Eastern Africa:Security and the Legacy of Fragility

Africa Program Working Paper Series

OCTOBER 2008Gilbert M. Khadiagala

I N T E R N AT I O N A L P E A C E I N S T I T U T E

Cover Photo: Elderly women receive

emergency food aid, Agok, Sudan,

May 21, 2008. ©UN Photo/Tim

McKulka.

The views expressed in this paper

represent those of the author and

not necessarily those of IPI. IPI

welcomes consideration of a wide

range of perspectives in the pursuit

of a well-informed debate on critical

policies and issues in international

affairs.

Africa Program Staff

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© by International Peace Institute,

2008

All Rights Reserved

www.ipinst.org

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

GILBERT KHADIAGALA is Jan Smuts Professor of

International Relations and Head of Department,

University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South

Africa. He is the co-author with Ruth Iyob of Sudan: The

Elusive Quest for Peace (Lynne Rienner 2006) and the

editor of Security Dynamics in Africa’s Great Lakes

Region (Lynne Rienner 2006).

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

IPI owes a great debt of thanks to the generous contrib-

utors to the Africa Program. Their support reflects a

widespread demand for innovative thinking on practical

solutions to continental challenges. In particular, IPI and

the Africa Program are grateful to the government of the

Netherlands. In addition we would like to thank the Kofi

Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, which

co-hosted an authors' workshop for this working paper

series in Accra, Ghana on April 11-12, 2008.

CONTENTS

Foreword, Terje Rød-Larsen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Key Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

TERRITORIAL SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE:THE LEGACY OF FRAGILITY

ECOLOGY, ECONOMY, AND HEALTH INEASTERN AFRICA

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY:REGION UNDER SIEGE

Mechanisms for Coping with ExistingChallenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

REGIONAL MECHANISMS

INTERNATIONALLY-DRIVEN MECHANISMS

Scenarios and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

WORST CASE SCENARIOS

BEST CASE SCENARIOS

MIDDLE CASE SCENARIOS

RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Further Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Foreword

IPI is pleased to introduce a new series of working papers on regional capacities to respond to securitychallenges in Africa. The broad range of United Nations, African Union, and subregional peacekeeping,peacemaking, and peacebuilding initiatives in Africa underscore a new sense of multilayered partnership in thesearch for the peaceful resolution of conflicts in Africa. As the total number of conflicts on the continent hasbeen significantly reduced in the past decade, there is widespread recognition of the opportunities for a morestable and peaceful future for Africa. But there is also a profound awareness of the fragility of recent peaceagreements, whether in Kenya, Liberia, or Côte d’Ivoire. Furthermore, continued violence in the Sudan, theDemocratic Republic of the Congo, and Zimbabwe; the long absence of a viable central government in Somalia;and continued tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea—to name only a few cases—reflect the legacy ofunresolved historic disputes and ongoing power struggles.

The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) has selected Burundi and Sierra Leone for its firstefforts, and will shortly be addressing the security challenges facing Guinea-Bissau which has become a majortransit point for narcotics traffic between South America and Europe. Yet, the impact of the PBC on promotinggood governance and facilitating economic growth remains to be determined. In sum, progress towards sustain-able peace and meaningful economic development in Africa remains checkered and uncertain.

On April 11-12, 2008, IPI and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre co-hosted a meetingof African civil society representatives and academics in Accra, Ghana to consider “Security Challenges inAfrica: Regional Capacities to Respond”; and on June 1-3, 2008, IPI held a seminar in cooperation with theAustrian Ministry of Defense and the Austrian Ministry of European and International Affairs entitled “Copingwith Crisis in Africa: Strengthening Multilateral Capacity for Peace and Security.” Each meeting sought toidentify the most important trends facing the continent and to propose effective and far-reaching strategicapproaches to meet the new challenges facing Africa in the twenty-first century. Five key points emerged fromthese discussions:

1) Multiple global challenges in a rapidly changing world confront Africa. No part of the globe suffers morefrom global warming; no population is more at risk from rising food and energy prices; and Africans areseverely affected by the inequities of the current international trading system. At the same time, Africansmust face the consequences of misgovernance, corruption, interstate and intrastate conflicts of the postCold War era, and the urgent need to repair or replace failed or failing states.

2) Which Africa—2008, 2020, or 2050? While addressing the crises of today, there is an urgent need to lookinto the future. By 2050 there will be an estimated 1.9 billion people on the continent. The pace of interna-tional change is accelerating, but the development of institutional capacities in the African Union andAfrican subregional organizations to respond to new challenges remains challenging and slow. How can thestrengthening of these capacities be accelerated? How can comparative advantages among international,continental, and subregional organizations be identified and strengthened?

3) Whose Responsibility? Negotiating the proper balance between the responsibility of the state and theresponsiblity of the international community in the face of intrastate ethnic violence remains a topic ofvigorous discussion. Yet, it is now widely accepted, in the aftermath of the tragedies of the 1990s, that theinternational community cannot simply stand aside in the face of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing,and crimes against humanity. The AU Constitutive Act of 2000 established the right of intervention by theUnion to stop genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity ocurring in one of its member states. And

i

ii

in September 2005, a summit of world leaders endorsed the concept of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP).But RtoP is not primarily about military intervention. The idea of “sovereignty as responsibility” puts thestress on building the capacity of states to prevent these crimes and violations in the first place. All statesneed to be responsible for the safety and wellbeing of their populations, but if they manifestly fail to do so,the broader international community must act. The ongoing violence in Darfur and the difficulties in thedeployment of UNAMID (African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur) reflect how difficultthe transformation of words into deeds remains. What more needs to be done to give the African Union,the regional economic communities, and African states the capacity to implement these commitments?And what can international actors do to assist them in this regard?

4) New Actors, Old Conflicts: Key European states, the European Union, and the United States have evincednew interest in strengthening African conflict management capacities. At the same time, China and India,the new actors on the continent, are making major investments in African infrastructure and economicdevelopment. While cognizant of African perceptions, arising from Europe’s colonial past in Africa, thereis an opportunity to forge new partnerships based on contemporary realities. To what extent can thesedivergent interests be harmonized? To what extent can historic suspicion and distrust be replaced bycooperative agendas based on a common interest in ending old conflicts and producing sustainableeconomic agendas?

5) Peacekeeping is Not Enough—Creating the Bridge to Peacebuilding: Deployment of UN and African Unionpeacekeepers to address ongoing conflicts is important but insufficent to meet the challenges ahead. Nor isgovernmental and international institutional engagement sufficient. The agenda for post-conflictreconstruction will be long and arduous. Incentives and encouragement—material and moral—should becreated for the involvement of African civil society, international nongovernmental organizations, and theAfrican diaspora in the future of the continent. This will require new openness on the part of the AfricanUnion, regional economic communities, and African governments, as well as on the part of outside actors.

Many if not all of the most critical challenges to human and international security today have particularrelevance to the African continent. Africa’s future will be directly affected by the ongoing international debatesover climate change and food insecurity; over how to respond to increased population pressures and thedemands of international migration; and over the global impact of the health pandemics that have taken anenormous economic as well as human toll on the continent.

These papers form a part of the IPI Africa Program’s four year initiative of research and policy facilitationintended to generate fresh thinking about the multiple challenges facing the African continent in the comingyears and decades. Each of the five papers in this series seeks to address one or more aspects of the issuesoutlined above from the perspective of challenges facing one particular region: North Africa, Southern Africa,Central Africa, Eastern Africa, and West Africa. Yet as the series illustrates, there are many commonalitiesamong the crises and challenges in each region. It is my hope that as you read this paper, and the others in theseries, you will give thoughtful consideration to how all of us can best contribute to strengthening Africancontinental and regional capacities in the interest of Africa itself and its many friends around the globe.

Terje Rød-LarsenPresident, International Peace Institute

Introduction“Eastern Africa” denotes the geographical areacomprising the seven member states of the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD):Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan,and Uganda. Tanzania is also included because ithas had long historical and political interactionswith Kenya and Uganda within the rubric of theEast African Cooperation (EAC). The mainchallenges to human security in this region haveoriginated from political and state fragility,resource scarcities, and environmental degradation.All these factors have contributed to a regionalcontext that is characterized by intrastate conflicts,interstate wars, and political extremism. Ragingcivil wars and interstate conflicts have, in turn,produced forms of statelessness and marginalitythat have deepened societal insecurities andstrained human livelihoods. Consequently, inaddition to profound political instability andeconomic destitution, human security is arrayedagainst escalating communal violence, small armsproliferation, and massive movements of peoplewithin and beyond the region.

Regional insecurities have also had wider globalresonance, attracting international actors, institu-tions, and resources. Since the turn of the newcentury, man-made conflicts and natural disasters,such as droughts and floods, have tasked theenergies of the international community.International engagement will continue becausenew security threats such as terrorism and piracyhave emerged, exploiting extant weaknesses instates and societies of the region. Resuscitatingstructures that reduce the challenges to humanlivelihoods in eastern Africa will entail the return tosturdy territorial order, national cohesion,economic viability, and the building of regionalinstitutions for security and prosperity.

Key ChallengesThe key challenges for East Africa and the Horninclude the following:

• Weak states and governments that lack authorityand legitimacy, resulting in the weak organiza-tion of security;

• Ecological, environmental, and health vulnera-bilities that have exacerbated the inability ofstates and societies to produce food and otherforms of material sustenance;

• The proliferation of lawless and marginalcommunities imperiled by the vagaries of theweather, internecine communal violence, andstate neglect;

• Susceptibility to international terrorist andcriminal networks.

TERRITORIAL SECURITY ANDGOVERNANCE: THE LEGACY OFFRAGILITY

Weak territorial boundaries that invited externaland internal challenges have long dominatedeastern Africa.1 Since the 1960s, the externalchallenge has been expressed in Somalia’s irreden-tist claims against its neighbors in Kenya, Ethiopia,and Djibouti while self-determination was capturedin secessionist struggles in southern Sudan andEritrea. The threats arising from weak states alsoled to the consolidation of authoritarian andmilitary governments that sought to defend thestate and the regime.2 Questions of territory andsecurity as symbols of weak statehood havepersisted in an admixture of new and old forms.Eastern Africa continues to evidence contentionover the definition of territory, state, and nation,producing a new spiral of regional insecurities withimplications for human livelihoods and economicviability.3

As before, the major states of the region—Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Sudan—have facedarmed threats to their regimes, challenges that alsoconstituted threats to their political and geograph-ical integrity.Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea

In Somalia, the collapse of irredentism forced abitter struggle between Mohamed Siad Barre andhis domestic opponents over the internal reaches of

Gilbert M. Khadiagala 1

1 For discussion of states and borders in East Africa see A. C. McEwen, International Boundaries of East Africa (Oxford: Clarendon, 1971); Christopher Clapham,“Boundary and Territory in the Horn of Africa,” in African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits, and Opportunities, edited by Paul Nugent and A. I. Asiwaju (London:Pinter, 1996), pp. 237-50; Pierre Englebert, Stacy Tarango, and Matthew Carter, “Dismemberment and Suffocation: A Contribution to the Debate on AfricanBoundaries,” Comparative Political Studies 35, no.10 (2002): 1093-1118; and Gunther Schlee, “Redrawing the Map of the Horn of Africa: The Politics of Difference,”Africa 73, no.3 (2003): 343-68.

2 For recent analyses of Sudan’s many wars see Ruth Iyob and Gilbert M. Khadiagala, Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006). 3 Lionel Cliffe, “Regional Dimensions of Conflict in the Horn of Africa,” Third World Quarterly 20, no.1 (1999): 89-111.

2 EASTERN AFRICA: SECURITY AND THE LEGACY OF FRAGILITY

the Somali state, itself a hastily-constructed countrycarved out of British and Italian Somaliland in the1960s. Rebel movements, led primarily by northernSomali clans, launched a decisive war against theSomali state, succeeding in deposing Barre in 1991,an event that jumpstarted Somalia’s disintegration.From the ashes of the disintegrating state, newforms of statehood—Somaliland and Puntland—steadily began to rise, setting themselves against ananarchic Mogadishu and southern Somalia.4

Somalia’s disintegration coincided with the end ofthe secessionist conflict in Eritrea after the defeat ofthe military regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam in1991. The emergence of Eritrea heralded anoptimistic phase in the resolution of the long-standing struggle for self-determination. Inaddition, negotiations for a peaceful end to therelationship were conducted against the backdropof the formation of new political institutions inEthiopia and Eritrea that sought to inject anelement of participatory politics. In Ethiopia, a newconstitution enshrined the principle of federalismand gave regions a measure of local autonomy, aswell as an exit option if the federation did not meettheir interests.5 For its part, the new Eritrean statetried to strengthen the nation through political andeconomic reconstruction programs.

The territorial settlement of Eritrea promised tolay the basis for new bilateral relationships betweenAddis Ababa and Asmara, but soon new fissuresclouded the relationship. Instead of erecting institu-tions that would stabilize the relationship, the twocountries continued to depend on the personal tiesbetween the two leaders—Eritrean Isais Afwerkiand Ethiopia’s Meles Zenawi. When personalityconflicts occurred between them, the two nationswent to war starting in June 1998 over a disputedborder at Badme. The battle over Badme illustratesthe persistence of territorial disputes in easternAfrica, but it also marks the continuation of a trendin which national leaders mobilize border claimsfor narrow nationalistic ends.6 Despite international

efforts to demarcate the border and lessen tensions,the continued stalemate in the conflict hasremained a paradigm of weak and authoritarianregimes fighting wars to strengthen their hold onpower.

Eritrean descent into authoritarianism alsodemonstrates the intimate links between territory,regime insecurity, and national consolidation.7 Inthe course of the war with Ethiopia, the govern-ment has decimated participatory institutions.Squandering the national resurgence generated bythe war for self-determination, Afwerki has usedthe border war to centralize control in a stylereminiscent of Stalin’s Russia. The regime hasinvoked rabid nationalism to alienate bothdomestic and international supporters, diminishingthe socioeconomic gains made after the war. Morerecently, Eritrea has resurrected a long-runningborder dispute with Djibouti, forcing the latter toseek the arbitration of the Arab League and theAfrican Union (AU). As it has fought wars with itsneighbors, the domestic situation has deterioratedin Eritrea. All indices point to the escalation ofhuman misery as food production has plummeted,exports have declined, and manufacturing hasground to a halt. Increasingly isolated at home andabroad, the Eritrean regime has fomented insurgen-cies by supporting Somali and Ethiopian armedgroups. The United States has threatened todesignate Eritrea as a sponsor of terrorism becauseof its links to the Somali leaders of the Union ofIslamic Courts (UIC) that Ethiopia deposed inDecember 2006.8

Ethiopia, on the other hand, has used the victoryfrom the war with Eritrea to maintain an uneasystatus quo on the border while also postponingadvances in participatory governance as oppositionleaders have demanded. The deadlock over borderdemarcation has persisted, despite efforts by theEthiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission and the2000 Algiers Agreement, which brought the two-year Ethiopian-Eritrea war to an end. The proxy

4 John Drysdale, Whatever Happened to Somalia? (London: Haan, 1994); and Anthony Vinci, “An Analysis and Comparison of Armed Groups in Somalia,” AfricanSecurity Review 15, no.1 (2006): 76-90.

5 John Harbeson, “Ethiopia’s Extended Transition,” Journal of Democracy 16, no.44 (2005): 144-58; Christopher Clapham, “Ethiopian Development: The Politics ofFormulation,” Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 44, no.1 (2006): 137-50.

6 Gilbert M. Khadiagala, “Reflection on the Ethiopia-Eritrea Border Conflict,” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 23, no.2 (1999): 39-56; Hussein M. Adam, “Eritrea,Somalia, Somaliland, and the Horn of Africa,” in Eritrea and Ethiopia: From Conflict to Cooperation, edited by Amare Tekle (Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea, 1994), pp.139-68.

7 Tanja R. Muller, “State Making in the Horn of Africa: Notes on Eritrea and Prospects for the End of Violent Conflict in the Horn,” Conflict, Security, andDevelopment 6, no.4 (2006): 207-19.

8 Elizabeth Blunt, “US Gives Stark Warning to Eritrea,” BBC News, September 8, 2007, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/6985656.stm.

Gilbert M. Khadiagala 3

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war in Somalia between Ethiopia and Eritrea hasfurther exacerbated the tensions between the two.On the domestic front, although Ethiopia maderemarkable progress in the governance arena, Melesand his ruling Ethiopian People’s RevolutionaryDemocratic Front (EPRDF) have confrontedgrowing demands for genuine democratization.Responding to these pressures, Ethiopia, asdemonstrated in the last two elections, has movedprogressively toward a return to a single-party statewith federalist trappings. With growing insecurityat the center, the regime has also curtailed some ofthe powers accorded to the provincial federations,potentially reversing the federal gains. The armedviolence unleashed against the opposition duringthe May 2005 elections elicited global condemna-tions and veiled threats of aid stoppage, but theregime has weathered these pressures.9

Like Eritrea, Ethiopia has embarked on an activistregional foreign policy, invading Somalia in ablistering attack in December 2006 to overthrowthe Islamists who had taken control of Mogadishu.Reinforcing its historic role as a regional hegemon,Ethiopia has described Somalia’s lawlessness andIslamism as a dire threat to the entire region.Exercising Ethiopia’s sub-imperial role in easternAfrica, Meles has used the invasion to bolster hisdomestic standing and win international supportfrom the United States in its war against terrorism.But Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia has also helpedto resurrect the old Ogaden grievances againstAddis Ababa, now organized as the OgadenNational Liberation Front (ONLF). For years, theONLF battled successive Ethiopian governmentswith the goal of splitting the ethnic Somali regionfrom the country. One of the justifications for theEthiopian invasion was that it was needed toprevent militant Islamists from stoking the fire ofOgaden irredentism as they did in the 1970s. Theescalating humanitarian crisis in the Ogaden regioncaused by violent skirmishes between the Ethiopianmilitary and the ONLF has, however, reopened theold wounds of secessionism.10 The ONLF hasrecently acquired the capacity to mount spectacularattacks within Ethiopia since the fall of the

Mengistu dictatorship, raising fears of its links toexternal forces. But although Ethiopia has tried tolabel the ONLF as a terrorist organization, failure tomeet the grievances in the Ogaden may recreate theinstabilities that have dogged the region in the past.

While Ethiopia and Eritrea support differentfactions in Mogadishu, new questions haveemerged about the future of the quasi-states thatemerged in Somalia after the collapse of the SiadBarre government. Although Somaliland has maderemarkable efforts toward statehood, primarily byholding elections and providing public goods, thesilence by the international community over itsrecognition continues to cast a pall over its future.Having fulfilled all the basic requirements ofempirical statehood, Somaliland now seeksjuridical statehood as the internationally recog-nized postcolonial state remains the only avenue forlegitimation.11 Similarly, Puntland has struggled toproject the image of a functional state, even thoughit is less-endowed than Somaliland in terms ofhuman capacity and economic resources. Inaddition to the uncertain relationships withMogadishu and southern Somalia, there are newborder conflicts between Somaliland and Puntlandthat have occasionally resulted in violence,underscoring the endurance of border disputes inthe region. Even if the two Somali entities were togain international recognition, a more stableMogadishu may have its own territorial disputeswith them as rival clans stake their claims onpasture, land, and water. Sudan

Of all the regional conflicts of the 1990s, theSudanese civil war had the most enormous effect onthe deterioration of human livelihoods. Ragingsince the 1980s, the north-south conflict capturedthe intersection of territorial, political, economic,and confessional sources of contestation that hadcharacterized the multinational Sudanese state.Regime security for the Islamists who assumedpower in Khartoum in 1989 became interlinkedwith the war in the south, even as the South SudanLiberation Movement (SPLM) fought for

4 EASTERN AFRICA: SECURITY AND THE LEGACY OF FRAGILITY

9 Harbeson, “Ethiopia’s Extended Transition.”10 United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), “Ethiopia: UN Warns of Humanitarian Crisis in Somali Region,” October 6, 2007, available at

www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=74666.11 For excellent discussions of Somaliland and its future see Matt Bryden, “Somalia and Somaliland: Envisioning a Dialogue on the Question of Somali Unity,” African

Security Review 13, no.2 (2004): 23-33; and Martin Dornboos, “Somalia: Alternative Scenarios for Reconstruction,” African Affairs 101, no. 402 (2002): 93-107.

secularism and self-determination. When oilexploration began in the late 1980s, the struggle forsouthern Sudan became even more virulent,lending a new resource fault line to the conflict.After much human suffering, the north and southresolved their conflicts in January 2005 through theComprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) mediatedover many years by IGAD and internationalmediators.12

The CPA heralded the start of amity in the Sudan,pending the referendum in 2011 that will afford thesouth the opportunity to choose between separa-tion and continuation within the territorialboundaries of Sudan. For most of the south,however, the CPA is merely a transitional stage inthe historical yearning for territorial space in whichthey could organize political life free ofencumbrance from the north. But Sudan’s transi-tion faces three obstacles:

• First, the CPA decided on a framework to resolvethe civil war without profoundly altering thepower balance so that the Islamist establishment,now labeled the National Congress Party (NCP),continues to hold sway over the north. Moreaccurately, peace without pluralism for the northportends the continuation of dictatorship thatmay along the way threaten peace with thesouth.

• Second, northern determination to hold ontoterritories in some parts of the oil-rich south, inparticular Abyei, have dampened the optimismthat attended the signing of the CPA. As thenorth reneges on implementing key provisions ofthe CPA, widespread fears have emerged that thenorth-south conflict is merely in abeyance, aworrying trend for a region that seemed to berecovering from years of civil conflagration.13

• Third, within Sudan, southern demands for self-determination galvanized other marginalizedgroups demanding freedom from the stultifyingarm of Khartoum. Thus the CPA forced thehands of the Darfurians to the West and the Bejato the East for their own agreements that wouldreflect a burgeoning order of a Sudan that is

internally more comfortable with itself.14

Yet, as the deepening humanitarian crisis inDarfur illustrates, the disintegration of the oldterritorial and political order in Sudan is coming ata heavy cost to civilians, now caught up in the battlebetween militias backed by the central governmentand the proliferating rebel movements in Darfur. Inits virulence and intensity, Darfur symbolizes thecontinuity of state fragility overlain by resource andregional differentiations. Although some factions ofDarfur’s rebellion and the Eastern LiberationMovement have found room in the transitionalinstitutions erected after the signing of the CPA, thecontinuation of the Darfur conflict echoes theinitial stirrings of southern grievances against thepost-independence government in Khartoum.

Sudan’s conflicts of self-determination andautonomy mirror the pattern in Ethiopia andSomalia where the grievances along clan, ethnic,and sectarian interests continue to dominate thesecurity landscape. Rather than diminishingOromo nationalism articulated by the OromoLiberation Front (OLF), the weak federalism inEthiopia has deepened it, forcing the centralizationof power in Addis Ababa to meet this challenge.Similarly, the Ogaden ethnic claims led by theONLF have benefited from the avenues ofdecentralization that Addis Ababa accorded to theregion, but they have also been fueled by lawless-ness in Somalia. Throughout the region, thefixation with territorial control exacerbates humaninsecurity in the short- to medium-term, while alsofortifying the draconian arms of these states, andreducing their abilities to negotiate the construc-tion of participatory institutions that wouldstabilize rule and reduce political vulnerabilities ofmarginal areas and territories. Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania

Weak state forms in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzaniahave been expressed in the absence of political andeconomic institutions that address the postcolonialdemands of ethnic diversity, economic marginaliza-

Gilbert M. Khadiagala 5

12 For details of the Sudanese conflict see Iyob and Khadiagala, Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace; L.B. Deng, “The Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement: Will itbe Sustained?” Civil Wars 7, no.3 (2005): 244-57; L.B. Deng, “The Challenge of Cultural, Ethnic, and Religious Diversity in Peace-Building and Constitution-Making in Post-Conflict Sudan,” Civil Wars 7, no.3 (2005): 244-57.

13 Douglas H. Johnson, “Why Abyei Matters: The Breaking Point of Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement?” African Affairs 107, no.426 (2008): 1-19; BBC News,“US ‘Fears for Sudan Peace Treaty’,” October 6, 2007, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7031899.stm.

14 For analyses of eastern Sudan and Darfur, see Khalid Ali el Amin, “Eastern Sudan: Indigenous Conflict Prevention,” Africa Security Review 13, no.2 (2004): 7-22;John Stompor, “The Darfur Dilemma: U.S. Policy toward the ICC,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 7, no.1 (2006): 111-119; and Shadrack W. Nasongoand Godwin R. Murunga, “Lack of Consensus on Constitutive Fundamentals: Root of the Sudanese Civil War and Prospects for Peace,” African and Asian Studies4, no.1-2 (2005): 51-82; and Seth Apiah-Mensah, “The African Mission in Sudan: Darfur Dilemmas,” African Security Review 15, no.1 (2006): 2-19.

tion, and social alienation.15 Ethnic tensions born ofincreasing regional inequalities and politicalintolerance continue to pose a danger to thepolitical stability in the three countries despite theremarkable political transformations since the1990s. Furthermore, the trend toward pluralismand democratization has brought about new socialmovements and actors that may not have a stake inthe sustainability of democratic order. In Tanzaniafor instance, the tentative move toward increasedparticipation has not affected the dominance of theruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party. Inaddition, economic reforms that have occurredsince the 1990s have deepened regional and socialinequalities and increased corruption in themanagement of public resources. Moreimportantly, the democratization processunleashed the religious and cultural divide betweenthe Tanzanian mainland and Zanzibar, producing apolitical conflict over power that both entities aregrappling to address through negotiations for newpower-sharing arrangements.

Uganda’s nationbuilding woes have centered onthe north-south divide, which has economic andethnic connotations. This has been a feature of thepolitical landscape since the 1960s, but it took onnew dimensions with the emergence of the govern-ment of Yoweri Museveni in 1986. By overthrowingnorthern-dominated regimes, Museveni changedthe course of Ugandan politics, putting power inthe hands of the numerous and economically-significant southern ethnic groups. Northernresentment, in turn, converged around therebellion that has since the mid-1990s been led bythe Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) that has been aperennial irritant to Uganda’s stability.16 Althoughthere have been recent regional and internationalefforts to negotiate the conflict, there are obstaclesthat remain in reaching durable peace, reconcilia-tion, and economic reconstruction.

Kenya’s recent descent into ethnic violencefollowing the December 2007 elections illustratesthe links between governance and human security.Although long considered a bastion of stability,

Kenya’s political landscape concealed profounddivisions along ethnic, regional, and social lines.There was also the growth of militarism andvigilantism as a result of the deliberate politiciza-tion of ethnic identities during the many years ofauthoritarianism and one-party state rule. In themultiparty era, democracy raised the ethnic stakesand, combined with elite procrastination on consti-tutional changes, Kenya erupted into violence thatled to the death of 1,500 and the displacement of300,000 persons, a major convulsion that hasshaken the nation and the region at large. Althoughexternal mediators hastily crafted a political settle-ment to pull the country out of collapse, Kenya’sfuture has entered the road to political uncertaintyas never before. Together with increasing socioeco-nomic inequalities, the ethnic wounds that surfacedduring the recent elections are going to make it verydifficult for the leaders to govern with any degree ofconfidence and certainty.ECOLOGY, ECONOMY, AND HEALTH INEASTERN AFRICA

Human security occurs in national and localcontexts that build the capacity to tame nature forthe welfare of communities and individuals. Where,as in eastern Africa, national institutions haveremained fixated on territorial and regime security,the majority of the citizens have been, for the mostpart, left to fend for themselves in clan and ethnicenclaves that are frequently not secure. Thedominant picture of marginality in the region isrepresented by the notion of borderlands, vastuncaptured spaces that thrive on the margins ofexisting states.17 Borderlands unite the region in asystem of localized insecurities from the Ogaden onthe Ethiopia-Somalia border, northeastern Kenyaon the Ethiopia and Somalia borders, andnorthwestern Kenya, bordering Ethiopia, Sudan,and Uganda. Borderlands are also marginal inecological and economic terms, as home to thefragile pastoralist economies that are perenniallysubject to drought, desertification, floods, and foodinsecurity. Over the years, borderlands have beenhome to some of the largest refugee camps in

6 EASTERN AFRICA: SECURITY AND THE LEGACY OF FRAGILITY

15 For recent analyses of the three countries see J. Cottrel and Y. Ghai, “Constitution-Making and Democratization in Kenya, 2000-2005,” Democratization 14, no.1(2007): 1-25; M. Robinson, “The Political Economy of Governance Reforms in Uganda,” Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 45, no. 4 (2007): 567-78.

16 Jeffrey Haynes, “Religion, Ethnicity, and Civil War in Africa: The Cases of Uganda and Sudan,” The Round Table 96, no.390 (2007): 305-17; and Anna Borzello,“The Challenge of DDR in Northern Uganda: The Lord’s Resistance Army,” Conflict, Security, and Development 7, no. 3 (2007): 387-415.

17 For elaboration of this concept see Mark Duffield, “Governing Borderlands: Decoding the Power of Aid,” Disasters 25, no.4 (2001): 308-20; and A. I. Asiwaju,“Borderlands in Africa: A Comparative Research Perspective with Particular Reference to Western Europe,” in African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits, andOpportunities, edited by Paul Nugent and A. I. Asiwaju (London: Pinter, 1996), pp. 266-72.

eastern Africa—Daadab and Kakuma in northernKenya.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the droughtsand famine that engulfed the region wroughtresource conflicts that contributed to the vulnera-bility of communities. Over time, conflicts pittingpastoralists and farming communities haveescalated to contiguous areas. For instance,environmental conflicts in northeastern Kenya thathad typically involved the Somali communitybegan to affect neighboring communities such asthe Orma pastoralists and Pokomo farmingcommunities in the Tana River district. Violentconfrontations between them started in 2002 andintruded on what had previously been an environ-ment of communal amity and collaboration. In thecenter of the Rift Valley, land and resource disputesamong the Kalenjin, Kikuyu, Kisii, and Masai havebecome more common. Although these conflictsare frequently stoked by politicians during times ofelections, they reflect real resource contestationsthat are not going to disappear any time soon.Competition over scarce resources was one of thekey issues behind the post-electoral violence thataffected this region in late 2007 and early 2008 andit continues to impede the return of internallydisplaced persons (IDPs) to their homes. Further tothe northwest, deadly feuds over land and waterresources afflict the Kerio Valley inhabited by thePokot, Samburu, and Marakwet pastoralists andalong the Uganda border, specifically in theTurkana, Pokot, Karamajong, Toposa ecologicalzone.18

In the rest of eastern Africa, drought and faminehave coincided with the persistence of war toincrease the vulnerability of marginalizedcommunities. Although the much-publicizedEthiopian famines of the 1980s have receded,droughts and famines in the region are cyclical andincreasing in frequency. Thus recurrent droughtsand war in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, andSomalia have been acknowledged as the sources ofa deteriorating humanitarian situation in eastern

Africa. A UN report released in 2006 warned of theworsening humanitarian conditions in Eritrea dueto recurrent drought and the protracted stalematein the peace process with Ethiopia.19 The reportpoignantly noted that “drought had caused failedharvests, loss of livestock and food insecuritythroughout all parts of the country—both rural andurban. Rains had failed for the fifth consecutiveyear.” In addition, surveys reveal that pastures inEritrea’s three most fertile regions—Anseba, GashBarka, and Debub—are at their driest since 1998.20

In May 2008, the United Nations Children’s Fund(UNICEF) estimated that well over 100,000children are in need of urgent therapeutic care forsevere malnutrition, while a further 6 millionchildren are in danger of malnutrition in Ethiopia.The agency also estimated that 3.4 millionEthiopians will need food aid over the next threemonths. At the same time, the World FoodProgram (WFP) projected that $147 million will beneeded to feed children at risk in Ethiopia.21

Closely linked to droughts and famines arepopulation increases in the region that are puttingadditional pressure on scarce resources. Even asborderlands dry up, the rate of population increasesin eastern Africa have grown to explosive propor-tions. Moreover, given their remoteness andmarginality, the regional borderlands have some ofthe highest fertility rates in the world. In most ofthe Somali regions of eastern Africa, it is estimatedthat women are likely to have six or seven childreneach, against three in urban areas. A recent study bythe Ethiopian government found that only 3percent of Somali women in Ethiopia had access tocontraception, compared with 45 percent of womenin Addis Ababa. For the entire region, over half thepopulation is aged fifteen years or younger, thuscontributing to a youth bulge.22

Population growth against the backdrop of afragile ecosystem engenders more environmentaldegradation. According to Conservation Inter-national, eastern Africa is one of the most degradedecosystems in the world, with only 5 percent of its

Gilbert M. Khadiagala 7

18 For good analyses of environmental challenges in Kenya see Colin H. Kahl, “Population Growth, Environmental Degradation, and State-sponsored Violence: TheCase of Kenya 1991-93,” International Security 23, no.2 (1998): 80-119; and Wacieni Kaniaru, “Token Gestures: Lack of True Political Reform in Kenya,” HarvardInternational Review 17, no.2 (1995): 40-41.

19 Cited in The Economist, “The Horn of Africa: The Path to Ruin,” August 10, 2006, pp. 4-6.20 The Economist, “The Horn of Africa.”21 All Africa, “Ethiopia: Over 100,000 Children Suffer from Malnutrition,” BuaNews (Tshwane), June 3, 2008, available at

http://allafrica.com/stories/200806030673.html.22 The Economist, “The Horn of Africa,” p.5.

original habitat remaining—the main culprits beingovergrazing and tree cutting for fuel and charcoal inthe borderlands.23 With more political instability,this environment invariably produces endemicfood insecurity. At a multilateral forum in Nairobiin June 2007 to launch a campaign to combat foodshortages, there was recognition that least 20million people need emergency aid. Kjell MagneBondevik, the UN Special Humanitarian envoy forthe Horn of Africa, noted the enormity of theproblem:

Over 70 million people in the Horn of Africa,around 45 per cent of the population still live inabject poverty, and face food shortages and vulner-ability to recurrent shocks. In the past six yearsalone, four major emergencies hit the countries ofthe Horn that required urgent emergencyassistance to millions of highly food insecure andvulnerable people each year. With this recenthistory—and considering the additional threatsposed by global warming and climate change—thenext major crisis could possibly involve more than20 million people urgently needing assistance.Fragile ecosystems and socioeconomic environ-ments can exacerbate competition for scarceresources and further increase the vulnerability ofmarginal populations.24

To reverse this condition, regional governmentsand UN agencies agreed on a road map for partner-ships for food security that entails seven sets ofpriorities: alliances to support millions of pastoral-ists and agro-pastoralists; measures to deal with theenvironmental challenges; programs to combatland degradation and desertification; efforts toboost the role of women as a primary force for ruraltransformation; steps to promote livelihoodsdiversification and income-generating activities forthe food insecure; finding better risk managementand crisis response strategies; and institutionalstrengthening and community-focused capacitybuilding. This initiative has been embraced as partof an armory of interventions that would tilt thebalance from humanitarian aid to development aid,an imbalance that has persisted since the late1970s.25

In addition to ecological and environmentalvulnerabilities, eastern Africa, like most of Africa,faces the specter of HIV/AIDS, particularly amongthe young and productive generations. In themainly Muslim-belt of eastern Africa, theHIV/AIDS crisis has been somewhat muted byIslamic norms and social strictures, but the rest ofthe region is characterized by high prevalence ofvictims of HIV/AIDS. Moreover, eastern Africawitnessed some of the first severe cases of regionalinfections in geographically-delineated HIV/AIDS“borderlands,” particularly in the Rakai region inUganda, the Bukoba region in Tanzania, and theNyanza region of Kenya. These incubation zonesgradually became the epicenters for the spread ofthe disease across eastern Africa, and with advancesin transport and other forms of mobility, theinfection rates have continued to climb, even inUganda, which was once touted as having maderemarkable progress in reversing the scourge. Highdeath rates from AIDS partly explain the decline ofagricultural production, the dwindling numbers ofrural schoolteachers, and the burgeoning orphanpopulation in eastern Africa. As part of the effortsto respond to the HIV/AIDS crisis, IGAD signed anaccord with the World Bank in February 2007 for a$492,000 grant as an initial advance of funds tosupport a Horn of Africa HIV/AIDS RegionalPartnership Program involving countries in theregion and international partners. This programconsolidates and integrates regional initiativesundertaken by national AIDS authorities targetingrefugees, cross-border and mobile populations, andsurrounding communities. In addition to regionalcapacity development, the program underscoresthe importance of the regional HIV/AIDS approachas a complement to national efforts.26

Breaking the cycle of hunger, food insecurity, anddisease without reversing political marginalization,however, is bound to repeat past flaws. Whetherdealing with the intramural resource conflicts ormanaging insurgencies, state policies toward theborderlands have been heavily militarized. Inrecent years, anti-small arms campaigns in eastern

8 EASTERN AFRICA: SECURITY AND THE LEGACY OF FRAGILITY

23 IRIN, “Ethiopia: Rapid Population Growth Undermining Development,” June 21, 2005, available at www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=54995; and, IRIN,“Ethiopia: High Population Growth Could Slow Development,” July 11, 2006, available at www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=59616.

24 Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), Horn of Africa: Consultations on Food Security: Executive Summary of Country Reports for Discussion at a Multi-Country Consultation, Nairobi, June 25-26, 2007 (Rome: FAO, 2007).

25 The Economist, “The Horn of Africa.”26 World Bank, “Horn of Africa Regional Partnership Program,” Washington DC, February 17, 2007.

Africa have disproportionately targeted thepastoralist communities. Despite evidence thatlinks small arms proliferation to environmentalfrailty, resource competition, and the absence ofalternative livelihoods, state disarmamentcampaigns routinely occur without any discernibleeffect on arms flows or the drivers of these conflicts.For instance, the Karamajong pastoralists thatinhabit the borderlands of northwestern Kenya,southwestern Ethiopia, southern Sudan, andnortheastern Uganda have perennially engaged inconflicts over cattle, water, pasture, and territoriallands. Over the years, these conflicts have attractedsmall arms flowing from the civil wars in Uganda,Somalia, and Ethiopia, affording new tools in thepastoralist contests.27 Consequently, as govern-ments have lost control of this region, they haveresorted to draconian weapons collection initiativesthat only deepen local resentment and alienation.Insecurity in pastoral communities not only poses acontinuing challenge for cross-border peace andholistic regional development in eastern Africa, butreflects wider questions of political economy andecology that states have hardly began to confront.Some of these questions pertain to the future ofpastoralism in light of mounting threats to itsexistence such as violent resource conflicts, privati-zation of water, grazing lands, and the growingrestrictions on the freedom of pastoralists in searchof water and pasture resources during difficulttimes.28

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: REGIONUNDER SIEGE

The widespread depiction of eastern Africa as aregion under severe siege captures the enormoussecurity challenges it poses for the internationalcommunity. Historically, the human crises spawnedin the region have exacted a heavy burden oninternational resources, a burden that continues inDarfur, southern Sudan, and Somalia. Home tosome of the largest refugee camps in Africa, theregion has witnessed large movements of popula-tions since the 1960s, a trend that continues

unabated. As a result of massive populationmovements, eastern Africa confronts statelesspeoples that national legislation or regionalconventions have yet to address. In addition, theEthiopia-Eritrea war, the meltdown in Somalia, andthe Sudanese conflicts have created significantnumbers of IDPs who are the wards of internationalrelief agencies and other humanitarian organiza-tions.

The religious fault lines that have propelled theregion into the global war on terrorism stem fromthe rise of Islamists in Sudan, the National IslamicFront (NIF), in 1989.29 Even before the bombing ofthe American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania inAugust 1998, radical Islamism was already causingstrains among the secular regimes in the region,building both on economic decline in theseeconomies and the perceived marginalization ofIslamic groups in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania.The previous years of economic growth in theregion had established national consensus alongreligious and ethnic lines: secularism in East Africawas anchored on state-led economic developmentwith a strong emphasis on public sector investmentin a wide range of social services. With economicdecline, large segments of the population wereconsigned into marginality, enabling state-sponsored charitable organizations and nongovern-mental organizations (NGOs) to fill the vacuum leftby the absent state. In Uganda, for instance, theTablighs, Muslim proselytizers funded by Pakistanicharities, became the vehicles for Islamicfundamentalist revivalism, making inroads intoKampala mosques when the government welcomedIslamic charities.30 Similarly, in the mid-1990s,Somalia witnessed the influx of NGOs specializingin madrassa teachings that drew their expertslargely from the Middle East, subsequently makingthe country a fertile ground for Islamic fundamen-talism.31

Economic deterioration coincided with theincreasing perception of political marginalizationof Muslim communities in eastern Africa in

Gilbert M. Khadiagala 9

27 Africa Peace Forum (APF), Controlling Small Arms in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region: Supporting Implementation of the Nairobi Declaration (Nairobi:APF, December 2005).

28 Kennedy Agade Mkutu, “Small Arms and Light Weapons among Pastoral Groups in the Kenya-Uganda Border Area,” African Affairs 106, no.422 (2007): 47-70;Paul T. W. Baxter, “A View From a Distance,” in African Pastoralism: Conflict, Institutions, and Government, edited by M.A. Mohamed Salih, Ton Dietz, and AbdelGhaffar Mohamed Ahmed (London: Pluto, 2003).

29 Assefa Jalata, “State Terrorism and Globalization: The Case of Ethiopia and Sudan,” International Journal of Comparative Sociology 46, nos.1-2 (2005): 79-102.30 Michael Twaddle, “The Bible, the Quran, and Political Competition in Uganda,” in Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa, edited by Alex De Waal

(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004), pp. 139-154.31 Kenneth Menkhaus, “Somalia: Next Up in the War on Terrorism?” Africa Notes Series no. 6, Washington, DC: CSIS, January 2002.

countries with Christian majorities. Like theTablighs in Uganda, the Islamic Party of Kenya(IPK) emerged in the early 1990s as the outwardexpression of the growing Muslim minority discon-tent at the dominance of Christians, harping on thealienation of coastal Muslims.32 The same trend wasvisible in the restiveness of Zanzibar politics, as theArab establishment on Pemba Island began tocontest the union with the Tanzanian mainland.Tinged with radical Islam, the anti-Unionist streakorganized in the Civic United Front (CUF) hasremained at the forefront of Zanzibar politics sincethe inauguration of the multiparty era.33 Morerecently, powerful groups on Pemba Island haveagitated for secession from Zanzibar and themainland because of the perception that politicalpluralism will not resolve their grievances. On theTanzanian mainland, Islamist revivalism waswitnessed in the growth of Islamic groups and thewell-publicized incidents of bombing of Christianinstitutions, attributable to Islamic extremists.34

In Somalia, the implosion of the Barre govern-ment had significant consequences for internalpolitics and the region, furnishing the context forlawlessness in which terrorist groups such as alIttihad and al-Shabab (the military wing of thedefeated Somalia Union of Islamic Courts), foundsolace.35 Similarly, with the consolidation of the NIForder in the Sudan, international extremism foundits most consistent regional base. Thus, the decisionby NIF to invite Osama bin Laden to Sudan in1991-1996 marked the high point for the injectionof terrorism into regional politics.

Al-Qaida’s destruction of the Americanembassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998was a momentous event for the region. This wasfollowed by the bombing of a hotel and theattempted downing of an Israeli airliner at theKenyan coast in September 2002. The two eventsraised the profile of eastern Africa as a major havenfor terrorists and underscored the unpreparednessof Tanzania and Kenya to anticipate the new

security threats. In both countries, while theexpansion of the tourist industry has attractedmany Westerners, there have been no fully-committed efforts to bolster security and protectiveinstitutions. Negligent border controls, underpaidsecurity forces, and rickety immigration policieshave rendered them vulnerable to outside terroristgroups. As a result, eastern Africa in general hasbecome an underbelly of terrorism.36

Alongside the threats associated with terrorism,the eastern African coastline confronts the newdanger of maritime piracy emanating principallyfrom lawless Somalia. Over the past five years, therehave been many publicized cases of piracy againstinternational vessels, some of them engaged inhumanitarian operations, with twenty-six shipsbeing attacked by pirates since 2007. Pirates findrefuge in Somalia, but the ultimate problem is thatnone of the states in the region have the resourcesto deal with issues of maritime security in theforeseeable future. It is partly for this reason thatthe United Nations Security Council passed aresolution in June 2008 allowing foreign countriesthat have agreements with Somalia’s interimgovernment to send warships into Somalia’s territo-rial waters to tackle pirates. The resolution permitsthese countries to use any means to repress acts ofpiracy for the next six months, until December2008.37

Mechanisms for Copingwith Existing ChallengesREGIONAL MECHANISMS

The cycle of despair and disaster in the region isreflected in fraying states, weak societies, andfragile socioeconomic environments that have beenbuffeted by manmade wars. International andnational initiatives to address the challenges of statefragility, food insecurity, and terrorism cannotsucceed in the long-term without sturdy regionalinstitutions that build collective problem-solving

10 EASTERN AFRICA: SECURITY AND THE LEGACY OF FRAGILITY

32 Arye Oded, Islam and Politics in Kenya (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000), pp. 135-48.33 For good accounts of Zanzibar politics see Greg Cameron, “Zanzibar’s Turbulent Transition,” Review of African Political Economy 29, no. 92 (2002): 313-30; and

Bruce Heilman and Paul J. Kaiser, “Religion, Identity, and Politics in Tanzania,” Third World Quarterly 23, no.4 (2002): 691-709.34 Ibid., pp. 695-97.35 Vinci, "An Analysis and Comparison of Armed Groups in Somalia," pp. 80-82.36 Gilbert M. Khadiagala, “Kenya: Haven or Helpless Victim of Terrorism?” in Terrorism in the Horn of Africa (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace,

Special Report no. 113, January 2004), pp. 2-4. For broader discussions on Islamism and the war on terror in East Africa see Jeffrey Haynes, “Islamic Militancy inEast Africa,” Third World Quarterly 26, no.8 (2005): 1321-39; and P. Marchesin, “The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism in East Africa,” African Geopolitics 6 (2003):229-240.

37 BBC News, “Navies to Tackle Somali Pirates,” June 3, 2008, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7432612.stm.

capacities, form common norms and standards onsecurity and governance, and promote economicintegration. Despite the externally-driven efforts topromote regional institutions and patterns aroundenvironmental and security issues, eastern Africahas had a history of weak regional institutions. AsMwaura and Schmeidl argue:

Given the socioeconomic disparities, societalheterogeneities, and geographical boundaries, ithas always been difficult to create a stable regionalsecurity identity in the IGAD region. Culturallyand historically speaking, various fault lines, whichhave successfully been politicized in the course ofthe last century, crisscross the arena. One is the linebetween Arabic and Black Africa linked with linesbetween Muslim and Christian culture; the linesbetween highland and lowland cultures are oftenlinked with ethno-political boundaries; the linebetween peasant cultures and nomadic pastoralismoften relates to the other lines mentioned too.There are political factors such as the absence of aleading power (like South Africa in SADC andNigeria in ECOWAS), heavily differing forms ofnational governments and types of national consti-tutions, diverging domestic policies, and self-centered ideologies.38

In 1986, donor-driven initiatives on drought anddesertification led to the formation of theIntergovernmental Authority on Drought andDesertification (IGADD), the precursor to thecurrent IGAD. Functional cooperation on environ-ment issues, however, could not proceed wherewars and civil strife prevailed. With the increasingthreats to human security, notably drought, floods,and famine, most of IGADD’s responsibilities weretaken over by international humanitarian organiza-tions, further diminishing the capacity of regionalactors to innovate around regional programs.

In the mid-1990s, IGAD under Kenya’s leader-ship mediated the Sudanese civil war, drawinginternational partners into a process that draggedon for almost eleven years before the signing of theCPA. IGAD also led the mediation initiatives that

produced the Transitional Federal Government(TFG) in Somalia in 2004. Even before the fall ofthe Islamists in Mogadishu in December 2006,IGAD had been at the forefront of efforts to send amission to stabilize the situation. In March 2005,IGAD proposed a Peace Support Mission toSomalia (IGASOM) involving 10,000 troops at acost of $500 million in the first year, but the AUapproved a smaller force of 8,000 in September2006, at an estimated cost of $335 million for thefirst year.39 With the momentum generated byEthiopia’s invasion of Somalia, the AU authorizedthe African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)in January 2007 with the initial deployment of 1,500troops from Uganda. There have been no otherdonors to IGASOM, particularly because of theworsening security situation in Mogadishu.

Despite the presence of both IGASOM and theEthiopian military, the TFG has faced considerableodds in restoring peace to Somalia. More critically,the resurgence of the Islamists under Eritreanguidance has added another layer of complexity tothe regionalized civil war. Renamed the Alliance forthe Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS), the Islamistsand their military wing, Al-Shabab, have regainedstrength in Mogadishu to frustrate politicalreconstruction. As a consequence of growingIslamist strength, the weak TFG, prodded by theUnited Nations, started negotiations in Djibouti inMay 2008 to reach a political compromise.40 Thenegotiations have, however, stalled because of theinsistence of the ARS on the withdrawal ofEthiopian troops and failure to recognize the legiti-macy of the TFG. The TFG has, for its part, pleadedwith the UN Security Council to deploy a 28,000-strong international peacekeeping force to replaceEthiopian troops and IGASOM, a request that afatigued international community may not beprepared to countenance.

IGAD’s roles in Sudan and Somalia havefurnished it with the stature of an incipient securitycommunity with the potential to unite the region

Gilbert M. Khadiagala 11

38 Ciru Mwaura, Gunther Baechler, and Bethuell Kiplagat, “Background to Conflicts in the IGAD Region,” in Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn ofAfrica, edited by Ciru Mwaura and Susanne Schmeidl (Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea, 2003), p. 34. In a similar vein, Mulugeta contends that “What makes the Hornof Africa markedly different from the other regions of Africa, such as southern Africa and West Africa with their relatively successful regional frameworks is thelevel of conflict and rivalries between and within the states.” Allehone Mulugeta, “Promises and Challenges of a Sub-Regional Force for the Horn of Africa,”International Peacekeeping 15, no.2 (2008), p. 175.

39 IRIN, “Somalia: IGAD to Deploy Peacekeepers Despite Opposition by Faction Leaders,” March 15, 2007, available atwww.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/EVIU-6AHJRM?OpenDocument.

40 IRIN, “Reconciliation Talks Move Closer in Djibouti,” June 3, 2008, available at www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=78533; BBC News, “Envoys seek aCompromise in Somalia,” June 4, 2008, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6942595.stm; and All Africa, “‘Ethiopian Army Issue Not Included inPeace Negotiations’ – President,” Garowe News, April 16, 2008, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200804170007.html.

along developmental, environmental, and securitylines. In one of its landmark efforts, IGAD hasworked collaboratively with donors to evolve anearly warning system in the region. The ConflictEarly Warning and Response Mechanism(CEWARN) was established in January 2000 toserve as the region’s mechanism to systematicallyanticipate and respond to violent conflicts in atimely and efficient manner. The core operationalprinciple of CEWARN is to involve all majorstakeholders—governments, NGOs, and othercommunity organizations—for the collection ofinformation pertaining to conflicts and conflictprevention. In this regard, CEWARN mechanismsat regional and national levels, work with civilsociety organizations in both its Early Warning andEarly Response efforts. Although cognizant of thefact that eastern Africa is ravaged by interstate,intrastate, and communal conflicts, CEWARN hasadopted an incremental approach to focusexclusively on cross-border pastoral conflicts.41

IGAD’s CEWARN has been recognized as thefirst comprehensive institutional framework onconflict early warning and response in Africa,drawing on the diverse resources of nonstateactors.42 In other areas of engagement, IGAD hasmoved to harmonize political and cultural differ-ences. At a ministerial meeting on the internallydisplaced persons (IDPs) in the IGAD subregion inSeptember 2003, the member states sought tointensify “efforts aimed at enhancing democracy,the rule of law, good governance, respect for humanrights and fundamental freedoms and internationalhumanitarian law in order to ensure stability andsecurity in the sub-region.”43

IGAD nonetheless has been stymied by theinternecine Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict which hasparalyzed its functions at the highest level. After abitter feud over Somalia during an IGAD summitin Nairobi in April 2007, Eritrea suspended itsmembership in the organization, blaming Ethiopiaand the US for interference in Somalia. Moreimportantly, IGAD has had to compete formembership and attention with the revived EastAfrican Community (EAC) that includes Uganda,

Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi, and Rwanda. While theyremain core players in IGAD, Uganda and Kenyahave increasingly turned their attention towardboosting trade and infrastructural ties that build ontheir historical linkages.

Through the Eastern African Standby Brigade(EASBRIG), the region forms one of the key propsin the African Union’s (AU) emerging peacekeepingarchitecture, the African Standby Force (ASF).There were debates, however, over the institutionalhome for EASBRIG given the desire to include awide number of countries outside the IGADsubregion. As Mulugeta has noted, while the AUenvisaged Regional Economic Groups (RECs) asthe anchors in the operationalization of subregionalforces, in eastern Africa,

no regional block incorporates all putativemembers of EASBRIG. In [this region], the EastAfrican Community (EAC), the Common Marketfor Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), andIGAD can all claim to do the task… In the EasternAfrican region, neither EAC nor COMESApossesses a mandate or structure directly related tothe issue of peace and security. Thus, a decisionwas made to assign such a role to IGAD, albeit onan interim basis. The debate regarding which sub-regional organization should lead in theoperationalization of EASBRIG was rarelyinformed by the original intent of the AU.44

In addition to IGAD members, EASBRIG alsoincludes the Comoros, the Seychelles, Mauritius,and Madagascar. Since its establishment inFebruary 2004, EASBRIG has tried to organizeplans to train a total of 3,000 troops for futuredeployment.INTERNATIONALLY-DRIVENMECHANISMS

The United Nations has been involved in copingwith mounting problems of state failure in additionto the restoration of peace in the region. The UnitedNations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) has affordedthe international community a unique opportunityto contribute to the implementation of the CPA.Despite delays in deployment, UNMIS isimplementing the agreement in addition to facili-

12 EASTERN AFRICA: SECURITY AND THE LEGACY OF FRAGILITY

41 Mwaura and Schmeidl, Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa.42 Kasaija Phillip Apuuli, “IGAD’s Protocol on Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN): A Ray of Hope in Conflict Prevention,” in The Quest

for Peace in Africa: Transformations, Democracy, and Public Policy, edited by Alfred G. Nhema (Addis Ababa: OSSREA, 2004): 173-87.43 IGAD, “Khartoum Declaration: Ministerial Conference on Internally Displaced Persons in the IGAD Sub-region.” Nairobi: IGAD Secretariat, p.3.44 Allehone Mulugeta, “Promises and Challenges of a Sub-Regional Force for the Horn of Africa,” International Peacekeeping 15, no.2 (2008): p.175.

tating the voluntary return of refugees anddisplaced persons, providing demining assistance,and contributing to international efforts to protectand promote human rights. Like all UNpeacekeeping missions, UNMIS may never have allthe resources to meet all challenges under itsmandate, but its presence nonetheless underscoresthe commitment of the international community toa peaceful transition in Sudan. Similarly, theAfrican Union/United Nations Hybrid Mission inDarfur (UNAMID), the successor to the AU’sAfrican Mission in Darfur (AMIS) was authorizedby the UN Security Council in July 2007 to supportthe implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement(DPA) and protect its personnel and civilians. Evenbefore its deployment, UNAMID faced formidableproblems arising mainly from Khartoum’s refusal toallow non-African forces, but steadily the standoffbetween Khartoum and the internationalcommunity is being resolved. Unlike UNMIS,however, UNAMID confronts an unsustainablesituation of trying to maintain a fragile peace andprotect civilians but without adequate resources tomake a significant difference on the ground.45

Moreover, while the international community has,understandably, expended considerable resourceson the humanitarian problems in Darfur and on thedeployment of peacekeepers, it has not done muchto find a durable political solution to the crisis. TheDarfur conflict is, at its heart, a political conflictthat needs to be resolved through aggressivediplomatic initiatives that yield an implementableagreement.

Other international engagements in easternAfrica have revolved around the threats occasionedby terrorism. Concerned that weak states withfragmented sovereignties furnish the ideal roamingand operational grounds for terrorist groups, theUnited States and other external actors have soughtways of boosting the security and developmentcomponents of states in the region.46 Regionalgroups that have been identified as having closelinks with international terrorism include the

Eritrean Islamic Jihad, the Ogaden NationalLiberation Front (ONLF) in Ethiopia, and Al-Ittihad and, more recently, Al-Shabab, in Somalia.The most visible regional antiterrorism initiative isthe US-led Combined Joint Task Force-Horn ofAfrica (CJTF-HOA) that includes Djibouti, Eritrea,Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda.Proceeding from the assumption that the region ishome to interlocking conflicts, weak and failingstates, pervasive corruption, and extreme poverty,the United States created the CJTF-HOA in 2002,based in Djibouti, to deter, preempt, and disableterrorist threats emanating principally fromSomalia, Kenya, and Yemen. The areas of participa-tion include counterterrorism, border control, lawenforcement and criminal investigation, andairport security.47

There have been other supplementary efforts tobuild regional capacity for counterterrorism. Forinstance, there are regular meetings of securityofficials in eastern Africa to evolve mechanisms onintelligence sharing (concerning terrorism) andproposals for the enactment of uniform antiter-rorism laws to stop suspected terrorists from onecountry seeking refuge in another. Similarly, intelli-gence chiefs from thirteen African countries met inKenya in June 2004 to develop a common countert-errorism strategy and reached consensus on astrategy to harmonize capacity building, invest-ment in new technologies, training, and legislationto wage the war on terrorism. To consolidate theseinitiatives, IGAD established a four-year CapacityBuilding Program against terrorism in June 2006that seeks to boost security cooperation amongmember states on issues of terrorism.48

Scenarios andRecommendationsThe content of short- to medium-term scenariosfor confronting complex security challenges ineastern Africa depends primarily on how currentand ongoing conflicts are resolved. The regional

Gilbert M. Khadiagala 13

45 P.D. Williams, “Military Response to Mass Killing: The African Union Mission in Sudan,” International Peacekeeping 13, no.2 (2006): 168-83.46 Princeton N. Lyman and Stephen J. Morrison, “The Terrorist Threat in Africa,” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 1 (2004): 75-86; Walter H. Kansteiner, “Political Reforms are

Essential in the Struggle Against Terrorism,” African Geopolitics 5 (2002); Herman H. Cohen, “The United States should be More Active in Solving AfricanConflicts,” African Geopolitics 5 (2002). See also the 2002 National Security Strategy of the Bush administration which rightly points out that threats to the UnitedStates do not emanate simply from other great powers but also from weak states, as has been the case with Afghanistan and Somalia. White House, "The NationalSecurity Strategy of the United States of America," September 2002, available at www.whitehouse.gov.

47 “Kenya: US General Urges Horn of Africa States to Cooperate with US to Counter Terrorism,” FBIS-AFR-2003-0123, January 23, 2003; BBC News, “AfricanLeaders in US Terror Talks,” December 6, 2002.

48 Mulugeta, "Promises and Challenges for a Subregional Force for the Horn of Africa," p. 177.

fault lines that potentially could create moredisasters or opportunities for regeneration andprosperity are Somalia, Sudan, and Ethiopia-Eritrea. Since the outcomes of these conflicts aregoing to be critical to both the broader regionalsecurity environment and the modalities ofexternal engagement in the region, they deserveclose attention in this section.WORST CASE SCENARIOS

As a paradigm of chaos in eastern Africa, theSomali conflict may grind on inconclusively for thenext five to twenty years. There are already signsthat Ethiopian military attempts to stabilizeSomalia may not work and that the TFG maycollapse because of the growing strength of Islamistforces. The latter may be using current overtures forpeace in Djibouti merely to reorganize themselvesfor a new onslaught on Mogadishu. Furthermore, asviolence escalates in Mogadishu, there is apossibility that the AU’s engagement may wane,leading to the withdrawal of the Ugandan-ledAMISOM. In the absence of reinforcements fromthe United Nations (an unlikely scenario),AMISOM has no future in Somalia. In such acontext, the humanitarian crisis in Somalia woulddeepen, contributing to the flight and misery of thepopulation. A return of the Islamists to powerwould spell disaster for the region since theIslamists are more likely to embrace an irredentistagenda in a virulent religious form.

The worst scenario for Sudan is the collapse ofthe CPA owing to Khartoum’s fear of anindependent south. The continued dominance ofnorthern politics by al-Bashir and the NCP doesnot augur well for a transition that entails southernseparation. It is likely that the NCP may revert toIslamism as a mode of mobilizing the north if theyperceive that southern independence may exposethem to pluralist forces in the north. This scenariois possible because, over the years, the Islamistshave continually used the southern conflict as a wayto procrastinate on political reforms in the north.From this view, the secession of the south mayoccasion fundamental alteration in northernpolitics that the Islamists may not be prepared tocountenance. In the absence of an amicable separa-tion, Sudan may lapse back into civil war thatconsumes the energies of the internationalcommunity for the foreseeable future. Moreimportantly, a renewed north-south conflagration

would be a harbinger for the deepening of violentsecessionist conflicts in Darfur and the East. Thescenario of a Sudan perpetually mired in war isconceivable if the ruling group in Khartoumcontinues the current pattern of dictating the termsof peace agreements.

A catastrophic scenario for Ethiopia-Eritreacould be the resumption of the border conflictstemming from a miscalculation by one of thesides. In such an event, there is no likelihood thatEthiopia would stop at the borders; rather, it wouldbe tempted to overthrow the government inAsmara and potentially install a more pliantregime, reminiscent of the old days of Ethiopiancontrol. Such a scenario would be a return to yearsof confrontation and regional instability.

The consequences of the resurgence of conflictsin these core states on security and livelihoods ineastern Africa would be enormous, captured inmore refugee movements, food insecurity, armsflows, and the general deterioration in humansecurity. In addition, with a legacy of weak institu-tions for coping with these conflicts, the regionwould increasingly find itself unable to contain thefall-out from these conflicts. With the regionengulfed in new forms of interstate and intrastateconflicts, the efforts to inject institutional vigor inIGAD would fail. Moreover, despite efforts toreinvent itself in the security and economic arena,IGAD would confront internal fragmentation.

Piracy along Africa’s eastern coast may worsen asSomalia further descends into anarchy. Despiterenewed international efforts to deal with thisproblem, the absence of endogenous naval capaci-ties will continue to hamper robust strategies tomanage piracy and other maritime threats. Since noregional power will have a credible naval force inthe next fifty years (and beyond), there is a likeli-hood of a new scramble for maritime resourcesalong the eastern African seaboard among Westerncountries, China, and India. This scramble maydestabilize the region in years to come. BEST CASE SCENARIOS

Best case scenarios for the region in the next five totwenty years would involve strengthened capacityof states to deal with the wide array of securityissues in both their domestic and regional domains,the gradual transformation of IGAD from a limited,narrowly-focused institution to a robust Regional

14 EASTERN AFRICA: SECURITY AND THE LEGACY OF FRAGILITY

Economic Community (REC), and a shift ininternational engagement from humanitarianismto development. Furthermore, since long-termsecurity ultimately depends on viable states with amodicum of internal coherence and order, realisticefforts to deal with governance questions willemanate from incremental and endogenousprocesses of negotiations and compromises thatfeed into long-term institutions for order andprosperity.

Given its centrality to regional security concerns,Somalia’s return to a more stable political orderwould provide significant political vistas for theregion. An internationally-mediated settlementamong the TFG, the Islamists, and other warringclans that restores a semblance of a functional statewould also generate the momentum for subsequentdiscussions between Mogadishu and the otherSomali entities for either confederal or federalarrangements. This would preempt the divisivedebates about whether Somaliland and Puntlanddeserve international recognition and wouldpeacefully resolve the multiple sources of conflictthat may potentially come with the permanentseparation of these entities.

For Sudan, the best scenario would be theemergence of a new Southern Sudanese statefollowing the referendum in 2011. The governmentin Juba would then negotiate resource and borderissues with Khartoum from the more comfortableposition of sovereignty. Leadership changes inKhartoum away from the NCP to moderateelements may produce governing elites who aremore amenable to a separate south that wouldnegotiate bilateral agreements on the many areas ofinterdependence between them. It is likely that apeaceful transition in the south would alsoencourage the fractious parties in Darfur to engagethe government in negotiations that enshrine anequitable and just framework for Darfur. For thisreason, the future of Darfur is inextricably tied tothe emergence of moderate elements in Khartoumthat acknowledge the significance of ending theconflict. With the separation of the south, theremaining entities will need to forge politicalstructures that decentralize more power andresources that fall short of secession. NorthernSudanese states have more in common to co-existwithin a confederal arrangement that is undergirdedby pluralism and equitable resource-sharing.

MIDDLE CASE SCENARIOS

Status Quo Tending TowardImprovement

These scenarios assume that in the next five totwenty years, while there is not going to be signifi-cant breakthroughs in resolving existing conflicts,some improvements may occur. These scenariosmean that unless the unexpected happens, theactors and events shaping security will remainrelatively stable, allowing little room for experi-mentation or change. For instance, in Somalia, thecurrent context of a weak transitional governmentsupported by a fledgling AMISOM force andEthiopian military will continue to survive despitemounting security threats. A precarious survival onthe part of the TFG would likely hinge on theinability of its Islamist opponents to gain sufficientstrength to overthrow it. Equally, this scenariorecognizes that the association of Islamists withterrorist groups may make it impossible for theinternational community to allow them to return topower. In the circumstances of political uncertain-ties in Mogadishu, Somaliland would likelycontinue to build the structures of statehood andnationhood in the search for international recogni-tion. As it stealthily expands its international andregional ties, the government in Hargesia may noteven need a formal AU or UN vote of recognition.In Sudan, a status quo scenario on the CPA mayentail postponement of the referendum for thesouth pending the resolution of border and otherissues that are now causing irritation on both sidesof the north-south divide. With the parties farbehind in the timetable toward the referendum, it islikely that elements from the two sides may beinclined to maintain the status quo as a way topostpone decisions about future political andeconomic arrangements. Khartoum, in particular,may seek the continuation of the existing politicalframework as it buys more time to find a resolutionon Darfur that dovetails with the objectives ofpreventing further secessionist pressures in thenorth.

For Eritrea and Ethiopia, the border dispute maysettle into an uneasy, but stable compromise of no-war, no-peace, irrespective of future changes in theleadership in both countries. The two leaders haveinvested in the status quo, but this condition maystabilize into normalcy, preventing alternativeoutcomes. This scenario also hinges on the patience

Gilbert M. Khadiagala 15

of the United Nations that has recently expressedfrustration about lack of movement on thedemarcation of the border. Unless the UN pulls outof the engagement, the situation could stabilize inthe long-term along the model of Cyprus, wherethe UN has had an engagement for decades.

With respect to governance issues in other statesin the region, status quo scenarios point to more ofthe same in terms of institutional consolidation ofpluralism and participation. Governance challengesthat reflect unresolved ethnic and communaldifferences will continue to impact markedly thestability of eastern Africa. Widespread politicalpolarization across the region has strengthened thetrends that have emerged since the late 1990s ofsubstantial reversals of the gains of pluralism anddemocracy. Before the Kenyan implosion, Ethiopiaand Uganda had witnessed significant setbacks indemocratic processes, leading to mass disenchant-ment and alienation. But without significantalternative leaderships from below, mass pressuresare unlikely to substantially destabilize theseregimes, giving current governments more room toplod along. The trend for the future seems to beweak democracies struggling with new socioeco-nomic strains and more agitated citizenriesfrustrated by the semidemocratic experiments. Status Quo Tending Toward Decline

These scenarios assume that things may remain thesame across the regional conflict zones but withshort- to medium-term deterioration. For instance,in the case of Sudan, the weakening of theframework established by the CPA may continueunabated, reducing the chances of dialogue over thecontentious issues such as Abyei and revenuesharing. Although both the south and north canlive with this status quo, the danger is that, withtime, the lack of a meaningful dialogue impairstheir ability to fulfill the more difficult provisions ofthe CPA. This scenario is already unfolding asinternational actors, particularly the UnitedNations, Western countries, and the AU, lose themomentum to re-engage Sudanese parties inreinvigorating the CPA. International inaction andparalysis on Sudan partly stems from exhaustionwith intervention that does not seem to be makinga significant difference in the behavior and actionsof the parties on the ground. For example, attemptsto restart the Darfur negotiations were dealt a deathblow by the decision of the Justice and Equality

Movement (JEM) to launch a blistering, butbotched, attack on Omdurman in May 2008. Thisattack handed Khartoum an appropriate diplomatictool to maintain the manageable status quo inDarfur, hold off potential negotiations, and stall onthe full deployment of UNAMID. For both JEMand Khartoum, this condition is bearable enoughfor the foreseeable future, but it compounds thedifficulty for the international actors to remaincredibly involved in finding peaceful solutions.

On Somalia, a status quo that gradually declineswould entail long-drawn negotiations on a peacefulsettlement, reminiscent of the marathon peace talksconducted in Kenya by Somali parties throughoutmost of the 1990s. The Djibouti talks may be thebeginning of another round of negotiations that areconducted to provide a semblance of movement onreconciliation, interspersed by more violence. Thescenario of intermittent war and peace may becomfortable to the key proxies in the Somaliconflict—Ethiopian and Eritrean—giving themroom to reorganize their military and politicalstrategies in dealing with their clan allies in theSomali conflict. More critically, this scenario hingeson the fact that none of the Somali factions will gainautonomy from their regional patrons in the futureto make agreements among themselves. Withoutsuch autonomy, the Somali parties will be perpetu-ally tied to the political vagaries of their patrons tothe detriment of long-term peace.

Throughout the region, problems of environ-mental and ecological vulnerability will remainbasically the same in the absence of a reduction inongoing conflicts and renewed regional efforts tofocus on these issues. But in the immediate future,things may deteriorate remarkably, particularly asthe emerging global food crisis, for instance,undercuts the ability of international actors torespond to these other crises as they have donebefore. There is growing recognition that interna-tional institutions, particularly humanitarianagencies, may not have the resources to managenew waves of refugees from the escalating conflictsin Somalia and Darfur. This is a problem that mayget worse as international donors face increasingpressure from domestic constituencies fordisengagement from emergency and humanitarianchores. Already the mass exodus of Somalis to newrefugee camps in Yemen and other Gulf regionspoints to the growing disenchantment with

16 EASTERN AFRICA: SECURITY AND THE LEGACY OF FRAGILITY

international humanitarian responses in countriesthat traditionally hosted them. In addition, ascountries such as Kenya generate their ownrefugees and IDPs, it is unlikely that Somalirefugees would be inclined to relocate to Kenyancamps. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. State fragility is the root cause of most conflictsin eastern Africa. National, regional, andinternational efforts should work to boost thecapacity of states as providers of order andprosperity. Eastern African states need notreinvent the wheel of state and national rejuve-nation; in the international context there arenumerous examples of strategies for reducingstate fragility and consolidating stability.

2. The United Nations and other internationaldonors have a role in helping eastern Africancountries deal with the problems that transcendborders such as environmental and ecologicalchallenges, refugee flows, piracy, and threats ofterrorism, but permanent international engage-ment around these issues reduces the ability ofregional actors to build their own local capaci-ties. International engagement should, therefore,be strategic, limited, and time-bound, to affordspace for endogenous processes of regionalproblem-solving.

3. Regional states need to rethink the pattern ofinstitution-building in order to move away fromthe multiple and duplicative institutionsinherited from past decades, toward morenarrowly-focused and functional institutions.Ultimately, regional economic institutionsprovide a more stable foundation for collectivepeace and security.

ConclusionFrom the foregoing it is clear that threats to securityin eastern Africa derive from manifold sources.Similarly, finding remedies to these threats is anongoing exercise in experimentation with diversepolicy instruments. The dominant pattern is that

old security threats that affected the ability of statesto be providers of order and prosperity have notdiminished in the face of new ones. As a regionalsecurity complex, eastern Africa has been insecureprimarily because its constituent units have found itdifficult to manage the demands of statehood,nationhood, and resource and environmentalconstraints. As a result, the region could beaccurately described as one in which states haveexisted precariously, as victims of their neighbor’sinsecurities, or conversely, as threats to theirneighbors. The cycle of insecurities that defineseastern Africa has, however, coexisted with islandsof stability and prosperity, but even these now seemunder siege as demonstrated in Kenya’s recentpolitical convulsion.

Durable mechanisms for coping with conflicthave often inhered in the resilience of communitiesand societies to defend themselves against thevagaries of nature or manmade obstacles. But theinstitutional contexts and governance rules ineastern African states have nullified the ability ofmost of these societies to function effectively. It is inthis respect that various issues from state andregime insecurities to environmental and resourcevulnerability have coalesced around the nature ofthe territorial political order. Human security ineastern Africa has deteriorated because states as thefirst line of security have gradually lost their abilityto be predictable defenders of communities andsocieties. This is the large security story of theinstitutional decay in Somalia, regional border-lands, and the war zones of Abyei, Darfur, and theOgaden.

Since independence, durable internationalengagements have supplemented rather thansupplanted national and regional initiatives infinding solutions to multiple security problems.The question has always depended on whetherinternational actors can find solid actors andinstitutions that are credible partners in problem-solving. This pattern has not changed and isunlikely to change in the future.

Gilbert M. Khadiagala 17

Further Reading

Bradbury, Mark. Becoming Somaliland. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2008.

The author details the struggle of Somaliland to obtain statehood and a measure of peace and stability.He points out that Somaliland has achieved remarkable empirical statehood with only a fraction of theresources that South Somalia has.

Cheadle, Don, and John Prendergast. Not on Our Watch: The Mission to End Genocide in Darfur and Beyond.New York: Hyperion, 2007.

Two activists speak to the lack of international engagement to protect the vulnerable Darfur civiliansagainst the onslaught of government-sponsored militias. They call for a radical change in policy to avoidthe mistakes of Rwanda.

Deng, Francis M. War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in Sudan. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995.

This is an authoritative account of the origins and trajectories of Sudan’s civil war from an author withdeep knowledge of the actors and issues.

Ghalib, Jama Mohamed. The Cost of Dictatorship: The Somali Experience. New York: Lilian Barber, 1995.

This is an eye-witness account of Somali history from the later colonial period through independence andthe civil war. It provides an insider’s account of the last days of President Mohamed Siad Barre.

Gurdon, Charles, ed. The Horn of Africa. New York: St. Martin’s, 1994.

This is a collection of essays about the political and economic challenges of nationbuilding in the Horn.There are excellent chapters on the status and viability of Somaliland.

Iyob, Ruth, and Gilbert M. Khadiagala. Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006.

In this International Peace Academy publication, the authors provide a comprehensive overview ofconflicts and conflict resolution in Sudan since the mid-1960s, paying attention to the role of regionaland international actors in prodding the Sudanese parties toward peace.

Johnson, Douglas H. The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2003.

This book was written by one of the foremost historians on the Sudan, who has also had first-handexperience working in the southern Sudan. It is a concise, accessible, and authoritative guide to the civilwars that have plagued the country’s modern history.

Little, Peter D. Somalia: Economy without a State. London: James Currey, 2003.

An account of how Somalis have coped without a central government. Focusing primarily on livestocktrade, the author shows that the lives of some traders improved without interference from the formerSomali regime.

18 EASTERN AFRICA: SECURITY AND THE LEGACY OF FRAGILITY

Mburu, Nene. Bandits on the Border: The Last Frontier in the Search for Somali Unity. Trenton, NJ: Red Sea,2005.

The author focuses on Somali national identity in eastern Kenya, pointing to the dilemmas of belongingboth to Somalia and Kenya.

van Notten, Michael. The Law of the Somalis: A Stable Foundation for Economic Development in the Horn ofAfrica. Trenton, NJ: Red Sea, 2005.

This is an excellent study of Somali customary law, including property law. It recommends that Somaliareturn to customary legal practices rather than reconstituting the state.

Pool, David. From Guerrillas to Government: The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front. Athens, OH: OhioUniversity Press, 2001.

The author provides an account of the transition of the EPLF from a guerrilla movement to a governingparty. Although not entirely neutral, given the author’s association with the EPLF, the book is a soliddiscussion of both eras in Eritrean political development.

Riehl, Volker. Who is Ruling Sudan? The Role of NGOs in Rebuilding Socio-Political Order. Uppsala, Sweden:Nordiska Afrikainistutet, 2001.

Written during the civil war in the south, the author reveals that the South Sudan People’s LiberationMovement (SPLM) focused more on war and fighting than on setting up alternative structures of govern-ment, leaving local affairs without organization.

Rolandsen, Oystein H. Guerrilla Government: Political Changes in the Southern Sudan during the 1990s.Uppsala, Sweden: Nordiska Afrikaninstutet, 2005.

The author documents the attempts by the South Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) to extendits authority across the south and the obstacles it faced.

Sahnoun, Mohammed. Somalia: The Missed Opportunities. Washington, DC: United States Institute of PeacePress, 1994.

A personal defense of Ambassador Sahnoun’s stewardship of the United Nations Operation in Somalia(UNOSOM) and a trenchant critique of UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s handling ofinternational involvement in the Somali crisis.

Samatar, Ahmed I., ed. The Somali Challenge: From Catastrophe to Renewal? Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner,1994.

The authors trace the political events leading to state collapse in Somalia, particularly the role ofPresident Mohamed Siad Barre. Contributors place these themes in the wider frame of conflicts and clanpolitics. There are also interesting chapters on the consequences of urbanization, environmental degrada-tion, and agrarian structures.

Gilbert M. Khadiagala 19

Tvedt, Terje, ed. Conflict in the Horn of Africa: Human and Ecological Consequences of Warfare. Uppsala,Sweden: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1993.

The chapters in this volume focus on the human consequences at the local level of conflicts in the Horn ofAfrica.

Waihenya, Waithaka. The Mediator: General Lazaro Sumbeiywo and the Southern Sudan Peace Process.Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 2006.

This is an account of the role of Kenyan mediator, Sumbeiywo, during the IGAD negotiations for Sudan.It conveys the mediators’ battles with the parties and other external actors involved in the peace processleading to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

Woodward, Peter. US Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa. London: Ashgate, 2006.

This book provides an excellent discussion of the role of the United States in the Horn of Africa, drawingfrom the author’s extensive background in the region.

Woodward, Peter, and Murray Forsyth, eds. Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa: Federalism and ItsAlternatives. Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1994.

These are broad-ranging analyses of key political developments in the Horn, with competent surveys onthe interaction among politics, economy, environment, and society. There are also chapters that detail theorigins of the Ethiopia-Somalia over the Ogaden region.

Yongo-Bure, Benaih. Economic Development of Southern Sudan. Lanham, MD: University Press of America,2007.

This is an apt survey of key themes relating to Southern Sudanese economy, including the challenges ofeconomic reconstruction and stabilization. Given the few books on this subject, this is an excellent surveyof the broader economic issues as the south moves into statehood.

Young, John. Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia: The Tigray People’s Liberation Front, 1975-1991. Cambridge, UK:Cambridge University Press, 1997.

The book focuses on why the peasants of Tigray supported the TPLF over the years and how themovement evolved to take power in Ethiopia. The author is very knowledgeable about the TPLF, havinglived with them during the liberation struggle.

20 EASTERN AFRICA: SECURITY AND THE LEGACY OF FRAGILITY

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