecommunication to the Commission ofthe (formal) implementation measuresmentioned in Article 2 refers to the

notification of these measures. It is nota transition period granted to the MemberStates to adopt the relevant legislation.Article 90(3) Directives only specifyexisting obligations under the Treaty.Such Directives and must therefore becomplied with, regardless of the timeperiod granted to the Member States tocommunicate implementation measures.

According to the case-law of the Court ofJustice, provisions of Directives havedirect effect where they are complete andprecise. This means that the relevantauthorities of the Member States,including the national courts, may notimplement laws or regulations which areincompatible with such provisions of theDirective. As regards this Directive, suchdirect effect results in particular from thenew Article 2(2) third indent, whichallows the establishment of owninfrastructure or the use of alternativeinfrastructures for the provision of alreadyliberalised telecommunications services.The relevant undertakings may thusproceed - so long as they comply with allother relevant rules - to apply these rightsacknowledged in the Directive withouthaving to wait for national measuresimplementing the Directive. On the otherhand, as regards provisions of Directivesrequiring further national implementationmeasures, the Court of Justice confirmedin its judgment of 5 March 1996(Brasserie du Pêcheur de Schiltighem) thatthe national governments were liable fordamages to compensate companies in caseof infringement of Treaty provisionsconferring rights on the latter.

This case-law is as a matter of factprobably more effective to ensure fullcompliance with Directives than theinfringement procedure provided for inArticle 169 of the Treaty, which, takinginto account the right granted to theMember States to state its case and thelong administrative delays, can take morethan three years before the Court ofJustice pronounces a final judgment.


ANTI-TRUST RULESApplication of Articles 85 & 86 EC and 65 ECSCMain developments between 1st January and 31st March 1996

Most important recentdevelopments

COMMISSION IMPOSES FINE ONBAYER AG FOR IMPEDINGEXPORTS OF THE PHARMA-CEUTICAL PRODUCT ADALATWITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION______________________________

The Commission has imposed a fine ofECU 3 million on the Germanpharmaceuticals producer Bayer AG in aDecision finding that the company hasinfringed Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty.

Documents obtained during investigationsof the group's various companies showthat the Bayer group has since at least theend of the 1980s been concerned by thephenomenon of parallel exports of thedrug Adalat (in France, Adalate) to theUnited Kingdom. Adalat, which is usedin the treatment of cardiovasculardiseases, is one of the most importantpharmaceutical products marketed by thegroup.

The prices for Adalat vary widely in thevarious Member States in which it ismarketed. Adalat's largest market sharesare in the United Kingdom. The price atwhich it is sold is also considerablyhigher in the United Kingdom than inother Member States, notably France andSpain.

Before 1989 in Spain and 1991 in France,the main customers of the French andSpanish subsidiaries of Bayer, i.e. thepharmaceutical wholesalers in thoseMember States, used to order largerquantities of Adalat than they requiredfor supplying the domestic market. Thesurpluses were exported to other MemberStates, including the United Kingdom.

As from September 1991, the Frenchwholesalers found that Bayer France wasno longer prepared to supply them withall of the quantities of Adalat which theyordered. The same phenomenon had beenencountered in Spain since early 1989.

Bayer Spain had set up a computerizedsystem for identifying exportingwholesalers. In the autumn of 1991, aBayer Spain executive came to explainhow this system worked to themanagement of Bayer France. However,the system set up by Bayer France foridentifying exporting wholesalersremained less elaborate (handwritten listswere drawn up specifying "do notsupply" or "blocked" for certain orders).

Wholesalers in France and Spaincontinued their commercial relations withBayer in an attempt to obtain supplies ofAdalat. They tried by various means toobtain larger quantities than theirdomestic requirements so as to enablethem to continue exporting to the UnitedKingdom. In particular, the wholesalersused a system of spreading ordersintended for export between their variousagencies and a system of placing ordersthrough other, small wholesalers notsubject to monitoring. In this way, theyendeavoured to ensure that their ordersappeared to comply with Bayer'srequirement that the product should notbe exported. When one of thewholesalers was found to be exporting,Bayer France and Bayer Spain penalizedhim by imposing successive reductions inthe volumes supplied.

All these practices engaged in by BayerFrance and Bayer Spain show that theysubjected their wholesalers to a

permanent threat of a reduction in thequantities supplied, a threat which wasrepeatedly put into effect if thewholesalers did not comply with theexport ban.

The export ban forms part of thecontinuous commercial relations betweenBayer France and Bayer Spain and theirrespective wholesalers. The wholesalers,both in France and in Spain, have shownby their conduct that they accepted theexport ban. It may thus be concluded thatan agreement, of which the export banforms an integral part, exists between theparties (Bayer France and its wholesalerson the one hand, and Bayer Spain and itswholesalers on the other), whichagreement is in breach of Article 85(1).

In determining the amount of the fine, theCommission has taken account of the factthat the practices involve a seriousinfringement of Community law. It hasalso taken account of the fact thatpharmaceutical product prices are not setautonomously by companies, but aregoverned by the various relevant nationalrules and regulations. [IP/96/19]

COMMISSION IMPOSESCONDITIONS ON COOPERATIONAGREEMENT BETWEENLUFTHANSA AND SAS______________________________

Acting on a proposal from Mr Karel VanMiert, the Commission Member withspecial responsibility for competitionpolicy, the Commission approved inStrasbourg a cooperation agreementconcluded on 11 May 1995 betweenLufthansa and SAS.

However, the Commission imposed fourconditions covering the following mainpoints:

a. At Frankfurt, Düsseldorf, Stockholmand Oslo airports, where available


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capacities are saturated at peak periods,Lufthansa and SAS must as necessarygive up up to eight slots a day to otherairlines wishing to operate services on thefollowing routes: - Düsseldorf-Copenhagen - Düsseldorf-Stockholm - Frankfurt-Copenhagen - Frankfurt-Gothenburg - Frankfurt-Oslo - Frankfurt-Stockholm - Hamburg-Stockholm - Munich-Copenhagen.

b. Where a new entrant starts operatingon one of those routes, Lufthansa andSAS may not increase the number oftheir daily frequencies by more than one.However, this figure may be increased tomatch, but not exceed, the combinednumber of frequencies operated byairlines other than Lufthansa and SAS.

c. The new entrants must, subject tocertain conditions, be able to concludeinterlining agreements with andparticipate in the joint frequent-flyerprogramme of Lufthansa and SAS.

d. Lufthansa and SAS must terminate thefollowing cooperation agreements withother airlines:

- SAS must terminate its cooperationagreement with Swissair and AustrianAirlines within the European QualityAlliance;

- Lufthansa must terminate itscooperation agreement withTranswede within the MarketingAlliance in Scandinavia;

- Lufthansa must terminate itscooperation agreement with Finnairin respect of routes betweenScandinavia and Germany.

These conditions are applicable until 31October 2002.

The Commission has also asked the twoairlines to provide regular information onhow their cooperation is working inpractice, particularly as regards the levelof fares charged. This information will be

particularly important in enabling theCommission to assess the agreement'simpact on air transport users.

The parties intend through the agreementto create a long-term alliance,establishing an operationally andcommercially integrated air transportsystem. The agreement provides for thesetting-up of a joint venture to act onbehalf of the two airlines as theirexclusive vehicle for offering scheduledpassenger and cargo air transport servicesbetween Scandinavia and Germany.However, the joint venture will not be anew airline. The transport services willbe supplied to the joint venture byLufthansa and SAS in their own names,on the basis of close operational andcommercial cooperation, which willinclude the setting of fares.

As regards worldwide cooperation, theparties intend to establish an integratedtransport system involving joint networkplanning, a joint pricing policy and theharmonization of product and servicelevels, though without creating a commonentity.

According to the parties, the object of thecooperation is twofold: firstly, to enhancethe two airlines' European and worldwidenetworks and, secondly, to carry out aplan for reducing their costs.

The economic significance of thearrangement is considerable. In terms ofpassenger-kilometres within Europe,Lufthansa and SAS are respectively thesecond and third largest Europeanairlines. Their cooperation agreement willthus have the effect of restrictingcompetition significantly, particularly onroutes between Scandinavia andGermany.

However, account must also be taken ofthe positive aspects of the agreement,which must be seen in the light of therestructuring of European air transport.

The alliance between the two airlines willgive them a much more efficient

worldwide network, enabling them tostand up more effectively to competitionfrom other airlines, notably non-Europeanairlines.

Furthermore, the study on the future ofEuropean air transport carried out in 1993by the "Committee of Wise Men" showedthat the European airlines are handicappedby much higher unit costs than those ofAmerican or Asian airlines. The costreduction plan accompanying theagreement between Lufthansa and SAS isan important aspect to be taken intoconsideration in this respect.

Consumers will derive benefit from theagreement, firstly, by having much moreextensive services available, notably asregards network size, better connectionsand the availability of a jointfrequent-flyer programme and, secondly,by benefiting indirectly from the airlines'lower costs.

The Commission has therefore concludedthat the cooperation can be authorized fora period of ten years, but that conditionsshould be imposed to allow other airlinesto operate services on the routes betweenScandinavia and Germany in competitionwith Lufthansa and SAS.

In general, the Commission has adoptedthe same approach in this case as thatadopted in 1995 in the Swissair/Sabenacase. In the wake of the liberalization ofEuropean air transport, new groupingsbetween airlines may be useful in helpingairlines to adjust to new marketconditions, provide a better service toconsumers and deal more effectively withcompetition from non-Community airlines.

The Commission has no wish to stand inthe way of such operations, but it has toensure that competition is not eradicatedon the routes in question and that newairlines can still enter the market andcompete with established airlines.

[IP/96/49]


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PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL:LETTER OF WARNING FROMTHE COMMISSION TO UEFA______________________________

Following the Commission meeting inStrasbourg on 16 January, Mr Van Miert- in agreement with Mr Santer and withhis colleagues Mr Flynn and Mr Oreja -has instructed his staff to send a letter ofwarning today to FIFA and UEFAquestioning the compatibility of theirrules on transfers and of the nationalityclauses (known as the "3+2 rule") withArticle 85 of the EC Treaty and Article53 of the Agreement on the EuropeanEconomic Area.

The letter is in response to the transferrules the two federations notified to theCommission on 28 July 1995 and hasbeen prompted by complaints brought bycertain players in that connection.

After preliminary scrutiny of the file inthe light of the judgment of the EuropeanCourt of Justice in the Bosman case(C-415/93), the Commission departmentsconcerned informed FIFA and UEFAthat, in their opinion, the rules inquestion constituted agreements betweenundertakings, or decisions by associationsof undertakings, which were contrary tothe rules of competition of the EuropeanUnion and the European Economic Areaand were therefore prohibited. Moreover,by virtue of the principles highlighted bythe Court of Justice, the rules and clausesdid not qualify for exemption from therules of competition.

The warning at this stage focuses onFIFA/UEFA rules governing the transfer,within the European Economic Area, ofprofessional players or amateur playerswho have turned professional and onUEFA nationality clauses applying tonational and international clubcompetitions. The Commission may alsoat a later stage examine the effects oncompetition of FIFA's rules governingrelations between the European Economic

Area and the rest of the world, andnational transfer systems.

The letter expressly requests FIFA andUEFA to comply with Community lawby abolishing the transfer rules andnationality clauses in question and toinform the Commission within six weeksof the measures taken. In the absence ofa satisfactory reply, a proposal will beput to the Commission formally toinitiate infringement proceedings underthe 1962 Regulation (known asRegulation No 17) implementing therules of competition enshrined in Articles85 and 86 of the Treaty and, solely inrespect of the rules on transfers, to liftthe immunity from fines which the twofederations have enjoyed since theirnotification to the Commission of thoserules on 28 July 1995.

The purpose of the letter is to provideplayers, clubs and football federationswith legal certainty in connection withthe contractual and organizationaldecisions they have to take.

Compliance with Community law andprotection of players' and clubs'individual rights deriving therefrom arenow matters for national courts, whichare required to apply the provisions ofthe Treaty, as interpreted by the Court ofJustice. That being so, the Commissionremains determined to ensure compliancewith the ruling of the Court of Justiceand with the principles arising therefrom.Accordingly, it is now taking action asregards the rules governing transfers andnationality clauses.

The Commission is prepared - subject, ofcourse, to compliance with the judgmentof the Court of Justice in Bosman - tocontribute actively to devising, by way ofan alternative to the present transfersystems, arrangements that can guaranteesolidarity between clubs, both large andsmall, and finance the training anddevelopment of players.

[IP/96/62]

Other relevantPress releases

The full texts of Commission'sPress releases are available on-line from the RAPID database, onthe day of their publication by theCommission's Spokesman'sService. To obtain access toRAPID, please write to EUR-OPInformation, Marketing andPublic Relations (OP/4B)2 rue Mercier L-2985Luxembourg tel. +352 292942455, fax +352 2929 42763

IP/96/98 : TECHNOLOGYTRANSFERS: COMMISSIONADOPTS NEW RULES TOPROMOTE DISTRIBUTION OFTECHNOLOGICALINNOVATIONS THROUGHOUTTHE EUROPEAN UNION[96/01/31]

IP/96/222 : NEW PROPOSALS TOENHANCE THECOMPETITIVENESS OFEUROPE'S SHIPPING ANDMARITIME INDUSTRIES


ANTI-TRUST RULES

Court JudgementsThese summaries of Court Judgements have been prepared by DGIV officials and represent their personal views on the Judgement.These views have not been adopted or in any way approved by theCommission and should not be relied upon as a statement of theCommission's or DG IV's views. The CELEX document numbers forthese Judgements are also included within brackets.

JUDGMENTS OF THE COURTOF 24 OCTOBER 1995 INCASES C-70/93, BAYERISCHEMOTORENWERKE AG V ALDAUTO-LEASING D GMBH, ANDC-266/93, BUNDES-KARTELLAMT V VOLKS-WAGEN AG, VAG LEASINGGMBH______________________________

In two proceedings pursuant to Art.177 of the EEC Treaty, the Court ofJustice, on 24 October 1995 issuedpreliminary rulings on theinterpretation of Art. 85(1) of the EECTreaty and Commission Regulation(EEC) No 123/85 of 12 December1984 on the application of Art. 85(3)of the Treaty to certain categories ofmotor vehicle distribution andservicing agreements (OJ 1985 L 15,p. 16, hereinafter "Reg. No 123/85").

T w o l e a d i n g German c a rm a n u f a c t u r e r s , B a y e r i s c h eMotorenwerke AG (hereinafter"BMW") and Volkswagen AG(hereinafter "VW") used theirdistribution network of selected cardealers to influence the market of carleasing, in which both undertakingsparticipate through their ownsubsidiaries, BMW Leasing GmbHand VAG Leasing GmbH,respectively.

BMW required its authorized dealers,by means of a circular letter, not to

provide cars to independent, i.e., notBMW-connected, leasing companieswho would make those BMW carsavailable to customers residing orhaving their principal place ofbusiness outside the territory assignedby BMW to the respective dealer.BMW's concern were those finalcustomers later turning to the localBMW dealer established in theirterritory for supply and maintenance,thereby disturbing BMW's territorialdivision of the German market. ALDAuto-Leasing D GmbH challengedBMW's practice in German courts.The Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Courtof Justice) then referred to the Courtof Justice to answer the questionswhether BMW's practice wasprohibited by Art. 85(1) of the Treatyand eventually exempted by Reg. No123/85 and, if allowed under EECcompetition rules, could neverthelessbe forbidden under Germancompetition law as a supply embargo(C-70/93, par. 13).

VW, by means of a circular letter anda pre-formulated contract, turned itsauthorized dealers into exclusiveagents for VAG Leasing GmbH,negotiating leasing contracts on behalfof VW's leasing company in thedealer's assigned territory. VW,having regard to the obligationsestablished by their respectivedistribution agreements, expected itsauthorized dealers to buy brand carsfrom VW, transfer ownership in thecars to VAG Leasing GmbH in return

of the purchase price and, uponexpiration of the lease, effectivelyrepurchase the cars from VAG LeasingGmbH. VW's dealers were allowed tosupply independent, i.e., not VW-connected, leasing companies onlyupon customer's request or uponintroduction of the customer by suchan independent leasing company. TheGerman Bundeskartellamt prohibitedVW's exclusive agency agreements asrestricting market access. VWchallenged this order in German courts,of which the Bundesgerichtshof thenreferred to the Court of Justice to ruleon whether VW's practice violated Art.85(1) of the Treaty, was eventuallyexempted by Reg. No 123/85 and, ifallowed under EEC competition rules,could nevertheless be consideredunlawful under German competitionlaw (C-266/93, par. 14).

The judgments of the Court ofJustice

The Court of Justice first applied Art.85(1) towards the contested practicesand turned to the question ofagreements between undertakings.

As to BMW's circular letter, the Courtof Justice restated that "a call by amotor vehicle manufacturer to itsauthorized dealers" constitutes anagreement within the meaning of Art.85(1) of the Treaty instead of aunilateral act "if it forme[s] part of aset of continuous business relationsgoverned by a general agreementdrawn up in advance" (C-70/93, par.16, citing Joined Cases 25-26/84 Fordv Commission [1985] ECR 2725 atpar. 21). The Court found such ageneral agreement in BMW'sdealership agreement to which thecircular letter referred "on numerousoccasions" (C-70/93, par. 17).


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As to VW's exclusive agencyagreements, the Court of Justice,answering VW's allegations,distinguished separate undertakingsfrom one economic unit and rejectedthe letter constellation as applyingtowards the relationship between VWor VAG Leasing GmbH and VW'sauthorized dealers. The Court ofJustice pointed out that representativesare generally separated from theirprincipal undertaking for the purposesof Art. 85(1) of the Treaty and willform one economic unit fallingoutside the scope of Art. 85(1) of theTreaty only if "they do not bear anyof the risks resulting from thecontracts negotiated on behalf of theprincipal and they operate as auxiliaryorgans forming an integral part of theprincipal's undertaking" (C-266/93,par. 19, citing Joined Cases 40-48, 50,54-56, 111, 113 and 114/73 SuikerUnie et al. v Commission [1975] ECR1663 at par. 539). The Court foundVW's authorized dealers, however, topartially assume the financial risks ofleasing transactions by accepting theirrepurchase obligation upon expirationof the lease and to conduct their salesactivities in their own name and fortheir own account (C-266/93, par. 19).

Turning to possible restrictions ofcompetition within the meaning ofArt. 85(1) of the Treaty, the Court ofJustice evaluated BMW's and VW'spractices with respect to the leasingmarket.

The Court held BMW's practice toamount to absolute territorialprotection in favour of authorizedBMW dealers, since only the dealer inwhose territory the ultimate lesseeresides is in a position to supplyBMW brand cars to a respectiveindependent leasing company.Additionally, the Court of Justice

found BMW's exclusivity rights toreduce each individual authorizeddealer's "freedom of commercialaction", because its choice ofcustomers was limited to suchindependent leasing companies havingcustomers exclusively in the dealer'sspecial territory (C-70/93, par. 19).

The Court of Justice found VW'sexclusive agency agreements torestrict competition mainly becausethey were, by their express terms andwith all their obligations, closelyattached to VW's distributionagreements which, so the Court,already restricted competition butwere exempted by Reg. 123/85 (C-266/93, par. 21). Since VW'sauthorized dealers had the exclusiveright to sell VW brand cars withintheir territory, the attached obligationsof exclusive agency in favour of VW'sVAG Leasing GmbH restricted marketaccess for other leasing companieswhich were "unable to use theprivileged channels of communicationwith potential customers", i.e., VW'sdealer network (C-266/93, par. 22/23).The Court of Justice again saw afurther restriction of competitionwithin the meaning of Art. 85(1) inthe agency agreements' limitations onthe "freedom of action of tradersindependent of VAG" by imposingexclusivity: authorized VAG dealersare, in effect, restrained fromengaging in leasing activitiesindependently and integration into themanufacturer's, i.e., the principal'sdistribution strategy is increased (C-266/93, par. 24).

With regard to the required effect ontrade between Member States, theCourt of Justice in both cases pointedto the contested practices' effects onthe whole territory of the MemberState Germany and the resultingforeclosure of the German market (C-

70/93 at par. 20 and C-266/93 at par.26). The Court of Justice also notedthat BMW's practice had the effects ofan export ban towards foreign leasingcompanies which customers wouldpossibly not reside in the respectivedealer's territory (C-70/93, par. 20).

Accordingly, the Court of Justicefound both BMW's and VW's practicesin violation of Art. 85(1) of the Treaty.

The Court of Justice next examined thequestion whether the two undertakings'practices were exempted by theprovisions of Reg. 123/85. BothBMW and VW had argued thatindependent leasing companies not partof their distribution system would bein the same position as unauthorizedresellers and relied on Arts. 3(10)(a)and 13(12) of Reg. 123/85 to justifytheir practices: BMW had purportedlylawfully prohibited dealers fromsupplying independent leasingcompanies and, similarly, prohibiteddistribution depots or intermediaries inaccordance Arts. 3(8) and 3(9); VWconcluded a fortiori that negotiationswith independent leasing companiescould be prohibited as much assupplying such companies.

Applying the provisions of Reg.123/85, the Court of Justice noted atthe outset that provisions in a blockexemption have to be narrowlyconstrued and will not extend in theirapplication "beyond what is necessaryto protect the interests which they areintended to safeguard" (C-70/93, par.28; C-266/93, par. 33).

The Court of Justice then found that,for the purposes of Reg. 123/85,independent leasing companies notoffering an option to purchase cannotbe considered to be in a comparableposition to resellers as long as they"confine themselves to purchasing


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vehicles in order to satisfy requestsfrom their customers and do not buildup stocks which they offer tocustomers attracted in that way" (C-70/93, par. 29; C-266/93, par. 34).Limited by reference of theBundesgerichtshof, the Court in bothproceedings considered only leasingtransactions by independent leasingcompanies without an intention oftransferring ownership to the lessee,i.e., purchase option (C-70/93, par. 3;C-266/93, par. 15).

The Court of Justice additionally heldthat Art. 13(12) of Reg. 123/85 onlyrelates to the manufacturer-dealerrelationship and intents to preventdealers from circumventing theirobligations under the distributionagreement by using the transactionalform of a lease instead of anothertransactional form of distribution.Art. 13(12), so the Court, does notprovide guidance for the questionwhether independent leasingcompanies are comparable tounauthorized resellers (C-70/93, par.30; C-266/93, par. 35).

Accordingly, the Court of Justice alsorejected BMW's further arguments andfound that neither Art. 3(8) nor Art.3(9) of Reg. 123/85 governed BMW'ssupply ban, pointing out thatindependent leasing companies wouldact on their own behalf and had to beregarded as final users (C-70/93, par.34). Additionally, so the Court, theNinth recital to Reg. 123/85 supportssupply by dealers outside theirterritory and the regulation as a whole"does not authorize [manufacturers] topartition their market" (C-70/93, par.36/37).

The Court of Justice therefore heldthat both BMW's and VW's restrictivepractices were not exempted by Reg.123/85. Since EEC competition law

prohibited the contested agreements,the national court's question as to therelationship between Community andnational competition law was leftunanswered by the Court.

Main points:

Analysing the judgment, the Court ofJustice refers to the two notions of amissing assumption of anytransactional risk and of being anauxiliary organ forming an integralpart of the principal's undertaking todefine the limits of separateundertakings as opposed to oneeconomic unit. The Court describesthe principal-agent relationship (C-266/93, par. 19 "representatives")establishing separation as the generalrule that will be overcome only if thetwo mentioned factors are fulfilledcumulatively. The Court of Justiceturns to financial risks and to theagent's remaining business to hold thatwith respect to VW's dealers non ofthe two requirements are met. Thecriteria used by the Court are thuspointed to the nature of the businessrelationship in each case. The Courthas examined this question withrespect to VW and its authorizeddealers in the light of the terms andprovisions of the contested agreement.The undertakings concluding theseagreements at that time existed in theordinary structure of a manufacturer-dealer relationship. The proposedagreement did not change did notmodify the legal status of the partiesinvolved in that regard (see C-266/93at par. 18/19).

The Court, in its analysis of VW'spractices, relies on the restrictiveeffects of the distribution agreementsexempted by Reg. 123/85 (C-266/93at par. 21) to which the contested

agreement is an adjunct. However, theCourt finds the positive effectsaccounted for by the block exemptionnot to extend to the exclusive agencyprovisions which reinforce the anti-competitive effects of the distributionagreements. In its findings of aninfringement of Art. 85(1) of theTreaty the Court of Justice clearlypresents the "freedom of commercialaction" of vertically connectedundertakings as a value that, ifnegatively affected, constitutes by itselfa restriction of competition. The Courteffectively seems to take the view that,in addition to the foreclosure effect,any exclusive agency agreement willalways impede Art. 85(1) of theTreaty: it will always affect the dealer'sfreedom of action (see C-266/93 at par.24). In addition, Art. 13(12) of Reg.123/85 accordingly protects onlyobligations already imposed on dealersby manufacturers and does not justifynew ones.

Finally, the Court's interpretation ofArt. 3 of Reg. 123/85 also confirmedthe Commission's view as expressed inthe new Regulation 1475/95 regardingdistribution of automobiles.

It is unfortunate that the Court was notgiven the chance to clarify its positionon the relationship between EEC andnational competition law.

[693J0070]M. WUNDERLICH and

P. ADAMOPOULOS

ARRÊTS DE LA COUR DEJUSTICE DU 12 DÉCEMBRE1995 DANS LES AFFAIRES C-399/93"HG OUDE LUTTIKHUISEA C/ VERENIGDECOOPÉRATIVE INDUSTRIALEMELKINDUSTRIECOBERCOBA" ET C-319/93, C-


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40/94, C-224/94 "DIJKSTRA C/FRIESLAND COÖPERATIEBA", "VAN ROESSEL C/ DECOÖPERATIE VERENIGINGZUIVELCO-ÖPERATIECAMPINA MELK-UNIE BA","WILLEM DE BIE E.A. C/ DECOÖPERATIE VERENIGINGZUIVELCO-ÖPERATIECAMPINA MELKUNIE BA"______________________________

Ces affaires concernent la légalité auregard de l'article 85 du traité d'unesérie de clauses statutaires d'unecoopérative laitière qui règlent lesrapports entre la coopérative et sesmembres et notamment celle desclauses dites "de fidélité".

Domaine: Statut des coopérativeslaitières - Régime d'indemnité audépart - article 85 et Règlement n 26.

Les Faits

L'affaire C-399/93 "HG OudeLuttikhuis ea c/ Verenigde coopérativeindustriale Melkindustrie CobercoBA"concerne deux questions préjudiciellesposées par l'Arrondissementsbank teZutphen et soulevées dans le cadred'un litige opposant des éleveurs debétail laitier à la coopérative agricoleCorbeco BA dont ils étaient membres.Celle-ci s'engage à acheter la totalitédu lait produit par ses adhérents,lesquels lui réservent, en contrepartiel'exclusivité.

Les requérants ont résilié leuradhésion à Coberco le 1er janvier1992 après avoir respecté le délai depréavis en vigueur. Le litige a étésoulevé à propos de l'obligationstatutaire de payer une indemnité audépart en cas de retraite oud'exclusion de celle-ci. Les questionsportent sur les critères d'application de

l'article 85, paragraphe 1 du traitéCEE et de l'article 2 paragraphe 1 durèglement 26/62 à ce régimed'indemnité.

Les affaires jointes C-319/93, C-40/94, C-224/94 "Dijkstra c/ FrieslandCoöperatie BA", "van Roessel c/ Decoöperatie vereniging ZuivelcoöperatieCampina Melkunie BA", "Willem deBie e.a. c/ De coöperatie verenigingZuivelcoöperatie Campina MelkunieBA" concernent plusieurs questionspréjudicielles posées par leGerechtshof te Leeuwarden etl ' A r r o n d i s s e m e n t s b a n k t e ' s -Hertogenbosch soulevées dans lecadre de litiges opposant des éleveursde bétail laitier aux coopérativesagricoles dont ils étaient membres àpropos de l'obligation statutaire depayer une indemnité de départ en casde retraite ou d'exclusion de celles-ci.Les requérants ont fait valoir quel'indemnité de départ exigée par lescoopératives crée, une obligation delivraison exclusive pendant unepériode indéterminée qui restreint laliberté économique de ses membres etconstitue une entrave pour lesconcurrents de la coopérative. Enoutre, les demandeurs au principal ontsoutenu que le régime de l'indemnitéde départ en question ne peut pasbénéficier de l'exception prévue àl'article 2 du règlement n° 26.

Il convient de rappeler que, selonl'article 1 du règlement n° 26, lesarticles 85 à 90 du traité sontapplicables à tous les accords relatifsà la production et au commerce desproduits agricoles, sous réserve del'article 2 du même règlement. Auxtermes de l'article 2, paragraphe 1:"l'article 85, paragraphe 1 estinapplicable aux accords...(visés àl'article 1) qui font partie intégranted'une organisation nationale de marchéou qui sont nécessaires à la réalisation

des objectifs de l'article 39 du traité(première phrase). Il ne s'applique pase n p a r t i c u l i e r a u xaccords...d'exploitants agricoles,d'associations d'exploitants agricoles oud' associations de ces associationsressortissant à un seul État membre,dans la mesure où, sans comporterl'obligation de pratiquer un prixdéterminé, ils concernent la productionou la vente des produits agricoles..., àmoins que la Commission ne constatequ'ainsi la concurrence est exclue ouque les objectifs de l'article 39 du traitésont mis en péril" (seconde phrase).

Sur le fond

Sur les critères d'application del'article 85

La Cour indique que la compatibilitédes clauses statutaires d'une sociétécoopérative ne peut être appréciée defaçon abstraite. Il faut l'examiner entenant compte des conditionséconomiques sur le marché concerné.La Cour établit qu'afin de déterminer sile régime d'indemnité est compatibleavec l'article 85, paragraphe 1, il fautexaminer les critères relatifs à l'objet etles effets de l'accord et enfinl ' a f f e c t a t i o n d e s é c h a n g e scommunautaires. Ainsi, elle confirmela ligne d'argumentation établie dansl'arrêt DLG du 15 décembre 1994 (C-250-92).

Quant à l'objet des accords, La Coursuit son approche d'un "rule of reason"limité en faveur des coopérativesd'achat, comme elle l'a élaboré dansson arrêt DLG précitée. En effet,l'organisation d'une entreprise selon laforme juridique d'une coopérative neconstitue pas en soi un comportementanticoncurrentiel (arrêt Luttikhuis,point 12). Or, les restrictions imposéesaux membres par les statuts doivent


ANTI-TRUST RULES

être "limitées à ce qui est nécessairepour le bon fonctionnement de lacoopérative et de soutenir sa puissancecontractuelle vis à vis desproducteurs" (arrêt DLG point 35 etpoint 14 de l'arrêt Luttikhuis).

Quant aux effets des accords ou desclauses statutaires, la Cour signale quela combinaison de certaines clausespeut produire une restriction de laconcurrence. Ainsi, dans le casd'espèce, l'obligation de livraisonexclusive et l'imposition d'indemnitésde départ excessives liant les membresà la coopérative durant des longuespériodes et les privant ainsi de lapossibilité de s'adresser à desopérateurs concurrents, pourrait avoirpour effet de restreindre laconcurrence. Il en résulte qu'une tellesituation rendrait le marchéexcessivement rigide et uneconsoliderait la forte positionconcurrentielle de la coopérative, cequi ferait obstacle à l'entrée denouveaux concurrents (point 16 del'arrêt Luttikhuis).

Quant au critère relatif au commerceintracomunautaire, la Cour reprendl'arrêt DGL pour établir qu'un accordest susceptible d'affecter le commerceentre Etats membres lorsqu'il peut, surla base d'un ensemble d'élémentsobjectifs de droit ou de fait, exercerune influence directe ou indirecte surles échanges entre Etats membres dansun sens qu'il pourrait nuire à laréalisation des objectifs d'un marchéunique entre Etats membres (arrêtDLG, point 54).

Sur les critères d'application durèglement 26 du 4 avril 1962:

La Cour rappèle que l'article 1 durèglement énonce la règle générale

d'applicabilité des articles 85 à 90 dutraité et l'article 2 prévoit dedérogations à cette norme et il doitêtre interprété de manière restrictive(voir supra). Or, pour interpréterl'article 2, paragraphe 1 du règlementn° 26, il convient de tenir compte dela genèse ainsi que de la motivationdudit règlement. Il en résulte lavolonté du législateur de protéger lescoopératives agricoles en leurappliquant un régime plus souple. Parconséquent, les coopératives nedoivent pas être soumises auxconditions tant de la première que dela seconde phrase de l'article 2,p a r a g r a p h e 1 . E l l e s s o n texclusivement soumises auxconditions énoncées à la secondephrase de cette disposition (arrêtDijkstra, point 18).

Cependant, il convient d'écarterl'argument selon lequel les accordsvisées à la seconde phrase de l'article2, paragraphe 1, bénéficient d'unevalidité provisoire aussi longtempsque la Commission n'a pas constatéque la concurrence était exclue ou queles objectifs de l'article 39 étaient enpéril. Cette disposition n'institue qu'unrenversement de la charge de lapreuve en faveur des exploitantsagricoles.

En ce qui concerne les dérogationsprévues par l'article 2 dudit règlement,la première n'a qu'un domained'application très limité parce que lesorganisations nationales de marché ontpratiquement disparu et la secondedérogation s'applique aux accordsnécessaires à la réalisation desobjectifs énoncés à l'article 39 dutraité.

La troisième dérogation a, selon laCour, une portée autonome parrapport aux deux autres dérogationsénoncées au même paragraphe. Celle-

ci contient trois conditionscumulatives: La coopérative doit êtreressortissant à un seul Etat membre, lesaccords ou clauses statutaires nedoivent pas porter sur le prix maisvisent plutôt la vente de produitsagricoles, ou l'utilisation d'installationscommunes de stockage, de traitementou de transformation de ces produits,et enfin qu'ils n'excluent pas laconcurrence ni mettent pas en péril lesobjectifs de la politique agricolecommune.

Pour ce qui est de ce dernier point, laCour indique qu'une accumulation declauses statutaires liant les membres àla coopérative durant de longuespériodes et les privant ainsi des'adresser a des opérateurs concurrentspeut mettre en péril l'objectif de lapolitique agricole commune relatif aurelèvement du revenu individuel deceux qui travaillent dans l'agriculture,dans la mesure où ces derniers nepourront pas se bénéficier de laconcurrence sur des prix d'achat de lamatière première pratiques par lesdifférentes entreprises transformatrices.

La Cour se réfère enfin aux affairesjointes C-319-93, C-40/94 et C-224/94(Dijkstra, Van Roessel e.a et De Biee.a.) pour aborder la questionconcernant les pouvoirs de laCommission et des juridictionsnationales en ce domaine, (point 29 et30).

S'agissant de la répartition descompétences entre la Commission etles juridictions nationales pourappliquer l'article 2, paragraphe 1, durèglement n° 26, la Commissionbénéficie d'une compétence exclusivepour constater qu'un accord remplit lesconditions prévues au paragraphe 1. En


ANTI-TRUST RULES

revanche, la Commission partage sacompétence pour appliquer l'article 85,paragraphe 1 avec les juridictionsnationales. Il convient d"examiner lesconséquences de cette répartition decompétences à la lumière desprincipes dégagés par la Cour dansl'arrêt Delimitis (arrêt du 28/02/1991,aff. C-234/89).

Afin d'éviter des décisionscontradictoires, le juge national peuttenir compte des considérationssuivantes: si les conditionsd'application de l'article 85,paragraphe 1, ne sont manifestementpas réunis, le juge national peutpoursuivre la procédure pour statuersur l'accord litigieux.

Au contraire, s'il estime que l'article85, paragraphe 1 est applicable et quel'accord ne remplit manifestement pasles conditions pour bénéficier de ladérogation de l'article 2 du règlementn° 26 ni d'une exemption au titre del'article 85, paragraphe 3, il peut endéclarer la nullité conformément àl'article 85, paragraphe 2. A cet égard,il doit tenir compte des critèresdégagés par la jurisprudence de laCour et par la pratique de laCommission (décisions, rapports sur lapolitique de la concurrence,communications).

En cas de doute, le juge nationalpourra, lorsque il s'avère opportun etconfo rme aux d i spos i t ionsprocédurales nationales, obtenir desinformations complémentaires de laCommission ou mettre les parties enmesure de demander à la Commissionde se prononcer.

Points essentiels

La Cour confirme l'application limitéede la règle de raison (rule of reason)aux coopératives comme elle l'a déjàénoncé dans son arrêt DLG, enconfirmant leur caractère foncièrementfavorable à la concurrence. La faveurdu législateur national et des autoritéscommunautaires pour cette formejuridique ont certainement joué unrôle important à cette prise de positionde la part de la Cour.

Afin de décider si les clausesstatutaires d'une société coopérative,sont compatibles avec l'article 85,paragraphe 1, du traité CEE, lajuridiction de renvoi doit prendre enconsidération les critères relatifs àl'objet de l'accord prévoyant cesclauses et ceux relatifs à l'affectiondes échanges intracommunautaires, entenant compte du contexteéconomique dans lequel opèrent lesentreprises, des produits ou servicesvisés par cet accord ainsi que de lastructure et des conditions réelles defonctionnement du marché concerné.En ce qui concerne l'interprétation dela seconde phrase de l'article 2,paragraphe 1, du règlement n° 26, laCour a adopté la thèse de laCommission relative à la portéeautonome de cette disposition.

A propos de la répartition descompétences entre la Commission etles juridictions nationales, la Cour seréfère aux critères qu'elle a élaborédans son arrêt Delimitis, reprisd'ailleurs par la Commission dans sacommunication pour la coopérationavec les juridictions nationales.

[693j0399] P. ADAMOPOULOSand R. MILLAN SANZ

Other Judgements

Extracts are published in the weeklypublication " Les activités de la Courde Justice et du Tribunal dePremière Instance desCommunautés Européennes",available on-line from the RAPIDdatabase, a few days after itspublication by the Court. To obtainaccess to RAPID please write to:EUR-OP Information, Marketingand Public Relations (OP/4B)2 rue Mercier L-2985 Luxembourgtel. +352 2929 42455,fax +352 2929 42763

Arrêt de la Cour du 9/1/96: Aff.T-575/93 Casper Koelman /Commission des Communautéseuropéennes; Concurrence;'Règlement No 17 - Rejet d'uneplainte - Motivation - Jugenational'; (Quatrième chambreélargie)

Arrêt de la Cour du 15/2/96: Aff.C-226/94; Grand garage albigeoisSA e.a. / Garage Massol SARL;Prejudicielle; Concurrence - Distribution d'automobiles -Règlement (CEE) no 123/85 -Opposabilité aux tiers - Revendeurindépendant; (Deuxième chambre)

Arrêt de la Cour du 15/2/96: Aff.C-309/94Nissan France SA e.a. / Jean-Luc Dupasquier du Garage Sport Auto e.a.; Prejudicielle;Concurrence - Distribution d'automobiles - Règlement (CEE) no 123/85 - Opposabilité aux tiers - Importateur parallèle - Cumul des activités de mandataire et derevendeur indépendant; (Deuxièmechambre)


MERGERSApplication of Council Regulation 4064/89Main developments between 1st January and 31st March 1996

Summary of the most importantrecent developmentsby John FELLS, DG IV-B

Between 1st January and 31st Marchthe Commission took 27 decisionsunder the Merger Regulation. Thistotal included a decision under Article8(2) of the Regulation (clearance withconditions and obligations: Kimberly-Clark/Scott Paper), and a decisionunder Article 9 of the Regulation(Member State referral: Gehe/LloydsChemists).

KIMBERLY-CLARK/SCOTTPAPER

On 16th January, after 5 months ofe x t e n s i v e i n v e s t i g a t i o n , t h eCommission approved the proposedmerger between Kimberly ClarkCorporation (USA) and the Scott PaperCompany (USA). However, thisapproval was only granted after theparties agreed to make substantialmodifications to the merger in Irelandand the United Kingdom. The result ofthese modifications is that KimberlyClark will not be able to combine itsown Kleenex, and Scott's Andrex,branded consumer tissue businesses inthe UK and Ireland.

- The parties will divest all ofKimberly-Clark's existing brandedconsumer toilet tissue business soldunder the Kleenex "Double Velvet,Quilted and Recycled" brands. In orderto allow the acquirer sufficient time toestablish these brands in the UK andIrish market, the purchaser will be able

to make use of the Kleenex umbrellatrademark for a maximum 10 yearperiod and Kimberly-Clark hasundertaken not to re-enter the marketwith the Kleenex trademark for aminimum 15 year period. Similararrangements will apply for Kimberly-Clark's branded consumer kitchen towelbusiness.

- The parties will also divest Scott's"Scotties" and "Handy Andies" brandsfor facials and hankies respectively andundertake not to use the Andrextrademark for consumer facials andhankies for an indefinite duration in theUK and Ireland.

- The parties agree to divest Kimberly-Clark's 80 000 ton-per-year tissuefacility at Prudhoe in England,comprising the tissue mill, theconverting factory and the consumertissue products converting equipment tosupport the above businesses as well asthe warehousing, offices and theadjacent regional distribution centre.

Through the divestment of the Prudhoemill, Kimberly-Clark's residual tissuepaper production capacity will fall tobelow 40% of overall capacity in theUK and Ireland. The Prudhoe mill is amodern facility currently producing allof Kimberly-Clark's branded consumertoilet tissue and kitchen towel business.It is the only plant in the UKproducing tissue paper using TAD

(through-air-dry) technology which iscapable of producing the highest qualitytoilet tissue.

Kimberly-Clark and Scott Paper aremajor tissue paper and related productmanufacturers with worldwidebusinesses in the consumer andindustrial (away-from-home) areas.Together, the surviving Kimberly ClarkCorporation will become the No. 1tissue paper producer both at the worldand the European levels.

The operation gave rise to concerns inthe UK and Irish markets for toilett i s s u e , k i t c h e n t o w e l s a n dfacials/hankies.

Because of the bulky, low value ofconsumer tissue products which givesrise to high transport costs, and inparticular brand as well as differences inconsumer preferences, the UK andIreland constitute separate geographicalreference markets.

Private label products (ie sold under theretailer's name) play an important rolein the UK and Irish markets, and nowin fact cover more than half of marketdemand. Nevertheless, the parties'control of the two leading brands, whichare essential brands for retailers tostock, coupled with their position as theleading supplier of private-labelproducts and overall market strengthwould have combined to create adominant position. In particular, theCommission was concerned that if themerger went through unmodified, therewould no longer have been sufficientlystrong inter-brand competition. Theresult would have been that consumerswould have had to pay too high pricesfor basic tissue paper products and thatthe benefits to consumers of furtherinnovation and product qualityimprovement would have been lost.


MERGERS

Moreover, the tissue paper market is avery large market with combined salesof approximately 1000 million ECU fortoilet tissue, kitchen towels andfacials/hankies in the UK and Ireland.

The transaction was also notified to theU.S. competition authorities, who foundcompetition concerns in the facialtissues and baby wipes markets. As aresult, Kimberly-Clark agreed to divestScott's baby wipes and facial tissuebrands, Scott's Dover, Delaware, plantused to make Scott baby wipes andother products, and a maximum of twoof four tissue mills.

GEHE/LLOYDS CHEMIST)

On 22nd March the Commissiondecided that the public bid by GEHEfor Lloyds the Chemists should bereferred to the competent UnitedKingdom authorities for furtherinvestigation.

Through its AAH subsidiary, GEHE iscurrently the largest wholesaler ofpharmaceutical products in the UK andat the retail level GEHE also owns alarge chain of chemist shops throughAAH's subsidiary, Hills Pharmacy.Lloyds is currently the third largest UKwholesaler (behind AAH and Unichem)and the second largest retailer (behindBoots) of pharmaceutical products.Through the acquisition GEHE willbecome the largest pharmaceuticalwholesaler and retailer in the UK.

After the merger GEHE/Lloyds andUnichem will have over two-thirds ofthe UK market for the wholesalesupply of pharmaceutical products toindependent retail chemists. In certainregions their combined market sharewill be significantly higher. AlthoughBoots has a large chain of retailchemists, it is not active in thewholesale market. After the merger,

there will be only two wholesalers,GEHE/Lloyds and Unichem, supplyinga full range of pharmaceutical productsthroughout the UK. Other wholesalersare very much smaller and operate onlyon a regional basis. Regionalwholesalers would appear unable toprovide a sufficient competitivecounterweight to the duopoly paircomposed of Gehe/Lloyds andUnichem. The Commission thereforeconsidered that the proposedconcentration threatens to create adominant position in the market forpharmaceutical wholesaling in the UK,whether this market be examined on aregional or a national basis.

The Commission also identified a smallnumber of areas in which pharmaciesbelonging to the AAH and Lloydschain of pharmacies would appear tohave a local monopoly, as otherpharmacies appear too distantly located.Furthermore, the Commissionconsidered that the verticalconsequences of the merger requirethorough investigation as after themerger, GEHE/Lloyds' position as theleading pharmaceutical wholesaler andretailer could have consequences forthe supply of pharmaceutical productsto independent pharmacies competingat the retail level with the group'soutlets. The Commission thereforeconsidered that the concentration alsothreatens to create a dominant positionin the market for pharmaceuticalretailing in the UK.

Lloyds has no turnover outside theUnited Kingdom and the distinctgeographical reference markets forpharmaceutical wholesaling andretailing are wholly limited to the UK.

Gehe's bid for Lloyds was notified tothe Commission on 8 February and arequest for referral was submitted bythe United Kingdom authorities on 1March.

The Commission decided to refer thecase to the UK authorities. TheCommission considered that only adetailed analysis of both thepharmaceutical wholesaling and retailingmarkets in the UK will make it possibleto determine the precise scope of thegeographical reference market and toproperly assess the competitionconsequences of the merger. TheCommission noted that the UnitedKingdom authorities have alreadydecided to refer the parallel Unichembid for Lloyds to The Monopolies andMergers Commission. Referral willtherefore also have the advantage ofallowing both bids to be examined bythe same regulatory authority on acoordinated timetable.

GENCOR/LONRHO

In December 1995 the Commissiondecided to initiate a detailedinvestigation of the proposed merger ofthe PGM (platinum group metals)interests of Gencor and Lonrho whichare located in South Africa. BothGencor and Lonrho have substantialoperations in the European Union.

The merger involves share exchangesbetween the two companies with respectto Impala Platinum Holdings Limited("Implats"), Eastern Platinum Limitedand Western Platinum Limited.

The operation will result in Lonrhoreceiving new shares in Implats. Theseshares would be listed on theJohannesburg Stock Exchange and theInternational Stock Exchange inLondon. Following the issue of newshares Gencor and Lonrho will eachhold about 32% of the shares inImplats. The remaining shares will beheld by the public.


MERGERS

The Commission considers that thescope of the geographic market forPGMs is worldwide. The Commissiondecided to initiate the second phaseinvestigation into the effects of theoperation because of concerns that themerged company may have an adverseeffect on competition in the PGMmarket. The second phase investigation,and hearings of the parties concerned,have continued during the firsttrimester of 1996, and theCommission's final decision is due tobe taken by early May 1996 at thelatest.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS CASES

Three decisions already taken in thefirst trimester of 1996 indicate theongoing restructuring which is takingplace in the telecommunications sector.The Commission cleared theacquisition by the Americantelecommunications company A.T.T. ofcertain business units of PhilipsElectronics N.V. in the market for theprovision of public telecommunicationsequipment. The Commission alsoapproved the acquisition from theBelgian State of a strategic interest inBelgacom by Ameritech International,Tele Danmark and the SingaporeTelecom; although the companies willcompete on the European-wide marketswhich should follow liberalisation,scheduled before the beginning of 1998by the Commission, they will be facedwith strong competitors such as BT,France Telecom and DeutscheTelekom. Finally the Commissioncleared the setting-up of a jointventure, 'Hermes', to create a pan-European telecommunications networkcombining the telecommunicationsexpertise of the American companyGTS with the infrastructure ofEuropean national railway companies.

ARTICLE 66 ECSC

Raab Karcher Kohle GmbH /Ruhrkohle Handel GmbH.

After an in-depth investigation of theeffects of the concentration in themarkets for the sale of hard coal andhard coal products in Germany theCommission approved the proposedacquisition of all capital and votingrights in Raab Karcher Kohle GmbHby Ruhrkohle Handel GmbH.

Ruhrkohle Handel GmbH is asubsidiary of Ruhrkohle AG and ismainly active in the trade in solid fuels(hard coal, hard coal briquette, coalcoke and brown coal). Accounting forover 80 % of domestic hard coalproduction, Ruhrkohle is by far thelargest German mining company. RaabKarcher Kohle GmbH groups togetherthe coal trading activities of RaabKarcher AG, a member of the VEBAgroup.

The concentration affects the sale ofhard coal to the electricity-generatingindustry, steelmakers as well as otherindustrial users, in particular in thecement, chalk and paper industry. In thepast the German market for the sale ofhard coal coal was characterized, inrelation to the two main user groups ofgenerators and steelmakers, byextensive price regulations andpurchasing commitments according tothe "Jahrhundertvertrag" and the"Hüttenvertrag". From 1996 thegenerators are not obliged any more topurchase certain minimum quantities ofGerman hard coal but can demandimported hard coal. Nevertheless, in thenext few years the market will open uponly for a limited extent for importedcoal.

As a result of the concentration themarket share of Ruhrkohle with the sale

of hard coal to the electricity-generatingindustry increases to about 73 %. Thissizeable market share is predominantlybased on price-regulated direct suppliesof Ruhrkohle to generators according tothe "Jahrhundertvertrag". SinceRuhrkohle has no real scope of pricesetting here, this market share does notreflect real market power. Through theacquisition Ruhrkohle will improve itsaccess to imported coal. However, on thebasis of the limited importance of RaabKarcher as an importer and on the basisof the diminishing importance ofmerchants in the import of coal it willnot gain any major advantage regardingthe import of coal.

Regarding the sale of hard coal tosteelmakers Ruhrkohle has a marketshare of about 78 %, which wll beincreased very slightly. This sizeablemarket share is based on predominantlyprice-regulated direct supplies ofRuhrkohle to steelmakers according tothe "Hüttenvertrag" and does not reflectreal market power.

In the case of the sale of hard coal toother industrial users Ruhrkohle has amarket share of about 38 %. Becausethese users are geographically dispersedand the volume of their purchasegenerally is small they depend on coalmerchants active in Germany. However,with Stinnes, RTE, Rheinbraun and anumber of smaller traders there will stillbe a sufficient number of alternativesources of supply.

On the basis of the results of theinvestigation the Commission decidedthat the concentration fulfils the criteriafor the protection of competitionaccording to Article 66 paragraph 2 ofthe ECSC-Treaty. In view of the degreeof concentration achieved and the highlevel of state coal subsidies, theCommission will carefully monitorfuture developments within thisindustry.


MERGERS

Press releases

The full texts of Commission's Pressreleases are available on-line from theRAPID database, on the day of theirpublication by the Commission'sSpokesman's Service. To obtainaccess to RAPID, please write toEUR-OP Information, Marketing andPublic Relations (OP/4B)2 rue Mercier L-2985 Luxembourgtel. +352 2929 42455,fax +352 2929 42763

IP/96/14 : THE COMMISSIONCLEARS A JOINT VENTUREBETWEEN ERICSSON AND ASCOM[96/01/09]

IP/96/40 : THE COMMISSIONCLEARS THE JOINT VENTURE OFSKANSKA FASTIGHETER AB ANDSECURUM FORVALTNING AB INTHE FIELD OF HOTEL BUSINESSESIN SWEDEN [96/01/12]

IP/96/41 : THE COMMISSIONAPPROVES A JOINT VENTURECREATED BETWEEN VEBA ANDCIBA-GEIGY IN CHEMICALPRODUCTS USED IN THE LEATHERAND PELT INDUSTRY [96/01/12]

IP/96/48 : AFTER SUBSTANTIALMODIFICATIONS, THECOMMISSION FINALLY GIVES THEGREEN LIGHT TO THE MERGERBETWEEN KIMBERLY-CLARK ANDSCOTT PAPER [96/01/16]

IP/96/97 : COMPANY MERGERS:THE COMMISSION LAUNCHES AWIDE RANGING DEBATE TOADAPT THE REGULATORYFRAMEWORK TO THE REALITIESOF THE SINGLE MARKET [96/01/31]

IP/96/110 : COMMISSION CLEARSTHE CREATION OF A JOINTVENTURE BETWEEN NOKIA ANDAUTOLIV [96/02/06]

IP/96/129 : COMMISSION CLEARSTHE ACQUISITION BY AT&T OFCERTAIN BUSINESS UNITS OFPHILIPS IN THETELECOMMUNICATIONSEQUIPMENT SECTOR [96/02/07]

IP/96/133 : COMMISSION CLEARSRAIL TECHNOLOGY JOINTVENTURE BETWEEN SIEMENSAND LAGARDERE [96/02/09]

IP/96/138 : THE COMMISSIONAPPROVES THE ACQUISITION OFLANDIS AND GYR BYELEKTROWATT [96/02/13]

IP/96/139 : THE COMMISSIONAPPROVES THE CREATION OF AJOINT VENTURE BETWEEN BPAND SONATRACH [96/02/13]

IP/96/152 : COMMISSION CLEARSTHE CREATION OF A JOINTVENTURE BETWEEN SKF AND INA[96/02/20]

IP/96/163 : THE COMMISSIONAPPROVES THE DOW/DUPONTELASTOMER JOINT VENTURE[96/02/22]

IP/96/182 : COMMISSIONAUTHORIZES THE ACQUISITIONOF RAAB KARCHER KOHLE GMBHBY RUHRKOHLE HANDEL GMBH.[96/02/28]

IP/96/192 : COMMISSION APPROVESSTRATEGIC INVESTMENT INBELGACOM [96/02/29]

IP/96/199 : COMMISSION CLEARSTHE CREATION OF A JOINTVENTURE BETWEENWIENERBERGER AND STARCK[96/03/05]

IP/96/236 : COMMISSION APPROVESTAKEOVER BY PREUSSAG OFELCO LOOSER [96/03/19]

IP/96/251 : THE COMMISSIONAPPROVES TAKEOVER BYPHOENIX OF COMIFAR. [96/03/22]

IP/96/252 : COMMISSION APPROVESACQUISITION OF VALOISINDUSTRIES BY TEXTRON [96/03/22]

IP/96/253 : COMMISSION CLEARSTHE ACQUISITION OF PART OF THEDIVERSEY CO. BY UNILEVER PLC[96/03/22]

IP/96/254 : COMMISSION REFERSTHE GEHE/LLOYDS CASE TO THEUNITED KINGDOM FOR FURTHERINVESTIGATION [96/03/22]

IP/96/276 : THE COMMISSIONCLEARS THE JOINT VENTURE OFVIACOM AND BEAR STEARNS[96/03/28]

IP/96/277 : THE COMMISSIONCLEARS DEAL BY WHICHLOCKHEED MARTIN WILLACQUIRE SOLE CONTROL OFLORAL [96/03/28]

JudgementsExtracts are published in the weeklypublication " Les activités de la Courde Justice et du Tribunal de PremièreInstance des CommunautésEuropéennes", available on-line fromthe RAPID database, a few days afterits publication by the Court.

Arrêt de la Cour du 11/1/96: Aff.C-480/93 P Zunis Holding SA e.a. /Commission des Communautéseuropéennes; 'Pourvoi - Concurrence - Contrôle des opérations de concentration -Recevabilité du recours enannulation formé contre unedécision refusant de rouvrir laprocédure'; (Cinquième chambre)


LIBERALISATION & STATE INTERVENTIONApplication of Article 90 ECMain developments between 1st January and 31st March 1996

Most important recentdevelopments

COMMISSION FORMALLYADOPTS DIRECTIVE ACCELE-RATING COMPETITION IN EUMOBILE AND PERSONALCOMMUNICATIONS MARKET______________________________

The Commission has today formallyadopted the Article 90 directive, putforward by Commissioner Van Miertin cooperation with CommissionerBangemann, opening the EU mobileand personal communications marketto full competition.

The directive is based on thediscussion process launched last yearby the Green Paper on Mobile andPersonal Communications. It requiresMember States to abolish allexclusive and special rights in thearea of mobile communications and,wherever this has not yet beenachieved, to establish open and fairlicensing procedures to authorise thelaunch of the digital services GSM,DCS 1800 and DECT. This includeslifting the restrictions on currentlicensees for one of these frequenciesfrom applying to extend their servicesinto the others. The directivestipulates that Member States mustcease to restrict the combination ofthe mobile technologies or systems, inparticular where multistandardequipment is available, while alsotaking into account the benefit ofensuring effective competition

between operators in the relevantmarkets by allowing new entrantsgain a foothold.

The directive also removes allexisting restrictions on use offacilities for mobile networks,allowing new mobile operators tomake full use of their owninfrastructure as well as that providedby third parties such as utilities'networks. Use of infrastructure otherthan those controlled by theincumbent telecoms operator isessential to the success of newentrants to the mobile market as itgives them much greater control overtheir cost base. Leasing capacitycurrently represents a cost factor forsecond operators of between 30 and50%. The right to set up their ownnetworks and choose alternativeinfrastructure and connections alsogives mobile operators significantlymore flexibility representing an strongpush towards further development andinnovation in the mobile market.

Greater efficency and choice boughtabout by competition in the mobilemarket is particularly important in therun up to 1998 full telecomsliberalisation as it will dampen thepotential for increases in (fixed) localcharges to the consumer. Theincreasingly commercial incumbent(fixed link) operations are now set toposition themselves to make the mostof their local loop monopoly before

the effects of full network competitionare felt. However, the rapidlydecreasing price of competitive mobileservices will set an effective ceilingfor the wire based local tariffs.

The Commission will be paying closeattention to price adjustments in thetelecoms sector between now and 1998in order to secure the maximumbenefits of liberalisation for consumersacross the EU.

Time Table

The mobile directive will enter intoforce twenty days after publication inthe Official Journal of the EC which isexpected within the next ten days. TheMember States then have nine monthsto notify the Commission of theappropriate national measures taken toimplement its provisions.

From the moment the directive entersinto force, in addition to what hasalready been achieved in opening upthe GSM licensing process across theUnion, Member States must openlicence allocation procedures for allpublic access/Telepoint applications,including systems operating on thebasis of the DECT standard.

By January 1, 1998, at the latest theMember States must also have openedup the licencing of mobile systemsaccording to the DCS 1800 standard.

Restrictions on infrastructure anddirect interconnection for mobilecommunications must be abolishedimmediately. However, Member Stateswith less developed networks mayapply for derogations of up to five


LIBERALISATION & STATE INTERVENTION

years to take account of their specificsituations. This concerns Portugal,Greece, Spain and Ireland.

Some figures about the MobileMarket

With adoption of these measures theEuropean Union has now taken thelead in setting the right regulatoryconditions for encouraging thedevelopment of mobile and personalcommunications into a vast massmarket. The directive means that theEU market will be the first region inthe world to enjoy the combination ofliberalisation of services andnetworks, together with thedeployment of harmonised, leadingedge, digital standards over such alarge area. The standards confirmedfor the EU are GSM, DCS 1800 (thetwo frequencies available for digitalmobile services) and DECT (fordigital cordless telephony within afixed radius). This both reflects andfurther establishes the globalmomentum behind the take up of thistechnology for the second generationdigital mobile systems. The wirelessmarket is now set to become a corecomponent of the information societyand the development of true person toperson communications.

The mobile sector is by far the mostdynamic in the telecoms market in theEU experiencing levels of growth ofover 60%. In the last year the numberof cellular subscribers in Europe hasgrown from around 12 million to over20 million, clearly outstrippinggrowth in numbers of fixedsubscribers. The vast majority of thenew mobile customers are enjoyingdigital services, particularly GSM,which allows them to roam

throughout Europe with the samehandset and is also much moreefficient concerning use of thefrequency spectrum.

On top of very substantial analoguenetworks in countries such as the UK,Italy and Scandinavia, the growthpotential of GSM is now also evidentin nearly all the Member States. InFrance, for example, GSM subscribersgrew from around 337 000 to around797 000 over the past year. InBelgium there were around 53 000GSM subscribers at the end of 1994and there are now nearly 146 000.Italy saw growth over the same periodfrom 45 000 in 1994 to 170 000 inOctober 1995. Germany still remainsby far the most important market withalmost three and a half million users,of which over two and a half millionare now on the GSM network.However progress in countries withless developed networks is alsonotable. Over the last 12 monthsGSM subscribers in Greece increasedfrom 125 000 to 255 000, and inPortugal, from 122 000 to 241 000.The Scandinavian countries are nowalso experiencing massive growth intake up of GSM. Most impressive isSweden where the GSM market hasgrown from around 200 000 to 905000 over the past year.

In total, Commission studies predict38 million cellular mobile users inEurope by the year 2000 and around80 million by 2010.

The Market growth and lower pricesbrought about by introducingcompetition into these markets willeffect all sorts of users: residential,both young singles as well asfamilies, and elderly or disabledpeople who benefit from a cordless

phone; small and medium sizedbusinesses benefitting from theorganisational flexibility implied bythe cordless office, and internationalbusiness travellers benefitting fromcross border GSM roaming.

[IP/96/51]

Press releases

The full texts of Commission's Pressreleases are available on-line from theRAPID database, on the day of theirpublication by the Commission'sSpokesman's Service. To obtainaccess to RAPID, please write to EUR-OP Information, Marketing andPublic Relations (OP/4B)2 rue Mercier L-2985 Luxembourgtel. +352 2929 42455,fax +352 2929 42763

IP/96/183 : COMMISSIONACCELERATES LIBERALISATION INTELECOMS SECTOR WHILEEMPHASISING THE IMPORTANCEOF UNIVERSAL SERVICE [96/02/29]

IP/96/205 : THE COMMISSIONACCEPTS PROPOSAL FROMDANISH GOVERNMENT TO SOLVECOMPETITION PROBLEM IN THEPORT OF ELSINORE [96/03/06]

IP/96/211 : COMMISSION APPROVESCREATION OF PAN-EUROPEANTELECOMMUNICATIONSNETWORK [96/03/08]

IP/96/218 : COMMUNICATION ONTHE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OFTHE UNIVERSAL SERVICE IN THEEUROPEAN UNION [96/03/13]


STATE AIDMain developments between 1st January and 31st March 1996

Summary of the most importantrecent developments

by Henrik MØRCH, DG IV-G-1

THE COMMISSION ADOPTSNEW "DE MINIMIS" RULE

In 1992 the Commission set out itspolicy on state aid for small andmedium-sized enterprises (SMEs) inCommunity guidelines (OJ C 213 of19.8.1992). In an effort to reduce theadministrative burden on the MemberStates and on the Commission itself -which ought to be left to concentrateits resources on matters of realimportance to competition policywithin the Community - theCommission decided to introduce a deminimis facility in the SMEguidelines which provided that aid notexceeding ECU 50 000 per firm overthree years for a given broad type ofexpenditure need not be notified tothe Commission under Article 93(3)of the EC Treaty. The Commissionconsiders that aid in such smallamounts is unlikely to have aperceptible impact on trade andcompetition between Member Stateswithin the meaning of Article 92(1).In 1993 DG IV sent a note to allMember States on the use of the deminimis facility which clarified anumber of outstanding issues, inparticular that:

- under the de minimis facility eachfirm may receive aid of ECU 50 000over three years for two categories ofexpenditure, i.e. investment of any

kind and for whatever purpose exceptR&D and other expenditure. Hence, agiven firm could receive a maximumof ECU 100 000 of aid under the twocategories over a three-year period.

- in respect of cumulation between aidunder the de minimis facility and aidunder an authorized scheme fallingwithin the same category, the deminimis and authorized aid combinedmust not exceed the maximum awardauthorized by the Commission for thenotified scheme if this is above ECU50 000.

It has since become clear that the deminimis facility as outlined abovedoes not cover some aid measureswhich clearly are not capable ofdistorting competition and affectingtrade between Member States to anyperceptible degree. Moreover, it hasproved difficult to establish that theconditions laid down are being met, inparticular where aid of this kind iscombined with aid under others c h e m e s a p p r o v e d b y t h eCommission.

Thus, in January the Commissionadopted a revised de minimis rule inthe form of a separate CommissionNotice (OJ C 68 of 6.3.1996) thepurpose of which is to make it clearerthat, although SMEs may be the mostfrequent beneficiaries, the rule applies

to enterprises of any size. Thus, thenew de minimis rule which replacesthe de minimis facility in the SMEGuidelines as outlined above. Theprimary objective of the revised deminimis rule is one of simplification,so to make it more comprehensibleand to facilitate the use of the rule bynational authorities. The de minimisrule is amended as follows:

- the ceiling for aid covered by the deminimis rule will now be ECU 100000 over a three-year periodirrespective of the type of expenditure.In other words, the previous distinctionbetween two categories of expenditure,i.e. investment and other expenditurefor which ECU 50 000 may begranted, has been abandoned;

- the ceiling of ECU 100 000 willapply to the total of all publicassistance considered to be de minimisaid and will not affect the possibilityof the recipient firm obtaining otheraid under schemes approved by theCommission. In other words, the ruleconcerning cumulation of de minimisaid and aid under approved scheme isno longer necessary.

- export aid is explicitly excluded fromthe benefit of the de minimis rule andstill need to be notified to theCommission. The revised de minimisrule provides a definition of export aid.

- the de minimis rule will also apply incertain sectors with specific rules onstate aid, i.e. the synthetic fibressector, the textile sector and the motor-vehicle sector. However, as for theprevious rule, it does not apply to thetransport, agriculture, fishery andECSC sectors.


STATE AID

THE COMMISSION ADOPTSNEW SME GUIDELINES

The Community guidelines on stateaid to small and medium-sizedenterprises (SMEs), adopted by theCommission in 1992 (OJ C 213 of19.8.1992) provide that before theend of the three-year periodfollowing their publication theCommission will review theoperation of the guidelines. Therevision of the SME guidelines isnow completed and has led theCommission to introduce certainmodifications to the guidelines whilemaintaining the overall favourableposition towards aid to SMEs. Thus,the Commission continues toacknowledge the importantcontribution of SMEs in terms of jobcreation, innovation and economicdevelopment on the one hand and thedifficulties SMEs have in raisingcapital and their insufficient access toinformation on the other hand. Therevised SME guidelines contain thefollowing important amendments thepurpose of which are primarily tomake the guidelines more clear andcoherent with other Communitypolicy objectives and to facilitatetheir application:

- in respect of the definition of SMEsthe new guidelines refer to the newcommon definition of SMEs in theCommission's recommendation of 7February 1996 (IP/96/121 of8.2.1996). This means that in the newguidelines the financial tresholds arebeing increased so that an SME mayhave a turnover up to ECU 40million (ECU 20 million before) anda balance sheet of ECU 27 million(ECU 10 million before). The max.number of employees of 250 remainsunchanged.

In respect of small enterprises theturnover may not exceed ECU 7million (ECU 5 million before) andthe balance sheet may go up to ECU5 million (ECU 2 million before).

- the most important amendment isconcerned with the clarification andextension of the type of investmenteligible for investment aid under theguidelines.

The SME guidelines from 1992 donot define which type of investmentis eligible for investment aid anduntil now the Commission hasapplied the regional aid rulesapplicable to investment aid whichstipulate that investment in fixedassets only is eligible for investmentaid. To clarify and confirm thisapproach the new guidelinesincorporate the Commission'sdefinition of investment in fixedassets as laid down in the Principlesof coordination principles of regionalaid systems (OJ C 31 of 3.2.1979). Itfollows from this definition that theinvestment must be in land, buildingsor equipment in the context of thesetting-up of a new business, theextension of an existing business orin engaging in an activity whichinvolves a fundamental change of theproduct or the production process ofan existing business. The definitionalso covers investment in fixed assetsby way of takeover of anestablishment which has closed orwould have closed had such takeovernot taken place.

The Commission's White Paper on"Growth, competitiveness andemployment" stresses the importanceof promoting immaterial investmentas an instrument to boost the globalcompetitiveness of European industryand calls for an elimination of the

current discrimination in favour ofmaterial investment. Under the newSME guidelines the Commission willallow aid for immaterial investment inthe form of transfer of technologyfrom research institutes or otherenterprises to SMEs. The aid intensitywill be similar to that allowed formaterial investment, i.e. 7.5% -15%outside regional assisted areas and anadditional 10-15% on top of the aidintensity allowed for bigger firms inassisted areas, and will be calculatedon the basis of the costs of acquiringpatent rights, licences or otherintellectual property rights in respectof a given technology/process.

- the Commission decided to maintainthe criteria adopted in the existingSME guidelines in respect of aid toencourage SMEs to use consultantsand provide training for theiremployees. This type of aid maybenefit from an aid intensity of 50%.However, in the new guidelines theCommission considered it to beappropriate to stress that this type ofaid will not be accepted on acontinous or repetitive basis and maynot contribute to cover the costs ofconsultancy forming part of any firm'snormal operating costs, such asconsultancy on legal or fiscal issues.

- the de minimis rule in the existingSME guidelines does not form part ofthe new guidelines but is made into aseparate Commission Notice, seeabove.

THE COMMISSION ADOPTSNEW CODE ON AID TO THESYNTHETIC FIBRESINDUSTRY

In 1977, in recognition of the lowaverage rate of capacity utilisation for


STATE AID

the production of synthetic fibres andyarns, the consequent job losses andthe risk that further aid wouldexacerbate the situation and distortcompetition, the Commission adopteda Code on aid to the synthetic fibresindustry imposing supplementarycontrol on aid to producers of certainfibres and yarns.

The validity of the current Codeexpired on 31.3.1996 and therefore in1995 the Commission commissionedan independent firm of specialistconsultants to undertake a first studyon the efficacity of the Code and thearguments for an against continuingto control such aid and a secondstudy on the future control of aid tothis industry. In the light of theconsultants conclusions theCommission considers that the Codehas been an effective industrial andcompetition policy tool in the pastand that to avoid a severe disruptionof competition in the capital-intensivesynthetic fibres industry, in particularin those sectors still characterized bystructural overcapacity, theCommission should continue toimpose supplementary control on aidto that industry. However, as theconsultants reports on the existingCode identified ways in which thecontrol of state aid to the syntheticfibres industry could be refined, theCommission decided that it shouldcontinue to excercise control throughthe introduction of new industry-specific measures rather than by afurther extension of the period ofvalidity of the current Code.

In January the Commission adoptedthe new Code on aid to the syntheticfibres industry (OJ C 94 of30.3.1996) which modifies the Codein force until 31.3.1996 as follows:

The scope of control

The previous Code encompassed allcategories of aid, with the exceptionof aid coming within the scope of theCommunity Guidelines on state aidfor environmental protection and theCommunity Framework for state aidfor research and development. Inaddition to these two exceptions thenew Code excludes from its scope ofcontrol aid for vocationaltraining/retraining awarded underschemes approved by theCommission.

The new Code clarifies the scope ofits application in respect of industrialprocesses in stressing that the scopeof control should not encompass aidin support of processess upstream ofpolymerization and certain activitiesdownstream of extrusion / texturi-zation.

The notification requirement

Under the previous Code, MemberStates were obliged to notify anyplan to grant aid in whatever form tothe synthetic fibres producers by wayof support for such activities.

Under the new Code the de minimisrule also applies to the syntheticfibres industry and Member Stateswill no longer be obliged to notifyaid awards to firms in the syntheticfibres industry not exceeding ECU100 000 over a three-year period (formore details on the de minimis rule,see above). Moreover, Member Stateswill no longer be required to notifythe categories of aid which arespecificly excluded from the scope ofthe new Code, see above.

When proposals were notified underthe previous Code in accordance with

the standard format, the Commissionwas generally obliged to ask a numberof additional questions some of whicharose out of the specific features ofthe case but some of which wereasked in all cases. These additionalquestions invariably extended theperiod required for the initialassessment and in order to reduce theadministrative burden and acceleratethe assessments the new Codeintroduces a supplement to thestandard format for notification of aidproposals requiring Member States tosupply certain additional informationon the aid recipient(s) and the purposeof the aided investments.

Methodology and authorizationcriteria

The new Code introduces amethodology for the assessment of aidto synthetic fibres producers and a setof authorization criteria.

In assessing the compatibility of aidcoming within the scope of the newCode, the fundamental considerationis the effect of that aid on the marketsfor the relevant products, i.e. thefibres/yarn whose production wouldbe supported by the aid. Thus, theCommission will examine the state ofthe relevant market, the effect that theaid would have on the productioncapacity of the relevant products ofthe recipient firm and theinnovativeness of the relevantproducts.

It is important to note that theauthorization of aid will still bedependent on a significant reductionin the relevant capacity except wherethere is evidence of a structuralshortage of supply. The new Codeincludes a non-exhaustive list of


STATE AID

factual evidence the Commission willconsider when assessing whether thereduction in capacity would be"significant".

Irrespective of the effect of the aidon the relevant market the Codeprovides for a limitation of theintensity of the aid. However, in linewith the SME Guidelines SMEs willbe able to receive aid at a higherintensity than larger firms and at aneven higher rate if it would supportthe production of an innovativeproduct.

PROPOSAL FOR A NEWSTEEL AIDS CODE

In a Communication of March thisyear the Commission proposes to theCouncil of Ministers to give itsunanimous assent pursuant to Article95 of the ECSC Treaty to theadoption of a new Steel Aids Code toreplace the current fifth Steel AidsCode which will expire by the end of1996.

The purpose of the new Steel AidsCode will be to ensure faircompetition in the ECSC steelindustry up until the expiry of theECSC Treaty in the year 2002. Theproposal is to renew the rules of thecurrent Code, however with theexemption of its Article 5 coveringregional investment aid for certainregions of the Community.

The Commission proposal for a newSteel Aids Code shall be seen in thelight of its intention to provide anequal footing of the Community steelindustry with other industries inrespect of awards of certain types ofaid. Thus, under the proposed new

Code the provisions on aid forresearch and development and aid forenvironmental protection referexplicitly to the Communityframework on aid for R&D and theCommunity guidelines on aid forenvironmental protection, includingany subsequent amendments to theserules. Hereby, an equal treatment ofthe steel industry under the twoframework/guidelines would beensured.

Similarly, the proposed new Codeintends to bring the procedural rulesapplicable to the steel industry in linewith those under Articles 92-94 ofthe Treaty. The proposed provisionsin the new Code stipulate thereforethat the Commission's power to orderthe suspension of the payment ofnon-notified aid pending the outcomeof its examination of that aid, (seeJudgment of the European Court ofJustice in the "Boussac" - C 301/87of 14.3.1990, ECR 1990 I 307), andthe Commission's power in certaincases to adopt a provisional decisionordering the reimbursement of non-notified aid pending the outcome ofits examination of that aid (seeCommission Communication toMember States in OJ C 156 of22.6.1995), also apply in cases ofnon-notified aid to a steelundertaking under the ECSC Treaty.

The provisions concerning aid forclosure are proposed to be maintainedin order to promote further adaptationof the capacity of the Communitysteel industry. However, it isproposed also to allow closure aid forundertakings which are part of agroup with different steelundertakings provided that the groupdoes not increase its ECSC capacityfor a period of five years.

Press releasesThe full texts of Commission'sPress releases are available on-line from the RAPID database, onthe day of their publication by theCommission's Spokesman'sService. To obtain access toRAPID, please write to EUR-OPInformation, Marketing andPublic Relations (OP/4B) 2 rueMercier L-2985 Luxembourgtel. +352 2929 42455, fax +3522929 42763

IP/96/50 : COMMISSION DECIDESTO TOUGHEN CONTROL ON STATEAID TO SECTORS OF THESYNTHETIC FIBRES INDUSTRY INOVERCAPACITY [96/01/16]

IP/96/80 : COMMISSION APPROVESPLAN TO RESTRUCTURECOMPTOIR DES ENTREPRENEURS[96/01/24]

IP/96/81 : COMMISSION AMENDSDE MINIMIS RULE IN ORDER TOSIMPLIFY NOTIFICATIONPROCEDURES FOR STATE AIDSCHEMES OF MINOR IMPORTANCE[96/01/24]

IP/96/102 : COMMISSIONAUTHORIZES CAPITAL INCREASEIN THE SPANISH AIRLINE IBERIAON COMME-RCIAL GROUNDS[96/01/31]

IP/96/111 : MEASURES IN SUPPORTOF COLLECTIVE GUARANTEES INTHE AGRICULTURE AND AGRO-INDUSTRY SECTORS [96/02/07]

IP/96/112 : MEASURES TO ASSISTECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INMOUNTAIN AREAS [96/02/07]

IP/96/114 : AGRI-MONETARYCOMPENSATION AID [96/02/07]


STATE AID

IP/96/115 : STATE AIDS FORFISHERIES IN THE UNITEDKINGDOM AND SPAIN [96/02/07]

IP/96/123 : COMMISSIONAUTHORISES AID TO THE SALE OFIRISH STEEL TO ISPATINTERNATIONAL [96/02/07]

IP/96/125 : STATE AID - SPAIN -COMMISSION ACCEPTS REGIONALAID SCHEME GRANTED TOSPANISH SUBSIDIARY OF FINNISHOUTOKUMPU COPPER GROUP[96/02/07]

IP/96/126 : AIDE D'ETAT - FRANCEENQUETE DETAILLEE DE LACOMMISSION SUR UNINVESTISSEMENT DESAAB-SCANIA A ANGERS [96/02/07]

IP/96/159 : COMMISSION APPROVESINSTALLATION OF A GUARANTEESCHEME FOR THE SHIPBUILDINGSECTOR IN THE GERMAN LANDMECKLENBURG--VORPOMMERN[96/02/22]

IP/96/160 : COMMISSION RAISES NOOBJECTIONS TO THE GRANT OFFRENCH GOVERNMENT AID FORA EUREKA R&D PROJECTINVOLVING RENAULT ANDSOLLAC [96/02/22]

IP/96/161 : COMMISSION TAKESFINAL DECISION ON AID TOFRENCH MANUFACTURER OFPULP FOR PAPER INDUSTRY[96/02/22]

IP/96/162 : AUSTRIA: COMMISSIONOPENS PROCEDURE IN RESPECTOF AID FOR HOFFMANN-LAROCHE FOR THE ORLISTATPROJECT [96/02/22]

IP/96/223 : MEASURES TO ASSISTSMES (SMALL & MEDIUM-SIZEDENTERPRISES) IN THEAGRICULTURAL SECTOR [96/03/14]

IP/96/224 : MEASURES TO ASSISTECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INMOUNTAIN AREAS [96/03/14]

IP/96/225 : AID FOR THEACQUISITION OF SUGAR BEETDELIVERY POINTS [96/03/14]

IP/96/226 : STATE AIDS :COMMISSION DECISIONS -STRASBOURG, 13TH MARCH 1996[96/03/14]

IP/96/238 : COMMISSIONAUTHORISES AID TO DUTCHMARITIME SECTOR [96/03/21]

IP/96/247 : THE COMMISSIONAUTHORIZES A TOTAL OF #378MILLION IN AID TO THE UNITEDKINGDOM COAL INDUSTRY[96/03/21]

IP/96/248 : STATE AID FORIPARLAT AND GRUPO LACTEOGALLEGO (GLG) [96/03/21]

IP/96/249 : COMMISSION ADOPTSNEW GUIDELINES ON STATE AIDFOR SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZEDENTERPRISES (SMES) [96/03/21]

IP/96/250 : THE COMMISSIONDECIDED TO RAISE NOOBJECTIONS TO AN AID PROJECT,BY SPAIN, TO SUZUKIMANUFACTURING [96/03/21]

IP/96/267 : STATE AID: FRANCE:COMMISSION AGREES TO "PACTEPOUR LA VILLE" [96/03/27]

IP/96/268 : STATE AID - ITALY -COMMISSION DECIDES TOTERMINATE PROCEEDINGSCONCERNING ALUMIX [96/03/27]

IP/96/269 : STATE AID - BELGIUM:THE MARIBEL CASE [96/03/27]

IP/96/270 : COMMISSION APPROVESAID TO JAGUAR CARS AND FORD

MOTOR COMPANY IN SUPPORT OFAN INVESTMENT PROJECT INBIRMINGHAM [96/03/27]

IP/96/274 : COMMISSION RAISES NOOBJECTION TO THIRD TRANCHEOF STATE AID TO TAP [96/03/27]

Judgements

Extracts are published in the weeklypublication " Les activités de la Courde Justice et du Tribunal de PremièreInstance des CommunautésEuropéennes", available on-line fromthe RAPID database, a few days afterits publication by the Court.

Arrêt de la Cour du 29 février1996: Aff. C-122/94:Commission des Communautéseuropéennes / Conseil del'Union européenne; 'Politiqueagricole commune - Aided'Etat'; (Cour plénière)

Arrêt de la Cour du 29 février1996: Aff. C-56/93: Royaume deBelgique / Commission desCommunautés européennes;'Aides d'Etat - Système tarifaire préférentiel pour leslivraisons de gaz naturel auxproducteurs néerlandaisd'engrais azotés'; (Cinquièmechambre)


INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF COMPETITION POLICYMain developments between 1st January and 31st March 1996

Summary of the most importantrecent developments

by Steffan DEPYPERE, Thinam JAKOB, Brona CARTON andY. SCARAMOZZINO, DG IV-A-3

CENTRAL and EASTERNEUROPEAN COUNTRIES,BALTIC STATES, NEWINDEPENDENT STATES

During the first quarter, the essentialactivity was situated at the level ofbilateral relations and the preparationof events that will take place duringthe second quarter.

Bilateral activity

In the framework of the EuropeAgreements, parties can meet inAssociation Councils, AssociationCommittees or in Subcommittees.Competition issues are prepared bythe Subcommittees for competitionmatters (one subcommittee for eachCEEC) that can meet as subcommitteeA (to discuss antitrust matters) andsubcommittee B (to discuss state aidmatters). On behalf of the Union it isthe Commission (DG IV) thatparticipates. On behalf of theassociated country it is the relevantinstitution (e.g. an AMO for antitrust,or a Ministry of Finance for state aid).In the subcommittee all the "dailybusiness" is discussed. The results ofthe subcommittees' work are thentransmitted to the AssociationCommittee for information orapproval.

During the first quarter subcommitteemeetings were held with the Czechand the Slovak Republics and withHungary. With the Baltic States nosubcommittees exist as yet. It is forthe Joint Committee (first meeting on1-3 April) to decide on the creation offormal working groups they wouldcorrespond to subcommittees underthe Europe Agreements. However, forthe moment the Europe Agreementswith the Baltic States are not yetinforce, and the corresponding bodiesunder the existing Free TradeAgreements are the Joint Committeeand Working Groups). Nevertheless,the competition authorities from theBaltic States and DG IV met in aninformal working group in Brussels toprepare the further cooperation withrespect to competition aspects.

Slovak Republic

The subcommittee with the SlovakRepublic met in Bratislava on 1February to discuss both antitrust(Antimonopoly Office) and state aid(AMO and the Ministry of Finance).

As regards antitrust the discussionpoints were the practical organisationonce the implementing rules would beadopted by the Association Council.(In the meantime the AssociationCouncil of 27/02/96 did adopt therules). On both sides, the operational

services have to take care, whenhandling cases, to verify whether ornot an important interest of the otherparty is involved. They have to beaware also of the possibilities that areoffered by the IR in terms of exchangeof information and positive or negativecomity actions (reminder : adescription of the rules was given inthe Newsletter of summer 1994). Thesubcommittee further reviewedtechnical assistance actions. This TA,which is financed through PHARE,has been an important tool to developthe competition policy in the SlovakRepublic. The nature of this TA canvary. It can cover issues such aslegislative advice, case advice,training, material organisation etc. TheTA is delivered by externalconsultants, mostly law offices.

Both DG IV and the Antimonopolyoffice have been very satisfied withthe quality of the assistance and thesupport given by PHARE.

As regards State aid the proposed draftof the implementing rules wasreviewed. Both sides agreed upon afinal text at administrative level. Onthe Slovak side further decisions haveto be taken as to the monitoringauthority.

As soon as this final element of thetext is ready it can be submitted onboth sides for further approval andfinal adoption by the AssociationCouncil.

Czech Republic

The relations between the Slovak andthe Czech antitrust authorities areexcellent. This has allowed DG IV and


INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION

the associated authorities to organisejoint subcommittees. Which is whythe subcommittee (antitrust) for theCzech Republic met in Bratislava aswell on 1 February. As with theSlovak authority, DG IV discussedwith the Czech Ministry for EconomicCompetition the implementing rulesand their practical application. To benoted that the rules were approved bythe Association Council of31/01/1996.

The subcommittee for state aid didnot meet. To be reported however onthe state aid side that theimplementing rules have been clearedby the relevant aid monitoringauthorities on both sides (DG IVrespectively Ministry of Finance) andthat they are now going through theprocess of adoption by theAssociation Council (on the Union'sside this implies i.a. consultationswith the Council and the Parliament).

HUNGARY

The EU-Hungarian Sub-Committeefor Competition met in Brussels on 21March 1996, and it was followed bythe EU-Hungarian AssociationCommittee on 22 March in Brussels.

The Sub-Committee focused onvarious issues :

Approximation of antitrust legislation:The Hungarian delegation wasencouraged to move ahead quicklywith their legislative work. The newdraft law was discussed. TheHungarian side hopes it will beadopted early so that it can enter intoforce by 1 January 1997.

Article 64 of the Europe Agreement:public undertakings and undertakings

with special or exclusive rights.

A discussion on the interpretation ofArticle 64 of the Europe Agreementwith respect to the correspondingArticle 90 of the EC Treaty has takenplace. The Hungarian delegationunderlined they were ready to complywith the requirements of Article 90.The Hungarian delegation hasprovided a detailed state of play of theliberalisation in energy sector,telecommunication sector, transportsector and postal sector.

Implementing rules undertakings: TheImplementing rules have beenapproved by the Hungarian side, andby the Community side (Commission,Council) and by the EuropeanParliament in its plenary session of 19September 1995. They are currentlybeing examined by EU/Hungarianlegal revisors. The Community sidestressed that the work should bespeeded up so that the AssociationCouncil can adopt the rules as quicklyas possible by way of the writtenprocedure.

Implementing rules state aid: TheHungarian government has now givenits approval. The Hungarian Ministryof Finance has been appointed as themonitoring authority. The above-mentioned process of consultationwith the Council, Parliament, can nowstart. It will lead to an adoption by theAssociation Council.

Baltic States

A first informal Working Group onC o m p e t i t i o n c o n s i s t i n g o frepresentatives of Estonia, Latvia andLithuania has taken place in Brusselson 19 March 1996, in the perspectiveof preparing the Association

Committees of 1-3 April 1996. Threeissues were treated :

Implementing Rules for undertakings:The proposed implementing rules forundertakings were discussed by thegroup. The Estonian Ministry ofFinance has already expressed itsapproval of the proposed rules and hasasked to launch the formal adoptionprocess. The Latvian and theLithuanian authorities are expected tofollow quickly.

Implementing Rules for state aids: Theproposed implementing rules for stateaid were also discussed by the group.The Estonian Ministry of Finance hasalready expressed its approval. Here,likewise, the other delegations couldagree on the proposed rules. Formalapproval is expected in the near future.

Approximation of legislation: Thedelegations reported on the legislativedevelopments in their countries.

Slovenia

The Europe Agreement with Sloveniais not yet in force. Neverthelessrelations between DG IV and theSlovene Competition ProtectionBureau are picking up. The SlovenianMinister responsible for competitionmatters visited DG IV at the end oflast year and cooperation waslaunched. Preliminary discussions aretaking place about the implementingrules for state aid and antitrust, as wellas about establishing an overview ofstate monopolies and undertakingswith special and exclusive rights inSlovenia. At the occasion of aconference organised by theCommission (DG IA) and the Sloveneauthorities, ground could be laid forbringing the relations between



Slovenia and DG IV upto the same levelas with the other CEEC.

Preparation of horizontal events

As already mentioned in previousnewsletters the bilateral activity iscomplemented more and more byhorizontal events, involving more thanone country. This is also in line with thetendency towards p lur i la te ra lcooperation in competition matters. Inthe CEEC, PHARE has supported thistendency in a flexible manner bymaking available a horizontal TAfacility. Two activities have beenprepared during the first quarter. Areport on the results will follow in thenext newsletter.

Baltic Booster Conference

Currently, the DG IV is finalising theBaltic Booster Conference incooperation with the CEEC and certainMember States. This project, financedby PHARE, will consist of a workshopin each of the three Baltic States whichwill be followed by a joint conferencein Riga. This conference takes place inthe week of 9-12 April 1996. Itsobjective is to speed up work oncompetition issues in the Baltic States.

Conference in Brno

This is a successor to the conferenceheld in Visegrad last year. This year theBaltic states and Slovenia will join theconference. It is a unique event inbringing together so many competitionauthorities (EU + 10 associatedcountries) both on antitrust and stateaid.

Accession strategy

At present major efforts are made toprepare for the accession issue. Thisimplies making an inventory of all

outstanding questions and making thepoint on the level of approximation oflegislation. A further report will bemade in forthcoming issues of thenewsletter.

FOLLOW-UP TO REPORT OFGROUP OF EXPERTS ONCOMPETITION POLICY IN THENEW TRADE ORDER

As reported in the last Newsletter, theDirectors General of the Member Statecompetition authorities, at their annualmeeing of 17 October, established aworking group to consider in moredetail the technical aspects of some ofthe recommendations of the report ofthe group of experts on "Competitionpolicy in the new trade order".

That working group had its first meetingon 9 January, when an extensive workprogramme was set out. On theinstructions of the Directors General,the working group will concentrate inparticular on the reinforcement ofpositive comity and the exchange ofconfidential information in theframework of deeper bilateralcooperation.

At its second meeting on 21 March, thegroup examined the legal rules withinthe Community and the Member Statesgoverning the exchange of informationin competition cases. It also assessedthe practical experience acquired so farin exchanging information both withinthe Community framework and betweenMember States or between theCommunity or its Member States andthird countries. Working groupparticipants looked at other sectors,such as securities, taxation, customs andcriminal matters, where internationalagreements already provide forextensive sharing of information of aconfidential nature.

The role played by comity in the conductof investigations was also evaluated andthe manner in which the importantinterests of other countries should betaken into account in determining whatmeasures are taken to resolveanticompetitive behaviour wasconsidered by the working group.

With a clear view of what can be and isbeing done currently in the competitionarea, the working group will go on toconsider at its next meeting theCommunity's needs in terms of greaterinformation exchange and a moredeveloped positive comity instrument. Afinal meeting will consider how theneeds identified by the working groupcan be realized.

The working group will report back tothe Directors General at their nextannual meeting in the autumn and on thebasis of the discussion which isgenerated the Commission will considerwhat, if any, measures it should proposein the area of bilateral cooperation.

On the multilateral front, theCommission is currently preparing aposition paper in the light of therecommendations in the report on"Competition policy in the new tradeorder" with a view to openingdiscussions with the Member States inCouncil on the approach the Communityshould adopt vis-à-vis the possibleinclusion of trade and competition in thework programme of the World TradeOrganization. The first WTO Ministerialconference in Singapore next Decemberpresents an opportunity to target traderelated areas which could usefully befurther explored within the WTOframework. The Marrakesh declarationhas already identified trade andcompetition as a possible subject forinclusion and the Commission serviceswill continue to work towards thedefinition of a Community position onthis matter.



Russian Competition Law on abuseof dominant position: basicprovisions and applicationexperienceby Iouri V. KOKOVIKHINE, State Committee of the RussianFederation for Anti-monopoly Policy and Promotion of NewEconomic Structures

The Russian Law on Competition andLimitation of Monopolistic Activityon Commodity Markets determinesthe organizational and legalfoundations for prevention, limitationand suppression of monopolisticactivities and unfair competition. thelaw is directed towards ensuring thecondition for the establishment andeffective functioning of commoditymarkets.

The present law extends to relationshaving an impact on competition inthe commodity markets of the RussianFederation involving Russian andforeign juridical persons as well asnatural persons.

State policy for promoting thedevelopment of commodity marketsand encouraging competition, and forpreventing, limiting and suppressingmonopolistic activities and unfaircompetition, is conducted by aFederal Anti-monopoly Authority: theState Committee of the RussianFederation for Anti-monopoly Policyand Promotion of New EconomicStructures.

MAIN POWERS OF THEAUTHORITY

The Russian Federal Anti-monopolyAuthority has the right to issue to

economic entities (undertakings)binding instructions (orders):- on the termination of infringementsof anti-monopoly legislation and/or onthe elimination of their consequences,- on the restoration of the initialposition,- on their compulsory division or onseparation of structural divisions fromtheir setup,- on the dissolution or change ofcontracts (agreements) which arecontrary to antimonopoly legislation,- on the conclusion of a contract(agreement) with another economicentity (undertaking),- on the transfer to the Federal budgetof profits made because ofinfringement of anti-monopolylegislation;

The Authority also has the right totake decisions concerning theimposition of fines and penalties oncommerc ia l and non-p ro f i torganisations and their managers,including individual entrepreneurs forinfringements of anti-monopolylegislation except in the cases ofviolation of the procedures for price-fixing in conformity with legislationon natural monopolies.

Finally the Authority can establish thefact of a dominant position ofeconomic entities (undertakings) and

can exercise other powers stipulatedby the relevant legislation of theRussian Federation.

BASIC CONCEPTS OF THERUSSIAN LAW

Article 4 of the Russian law containsthe following definitions:Commodity: a product or activity(including work, services) intended forsale or exchange.

Commodity market: a sphere ofcirculation of commodities having nosubstitutes, or interchangeablecommodities, on the territory of theRussian Federation or in its part,determined preceding from theeconomic capacity of the buyer toacquire a particular commodity orarticle of merchandise or manufactureon a given territory or the absence ofsuch capacity outside territory.

Dominant position: the exclusiveposition of an economic entity, orseveral economic entities, on arelevant market handling a commoditythat has no substitute(s), orinterchangeable commodities affordingit (them) the possibility of exerting adecisive influence on the generalconditions of circulation of a particularcommodity on a given market or ofmaking access to the market difficultfor other economic entities. Theposition of an economic entity shouldbe deemed to be dominant if its shareon the market of a particularcommodity makes up 65% of the totaland more, except instances in whichthe economic entity can prove that,despite exceeding the said proportion,its position on the market is notdominant. The position of an economicentity should also be deemed to be



dominant, though its share on themarket of a particular commodity isless than 65%, should this beestablished by the AntimonopolyAuthority from stability of the shareof the said economic entity, therelative shares on the market held bycompetitors, and possibilities for newcompetitors to gain access to thatrelevant market or other criteriacharacterizing the commodity market.The position of an economic entitywhose share on the market of aparticular commodity does not exceed35% should not be deemed to bedominant.

Monopolist activity: actions (or failureto act) of economic entities that arecontrary to anti-monopoly legislationand are directed towards prevention,restriction or elimination ofcompetition.

Monopolistically high price: the priceof a commodity fixed by an economicentity occupying the dominantposition on a particular commoditymarket, with the object of makinggood unwarranted losses caused byunder-utilization of productioncapacity and/or of making extraprofits by lowering product quality.

Monopolistically low price: the priceof a commodity fixed by an economicentity occupying the dominantposition on the market, as a buyer,with the object of making extra profitsand/or making good unwarrantedlosses at the expense of the seller; orthe price of a commodity deliberatelyfixed by an economic entity at somelevel causing losses from the sale of aparticular commodity. Its fixingcauses or can cause a limitation ofcompetition through displacing acompetitor from the market.

ABUSE OF DOMINANCE

In accordance with Article 5 of theRussian Competition Law actions byan economic entity (group of persons)occupying a dominant position whichhave or might have as their result alimitation of competition and/orimpingement on the interests of othereconomic entities or natural personsare prohibited, including such actionsas:

- the withdrawal of goods fromcirculation for the purpose of, orresulting on, creation and maintenanceof a deficit on the market or anincrease of prices;- consent to conclude a contract onlyon condition of placing conditionstherein concerning goods in which thecontracting party (or a consumer) isnot interested;- posing obstacles to access to themarket (or withdrawal from themarket) for other economic entities;- infringement of the procedure forprice-formation established bynormative acts;- tying up a contracting party throughthe conditions of a contract which arenot advantageous to it or do not relateto the subject of the contract(unjustified demands for the transferof financial assets, property,proprietary rights, the contractingparty's labour, etc.);- incorporation into a contract ofdiscriminatory conditions which placethe contracting party in an unequalposition compared with othereconomic entities";- fixing monopolistically high (low)prices;- reduction in, or discontinuation of,the production of commodities whichenjoy a demand and draw orders fromconsumers (users) provided there arepossibilities for their break-even

production;- an unjustified refusal to conclude acontract with separate buyers(customers) while there are capabilitiesfor producing and delivering a specificcommodity.

In exceptional instances, the actions ofan economic entity specified abovemay be deemed to be lawful if theeconomic entity proves that thepositive effect of its actions, includingthat in the socially economic sphere,will exceed the negative consequencesfor the commodity market underconsideration.

THE RECENT CASE OFABUSIVE BEHAVIOUR ON THEMARKET : SINGER

Concentration

On November 1994 the Russian Anti-monopoly Committee examined theapplication from the Semi-TechCompany Limited (Hong Kong) onacquisition of 70% of stocks ofownership capital of Joint StockCompany PODOLSK (Russia).

Semi-Tech Company Limited is aninvestment company established in1982. Semi-Tech owns and operatesthe worldwide SINGER business. InMarch 1993 Semi-Tech reached aconditional agreement to purchase upto a 51% share interest in G.M PFFAFAG of Germany. SINGER andPFFAF are the leading producers ofconsumer sewing machines. Thisinternational business group (SINGERand PFFAF) in 1993 possessed 37% ofthe consumer sewing machines worldmarket.

PODOLSK is the single producer ofconsumer sewing machines in Russia.



Its share of the relevant Russian marketin 1994 was more than 73%. TheRussian Anti-monopoly Committeedeemed that PODOLSK held adominant position in consumer sewingmachines market.

The Anti-monopoly Committee, tookinto account that information, supposedthat the said transaction could lead tothe strengthening of dominance ofPODOLSK. Thereby the Committeehad the right to reject Semi-Tech'sapplication pursuant to Article 18(4) ofRussian Competition Law but theparties to the transaction proved thatthe positive effect of their activities,including that in the socially economicsphere, would be more than theirnegative consequences for the relevantmarket. For instance PODOLSK'spresident in his official letter to theAnti-monopoly Committee wrote thatthe transaction should let them anefficient use of investment and shoulddo home-made products morecompetitive in the world markets. Alsohe noted that they planned to produceconsumer sewing machines in totalamount of 350.000 units per year.Based on these facts the Anti-monopoly Committee gave the consentto the Semi-Tech's acquisition of 70%of stocks in ownership capital ofPODOLSK but at the same time theCommittee informed PODOLSK that itshould be under observation andcontrol by the Committee in order toprevent the monopolist activity; inDecember 1994 the Joint StockCompany PODOLSK was named JointStock Company SINGER.

Investigation of the PODOLSK(SINGER) company

On July 1995 the Anti-monopolyCommittee received a complaint fromthe Deputy of Parliament of theRussian Federation in which hereported that PODOLSK (SINGER)had discontinued the production ofconsumer sewing machines. The

Committee also had taken the sameinformation from several sources and itmade a decision to undertake aninvestigation into PODOLSK(SINGER) as well as a general inquiryinto that sector of the economy(consumer sewing machines).

Results of the investigation showed thefollowing. The volume of output inPODOLSK (SINGER) during the firsthalf-year of 1995 decreased in sixtimes and was about 35.000units(1995). The production wasceased in July 1995. The lowering ofproduction had gone simultaneouslywith the decreasing of sale. Theinspection ordered by the Committeediscovered evidences concerningPODOLSK's (SINGER) refusals tosupply orders from customers onconsumer sewing machines while therewas possibilities for their producingand delivering.

At the same time the Committeeconducted a customers opinion pollwithin Moscow and 6 provinces of theRussian Federation which demonstratedthat consumer sewing machines madeby PODOLSK (SINGER) had beenenjoying a demand. More than 55% ofrespondents confirmed that. On theother hand the Committee of theRussian Federation for Trading hadestimated a potential demand on thatproduction in 1995-1996 about 300.000units per year. Information which wassubmitted by the State CustomsCommittee of the Russian Federationtestified about a permanence ofconsumer sewing machines import in1994-1995 and about high increasing init the shares of imported productionfrom Germany and Japan.

Under analysis of consumer demandthe Anti-monopoly Committee drew theconclusion that the main buyers ofPODOLSK's (SINGER) productionwere the families with average earnedincome (about 55,5% of all families)which preferred simple, reliable and not

expensive home-made sewing machines.Thereby discontinuation of productionof that kind of goods by PODOLSK(SINGER) should lead to creation of adeficit on the market and an increase ofprices.

Decision

On 14 November 1995 the Anti-monopoly Committee has adopted thefollowing decision:

- PODOLSK (SINGER) occupying adominant position on the market ofconsumer sewing machines hasinfringed Article 5(1) of the RussianFederation Law on Competition andLimitation of Monopolistic Activity onCommodity Markets by reduction in anddiscontinuation (from 01.07.1995) of theconsumer sewing machines which enjoya demand and draw orders fromconsumers (users) while there arepossibilities for their break-evenproduction;- To issue to PODOLSK(SINGER)binding instructions (order) on thetermination of infringement of anti-monopoly legislation and in time before1 April 1996 the ensuring of productionof consumer sewing machines involume of output which shall satisfy thedemand provided that there arepossibilities for their break-evenproduction.

Conclusion

This case has an important significancefor anti-monopoly practice. There are alot of discussions about this case inRussia. It is very difficult to investigatesuch kind of abusive behaviour becauseyou have to prove available demand andpossibility for break-even production.On the other hand some opponentsconsider that it means interfering inprivate company marketing strategy.Other analysts deem that these actioncould prove an agreement between firmsaimed to the elimination of othercompetitors from the market.


INFORMATION SECTION

DG IV staff listTélécopieur central : 295 01 28

Directeur général Alexander SCHAUB 2952387/2954576

Directeur général adjoint Jean-François PONS 2994423/2962284plus particulièrement chargé des Directions C et D

Directeur général adjoint Gianfranco ROCCA a.i. 2951152/2951139plus particulièrement chargé des Directions E et F

Conseiller principal . . .Conseiller auditeur Hartmut JOHANNES 2955912/2956942Conseiller auditeur Joseph GILCHRIST 2955673/2960246(chargé également de la sécurité des informations)

Assistants du Directeur général Christopher JONES 2965030/2957491. . .

directement rattachés au Directeur général :1 Affaires administratives et budgétaires; Irène SOUKA 2957206/2960189

Information, Parlement européenComité Economique et Social

2 Questions informatiques Guido VERVAET 2959224/2951305

DIRECTION APolitique générale de la concurrence et coordination Jonathan FAULL 2958658/2965201

Conseiller Juan RIVIERE MARTI 2951146/2960699

1 Politique générale de la concurrence et Coordination David DEACON 2955905/2960562 Chef adjoint d'unité Emil PAULIS 2965033/2966207

2 Affaires juridiques et législation Helmut SCHRÖTER 2951196/2955911Chef adjoint d'unité . . .

3 Aspects internationaux Claude RAKOVSKY 2955389/2962368Chef adjoint d'unité . . .

DIRECTION BTask Force "Contrôle des opérations Götz DRAUZ a.i. 2958681/2952965de concentration entre entreprises"

1 Unité opérationnelle I . . .2 Unité opérationnelle II Enrique LOPEZ VEIGA 2957381/29611803 Unité opérationnelle III Roger DAOUT 2965383/29655744 Unité opérationnelle IV Kirtikumar MEHTA 2957389/2952871

DIRECTION CInformation, communication, multimédias John TEMPLE LANG 2955571/2954512

1 Télécommunications et Postes Herbert UNGERER 2968623/2968622Coordination Société d'information- Cas relevant de l'Article 85/86 Suzette SCHIFF 2957657

2 Médias, éditions musicales . . . - Aspects de propriété intellectuelle Sebastiano GUTTUSO 2951102/2954363

3 Indu. de l'information, électronique de divertissement Fin LOMHOLT 2955619/2951150


INFORMATION SECTION

DIRECTION DServices Humbert DRABBE 2950060/2952701

Conseiller Georges ROUNIS 2953404

1 Services financiers (banques, assurances) Luc GYSELEN 2961523/2959987

2 Transports . . . 2957243/2954623

3 Commerce (y compris la grande distribution), Luigi CAMPOGRANDE 2952767/2960872tourisme & autres services

DIRECTION EIndustries de base Rafael GARCIA PALENCIA 2950253/2950900

1 Acier, métaux non ferreux, produits minéraux non Maurice GUERRIN 2951817/2951816métalliques, bâtiment, bois, papier, verre

2 Prod. chimiques de base & transformés, caoutchouc Wouter PIEKÉ 2959824

3 Energie (charbon, hydrocarbures, électricité, gaz) Paul MALRIC-SMITH 2959675/2964903

4 Cartels et Inspections Pierre DUPRAT 2953524/2954850Chef adjoint d'unité notamment chargé des Cartels Julian JOSHUA 2955519/2958986

DIRECTION FIndu. des biens d'équipement & de consommation Sven NORBERG 2952178/2959031

1 Indu. mécaniques et électriques et industries diverses Franco GIUFFRIDA 2956084/2950663

2 Automobiles, autres moyens de transport Dieter SCHWARZ 2951880/2950479et construction mécanique connexe

3 Produits agricoles, alimentaires, pharmaceutiques,textiles et autres biens de consommation Jürgen MENSCHING 2952224/2961179

DIRECTION G Aides d'Etat Asger PETERSEN 2955569/2958566

Conseiller Francisco ESTEVE REY 2951140/2955900Conseiller . . .

Task Force "Aides dans les nouveaux Länder Stefaan DEPYPERE 2990713/2952007

1 Politique des aides d'Etat Anne HOUTMAN 2959628/2969719Chef adjoint d'unité . . .

2 Aides horizontales Claude ROUAM 2957994/2954592

3 Aides à finalité régionale Loretta DORMAL-MARINO 2967581Chef adjoint d'unité Alfredo MARQUES 2962542/2967581

4 Aides sectorielles I Constantin ANDROPOULOS 2956601/2960009Chef adjoint d'unité Geert DANCET 2960993/2950068

5 Aides sectorielles II Cecilio MADERO VILLAREJO 2960949/2955900Chef adjoint d'unité . . .

6 Entreprises publiques et services Ronald FELTKAMP 2954283/2960450

7 Analyses,inventaires et rapports Reinhard WALTHER 2958434/2955410


INFORMATION SECTION

Documentation ...This section contains details of recent speeches or articles given byCommunity officials that may be of interest. Copies of some of thesemay be available from DGIV's Information Officer. Future issues ofthe newsletter will contain details of conferences on competitionpolicy which have been brought to our attention. Organisers ofconferences that wish to make use of this facility should refer topage 1 for the address of DGIV's Information Officer.

SPEECHES AND ARTICLES__________________________

Main developments in mergercontrol during 1994, by JuanBriones Alonso [sp96002]

Services publics et règlescommunautaires, par J.F. Pons,Colloque à Calais organisé parl'U.N.S.A., le 7 février 1996[sp96003]

Die Stellung der Unternehmen imeuropäischen Beihilfeverfahren,Studienvereinigung Kartellrecht e.V.,Arbeitssitzung, Brüssel 25/01/95,Wolfgang MEDERER [sp96004]

European telecommunicationspolicy,by Herbert UNGERER,Fontainebleau GiTi Forum Day, 7July 1995 [sp96005]

Introduction to the EC AntitrustLaw, practice and policy, by RolandA.J. KOBIA, 1st semester 1995[sp96006]

Introduction to the law, practiceand policy of state aids in theEuropean Community, by RolandA.J. Kobia, Gand (Belgium), 1996Institute for European BusinessAdministration [sp96007]

An outline of CommunityCompetition Policy, by DonncadhWoods. Speech to masters degreestudents from University CollegeDublin, CEEPA Irish Institute forEuropean Affairs, Leuven, 22 March1996 [sp96008]

Règles de concurrence de l'UnionEuropéenne applicables auxentreprises, Joos Stragier. Charleroi,7.10.95 [sp96009]

EU pharmaceutical forum:Mergers, Joint Ventures and thePharmaceutical Industry, by JohnGatti [sp96010]

Calendrier et mesures d'ouverturedes télécommunications à laconcurrence, par J.F. Pons.Symposium international destélécommunications Monaco, le 22mars 1996 [sp96011]

Transport multimodal et fixationdes taux de transport terrestre,Paris, le 28 mars 1996 par J.F. Pons[sp96012]

Distribution automobile, et autres:les relations verticales entre règlede concurrence et règle de raison,par R. Goyer (paru le 7 mars 1996dans SEMAINE JURIDIQUE,Cahiers de Droit de l'Entreprise(Supplément) [sp96013]

COMMUNITY PUBLICATIONS ONCOMPETITION__________________________

Unless otherwise indicated, thesepublications are available throughthe Office for Official Publicationsof the European Communities, 2rue Mercier, L 2985 Luxembourg- Tel.4992821 - Fax 488573, orits sales offices (see last page).;use ISBN or Catalogue Numberto order.

LEGISLATION

Competition law in the EuropeanCommunities - volume 1A Rulesapplicable to undertakings, situation at30 june 1994; this publication containsthe text of all legislative acts relevant toArticles 85, 86 and 90. catalogue No:(xx=language code; 9 languages) CM 29-93-A01-xx-C

Competition law in the EuropeanCommunities, Addendum to VolumeIA: Rules applicable to udertakingssituation as of 31 December 1994. catalogue No: (xx=language code; 9languages) CM 88-95-436-xx-C

Merger control in the EuropeanUnion, this publication contains the textof all legislative acts relevant to theMerger regulation; catalogue No:(xx=language code; 9 languages) CV 88-95-428-xx-C

Competition law in the EuropeanCommunities - volume IIA Rulesapplicable to State aid, situation at 31December 1994; this publication containsthe text of all legislative acts relevant toArticles 42, 77, 90, 92 to 94. CatalogueNo. (xx=language code; 9 languages) :CM-29-93-A02-xx-C


INFORMATION SECTION

Brochure concerning the competitionrules applicable to undertakings ascontained in the EEA agreement andtheir implementation by the ECCommission and the EFTAsurveillance authority, CV-77-92-118-EN-C

COMPETITION DECISIONS

Reports of Commission Decisionsrelating to competition-Articles 85,86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.Catalogue numbers:* 64/72, in it, de, fr, nl: CM 76-92-996-xx-C* 73/80, in da, de, en, fr, it, nl: CM 76-92-988-xx-C* 81/85, in 7 languages: CM79-93-792-xx-C* 86/88, 9 languages: CM 80-93-290-xx-C* 89/90, 9 languages: CV 73-92-772-xx-C* 90/92, 9 languages: CV 84-94-387-xx-C* 93/94, 9 languages: CV 90-95-946-xx-C

COMPETITION REPORTS

European Community competitionpolicy 1994, 11 languages, (available onrequest through DG IV's CelluleInformation)

XXIV Report on competition policy1994, 11 languages, CM-90-95-283-xx-C

XXIIIeme Rapport sur la politiquede concurrence 1993, 9 languages, CM82-94-650-xx-C

XXIIe Rapport sur la politique deconcurrence: 1992, 9 languages, CM76-93-689-xx-C

XXIe Rapport sur la politique deconcurrence: 1991, 9 languages, CM73-92-247-xx-C

Fourth survey on State aid in theEuropean Union in the manufacturing

and certain other sectors (11languages). ISBN 92-827-5381-6.

Older annual reports are also availableon request.

OTHER DOCUMENTS andSTUDIES

Community Competition Policy in theTelecommunications Sector, acompedium prepared by DG IV; itcontains Directives under art 90,Decisions under Regulation 17 andunder the Merger Regulation as well asrelevant Judgements of the Court ofJustice. Copies available through DGIV-C-1 (tel. +322-2968623, 2968622,fax +322-2969819).

Brochure explicative sur les modalitésd'application du Règlement (CE) Nº1475/95 de la Commission concernantcertaines catégories d' accords dedistribution et de service de vente etd'après-vente de véhiculesautomobiles. Copies available throughDG IV-F-2 (tel. +322-2951880,2950479, fax. +322-2969800)

Proceedings of the 2nd EU/JapanSeminar on competition,CV-87-95321-EN-C.

The Institutional Framework for theRegulation of Telecom-municationsand the Application of EC Compe-tition Rules - Final Report, ForresterNorall & Sutton, CM-94-96-590-EN-C

Competition Aspects of Access Pricing-December 1995, M. Cave, P. Crowther,L. Hancher, CM-94-96-582-EN-C

Competition Aspects ofInterconnection Agreements in theTelecommunications Sector, CM-90-95-801-EN-C

The effect of conglomerate mergerson competition; CM-59-90-039-EN-C

Surveys of the Member States' powersto investigate and sanction violationsof national competition laws,CM 90-95-089-EN-C

L' Office de l'harmonisation dans lemarche interieur, AH-89-95-260-FR-C

Information exchanges among firmsand their impact on competition,CV 89-95-026-EN-C

Impact of EC-funded R&Dprogrammes on human resourcedevelopment and long-termcompetitiveness, CG NA-15-920-EN-C

Meeting universal service obligationsin a competitive telecommunicationssector, CV 83-94-757-EN-C

The geographical dimension ofcompetition in the European singlemarket, CV 78-93-136-EN-C

Copyright and information limits tothe protection of literary andpseudo-literary works in the MemberStates of the EC, CM 75-92-049-EN-C

Evaluation of the Impact of EuropeanCommunity Research Programmesupon the Competitiveness of EuropeanIndustry: Concepts and approaches,CD NA-14-198-EN-C

Competition and integration:Community merger controlpolicy,CM AR-94-057-EN-C

Growth, competitiveness, employment:The challenges and ways forward intothe 21st century: White paper, 9languages, CM 82-94-529-xx-C

Growth, competitiveness, employment:The challenges and ways forward intothe 21st century: "White paper" - Vol.2 -Part C, CM NF-93-0629-A-C

EG-Wettbewerbsrecht undZulieferbeziehungen derAutomobilindustrie,CV 73-92-788-DE-C


INFORMATION SECTION

Competition policy in the new tradeorder: strengthening internationalcooperation and rules,CM 91-95-124-EN-C

The impact of joint ventures oncompetition: The case ofpetrochemical industry in the EEC,CM 70-91-491-EN-C

Forum consultatif de la comptabilite:subventions publiques,C-184-94-735-FR-C

Les investissements dans lesindustries du charbon et de l'acier dela Communaute: Rapport surl'enquete 1993, CM 83-94-2963-A-C

Les investissements dans lesindustries du charbon et de l'acier dela Communaute: Enquete 1992, 9languages, CM 76-93-6733-A-C

The effect of different state aidmeasures on intra-Communitycompetition, CM 59-90-702-EN-C

Study on the impact of liberalizationof inward cross-border mail on theprovision of the universal postalservice and the options forprogressive liberalization: Finalreport, CV 89-95-018-EN-C

Green Paper on the development ofthe single market for postal services,9 languages, CD NA-14-858-EN-C

COST allocation and cross subsidies,CV 83-94-894-EN-C

New industrial economics andexperiences from European mergercontrol: New lessons about collectivedominance ? CM 89-95-737-EN-C

Competition and integration:Community merger control policy,CM AR-94-057-EN-C

The effects of intra-Communitycompetition of export subsidies tothird countries: The case of export

credits, export insurance and officialdevelopment assistance,CM 59-90-281-EN-C

Aid element of government R&Dcontracts, CM 70-91-314-EN-C

Concurrence et cooperation dans letransport aerien en Europe,CV 74-92-815-FR-C

European Economy, Supplement A,Recent economic trends, No 4 - 04/94,State aid control in the context ofother community policies, 9 languages,CM-AS-94-004-xx-C.

European Economy,; "Competition andintegration - Community merger controlpolicy", Supplement A nr. 3/95, 9languages, CM AS-95--005-xx-C,

Activities in favour of SMEs and thecraft sector. European Commission.1995. ISBN 92-827-5175-9 + versionFR et DE.

Aides et prêts de l'Union européenne- Guide des financementscommunautaires. 1995. ISBN 92-827-4601-1.

Répertoire de jurisprudence de droitcommunautaire 1977-1990. 3 volumes.Cour de justice des Commuautéseuropéennes.

Conference on Competition Policy.Organised by the European Commissionin cooperation with the Office ofEconomic Competition of Hungary.Visegrad. 19-21 June 1995.

Les marchés publics en Europe - Lesdirectives (+EN,DE) ISBN 92-826-8189-0.

PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIALJOURNAL

1st January to 31 March 1996__________________________

ARTICLES 85, 86, 90(RESTRICTIONS ANDDISTORTIONS OF COMPETITIONBY UNDERTAKINGS)

Legislation

Décision du Comité mixte de l'EEE n°65/95, du 22 novembre 1995, modifiantl'annexe XIV (concurrence) de l'accordEEE, JO L 8, 11/01/96

96/2/CE: Directive de la Commission, du16 janvier 1996, modifiant la directive90/388/CEE en ce qui concerne lescommunications mobiles et personnelles,JO L 20, 26/01/96

Règlement (CE) n° 385/96 du Conseil,du 29 janvier 1996, relatif à la défensecontre les pratiques préjudiciables enmatière de prix dans la constructionnavale, JO L 56, 06/03/96

Règlement (CE) no 240/96 de laCommission, du 31 janvier 1996,concernant l'application de l'article 85paragraphe 3 du traité à des catégoriesd'accords de transfert de technologie(Texte présentant de l'intérêt pour leEEE), JO L 31, 09/02/96

Decisions

96/180/CE - Décision de la Commission,du 16 janvier 1996, relative à uneprocédure d'application de l'article 85 dutraité CE et de l'article 53 de l'accordEEE (IV/35. 545 LH/SAS), JO L 54,02/03/96

Communications

Communication de la Commission. Lesdéfis auxquels sont confrontées lesindustries européennes liées à la défense


INFORMATION SECTION

- contribution en vue d'actions au niveaueuropéen, COM/96/10/fin., 24/01/96

Communication effectuée conformémentà l'article 12 paragraphe 2 du règlement(CEE) No. 4056/86 du Conseil et àl'article 12 paragraphe 2 du règlement(CEE) n° 1017/68 du Conseilconcernant l'affaire n° IV/35. 680 BalticLiner Conference Agreement, JO C 44,16/02/96

Communication faite conformément àl'article 19 paragraphe 3 du règlement n°17 du Conseil concernant le cas n°IV/E-3/35.875 - Nuclear Electricplc/British Nuclear Fuels plc, JO C 89,26/03/96

Communication faite conformément àl'article 19 paragraphe 3 du règlement n°17 du Conseil concernant le cas n°IV/E-3/35.876 - Scotish NuclearLtd/British Nuclear Fuels plc, JO C 89,26/03/96

Communication faite en application del'article 19 paragraphe 3 du règlement n°17 du Conseil concernant l'affaire n°IV/E-3/35.757 - British Gas plc - Codede gestion du réseau, JO C 93, 29/03/96

Opinions

Avis sur le "XXIVe rapport de laCommission sur la politique deconcurrence 1994", JO C 39, 12/02/96

Notifications

Notification d'une entreprise commune(Affaire n° IV/E-2/35.883 -Nisso/BASF), JO C 36, 09/02/96

Notification d'une entreprise commune(Affaire n° IV/35.869 - BanqueBruxelles Lambert), JO C 41, 13/02/96

Notification d'un accord sur les fraisterminaux (REIMS) conclu entreopérateurs postaux (Affaire n°IV/35.849 -REIMS), JO C 42, 14/02/96

Notification d'accords concernant lacoopération industrielle entre entrepriseset la création d'une entreprise commune(Affaire n° IV/35.895 - Mercedes-Benz,MTU, Detroit Diesel Corporation), JO C63, 02/03/96

Notification d'une entreprise commune(Affaire n° IV/35.993/F3), JO C 76,16/03/96

Affaire n° IV/34. 657 - Sammelrevers,JO C 54, 23/02/96

CONTROL OFCONCENTRATIONS/MERGERPROCEDURES

Decisions

96/177/CE: Décision de la Commission,du 19 juillet 1995, déclarant uneconcentration incompatible avec lemarché commun et le fonctionnement del'accord sur l'Espace économiqueeuropéen (Affaire n° IV/M. 490 -Nordic Satellite Distribution), JO L 53,02/03/96

96/204/CE: Décision de la Commission,du 20 septembre 1995, déclarant uneconcentration compatible avec le marchécommun et le fonctionnement del'accord sur l'Espace économiqueeuropéen (Affaire n° IV/M.582 -Orkla/Volvo), JO L 66, 16/03/96

96/222/CE: Décision de la Commission,du 14 novembre 1995, déclarant uneopération de concentration compatibleavec le marché commun et l'accord EEE(Affaire n° IV/M.603 - Crown Cork &Seal/CarnaudMetalbox), JO L 75,23/03/96

Non-opposition à une concentrationnotifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 666 - JohnsonControls/Roth Frères), JO C 3, 06/01/96

Non-opposition à une concentrationnotifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 664 - GRSHolding), JO C 8, 13/01/96

Non-opposition à une concentrationnotifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 567 -Lyonnaise des eaux/NorthumbrianWater), JO C 11, 16/01/96

Non-applicabilité du règlement à uneopération notifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 544- Unisource/Telefónica), JO C 13,18/01/96 Non-opposition à une concentrationnotifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 595 - BritishTelecommunications/VIAG), JO C 15,20/01/96/ Non-opposition à une concentrationnotifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 655 -Canal+/UFA/MDO), JO C 15, 20/01/96 Non-opposition à une concentrationnotifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 676 -Ericsson/Ascom II), JO C 19, 23/01/96

Non-opposition à une concentrationnotifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 678 -Minorco/Tilcon), JO C 24, 30/01/96

Non-opposition à une concentrationnotifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 670 - ElsagBailey/Hartmann & Braun AG), JO C24, 30/01/96

Non-opposition à une concentrationnotifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 660 -RTZ/CRA), JO C 22, 22/01/96 Non-opposition à une concentrationnotifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 621 -BLG/Bawag), JO C 23, 27/01/96

Non-applicabilité du règlement à uneopération notifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 650- SBG/Rentenanstalt, JO C 23, 27/01/96

Non-opposition à une concentrationnotifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 642 - ChaseManhattan/Chemical Banking), JO C 33,06/02/96 Non-opposition à une concentrationnotifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 674 -Demag/Komatsu), JO C 38, 10/02/96


INFORMATION SECTION

Non-applicabilité du règlement à uneopération notifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 661- Stragab/Bank Austria/Stuag, JO C 38,10/02/96 Non-opposition à une concentrationnotifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 677 -Skanska Fastigheter/SecurumFörvaltning, JO C 54, 23/02/96 Non-applicabilité du règlement à uneopération notifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 681- RB of Scotland/Bank of Ireland), JO C57, 27/02/96

Non-applicabilité du règlement à uneopération notifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 673- Channel Five)., JO C 57, 27/02/96 Non-opposition à une concentrationnotifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 668 -Philips/Origin), JO C 58, 28/02/96

Non-opposition à une concentrationnotifiée (Afaire n° IV/M. 657 -Röhm/Ciba Geigy/TFL Ledertechnik),JO C 60, 29/02/96 Non-opposition à une concentrationnotifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 662 - LeisurePlan), JO C 63, 02/03/96 Non-opposition à une concentrationnotifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 692 -Elektrowatt/Landis & Gyr), JO C 69,07/03/96 Non-opposition à une concentrationnotifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 686 -Nokia/Autoliv, JO C 69, 07/03/96

Non-opposition à une concentrationnotifiée (Affaire n° IV/M. 672 -BP/Sonatrach), JO C 72, 12/03/96

Non-opposition à une concentrationnotifiée (Affaire n° IV/M.694 -SKF/INA/WPB), JO C 76, 16/03/96

Non-opposition à une concentrationnotifiée (Affaire n° IV/M.707 - ToroAssicurazioni/Banca di Roma), JO C 76,16/03/96

Non-opposition à une concentrationnotifiée (Affaire n° IV/M.685 -Siemens/Lagardère), JO C 86, 23/03/96

Opinions

Avis du comité consultatif en matière deconcentrations rendu lors de la 30eréunion tenue le 5 juillet 1995concernant une proposition de décisiondans l'affaire n° IV/M. 490 - NordicSatellite Distribution, JO C 63, 02/03/96

Avis du comité consultatif en matière deconcentrations entre entreprises rendulors de sa trente et unième réunion, le 4septembre 1995, sur un avant-projet dedécision relatif à l'affaire IV/M.582 -Orkla/Volvo, JO C 76, 16/03/96 Avis du comité consultatif en matière deconcentrations rendu lors de la 34eréunion, le 6 novembre 1995, sur unavant-projet de décision rélatif à l'affairen° IV/M. 603 - Crown Cork & Seal/CarnaudMetalbox, JO C 86, 23/03/96

Notifications

Affaire n° IV/M. 681 - RB ofScotland/Bank of Ireland), JO C 7,12/01/96 Affaire n° IV/M. 686 - Nokia/Autoliv,JO C 7, 12/01/96

Affaire n° IV/M. 651 - AT&T/PhilipsElectronics NV, JO C 7, 12/01/96

Affaire n° IV/M. 685 -Siemens/Lagardère, JO C 8, 13/01/96

Affaire n° IV/M. 672 - BP/Sonatrach,JO C 13, 18/01/96

Affaire n° IV/M. 692 -Elektrowatt/Landis & Gyr, JO C 13,18/01/96

Affaire n° IV/M. 269 -Shell/Montecatini, JO C 13, 18/01/96

Affaire n° IV/M. 694 - SKF/INA/WPB,JO C 23, 27/01/96

Affaire n°. IV/M. 663 - Dow/DuPont, JOC 24, 30/01/96

Affaire n° IV/M. 697 - Lockheed MartinCorporation/Loral Corporation, JO C 33,06/02/96

Affaire n° IV/M. 689 - ADSB/Belgacom,JO C 33, 06/02/96

Affaire n° IV/M. 702 -Starck/Wienerberger, JO C 35, 08/02/96

Affaire n° IV/M. 707 - ToroAssicurazioni/Banca di Roma), JO C 36,09/02/96 Affaire n° IV/M. 699 - Tomkins/Gates,JO C 38, 10/02/96

Affaire n° IV/M. 683 - GTS-HermesInc/Danske Statsbaner/Deutsche BahnAG/Ferrovie dello Stato SpA/NVNederlandse Spoorwegen/ÖsterreichischeBundesbahnen/Red Nacional de losFerrocarriles Españoles/Société nationaledes chemins de fer belges/NationaleMaatschappij der Belgische spoorwegen /Société nationale de chemins de ferfrançais / Schweizerische Bundesbahnen/ Statens Järnvägar/Racal-BR Telecom-munications Ltd, JO C 41, 13/02/96

Affaire n° IV/M. 716 - GEHE/LloydsChemists, JO C 43, 15/02/96

Affaire n° IV/M. 711 -Generali/Unicredito, JO C 44, 16/02/96

Affaire n° IV/M. 698 -NAW/Saltano/Contrac, JO C 49,20/02/96

Affaire n° IV/M. 714 - Preussag/ElcoLooser, JO C 53, 22/02/96. 3) Affaire n° IV/M. 704 -Unilever/Diversey, JO C 55, 24/02/96

Affaire n° IV/M. 721 - Textron/Valois,JO C 58, 28/02/96


INFORMATION SECTION

Affaire n° IV/M. 717 - Viacom/BearStearns, JO C 60, 29/02/96

Affaire n° IV/M. 718 -Phoenix/Comifar, JO C 62, 01/03/96

Affaire n° IV/M. 697 - Lockheed MartinCorporation/Loral Corporation, JO C 68,06/03/96

Affaire n° IV/M. 556 -Zeneca/Vanderhave, JO C 70, 08/03/96

Affaire n° IV/M. 705 - DeutscheTelekom/SAP-S, JO C 70, 08/03/96

Affaire n° IV/M. 726 - Bosch/AlliedSignal, JO C 71, 09/03/96

Retrait de la notification d'une opérationde concentration (Affaire n° IV/M. 680- Kvaerner/Amec), JO C 8, 13/01/96

Affaire n° IV/M.722 - Téneo/MerillLynch/Bankers Trust), JO C 81,19/03/96

Affaire n° IV/M.731 -Kvaerner/Trafalgar), JO C 83, 20/03/96

Affaire n° IV/M.732 - NordicCapital/Euroc), JO C 85, 22/03/96

Affaire n° IV/M.729 - GECAlsthom/Tarmac/Central IMU), JO C86, 23/03/96

Affaire n° IV/M.738 -Natwest/Schroder/Shefield), JO C 89,26/03/96

STATE AID

96/75/CE: Décision de la Commission,du 4 octobre 1995, concernant l'aideaccordée par la Région flamande deBelgique au constructeur de camionsDAF, JO L 15, 20/01/96

96/76/CE: Décision de la Commission,du 4 octobre 1995, concernant l'aideaccordée par les Pays-Bas au

constructeur de camions DAF, JO L 15,20/01/96

Approbation d'une aide d'Etatconformément aux articles 92 et 93 dutraité CE - Cas pour lesquels laCommission ne soulève pas d'objections- Aides d'Etat N 241/95 - Belgique, JOC 5, 10/01/96

Communication de la Commissionconcernant les aides d'Etat relatives auxcrédits à court terme à taux d'intérêtbonifiés en agriculture ("crédits degestion"), JO C 44, 16/02/96

Encadrement communautaire des aidesd'Etat à la recherche et audéveloppement, JO C45, 17/02/96

96/169/CE: Décision de la Commission,du 14 février 1996, relative aux dates àfixer par les Etats membres pour laprésentation des demandes d'aides"surfaces" dans le cadre du systèmeintégré de gestion et de contrôle relatif àcertains régimes d'aides communautaires("système intégré"), JO L 45, 23/02/96

96/178/CECA: Décision de laCommission, du 18 octobre 1995,relative à des aides d'Etat accordées parle Land de Bavière à l'entreprise CECANeue Maxhütte Stahlwerke GmbH,Sulzbach-Rosenberg, JO L 53, 02/03/96

96/179/CE: Décision de la Commission,du 31 octobre 1995, enjoignant augouvernement allemand de fournir tousles documents, informations et donnéesconcernant les projets de nouveauxinvestissements du groupe Volkswagendans les nouveaux Länder allemands etles aides prévues en faveur de cesinvestissements (C 62/91 ex NN 75, 77,78 et 79/91), JO L53, 02/03/96

Adoptions des aides d'Etat

-C 45/95 (NN 48/95) - Italie, JO C 3,06/01/96-N 463/94 - Espagne, JO C 25, 31/01/96-C 2/93 (ex N 505/92) - Belgique, JO C33, 06/02/96

-C 4/93 (ex N 652/92) - Allemagne, JOC 33, 06/02/96-Contrôle des aides d'Etat - Appeld'offres (IV G 5/PSI/01), JO C 36,09/02/96-C 21/94 (ex N 415/93) - Italie, JO C 42,14/02/96-C 46/95 (NN 130/93) - France, JO C 58,28/02/96-C 10/94 (ex NN 126/93) - Grèce, JO C68, 06/03/96-C 47/95 (ex NN 61/95) - Italie, JO C68, 06/03/96-C 43/93 - Irlande, JO C 70, 08/03/96-C 49/95 (ex N 76/95) - Républiquefédérale d'Allemagne, JO C 71, 09/03/96-C 50/95 (N 317/95) - Autriche, JO C71, 09/03/96-C 51/95 (ex N 320/95) - Autriche, JO C71, 09/03/96-C 48/95 (N 295/95 et N 296/95) -Belgique, JO C 73, 13/03/96-C 56/95 (N 941/95) - Espagne, JO C 75,15/03/96-C 32/94 (N 48/94) - Allemagne, JO C76, 16/03/96-C 2/88 (NN 128/87) - Grèce, JO C 84,21/03/96-C 5/96 (NN 138/95) - France, JO C 84,21/03/96-C 59/95 (ex NN 79/95) - Italie, JO C92, 28/03/96

Autorisation des aides d'Etat dans lecadre des dispositions des articles 92 et93 du traité CE - Cas à l'égard desquelsla Commission ne soulève pasd'objection:JO C 6, 11/01/96; JO C 23, 27/01/96; JO C 19, 23/01/96; JO C 53, 22/02/96;JO C 63, 02/03/96; JO C 67, 05/03/96;JO C 70, 08/03/96; JO C 72, 12/03/96;JO C 73, 13/03/96; JO C 74, 14/03/96;JO C 75, 15/03/96; JO C 72, 12/03/96;JO C 73, 13/03/96; JO C 74, 14/03/96;JO C 85, 22/03/96; JO C 86, 23/03/96

DIVERS

Appel à manifestations d'intérêtd'experts-conseils dans le domaine de lapolitique de la concurrence, del'information, de la communication et de


INFORMATION SECTION

la société de l'information, JO C 73,13/03/96

WRITTEN QUESTIONS

E-1875/95 de Christine Crawley(Écolabel)

E-2101/95 de Lyndon Harrison (tarifsautoroutiers au Benelux)

E-2403/95 de Edward McMillan-Scott(commandes en chaîne dans le secteurdes chemins de fer)

E-2549/95 de Tony Cunningham(finnancement d'un fabricant d'armes parla Commission)

E-2617/95 de Amedeo Amadeo (réseauxcâblés de télévision)

E-2618 de Amedeo Amadeo (réseauxcâblés de télévision)

E-2227/95 de Iñigo Méndez de Vigo(aides au secteur de l'automobile)

E-2548/95 de Liam Hyland (portsprivés)

P-2761/95 de Hugh McMahon (non-respect des règles communautaires deconcurrence pour la traversée du pont del'île de Skye)

E-2728/95 de Christoph Konrad(subventions de l'Union européenne enfaveur de la construction d'un nouvelaéroport à Athènes)

E-2793/95 de Alexandros Alavanos(correspondance entre la Commission etle gouvernement grec concernant leschantiers navals grecs)

P-2942/95 de Graham Watson (aided'État au secteur irlandais d'extractionde la tourbe)

E-2051/95 de Wolfgang Nuβbaumer(financement des réseauxtranseuropéens)

E-2159/95 de Markus Ferber (initiativescommunautaires à venir visant àpromouvoir la compétitivité del'industrie européenne aéronautique etastronautique face aux États Unisd'Amérique et aux pays asiatiques)

E-2376/95 de WolfgangKreissl-Dörfler(aide de l'Union européenne à desprojets industriels en Chine)

E-2733/95 de Amedeo Amadeo etCristiana Muscardini (transports aériens)

E-2720/95 de Mathias Reichhold(violation des règles de concurrence del'Union européenne sous forme dedouble péage en Autriche)

E-2734/95 de Cristiana Muscardini(restructuration des industriesinformatiques du groupe Olivetti)

E-2745/95 de Jannis Sakellariou(délocalisations d'entreprisesindustrielles opérées grâce des crédits del'union européenne)

E-2987/95 de Irene Crepaz (droitsrelatifs à la periode de non-concurrenceet aux indemnités dues au titre de laclause de non-concurrence, acquisrégulièrement dans un État membre etrevendiqués dans un autre État membrede l'Union européenne)

E-2533/95 de Detlev Samland(information sur le montant des aidesaccordées en 1994 à la régionNordrhein-Westphie)

E-2579/95 de Richard Howitt (demanded'aide financière de Oikkos Ltd, Essex,pour un projet de régénéation deshydrocarbures)

E-2833/95 de Gerhard Schmid (loi surl'utilisation du français -loi Toubon- etlibre concurrence sur le marchéintérieur)

E-1631/95 de Markus Ferber (aide del'Union européenne à la recherche)

E-1984/95 de Nel van Dijk (distorsionsde concurrence provoquées par une aidepublique accordée par la ville de LaHaye)

E-2169/95 de Ursula Schleider (tarifsaériens)

E-3136/95 de Jaak Vandemeulebroucke(distorsion de concurrence)

E-2872/95 de Winifred Ewing (aidesd'État)

E-2717/95 de Gerardo Fernández-Albor(compatibilité entre les réglementationsnationales relatives à l'etablissement depharmacies et les règles communautairesde libre concurrence)

E-3166/95 de Imelda Read (entreprisecommune Atlas)

E-3200/95 de KARL VON Wogau(distorsions de la concurrence dans lesecteur de la production du boisenrépublique fédérale d'Allemagne)

E-3208/95 de James Fitzsimons (aidespubliques excessives)

COURT OF JUSTICE/TRIBUNAL

Affaires introduites devant la Cour

Aff. C-379/95 P : France e.a. /Commission: Pourvoi contre l'arrêt duTribunal (première chambre élargie),rendu le 18 septembre 1995, dansl'affaire T-548/93 - Annulation de ladécision de la Commission rejetant la plainte de Ladbroke Racing Ltd - Paris sur les courses de chevaux - Parimutuel urbain

Aff. C-399/95 : Allemagne / CommissionAnnulation de la décision K(95)2828final concernant une aide du FreistaatBayern à l'entreprise CECA NeueMaxhütte Stahlwerke GmbH

Aff. C-404/95 : Allemagne / CommissionAnnulation de la décision K(95)2754


INFORMATION SECTION

de la Commission du 31 octobre 1995concernant une aide de la Freie undHansestadt Hamburg à l'entrepriseHamburger Stahlwerke GmbH

Aff. C-406/95 : Italie / CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission du 4 octobre 1995 relative aux conditions imposées ausecond opérateur de radiotéléphonieGSM en Italie

Aff. C-410/95 : Grands garages méditerranéens SA et Nissan France SA / Nice ouest automobilesPréjudicielle - Tribunal de commercede Nice - Interprétation du règlement(CEE) n 123/85 de la Commissionconcernant l'application de l'art. 85, par.3, du traité CE à des catégoriesd'accords de distribution et de servicede vente et d'après-vente de véhicules automobiles - Revendeurs n'appartenantpas à un réseau de distributionexclusive - Activité consistant à vendredes véhicules neufs provenantd'importations parallèles

Aff. C-2/96 : Carlo Sunino / GiancarloData : Préjudicielle - Preturacircondariale di Ivrea, sezione di Strambino - Interprétation des art. 48, 55, 59, 60, 66, 86 et 90 du traité CE - Législation nationale qui exclut les entreprises privées de l'activitéd'intermédiaire dans le marché du travailintérimaire

Aff. C-35/96 : Commission / ItalieManquement d'Etat - Concurrence -Violation des art. 5 et 85 du traité CE -Fixation des tarifs obligatoires pour lesexpéditeurs en douane

Aff. C-41/96 : VAG-Händlerbeirat e.V./ SYD-Consult : Préjudicielle -Landgericht - Hamburg - Interprétation de l'art. 85 du traité CEet du règlement (CEE) nu 123/85 dela Commission concernant l'applicationde l'article 85 paragraphe 3 du traitéCEE à des catégories d'accords de distribution et de service de vente et d'après-vente de véhicules automobiles

- Législation nationale en matière de concurrence qui exige l'étanchéité du système pour que les membres du système puissent obtenir desinjonctions interdisant à des tiers ladistribution des produits concernés - Distinction entre systèmes de distribution théoriquement étanches etthéoriquement et pratiquement étanches

Aff. C-46/96 : Allemagne / CommissionAnnulation de la décision C(95)3319final concernant une aide fiscale enmatière d'amortissements octroyée au profit d'entreprises allemandes -Amortissements extraordinaires sur lesaéronefs

Aff. C-51/96 : C. Deliège / Liguefrancophone de judo et disciplinesassociées ASBL e.a. Préjudicielle - Tribunal de premièreinstance de Namur - Interprétation desart. 59 à 66, 85 et 86 du traité CE au regard de la réglementation d'uneassociation sportive (internationale)qui exige une autorisation ou unesélection de la fédération nationale pour concourir dans une compétitioninternationale - Sportif amateur, mais candidat au professionnalisme ousemi-professionnalisme - Judo féminin

Aff. C-55/96 : Job Centre coop. arlPréjudicielle - Corte d'Appello - Milano- Interprétation des art. 48, 49, 55, 59,60, 62, 66, 86 et 90 du traité CE au regard d'une législation nationale quiexclut les entreprises privées del'exercice des activités de placementdes travailleurs

Affaires introduites devant leTribunal

Aff. T-221/95 : Endemol EntertainementHolding e.a. / CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommision relative à une procédured'application du règlement (CEE) nu4064/89 du Conseil (affaire nuIV/M.553-RTL/Veronica/Endemol),déclarant incompatible avec le marché

commun l'accord de concentrationd'entreprises visant la constitution duHolland Media Group.

Aff. T-224/95 : R. Tremblay e.a. /Commission : Annulation de la décisionde la Commision rejetant la plainteintroduite par les requérants sur lefondement des art. 85 et 86 du Traité CE(nu IV/31.773), relative à l'entente entreles societés d'auteurs des différents Étatsmembres - Exécution incorrecte de l'arrêtdu Tribunal du 24 janvier 1995 rendudans l'affaire T-5/93

Aff T-227/95 : AssiDomãn KraftProducts e.a. / CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommision refusant de rembourser lesamendes infligées aux requérantes parune décision relative à une procédured'infraction à l'art. 85 du traité CE ayantété partiellement annulée par l'arrêt de laCour du 31 mars 1993, rendu dansl'affaire C-89/95

Aff. T-229/95 :Telecom Italia Mobile /Commission; Annulation de la décisionde la Commission relative aux conditionsimposées au second opérateur deradiotéléphonie GSM en Italie

Aff. T-231/95 : SIC / CommissionRecours en carence tendant à faireconstater que la Commission s'estillégalement abstenue d'ouvrir uneprocédure au titre de l'article 93 par. 2,du traité CE suite à une plainte déposéepar la requérante, relative aux aidesaccordées par le gouvernement portugaisà la RTP - (radiotelevisão Portuguesa).

Aff. T-234/95 : Hamburger Stahlwerke /Commission; Annulation de la décisionle la Commission K (95) 2754 endg.relative à l'octroi d'une aide accordée parla ville hanséatique de Hamburg àl'entreprise CECA HamburgerStahlwerke

Aff. T-235/95 : A. Goidstein /Commission; Annulation de la décisionde la Commission refusant dereconsidérer, suite aux arguments de fait


INFORMATION SECTION

et de droit développés par le requérant,sa décision de rejeter la demande demesures provisoires introduite dans lecadre d'une procédure tendant à faireconstater la violation des art. 85 et 86du traité CE par le "General MedicalCouncil", organisme chargé deréglementer les professions médicales auRoyaume-Uni

Aff. T-236/95 : TAT European Airlines/ Commission; Annulation de ladécision de la Commission relative aupaiement de la seconde tranche de l'aideen faveur d'Air France, approuvé par ladécision de la Commission consistant enune augmentation de capital payable entrois tranches

Aff. T-2/96 : Neue MaxhuetteStahlwerke / CommissionAnnulation de la decision de laCommission K (95) 2828 endg.,concernant une aide accordee par le Freistaat Bayern a l'entreprise Neue Maxhuette Stahlwerke

Aff. T-9/96 : Europeenne automobile /Commission; Recours en carence tendant a faire constater que la Commission s'est illegalement abstenuede prendre une decision suite a laplainte deposee par la requerante sur lefondement de l'art. 85 du traite CE etde l'art. 3, point 11, du reglement (CEE) no 123/85 de la Commission, etconcernant les agissements de la societe Peugeot aupres des concessionnaires de ses filialesetrangeres afin de les empecherd'accepter de vendre des vehicules aux intermediaires francais - Recours en indemnite en reparation du prejudicepretendument cause par lecomportement de la Commission

Aff. T-14/96 : BAI / CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission de clore la procédureouverte, en application de l'art. 93, par.2, du traité CE, suite à une plainte de larequérante relative au soutien financieraccordé par les autorités espagnoles enfaveur d'un nouveau service de ferries

pour le transport de marchandises et depassagers entre l'Angleterre et l'Espagne,exploité par la société Ferries Golfo deVizcaya, estimant que l'accord enquestion ne constitue pas une aide d'Etat

Aff. T-16/96 : Cityflyer Express /Commission; Annulation de la décisionde la Commission concernant l'aideaccordée par la région flamande à lacompagnie aérienne belge VlaamseLuchttransportmaatschappij NV (VLM)

Aff. T-17/96 TFI / CommissionRecours en carence tendant à faireconstater que la Commission s'estillégalement abstenue de prendreposition sur la plainte déposée par larequérante contre l'Etat français, sur lefondement des art. 85, 90 par. 1 et 92du traité CE, et concernant les modes definancement des chaînes de télévisionpubliques FRANCE2 et FRANCE3 -Subsidiairement, annulation de la prisede position sur la plainte éventuellementcontenue dans la lettre de laCommission du 11 décembre 1995

Aff. T-18/96 SCK e.a. / CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission relative à une procédured'application de l'art. 85 du traité CE(IV/34.179, 34.202, 216 - StichtingCertificatie Kraanverhuurbedrijf etFederatie van NederlandseKraanverhuurbedrijven) ou,subsidairement, déclaration del'inexistence de l'acte attaqué

BOOKS and PUBLICATIONS__________________________

Received by DG IV' s library

The antimonopoly laws andpolicies of Japan by H. Iyori and A.Uesugi, published by New York:Federal Legal Publications 1994 -ISBN 0-87945-077-0.

Approaching 2000 : thecorporation in transition, edited byDennis Campbell - Deventer: KluwerLaw and Taxation, 1994 - ISBN 90-41-10007-5.

Kommentar zum Kartellgesetz inder Fassung derKartellgesetznovelle 1993 samtNahversorgungsgesetz und EU-Kartellrecht by Norbert Gugerbauer(Österreich).

Gli aiuti alle imprese nel mercatounico europeo, by Patrizia Fariselli,Enrico Mantovani - Perugia:Protagon Editrice 1992 - ISBN 88-7891-059-6.

The legal protection of tradesecrets by Alison Coleman, London:Sweet and Maxwell. 1992 - ISBN 0-421-47170-0.

Vorbeugender Rechtsschutz imRecht der EuropäischenGemeinschaften by Thomas JeanBerrang. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1994- ISBN 3-7890-3577-7.

Taylor and Winsor on jointoperating agreements by MichaelP.G. Taylor and Sally M. Tyne.London: Longman Law, Tax &Finance, 1992: ISBN 0-85121-854-7.

The mystery of Japanesegrowth/Ramesh Ponnuru. London:Trade Policy Unit, Centre for PolicyStudies, 1995 - ISBN 1-897969-31-7.

Les nouveau maîtres du monde.Renaud de La Baume, Jean-JeromeBertolus. Paris: Belfond, 1995 -ISBN 2-7144-3253-0.

International direct investmentstatistics = Annuaire des


INFORMATION SECTION

statistiques d'investissement directinternational / Paris OECD.

Multinationalisatie vanNederlandse dienst-enondernemingen door Pieter KlaasJagersma. Jagersma Research &Consultancy, 1994.

Monopoly and competition policyedited by F.M. Scherer. Aldershot:Edward Elgar, 1993 2nd volume -ISBN 1-85278-753-8.

State aid: Community law andpolicy - Staatliche Beihilfen:Gemeinschaftsrecht undGemeinschaftspolitik = Aidesd'Etat: droit et politiquecommunautaires herausgegebenvon Ian Harden. Köln:Bundesanzeiger, 1993 - ISBN 3-88784-424-6.

EC shipping law: first supplementto the first edition by VincentPower. London: Lloyd's of LondonPress, 1994.

Les entreprises publiques dansl'Union européenne: entreconcurrence et intérêt général sousla direction de Bernard Thiry etJacques Vandamme; CIRIECInternational; TEPSA. Paris:Pedone, 1995: ISBN 2-233-00270-9.

Competition and integration: whatgoals count? EEC competition lawand goals of industrial, monetaryand cultural policy by R.B.Bouterse. Deventer: Kluwer Lawand Taxation, 1994 - ISBN 90-6544-8160-0.

EC competition law sourcematerials by Ivo Van Bael, Jean-François Bellis. Bicester: CCHEurope, 1994: ISBN 0-86325-384-9.

Pratique communautaire ducontrôle des concentrations:analyses juridique, économique etcomparative: Europe, Etats-Uniset Japon. Laurent Cohen-Tanugi,David Encoua, Antoine Winckler .. -ISBN 2-8041-1991-2.

The Development of a CompetitiveInternal Energy Market in theEuropean Community by RüdigerDohms. Connecticut Journal ofInternational Law - Summer 1994.

Monopolies & anti-competitivepractices. A guide to the provisionsof the Fair Trading Act 1973 & theCompetition Act 1980. Office ofFair Trading 1995.

Umbruch der Wettbewerb-sordnung in Europa. Referate desXXVIII.FIW-Symposiums. 1995.

Schwerpunkte des Kartellrechts1993/94. Referate desZweiundzwanzigsten FIW-Seminars1994. 1995.

The anti-subsidies code of theUruguay Round transposition inthe European Union. 1995.

Loosening the strait-jacket. CBIproposals for reform of the scopeand administration of Art. 85. CBI.

StandortfaktorWettbewerbspolitik -Reformbedarf auf deutscher undeuropäischer Ebene.Bundesverband der DeutschenIndustrie e.V. 1995.

Legislações nacionais deconcorrência. (Finlândia, Hungriae Suécia). Direcção-Geral deConcorrência e Preços- 1995.

Die Anwendbarkeit der EG-Fusionskontrollverordnung imVerhältnis zumFusionskontrollrecht derMitgliedstaaten von Dr. ThomasLampert. 1995.

L'Europe de l'utilité publique. Desindustries de services publics réno-vées dans l'Europe libérale. 1995.

GATS - AllgemeinesÜbereinkommen über denDienstleistungsverkehr. 1995. ISBN92-827-4228-8.

Pricing. A Behavioural Approach toAbuses of Market Power by ConorHanly. 1995.

Sicherung des Wettbewerbs imkommunalen Bereich. Referate desBerliner Kolloquiums 1994 und einerSonderveranstaltung 1994. 1995.

Das Leisungsprofil desGroßhandels in Bayern von BrunoTietz. 1995.

EG:s konkurrensrätt - vägledandedomar. Carl Nisser, Anna CarinKrokstäde. 1995.

Aktuelle Rechtsprobleme derElektrizitätswirtschaft 1995 mitBeiträgen von K. Arnold, R. Dohms,H. Hörtenhuber, W. Pesendorfer, N.Wimmer.

Marktaggressivität undUnternehmenserfolg von JoachimLücking. 1995.

Polish antimonopoly case law.Tadeusz Skoczny. 1995.

Konkurrensreglerna i detIntegrerade Europa (EU/EES).Johan Bärlund. 1995.


INFORMATION SECTION

Rechtfertigungs- undEntschuldigungsgründe imBußgeldrecht der EuropäischenGemeinschaften von Dr. MarkusWagemann. 1995.

Economic report of the Presidenttransmitted to the Congress.Together with the annual report ofthe Council of Economic Advisers.Washington, DC:USGPO. 1996.

European Law Review.Competition Law Checklist 1995.Year 1994 by C. Jones et M. van derWoude, including "Maindevelopments in merger controlduring 1994" by Juan BrionesAlonso

Konkurrensfoerhaallanden : Omfoerhaallandet mellan EGskonkurrensraett och nationellKonkurrensraett/Nils Wahl.Stockholm : Juristfoerlaget, 1994.

Droit des affaires de l'Unioneuropéenne by Christian Gavalda etGilbert Parleani.

Praxis der EuropäischenFusionskontrolle von Götz Drauzund Dirk Schröder. Köln. VerlagKommunikationsforum, 1994.

Global Forum on Competition andTrade Policy. Harmonization ofInternational Competition LawEnforcement. June 1995.

Frankfurter Institut - StiftungMarktwirtschaft und Politik.Dauerkrise am europäischenStahlmarkt -Markt- oderPolitikversagen? von NorbertBerthold. 1994. ISBN 3-8015-044-6.

Handelen med Stål.KonkurrenceRådet 1996.

Les organisations interbancairesen Europe (Moyens et systèmes depaiement). Rapport pour le ConseilNational du Crédit. Novembre 1995.

RealkreditinstitutternesSamarbejde med Pengeinstitutterom Formidling af Realkreditlån tilEjerbolig. KonkurrenceRådet 1996.

Aspects juridiques de laconcurrence maritime : etudecomparative a partir du droitcommunautaire, de L. Athanasiou,éditions Pédone, France.

Coming up ...._________________________________

The following publications areunder preparation by DG IV;however, a budget has beenallocated only for publicationsmarked with an *:

EC Competition PolicyNewsletter: Summer 1996*,autumn/Winter 1996

Competition law in the EuropeanCommunities -volume 1BExplanation of rules applicable toundertakings.

Dealing with the Commission -notifications, complaints,inspections and fact-findingpowers.

XXV Report on CompetitionPolicy - 1995*

Competition law in the EuropeanCommunities -volume 3A:International aspects ofcompetition policy.*

Actes Forum Européen de laConcurrence.(co-edition with J.Wiley) Catalog number: CV-88-95-985-EN-C*

L' application des articles 85/86par les juridictions nationales*

Recueil des décisions sur les aidesd'Etat

Brochure sur la politique de laconcurrence dans le Marchéunique (concernant les art.85,86,90et le règlement sur lesconcentrations)

Brochure sur la politiqueconcernant les aides d'Etat

Brochure concernant des sujetsprésentant un intérêt pratiquepour l'industrie de la Communautéet plus particulierement les PMEs

Video: Introduction to competitionpolicy*

Survey of the Memeber StateNational Law Governing VerticalDistribution Agreements*

Interim report of the multimodalgroup*

Video: Dealing with theCommission - Notifications,complaints, inspections and fact-finding powers

SHORTLY ON THE INTERNET /BIENTÔT SUR L'INTERNET

EUROPA, the Commission's WWWsite (http://www.cec.lu) will shortlycontain data on EuropeanCommunity Competition Policy.


INFORMATION SECTION

New procedure for thedissemination ofMerger decisions___________________

In conformance with the rules that applyon public access to Commissiondocuments (see Commision decision of8 February 1994 on public access toCommission documents (94/90/ECSC,EC, Euratom) in OJ L 46 of 18/02/1994p. 58), the Commission is implementinga new system of disseminatingCommission's Merger Decisions basedon Articles 6 (1) a) and b) of Regulation4064/89.

Unfortunately, although the introductionof the new system was planned for the1st of March 1996, it has been delayeduntil mid-April, mainly for technicalreasons.

These decisions will be available:

- in paper form through the documentdelivery procedures of the Office forOfficial Publications of the EuropeanCommunities and its sales agents;

- in electronic form, through the CELEXdatabase containing Communitylegislation and case law.

The announcement of these decisions inthe Official Journal series C will containthe appropriate CELEX documentnumber (necessary to consult theelectronic version online).

Several gateways provide access toCELEX, while commercial hostsdistribute CELEX under licence eitheronline or on CD-ROM. For moreinformation about CELEX or to receivean updated list of gateways anddistributors please contact: EUR-OP,Information, Marketing & PublicRelations, (OP/4B), 2, rue Mercier, L-2925 Luxembourg; tel. +(352) 292942455 fax. +(352) 2929 42763

For countries not covered by gatewaysand for Universities please contactEUROBASES at the following address:EUR-OP, Eurobases, (OP/4C, 2, rueMercier, L-2985 Luxembourg; tel.+(352) 2929 42053, fax. +(352) 292942025.

A short manual for extracting Article 6(1) a) and b) decisions from CELEX isavailable on request through DG IV'sCellule Information.

More Information ...___________________

The Directorate General for Competition(DG IV) receives many requests withspecific questions. While it isimpossible, given the resourcesavailable, to investigate and replyindividually to each one of them, wewill do our best to reply as soon aspossible. In order to better inform thepublic on Competition Policy, DG IVproduces several publications, availablethrough the Office for OfficialPublications of the European Union (seecatalog on p. 46). We also publish threetimes a year the "EC CompetitionPolicy Newsletter", available free ofcharge. Finally, we can provide copiesof speeches by the CompetitionCommissioner and by officials from theDirectorate General. Please address yourquestions to :

European Commission,Directorate General IV-Competition,

Cellule Information,C150 00/158, Rue de la Loi 200

Wetstraat, BruxellesB-1049 Brussel, Belgium.

fax(+322) 29 55437 E-Mail: Internet:[email protected] X.400:

c=be;a=rtt;p=cec;ou=dg4;s=info4

The members of the CelluleINFORMATION will endeavour toanswer your enquiries. If they are unableto do so they will find someone who can.They will not, however, answerquestions pertaining to ongoing cases.

Cases covered in thisissue___________________

Anti-trust Rules

Commission Decisions

18 Bayer/Adalat18 Lufthansa / SAS19 UEFA

Court Judgements

21 C-70/93 BMW/ALD21 C-266/93 Bundeskartellamt/VAG23 C-399/93 Oude Luttikhuis /

Cobercoba

Mergers

Commission Decisions

27 Kimberly-Clark/Scott Paper28 GEHE/Lloys Chemist28 Gencor/Lonrho29 Raab Karcher Kohle / Ruhrkohle

Handel


58

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© ECSC-ECE-EAEC, Brussels • Luxembourg, 1996Reproduction is authorised, except for commercial purposes, provided the source is acknowledged.