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2012 JURISPRUDENCE

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1582012 JURISPRUDENCE FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER (FULL TEXT)

G.R. No. 170575 June 8, 2011Spouses MANUEL and FLORENTINA DEL ROSARIO, Petitioners, vs.GERRY ROXAS FOUNDATION, Inc., Respondent.

The allegations in the complaint and the reliefs prayed for are the determinants of the nature of the action1 and of which court has jurisdiction over the action.2

This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the April 26, 2005 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87784 which dismissed the Petition for Review before it. Also assailed is the CA Resolution4 dated November 15, 2005 denying the Motion for Reconsideration thereto.

Factual Antecedents

The controversy between petitioners Manuel and Florentina Del Rosario and respondent Gerry Roxas Foundation Inc. emanated from a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer filed by the former against the latter, the surrounding circumstances relative thereto as summarized by the CA in its assailed Decision are as follows:

The petitioner Manuel del Rosario appears to be the registered owner of Lot 3-A of Psd-301974 located in Roxas City which is described in and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18397 of the Registry of Deeds for the City of Roxas.

Sometime in 1991, the respondent, as a legitimate foundation, took possession and occupancy of said land by virtue of a memorandum of agreement entered into by and between it and the City of Roxas. Its possession and occupancy of said land is in the character of being lessee thereof.

In February and March 2003, the petitioners served notices upon the respondent to vacate the premises of said land. The respondent did not heed such notices because it still has the legal right to continue its possession and occupancy of said land.5

On July 7, 2003, petitioners filed a Complaint6 for Unlawful Detainer against the respondent before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Roxas City, docketed as Civil Case No. V-2391. Said complaint contains, among others, the following significant allegations:

3. Plaintiffs are the true, absolute and registered owner[s] of a parcel of land, situated at Dayao, Roxas City and covered by and described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18397 issued to the plaintiffs by the Register of Deeds for Roxas City as evidenced by a xerox copy thereof which is hereto attached as Annex "A".

4. Sometime in 1991, without the consent and authority of the plaintiffs, defendant took full control and possession of the subject property, developed the same and use[d] it for commercial purposes.

x x x x

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/jun2011/gr_170575_2011.html#fnt6







7. Plaintiffs have allowed the defendant for several years, to make use of the land without any contractual or legal basis. Hence, defendant’s possession of the subject property is only by tolerance.

8. But [plaintiffs’] patience has come to its limits. Hence, sometime in the last quarter of 2002, plaintiffs made several demands upon said defendant to settle and/or pay rentals for the use of the property.

x x x x

10. Notwithstanding receipt of the demand letters, defendant failed and refused, as it continues to fail and refuse to pay reasonable monthly rentals for the use and occupancy of the land, and to vacate the subject premises despite the lapse of the fifteen-day period specified in the said demand letters. Consequently, defendant is unlawfully withholding possession of the subject property from the plaintiffs, who are the owners thereof.7

Upon service of summons, respondent filed its Answer8 dated July 31, 2003 where it averred that:

3. The defendant ADMITS the allegations set forth in paragraph 4 of the Complaint to the effect that the defendant "took full control and possession of the subject property, developed the same" and has been using the premises in accordance with its agreements with the City of Roxas and the purposes of the defendant corporation without any objection or opposition of any kind on the part of the plaintiffs for over twenty-two long years; the defendant specifically DENIES the allegations contained in the last part of this paragraph 4 of the Complaint that the defendant has used the property leased for commercial purposes, the truth of the matter being that the defendant has used and [is] still using the property only for civic non-profit endeavors hewing closely to purposes of the defendant Gerry Roxas Foundation Inc., inter alia, devoted to general welfare, protection, and upliftment of the people of Roxas City, Capiz, and in Panay Island, and elsewhere in the Philippines; that the Foundation has spent out of its own funds for the compliance of its avowed aims and purposes, up to the present, more than P25M, and that all the improvements, including a beautiful auditorium built in the leased premises of the Foundation "shall accrue to the CITY (of Roxas), free from any compensation whatsoever, upon the expiration of this Lease" (Memorandum of Agreement, Annex "2" hereof), eighteen (18) years hence;

x x x x

5. The defendant specifically DENIES the allegations set forth in paragraph 7 of the Complaint, the truth being that the defendant took possession of the subject property by virtue of Memorandums of Agreement, photo-copies of which are hereto attached as Annexes "1" and "2" and made integral parts hereof, entered into by defendant and the City of Roxas, which is the true and lawful owner thereof; thus, the possession of the subject property by the defendant foundation is lawful, being a lessee thereof;

x x x x




8. The defendant ADMITS the allegations set forth in paragraph 10 of the Complaint that defendant refused to pay monthly rental to the plaintiffs and to vacate the premises, but specifically DENIES the rest of the allegations thereof, the truth being that defendant has no obligation whatsoever, to the plaintiffs, as they are neither the owners or lessors of the land occupied by defendant;

x x x x

As and by way of –

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The defendant repleads the foregoing allegations, and avers further that:

12. The plaintiffs have no cause of action against defendant.

The leased property does not belong to the plaintiffs. The property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18397, [is] occupied by the [defendant] as [lessee] of the City of Roxas since 1991, the latter having acquired it by purchase from the plaintiffs way back on February 19, 1981, as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale which is hereto attached as Annex "3" and made an integral part hereof. While, admittedly, the said certificate of title is still in the name of the plaintiffs, nevertheless, the ownership of the property covered therein has already transferred to the City of Roxas upon its delivery to it. Article 1496 of the Civil Code provides that, ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other manner signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee. It is also provided under Article 1498 of the Civil Code that, when the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing, which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. Upon execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale (Annex "3"), the plaintiffs have relinquished ownership of the property subject thereof in favor of the vendee, City of Roxas. Necessarily, the possession of the property subject of the said Deed of Absolute Sale now pertains to the City of Roxas and the plaintiffs have no more right, whatsoever, to the possession of the same. It is defendant foundation by virtue of the Memorandums of Agreement (Annexes "1" and "2" hereof), which has the legal right to have possession of the subject property;9

After the MTCC issued an Order setting the case for preliminary conference, respondent filed on October 20, 2003 a Motion to Resolve its Defenses on Forum Shopping and Lack of Cause of Action. Records show that before the instant case was filed, the City of Roxas had already filed a case against petitioners for "Surrender of Withheld Duplicate Certificate Under Section 107, [Presidential Decree No.] 1529" docketed as Special Case No. SPL-020-03 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City. Subsequently, on October 27, 2003, petitioners filed their Opposition to the said Motion.

Ruling of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities



On November 24, 2003, the MTCC issued an Order10 resolving the respondent’s Motion. In the said Order, the MTCC held that:

The plaintiffs [have] no cause of action against herein defendant. The defendant is the lessee of the City of Roxas of the parcel of land in question. There has been no previous contractual relationship between the plaintiffs Del Rosarios and the defendant Gerry Roxas Foundation, Inc. affecting the title of the land leased by the [Gerry] Roxas Foundation. The Gerry Roxas Foundation, Inc. has not unlawfully withheld the possession of the land it is leasing from its lessor. Its right to the physical possession of the land leased by it from the City of Roxas subsists and continues to subsist until the termination of the contract of lease according to its terms and pursuant to law.

The defendant had presented as its main defense that the property was already sold by the plaintiffs to the present lessor of the property, the City of Roxas thru a Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 19, 1981 executed by herein [plaintiff] spouses as vendors.

Plaintiffs had not directly and specifically shown that the purported Deed of Absolute Sale does not exist; rather, they contend that said document is merely defective. They had not even denied the signatories to the said Contract of Sale; specifically the authenticity of the spouses-plaintiffs signatures; all that plaintiffs did merely referred to it as null and void and highly questionable without any specifications.

When the parties’ pleadings fail to tender any issue of fact, either because all the factual allegations have been admitted expressly or impliedly; as when a denial is a general denial; there is no need of conducting a trial, since there is no need of presenting evidence anymore. The case is then ripe for judicial determination, either through a judgment on the pleadings (Rules of Court, Rule 34) or by summary judgment under Rule 35, Rules of Court.

In the instant case, plaintiffs alleged that sometime in 1991, without the consent and authority of the plaintiffs, defendant took full control and possession of the subject property, developed the same and use[d] it for commercial purposes. x x x for so many years, plaintiffs patiently waited for someone to make representation to them regarding the use of the subject property, but the same never happened. Plaintiff[s] have allowed the defendant for several years, to make use of the land without any contractual or legal basis. Hence, defendant’s possession of the subject property is only by tolerance.

x x x x

Defendant admits the allegations of the plaintiffs that the defendant "took full control and possession of the subject property, developed the same" and has been using the premises in accordance with its agreements with the City of Roxas and the purposes of the defendant corporation without any objection or opposition of any kind on the part of the plaintiffs for over twenty-two long years.

That the defendant’s possession of the subject property is by virtue of a contract of lease entered into by the defendant foundation with the City of Roxas which is the true and lawful owner, the latter having acquired said property by virtue of a Deed of



Absolute Sale as early as February 19, 1981, long before the defendant foundation’s occupation of the property. In Alcos v. IAC 162 SCRA 823 (1988), Buyer’s immediate possession and occupation of the property was deemed corroborative of the truthfulness and authenticity of the deed of sale.

WHEREFORE, although this Court finds the defense on forum shopping interposed by the defendant to be untenable and unmeritorious, and hence, denied; this Court still finds the pleadings filed by the plaintiffs-spouses to be without a cause of action and hence, dismisses this instant complaint. With cost against the plaintiffs.

SO ORDERED.11

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On appeal, the RTC of Roxas City, Branch 17 rendered a Decision12 dated July 9, 2004 affirming the MTCC Order.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Aggrieved, petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Review. However, the CA, in a Decision13 dated April 26, 2005, dismissed the petition and affirmed the assailed Decision of the RTC.

Petitioners timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration14 which was, however, denied in a Resolution15 dated November 15, 2005.

Issues

Still undaunted, petitioners now come to this Court on a Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:

I. Whether x x x in determining if there is a case for unlawful detainer, a court should limit itself in interpreting a single phrase/allegation in the complaint; and,

II. Whether x x x there exists an unlawful detainer in this case.16

Our Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

The allegations in petitioner’s Complaint constitute judicial admissions.

Petitioners alleged in their Complaint before the MTCC, among others, that: (1) sometime in 1991, without their consent and authority, respondent took full control and possession of the subject property, developed the same and used it for commercial purposes; and (2) they allowed the respondent for several years, to make use of the land without any contractual or legal basis. Petitioners thus conclude that respondent’s possession of subject property is only by tolerance.

Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that:

Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. – An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. x x x








"A judicial admission is one so made in pleadings filed or in the progress of a trial as to dispense with the introduction of evidence otherwise necessary to dispense with some rules of practice necessary to be observed and complied with."17 Correspondingly, "facts alleged in the complaint are deemed admissions of the plaintiff and binding upon him."18 "The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader."19

In this case, petitioners judicially admitted that respondents took control and possession of subject property without their consent and authority and that respondent’s use of the land was without any contractual or legal basis.

Nature of the action is determined by the judicial admissions in the Complaint.

In Spouses Huguete v. Spouses Embudo,20 citing Cañiza v. Court of Appeals,21 this Court held that "what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought."

This Court, in Sumulong v. Court of Appeals,22 differentiated the distinct causes of action in forcible entry vis-à-vis unlawful detainer, to wit:

Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are two distinct causes of action defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of any land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the only issue is who has the prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess and the issue of rightful possession is the one decisive, for in such action, the defendant is the party in actual possession and the plaintiff's cause of action is the termination of the defendant's right to continue in possession.23

"The words ‘by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth’ shall include every situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another, who has had prior possession, therefrom."24 "The foundation of the action is really the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a person who has entered without right."25

"The act of going on the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is necessary."26 The employment of force, in this case, can be deduced from petitioners’ allegation that respondent took full control and possession of the subject property without their consent and authority.1avvphi1

"‘Stealth,’ on the other hand, is defined as any secret, sly, or clandestine act to avoid discovery and to gain entrance into or remain within residence of another without permission,"27 while strategy connotes the employment of machinations or artifices to gain possession of the subject property.28 The CA found that based on the petitioners’ allegations in their complaint, "respondent’s entry on the land of the petitioners was by stealth x x x."29However, stealth as defined requires a clandestine















character which is not availing in the instant case as the entry of the respondent into the property appears to be with the knowledge of the petitioners as shown by petitioners’ allegation in their complaint that "[c]onsidering the personalities behind the defendant foundation and considering further that it is plaintiff’s nephew, then the vice-mayor, and now the Mayor of the City of Roxas Antonio A. del Rosario, although without any legal or contractual right, who transacted with the foundation, plaintiffs did not interfere with the activities of the foundation using their property."30 To this Court’s mind, this allegation if true, also illustrates strategy.

Taken in its entirety, the allegations in the Complaint establish a cause of action for forcible entry, and not for unlawful detainer.

"In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of any land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth."31 "[W]here the defendant’s possession of the property is illegal ab initio," the summary action for forcible entry (detentacion) is the remedy to recover possession.32

In their Complaint, petitioners maintained that the respondent took possession and control of the subject property without any contractual or legal basis.33 Assuming that these allegations are true, it hence follows that respondent’s possession was illegal from the very beginning. Therefore, the foundation of petitioners’ complaint is one for forcible entry – that is "the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a person who has entered without right."34 Thus, and as correctly found by the CA, there can be no tolerance as petitioners alleged that respondent’s possession was illegal at the inception.35

Corollarily, since the deprivation of physical possession, as alleged in

petitioners’ Complaint and as earlier discussed, was attended by strategy and force, this Court finds that the proper remedy for the petitioners was to file a Complaint for Forcible Entry and not the instant suit for unlawful detainer.

Petitioners should have filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry within the reglementary one-year period from the time of dispossession.

Petitioners likewise alleged in their Complaint that respondent took possession and occupancy of subject property in 1991. Considering that the action for forcible entry must be filed within one year from the time of dispossession,36 the action for forcible entry has already prescribed when petitioners filed their Complaint in 2003. As a consequence, the Complaint failed to state a valid cause of action against the respondent.

In fine, the MTCC properly dismissed the Complaint, and the RTC and the CA correctly affirmed said order of dismissal.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 26, 2005 and the Resolution dated November 15, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87784 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.









G.R. No. 194880 June 20, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, both represented by the PRIVATIZATION MANAGEMENT OFFICE, Petitioners, vs.SUNVAR REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.

This is a Rule 45 Petition questioning the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, which ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for unlawful detainer filed by petitioners herein with the Metropolitan Trial Court.

Petitioners Republic of the Philippines (Republic) and National Power Corporation (NPC) are registered co-owners of several parcels of land located along Pasong Tamo Extension and Vito Cruz in Makati City, and covered by four Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs).1 The main subject matter of the instant Petition is one of these four parcels of land covered by TCT No. 458365, with an area of approximately 22,294 square meters (hereinafter, the subject property). Eighty percent (80%) of the subject property is owned by petitioner Republic, while the remaining twenty percent (20%) belongs to petitioner NPC.2 Petitioners are being represented in this case by the Privatization Management Office (PMO), which is the agency tasked with the administration and disposal of government assets.3 Meanwhile, respondent Sunvar Realty Development Corporation (Sunvar) occupied the subject property by virtue of sublease agreements, which had in the meantime expired.

The factual antecedents of the case are straightforward. On 26 December 1977,4 petitioners leased the four parcels of land, including the subject property, to the Technology Resource Center Foundation, Inc., (TRCFI) for a period of 25 years beginning 01 January 1978 and ending on 31 December 2002.5 Under the Contract of Lease (the main lease contract), petitioners granted TRCFI the right to sublease any portion of the four parcels of land.6

Exercising its right, TRCFI consequently subleased a majority of the subject property to respondent Sunvar through several sublease agreements (the sublease agreements).7 Although these agreements commenced on different dates, all of them contained common provisions on the terms of the sublease and were altogether set to expire on 31 December 2002, the expiration date of TRCFI’s main lease contract with petitioners, but subject to renewal at the option of respondent:8

The term of the sublease shall be for an initial period of [variable] years and [variable] months commencing on [variable], renewable for another twenty-five (25) years at SUNVAR’s exclusive option.9

According to petitioners, in all the sublease agreements, respondent Sunvar agreed "to return or surrender the subleased land, without any delay whatsoever upon the termination or expiration of the sublease contract or any renewal or extension thereof."10

During the period of its sublease, respondent Sunvar introduced useful improvements, consisting of several commercial buildings, and leased out the












spaces therein.11 It also profitably utilized the other open spaces on the subject property as parking areas for customers and guests.12

In 1987, following a reorganization of the government, TRCFI was dissolved. In its stead, the Philippine Development Alternatives Foundation (PDAF) was created, assuming the functions previously performed by TRCFI.13

On 26 April 2002, less than a year before the expiration of the main lease contract and the sublease agreements, respondent Sunvar wrote to PDAF as successor of TRCFI. Respondent expressed its desire to exercise the option to renew the sublease over the subject property and proposed an increased rental rate and a renewal period of another 25 years.14 On even date, it also wrote to the Office of the President, Department of Environment and Natural Resources and petitioner NPC. The letters expressed the same desire to renew the lease over the subject property under the new rental rate and renewal period.15

On 10 May 2002, PDAF informed respondent that the notice of renewal of the lease had already been sent to petitioners, but that it had yet to receive a response.16 It further explained that the proposal of respondent for the renewal of the sublease could not yet be acted upon, and neither could the proposed rental payments be accepted.17 Respondent acknowledged receipt of the letter and requested PDAF to apprise the former of any specific actions undertaken with respect to the said lease arrangement over the subject property.18

On 03 June 2002, six months before the main contract of lease was to expire, petitioner NPC – through Atty. Rainer B. Butalid, Vice-President and General Counsel – notified PDAF of the former’s decision not to renew the contract of lease.19 In turn, PDAF notified respondent of NPC’s decision.20

On the other hand, petitioner Republic through then Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Waldo Q. Flores likewise notified PDAF of the former’s decision not to renew the lease contract.21 The Republic reasoned that the parties had earlier agreed to shorten the corporate life of PDAF and to transfer the latter’s assets to the former for the purpose of selling them to raise funds.22 On 25 June 2002, PDAF duly informed respondent Sunvar of petitioner Republic’s decision not to renew the lease and quoted the Memorandum of Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Flores.23

On 31 December 2002, the main lease contract with PDAF, as well as its sublease agreements with respondent Sunvar, all expired. Hence, petitioners recovered from PDAF all the rights over the subject property and the three other parcels of land. Thereafter, petitioner Republic transferred the subject property to the PMO for disposition. Nevertheless, respondent Sunvar continued to occupy the property.

On 22 February 2008, or six years after the main lease contract expired, petitioner Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), advised respondent Sunvar to completely vacate the subject property within thirty (30) days.24 The latter duly received the Notice from the OSG through registered mail,25 but failed to vacate and remained on the property.26


















On 03 February 2009, respondent Sunvar received from respondent OSG a final notice to vacate within 15 days.27 When the period lapsed, respondent Sunvar again refused to vacate the property and continued to occupy it.

On 02 April 2009, the PMO issued an Inspection and Appraisal Report to determine the fair rental value of the subject property and petitioners’ lost income – a loss arising from the refusal of respondent Sunvar to vacate the property after the expiration of the main lease contract and sublease agreements.28 Using the market comparison approach, the PMO determined that the fair rental value of the subject property was P 10,364,000 per month, and that respondent Sunvar owed petitioners a total of P 630,123,700 from 01 January 2002 to 31 March 2009.29

On 23 July 2009, petitioners filed the Complaint dated 26 May 2009 for unlawful detainer with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City. Petitioners prayed that respondent Sunvar be ordered to vacate the subject property and to pay damages for the illegal use and lost income owing to them:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully prayed that after proper proceedings, judgment be rendered:

1. Ordering defendant SUNVAR REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and all persons, natural and juridical, claiming rights under it, to vacate the subject property and peacefully surrender the same, with the useful improvements therein, to the plaintiffs or to their authorized representative; and

2. Ordering defendant SUNVAR REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION to pay plaintiffs damages in the amount of SIX HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION ONE HUNDRED TWENTY THREE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED PESOS (P 630,123,700.00) for the illegal and unauthorized use and occupation of the subject property from January 1, 2003 to March 31, 2009, and the amount of TEN MILLION THREE HUNDRED SIXTY-FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P 10,364,000.00) per month from April 1, 2008 until the subject property, together with its improvements, are completely vacated and peacefully surrendered to the plaintiffs or to their authorized representative.30

Respondent Sunvar moved to dismiss the Complaint and argued that the allegations of petitioners in the Complaint did not constitute an action for unlawful detainer, since no privity of contract existed between them.31 In the alternative, it also argued that petitioners’ cause of action was more properly an accion publiciana, which fell within the jurisdiction of the RTC, and not the MeTC, considering that the petitioners’ supposed dispossession of the subject property by respondent had already lasted for more than one year.

In its Order dated 16 September 2009, the MeTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and directed respondent Sunvar to file an answer to petitioners’ Complaint.32 The lower court likewise denied the Motion for Reconsideration33 filed by respondent.34 Respondent later on filed its Answer35 to the Complaint.36

Despite the filing of its Answer in the summary proceedings for ejectment, respondent Sunvar filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari with the RTC of Makati City to assail the denial by the MeTC of respondent’s Motion to Dismiss.37













In answer to the Rule 65 Petition of respondent, petitioners placed in issue the jurisdiction of the RTC and reasoned that the Rules on Summary Procedure expressly prohibited the filing of a petition for certiorari against the interlocutory orders of the MeTC.38 Hence, they prayed for the outright dismissal of the certiorari Petition of respondent Sunvar.

The RTC denied the motion for dismissal and ruled that extraordinary circumstances called for an exception to the general rule on summary proceedings.39 Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,40 which was subsequently denied by the RTC.41 Hence, the hearing on the certiorari Petition of respondent proceeded, and the parties filed their respective Memoranda.42

In the assailed Order dated 01 December 2010, which discussed the merits of the certiorari Petition, the RTC granted the Rule 65 Petition and directed the MeTC to dismiss the Complaint for unlawful detainer for lack of jurisdiction.43 The RTC reasoned that the one-year period for the filing of an unlawful detainer case was reckoned from the expiration of the main lease contract and the sublease agreements on 31 December 2002. Petitioners should have then filed an accion publiciana with the RTC in 2009, instead of an unlawful detainer suit.

Hence, the instant Rule 45 Petition filed by petitioners.44

IPetitioners’ Resort to a Rule 45 Petition

Before the Court proceeds with the legal questions in this case, there are procedural issues that merit preliminary attention.

Respondent Sunvar argued that petitioners’ resort to a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court is an improper mode of review of the assailed RTC Decision. Allegedly, petitioners should have availed themselves of a Rule 65 Petition instead, since the RTC Decision was an order of dismissal of the Complaint, from which no appeal can be taken except by a certiorari petition.

The Court is unconvinced of the arguments of respondent Sunvar and holds that the resort by petitioners to the present Rule 45 Petition is perfectly within the bounds of our procedural rules.

As respondent Sunvar explained, no appeal may be taken from an order of the RTC dismissing an action without prejudice,45 but the aggrieved party may file a certiorari petition under Rule 65.46 Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this Court, in case only questions of law are raised or involved.47 This latter situation was one that petitioners found themselves in when they filed the instant Petition to raise only questions of law.

In Republic v. Malabanan,48 the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court













under Rule 45. "The first mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal is elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law."49 (Emphasis supplied.)

There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter.50 The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.51

In the instant case, petitioners raise only questions of law with respect to the jurisdiction of the RTC to entertain a certiorari petition filed against the interlocutory order of the MeTC in an unlawful detainer suit. At issue in the present case is the correct application of the Rules on Summary Procedure; or, more specifically, whether the RTC violated the Rules when it took cognizance and granted the certiorari petition against the denial by the MeTC of the Motion to Dismiss filed by respondent Sunvar. This is clearly a question of law that involves the proper interpretation of the Rules on Summary Procedure. Therefore, the instant Rule 45 Petition has been properly lodged with this Court.

IIPropriety of a Rule 65 Petition in Summary Proceedings

Proceeding now to determine that very question of law, the Court finds that it was erroneous for the RTC to have taken cognizance of the Rule 65 Petition of respondent Sunvar, since the Rules on Summary Procedure expressly prohibit this relief for unfavorable interlocutory orders of the MeTC. Consequently, the assailed RTC Decision is annulled.

Under the Rules on Summary Procedure, a certiorari petition under Rule 65 against an interlocutory order issued by the court in a summary proceeding is a prohibited pleading.52 The prohibition is plain enough, and its further exposition is unnecessary verbiage.53 The RTC should have dismissed outright respondent Sunvar’s Rule 65 Petition, considering that it is a prohibited pleading. Petitioners have already alerted the RTC of this legal bar and immediately prayed for the dismissal of the certiorari Petition.54 Yet, the RTC not only refused to dismiss the certiorari Petition,55 but even proceeded to hear the Rule 65 Petition on the merits.

Respondent Sunvar’s reliance on Bayog v. Natino56 and Go v. Court of Appeals57 to justify a certiorari review by the RTC owing to "extraordinary circumstances" is misplaced. In both cases, there were peculiar and specific circumstances that justified the filing of the mentioned prohibited pleadings under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure – conditions that are not availing in the case of respondent Sunvar.

In Bayog, Alejandro Bayog filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Patnongon-Bugasong-Valderama, Antique an ejectment case against Alberto Magdato, an agricultural tenant-lessee who had built a house over his property. When Magdato, an illiterate farmer, received the Summons from the MCTC to file his











answer within 10 days, he was stricken with pulmonary tuberculosis and was able to consult a lawyer in San Jose, Antique only after the reglementary period. Hence, when the Answer of Magdato was filed three days after the lapse of the 10-day period, the MCTC ruled that it could no longer take cognizance of his Answer and, hence, ordered his ejectment from Bayog’s land. When his house was demolished in January 1994, Magdato filed a Petition for Relief with the RTC-San Jose, Antique, claiming that he was a duly instituted tenant in the agricultural property, and that he was deprived of due process. Bayog, the landowner, moved to dismiss the Petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC, since a petition for relief from judgment covering a summary proceeding was a prohibited pleading. The RTC, however, denied his Motion to Dismiss and remanded the case to the MCTC for proper disposal.

In resolving the Rule 65 Petition, we ruled that although a petition for relief from judgment was a prohibited pleading under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, the Court nevertheless allowed the filing of the Petition pro hac vice, since Magdato would otherwise suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury:

We disagree with the RTC’s holding that a petition for relief from judgment (Civil Case No. 2708) is not prohibited under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, in light of the Jakihaca ruling. When Section 19 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure bars a petition for relief from judgment, or a petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court, it has in mind no other than Section 1, Rule 38 regarding petitions for relief from judgment, and Rule 65 regarding petitions for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition, of the Rules of Court, respectively. These petitions are cognizable by Regional Trial Courts, and not by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. If Section 19 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and Rules 38 and 65 of the Rules of Court are juxtaposed, the conclusion is inevitable that no petition for relief from judgment nor a special civil action of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus arising from cases covered by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure may be filed with a superior court. This is but consistent with the mandate of Section 36 of B.P. Blg. 129 to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of the cases subject of summary procedure.

Nevertheless, in view of the unusual and peculiar circumstances of this case, unless some form of relief is made available to MAGDATO, the grave injustice and irreparable injury that visited him through no fault or negligence on his part will only be perpetuated. Thus, the petition for relief from judgment which he filed may be allowed or treated, pro hac vice, either as an exception to the rule, or a regular appeal to the RTC, or even an action to annul the order (decision) of the MCTC of 20 September 1993. As an exception, the RTC correctly held that the circumstances alleged therein and the justification pleaded worked in favor of MAGDATO, and that the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 2708 was without merit. xxx 58 (Emphasis supplied.)

On the other hand, in Go v. Court of Appeals, the Court was confronted with a procedural void in the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure that justified the resort to a Rule 65 Petition in the RTC. In that case, the preliminary conference in the subject ejectment suit was held in abeyance by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities



(MTCC) of Iloilo City until after the case for specific performance involving the same parties shall have been finally decided by the RTC. The affected party appealed the suspension order to the RTC. In response, the adverse party moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it concerned an interlocutory order in a summary proceeding that was not the subject of an appeal. The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and subsequently directed the MTCC to proceed with the hearing of the ejectment suit, a ruling that was upheld by the appellate court.

In affirming the Decisions of the RTC and CA, the Supreme Court allowed the filing of a petition for certiorari against an interlocutory order in an ejectment suit, considering that the affected party was deprived of any recourse to the MTCC’s erroneous suspension of a summary proceeding. Retired Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban eloquently explained the procedural void in this wise:

Indisputably, the appealed [suspension] order is interlocutory, for "it does not dispose of the case but leaves something else to be done by the trial court on the merits of the case." It is axiomatic that an interlocutory order cannot be challenged by an appeal. Thus, it has been held that "the proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment on the merits incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order. Allowing appeals from interlocutory orders would result in the ‘sorry spectacle’ of a case being subject of a counterproductive ping-pong to and from the appellate court as often as a trial court is perceived to have made an error in any of its interlocutory rulings. However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of redress."

Clearly, private respondent cannot appeal the order, being interlocutory. But neither can it file a petition for certiorari, because ejectment suits fall under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, Section 19(g) of which considers petitions for certiorari prohibited pleadings:

x x x x x x x x x

Based on the foregoing, private respondent was literally caught "between Scylla and Charybdis" in the procedural void observed by the Court of Appeals and the RTC. Under these extraordinary circumstances, the Court is constrained to provide it with a remedy consistent with the objective of speedy resolution of cases.

As correctly held by Respondent Court of Appeals, "the purpose of the Rules on Summary Procedure is ‘to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases without regard to technical rules.’ (Section 36, Chapter III, BP Blg. 129)" Pursuant to this objective, the Rules prohibit petitions for certiorari, like a number of other pleadings, in order to prevent unnecessary delays and to expedite the disposition of cases. In this case, however, private respondent challenged the MTCC order delaying the ejectment suit, precisely to avoid the mischief envisioned by the Rules.

Thus, this Court holds that in situations wherein a summary proceeding is suspended indefinitely, a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion may be allowed. Because of the extraordinary circumstances in this case, a petition for


certiorari, in fact, gives spirit and life to the Rules on Summary Procedure. A contrary ruling would unduly delay the disposition of the case and negate the rationale of the said Rules.59 (Emphasis supplied.)

Contrary to the assertion of respondent Sunvar, the factual circumstances in these two cases are not comparable with respondents’ situation, and our rulings therein are inapplicable to its cause of action in the present suit. As this Court explained in Bayog, the general rule is that no special civil action for certiorari may be filed with a superior court from cases covered by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. Respondent Sunvar filed a certiorari Petition in an ejectment suit pending before the MeTC. Worse, the subject matter of the Petition was the denial of respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, which was necessarily an interlocutory order, which is generally not the subject of an appeal. No circumstances similar to the situation of the agricultural tenant-lessee in Bayog are present to support the relaxation of the general rule in the instant case. Respondent cannot claim to have been deprived of reasonable opportunities to argue its case before a summary judicial proceeding.

Moreover, there exists no procedural void akin to that in Go v. Court of Appeals that would justify respondent’s resort to a certiorari Petition before the RTC. When confronted with the MeTC’s adverse denial of its Motion to Dismiss in the ejectment case, the expeditious and proper remedy for respondent should have been to proceed with the summary hearings and to file its answer. Indeed, its resort to a certiorari Petition in the RTC over an interlocutory order in a summary ejectment proceeding was not only prohibited. The certiorari Petition was already a superfluity on account of respondent’s having already taken advantage of a speedy and available remedy by filing an Answer with the MeTC.

Respondent Sunvar failed to substantiate its claim of extraordinary circumstances that would constrain this Court to apply the exceptions obtaining in Bayog and Go. The Court hesitates to liberally dispense the benefits of these two judicial precedents to litigants in summary proceedings, lest these exceptions be regularly abused and freely availed of to defeat the very goal of an expeditious and inexpensive determination of an unlawful detainer suit. If the Court were to relax the interpretation of the prohibition against the filing of certiorari petitions under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, the RTCs may be inundated with similar prayers from adversely affected parties questioning every order of the lower court and completely dispensing with the goal of summary proceedings in forcible entry or unlawful detainer suits.

IIIReckoning the One-Year Period in Unlawful Detainer Cases

We now come to another legal issue underlying the present Petition – whether the Complaint filed by petitioners is properly an action for unlawful detainer within the jurisdiction of the MeTC or an accion publiciana lodged with the RTC. At the heart of the controversy is the reckoning period of the one-year requirement for unlawful detainer suits.

Whether or not petitioners’ action for unlawful detainer was brought within one year after the unlawful withholding of possession will determine whether it was properly



filed with the MeTC. If, as petitioners argue, the one-year period should be counted from respondent Sunvar’s receipt on 03 February 2009 of the Final Notice to Vacate, then their Complaint was timely filed within the one-year period and appropriately taken cognizance of by the MeTC. However, if the reckoning period is pegged from the expiration of the main lease contract and/or sublease agreement, then petitioners’ proper remedy should have been an accion publiciana to be filed with the RTC.

The Court finds that petitioners correctly availed themselves of an action for unlawful detainer and, hence, reverses the ruling of the RTC.

Under the Rules of Court, lessors against whom possession of any land is unlawfully withheld after the expiration of the right to hold possession may – by virtue of any express or implied contract, and within one year after the unlawful deprivation – bring an action in the municipal trial court against the person unlawfully withholding possession, for restitution of possession with damages and costs.60 Unless otherwise stipulated, the action of the lessor shall commence only after a demand to pay or to comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee; or after a written notice of that demand is served upon the person found on the premises, and the lessee fails to comply therewith within 15 days in the case of land or 5 days in the case of buildings.61

In Delos Reyes v. Spouses Odenes,62 the Court recently defined the nature and scope of an unlawful detainer suit, as follows:

Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession by the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess. The proceeding is summary in nature, jurisdiction over which lies with the proper MTC or metropolitan trial court. The action must be brought up within one year from the date of last demand, and the issue in the case must be the right to physical possession. (Emphasis supplied.)

Hence, a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it states the following elements:

1. Initially, the possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff.

2. Eventually, the possession became illegal upon the plaintiff’s notice to the defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession.

3. Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the latter’s enjoyment.

4. Within one year from the making of the last demand on the defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the Complaint for ejectment.63

"On the other hand, accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when






dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint, more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one of forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana."64

There are no substantial disagreements with respect to the first three requisites for an action for unlawful detainer. Respondent Sunvar initially derived its right to possess the subject property from its sublease agreements with TRCFI and later on with PDAF. However, with the expiration of the lease agreements on 31 December 2002, respondent lost possessory rights over the subject property. Nevertheless, it continued occupying the property for almost seven years thereafter. It was only on 03 February 2009 that petitioners made a final demand upon respondent Sunvar to turn over the property. What is disputed, however, is the fourth requisite of an unlawful detainer suit.

The Court rules that the final requisite is likewise availing in this case, and that the one-year period should be counted from the final demand made on 03 February 2009.

Contrary to the reasoning of the RTC,65 the one-year period to file an unlawful detainer case is not counted from the expiration of the lease contract on 31 December 2002. Indeed, the last demand for petitioners to vacate is the reckoning period for determining the one-year period in an action for unlawful detainer. "Such one year period should be counted from the date of plaintiff’s last demand on defendant to vacate the real property, because only upon the lapse of that period does the possession become unlawful."66

In case several demands to vacate are made, the period is reckoned from the date of the last demand.67 In Leonin v. Court of Appeals,68 the Court, speaking through Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, reckoned the one-year period to file the unlawful detainer Complaint – filed on 25 February 1997 – from the latest demand letter dated 24 October 1996, and not from the earlier demand letter dated 03 July 1995:

Prospero Leonin (Prospero) and five others were co-owners of a 400-square meter property located at K-J Street, East Kamias, Quezon City whereon was constructed a two-storey house and a three-door apartment identified as No. 1-A, B, and C.

Prospero and his co-owners allowed his siblings, herein petitioners, to occupy Apartment C without paying any rentals.

x x x x x x x x x

Petitioners further contend that respondent’s remedy is accion publiciana because their possession is not de facto, they having been authorized by the true and lawful owners of the property; and that one year had elapsed from respondent’s demand given on "July 3, 1995" when the unlawful detainer complaint was filed.

The petition fails.







Contrary to petitioners’ contention, the allegations in the complaint make out a case for unlawful detainer. Thus, respondent alleged, inter alia, that she is the registered owner of the property and that petitioners, who are tenants by tolerance, refused to vacate the premises despite the notice to vacate sent to them.

Likewise, contrary to petitioners’ contention, the one-year period for filing a complaint for unlawful detainer is reckoned from the date of the last demand, in this case October 24, 1996, the reason being that the lessor has the right to waive his right of action based on previous demands and let the lessee remain meanwhile in the premises. Thus, the filing of the complaint on February 25, 1997 was well within the one year reglementary period.69 (Emphasis supplied.)

From the time that the main lease contract and sublease agreements expired (01 January 2003), respondent Sunvar no longer had any possessory right over the subject property. Absent any express contractual renewal of the sublease agreement or any separate lease contract, it illegally occupied the land or, at best, was allowed to do so by mere tolerance of the registered owners – petitioners herein. Thus, respondent Sunvar’s possession became unlawful upon service of the final notice on 03 February 2009. Hence, as an unlawful occupant of the land of petitioners, and without any contract between them, respondent is "necessarily bound by an implied promise" that it "will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them."70 Upon service of the final notice of demand, respondent Sunvar should have vacated the property and, consequently, petitioners had one year or until 02 February 2010 in which to resort to the summary action for unlawful detainer. In the instant case, their Complaint was filed with the MeTC on 23 July 2009, which was well within the one-year period.

The Court is aware that petitioners had earlier served a Notice to Vacate on 22 February 2008, which could have possibly tolled the one-year period for filing an unlawful detainer suit. Nevertheless, they can be deemed to have waived their right of action against respondent Sunvar and continued to tolerate its occupation of the subject property. That they sent a final Notice to Vacate almost a year later gave respondent another opportunity to comply with their implied promise as occupants by mere tolerance. Consequently, the one-year period for filing a summary action for unlawful detainer with the MeTC must be reckoned from the latest demand to vacate.

In the past, the Court ruled that subsequent demands that are merely in the nature of reminders of the original demand do not operate to renew the one-year period within which to commence an ejectment suit, considering that the period will still be reckoned from the date of the original demand.71 If the subsequent demands were merely in the nature of reminders of the original demand, the one-year period to commence an ejectment suit would be counted from the first demand.72 However, respondent failed to raise in any of the proceedings below this question of fact as to the nature of the second demand issued by the OSG. It is now too late in the proceedings for them to argue that the 2009 Notice to Vacate was a mere reiteration or reminder of the 2008 Notice to Vacate. In any event, this factual determination is beyond the scope of the present Rule 45 Petition, which is limited to resolving questions of law.






The Court notes that respondent Sunvar has continued to occupy the subject property since the expiration of its sublease on 31 December 2002. The factual issue of whether respondent has paid rentals to petitioners from the expiration of the sublease to the present was never raised or sufficiently argued before this Court. Nevertheless, it has not escaped the Court’s attention that almost a decade has passed without any resolution of this controversy regarding respondent’s possession of the subject property, contrary to the aim of expeditious proceedings under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. With the grant of the instant Petition and the remand of the case to the MeTC for continued hearing, the Court emphasizes the duty of the lower court to speedily resolve this matter once and for all, especially since this case involves a prime property of the government located in the country’s business district and the various opportunities for petitioners to gain public revenues from the property.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 14 February 2011, filed by petitioners Republic and National Power Corporation, which are represented here by the Privatization Management Office. The assailed Decision dated 01 December 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, is DIRECTED to proceed with the summary proceedings for the unlawful detainer case in Civil Case No. 98708.

SO ORDERED.


G.R. No. 172008 August 1, 2012

HEIRS OF ROGELIO ISIP, SR., namely: CELEDONIA, ROLANDO, ROGELIO, JR., all surnamed ISIP, and IRENE ISIP-SILVESTRE, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact ROLANDO ISIP, Petitioners, vs.RODOLFO QUINTOS, RODOLFO DE GUZMAN and ISAGANI ISIP, doing business under the name RONIRO ENTERPRISES COMPANY, Respondents.

In forcible entry cases, the only issue is who has the better right of possession over the subject property.

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision1 dated 18, 2003 and Resolution2 dated March 21, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 74178. The CA affirmed the Order3 dated July 31, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 154, in SCA No. 2146 which reconsidered and set aside its own Decision4 dated March 25, 2002 and in effect affirmed in toto the Decision5 dated May 22, 2001 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Taguig City, Branch 74, in Civil Case No. 1715 which dismissed herein petitioners’ complaint for forcible entry against the respondents.

Factual Antecedents

In 1986, Rogelio Isip, Sr. (Rogelio Sr.) occupied and took possession of a parcel of land known as Lot 69, Block 169 Psd-13-002680. Located at No. 2 Barrameda Street, Upper Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila, the said parcel of land contains an area of 292 square meters, more or less, where Rogelio Sr. constructed a small house to serve as his place of residence.

A year later, Toyo Keiki Philippines, Inc. (Toyo Keiki) requested Rogelio Sr. that it be allowed to dig a deep well on the subject property and to put up thereon a water distribution system. Since Rogelio Sr. was a stockholder of Toyo Keiki, he allowed the corporation to build the water distribution system. Thus, Toyo Keiki tore down Rogelio Sr.’s house and replaced it with a bigger structure with a room for the latter and an office in front. The water distribution project, however, did not become fully operational.

In January 1991, the deep well was rehabilitated with funding from Sunrise Management Corporation and Jiro Yamashita. Upon the completion of the rehabilitation work, Sunrise Management Corporation operated the water distribution system with Rogelio Sr. as General Manager, assisted by his two sons Rolando Isip (Rolando) and Rogelio Isip, Jr. (Rogelio Jr.) and brother-in-law Alfredo Lobo.

In 1997, Rodolfo Quintos (Quintos) proposed to Rogelio Sr. to operate a car repair shop in the compound. Since Quintos is a former claims manager in an insurance company and is familiar with running a business, Rogelio Sr. agreed and, hence, a car repair shop was constructed in the compound. However, despite the completion of the repair shop, they were not able to start the business due to Rogelio Sr.’s illness.

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_172008_2012.html#fnt5






On February 5, 1998, Rogelio Sr. died. Six months later, his son Rolando was appointed General Manager of the water distribution system of Sunrise Management Corporation. Quintos then revived to Rolando the proposal to establish the car repair shop.

Quintos allegedly told Rolando that there was a need for accreditation from the insurance companies before the car repair shop could commence operation. In line with such accreditation, Quintos told Rolando that inspectors from the insurance companies will conduct ocular inspection to see if the building is being used for commercial or business purposes and not for residential use. Hence, Rolando had to temporarily vacate the premises. Relying on the representations of Quintos, who was their legal counsel and the godfather of Rogelio Jr., Rolando and Rogelio Jr. agreed to temporarily vacate the compound.

When Rolando returned to the compound, however, he was refused entry by three armed security guards allegedly upon the instructions of Quintos, Rodolfo De Guzman (De Guzman), and Isagani Isip (Isip). A notice was also posted at the gates of the compound that Sunrise Management Corporation had been dissolved and that the deep well compound was already under the management of Roniro Enterprises Company (Roniro Enterpises).

Thus, on January 4, 1999, petitioners Celedonia Isip, Rolando, Rogelio Jr. and Irene Isip-Silvestre, claiming to be the legitimate children and legal heirs of Rogelio Sr., filed before the MeTC of Taguig City a complaint for forcible entry against respondents Quintos, De Guzman, and Isip, all doing business under the name Roniro Enterprises. Petitioners claimed that respondents, through deceit, strategy, and stealth, succeeded in entering the deep well compound and once inside the premises, prevented the petitioners from re-entering the same through the use of force, intimidation, and threat.

Respondents vehemently denied the charge. They asserted that Eddie Dizal Pontino (Pontino) formerly owned and occupied the disputed lot. On May 12, 1984, he executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of Rights in favor of Pendatun Hadji Datu (Hadji Datu) for the sum of P 60,000.00. However, on May 19, 1984, Pontino rescinded the said contract of sale on the ground that Hadji Datu failed to pay the purchase price of the lot after repeated demands to do so.6

Despite the rescission of the contract of sale, Hadji Datu sold the lot to Toyo Keiki, through its President Michael S. Sagara (Sagara), the latter being unaware of the said rescission. Subsequently Pontino wrote a letter7 to Toyo Keiki through Sagara informing the latter that Hadji Datu never became the owner of the subject lot. Thus, when Hadji Datu tried to claim the balance of the purchase price, Sagara told him that he cannot release the said amount because Pontino claimed to be the true owner and possessor of the subject lot.

In 1988, Pontino and Jedco Corporation entered into a Deed of Assignment concerning the water distribution system and the subject lot. Jedco Corporation then acquired the right of possession over the premises in question and the control over the operation of the water distribution system.




It was not long thereafter when Jedco Corporation decided to withdraw and relinquish its rights over the premises in question in favor of De Guzman. De Guzman then took over the premises and summoned the late Ireneo Isip (Ireneo) and Quintos to help him in the operation of the water distribution business. Ireneo then recommended his brother Rogelio Sr. to manage the said business under the umbrella of Sunrise Management Corporation.

Respondents claimed that Rogelio Sr., the petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest, was an employee of Sunrise Management Corporation. After the death of Rogelio Sr., De Guzman wrote a letter dated August 14, 1998 addressed to the president and chairman of the board of Sunrise Management Corporation stating that he is terminating the services of the said corporation because of the unfortunate death of Rogelio Sr. In the same letter, De Guzman likewise held Sunrise Management Corporation, together with the sons of Rogelio Sr., responsible to render an accounting relative to the operation of the said deep well.

Respondents prayed that judgment be rendered dismissing the complaint for lack of merit; ordering petitioners to jointly and severally pay moral damages and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, plus other litigation expenses as may be proven, and the costs of the suit.

Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court

After summary proceedings, the MeTC rendered a Decision on May 22, 2001 dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action. It held that no forcible entry was committed since Roniro Enterprises was merely exercising its right over the premises.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

Upon appeal, the RTC initially reversed and set aside the MeTC’s Decision. On respondents’ motion for reconsideration, however, the RTC issued an Order8 reversing its earlier Decision and affirming the MeTC’s May 22, 2001 Decision. Thus:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated March 25, 2002, of this Court is hereby RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE and the Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Taguig, Metro Manila, in Civil Case No. 1715, which was appealed to this Court, is hereby affirmed in toto.

SO ORDERED.9

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for review before the CA. On June 18, 2003, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision10 dismissing the petition and affirming the Order of the RTC. Undeterred, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration11 but it was likewise denied.12

Despite having been thrice rebuffed, petitioners remain unfazed and are now before this Court via this petition for review on certiorari.







Issue

The only issue to be determined in this case is whether the respondents committed forcible entry.

Our Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, a case of forcible entry may be filed by, "a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth x x x." In cases of forcible entry, "the possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possessionde facto."13

In the case at bench, petitioners argue that respondents deprived them of the possession of their lot through deceit, strategy, and stealth. They aver that respondents deceived them to temporarily vacate the premises on the pretext that they must convince the insurance inspectors that the premises are being used solely for commercial purposes. They were thus allegedly tricked to move out and once the respondents achieved their goal, they were prevented from entering the premises by posting security guards at the gates.

For their part, respondents claim that they have in their favor prior possession of the land dating back to 1984. They stake their claim of possession upon the right of title and possession of Pontino. The respondents posit that through a series of various transfers originating from Pontino, they now legally occupy the subject premises and do their business therein under the name Roniro Enterprises.

It is clear that respondents have prior possession de facto. While petitioners allege that their predecessor-in-interest Rogelio Sr. was in possession of the subject lot in 1986, evidence on record supports the respondents’ claim that as early as 1984, Pontino not only possessed and occupied the lot but also had a title over the disputed property. And by virtue of a Deed of Assignment between Pontino and Jedco Corporation, which the latter relinquished in favor of De Guzman, respondents enjoy the right of prior possession de facto. In addition, the possession of respondents was lawful from the beginning since it was acquired through lawful means and thus no forcible entry was committed.

Petitioners further assert that the lot they occupy is different from the lot occupied by the respondents. They claim that their lot is located at No. 2, Barrameda St., Upper Bicutan, Taguig while the lot occupied by the respondents is located in Lower Bicutan. This, according to the petitioners, is enough reason to reverse the Decision of the CA as the same "does not conform to the truth."14

However, and as correctly found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, "the point raised by the petitioners x x x in respect of the identity of the property subject of the controversy may not be considered anymore at this point since it was never raised as an issue in their appeal, nay even when the case was heard by the court a quo."15





Moreover, the resolution of the issue raised by petitioners requires us to inquire into the evidence presented during trial. It has been consistently held that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Only questions of law may be entertained subject only to certain exceptions, none of which are present in the instant petition. It is the function of trial courts to resolve factual issues whose findings on these matters are accorded respect and considered binding by the Supreme Court especially when there is no conflict in the factual findings of both the trial court and the appellate court. In this case, the MeTC, the RTC and the CA are one in their findings that respondents did not forcibly enter the subject premises. All three tribunals found that respondents’ possession is lawful and legal from the beginning.

The petitioners also want us to reverse the findings of the court a quo that their predecessor-in-interest was an employee of Roniro Enterprises.

We find no reason to do so.

It is clear from the facts that when the rights over the subject lot was relinquished in favor of De Guzman, Rogelio Sr. was employed in order to help the respondents run the water distribution system. Hence, it was actually through the respondents that the petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest was able to enter the disputed lot. And although Rogelio Sr. was able to occupy the lot, he was in fact possessing the same in the name of the respondents. Verily, whatever right to possess petitioners have in this case cannot be superior to that of the respondents since it was from the latter that their predecessor-in-interest derived his claim of possession.

In Reyes v. Court of Appeals,16 we held thus:

Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as those a party would naturally exercise over his own property. It is not necessary that the owner of a parcel of land should himself occupy the property as someone in his name may perform the act. In other words, the owner of real estate has possession, either when he himself is physically in occupation of the property, or when another person who recognizes his rights as owner is in such occupancy. This declaration is in conformity with Art. 524 of the Civil Code providing that possession may be exercised in one’s own name or in the name of another.

The CA therefore correctly cited the case of Dalida v. Court of Appeals,17 where it was held that a mere caretaker of a land has no right of possession over such land.

To conclude and to finally put this case to rest, forcible entry being an ejectment case is summary in nature. When the findings of facts of the trial court have been affirmed by the CA, such are binding and deemed conclusive upon the Supreme Court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated June 18, 2003 and Resolution dated March 21, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74178 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.




G.R. No. 174082 January 16, 2012

GEORGIA T. ESTEL, Petitioner, vs.RECAREDO P. DIEGO, SR. and RECAREDO R. DIEGO, JR., Respondents.

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the Decision1 promulgated on September 30, 2005 and Resolution2 dated August 10, 2006 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 77197. The assailed Decision affirmed the Decision dated October 7, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gingoog City, Branch 27, Misamis Oriental, while the questioned Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

The present petition originated from a Complaint for Forcible Entry, Damages and Injunction with Application for Temporary Restraining Order filed by herein respondents Recaredo P. Diego, Sr., and Recaredo R. Diego, Jr. with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Gingoog City, Misamis Oriental. Respondents alleged that on April 16, 1991, they entered into a contract of sale of a 306 –square-meter parcel of land, denominated as Lot 19, with petitioner; after receiving the amount of P17,000.00 as downpayment, petitioner voluntarily delivered the physical and material possession of the subject property to respondents; respondents had been in actual, adverse and uninterrupted possession of the subject lot since then and that petitioner never disturbed, molested, annoyed nor vexed respondents with respect to their possession of the said property; around 8:30 in the morning of July 20, 1995, petitioner, together with her two grown-up sons and five other persons, uprooted the fence surrounding the disputed lot, after which they entered its premises and then cut and destroyed the trees and plants found therein; respondent Recaredo R. Diego, Jr. witnessed the incident but found himself helpless at that time. Respondents prayed for the restoration of their possession, for the issuance of a permanent injunction against petitioner as well as payment of damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.3

On July 26, 1995, the MTCC issued a Temporary Restraining Order4 against petitioner and any person acting in her behalf.

In her Answer with Special/Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims, petitioner denied the material allegations in the Complaint contending that respondents were never in physical, actual, public, adverse and uninterrupted possession of the subject lot; full possession and absolute ownership of the disputed parcel of land, with all improvements thereon, had always been that of petitioner and her daughter; the agreement she entered into with the wife of respondent Recaredo P. Diego, Sr. for the sale of the subject lot had been abrogated; she even offered to return the amount she received from respondents, but the latter refused to accept the same and instead offered an additional amount of P12,000.00 as part of the purchase price but she also refused to accept their offer; the subject of the deed of sale between petitioner and respondents and what has been delivered to respondents was actually Lot 16 which is adjacent to the disputed Lot 19; that they did not

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destroy the improvements found on the subject lot and, in fact, any improvements therein were planted by petitioner's parents.5

On February 16, 2002, the MTCC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, viewed in the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs [herein respondents], dismissing defendant's [herein petitioner's] counterclaim and ordering the defendant, her agents and representatives:

1. To vacate the premises of the land in question and return the same to the plaintiffs;

2. To pay plaintiffs, the following, to wit:

a) P100.00 a month as rentals for the use of the litigated property reckoned from the filing of the complaint until the defendant vacates the property;

b) P5,000.00 representing the value of the fence and plants damaged by the defendants as actual damages;

c) P20,000.00 as and for attorney's fees;

d) P2,000.00 for litigation expenses;

3. Ordering the defendant to pay the cost of suit;

Execution shall immediately issue upon motion unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a supersedeas bond which is hereby fixed at P10,000.00 approved by this Court and executed in favor of the plaintiffs, to pay the rents, damages and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, defendant deposits with the appellate court the amount ofP100.00 as monthly rental due from time to time on or before the 10th day of each succeeding month or period.

SO ORDERED.6

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the RTC of Gingoog City.7

On October 7, 2002, the RTC rendered its Decision8 affirming the assailed Decision of the MTCC.

Petitioner then filed a petition for review with the CA.

On September 30, 2005, the CA promulgated its Decision which affirmed the Decision of the RTC.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated August 10, 2006.

Hence, the instant petition based on the following arguments:






[THE] COURT OF APPEALS, 23rd DIVISION, ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT THE RTC BRANCH 27 OF GINGOOG CITY ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT THE MTCC OF GINGOOG CITY HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE ACTION.

[THE] COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RECOGNIZING THAT THE RTC BRANCH 27 OF GINGOOG CITY FAILED TO MAKE A FINDING OF FACT THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED LIKEWISE IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 27 OF GINGOOG CITY OVERLOOKING THE FACT THAT ITS FINDING OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS ARE AGAINST OR NOT SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT MATERIAL EVIDENCE.9

Petitioner contends that since respondents failed to allege the location of the disputed parcel of land in their complaint, the MTCC did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the said complaint. Petitioner also avers that the MTCC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for failure of respondents to specifically allege facts constitutive of forcible entry. On the bases of these two grounds, petitioner argues that the MTCC should have dismissed the complaint motu proprio.

Petitioner also avers that the complaint states no cause of action because the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping accompanying the complaint are defective and, as such, the complaint should be treated as an unsigned pleading. As to the verification, petitioner contends that it should be based on respondent's personal knowledge or on authentic record and not simply upon "knowledge, information and belief." With respect to the certificate of non-forum shopping, petitioner claims that its defect consists in respondents' failure to make an undertaking therein that if they should learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or any other tribunal or agency, they shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court or agency wherein the original pleading and sworn certification have been filed.

The Court does not agree.

A review of the records shows that petitioner did not raise the issue of jurisdiction or venue in her Answer filed with the MTCC. The CA correctly held that even if the geographical location of the subject property was not alleged in the Complaint, petitioner failed to seasonably object to the same in her Affirmative Defense, and even actively participated in the proceedings before the MTCC. In fact, petitioner did not even raise this issue in her appeal filed with the RTC. Thus, she is already estopped from raising the said issue in the CA or before this Court. Estoppel sets in when a party participates in all stages of a case before challenging the jurisdiction of the lower court.10One cannot belatedly reject or repudiate the lower court's decision after voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction, just to secure affirmative relief against one's opponent or after failing to obtain such relief.11 The Court has, time and again, frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting a case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.12






In any case, since the Complaint is clearly and admittedly one for forcible entry, the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is, thus, upon the MTCC of Gingoog City. Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, as amended by Section 3 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, as well as Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, clearly provides that forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. Hence, as the MTCC has jurisdiction over the action, the question whether or not the suit was brought in the place where the land in dispute is located was no more than a matter of venue and the court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction over the case, could determine whether venue was properly or improperly laid.13 There having been no objection on the part of petitioner and it having been shown by evidence presented by both parties that the subject lot was indeed located in Gingoog City, and that it was only through mere inadvertence or oversight that such information was omitted in the Complaint, petitioner's objection became a pure technicality.

As to respondents' supposed failure to allege facts constitutive of forcible entry, it is settled that in actions for forcible entry, two allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to acquire jurisdiction.14 First, the plaintiff must allege his prior physical possession of the property.15 Second, he must also allege that he was deprived of his possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court, namely, force, intimidation, threats, strategy, and stealth.16

In the present case, it is clear that respondents sufficiently alleged in their Complaint the material facts constituting forcible entry, as they explicitly claimed that they had prior physical possession of the subject property since its purchase from petitioner, who voluntarily delivered the same to them. They also particularly described in their complaint how petitioner, together with her two sons and five other persons, encroached upon the subject property and dispossessed them of the same. Respondents' complaint contains the allegations that petitioner, abetting and conspiring with other persons, without respondents' knowledge and consent and through the use of force and intimidation, entered a portion of their land and, thereafter, uprooted and destroyed the fence surrounding the subject lot, as well as cut the trees and nipa palms planted thereon. Unlawfully entering the subject property and excluding therefrom the prior possessor would necessarily imply the use of force and this is all that is necessary.17In order to constitute force, the trespasser does not have to institute a state of war.18 No other proof is necessary.19 In the instant case, it is, thus, irrefutable that respondents sufficiently alleged that the possession of the subject property was wrested from them through violence and force.

Anent respondents' alleged defective verification, the Court again notes that this issue was not raised before the MTCC. Even granting that this matter was properly raised before the court a quo, the Court finds that there is no procedural defect that would have warranted the outright dismissal of respondents' complaint as there is compliance with the requirement regarding verification.

Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC provides:









Sec. 4. Verification. – Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.

A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief" or upon "knowledge, information and belief" or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.

A reading of respondents’ verification reveals that they complied with the abovequoted procedural rule.1awp++i1Respondents confirmed that they had read the allegations in the Complaint which were true and correct based on their personal knowledge. 1 The addition of the words "to the best" before the phrase "of our own personal knowledge" did not violate the requirement under Section 4, Rule 7, it being sufficient that the respondents declared that the allegations in the complaint are true and correct based on their personal knowledge.20

Verification is deemed substantially complied with when, as in the instant case, one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.21

As to respondents' certification on non-forum shopping, a reading of respondents’ Verification/Certification reveals that they, in fact, certified therein that they have not commenced any similar action before any other court or tribunal and to the best of their knowledge no such other action is pending therein. The only missing statement is respondents' undertaking that if they should thereafter learn that the same or similar action has been filed or is pending, they shall report such fact to the court. This, notwithstanding, the Court finds that there has been substantial compliance on the part of respondents.

It is settled that with respect to the contents of the certification against forum shopping, the rule of substantial compliance may be availed of.22 This is because the requirement of strict compliance with the provisions regarding the certification of non-forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded.23 It does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances, as the Court finds in the instant case.24

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals areAFFIRMED.







A.M. No. MTJ-11-1779 July 16, 2012 (formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-2191-MTJ)

MURPHY CHU/ATGAS TRADERS and MARINELLE P. CHU, Complainants, vs.HON. MARIO B. CAPELLAN, Assisting Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 40, Quezon City,Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

BRION, J.:

In a verified complaint dated September 14, 2009 filed before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), the spouses Murphy and Marinelle P. Chu and ATGAS Traders (complainants) charged Judge Mario B. Capellan (respondent), Assisting Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 40, Quezon City, with Gross Ignorance of the Law, Partiality and Grave Abuse of Decision.1

BACKGROUND FACTS

On March 22, 2007, spouses Ofelia and Rafael Angangco filed before the MeTC, Branch 40, Quezon City, an unlawful detainer complaint, with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (PMI) against the complainants.2 The complainants filed their answer with compulsory counterclaim on March 30, 2007.3

The respondent heard the application for the issuance of a writ of PMI on April 11, 2007,4 November 20, 2007,5December 11, 2007,6 February 12, 2008,7 and April 22, 2008.8 He later set the unlawful detainer case for preliminary conference on June 24, 2008, but rescheduled it to August 26, 2008 due to the still pending application for a writ of PMI.9

In an order dated October 7, 2008,10 the respondent denied the application for a writ of PMI and set the case for preliminary conference on November 25, 2008. On this date, the respondent referred the case for mediation,11 so the preliminary conference was again reset to December 9, 2008.12

On November 21, 2008, the spouses Angangco filed their pre-trial brief.13 The complainants, on the other hand, did not file their pre-trial brief.

During the December 9, 2008 preliminary conference, the complainants moved for the consignation of several checks as payment for the amounts they owed to the spouses Angangco, for which the respondent set clarificatory hearings on January 23 and 30, 2009.14 The preliminary conference finally took place on February 3, 2009.15

During the February 3, 2009 preliminary conference, the complainants moved to dismiss the unlawful detainer complaint on the grounds that: (1) the spouses Angangco failed to comply with the required barangay conciliation and to implead the other co-owners of the property subject of the unlawful detainer case; and (2) the MeTC had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of PMI. On the other hand, the spouses

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Angangco orally moved to declare the complainants in default for their failure to file a pre-trial brief.16

On February 26, 2009, the respondent issued the assailed joint order17 which submitted the unlawful detainer case for decision based on the facts alleged in the unlawful detainer complaint.

The complainants moved for reconsideration, but the respondent denied their motion.18 The complainants thereupon filed the present administrative complaint against the respondent. They also filed a motion asking for the respondent’s inhibition from the unlawful detainer case.19 The respondent eventually inhibited himself from the case in an order dated September 8, 2009.20

COMPLAINT AGAINST THE RESPONDENT

The complainants allege that the respondent had no basis to declare them in default because no notice of preliminary conference was issued to them.21 They argue that the issuance of a notice of preliminary conference is mandatory and its non-issuance may be punishable under Section 2, Rule 11 of Supreme Court Administrative Memorandum (A.M.) No. 01-2-04, which provides:

SEC. 2. Disciplinary sanctions on the judge. – The presiding judge may, upon a verified complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator, be subject to disciplinary action under any of the following cases:

xxxx

(2) Failure to issue a pre-trial order in the form prescribed in these Rules.

Also, the complainants allege that the respondent erred in entertaining the oral motion to declare the defendants in default; in incurring delay in setting the unlawful detainer case for preliminary conference; and in not dismissing the unlawful detainer complaint for the spouses Angangco’s failure to personally appear during the mediation proceedings. The complainants also allege that these acts of the respondent clearly showed the latter’s bias and partiality towards the plaintiffs.

THE RESPONDENT’S ANSWER

In his answer with counter-charge,22 the respondent argues that he did not commit any violation for failing to issue a notice of preliminary conference because there is nothing in the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure or the Rules of Court, particularly in Section 6, Rule 18, that requires him to issue a notice of preliminary conference, in addition to his order setting the case for preliminary conference. He claims that, despite the lack of notice, both parties were duly informed of the preliminary conference on November 25, 2008 through his order dated October 7, 2008; thus, to issue a notice at that time would only be superfluous.

The respondent adds that the complainants’ citation of Supreme Court A.M. No. 01-2-04 was misplaced; that the said memorandum applies exclusively to cases involving intra-corporate controversies, not to ejectment cases, and subjects a judge to disciplinary action for his failure to issue a pre-trial order, not for failure to issue a notice of preliminary conference.









On the complainants’ other allegations, the respondent argues that he could not be faulted for not dismissing the unlawful detainer complaint due to the alleged failure of the spouses Angangco to personally appear at the mediation proceedings because he could not have known of their non-appearance during that time, as he was informed of what happened during the mediation proceedings only after their conclusion. He also states that it would be unfair to allow the complainants, who actively participated in the mediation proceedings, to now impugn their dealings with and the authority of the lawyer who attended the mediation in behalf of the spouses Angangco.

Ultimately, the respondent prayed for the dismissal of the administrative complaint, as it is nothing but an insidious attempt by the complainants to harass him and to conceal their negligence in not filing a pre-trial brief.

THE OCA’S RECOMMENDATION

In a report dated November 11, 2010,23 the OCA finds no merit in some of the complainants’ allegations.

First, the OCA remains unconvinced that the complainants’ rights to due process were violated because of the lack of notice of preliminary conference; that the complainants could not feign ignorance of the scheduled date of preliminary conference and their need to file a pre-trial brief since they received copies of the respondent’s order dated October 7, 2008 and of the other party’s pre-trial brief before the scheduled preliminary conference on November 25, 2008; and that the complainants were also present in court during the times the preliminary conference was repeatedly reset to later dates. Considering these circumstances, the OCA opines that the complainants were merely finding an excuse to justify their negligence as they were afforded enough opportunity to submit their pre-trial brief, but they still failed to do so.

Second, the OCA agrees with the respondent that Supreme Court A.M. No. 01-2-04 is inapplicable to the subject unlawful detainer case as it pertains to the Proposed Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8799.24

Third, the OCA belies the complainants’ allegation that the respondent entertained the spouses Angangco’s oral motion to declare defendants in default. While the complainants were correct that a motion to declare defendants in default is a prohibited pleading under the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure; the respondent, in issuing the assailed joint order dated February 26, 2009, did not rule on the basis of the oral motion but relied on Section 8, Rule 70, in relation to Section 6, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Sec. 8. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties. – Not later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed, a preliminary conference shall be held. The provisions of Rule 18 on pre-trial shall be applicable to the preliminary conference unless inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.

The failure of the plaintiff to appear in the preliminary conference shall be cause for the dismissal of the complaint. The defendant who appears in the absence of the




plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment on his counterclaim in accordance with the next preceding section. All cross- claims shall be dismissed.

If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff shall likewise be entitled to judgment in accordance with the next preceding section. This procedure shall not apply where one of two or more defendants sued under a common cause of action who had pleaded a common defense shall appear at the preliminary conference.

Sec. 6. Pre-trial brief. - The parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party, in such manner as shall ensure their receipt thereof at least three (3) days before the date of the pre-trial, their respective pre-trial briefs which shall contain, among others:

xxxx

Failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial.

And even assuming that the respondent erred in issuing the assailed joint order, the OCA opines that errors committed in the exercise of adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings where judicial remedies are available; that there must be a final declaration by the appellate court that the assailed order is manifestly erroneous or impelled by ill-will, malice or other similar motive.

The OCA, however, finds merit in the complainants’ allegation that the respondent incurred delay in setting the case for preliminary conference. The OCA finds that the respondent violated Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, which provides that a preliminary conference shall be held not later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed, and Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which mandates that judges should administer justice without delay. It opines that the respondent should have facilitated the prompt disposition of the subject case and refrained from postponing and resetting the case for preliminary conference several times.

The OCA, then, recommends that the present administrative complaint be redocketed as a regular administrative case and that the respondent be reprimanded, considering that this was his first offense, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

In a Resolution dated January 19, 2011,25 we ordered the administrative complaint against the respondent redocketed as a regular administrative case and required the parties to manifest, within ten (10) days from notice, whether they were willing to submit the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings or records filed and submitted.

Both the complainants and the respondent expressed their willingness to submit the case for decision in their Manifestations dated March 22, 201126 and August 29, 2011,27 respectively.

THE COURT’S RULING

We find the OCA’s findings to be well taken.





As the OCA recommends, we find no merit in the complainants’ allegations that the respondent committed gross ignorance of the law, partiality and grave abuse of discretion in not issuing a notice for the holding of the November 25, 2008 preliminary conference, and in entertaining the spouses Angangco’s oral motion to declare the defendants in default.

We find no violation committed by the respondent in not issuing a notice for the November 25, 2008 preliminary conference because his order dated October 7, 2008 already constituted sufficient notice to the parties of the holding of such preliminary conference. In the dispositive portion of said order, the respondent clearly set the case for preliminary conference at exactly one o’clock in the afternoon of November 25, 2008. And both parties in the subject unlawful detainer case received copies of the respondent’s order. Therefore, the complainants have no reason to argue that they were denied their rights to due process in this instance.

On the complainants’ other contention, a close reading of the assailed joint order dated February 26, 2009 would show that the respondent did not actually entertain the oral motion to declare the defendants in default filed by the spouses Angangco, to wit:

On the plaintiffs’ motion to declare defendants as in default, record reveals that defendants have not filed any pre-trial brief with this Court despite the directive setting the case for preliminary conference and as mandated in the Notice of Pre-Trial Conference. While a motion to declare defendants in default is prohibited in unlawful detainer cases, (Section 3, Rule 70) the failure of the defendants to file a pre-trial brief within the 3-day period before the preliminary conference necessitates a judgment based on the facts alleged in the Complaint. (Section 7, Rule 70[,] in relation to Section 8, Rule 70 and Section 6, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court) Thus, this Court resolves and treats the oral motion of the plaintiffs to declare defendants as in default as a Motion to render judgment and that the instant case is now submitted for decision on the basis of the facts alleged in the Complaint.28 (emphasis supplied)

As the OCA correctly observed, the respondent’s order in submitting the unlawful detainer case for decision was not based on the spouses Angangco’s oral motion, but was the inevitable result of the complainants’ failure to file their pre-trial brief. Thus, contrary to the complainants’ allegation, the respondent did not commit the mistake of entertaining in the unlawful detainer case a motion to declare the defendants in default, which is a prohibited pleading in ejectment cases under Section 19, Rule IV of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.29

We, likewise, dispel the complainants’ assertions that Supreme Court A.M. No. 01-2-04 may be suppletorily applied to the subject unlawful detainer case and that the failure of the spouses Angangco to personally appear during the mediation proceedings should have caused the dismissal of the unlawful detainer complaint.

Section 2, Rule 11 of Supreme Court A.M. No. 01-2-0430 cannot be suppletorily applied to the subject unlawful detainer case. The cited administrative memorandum specifically refers to the rules governing intra-corporate controversies under R.A. No. 8799 and applies only to the cases defined under Section 1, Rule 131 thereof, which






does not include ejectment cases. Also, there is nothing in Supreme Court A.M. No. 01-2-04 that permits its suppletory application to ejectment cases.

Regarding the complainants’ other assertion, we find that the failure of the spouses Angangco to personally appear at the mediation proceedings was not a ground to dismiss the subject unlawful detainer complaint. In Senarlo v. Paderanga,32 we held that the personal non-appearance of a party at mediation may be excused when the representative, such as the party’s counsel, has been duly authorized to enter into possible amicable settlement or to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution.33 In the present case, the spouses Angangco were fully represented by their lawyer during the mediation proceedings.

We now proceed to the administrative liability of the respondent.

The Revised Rules on Summary Procedure was promulgated to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of the cases that it covers.34 In the present case, the respondent failed to abide by this purpose in the way that he handled and acted on the subject unlawful detainer case.

A review of the relevant background facts shows that the unlawful detainer case against the complainants was filed on March 22, 2007 and the complainants filed their answer thereto on March 30, 2007. Under Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, a preliminary conference should be held not later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed.

The respondent set the case for preliminary conference only on June 24, 2008, i.e., at a time way beyond the required thirty (30)-day period.

Another of the respondent’s procedural lapses relates to the frequent resetting of the date of the preliminary conference. 1 The preliminary conference scheduled for June 24, 2008 was reset, for various reasons, to August 26, 2008, November 25, 2008 and December 9, 2008, and was finally conducted on February 3, 2009, or almost two (2) years after the complainants filed their answer. Clearly, the respondent failed to exert his authority in expediting the proceedings of the unlawful detainer case. Sound practice requires a judge to remain, at all times, in full control of the proceedings in his court and to adopt a firm policy against unnecessary postponements.35

In numerous occasions, we admonished judges to be prompt in the performance of their solemn duty as dispensers of justice because undue delay in the administration of justice erodes the people’s faith in the judicial system.36 Delay not only reinforces the belief of the people that the wheels of justice in this country grind slowly; it also invites suspicion, however unfair, of ulterior motives on the part of the judge. Judges should always be mindful of their duty to render justice within the periods prescribed by law.

Sections 9 and 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC,38 classifies undue delay in rendering a decision or order as a less serious charge sanctioned by either (a) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) or more than three (3) months, or (b) a fine of more








than Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) but not to exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).

Considering that the respondent had been previously adjudged guilty of the same offense,39 we impose upon him a maximum fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00). Again, we remind him that a repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.

WHEREFORE, we find Judge Mario B. Capellan, Assisting Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 40, Quezon City, GUILTY of under delay in rendering a decision or order and hereby impose upon him a FINE of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).

SO ORDERED.



GEORGIA T. ESTEL VS. RECAREDO P. DIEGO SR. AND RECAREDO R. DIEGO JR.GR NO. 174082, JANUARY 16, 2012

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the Decision promulgated on September 30, 2005 and Resolution dated August 10, 2006 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 77197. The assailed Decision affirmed the Decision dated October 7, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gingoog City, Branch 27, Misamis Oriental, while the questioned Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

The present petition originated from a Complaint for Forcible Entry, Damages and Injunction with Application for Temporary Restraining Order filed by herein respondents Recaredo P. Diego, Sr., and Recaredo R. Diego, Jr. with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Gingoog City, Misamis Oriental. Respondents alleged that on April 16, 1991, they entered into a contract of sale of a 306 –square-meter parcel of land, denominated as Lot 19, with petitioner; after receiving the amount of P17,000.00 as downpayment, petitioner voluntarily delivered the physical and material possession of the subject property to respondents; respondents had been in actual, adverse and uninterrupted possession of the subject lot since then and that petitioner never disturbed, molested, annoyed nor vexed respondents with respect to their possession of the said property; around 8:30 in the morning of July 20, 1995, petitioner, together with her two grown-up sons and five other persons, uprooted the fence surrounding the disputed lot, after which they entered its premises and then cut and destroyed the trees and plants found therein; respondent Recaredo R. Diego, Jr. witnessed the incident but found himself helpless at that time. Respondents prayed for the restoration of their possession, for the issuance of a permanent injunction against petitioner as well as payment of damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.

On July 26, 1995, the MTCC issued a Temporary Restraining Order against petitioner and any person acting in her behalf.

In her Answer with Special/Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims, petitioner denied the material allegations in the Complaint contending that respondents were never in physical, actual, public, adverse and uninterrupted possession of the subject lot; full possession and absolute ownership of the disputed parcel of land, with all improvements thereon, had always been that of petitioner and her daughter; the agreement she entered into with the wife of respondent Recaredo P. Diego, Sr. for the sale of the subject lot had been abrogated; she even offered to return the amount she received from respondents, but the latter refused to accept the same and instead offered an additional amount of P12,000.00 as part of the purchase price but she also refused to accept their offer; the subject of the deed of sale between petitioner and respondents and what has been delivered to respondents was actually Lot 16 which is adjacent to the disputed Lot 19; that they did not destroy the improvements found on the subject lot and, in fact, any improvements therein were planted by petitioner's parents.


On February 16, 2002, the MTCC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, viewed in the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs [herein respondents], dismissing defendant's [herein petitioner's] counterclaim and ordering the defendant, her agents and representatives:

1. To vacate the premises of the land in question and return the same to the plaintiffs;

2. To pay plaintiffs, the following, to wit:

a) P100.00 a month as rentals for the use of the litigated property reckoned from the filing of the complaint until the defendant vacates the property;b) P5,000.00 representing the value of the fence and plants damaged by the defendants as actual damages;c) P20,000.00 as and for attorney's fees;d) P2,000.00 for litigation expenses;

3. Ordering the defendant to pay the cost of suit;

Execution shall immediately issue upon motion unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a supersedeas bond which is hereby fixed at P10,000.00 approved by this Court and executed in favor of the plaintiffs, to pay the rents, damages and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, defendant deposits with the appellate court the amount of P100.00 as monthly rental due from time to time on or before the 10th day of each succeeding month or period.

SO ORDERED.[6]

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the RTC of Gingoog City.

On October 7, 2002, the RTC rendered its Decision[8] affirming the assailed Decision of the MTCC.

Petitioner then filed a petition for review with the CA.

On September 30, 2005, the CA promulgated its Decision which affirmed the Decision of the RTC.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated August 10, 2006.

Hence, the instant petition based on the following arguments:


[THE] COURT OF APPEALS, 23rd DIVISION, ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT THE RTC BRANCH 27 OF GINGOOG CITY ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT THE MTCC OF GINGOOG CITY HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE ACTION.

[THE] COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RECOGNIZING THAT THE RTC BRANCH 27 OF GINGOOG CITY FAILED TO MAKE A FINDING OF FACT THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED LIKEWISE IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 27 OF GINGOOG CITY OVERLOOKING THE FACT THAT ITS FINDING OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS ARE AGAINST OR NOT SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT MATERIAL EVIDENCE.

Petitioner contends that since respondents failed to allege the location of the disputed parcel of land in their complaint, the MTCC did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the said complaint. Petitioner also avers that the MTCC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for failure of respondents to specifically allege facts constitutive of forcible entry. On the bases of these two grounds, petitioner argues that the MTCC should have dismissed the complaint motu proprio.

Petitioner also avers that the complaint states no cause of action because the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping accompanying the complaint are defective and, as such, the complaint should be treated as an unsigned pleading. As to the verification, petitioner contends that it should be based on respondent's personal knowledge or on authentic record and not simply upon “knowledge, information and belief.” With respect to the certificate of non-forum shopping, petitioner claims that its defect consists in respondents' failure to make an undertaking therein that if they should learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or any other tribunal or agency, they shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court or agency wherein the original pleading and sworn certification have been filed.

The Court does not agree.

A review of the records shows that petitioner did not raise the issue of jurisdiction or venue in her Answer filed with the MTCC. The CA correctly held that even if the geographical location of the subject property was not alleged in the Complaint, petitioner failed to seasonably object to the same in her Affirmative Defense, and even actively participated in the proceedings before the MTCC. In fact, petitioner did not even raise this issue in her appeal filed with the RTC. Thus, she is already estopped from raising the said issue in the CA or before this Court. Estoppel sets in when a party participates in all stages of a case before challenging the jurisdiction of the lower court. One cannot belatedly reject or repudiate the lower court's decision after voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction, just to secure affirmative relief against one's opponent or after failing to obtain such relief. The Court has, time and again, frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting a case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.


In any case, since the Complaint is clearly and admittedly one for forcible entry, the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is, thus, upon the MTCC of Gingoog City. Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, as amended by Section 3 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, as well as Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, clearly provides that forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. Hence, as the MTCC has jurisdiction over the action, the question whether or not the suit was brought in the place where the land in dispute is located was no more than a matter of venue and the court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction over the case, could determine whether venue was properly or improperly laid.[13] There having been no objection on the part of petitioner and it having been shown by evidence presented by both parties that the subject lot was indeed located in Gingoog City, and that it was only through mere inadvertence or oversight that such information was omitted in the Complaint, petitioner's objection became a pure technicality.

As to respondents' supposed failure to allege facts constitutive of forcible entry, it is settled that in actions for forcible entry, two allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to acquire jurisdiction. First, the plaintiff must allege his prior physical possession of the property. Second, he must also allege that he was deprived of his possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court, namely, force, intimidation, threats, strategy, and stealth.

In the present case, it is clear that respondents sufficiently alleged in their Complaint the material facts constituting forcible entry, as they explicitly claimed that they had prior physical possession of the subject property since its purchase from petitioner, who voluntarily delivered the same to them. They also particularly described in their complaint how petitioner, together with her two sons and five other persons, encroached upon the subject property and dispossessed them of the same. Respondents' complaint contains the allegations that petitioner, abetting and conspiring with other persons, without respondents' knowledge and consent and through the use of force and intimidation, entered a portion of their land and, thereafter, uprooted and destroyed the fence surrounding the subject lot, as well as cut the trees and nipa palms planted thereon. Unlawfully entering the subject property and excluding therefrom the prior possessor would necessarily imply the use of force and this is all that is necessary. In order to constitute force, the trespasser does not have to institute a state of war. No other proof is necessary. In the instant case, it is, thus, irrefutable that respondents sufficiently alleged that the possession of the subject property was wrested from them through violence and force.

Anent respondents' alleged defective verification, the Court again notes that this issue was not raised before the MTCC. Even granting that this matter was properly raised before the court a quo, the Court finds that there is no procedural defect that would have warranted the outright dismissal of respondents' complaint as there is compliance with the requirement regarding verification.


Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC provides:

Sec. 4. Verification. – Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.

A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on “information and belief” or upon “knowledge, information and belief” or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.

A reading of respondents’ verification reveals that they complied with the abovequoted procedural rule. Respondents confirmed that they had read the allegations in the Complaint which were true and correct based on their personal knowledge. The addition of the words "to the best" before the phrase "of our own personal knowledge" did not violate the requirement under Section 4, Rule 7, it being sufficient that the respondents declared that the allegations in the complaint are true and correct based on their personal knowledge.

Verification is deemed substantially complied with when, as in the instant case, one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.

As to respondents' certification on non-forum shopping, a reading of respondents’ Verification/Certification reveals that they, in fact, certified therein that they have not commenced any similar action before any other court or tribunal and to the best of their knowledge no such other action is pending therein. The only missing statement is respondents' undertaking that if they should thereafter learn that the same or similar action has been filed or is pending, they shall report such fact to the court. This, notwithstanding, the Court finds that there has been substantial compliance on the part of respondents.

It is settled that with respect to the contents of the certification against forum shopping, the rule of substantial compliance may be availed of. This is because the requirement of strict compliance with the provisions regarding the certification of non-forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded. It does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances, as the Court finds in the instant case.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.


[G.R. No. 197124, March 19, 2012]

ALPA-PCM, INC., PETITIONER, VS. VINCENT BULASAO, JULIET BULASAO

AND SUSANA BULASAO, HONORABLE JUDGE DANILO F. CAMACHO, AND

THE DEPUTY SHERIFF OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, LA TRINIDAD,

BENGUET, RESPONDENTS.

The petitioner, ALPA-PCM, Inc. (ALPA-PCM), filed with the Court a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying for the reversal of the decision[1] dated January 6, 2011 and the resolution[2] dated May 19, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP No. 102417. On July 6, 2011, the Court denied the petition for failure to find any reversible error in the assailed CA rulings.[3] ALPA-PCM filed the present motion seeking a reconsideration of the Court’s Resolution.

BACKGROUND FACTS

In 2004, the private respondents, Vincent, Juliet and Susana, all surnamed Bulasao (the Bulasaos) filed an action for unlawfuldetainer against ALPA-PCM before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet.[4] The MTC ruled in favor of the Bulasaos and ordered ALPA-PCM to vacate the subject property in a decision dated May 31, 2006.[5] On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 62, affirmed the MTC’s ruling in a decision dated July 31, 2007.[6]

On August 13, 2007, the Bulasaos filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. Three days after or on August 16, 2007, ALPA-PCM filed its motion for reconsideration of the RTC decision dismissing its appeal, which the RTC denied on October 25, 2007. Intending to seek recourse against the RTC rulings via an appeal, ALPA-PCM initially filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition/Appeal on November 13, 2007.[7]

In the meantime, the RTC granted the Bulasaos’ motion for execution through an order dated November 21, 2007. ALPA-PCM sought reconsideration of the November 21, 2007 order, but the RTC denied the motion in an order dated February 5, 2008. The RTC subsequently issued a writ of execution on February 12, 2008. ALPA-PCM questioned the RTC orders granting execution of the decision, as well as the writ of execution itself, before the CA by filing a separate certiorari petition. ALPA-PCM alleged that the RTC’s orders authorizing the execution of the decision in favor of the Bulasaos are null and void, since the filing of its appeal with the CA deprived the RTC of jurisdiction to issue the orders.

In a decision dated January 6, 2011, the CA dismissed ALPA-PCM’s petition, [8]


finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in granting the Bulasaos’ motion for execution. The CA declared that the RTC had power to grant execution pending appeal as part of its residual jurisdiction under Section 8, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.

As stated earlier, ALPA-PCM took exception from the CA’s ruling by filing a petition for review on certiorari with this Court. It argued that there must be good reasons to justify execution pending appeal and cited as basis Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. It pointed out that the RTC failed to state good reasons that justified the writ of execution. We denied ALPA-PCM’s petition in our Resolution of July 6, 2011.

In support of its motion for reconsideration of the Court’s Resolution, ALPA-PCM reiterated the above arguments and added that the RTC acted with undue haste in granting the Bulasaos’ motion for writ of execution. It alleged that the filing of a motion for execution by the Bulasaos (August 13, 2007) preceded its filing of a motion for reconsideration of the RTC decision (August 16, 2007); hence, the motion for execution was premature since the decision sought to be executed was still for further review by the RTC. It cited the Court’s ruling in JP Latex Technology, Inc. v. Ballons Granger Balloons, Inc.,[9] which said that “[w]here there is a pending motion for reconsideration of the RTC decision, an order execution (sic) pending appeal is improper and premature.”


The Court fails to find any substantial argument raised by ALPA-PCM that merits a reconsideration of our earlier Resolution.

Execution pending appeal ofdecisions in ejectment cases

Rule 42 of the Rules of Court governs the appeal of a decision of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; the appeal is made by filing a petition for review with the CA.[10] Despite the filing of a petition with the CA, however, Rule 42 grants the RTC residual jurisdiction to order execution pending appeal, so long as (1) the CA has not yet given due course to the petition, and (2) the requirements of Section 2, Rule 39 are observed. The relevant portion of Section 8, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court states:

Section 8. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof — (a) x x x

However, before the Court of Appeals gives due course to the petition, the Regional Trial Court may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the


rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal. xxx

Under Section 6, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, the CA can give due course to a petition for review when it finds prima facie that the lower court has committed an error of fact or law that will warrant a reversal or modification of the appealed decision.[11] This initial determination by the CA can take place only when the proper pleadings have actually been filed before the CA, enabling it to study the facts of the case and the alleged errors of the assailed ruling. In other words, the CA can give due course to an appeal of the RTC decision only (1) after the filing of a petition for review, and (2) upon the filing of the comment or other pleading required by the CA, or the expiration of the period for the filing thereof without such comment or pleading having been submitted.

When the RTC granted the Bulasaos’ motion for execution pending appeal on November 21, 2007, ALPA-PCM has not yet filed its petition for review with the CA; what ALPA-PCM filed on November 13, 2007 was only a motion for extension of time to file its petition. In the absence of any petition for review actually filed with the CA, the CA could clearly not have given due course to ALPA-PCM’s appeal. The RTC, thus, retained its residual jurisdiction over the case to authorize execution of the decision.

The Court also fails to find anything irregular in the filing by the Bulasaos of a motion for execution ahead of the filing by ALPA-PCM of its motion for reconsideration of the RTC decision. ALPA-PCM misconstrues our ruling in JP Latex Technology, Inc. v. Ballons Granger Balloons, Inc.[12] The ruling does not prevent the prevailing party from filing a motion for execution until after the adverse party has filed a motion for reconsideration of the judgment. The RTC, however, is precluded from acting on the motion for execution until it has resolved the motion for reconsideration. In the present case, the RTC heeded this rule, as it granted the Bulasaos’ motion for execution only after it has resolved to deny ALPA-PCM’s motion for reconsideration of its decision.

Immediate execution of the RTC decision on appeal to CA or SC

After affirming the RTC’s power to allow execution, we now consider ALPA-PCM’s claim that the RTC must nonetheless cite good reasons justifying execution, citing as basis Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

The Court reminds ALPA-PCM, particularly its counsel, Atty. Guillermo R. Bandonil,


Jr., that this case originated from the complaint for unlawful detainer filed by the Bulasaos against it. Actions for unlawful detainer are governed primarily by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure[13] and suppletorily by the Rules of Court.[14] Section 21 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure states that:

Sec. 21. Appeal. — The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate regional trial court which shall decide the same in accordance with Section 22 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The decision of the regional trial court in civil cases governed by this Rule, including forcible entry and unlawful detainer, shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom. Section 10 of Rule 70 shall be deemed repealed. [emphasis and underscoring ours]

The above rule, without any qualification whatsoever, has decreed the immediately executory nature of decisions of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, involving cases falling under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. It requires no further justification or even “good reasons” for the RTC to authorize execution, even if an appeal has already been filed before the CA. Indeed, the provision does not even require a bond to be filed by the prevailing party to allow execution to proceed.[15] The rationale for this is the objective of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases governed by it. This objective provides the “good reason” that justifies immediate execution of the decision, if the standards of Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court on execution pending appeal, as what ALPA-PCM insists, are considered.

Notwithstanding the rule’s objective and clear mandate, losing litigants and their lawyers are determined to stall execution by misusing judicial remedies, putting forth arguments that, by simple logic, can easily be resolved by a basic reading of the applicable laws and rules. When judicial remedies are misused to delay the resolution of cases, the Rules of Court authorizes the imposition of sanctions. Section 3, Rule 142 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 3. Costs when appeal frivolous.—Where an action or an appeal is found to be frivolous, double or treble costs may be imposed on the plaintiff or appellant, which shall be paid by his attorney, if so ordered by the court.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to DENY the ALPA-PCM, Inc.’s motion for reconsideration of our Resolution dated July 6, 2011. For instituting a frivolous appeal manifestly intended for delay, the Court imposes treble costs against ALPA-PCM, Inc., to be paid by its counsel, Atty. Guillermo R. Bandonil, Jr. SO ORDERED.


G.R. No. 190071 August 15, 2012

UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.MAUNLAD HOMES, INC. and all other persons or entities claiming rights under it, Respondents.

VILLARAMA, JR.,*

D E C I S I O N

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines (Union Bank), assailing the decision dated October 28, 20092 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 107772.

THE FACTS

Union Bank is the owner of a commercial complex located in Malolos, Bulacan, known as the Maunlad Shopping Mall.

Sometime in August 2002, Union Bank, as seller, and respondent Maunlad Homes, Inc. (Maunlad Homes), as buyer, entered into a contract to sell3 involving the Maunlad Shopping Mall. The contract set the purchase price at P151 million, P2.4 million of which was to be paid by Maunlad Homes as down payment payable on or before July 5, 2002, with the balance to be amortized over the succeeding 180-month period.4 Under the contract, Union Bank authorized Maunlad Homes to take possession of the property and to build or introduce improvements thereon. The parties also agreed that if Maunlad Homes violates any of the provisions of the contract, all payments made will be applied as rentals for the use and possession of the property, and all improvements introduced on the land will accrue in favor of Union Bank.5 In the event of rescission due to failure to pay or to comply with the terms of the contract, Maunlad Homes will be required to immediately vacate the property and must voluntarily turn possession over to Union Bank.6

When Maunlad Homes failed to pay the monthly amortization, Union Bank sent the former a Notice of Rescission of Contract7 dated February 5, 2003, demanding payment of the installments due within 30 days from receipt; otherwise, it shall consider the contract automatically rescinded. Maunlad Homes failed to comply.Hence, on November 19, 2003, Union Bank sent Maunlad Homes a letter demanding payment of the rentals due and requiring that the subject property be vacated and its possession turned over to the bank. When Maunlad Homes continued to refuse, Union Bank instituted an ejectment suit before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City, Branch 64, on February 19, 2004. Maunlad


Homes resisted the suit by claiming, among others, that it is the owner of the property as Union Bank did not reserve ownership of the property under the terms of the contract.8 By virtue of its ownership, Maunlad Homes claimed that it has the right to possess the property.

On May 18, 2005, the MeTC dismissed Union Bank’s ejectment complaint.9 It found that Union Bank’s cause of action was based on a breach of contract and that both parties are claiming a better right to possess the property based on their respective claims of ownership of the property. The MeTC ruled that the appropriate action to resolve these conflicting claims was an accion reivindicatoria, over which it had no jurisdiction.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 139, affirmed the MeTC in its decision dated July 17, 2008;10 it agreed with the MeTC that the issues raised in the complaint extend beyond those commonly involved in an unlawful detainer suit. The RTC declared that the case involved a determination of the rights of the parties under the contract. Additionally, the RTC noted that the property is located in Malolos, Bulacan, but the ejectment suit was filed by Union Bank in Makati City, based on the contract stipulation that "the venue of all suits and actions arising out or in connection with the Contract to Sell shall be in Makati City."11 The RTC ruled that the proper venue for the ejectment action is in Malolos, Bulacan, pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, which states:

Section 1. Venue of real actions. - Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.

Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in the municipal trial court of the municipality or city wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. [emphasis ours]

The RTC declared that Union Bank cannot rely on the waiver of venue provision in the contract because ejectment is not an action arising out of or connected with the contract.

Union Bank appealed the RTC decision to the CA through a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. The CA affirmed the RTC decision in its October 28, 2009 decision,12 ruling that Union Bank’s claim of possession is based on its claim of ownership which in turn is based on its interpretation of the terms and conditions of the contract, particularly, the provision on the consequences of Maunlad Homes’ breach of contract. The CA determined that Union Bank’s cause of action is premised on the interpretation and enforcement of the contract and the


determination of the validity of the rescission, both of which are matters beyond the jurisdiction of the MeTC. Therefore, it ruled that the dismissal of the ejectment suit was proper. The CA, however, made no further ruling on the issue of venue of the action.

From the CA’s judgment, Union Bank appealed to the Court by filing the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS

Union Bank disagreed with the CA’s finding that it is claiming ownership over the property through the ejectment action. It claimed that it never lost ownership over the property despite the execution of the contract, since only the right to possess was conceded to Maunlad Homes under the contract; Union Bank never transferred ownership of the property to Maunlad Homes. Because of Maunlad Homes’ failure to comply with the terms of the contract, Union Bank believes that it rightfully rescinded the sale, which rescission terminated Maunlad Homes’ right to possess the subject property. Since Maunlad Homes failed to turn over the possession of the subject property, Union Bank believes that it correctly instituted the ejectment suit.

The Court initially denied Union Bank’s petition in its Resolution dated March 17, 2010.13 Upon motion for reconsideration filed by Union Bank, the Court set aside its Resolution of March 17, 2010 (in a Resolution dated May 30, 201114) and required Maunlad Homes to comment on the petition.

Maunlad Homes contested Union Bank’s arguments, invoking the rulings of the lower courts. It considered Union Bank’s action as based on the propriety of the rescission of the contract, which, in turn, is based on a determination of whether Maunlad Homes indeed failed to comply with the terms of the contract; the propriety of the rescission, however, is a question that is within the RTC’s jurisdiction. Hence, Maunlad Homes contended that the dismissal of the ejectment action was proper.


We find the petition meritorious.

The authority of the MeTC tointerpret contracts in an unlawfuldetainer action

In any case involving the question of jurisdiction, the Court is guided by the settled doctrine that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the nature of the action pleaded by the litigant through the allegations in his complaint.15

Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold


possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to expiration or termination of the right to possess.16 Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the action must be filed "within one (1) year after the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession." Thus, to fall within the jurisdiction of the MeTC, the complaint must allege that –

1. the defendant originally had lawful possession of the property, either by virtue of a contract or by tolerance of the plaintiff;

2. eventually, the defendant’s possession of the property becameillegal or unlawful upon notice by the plaintiff to defendant of the expiration or the termination of the defendant’s right of possession;

3. thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff the enjoyment thereof; and

4. within one year from the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.17

Contrary to the findings of the lower courts, all four requirements were alleged in Union Bank’s Complaint. Union Bank alleged that Maunlad Homes "maintained possession of the subject properties" pursuant to the Contract to Sell.18 Maunlad Homes, however, "failed to faithfully comply with the terms of payment," prompting Union Bank to "rescind the Contract to Sell in a Notice of Rescission dated February 5, 2003."19 When Maunlad Homes "refused to turn over and vacate the subject premises,"20 Union Bank sent another Demand Letter on November 19, 2003 to Maunlad Homes requiring it (1) "to pay the equivalent rentals-in-arrears as of October 2003 in the amount of P15,554,777.01 and monthly thereafter until the premises are fully vacated and turned over" to Union Bank, and (2) to vacate the property peacefully and turn over possession to Union Bank.21 As the demand went unheeded, Union Bank instituted an action for unlawful detainer before the MeTC on February 19, 2004, within one year from the date of the last demand. These allegations clearly demonstrate a cause of action for unlawful detainer and vested the MeTC jurisdiction over Union Bank’s action.

Maunlad Homes denied Union Bank’s claim that its possession of the property had become unlawful. It argued that its failure to make payments did not terminate its right to possess the property because it already acquired ownership when Union Bank failed to reserve ownership of the property under the contract. Despite Maunlad Homes’ claim of ownership of the property, the Court rules that the MeTC retained its jurisdiction over the action; a defendant may not divest the MeTC of its jurisdiction by merely claiming ownership of the property.22Under Section 16, Rule


70 of the Rules of Court, "when the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession." Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, however, states that "the judgment x x x shall be conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building."

The authority granted to the MeTC to preliminarily resolve the issue of ownership to determine the issue of possession ultimately allows it to interpret and enforce the contract or agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant. To deny the MeTC jurisdiction over a complaint merely because the issue of possession requires the interpretation of a contract will effectively rule out unlawful detainer as a remedy. As stated, in an action for unlawful detainer, the defendant’s right to possess the property may be by virtue of a contract, express or implied; corollarily, the termination of the defendant’s right to possess would be governed by the terms of the same contract. Interpretation of the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant is inevitable because it is the contract that initially granted the defendant the right to possess the property; it is this same contract that the plaintiff subsequently claims was violated or extinguished, terminating the defendant’s right to possess. We ruled in Sps. Refugia v. CA23 that –

where the resolution of the issue of possession hinges on a determination of the validity and interpretation of the document of title or any other contract on which the claim of possession is premised, the inferior court may likewise pass upon these issues.

The MeTC’s ruling on the rights of the parties based on its interpretation of their contract is, of course, not conclusive, but is merely provisional and is binding only with respect to the issue of possession.

Thus, despite the CA’s opinion that Union Bank’s "case involves a determination of the rights of the parties under the Contract to Sell,"24 it is not precluded from resolving this issue. Having acquired jurisdiction over Union Bank’s action, the MeTC can resolve the conflicting claims of the parties based on the facts presented and proved.

The right to possess the property wasextinguished when the contract tosell failed to materialize

Maunlad Homes acquired possession of the property based on its contract with Union Bank. While admitting that it suspended payment of the installments,25

Maunlad Homes contended that the suspension of payment did not affect its right to possess the property because its contract with Union Bank was one of sale and not


to sell; hence, ownership of the property has been transferred to it, allowing it to retain possession notwithstanding nonpayment of installments. The terms of the contract, however, do not support this conclusion.

Section 11 of the contract between Union Bank and Maunlad Homes provides that "upon payment in full of the Purchase Price of the Property x x x, the SELLER shall execute and deliver a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying the Property to the BUYER."26 "Jurisprudence has established that where the seller promises to execute a deed of absolute sale upon the completion by the buyer of the payment of the price, the contract is only a contract to sell."27 The presence of this provision generally identifies the contract as being a mere contract to sell.28 After reviewing the terms of the contract between Union Bank and Maunlad Homes, we find no reasonable ground to exempt the present case from the general rule; the contract between Union Bank and Maunlad Homes is a contract to sell.

In a contract to sell, the full payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive condition whose non-fulfillment is not a breach of contract, but merely an event that prevents the seller from conveying title to the purchaser. "The non-payment of the purchase price renders the contract to sell ineffective and without force and effect."29

Maunlad Homes’ act of withholding the installment payments rendered the contract ineffective and without force and effect, and ultimately deprived itself of the right to continue possessing Maunlad Shopping Mall.

The propriety of filing the unlawfuldetainer action in Makati Citypursuant to the venue stipulation inthe contract

Maunlad Homes questioned the venue of Union Bank’s unlawful detainer action which was filed in Makati City while the contested property is located in Malolos, Bulacan. Citing Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, Maunlad Homes claimed that the unlawful detainer action should have been filed with the municipal trial court of the municipality or city where the real property involved is situated. Union Bank, on the other hand, justified the filing of the complaint with the MeTC of Makati City on the venue stipulation in the contract which states that "the venue of all suits and actions arising out of or in connection with this Contract to Sell shall be at Makati City."30

While Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court states that ejectment actions shall be filed in "the municipal trial court of the municipality or city wherein the real property involved x x x is situated," Section 4 of the same Rule provides that the rule shall not apply "where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof." Precisely, in this case, the parties provided for a different venue. In Villanueva v. Judge Mosqueda, etc., et al.,31 the Court upheld the validity of a stipulation in a contract providing for a venue for ejectment actions other


than that stated in the Rules of Court. Since the unlawful detainer action is connected with the contract, Union Bank rightfully filed the complaint with the MeTC of Makati City.

WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the decision dated October 28, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 107772. Respondent Maunlad Homes, Inc. isORDERED TO VACATE the Maunlad Shopping Mall, the property subject of the case, immediately upon the finality of this Decision. Respondent Maunlad Homes, Inc. is further ORDERED TO PAY the rentals-in-arrears, as well as rentals accruing in the interim until it vacates the property.

The case is REMANDED to the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 64, to determine the amount of rentals due. In addition to the amount determined as unpaid rent, respondent Maunlad Homes, Inc. isORDERED TO PAY legal interest of six percent (6o/o) per annum, from November 19, 2003, when the demand to pay and to vacate was made, up to the finality of this Decision. Thereafter, an interest of twelve percent ( 12%) per annum shall be imposed on the total amount due until full payment is made.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION


G.R. No. 183822 January 18, 2012

RUBEN C. CORPUZ, represented by Attorney-in-Fact Wenifreda C. Agullana, Petitioner, vs.Sps. HILARION AGUSTIN and JUSTA AGUSTIN, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

SERENO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the Decision dated 08 January 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 90645, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City and its Resolution dated 15 July 2008 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, affirmed the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Laoag City, which had dismissed the unlawful detainer case filed by herein petitioner.

The Factual Antecedents

The Court adopts the findings of fact of the CA as follows:

Ruben C. Corpuz (Ruben) filed a complaint for ejectment against Spouses Hilarion and Justa Agustin on the allegation that he is the registered owner of two parcels of land located in Santa Joaquina, Laoag City covered by TCT No. 12980 issued on October 29, 1976 by the Laoag City Register of Deeds and with technical descriptions as follows:

1) A parcel of land (Lot No. 20 of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag), with improvements thereon, situated in the barrio of Santa Joaquina, Municipality of Laoag. Bounded x x x containing an area of five thousand seven hundred and fifty nine (5,759) square meters more or less x x x.

2) A parcel of land (Lot No. 11711 of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag), with the improvements thereon, situated in the barrio of Santa Joaquina, Municipality of Laoag. Bounded x x x, containing an area of twenty thousand seven hundred and forty five (20,745) square meters, more or less x x x.

Aforesaid parcels of land were formerly owned by Elias Duldulao in whose name Original Certificate of Title No. O-1717 was issued. Duldulao sold said properties on August 27, 1951 to Francisco D. Corpuz, father of Ruben C. Corpuz. The elder Corpuz allowed spouses Agustin to occupy subject properties, the latter being relatives.

Despite demand to vacate, the Agustins refused to leave the premises.


Ruben alleged further that he has the better right to possess subject property having acquired the same from his father, Francisco, who executed a Deed of Quitclaim in his favor on March 15, 1971.

Spouses Agustin, in their Answer, interposed the defense that on June 5, 1971 Francisco Corpuz, Ruben's father, disposed of subject property by executing a Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor for a consideration of Eleven Thousand One Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,150.00).

The Municipal Trial Court found for the spouses Agustin and dismissed the complaint.

In sum, considering the evidence of the defendants which shows that they entered into and occupied Lot No. 20 and the 9,657 sq. m. portion of Lot No. 11711 as buyers or owners, disproving the allegation of the plaintiff that defendants were merely allowed by Francisco Corpuz to occupy the subject properties, being his relatives, and considering further the length of time that the defendants have been in possession, as owners, of Lot No. 20 and the 9,657 sq. m. portion of Lot No. 11711, and have been continuously exercising their rights of ownership thereon, this court is of the view and holds, in so far as this case is concerned, that the defendants are the ones entitled to the possession of Lot No. 20 and the 9,657 sq. m. portion of Lot No. 11711.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case, is hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, Branch XVI, Regional Trial Court of Laoag City affirmed said dismissal, the dispositive portion of said decision states:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the JUDGMENT of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 01, Laoag City is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against the plaintiff-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner assailed the Decision of the RTC, affirming the earlier dismissal of the case by the MTC, by instituting an appeal with the CA. On 08 January 2008, the appellate court through its Fourteenth Division dismissed his appeal. It noted that his father engaged in a double sale when he conveyed the disputed properties to petitioner and respondents. The Quitclaim executed by the elder Corpuz in favor of petitioner was dated 15 March 1971, while the Deed of Sale with respondents was later, on 15 June 1971; both documents were notarized shortly after their execution. The Quitclaim, which was subsequently inscribed at the back of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. O-1717 on 29 October 1976, resulted in the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-12980 in the name of petitioner. The Deed of Sale executed with respondents was, however, not annotated at the back of OCT No. O-1717 and remained unregistered.


Based on the above findings, the CA ruled that petitioner had knowledge of the sale of the disputed real property executed between Francisco Corpuz, petitioner's father, and respondents. Due to this conveyance by the elder Corpuz to respondents, the latter's possession thereof was in the nature of ownership. Thus, in the context of an unlawful detainer case instituted by petitioner against respondents, the appellate court concluded that respondents’ possession of the property was not by mere tolerance of its former owner – petitioner's father – but was in the exercise of ownership.

The CA noted that petitioner had knowledge of his father’s sale of the properties to respondents as early as 1973. However, despite knowledge of the sale, petitioner failed to initiate any action to annul it and oust respondents from the subject properties. The appellate court rejected his contention that, as registered owner of the disputed properties, he had a better right to possession thereof, compared to the unregistered Deed of Sale relied upon by respondents in their defense of the same properties. The CA ruled that the inaction on his part despite knowledge of the sale in 1973 was equivalent to registration of respondents’ unregistered deed. In dismissing his appeal, the CA concluded that respondents’ possession was "not ... anchored on mere tolerance nor on any of the grounds for forcible entry or unlawful detainer"; hence "the complaint for ejectment must fail."11 The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of Branch XVI, Regional Trial Court of Laoag City in Civil Case No. 13293-16 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

The Issues

Petitioner assigns the following errors in this Petition for Review on Certiorari:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT of appeals seriously erred in failing to consider the legal ownership of petitioner on the disputed property to claim better right to possession.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN THE APPRECIATION OF THE ALLEGED SALE IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS TO RULE THAT THEY HAVE BETTER RIGHT TO POSSESSION.

III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE CASE OF JACINTO CO VS. MILITAR, ET AL. (421 SCRA 455) WHICH IS SIMILAR TO THE INSTANT CASE.

IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DENYING THE PETITION FOR REVIEW RAISED BEFORE IT.13

Petitioner presents to this Court for resolution the core issue of his Petition: who between the parties has the right to possession of the disputed properties --




petitioner, who is the registered owner under TCT No. T-12980; or respondents, who have a notarized yet unregistered Deed of Absolute Sale over the same properties?

The Court's Ruling

We DENY the Petition.

Although this case does not present a novel question of law, there is a need to discuss the nature of an ejectment case for the recovery of physical possession in relation to the Torrens system. A resolution of the issue would be relevant to the determination of who has the better right to possession in this unlawful detainer case.

One of the three kinds of action for the recovery of possession of real property is "accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding ... which may be either that for forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio), which is a summary action for the recovery of physical possession where the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, and should be brought in the proper inferior court." In ejectment proceedings, the courts resolve the basic question of who is entitled to physical possession of the premises, possession referring to possession de facto, and not possession de jure.

Where the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon that issue to determine who between the parties has the better right to possess the property. However, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to that of possession, adjudication of the ownership issue is not final and binding, but only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership is only provisional, and not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property.

In the instant case, the position of respondents is that they are occupying the disputed properties as owners, having acquired these from petitioner's father through a Deed of Absolute Sale executed in 1971. Respondents believe that they cannot be dispossessed of the disputed properties, since they are the owners and are in actual possession thereof up to this date. Petitioner, however, rebuts this claim of ownership, contending that he has registered the disputed properties in his name and has been issued a land title under the Torrens system. He asserts that, having registered the properties in his name, he is the recognized owner and consequently has the better right to possession.

Indeed, a title issued under the Torrens system is entitled to all the attributes of property ownership, which necessarily includes possession. Petitioner is correct that as a Torrens title holder over the subject properties, he is the rightful owner and is entitled to possession thereof. However, the lower courts and the appellate court consistently found that possession of the disputed properties by respondents was in the nature of ownership, and not by mere tolerance of the elder Corpuz. In fact, they have been in continuous, open and notorious possession of the property for more than 30 years up to this day.


Petitioner cites Jacinto Co v. Rizal Militar, et al., which has facts and legal issues identical to those of the instant case. The petitioner therein filed an unlawful detainer case against the respondents over a disputed property. He had a Torrens title thereto, while the respondents as actual occupants of the property claimed ownership thereof based on their unregistered Deeds of Sale. The principal issue was who between the two parties had the better right to possess the subject property.

This Court resolved the issue by upholding the title holder as the one who had the better right to possession of the disputed property based on the following justification:

We have, time and again, held that the only issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. Moreover, an ejectment suit is summary in nature and is not susceptible to circumvention by the simple expedient of asserting ownership over the property.

In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the lower courts and the Court of Appeals, nonetheless, have the undoubted competence to provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining the issue of Possession.

Such decision, however, does not bind the title or affect the ownership of the land nor is conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving possession.

In the instant case, the evidence showed that as between the parties, it is the petitioner who has a Torrens Title to the property. Respondents merely showed their unregistered deeds of sale in support of their claims. The Metropolitan Trial Court correctly relied on the transfer certificate of title in the name of petitioner.

In Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the Torrens System was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized.

It is settled that a Torrens Certificate of title is indefeasible and binding upon the whole world unless and until it has been nullified by a court of competent jurisdiction. Under existing statutory and decisional law, the power to pass upon the validity of such certificate of title at the first instance properly belongs to the Regional Trial Courts in a direct proceeding for cancellation of title.

As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the possession of the property, which is one of the attributes of his ownership. Respondents' argument that petitioner is not an innocent purchaser for value and was guilty of bad faith in having the subject land registered in his name is a collateral attack on the title of petitioner, which is not allowed. A certificate of title cannot be subject to a collateral attack and


can be altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.

The pronouncement in Co v. Militar was later reiterated in Spouses Pascual v. Spouses Coronel and in Spouses Barias v. Heirs of Bartolome Boneo, et al.,21 wherein we consistently held the age-old rule "that the person who has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession thereof."

However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the present petitioner has instituted an unlawful detainer case against respondents. It is an established fact that for more than three decades, the latter have been in continuous possession of the subject property, which, as such, is in the concept of ownership and not by mere tolerance of petitioner’s father. Under these circumstances, petitioner cannot simply oust respondents from possession through the summary procedure of an ejectment proceeding.

Instructive on this matter is Carbonilla v. Abiera, which reads thus:

Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession. However, the owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To recover possession, he must resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he chooses what action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to prosper.

In the present case, petitioner opted to file an ejectment case against respondents. Ejectment cases—forcible entry and unlawful detainer—are summary proceedings designed to provide expeditious means to protect actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved. The only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a party’s title to the property is questionable. For this reason, an ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who has presented proof of ownership of the subject property. Key jurisdictional facts constitutive of the particular ejectment case filed must be averred in the complaint and sufficiently proven.

The statements in the complaint that respondents’ possession of the building was by mere tolerance of petitioner clearly make out a case for unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer involves the person’s withholding from another of the possession of the real property to which the latter is entitled, after the expiration or termination of the former’s right to hold possession under the contract, either expressed or implied.

A requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case is that possession must be originally lawful, and such possession must have turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to possess. It must be shown that the possession was initially lawful; hence, the basis of such lawful possession must be established. If, as in this case, the claim is that such possession is by mere tolerance of the plaintiff, the acts of tolerance must be proved. (Emphasis supplied.)



In this case, petitioner has not proven that respondents’ continued possession of the subject properties was by mere tolerance of his father, except by a mere allegation thereof. In fact, petitioner has not established when respondents’ possession of the properties became unlawful – a requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case.

In Canlas v. Tubil, we enumerated the elements that constitute the sufficiency of a complaint for unlawful detainer, as follows:

Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the action as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence.

Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.

An unlawful detainer proceeding is summary in nature, jurisdiction of which lies in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court. The action must be brought within one year from the date of last demand and the issue in said case is the right to physical possession.

... ... ...

In Cabrera v. Getaruela, the Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:

(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;

(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession;

(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and

(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.

Based on the above, it is obvious that petitioner has not complied with the requirements sufficient to warrant the success of his unlawful detainer Complaint against respondents. The lower courts and the CA have consistently upheld the entitlement of respondents to continued possession of the subject properties, since


their possession has been established as one in the concept of ownership. Thus, the courts correctly dismissed the unlawful detainer case of petitioner.

We concur in the appellate court’s findings that petitioner’s father engaged in a double sale of the disputed properties. The records of the case show that it took petitioner more or less five years from 1971 when he acquired the property from his father to 1976 when petitioner registered the conveyance and caused the issuance of the land title registered in his name under the Torrens system. Respondents, on the other hand, continued their possession of the properties, but without bothering to register them or to initiate any action to fortify their ownership.

We cannot, however, sustain the appellate court’s conclusion that petitioner's failure to initiate any action to annul the sale to respondents and oust them from the disputed properties had the effect of registration of respondents’ unregistered Deed of Absolute Sale. We held thus in Ruiz, Sr. v. Court of Appeals:

(But) where a party has knowledge of a prior existing interest which is unregistered at that time he acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to him. Knowledge of an unregistered sale is equivalent to registration. As held in Fernandez v. Court of Appeals [189 SCRA 780 (1990)],

Section 50 of Act No. 496 (now Sec. 51 of P.D. 1529), provides that the registration of the deed is the operative act to bind or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned. But where the party has knowledge of a prior existing interest which is unregistered at the time he acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to him. The Torrens system cannot be used as a shield for the commission of fraud (Gustillo v. Maravilla, 48 Phil. 442). [Emphasis supplied.]

In this case, the Quitclaim executed by the elder Corpuz in favor of petitioner was executed ahead of the Deed of Sale of respondents. Thus, the sale of the subject properties by petitioner’s father to respondents cannot be considered as a prior interest at the time that petitioner came to know of the transaction.

We also note that, based on the records, respondents do not dispute the existence of TCT No. T-12980 registered in the name of petitioner. They allege, though, that the land title issued to him was an "act of fraud" on his part. We find this argument to be equivalent to a collateral attack against the Torrens title of petitioner – an attack we cannot allow in the instant unlawful detainer case.

It is settled in jurisprudence that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be the subject of collateral attack. Such attack must be direct and not by a collateral proceeding. It is a well-established doctrine that the title represented by the certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding. Considering that this is an unlawful detainer case wherein the sole issue to be decided is possession de facto rather than possession de jure, a collateral attack by herein respondents on petitioner's title is proscribed.


Our ruling in the present case is only to resolve the issue of who has the better right to possession in relation to the issue of disputed ownership of the subject properties. Questions as to the validity of petitioner's Torrens title can be ventilated in a proper suit instituted to directly attack its validity, an issue that we cannot resolve definitively in this unlawful detainer case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we deny the instant Petition for lack of merit. 1 The Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90645 (dated January 08, 2008), of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City in Civil Case No. 3111-13293-65, as well as of the Municipal Trial Court of Laoag City in Civil Case No. 3111 -- all dismissing the unlawful detainer case of petitioner – are AFFIRMED.

We make no pronouncements as to attorney's fees for lack of evidence.

SO ORDERED.

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