TACTICAL MOBILITY AND THE IN-STRIDEOBSTACLE BREACH: IMPOSSIBLE, PROBABLE,

FUTURISTIC?

A Monograph

by

Major James W. DeLony

Engineer fTl CE [•2 L.E- -CTK E

AP R 27 1990

S~LDq4ft~ jS CL VI WcrORR-

School of Advanced Military StudiesUnited States Army Command and Gen2ral Staff College

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

First Term AY 88-89

A..)provced for Pulblic R•cleas.-; DIistr~htiion IsUni te/00

.0 i2==o'"*o 04 26 03~

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE B o.r0704ro 188

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11. TITLE (include Security Classification)TACTICAL MOBILITY AND THE TNSTRIDE OBSTACLE BREACH: IMPOSSIBLE, PROBABLE, FUTURISTIC? (Uj)

12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)MAJ James W. DeLony

13a. TYPE OF REPORT Ilab. TIME COVERED j 14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 15. PAGE COUNTMonograph IFROM -TO-___ 88/11/29 57 6

16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION

17. COSATI CODES 18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on re.rerse if necessary and identify by block number)FIELD GRU U-RUP Mobility Countermine Warfare

Obstacles Soviet Combat Engineer OperationsM ý n es Combat Engineer Operations

\19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number).- ý..This monograph analyzes the 'or cpt. of anl in-stride breach of an obstacle b)y at tact ical

maneuver force. Its focus is on a historical and Cu~rrent review of the tactical doctrinesof the U. S. and Soviet ilaries development of tactics, eqluipment, and force structure toexecute an inl-stride breach ofa wtcle concurrent to sustaining the momentum of amaneuver f orce. Given thle fitoofterrain and combined arms operations, ttau paperseeks to answer whether the ilsrde obstacl e breachj j. po,,ssible for either force ontoday's battlefield.

The ,,tud yhof begins Wi1th1 a d i SC-"35 011o t act i ca 1 mob 1 i ty the iorV asocv ilt edwit h an i n -s r 1 1doobstacle-1 broach. Hli storical oxprec5 c"I doctrine for, breach'Ing1' ol)ýtaclos fromWorldl War: 11 arl, presented t or theli. . thŽý Sýýoviets, Current. doctrine, equip]Ilinot.and fo(e" st~ruct ore tor the two arm' 00 r"irev fec- anally!7is a-nd cc-lmaclsons'.Cons) uLSiOnS as to thme SIAr 3er1tblS andi~ Ceose fe ryscapability to) 'onlduuct in( conti~nued On 01ther sýid(1 Of for-m)

20. DISTRIBU-TION i AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT 21 ABSTR,"CT SECHRITY CLASSIFICATIONEl UNCLASSIFIE D/UNLIMITED CJ SAME AS RPT 0 DTIC USERS UýNCLASS 1 FT D

22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE iNDIVIDUAL 22b TELEDHONE (include Area Code) 22c OFFICE SYM90L

DForm 1473, JUN 86 Previous editions are obsolete. SECUR;TY CLASSIFI-CATION OF. iHIS PAGEN NC -AS I F]I2 1]')

Item 1.9 cont.

h in-stride obstacle breach are made. A final section of recommendations for futureU.S. Airland Battle in-strideobstacle breach operations is presente&.

-|A

Tc~OTICl MCE:LITY AND THE IN-STRIDE OBSTACLE BREACH:

I M~OS3 I0 PrQB.PIlE, FUTLW':I S T I C?

NTIS CAOTIC TAB3

Ml-iJc- Jamres 'W. DeLony rnolc 0Enoi neer J~IJ(

By __

A-i.4rn,. Cc"r-mmand ano Ueneral Staff Coll ege Dist d

j:-~-~;s4-cr- nputll;c e distribu~tion is unlimixted.

School of Advanced Military StudiesMonograph Approval

Name of Student: Major James W. DeLonyTitle of Monograph: Tactical Mobility and the In-Stride

Obstacle Breach: Impossible, Probable,Futuristic?

Approyed b': //

-- .....- "- _______________________Monograph Director

--Colonpl Julian' M•. mpbell,/ill M.S.

-. 'Director, School ofColonel L. D. Holder, MA Advanced Military

Studies

Director, GraduatePhilip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Degree Programs

Accepted this el___ day of CC•i. -' 1988.

ABSTRACT

VDTCPL MO.I.LITY AND THE_ IN-STRIDE OBSTACLE BREACH:I MF0S- I BLE * PrOR,'0E.ALE FUTUR IST IC-?

by Major JamTes W. DeLony, USA, 56 oagc-_.

h"is n.: oap nay the concept of an in-stride breach o-Frioh~toacle ?7,y -i trt manvuver force. Its focus 1s on a

h-i d.cr E ac cuirrF:,n t rev --e w o f t he t act icaI d0c t r in es o fk.he 'U. z. atnd Soviet armis uvelcopment of tactics, eouipment.;:nd focet~ructure to ex..eCuttE- an in-stride breach of an

~(-frni-t~krrenk LO toustkAin i n the momentum of a ManeUver'ji re. Giv,,en the friction of terra-in and combined arms

kFI5, t ,C Oper EE'5to answer whether the in-stride.~ a'iL t-7-cich is; Poasi bi e for either force on today's

C! 1 Sv bfci I-s-wh a. diSCuISS(io Of tLac-tical mobilityth - C Itcý4 w it h ian in-stride obstacle breach.

H n al ~ipe~enes and dc~trlne for breaching-from World [WAr IT are presented for the U.D. an-d

L3_ies Current doctrine, equil:ment, and forcec~-sr L.' LII for the two armries are revi ewed for analysis and

---- I 7 -Crn'~ -or ua.on s to the strengths and weak~nesses,c~ ".c r~'i's apability to condIc~t an in-stride obstaclei~-~ ' m --A~ md. P final. section of recommendations for

#L~Ur e 11.5. "irLrand Dattle jr-stride obstacle breachoe I-.-t jCrs ý,s coresented.

*h -1 L~ conclurdes. that the current mobility capabilities ofU.S. army co not supoort. t-he AirLand Battle doctrinet~c-tWnqan in-stride ob-tacle breach. The Soviets

ý,r h' Ttnri cal arc1 prnPr iferice based total forcemTc,'o~ljLv coanaility i-~ a.F eachieve aýn in-stride obs=tacletLreach WC "loortei r doctri~ne of engaoements in depth.

rk ~ -" f -.-en p m e nmen a nd +fie Idin q. i nt egqration o froLbi . lv ý-.rd r-conrrai ss;ance aSse~ts within Maneuver

fvw'; ~ h~t~r o'ri'1c nd i-ontrol o-f mobil itv assets -7rerri tic theý essent a, -factors' reqUired to

t~erorn;'k~ of an i n--tni de obstacl e b t -C~

YTAgLE OF CONTENTS

cnection I. introduction ................................. 1

ecticn II. Tac-tical Mobility and the In-Stride Preach..

Section Ill. U.S. At-my Doctrine and the In-Stride Breach. .7

IV. Soviet Army Doctrine and the In-Stride

EBreach ....................................... 16

SSection V. Analysis and Evaluation....................... 27

...... nn JT.' Concl usiA on=s.3JEC 1_ i. n V'. I. Fdat j ......... ...... ..... .. ........... ........ 2

c.,i n . I . 'Hn -.),n pn d at i cn s ý. . . . . . . . . . . . ... 735

-]ure5-I. The Mobility Scheme. ....................... 22. U.S. Task Force In-Stride Breach .......... 43S3. March Formation for a Soviet Motorized

RA-ie Reoilmentt ............................ 44. foviet Engineer Reconnaissance Patrol and

Mnvemer't Support Detachment ............... 455. Sovipet Mobile Obstacle Detachment ......... 466- Soviet Enoineer Organizations .. ........ 47

'I. . 7Ef.nd Scvi.ei: Divisio',nal Breachinoar;,ab• i ti e-.. .............................. 4G

V ~2 r,- rima '- ........................................................ 4?

SECTIOIN I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this oaper is to e'amine the coeLcept of

thhe in-stride obstacle breach bv a tactical maneuver force.

The battlefield environment is in direct contrast to this

conceot. Battlefield friction, due to the effects of terrain

and obstacles, and the requirement for integrated,

s'ynchronized, end combined armed forces to affect a decisive

milita-v _Lccess. comclicate both movement and maneuver.

Fe-roc•-,tion of this problem by Soviet and U.S. forces di+fers

in doctrine, apolied technology, and organization for combat.

L'ow.ever. uLtnd-mental to both is the conceot of a tactical

-For ation with the caoacity to maneuver through an obstacle,

e;i.stinq or reinforcing, without loss o-f momentuIm.

The in-stride breach is a complex operation. Despite its

¶act-'+cel jionificance in the current doctrines of both the

U.S. and tte Soviets, its feasibility for either army is open

to question. Modern methods of terrain obstacle

reinforcement, mobility limitations of combat vehicles, and

the litmL-ation imposed bv the near eoualitv in mobility and-J

countermobilitv caoabilities create the condition that the

in-stride breech !_s rLlite deliberate. Only throuoh a well

conceived doctrine, aoolication of the latest technoloov; and

ccw ''-ct oroaniz• 0,ti or, for combat can tfhn momentum of c1-+erni ve

maneLivEr be sustained concurrent with the breaching of

, a,,. cl -- . Tb h os D er-r Am rines th' - _u;-r- nt i n -- tri e breach

r-~t r,i rt ' f tf h;_ U. '. ant! r_~ t )rrnIl es. World War 11

o n rLe.s a.r-e2 presemited to trace the evol~tioflarv nlAtLkl- of

o~'~tdoctrine, ar-d to provide the relevent hisitor-icai

rei-rco for c-ut-rent U.S3. doctrine. The paper conciludes with

~r~a~l~sand Lcorroaisof of the tWo, doc~trineS, C onC 1Lu

'-C "o!';e C~irrent force mobility capabilities to ex ect

7". Z .8 ~ ~ S , :,7, -

~~~~~~D G-- - 8' ~ -~' ~__

d- -' t .7!n

a -iIMI -!S O.f..

I l-.ý-,-- l'.Ifrom a

L --C -Ia V F r4..n f no q z

* - r,+ i CC tr-(ýIhn -j4 dt t urn thed fromr arerm

4- ID tht aalv c:~iltO f1O i

ErECTION II: TACTICAL MOBILITY AND THE IN-STRIDE BREACH

Success in war deoends utocci mobility arnd mobilityuLon time. Mobility leads to mass, to surprise, andtLM sEcurity. Other things being equal. the mostmbi ip side must ,4n: this is a truism in war as in

hr, se-raci n q. J.F.. Fuller'

Nothing1 is more difficu]t than the art of maneuver.14hAt is difficult about maneuver is to make the

devious route the most direct and to turn misfortunetc e dvanta~e. Sun T•u._

Tactical mobility is the ability of a maneuver force to

nio\'e personnel and equipment on the battlefield without

J'i-r•.otion ,r delay dý,e to effects oF terrain or obstacles.

The environment of the battlefi eld, according to Clausewitz,

mal:G ' c o; in war- like movement in a resistant element".

Wiln -it con ept of tcacticall mobility is a demand for

t-,-- c;d] m:obi 1 ity to ov Come the natural effects of terrain.

(9 t,',c~o t: .'n ~Fricti on, dlesrIribed by theorist Richard Simpkin

-. QrIr1• y E Yh-¢sIiC ohenomenon, certainlv is an

Api,; orlr-] 4tF term to describe the battlef ield relative tor! v;- (:ri ' !on tv. Th,-. t +rrain fiictnr- f3f zur- ace

-Unf jowIt L -;I, rfAe mt~ ~1' dr-i naci, vkQetlatienl * nd

",.1(chae] CI'-va -'r lh-- Aoa tle; of Mnbil}_ty:-____ Ih.I'_crY.5nd 'raCt i _Of ArmoLitred War fa.are Leec ý,nowl pý

LvCtUres (London: Weiden{ eld and NicholJcln, 1979) , . 27.

SSun TZLI, .he Ai-t of__War (Londoni U;:ford

ai .erc• tv F'rri-s, 176-S) , p. I02.

4

b.211lt-uo areas. interactively coupled with w~eather, ;5f-fect

icrioi2ljty coer-ations by stoooino, delavina, or constricting

mový,ement on the ar-ound. Added to the -friction caused by

tsr=Yrain and weather- are enemy countermobility ooerations,

wh~'ich -Further deny physica:l freedom of movement by reinforcing

the na-turai terrein witn man-made obstacles and fires.'~

Beyvond the physical restraints of terrain, maneuver

fomesusiniQ the craniobilitv of tactical mobility, must

epjDncurrentlv overcome the friction inherent to combined arms

rnAnri-ajvcer ý.nd oenerat-ion o+_ combat power. In his -article

ýonfcernino the development of combat power, COL Huba Wass de

~7~19 tatsthait in order- to creite i favorable effect on the

-c~v orrr'. mobility or physical movement alone is not

dcc-i:ive, but ra:_ther is an "enabling caniability"'. Note that

the oceninci qukotation by J.F.C. Fuller aorees with the role of

--,-; rlt'tA, tat-)`,inq cauab-i lity allowing for the

aoriuilicafion rif thp principles o-f war--specificallv, mass,

sn~r'r IFad _.;eCur i tV . I iubhnnt that the or inci p1es of

i:co~nomyv c_4 {orce, ~irnolicitv, a..nd f-inally the ojbviou-S.

rcaIc~o deD-.nndent on the enablirnh c~aoability of

t-I: ti cal '110bil itV.

lhi; -_ncseot of myobility as: an enuiblino capability doe-IP

ncd provid~e thp rnlvcments or o.t tri' but,(s es,-~nti al for a

Ih C~~~ C K. "'I Mp i 1n., F-Lc c) Ihe t7 i f t(L.n onlo.;c7V DU4 PfI en cc b I I -,i~ , 1 985j) .n. 1IOY.

~ Y'; cn U:ene. tnde'-';andino mid Dc-velooi1nri~ '>~:t 'r ~Lour--,o Twrn 1,?.;cdinrlo (0(V" 'L,' p

maneUVer force to achieve relative mobility due to the

friction of terrain and enemy. Given the premise that tactical

mobility is critical to the employment of combat Dower in

ý,upo-t c-F the pr-incioles of war, just what does this mean for

modern, mobile forces? Writina while a student at the Armiy

War Clclleoe. General Creiohtor, Abrams. a hiohi'-. successful

t-anL: battalion commander in World War IT. stated that mobility

i-s a. colmole, bolance c+ "essential factors"--equiprnent,

organization, communications, command structure, and

initca raizto. This holis-tic aooroach to tactic.?l

motbility' a~s defined by General Abrams captures the nature of

Utii realtnirements to eVecLute an in-stride breach. Mobility

fCr1rSt-.tL't.eS a capabiiity--the- in-stride breach therefore is

oA-'a c,?apablity and a mrission repqlirina soecificzilly

ornarii ~rld and enriuieped forCeS for -exc~tt 1on.

h- concr-clt of th(ý ini-stride breach chall1enoes the li mi ts

C, PLIaneuver -frc "_CP'S t ACt i CAlI mobi III t V. The above QUOtAt ion

V .. Fl-ni br ýf-cooini zs the limiinn inn And c-hal lcenging

fi wjte of~ thi '-; Dart- i rub-t 7,t ac La i r~son. The concept o-f an

a a .~hr eac I -- ; d eh to the Lime,* mass,* and

~ v.t~-tC~ f hcjlh mtjhi I t.v utPar-Ations and monpiie-v'

lhvi~ih oi.ir.iv' vor- 4 rem mid-r~n_ mcuhi In wa~r * re,, dot-~,

'dlt.H ii ~JI tH' ih' f-, 1 r' ()iut. ( or nt e 1 ~ ~ d no~ -'-nt f

t 0' if f fei - In~ ' st ii ttr iilse mnrl) lit,, cr on r 1t 1on c.

I. ~Ii TV; -'-, t'il(1thI 1,40tikI It' (fl;-,,Pd on- the r-_hvirKillS ruult-f'

6

Tirne 17 ar, important aspect o-F in-stride mobility

r_•?-•tinns. Thouach a breach in-stride by its concept suaoests

,-anld action, the time required to conduct an in-stride breach

s nc.rma y orater than the time reQuired to reduce the

tAc Ie 10ith mobility assets. In-stride operations also

r,(1ulire detection o+ the obstacle, d cision as to the best

Ioc:+-tion 4or the breach, and effective suppression of enemy

•-~~', ,nd -sv(txon of the breaching ooeration. This is

acrc',li ch~c by reconnaissance. integrated tactical battle

1 +. 4ireo owe-. d(Iceotion, and electronic countermeasures.

There-Foiý.-, the time factor o{ in-stride breach operations

-,•IaLes to task e,'ecution bv synchronized mobility and

rArieiver assets. i.e.. "essential factors", to accomplish

T-L,' ]•D1l ooer Dtior-; and taks, and not to the sinole task of

- • <e through an obstacle.

7

SECTION III: U.S. ARMY DOCTRINE AND THE IN-STRIDE BREACH

The Germans believe that the modern trend towardmotorization and mechanization demands a much largerproportion of Enoineer and other troops with thecombat: troops than formerly. We seem to be movingin exactly the opposite direction.- MG J.L.Schley, Chief of Enaineers, 19'37-1941

World !-•oar Breachinq Operations

In the period immediately before the war and until 1942,

mo',i .itv operations in supoort of maneuver units were

in+tLenced orimarilv by three developments: the success of

German r,-ltz_:-ijeq tactics, the experiences of the 1941

trainina maneuvers in the southern United States, and the

irrres- n-f obstacles in the European theater.- In 1941 and

:'?41. the Enoineer School conducted a series of tests to

',.iuate th- cur,-ent doctrine for breaching obstacles.

Vnrcosinn on mobility support to armor and infantry units in

hra-china obstacles similar to those found on the Siegfried

Line, th,? 4 inal -eport 4ound that mobility operations required

scici1lly traened soldiers to assault and reduce obstacles.

that infantrv and engineers should both be trained in the use

oi 0emT:itkcons. and that the incantry division oroanization

,- Iuns5'ta;?• -for the conduct of breachino ooerations due to

%blanche D. Cell, Jean E. Veith and Herbert H.F)s&-nthal . The Corp-so.Enoineers: Troopps_-and_Eoui pment.

United States Army in World War II (Washinoton D.C.: Office ofthe Chief of Military History. 1958), p. 14.

"'Mar-ion Cain and Stanley Murphy. "Develooment ofEnrireer -Jactical Doctrine and Equinment." Enaineer,Winter 1985-8t), n. ,.

the smallness of the divisional engineer battalion(520 men).

1he report also concluded that the current doctrine for the

conduct of breaching ooerations was sound but needed

clArification. *

FM 5-6, Enaineer Fiel dPlanual--Doerations of Enq_ineer___

Field Units, dated Aorilý 1943, and FM 100-5 0_erations, dated

22 May 1941, prescribed five specific assault techniques to

br-each obstacles: hand-olaced charges, hand removal,

artillerv fire. bridoinp, and direct fire from tanks or tank

destroyer-s. Minefields were to be breached by manuzal removal

usirCg pr-obes, placement of explosives near the minre, or

r~mova1 and disarming by hand. Assault of enemy obstacles was

to be conducted in four phases as a combined arms operation of

infant-y, artillervy enaineers, tanks, and chemical smoke

1 Ir. ts. Phase I, reduction of the enemy outpost system, was

conducted bv the a-tillery and infantry. Phase II consisted

o-' a shift of artillery fires to enemy counterbattery and

reservps whiJe direct fire from tanks and tank destroyers

sUppressed enemy fire to protect the approachinq assault and

brt:arhino detachments. Once at the obstacle, the breaching

deiachmernt Would breach a gap through the obstacle, using

h-' di-p] azed cha'-aes --nd manual mireclf-arinn procedures.

Dut inn Fhaspe I1. tne asF-ault detachment would pass through

t¾I Qa4 to secur-e the far side with arenades, antitank

ruoI-:et•, fia.methrowers, and handplaced chargcs. In Fhase IV,

fý .bile Torces vould oass through the oap ap7d continue the

9

attack. Neither manual mentioned the breaching of obstacles

with mechanical means or prescribed a need to protect the

breaching detachment e) through the use of smoke and enemy

-fire suppression by art. i-y and covering fires.

Furthermore, there was " Et: •ntion of a requirement to conduct

_•n in-stride breech of an, ibstacie to sustain the momentum of

the maneuver or attack.J`1

Bv 1943, the accumu.': ed experiences of the Soviets.

British, and the North : _an and Italian campaigns began to

affect U.S. training aný .bbility equipment development. The

extensive use of minefiexds and wire obstacles by the Germans

resulted in a requirement that select officers of every combat

unit, prior to deployment overseas, would receive a one week

course on the laying of hasty minefields and the breaching of

G-.rman mine-Fields. e

The effect of minefields on mobility also cau ed

sionificant research for development of explosive and

mechanical breaching devices to reduce danger and time.

Ex plosive ]ir-e charoes, such as the British bangalore torpedo

?rid the Canadian snake, were adopted for exolosive reduction

of minefields. Mechanical breaching equipment development.

DField Manual 100-5, Ooeratiorns (22 May 1941).-n. 187:.

'Field Manual 5-6. Ocerations of EngineerUrits: (2`7 ApriI 194.) , pp. 72-84.

"1 0 Marion Cain and Stanley Murphy. "Development of

Enoineer Tactical Doctrine and Equipment." Eng!ineer_.Winter 1985-86, p. .

begun in 1942 with thought of a method which offered the

advantages of less time and manpower to clear mines, had very

limi ed success. Except for armor protected D-7 dozers and

the mountin: of a blade on a very small number of medium

tan.-., all the items "developed were either too heavy, too

co;,,plicated to project into a minefield, too slow, or too

lacking in dependabilitv."3 1 Pressure for a detection device

for mines, particularly a vehicular mounted device, met with

similar results. Research methods failed to develop a

deoendable and effective mine detector prior to the end of the

war. The only available detector, the SCR 625. was unreliable

and only decected metallic mines, renderino it useless in

eas litter-ed with artillery shrapnel. In light of these

failed attempts in research and development, and the paucity

of equipment fielding ex'ceot for the snake and bangalora.

"most mines were discovered and removed by soldiers, crawling

on hands 5-nd knees and eujuipped only with probes, and the tank

dozer remained the combat enaineers' closest approach to an

", ~assl•!t Vehicle."*

Revi. ew of combat ooerations reveals the extensive manual

clrarino of mines and hand placement of explosive demolitions

tn) reduce obstacles as orescribed by the doctrine.

Casualties, loss of time and momentum, and heavy reliance on

"1 Blanche D. Co~ll Jean E. Keith. and Herbert H.Fc,•Enthai l, The Corps of Engi!neers. Troops and Enuipment,

United States Army Lin World War II (Washin.gton D.C.: Office of-h- Chief of Military H..story. 1958), p. 476.

11

both the infantry and the engineer to conduct manual

counterobstacle/countermine reduction operations were common

to all phases of the war. Innovation was often demonstrated

in mobility operations, such as the welding of a steel rod to

the front of a tank to cut the hedgerows in the 'bocaoe'

terrain o; Normandy. The VIII Corps was able to sustain the

Normandy breakout operation in July, 1944, because the

infantry and armor soldiers of the lead divisions had been

trained on manual clearino of mines, despite the retreating

Germans leaving behind "the most extensive minefields

encountered on the Continent.""' Fortunately, the mine and

reinforcing obstacle threat diminished sionificantlv as the

U.S. maneuver forces moved faster than German countermobility

capabilities in the pursuit across France. However, at the

Sieqfried Line and West Wall, mobile operations were

restricted by the countermobilitv operations of the defendino

Germans. Tactical operations in Lorraine, the Stolberg

Corridor, and the Roer River Plain were hampered by a

dependence on manual reduction of obstacles."•

Fiir-ent U.S. Doctrine and the In-Stride Breach

AirLand Battle doctrine is the U.S. Army's approach to

1 Alfred M. Beck. et.al.. The Corps ofEn~qineers: The War Aaainst Germany, United States Army inWorld War II (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government PrintingO+fice, 1985), p. 380.

" 1 Russel IA. Stolfi, Mine and Countermine Warfarein Recent History, 1914-1_970 Report No. 1582 (AberdeenFrovinq Ground. Md.: Ballistic Research Laboratories, 1972),Do. 80-88.

12

generating and applying combat power. The concept of securing

and retaining initiative through the delivery of a powerful

blow from an unexpected direction and followed by aggressive.

continuous operations to accomolish the mission requires that

mobility relative to the terrain and the enemy must be

maintained. FC 90-13, Counterobstacle and Rivercrossina

Ooerations, defines mobility as the ability to move quickly

and decisively in any direction without loss of momentum.

SRecoonizino that obstacles are the most serious threat to

maintenance of mobility, the doctrine correctly prescribes

that U.S. -orces must be able to overcome a wide variety of

natural and reinforcina obstacles through a coordinated,

combined arms operation. However, the doctrine states that a

counLerobstacle operation is not "a mission in itself." 1'

This coordinated, combined arms operation, termed the

mobility scheme, requires maneuver forces to be able to

conduct counterobstacle operations in accordance with four

interdeoendent tenets: initiative, agility, depth, and

synchronization. The mobility scheme, structured to execute a

series of ooerations which will overcome obstacles to movement

Rnd maneuver, is systematic in its approach, but requires

integration of two orqanizational elements to achieve effect.

Piaure 1 i- an extract from FC 90-13 and FM 5-101, Mobility,

which Qraphically depicts the interaction of the two

orgianizational components, the lead and follow-on forces, in

" 1 Field Circular 90-13. Counterobstacle andRiver CrossinOpegations (March 1987), 0o. 2-7 to 2-18.

' 13

breaching an obstacle. Based on a METT-T assessment, the

commander may decide that the counterobstacle operation must

1 ". be executed in-stride to maintain the momentum. This

in-stride breach of the obstacle, doctrinally executed at

battalion task force and/or company team level, is considered

to be a preplanned and drilled operation rather than an

operation which requires extensive planning and massing of

combat forces.

The doctrine of the in-stride breach is conceptually tied

to the "battle drill.--a rehearsed and standardized operation

which the force executes as an immediate reaction to an

obstacle. Based on the the earlier World War II doctrine of

assaulting an obstacle in four phases, the in-stride breach

battle drill involves the organizing of the maneuver task

force into three elements: the support force, the breaching

fnrce, and the assault force. These three elements execute

the in-stride breach by accomplishing four tasks:

SUPPRESS: Suppression is the prevention of enemyfires from attacking the force executing thereduction of the obstacle.

OBSCURE: Obscuration prevents direct observation ofthe obstacle crossing sites(s).

SECURE: Securing the crossinq site prevents enemyoround forces from attaciing the force duringbreaching operations. Security of the far side ofthe obstacle is done by direct or indirect firerather than nhysicAl occupation to facilitate speedand economy of force.

REDUCE: Reduction is the physical creation of lanesor gaps in throuoh or over the obstacle. Thedoctrine requires that two lanes be prepared for a

14

maneuver task force.

The in-stride breach doctrine has been developed into

several counterobstacle battle drills which prescribe

guidelines for the organization of weapons and combined arms

assets, such as engineers, which are required to conduct the

operation. Figure 2 is an extract from FC 90-13-1, Combined

Arms Counterobstacle Operations: The In-Stride Breach, which

provides an example of a mechanized task for in the conduct of

an in-stride breach operation. The reduction element in this

example is to use both mechanical and explosive means to

create lanes through the obstacle. Artillery, overwatching

indirect ana direct fires, reconnaissance elements, smoke, and

command and control to synchronize the operation, though

considered a rehearsed drill, are complex.

Organization and Equipment to Conduct the In-Stride Breach

The combined arms nature of in-stride breach operations

as required by the doctrine places great emphasis on the

equipment and organizations to conduct the operation.

Execution of the in-stride breach is a battalion task force

operation as this is the lowest echelon at which the elements

of firepower, maneuver, intelliaence, and support are combined

under a single commander. Accordina to FM 71-2.The Tank and

Mechanized InfantryjTask Force, the allocation of enaineer

support for a battalion task force is normally an engineer

platoon depending on METT-T. Fiqure 2 is a U.S. battalion

task force organized for an in-stride breach operation with an

engineer company in direct sijoport. Note the reconnaissance

15

element is the battalion task force organic scouts and does

not include engineers. The specific equipment available for

the reduction o-P the obstacle to create a lane is the combat

engineer vehicle, the armored combat earthmover, a towed

trailer with the mine-clearing line charge, and demolition

e:Xplosives carried on the engineer squad tracks, such as the

bangalorp torpedo and composition C-4 explosive blocks. The

maneuver task force has organic direct and indirect firepower

firnpoiJ,•r, as well as the indirect fires of direct support

artillery.

16

SECTION IV: SOVIET ARMY DOCTRINE AND THE IN-STRIDE BREACH

The tactical art of our troop units is developedaround a lofty moral and political core, and isbased on mobility, boldness, and constant pressure.M i kna.i i N. Tukhecnovski •

Soviet World War II Breaching Operations

Soviet Doctrine in the years preceding and during World

War- II concentrated on the theory of the engagement in depth.

As technical and material resources were developed to execute

this doctrine, the organization of the Soviet Army was adapted

to accommodate the simultaneous employment of mass weaponry

throughout the depth of the enemy defensive zone with the aim

o-F encirclement and annihilation. Success depended on

surprise, a "Skillful combination of movement", coordination

0+ fires, =knd maneuver involving close and continuous

cofioeration between the combat and service support arms.'-,

During the war, tactical combat experience was continually

stJdied on the theoretical level for improving weapons and

tactics. In particular, the need for integration of combat

rengineer support of mobility operations to sustain the rapid

pace of the offense was recognized throughout the war.

In the first period of the war, combat engineer support

1ýArt of War Collguium Publication--New Problemsin Warfareby_ Tukhachevsk iy (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S,Army War College, 1983), p. 65.

1 7 V. G. Reznichenko, ed. , Tactics---A SovietView, Soviet Military Thought (Washington D.C.: U.S.Government Printinq Office, 1987), p. 7-8.

17

was largely concerned with supplying engineer weapons,

training the infantry, and construction. Suffering great

losses due to poor tactical control of engineer assets in the

early years of the war, the Soviet Army reorganized the

division engineer battalion in 1941, reducing its strength

-from 805 men to 162 men. This reduction of engineers at the

division level allowed for the creation of independent

enqineer companies, battalions, regiments, and brigades

controlled by higher headquarters. This centralization of men

and equipment allowed for concentration of the mobility assets

behind the main effort. Included in this reorganization were

"assault engineer-sapper" battalions of approximately 290 men.

Other special unit were mining companies, road construction

battalions, and bridge companies. These units were often

mission orqanized into assault engineer bricades of varying

sizes. I

Soviet doctrine required that a rifle battalion be

supported by a platoon of engirieers; each regiment by a

company, and a division by a battalion. This required at

l,-ast a battalion of combat engineers beyond the oroanic

divisional engineers. This requirement was met by attaching

assiult engineer battalions of the corps or armies, but only

wJhn the divisiron was conductinra a breakthrough of a fortfi4ied

zone or an assaul t in A bui lt-uop area. This i nsttred

£ IEdward N. LIt.'twak, 1"hle A>v e rm y hDucond World War-Aissaul I EnqAi nepr,-Sappe4r niclades, Hit slot.i :,a1Analysis and Frolection for Army -000 (Chevy Chase, Md.:

L, Dn. 1-4.

J € 18

concentration of engineer assets in the zones where they would

achieve the greatest effect relative to the main effort. •

This centralization of engineer assets afforded a

concentrated enaineer force to breach enemy obstacles

necessary in the breakthrough operations of the second and

third ceriods of the war(1943-1945). One critical aspect of

Soviet breaching operations was engineer reconnaissance of the

enem;, defense prior to the start of offensive operations.

ExYensive use of engineer reconnaissance posts provided

critical. in-formation concerning the location and density of

obstacles, and allowed for detailed mission analysis of

.enginier forces req•uired to conduct breaching operations.

Thes;e enoineer reconnaissance posts also included in depth

reconnaissance of the enemy defense behind' the initial line of

defense. This facilitated planning of mobility assets

requir-ed in the movement to the enemy tactical depths by,

so-.co:nd and third echelon forces.

Until 1942, breachinq techniques exclusively involved

hand ( learino of mines and reduction of other obstacles by

_manual labor. Beqinninq in 1945, eplosive and mechanical

.clearinen techniqcues were adapted to counter the extensive

G'.rman kis of mi rn-f i c-Is and obstacles to slow the Soviet

1advan:e. In the K kiev operation in 1943, the use of the FIT-3

*i, mt) r ulf ir- mounted on a tan[ was used to lead the assa!ult for

-- , t .h r t tIL r:rar r ,oan nt.. in the Vistula-Oder Ooeration.

i~ ent . la 1 1 v , enoqinleer tan 1; reciment s were 4orined to support

19

countermine operations. Each tank reiiment, crganized into

three companies, had 20 PT-3's. Deployed in pairs to clear a

4.8 meter lane, these mine rollers were used with engineer

troops as escorts to mark the cleared lanes. E>xolosive

breachinq techniques included development of a line charge.

the UZ. that eventually was refined to create a six meter wide

lane. Despite these improvements in technical equipment,

sionificant numbers of engineer sapper units were still

reqUired to support the first echelon maneuver forces in the

of 4ense. During the offensive operations of 1944-45, 10 or

more spper companies were used per kilometer of front in the

breakthrough sector. Specific examples include 7 companies per

kilomteter at Kursk and 13-17 in East Prussia. In the special

•es of attacks on cities, the density reached 17-22

companies oer kilometer of front.-m

Soviet in-stride breach operations of minefields were

iairly refined by the end of the war. By experience,

hrachina operations in support of a mobile operation reGuired

- massed" use of tank mounted PT-3 mine rollers, artillery, and

infantry. A company of mine-clearing tanks with a sapper

platoon wolid clear minefield passaoes for a tank reqiment.

A.• the •0,a~t1 $ phase of thF1 breach begin. the mine clear-ino

tanits w -nid move -forward in paircs alon(n predesigonated rotttes

ond clin rr - 4.0 meter strip. 1he mine r learin, tanl s woold

"•0 Yeqevqeniy [.olihernov, Vasily Kornev, and Andrey.osLov, C* mbat. Jnqi-neer Stipport , Forel on ProadcastInforomnt ion Service.--.-. 3'TR Report (Washincqton D.. C : Foreictn

}{r •.•:l:a÷t nformaýtion ServiceF,, 19W.O,). p. 16•.

20

follow each other in echelon at a distance of 15 to 25 meters.

Lanes for the infantry(1.2 meters) were made by a single mine

clearing tank that could be widened by sappers using explosive

line charqes. Infantry lanes could also be created by line

cha-oes "pushed" into the minefield by a tank, but this was

slow due to assembly time for the line charges.2 1

One other ta'..tic developed by the end of the war was the

formation of small groups of sappers to follow the lead

reconnaissance element in a tactical march and clear obstacles

in the advance of the main body. These sappers. using

e'xplosives. motorized graders, and special route clearing

Julldozers, created fords, develooed bypassesý., and cleared the

r-oute of destroyed vehicles and other battlefield damage. By

t1r.•iling this advance element, the main body of the maneuver

force could pass through an obstacle or an area of restricted

-nobility without loss of time or momentum.ý 2

Current Soviet In-Stride Breach Operations

Current Soviet doctrine stresses that the offense is the

most decisive form of combat. Building on the theoretical and

rr,3:tical ex;oeriences of World War 1I, the theory of

engagement in depth has been refined into modern tactics to

employ the very latest in modern technology in combined arms

21 ~*Soskov, "Wartime Operations: Methods of

Breachina Minefields," Voyenno-lstoricheskiv Zhurnak, 24March 1980. n. 16.

=Yegevgeniy Kolibernov, Vasily Kornev, and AndreySjsL.ov. Combat Enqineer Suprort. Foreian BroadcastTnformation Service--USSR Report (Washington D.C.: ForeionSrandc~t Information Service, I5) . 17.

21

combat operations. Fundamental to success of Soviet offensive

operations are high rates of advance by maneuver forces that

disrupt and destroy the integrity of the enemy's forces.

Soviet principles of war at the tactical and operational level

are listed below:2-- z4 Z

1. The achievement of battlefield mobility andrapid tempo of attack.

2. The achievement of an adequate correlationof forces at the decisive place and time.

Surprise.4. Continuous operations.5. Preservation of combat vower by maintenance

of combat ready forces. command and control, andgond morale of the soldiers.

6. Co-operation of all arms and services.7. Not attempting too little or too much with

the forces available.a. Carry the battle to the deoths ot the enemy

deployment and deep in his rear.

The Soviets identify three types of combat operations:

the meeting engagement, the offense, and the defense. The

meeting enqaoement, a form of the offense, is recognized

separately to emphasize its importance. The offense is further

divided into the attack, the exploitation, and the pursuit

rulmina-ino in the encirclement. Each of these offensive

operations is to be conducted by the maximum use of maneuver,

firepowe-, and shock action. The meetina engagement and the

"C.N. Donnel]y, "Enoineers o+ the Soviet Army."International Defense Review (February 1978), p. 195,

"=kRichard Simpkin, Red Armour (Elmsford, N.Y.:Brassey's International Defense, 1984). p. 22.

'IV. G. Rezpichenko, ed., 7actics---A SovietView, Soviet Military Thought. (Wahington D.C.: U.S.Government Printing Office, 19j7), pp. 41-58.

-(-fense are predicated un the maintenance of the initiative,

-Freedom of movement and maneuver, combat on a wide front,

rapid troop deployment and concentration, and the ability to

generate high rates of advance against the enemy, thus

resulting ir both his destruction and dislocation. The

doctrine is highly dependent on achieving superior mobility

-elative tn the enemy to sustain the momentum of the

operati on.

The role o- mobility operations to achieve the "c~ombat

mission" assigned the tactical commander is well recognized in

the tactic=, force structure, and training of Soviet forces.

Soviet- combat missions relate to the defeat of the enemy

4 orce, the nature of the terrain, and time. This relationship

of enemy, terrain, and time cause deliberate structuring of

maneuver forces for in--stride counterobstacle operations to

sLIstain momentum and tempo. The battle formation as well as

the Torce structure of the combat units corresponds to the

concrept of sustaining high mobility and movement rates to

-:chieve engagement in e-pth of the enemy force. Notably,

Soviet doctrine requires the designation of successive

v.chelors, to break-through enemy defenses and exuloit the

suiccess achieved by a rapid, decisive, and integrated

ooeration. The use of set formatiorns of combined arms Lorces

,Nith rectonnaissance, advance guards, and main body elements

al low +or f1e,:i ble but concentrated movement. Engineer support

for each of these elements is provided to overcome the natural

r1d rei nf orc ing obstacles ntncountered as the force maneuvers

23

on one of several routes.

The Soviet motorized rifle regiment in march formation is

organized as shown in Figure 3. Note the dispersion of

engineer- elements throughout the formation to identify

byoasses, reduce obstacles, and mark routes for the main

force. The mission of the engineer reconnaissance patrol is

to conduct engineer reconnaissance of the march route. In

particulIar, the reconnaissance patrol is to locate enemy

obstacles and determine either bypass options or estimates of

enoineer ef-Fort to reduce the obstacle. The movement support

detachment(MSD), found in the forward security element or- the

advance guard, consists of engineer equipment assets from the

division or regimental engineer company with attached infantry

anti armor For protection. The MSD conducts route clearina and

oreparation based on the estimates from the engineer

rPCOnnaiss ,nee ,atr-ol. Figure 4 illustrates the organization

and equipmr.qnt of the enaineer reconnaissance Datrol and the

MSD.

At the motorized rifle/tank battalion level, mobility

asserts consist o3 oroanic mine rollers and plows mounted on

the t-Fnks of the unit. When task organized with combat

enoineers from either reoimental or divisional assets.

engineer mobility assets are distributed much like those found

in the regimental march formation. There is an engineer squad

with the combat reconnaissance oatrol, an MSD of at least a

platoon with mine clearing equipment and blade assets, and the

remainder of the enqineer company moving in the forward

24

portion of the main body.

Much er,)ohasis is placed on engineer reconnaissance, which

can be performed independently or as a part of the maneuver

force reconnaissance elements. By having the advance engineer

reconnaissance patrol locate and estimate route bypasses or

the effort required to create passages through the obstacle,

a maneuver element can sustain its momentum. Due to the

centralization of engineer assets above division, higher level

commanders can weight the main effort with engineer equipment

and sappers based on the results of the enaineer

reconnaissance estimates in the preparation phase of the

at t ck.

When an obstacle is encountered that must be breached,

powerful art-illery fires are placed in the vicinity of the

passage sites to neutralize and destroy overwatching enemy

artillery, mortars, antitank missile, and small arms fires.

Tanks and artitank missiles are deployed to provide direct

fire. Smoke is used to obscure the enemy vision of the

breachinq operation. Oroanic tank mounted mine rollers and

plows, and the attached engineers, are deployed forward to

create the oassaaes required for the maneuver force.

Normally, one passage is created for each tank or motorized

rifle company in the first echelon. Mechanical rollers and

e>j:ilosive line charoes are used to breach lanes, in minefields.

rEnaineer- dcozers and multi-Ourpose counterobstacle vehicles(IMR

combat engineer tractor) fill holes and remove debris.

Dismounted sapoers mar-. lanes and Quide fullow-on elements

z2'5

through the passages.

During the clearing of the route of obstacles by the

maneuver force direct support engineers, other engineer

elements are constructing flank and rear obstacles of mines

and point demolition obstacles for protection. This engineer

element, the mobile obstacle detachment, though not directly

involved in the reduction of obstacles blocking the advance,

sJgnificantly contributes to the mobility of the advancing

element by providing flank security, and the construction of

reinforcing obstacles that will disrupt and delay enemy

counterattack 4orces. Normally a platoon or company of

sappers, the mobile obstacle detachment is often deployed with

antitank reserve elements. Figure 5 is an example of the

composition of a mobile obstacle detachment.

Qrqanization and Equipment to Conduct the In-Stride Breach

The need to rapidly overcome obstacles to achieve rapid

penetration in depth of the enemy defenses has resulted in a

general concept that maneuver tank and infantry forces must

have continuous mobility support throughout the operation.

Enoinee'- mobility assets, from organic and hiaher levels, are

employed "to create the necessary conditions for the obstacle

free movement of a unit and ensure its timely arrival at its

objecLivE or its successful entry into battle. "• Critical to

the success of the maneuver force's relative mobility is the

=16 C.N. Donnelly, "Engineers of the Soviet Army,"International Defense Review (February 1978), p. 200.

•" •TIlbid. , no. 195--196.

I1

26

centralized control of enoineer-sappers and equipment. Figure

6 is a schematic of the regimental and divisional engineer

orn-a.ni zations.

The essential features of Soviet engineer mobility

forces are the ability of Soviet commanders to position their

assets throughout the advancing maneuver forces to support the

main effort at the point of the assault by direct support

engineer-sappers; the placement of engineer reconnaissance

forward to detect obstacles and develop bypass

routes/estimates for reduction effort. finally, the

Ltilization of engineer MSD's to sustain the mobility of the

_sain body in the march. In the context of supporting mobility

operations by providing security to the maneuver force, mobile

obstacle detachments assist in preserving the momentum and

ý2ecurity of the maneuver force by the construction of

reinforcinq obstacles along the flanks of the movement route.

27

SECTION V: ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION

The concept of an in-stride breach is found in both the

-U.3 and Soviet armies. Both require a mobility capability to

overcome obstacles that sustains the momentum and tactical

integrity of the movement/maneuver. However, the two armies

di-ýFer in their historical experiences and perspectives,

current doctrine, and organization for combat in designing the

"essential factors" of a combined arms force with the

caoabiiity to execute a breach of an obstacle "in-stride".

Historical E.,periences and Perspectives

The two armies beoan World War II with a doctrine based

on the hand-clearing of obstacles. The Soviets, in response

to heavy losses and the extensive use of minefields on the

Eastern front, were forced early in the war to develop

alternatives. Detailed and continuous analysis of ooerations

al-!owed for a steady improvement in technical equipment and

m-inruver- -Force organization to execute obstacle breaching

S ooeratrjons, a trend that continues until today. The U.S. , a

reLative late-c:ooer to the European theater, was also forced

to explore alternatives to manual breaching techniques.

CentralizAtion of engineer mobility assets and the emoloyment

of large number-s of mine rollers and plows was not

miccn I:i shed by the U. . Certainly the ability of U.S. forces

to move faster than the withdrawinq Germans' ability to

emplkce mines and other obstacles accounts for some of the

20

historical perspectives of the two armies. For example, the

U.S. did not develop an equivalent concept to the Soviet's

movement support detachment or the mobile obstacle detachment.

Following the war, the U.S., unlike the Soviets, did not

maintain a balance between doctrine and the development and

procurement of mobility equipment. Today, the mobility

capabilities of the U.S., particularly in countermine warfare.

are essentially the same as at the end of World War II.2B

Current Doctrine and Organization for Combat

The current doctrine of the two armies requires combat

ennineers to clear obstacles in-stride to preserve the

momentum of the maneuver force. The main battle tanks and

infantry fighting vehicles of both armies have been designed

to strike deep and raoidly with effective firepower. The

responsibilitv for conduct of an in-stride breach is a

mlneuver commandet-'s responsibility in both doctrines;

however, the resultant tactics. equipment densities, and use

of combat engineers are not similar. Figure 7 is a comparison

of the orpanic breaching capabilities of U.S. and Soviet

divisions. Note the hiaher density of engineer mobility

assets in the Soviet division.

Richai-d Simpkin views the differences between the

apolic.;tion of Soviet and U.S. mobility doctrines as "the

Russian fiphts between moves and the Anglo-Saxon moves between

*"JS. ~Armv General. Ofzicer Steering Committee

'i'outntermnine Master Flan," U.S. Army Engineer School (14

I~ b 'L-8r -11) . p. ES-5.

S~2?

fichts. 9 He also points out that significantly every Soviet

offensiv7 tarctical diagram he has studied began with the

forces in column end ended with the forces reforming into

column. This focus on constant movement to achieve

"enljagement in depth" places a higher priority on force

structure arkn organization For combat for areater relative

mrobir..ility than that found in the current U.S. doctrine. Though

i s tenets n,.f the Air-Land Btle doctrine are highly dependent

v'n a-t•4fiId grc,!And mobility, the translation o,- that

recLt~r5.mont has nol: resLIlted in the development and fielding

o(J .r•r( numbhersc-• nbili-" systems to sustain in-stride

._,V oper.• t j -ns.

ISeve-.L U.s. doctrinal solutions re~uire the use of

mobility systems which are not compatible with the concept of

an in-stride breach. For e.<amole, the number of mine

p1 n/,ror ]-4.rs ir 1nsukt-fic(in.. to counter the eFfects of a

,. ,terabl� .i.iie.u. The doctrinal procedurs found

in 1-70 1 -7.I- dopicts _•n ezinoer comoany in direct suopor-t of

o , n v.?Vr ta- ore. With only f-iir engineer iompani-,

- ns qucst orab -¾ufficient en.gineer......

~ ~ (nt t, or r- Co p," -4 17'i

-. ~ ~~jq,

h j C e F, nrL-d C-. on -e ad v an ce r crn na sn

r -. r n H recor, n_,51sance e. Iement of the

-A l o -. ._n T- \- .E

I"- - is .- ~�c w•-hd more r_--.p icv •j-d

I. L,- . (L1•ntf E fTii rr r; -r, p c'..s avail ab Ie to

ii-m .:- ;ty t s -vrc? c- - , ianid reduction of

T <' 1 - qe cýoncentration of combat

r- : . .- .. ,..•. rb)ov- Ihe division level that can be quickly

-. .. O't -he forward maneuver forces as a MSD or

... i•,, t•.tcu detachment. This is due to a deliberate

I.rc~.,r-1nu o4 non-divisional engineer assets much like their

di /isioral counterparts and the Soviet World War II experience

which verified the requirement for a large number of

enginpe-r-sappers -orward to sustain the momentum of the main

off cw L -- '

Command and control of engineer elements to support the

in-.st-ride br-each of an obstacle system are critical. The

Fo,<,ot placement of an engineer commander at every level

fa:.-ilitates command and control ensures priority of engineer

.U~ofporttto the main effort, and results in the rapid

ir-tsegration of additional engineer resources to support the

tuLt-31 Force (i.e. movement suonort detachments). The U.S.

P~noinpvr comma7nd and control structure is not integrated with

th Un'.Ineliver forces. Relying on an archaic command and

"•Joseph Schroedel, "Tactical Mobility:Oy-ganizing Engineers for an All Arms Problem," School of

C,-(4÷ V, '• "iIit r - ,, i,_ Mnnno r~oh ',19P7) , n . ...

- 31

control structure, the effect is a thinly dispersed and

uncoordinated engineer force that can not be focused on

mobility support for the forward maneuver forces due to

incompatible equioment and traininq.- 1

-1 "U.S. Army General Officer Steering Committee

Countermine Master Plan," U.S. Army Engineer School (14

September- 1988), p. 5-6.

i

SECTION VI: CONCLUSIONS

The concept of the in-stride obstacle breach on the

modern battlefield is a critical component of the doctrines of

the Soviet and the U.S armies. Given the difficulty and

comple;xity of breaching an obstacle in-stride without

affecting the momentum of the attack, the Soviets currently

are better organized and equipped to perform this task.

Superiority in both numbers and types of breaching equipment,

oroanizati•on and command and control of engineer mobility

assets, and the integration of engineer and maneuver force

reconnaissance enable the Soviets to effectively execute an

instride obstacle breach. Remarkably, the two doctrines are

very similar in their prescription of "how" to apply combat

powe- to overcome an obstacle in-stridp. However, the U.S.

has failed to balance doctrinal "requirements" to fielded

forcp "cap,'pbilities". The realities of combat development and

ejuipment fielding and the integration of mobility engineer

s with onanf-uver forces have not kept pace with the

evolution and demands of AirLand battle doctrine.

Thpe current Soviet doctrine and organization for combat

is rl h,7iped by the e':peripnces of World War-I .

Petailie'.I ;•nalyvu•;i of the mobile operations, particularly in

tfhe final •l o vers of the war, continue today. Additionally,

th'c So\ Ar( ,rc, currently reevalUatin( their doctrinal rates

Of ad,'Vn;ri ,W.l t() thpir eL-periences in Afghanistan. Though

rnot i.2prrt.od IF) uPPn GoLtrc:E?,F", the combin-d effects cf

33

terrain and Afghani rebel mines has caused some doubt as to

-'their ability to sustain the desired momentum of movement and

maneuver. In particular, engineer requirements to support

both main battle and rear area operations may have been

underestimated.1 Beyond reevaluation of their- mobility

doctrine, the Soviets continue to improve their engineer

mobility equipment in both capabilities and survivability.

The classification of this paper precludes a detailed

discussion of these improvements or specific indication- of

Sovirnt research efforts particularly 'n the area of mine and

countermine technology. Unquestionably the use of aerial

platforms for reconnaissance and delivery of mobility

eqtlpment in the advance of qround maneuver forces as observed

in .fqhýnistan is representative of the Soviet intention to

continhii, imorovement of their capabil ity to sustain the

mljnnn linum o ql-tLtnd manpitvror forces.

This e,,perirnced--based commitm.ent to improve mobility

c,-ipabliitv for overcoming obstacles in-stride is not evident

in tlh current U.S. Army for-_-e structure. The problem has

becolme ýo apparent that the House and Senate Armed Services

COFImi Lttes have expressed concern. Z- The fai lure to learn from

tU, oxp-rirencn? of World War fI and Vietnam have insured the

f;il1oir,- o4 the ;.FS. army to conduct the in-stride obstacle oen

`'LUrahým H. Tirbivi lle, "53)viet Combat Ln iri,-ret-sin (fljhani • ,tin, Pop t, Militarv Einqineer , Pe0t,',ct 1:,B7 p.

"U.S. ~Army Bc-neral Of4ir•or Steprina CommitteP-Cou'r, L-r mi ne Master F' an." l. S. ArmV Enni n-ir E-chool ( 14

l 1.- ~ ' F e

34

the AirLand battlefield. In a recent National Training Center

Lessons Learned Newsletter, the need for integrated and

improved _aoabilities of detection and engineer reconnaissance

o4 obstacles was stressed as well as a Soviet style emphasis

on the importance of combat formations with integrated

engineer support.ý 4 However, the actual reduction of the

obstacles, particularly mines, depended on employment of

limited engineer assets with only manually emplaced explosives

or hand removal. By no means does the current U.S. mobility

capa~jilities available to a maneuver force commander allow frr

an in-stride breach oa an cbstacle.

- 4""NTC Leasons Learned," Combined Arms Training

Activity (277 May 1788), p. 1-20.

9

____.___________ I• '• ______ a . • . , . . . . , ' -~

SECTION VII: RECOMMENDATIONS

To reveal the direction in which the cognitiveprocess will develop further, it is necessary todetect in it the remnants of the past, fundamentalso-F the present, and the embryos of the future.G3eneral of the Army I. Shavrov-

The concept of the in-stride breach of an obstacle will

remain an important task for the future AirLand Battle(ALB).

U. S. tactical. doctrine and force structure must be evaluated

to insure manejver force mooility capabilities meet the

requirements of ALB doctrine. Not enough has been

accomplished in the fielding of mobility equipment,

integrating en•ineers with maneuver reconnaissance elements,

and centralizing command and control of mobility assets. A

review of the current -orward-looking studies done by the U.S.

Army Engineer School and the Training .•nd Doctrine Command

reveals that the problem of tactical mo'bility, in particular

the capacity to conduct the in-stride obstacle breach, is very

much a priority concern for future operations. The management

of the combat development and fielding of critically needed

mobil:tty systems, and development of tactical procedures to

enhance the maneuver -Force mobility can not repeat the poor

performance of the years since World War II.

This paper has provided the current Soviet in-stride

breach doctrine and capabilities. Current Soviet "open

'.5Soviet Ennineer EILlipment: The ThirdG3eneration, U.S. Army Scientific and Technical IntelligenceBulletin (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,May 1984), p. 97.

36

source" literature indicates that tactical mobility of ground

maneuver forces continues to be a high priority. Certainly,

it must be acknowledged that the current Soviet rapabilities

will continue to improve as modernization with new technology

becomes Feasible. The Soviets have fielded over 40 new

equipment systens in their engineer force structure since

1970.'- This trend is likely to continue, given the Soviets'

soohisticated understanding of the importance of tactical

mobility, in particular the capability to breach obstacles

in-stride to sustain momentum and achieve a grrater relative

mobility. What appears to be most significant is the Soviet

capaiilitv to field new systems and modify them to employ the

Slatest technology. Having an historical and experienced-based

reCuirrements system, the Soviets have continued to gain

0ý •xperience in tactical in-stride breach operations while the

U.S has continued to write doctrine and tactical procedures

for equipment and ca..pabilities which have not been available

fT.o trining and evaluation.

Historir-al evidence supports the fact that as the

bsittlefield becomes more lethal and artificially structured

the role of engineers in tactical mobility operations

increases. Historically. the requirements for total force

mobility support have been underestimnated prior to the start

of the war, causinq diversion of eri neer assets from support

of the forward combat units to the mainternance of the iines of

11"Engineer Fqui pment Review," U.3. Arniv Engineer

Schnol , 16 Decernher I1985.

= -• •. i •n 11 i Iit i ' i i m m mp • "

37

communication.ý57 Given the nature of ALB mobility

requirements, forward maneuver forces must have full time,

dediýzated engineer support. This competition for engineer

support, wghich exists even for peacetime training and

construction priorities, causes a critical problem for

peacetime force structure decisions. Design of engineer units

to support maneuver forces can no longer be based on providing

"general purpose" units. The need to integrate divisional and

higher level eiigineer forces to support forward mobile

operations can not be met unless the units have compatible

Pequipment and training. The proposal to combine the assets of

;the divisional battalion and a Corps combat engineer battalion

into one organic divisional engineer organization(E-Force)

goes far in solving the command and control pr(tblems found at

divlisional level. Engineer support will be more agile and

sustainable, resulting in better training, enhanced maneuver

and engineer battle drill and doctrine development, and a

command and control headquarters at the division level to

integrate total force mobility support without degrading

support to forward maneuver forces. This proposal should be

implemented immediately. Once E-Force is in-place, the

employment of U.S. mobile obstacle detachments and mobile

support detachments should be explored to support division and

brigade operations. These Soviet concepts have significant

utility for mobility support at both the tactical a:nd

`John W. Morris, "Combat Enrineers, Mobility.History, AirLand Battle," U.S. Army War College (2ý3 March'.•-.:---- ..-.- -.

operational maneuver levels.

Technology is changing the battlefield and the nature of

combat at a pace not previously experienced. A noted Soviet

exoert remarked recently in a lecture at the School of

Advanced Military Studies that operational and tactical

mobility have not "kept up" with the means to deny movement on

the modern battlefield. Manual means of detection and hand

removal of mines and other obstacles must be eliminated for

* two reasons. First, the lethality of modern mines,

particularly scatterable mines, make them too dangerous to

clear by hand. Secondly, the time available to manually clear

an obstacle has never been so short due the lethality of

Soviet artillery and air assets. Clearing and reduction of

obstacles must be either explosive or mechanical, therefore

limiting soldier and equipment exposure to enemy fires.

Stand-off explosive reduction means, such as fuel-air

explosives, have considerable advantages as a "first priority"

near-term solutioti. Mine rollers and plows for the M1 must be

fielded immediately. The limitations of the current

technology available for mechanical clearing of mines is

acceptable if explosive line charges or fuel-air explosives

can be used in conjunction with mine rollers and plows. The

threat posed by scatterable mines mandates that mine rollers

and plows be organic to the tank battalion for immediate

availability and training familiarity. A mine detection and

countermine device, such as the Vehicular Mapnetic Signature

Duplicator(VEMASID), should be developed and fielded for

39

placement on one combat vehicle per platoon in both tank and

mezchanized infantry units.

The development of an armored engineer mobility vehicle

is crucial to the breaching of natural and complex obstacles

as well as the clearing of rubble caused by collateral

battlefield damage. The current Operational and

Orqanizational Plan for the proposed Combat Mobility

Vehicle(CMV) is an excellent outline of the required systems

and capabilities for the CMV. I suggest the priority of

anti-mine, anti-tank ditch, and an articulating arm to lift,

drag, and graople be the priority of development of the CMV's

mobility sub-systems.

The "linch pin" of in-stride breach operations is

reconnaissance. For future tactical operations, the use of

remotely piloted aerial platforms to detect enemy and natural

obstacles must be integrated into the reconnaissance assets

available to the maneuver commander. For a near term

solution, integration of engineer-sappers with the maneuver

tast: force scouts is recommended. Training of divisional

enoineer squads must include recognition of Soviet mines and

likely arfas of Soviet countermobility operations. Until

equipment development and fielding can provide a stand-off

detection capability for the maneuver task force, the engineer

supporting the task force reconnaissance element must be a

highly tra.ined "specialist" with superior training and

initiative to recommend bypass routes, estimate effort for

breaching operations, and anticipate the enemy countermobility

40

scheme. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield by the

task force commander and his staff must also anticipate

effects of enemy counterobstacle operations.

Current doctrine does not recognize the in-stride breach

as a tactical mission. Until the current shortfall of mobility

and reconnaissance capabilities is resolved, the in-stride

breach must be considered a deliberate mission for the

mAneLver task force. Without extensive prior planninp,

rehearsals, and detailed instructions to all participants,

current maneuver force mobility capabilities fail to rapidly

integrate the combined arms assets of engineers, air defense,

artillery, mortars, scouts, infantry, and armor. The National

Training Center is validating the need for a better combined

arms integration in breaching operations as well as

highlighting the need for improvements in the areas of

detection, reduction, and marking of obstacles. Training and

evaluation of doctrinal techniques are limited by the pauc:ity

of realistic training aids.

My final appraisal is that the doctrine requiring an

in-stride breach is sound and I support completely the

following assessment from the TRADOC General Officer Steering

Committee for the Countermine Master Plan:'

By the 21st Century, it is more than feasible thatnatural and man-made obstacles to movement could belocated, reoorted, breached, marked, and crossedin-stride and under fire.

-"U.S. Army General Officer Steering CommitteeCountermine Master Plan," U.S. Army Engineer School (14September 1988), p. -3-2.

41

The capability to execute an in-stride breach does not exist

* in today's U.S. maneuver force. Until that capability is

*. developed, fielded, and sustained by realistic training, the

* in-stride breach should be recognized as a deliberate mission

for maneuver forces.

4 2

FIGURE 1: The Mobility Scheme

Realor tio

f hartdoff of Existing and/or hnofoinformqtlion and reinforcing information and

~' bypass sitefs) obstactefaf breach site's)

Detect Movement toIdentify/verify objective

recon1' 1

Leading force

road/troilsPlan

and FACE tasks Moe etprepqreaccomplished oadpattac

moetmstatus /

Fo~llow-on

Reference: Field Manult~ 5-101,1bit. Washington, D.C.:

U.S. Governmenlt Printing~ Of fice, 1985, page .2"-7.

43

FIGURE 21: U.S. Task Force In--Stride Breach

ZZZ~Z

CA'A

CI,,,

%in

J/

RFligrt -3 ncl e:le "ftwrielyad r CrminrcL e ir 11 I~1 om i e rn$tMntIerqobsgvtrhan kmthbrOerhcle Figureon ThermqH n Cm~ In-S rd 4ureaciig Ft. hemht

8e~~~voir~~~- opEJfE18, ae - o59

44

FIGURE 3: March Formation for a Soviet Motorized RifleRegiment

i < ~3- 8 km

Motorized Ri+1e Squad/Motorized Rifle Platoon LeaderiCOMBATNBC Reconnaissance Team IRECONEngineer Reconnaissance Patrol IPATROLMotorized Rifle Squad(2) I

Si I

I 210-30km

Motorized Rifle Company/Tank Platoon IFORWARDMovement Support Detachment !SECURITYMortar Battery/Artillery Battery IELEMENT

* Chemical Defense Platoon I

I 10-15km

Battalion Headquarters

Anti-tank Platoon/Anti-aircraft sectionArtillery Battalion(-) IADVANCE

Tank Company(-) IGUARDMotorized Rifle Company(2) IRear Services I

-I 1-15km

Regimental Headquarters IAnti-tank Battery/Mobile Obstacle Detachment IAnti-tank Section/SAM Platoon IMAINArtillery Battalion IFORCEMotorized Rifle Battalion/Tank Company(2) I

- Rear SerVi CS I-_J

Reference: "Soviet Combat. Engineers", USAES Combat Engineer

Special Text, Ft. £EFvoir: Department of Combined Arms, JulyL911.

I. .Ll

4r

FIGURE 4: Soviet Engineer Reconnaissance Patrol and Movement

Support Detachment

Engineer Reconnaissance Patrol

r-VehicularVIMDH Induction

1--Mine Det.EN----Engr. APC

<T:P >r-ArmoredAVLB-i Vehicle

VJMD I LaunchedL-Bridge

TD-Tank Dozer

TP-Tank w/MinePlow/Roller

Reference: Combat Support. En~gjneerinq, and Mine Warfare.Mission Area Analysis. Ft. Belvoir, Va. May 1983, Volume V,

page 2-55.

Movement Support Detachment

I. Reconnaissance and Barricade Removal Destruction Group-1 Tank w/mine plow-1 APC with Combat Engineer Squad

explosivesmine detectorsmine probes

-I Armored Bridge Laying Vehicle(MT!J-20)-1 BRDM (NBC reconnaissance version) (NDC Detection

Section)

2. Road-Bridge Group-1 APC/Truck with Combat Enaineer Squad-2 to 4 Truck launched Scissors Bridge(TMM)

-Tracked Bulldozer(PAT-M)/Armored Engineer TractorilMR)

-Crane/Bucket Excavator--Carriers for Bridge and Road Personnel-Motorized Rifle Flatoon(-l squad)

3. Route Marking Group-Motorized Rifle Squad(could be larger as required)

route marking equipment

References: 1. Gertoer, D. "The Organization, Equipping,and Operational Principles Adhered to by a Soviet CombatEnginper Company". Charlottesville: Army Foreign Scienceand Technology Center, 1985, page 21.

2. Field Manual 1•0-2-1, The Soviet Ariy

Operatjons and Tactics. 16 July 1984, page 14-1.

46

FIGURE 5: Soviet Mobile Obstacle Detachment

1. Reconnaissance and Route Marking Element-Truck/APC with half of a Combat Engineer Squad-Route Marking Kit-I Anti-tank Officer (assigned from AT force element)

2. Barrier Construction Element-3 Trucks with Mine Laying Trailers-1 Truck with a Combat Engineer Squad with Explosives-1 Bulldozer-2 to 3 Trucks with Additional Mines

Support Element-1 Anti-tank Platoon(3 AT Weapons)-1 Motorized Rifle Platoon w~ith SAGGER/SPG-9

Reference: Gerner, D. "The Organization, Equipping, andOperational ,Principles Adhered to by a Soviet EngineerCompany". Charlottesville: Army Foreign Science andTechnology Center, 1985, page 2.

47

FIG3URE 6: Soviet Engineer Organizations

Mot oId 1.q I., F nn hq NIn,,y fO n%

LAWCa~bot F~rI'n , 'nl, anco p y, Bati.11cn, Mfln amd to

B Ngln . 1 S .tII , FORD and 7O

t~P 'DanEI!

1ýa~~~~p. - ni-z ,t-i-o

Gove nmen Pri tin COfT f Eice, 019134 SIIUCt 4- 7 4-70 4--7-.,, 4-

9...

48

FIGURE 7: U.S. and Soviet Divisional PreachingCapabi l ities

U.S1 Soviet

Maneuver ForcesNumber of Personnel 16,951 11,470Number of Combat Vehicles 754 672

Preaching DoctrineNumber of Lanes/Breach 2/TF 1-2/Co

Engineer ForcesNumber cf Personnel (Div Bn) 690 375Number of Personnel (Reg Co) 0 (3@70) 210% of Division Strength 5.25 5.27

Mobility EquipmentArmored Engineer Tractor - 2 IMRCombat Engineer Vehicle 8 CEVCombat Dozer 25 M9 12 BATMine Roller 18 Tank Mtd 30 KMT5Mine Plow - 90 KMT4/6Tank Mtd Dozer Blade 18 M60A3 12 BTUMineclearer - 2 BTR50

Referpnce: Schroedel, Joseph. "Tactical Mobility:Organizing Engineers for an All Arms Problem". Ft.

Leavinwrth, Ks.: SAMS Monograph, 1987, panes 55-56.

49

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