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u Copy NO. v

INTELLIGENCE STUDY

THE POSITIONS OF HANOI, PEKING,, AND MOSCOW ON THE ISISUE OF VIETNAM NEGOTIATIONS: 1962 to 1966

(Reference Title : . ESAU XXXX-66)

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Research Staff

It I s to be seen only authorized to receive matlon; Its securlty

r

ich may be coctained Aereln, regarclli.ss

!t'HE POSITIONS OF HANOI. PEXING. AND MOSCOW ON THE --

ISSUE OF ---- VIETNAM NEGOTIATIONS: 1962 t% 1966 - -- --

T h i s working paper of t h e DDI/Research S t a f f sets f o r t h t h e v a r i o u s p o s i t i o n s t a k e n by Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow on t h e m a t t e r of n e g o t i a t i n g a s e t t l e m e n t of t h e Vietnam war and ana lyzes t h e d i f f e r e n c e s on t h i s i s s u e which have emerged between t h e t h r e e Communist states i n t h e pe r iod between 1962 and 1966. The North Vietnamese and Chinese l e a d e r s have been s i g n i f i c a n t l y more i n t r a n - s i g e n t t h a n t h e p r e s e n t S o v i e t l e a d e r s , bu t HanoiDs

' acceptance of t a l k s i n p r i n c i p l e (provided t h a t Washington a t l e a s t c e a s e a i r s t m s and d e c l a r e p u b l i c l y a commitment t o withdraw American f o r c e s ) has r a i s e d some concern i n Peking t h a t Ho Chi Minh and h i s l i e u t e n a n t s might, a t some f u'ture s t a g e i n t h e f i g h t i n g , agree t o n e g o t i a t e . The Chinese have pressed Ho t o remain permanently i n t r a n - s i g e n t ( r e j e c t i n g t a l k s under any c o n d i t i o n s p r i o r t o a t o t a l American withdrawal) and t h e S o v i e t s , on t h e o t h e r hand, have decided t o t a k e no negot i a t ions i n i t i a t i v e wi thout Hanoi's consent .

A n a l y t i c a l a s s 1st ance was provided by 7 1 of t h e Research S t a f f i n t h e d r a f t i n g of t h i s paper. It has no t been c o ~ r d i n a t e d w i t h o t h e r o f f ices, but comments from O C I a n a l y s t s , p a r t i c u l a r l y have been h e l p f u l ; and t h e au thor , kr a t e f u l f o r t i review of t h e d r a f t . k D ~ ~ / ~ ~ ~ h ~ ~ ~ ~ l ~ ~ ~ ~ a d d i t i o n a l comment, addressed t o t h e Chief o r Deputy Chief of t h e s t a f f

THE POSITIONS OF HANOI, PEKING, AND MOSCOW ON THE - ISSUE OF VIETNAM NEGOTIATIONS: 1962 t o 1066

Page - ........................................... Sumary. . . i

SINO-VIETNAMESE AGREEMENT ON NEGOTIATIONS AS KHRUSHCHEV STANDS ASJDE (February 1962 t o October 1964)

MACV : Target of In t e rna t iona l Negot i a t ions (February t o Ju ly 1962) . , , ............. ;. .... \ 1

Laos-Type "Neutral h a t ion" In feas ib l e For ........... Vietnam (August t o October 1962) 6

DRV M i l i t a n t s Imp l i c i t l y Rebuke Khrushchev .................... (March t o October 1963) 7

' 'Neutral i z a t ionu : A Finesse For Expel1 ing t h e U.S. (June 1963 t o March 1964). ....... 12

Hanoi Says Mi l i ta ry Successes Must Precede ................. Talks (Apri l t o May 1964) 16

Mao Increases Support f o r DRV a s Khrushchev Stands Aside (January 1964 t o August ''

1964).....t...............................18

Mao I n s i s t s on Forcing U S t o Withdraw .......................... (September 1964) 23

SINO-VIETNAMESE DISAGREEMENT ON NEGOTIATIONS AS KHRUSHCHEV IS REPLACED (October 1964 t o April 1965)

A: Peking Departs from Hanoi's V i e w on Timing of In t e rna t iona l Negotiations (Octpber ... 1964 t o January 1065)...,..,...,,..,.,. 24

B; Peking ~ e l d s t o Upgrade t h e Role of t h e L ibe rad ion Front (December 19640. ...... ,27

C: Peking Opposes Vietnam Negot i a t ions U n t i l A f t e r an American Vithdrawal (January 1965) ...................................... 20

D: Moscow Suggests a "Way Out" For t h e U . S . , (February X965) ............................ 32

E: Peking Susijains P r e s s u r e on Hanoi Openly t o R e j e c t Nego t i a t ions (March 1965). ...... .40

F: L i b e r a t i o n Fron t I n s i s t s on Withdrawal ....... U e f o r e Negat i a t ions (22 March 1965) .45

HANOI FORMULATIE3 VERBALLY ELASTIC POSITION BETWEEN THAT OF PEKING AND MOSCOW ( A p r i l 1965 t o September 1966) . ., ,. . . . . . . -

Hanoi Manipulates t h e Concept of Precond i t ions f o r Nego t i a t ions (Apr i l 1965) ............. .48

Chinese Saliotage P r o s p e c t i v e Conference on Cambodia (Apr i l 1965) ................... 51

Moscow ~edulced t o Wait ing for I n i t i a t i v e from Hanoi During May 1965 and January 1966 Airs t r l ike Suspensions ................. 55

1. May 1965...............................54

2. December 1965 t o January 1966 . . . . . . . . . . 59

Hanoi Downgrades P rospec t of M i l i t a r y , and Uprgades P rospec t of P o l i t i c a l , V ic to ry ( F a l l 1965 t o September 1966) .............. 6 5

ANNEX

SUMMARY

The North Vietnamese made it c l e a r i n 1962 t h a t t h e y d i d no t in tend t o make concess ions e i t h e r t o set up n e g o t i a t i o n 8 on Vietnam o r i n t h e course of any n e g o t i a t i o n s . In t h e i r concept , on ly t h e U . S . would make concess ions : t h e U.S. would f i r s t ag ree t o withdraw from t h e South , and i n t h e subsequent n e g o t i a t i o n s t h e n a t u r e andi \ t iming of t h e U.S. withdrawal would be worked o u t . The North Vietnamese a p p a r e n t l y c a l c u l a t e d t h a t r e a l n e g o t i a t i o n s on t h e real issue--namely, t h e end of t h e Communist e f f o r t a g a i n s t t h e South--would c r e a t e i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r e s s u r e on them t o make a conces- s i o n corresponding t o t h e one t h e y demanded of Washington. They were, t h e r e f o r e , c a r e f u l t o i n s i s t t h a t n e g o t i a t i o n s on "reunif i c a t ionv-- tha t is, t h e Communist m i l i t a r y - p o l i t i c a l e f f o r t a g a i n s t t h e South--could n o t be a s u b j e c t of a Geneva-type confe rence o r DRV-U. S. b i l a t e r a l negot i a - t i o n s . They argued t h a t " r e u n i f i c a t i o n " was s t r i c t l y an " i n t e r n a l " ma t t e r of t h e Vietnamese themselves , and i n t h i s way t r i e d t o convince i n t e r n a t i o n a l op in ion t h a t Washington had no r i g h t t o i n t e r v e n e .

The immediate occas ion of Hanoi ' s appeal f o r i n t e r - n a t i o n a l negot i a t i o n s i n 1962 was A m e r i c a n '' i n t e r f erenceVt i n t h e form of t h e M i l i t a r y Advisory Command i n Vietnam (MACV) , and t h e bogus concept of a " n e u t r a l H South was advanced by Hanoi a t t h e t i m e t o suppor t its d r i v e t o c r e a t e p r e s s u r e on Washington t o d i s m a n t l e its m i l i t a r y adv i so ry command. The Chinese agreed wi th t h e North Vietnamese t h a t t h e MACV's presence should be a t t a c k e d and e l iminated . Ehrushchev , however, was unwi l l ing t o push hard on t h e m a t t e r and p r e f e r r e d t o provide Hanoi w i t h o n l y p e r f u n c t a r y suppoa t , i n t h e form of backing Hanoi 's c a l l f o r a conference t o denounce t h e U.S. r o l e i n t h e South. He no t o n l y r e f u s e d t o work a c t i v e l y f o r Hanoi (and Peking) , b u t went s o f a r a s t o r e b u f f t h e North Vietnamese, a t t h e cost of exposing h i s p o l i c y of non- s u p p o r t t o Chinese criticism. North Vietnamese m i l i t a n t 8 ( i n d i r e c t l y ) and t h e Chinese ( d i r e c t l y ) rebuked Khru- ahchev f o r st anding a s i d e , and by mid-1963, Moscow-Hanoi

coopera t ion broke down s i g p i f i c a n t l y as Khrushchev took r e p r i s a l s by withdrawing the s m a l l amount of p o l i t i c a l s u p p o r t he had given p r e v i b u s l y a s a r o u t i n e m a t t e r and, more impor tant ly , by c o n t i n u i n g t o withhold v a l u a b l e m i l i t a r y a i d . There fo re , i n t h e absence of Sov ie t in f lu - ence on Hanoi d u r i n g KhrusFcheVts per iod of l e a d e r s h i p , t h e r e was no r e a l p rospec t ' f o r an i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference on Vietnam.

P r i o r t o t h e f a l l oil! Khrushchev i n October 1964, t h e North Vietnamese and Chinese l e a d e r s a p p a r e n t l y had agreed on t h e need t o conthnue t h e m i l i t a r y e f f o r t i n t h e South and provided impbrtant a i d t o Hanoi; t h e y saw no rea l p rospec t f o r a Geneva-type conference . They apparen t1 y held i n r e s e r v e t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s On whether t o permit t h e U.S. t o make a face-saving withdrawal ( a s H o p r e f e r r e d o r was w i l l i n g t o accept) o r t o s u b j e c t t h e U.S. t o a complete m i l i t a r y d i s g r a c e (as l a o p r e f e r r e d , i n o r d e r t o prove h i s p o i n t about t h e e f f i c a c y of smal l wars a g a i n s t t h e U.S. m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y ) . The North Vietnamese were aware t h a t some d e f e a t s had been imposed on French f o r c e s i n 1953 an-54 before t h o s e d e f e a t s and domestic p o l i t i c a l g rebsure impelled P a r i s t o withdraw; t h e y apparen t ly viewed t h e precedent a s be ing of s o m e r e levance t o t h e c u r r e n t s i t u a t i o n , t h e i m p l i c a t i o n be ing t h a t a t o t a l A m e r i c a m m i l i t a r y d e f e a t would no t be necessary t o i n t h e i r b a s i c o b j e c t i v e . But Mao, w i t h g r e a t e r pe r sona l requirements and p r e t e n s i o n s t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l Communist l e a d e r s h i p t h a n 110, demanded t h a t t h e U.S. be fo rced o u t m i l i t a r i l y . A t t h e same t i m e , he and h i s l i e u t e n a n t s were c a r e f u l n o t t o provoke a U.S. a t t a c k on China.

As t h e new, post-Khzushchev l e a d e r s h i p began t o r e b u i l d t h e b r idge between Moscow and Hanoi which Xhru- shchev had v i r t u a l l y d e s t r o y e d , Sov ie t p o l i t i c a l i n f lu - ence wi th t h e North Vietnahese inc reased ; and by Febru- - . a r y 1965, Eo was w i l l i n g t empora r i ly t o acqu iesce i n S o v i e t maneuvers t o convend an i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference on Vietnam. Mao and Chou Bn-lai t r i e d t o make any con- f e r e n c e an i m p o s s i b i l i t y b~ demanding, i n January 1965, t h a t an a c t u a l American withdrawal--not j u s t an agreement t o withdraw--be made be fore n e g o t i a t i o n s ; but t h e --

North Vietnamese d id no t r a i s e t h i s p r e c o n d i t i o n . A t f i r s t (February 1965), Ho d i d n o t t r y t o sabo tage t h e S o v i e t effort to a t t a i n a conference a t which Washington could be pressed t o agree t o withdraw American f o r o e s . But in - l a r c h , l 9 6 5 , he s h i f t e d and opposed t h e Sov ie t maneuver'ing because he recognized t h a t (1) t h e U.S. was unwi l l ing t o agree t o d e p a r t ankI (2) t h e Sov ie t e f f o r t was c r e a t i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r e s s u r e f o r Nanoi t o be less adamant. F u r t h e r , he was under c o n s i d e r a b l e p ressure from t h e Chinese, who were anxious t o sabo tage t h e Sovie t effor t by persuading ,Ho openly t o a t t a c k t h e idea of a conferenco. Pollowiug Bo's shift, t h e S o v i e t l e a d e r s were reduced t o demanding an end t o t h e a i r s t r i k e s a s necessary f o r c r e a t i n g t h e proper atmosphere f o r a con- f e rence , whi le avoiding any r e a l n e g o t i a t i n g i n i t i a t i v e s wi thout t h e c l e a r consent of t h e North Vietnamese.

The c e s s a t i o n s 09 bombing i n May 1965 and i n December-January 1966 f a i l e d t o budge t h e North V i e t - namese from t h e i r adamant o p p o s i t i o n t o n e g o t i a t i o n s , because t h e U.S. had no t y ie lded t o t h e i r b a s i c demand: t h a t Washington make a u n i l a t e r a l pub1 i c pledge--pr i o r t o nego t ia t ions - - to withdraw from t h e South and a l s o (a theme in t roduced i n s u m m e r 1965) provide some proof t h a t it would do s o . An important p o l i t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n Hanoi 's advancement of t h i s l i n e was t h e need f o r decept ion-- that is, t h e need t o conunit Washington t o a d e c l a r a t i o n of suxrender whi le p re tend ing t h a t t h e demand f o r such a dciclarat ion was reasonab le . Euphemist ic language was used t o conceal t h e f a c t t h a t t h e demand was s imply f o r s u r r e n d e r . The North Vietnamese d i d n o t , t h e r e f o r e , demand a "surrender" e x p r e s s l y , but r a t h e r c a l l e d on Washington t o trrecognize" or "accept" t h e f o u r p o i n t s ( a s set f o r t h on 8 Apr i l 1965). Following A m e r i - c a n m i l i t a r y i n p u t s i n J u l y 1965, Hanoi became even more unreasonable , and even more f r e q u o n t l y demanded t h a t t h e U.S. "ca r ry out" o r show by- " a c t u a l deeds" t h a t it recognized t h e s e p o i n t s and would abide by them. Fur the r , toward t h e end of t h e second suspens ion of bombing, Ho went beyond t h e demand f o r proof of U.S. acceptance of t h e f o u r p o i n t s t o t h e demand t h a t Washington n e g o t i a t e w i t h t h e L i b e r a t i o n Fron t and s t o p bombing f o r e v e r and "uncondi t ional ly ." . I n t h i s way, Ho t r i e d t o d e f l e c t t h e

- iii-

a p p e a l s of Western and n e u t r a l l e a d e r s f o r t h e commence- ment of n e g o t i a t l o n e , and t o n e u t r a l i z e t h e e f f e c t s of tho import ant American po l it i c a l weapon ( the cessat Ion of bombing) which had revea led Hanoi as t h e real r e c a l - c i t r a n t opposed t o n e g o t i a t i o n s . In s h o r t , Hanoi '8 posi - t i o n s i n c e January 1966 has been more adamantly opposed t o n e g o t i a t i o n s than it had seemed t o be p rev ious ly .

. t

As f o r t h e North Vietnamese e s t i m a t e ( i n 1964) o r l a t e r hope t h a t t h e y could win a m i l i t a r y v i c t o r y a t some f u t u r e T i X e , Hanoi, f ollolkihg t h e s i g n i f i c a n t American involvement i n J u l y 1965, begm t o t a l k more about an e v e n t u a l p o l i t i c a l d e f e a t of t h e U . S. t h a n d e f e a t by f o r c e of arms. Beginning i n an important way i n t h e f a l l of 1965, t h e y have been s t a t i n g p r i v a t e l y t h a t American pub1 i c op in ion would f o r c e t h e Adminis t ra t i o n i n Washing- t o n t o d e c i d e on withdrawal, and t h e y have a l s o s t a t e d t h a t i f t h i s Adminis t ra t ion would no t s o dec ide , some f u t u r e one w i l l . A t t ,he same t i m e , t h e y have i n s i s t e d t h a t t h e y and t h e Vie t Cong w i l l f i g h t on, d e s p i t e U.S. a i r s t r l k e s , u n t i l t h a t day.

- iv -

I, SINO-VIETNAMESE AGREEMENT ON NATURE AND TIMING OF INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS AS KHRUSHCHEV STANDS

.ASIDE (February 1962 t o October 1964)

A. The MACV : Targe t of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Negot ia t ions (February t o July 1962)

Hanoi and Peking u rgen t l y advanced t h e i d e a of in- t e r n a t i o n a l n e g o t i a t i o n s on Vietnam on ly a f t e r t h e es tab- l i shment of t h e M i l i t a r y Advisory Command i n Vietnam (MACV) i n February 1962. P r i o r t o t h a t t i m e , t h e Communist appeal f o r nego t i a t i ons was cen te red on an appeal f o r North-South c o n t a c t s . The t en -po in t program of the Lib- e r a t ion Fron.t, a s set f o r t h on its f oundiog -d@y : (20 December 1960) , held "peaceful r eun i f icat ion by st ages on t h e b a s i s of nego t ia t ions" t o be a mat te r between t h e two zones , t h a t is, an i n t e r n a l mat te r f o r Vietnamese a lone. Even t h e s e n e g o t i a t i o n s were viewed by Hanoi and Peking as a h igh ly u n l i k e l y development, and t h e very i d e a of t a l k s was i n fact used a s a cover under which t h e V i e t Cong continued m i l i t a r y and subvers ive ope ra t i ons . P a c i f i s t s and ant i -Diemis ts i n the South were t h e elements t h a t Hanoi hoped t o in f luence w i th nego t i a t i ons appea l s --appeals which s t r o n g l y implied c l andes t i ne c o n t a c t s between t h e Communists and t hose men w i l l i n g t o have a r o l e i n undercu t t ing t h e s t a b i l i t y of t h e Saigon government.

Following t h e es tab l i shment of t h e MACV, however, t h e North Vietnamese, whi le r e t a i n i n g t h e i r b a s i c posi- t i o n on North-South n e g o t i a t i o n s , added t h e demand f o r t h e convening of a 14-nat i on i n t e r n a t iona l conference on Vietnam. They had no i n t e n t i o n of n e g o t i a t i n g an end -. -..-. t o f h e w h t i n g - - t h a t is, they imp l i c i t Jy r e j e c t e d t h e Western powerst concept of i n t e r n a t i o n a l t a l k s a s t h e means f o r s e t t l i n g disputes--and revea led t h e i r r e a l goa l : t o use t h e conference a s t h e forum f o r i nc r ea s ing p r e s su re on Washington t o d i s s o l v e t h e m i l i t a r y command. Thus t hey made it c l e a r t h a t t h e on ly permiss ib le sub- ject f o r t h e conference was t o f i n d an " e f f ec t i ve" way t o compel t h e U.S. t o end its presence i n t h e South. A c e a s e - f i r e was s a i d t o be an " in t e rna l " mat te r , which t h e Vietnamese would decide f o r themselves.

The Chinese had t h e i r own reasons f o r advancing t h e i d e a of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference. I n mid-Yay 1962 t h e y were deeply concerned about t h e h y p o t h e t i c a l p rospec t of a Chinese N a t l o n a l i e t invas ion of mainland c o a s t a l areas--an invas ion which t h e y mis takenly be l i eved t o be i n t h e f i n a l p lanning s t a q e s . They a l s o f e l t t h a t Wash- ing ton , having d i r e c t e d t h e l and ing of marines i n Tha i l and , . might send t r o o p s t o Laos " to l i n k t h e war i n South V i e t - nam with t h a t i n Laos." <Peking People 's Da i ly e d i t o r i a l of 19 May) They were anx*ous t o prevent f u r t h e r American moves on o r nea r China 's sou thern borders . Chou En- la i on 6 June f o r c e f u l l y t o l d khe Cambodian e l d e r s ta tesman, Penn Nouth, who was i n Pek'ing, t h a t h e wanted Sihanouk t o make a p u b l i c proposal f o r a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference "to r e g u l a t e peacef

1 I The Chinese l e a d e r s ' a l s o viewed a mul t i -na t iona l

conference on Vietnam as t h e way t o b r i n g p r e s s u r e on t h e U.S. t o withdraw from Vietnam. In February 1962 t h e y were even more e x p l i c i t i n demanding it than were t h e North Vietnamese. T h i s d i f f e r e n c e i n e x p l i c i t n e s s stemmed p r i - m a r i l y from Hanoi's r e l u a t m c e t o adopt t h e Maoist a t t i - t u d e of unmit igated h o s t i l i t y t o Khrushchev. The North Vietnamese w e r e d e t e r m i n e d , t o be more t a c t f u l t h a n t h e Chinese I n urging t h e Sov ie t l e a d e r t o p r e s s Washington f o r a conference . Moreover, t h e y d i d no t want to appear u n w i l l i n g to accept Sov ie t advice , o r a t l e a s t t o hea r t h e S o v i e t p o s i t ion :

B u t . t h e Chinese l e a d e r s were r e s t r a i n e d by no such c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of nea r -neuera l i ty , and t h e y moved t o maneuver Khrushchev i n t o a kiiplomatic box. They confronted him w i t h t h e cho ice of e i th ier

(1) a c t i v e l y a g i t a t h g f o r a conference , t h e r e b y i n j u r i n g Soviet-American r e l a t i o n s by championing t h e Hhnoi-Llberat ion h 'on t cause a g g r e s s i v e l y rather f han per f unc to r 11 y, o r

(2) avo id ing moves toward a conference on Vietnam, t h u s damagitg h i s r e l a t i o n s wi th Hanoi by f a i l i n g t o p u t p r e s s u r e on Washing- ton . I

Khrushchev a c t e d on (2) . * The Chinese l e a d e r s were t h u s i n a p o s i t i o n t o r e i n f o r c e Hanoi 's own awareness t h a t t h e S o v i e t l e a d e r was no t e f f 6 c t i v e l y s u p p o r t i n g t h e i r V i e t - nam e n t e r p r i s e , and t h e North Vietnamese became increas- i n g l y p e s s i m i s t i c about t h e i r a b i l i t y t o use him. They were aware t h a t he d e s i r e d an Asian Communist a l l y a g a i n s t Mao, bu t t h e y were g r a d u a l l y brought t o reoognize t h a t h e p r e f e r r e d t o have his own way w i t h Soviet-American r e l a - t i o n s and would n o t pay t h e p r i c e f o r an ally i n Hanoi- namely, a l l - o u t suppor t f o r t h e North Vietnamese d ip lomat ic @me and t h e V i e t Cong m l l i t a r y e f f o r t . Xn mid-March, f o l l o w i n g t h e d e p a r t u r e of t h e Ponomarev d e l e g a t i o n t o Hanoi, t h e North Vietnamese urged Moscow (as well a s London, t h e o t h e r Geneva co-chairman) t o "proceed w i t h consu l t a - t i o n s " wi th c o u n t r i e s concerned s o a s t o f i n d e f f e c t i v e s t e p s f o r defending peace i n t h e Indochina a r e a . 7 D l T Foreign Min i s t ry n o t e of 15 March 1962)

Khrushchev, however, handled t h e matter i n a cur- sory way w i t h i n t h e c o n f i n e s of d ip lomat ic p r o p r i e t y . Re merely noted i n h i s speech of 1 6 March t h e f a c t of American " i n t e r f e r e n c e " i n t h e South. Furthermore, a S o v i e t Fore ign Min i s t ry n o t e of 1 7 March s t a t e d merely t h a t an end t o t h e American presence was necessa ry i n o r d e r t o normalize t h e s i t u a t i o n - - a p r o f orma and un- i n s p i r e d r e i t e r a t i o n of what was a t t h e t i m e an urgent North Vietnamese demand.

Although, on t h e one hand, Khrushchev had r e f u s e d t o apply p r e s s u r e on Washington t o convene a conference on Vietnam, on t h e o t h e r hand, he a p p a r e n t l y had n o t p ressed Ho t o c o n s i d e r a c e a s e - f i r e o r an end t o Hanoi's e f f o r t to t a k e over t h e South by M i l i t a r y f o r c e . I t is

*In t h e s p r i n g of 1962, he was a l r e a d y engaged i n ' h i s major e f f o r t t o deceive Washington about t h e S o v i e t in- t e n t i o n to, pu t s t r a t e g i c missile8 i n Cuba and he was c a r e f u l n o t t o a larm t h e U . S . by t a k i n g a hard l i n e on Vietnam, which was at t h e t i m e an a r e a of on ly marginal importance t o him.

important t o n o t e t h a t on t h e matter of " reunif ic&tionw-- t h a t is, Vietnamese Communiet a c t ion a g a i n s t ~ a i g o n ' 6 forces-- the t h r e e Communist c a b i t o l s agreed t h a t it was p u r e l y an " i n t e r n a l " m a t t e r and, t h e r e f o r e , inadmiss ib le a s a s u b j e c t f o r i n t e r n a t q o n a l t a l k s . Bo Chi Minh made t h e d e f i n i t i v e s t a tement when he d e c l a r e d i n March t h a t r e u n i f i c a t i o n "is an i n t e r n a l a f f a i r of the Vietnamese people, t h a t "they w i l l diecide whether South Vietnam is t o have a n e u t r a l regime or any o t h e r regime," and t h a t "no o t h e r coun t ry has a r i g h t t o i n t e r f e r e ." ( In te rv iew wi th t h e London Daily Express, broadcas t from Hanoi on 27 March m p l i c a t ion, t h e o n l y p e r m i s s i b l e s u b j e c t f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l t a l k s was t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l m a t t e r of American ' I in ter f erence . " Hanoi's p o s i t ion on Geneva n e g o t i a t i o n s was, t h e r e f o r e , n o t a b a s i s f o r d i s - c u s s i n g a c e a s e f i r e . I n f a c t , it was n o t a p o s i t i o n f o r any "negot i a t ions"--that is, for t a l k s which might be undertaken t o a r r i v e a t a compromise and agreement. It was a demand f o r an American r e t r e a t : mutual concess ions were r u l e d o u t . Even t h e concept of a w a l w South was a c t u a l l y aimed a t MACV, I n late May 1962, Ho informed Sihanouk--using t h e pro-Soviet j o u r n a l i s t Wilfred Burchett- t h a t t h e c r e a t i o n of a "neutral8 ' South would l e a d t o t h e format ion of a b l o c of n e u t r a l s , namely, Cambodia, Laos, Thai land, and Burma "with t h e u l t h a t e r e s u l t of f o r c i n g t h e c l o s u r e of U.S. bases and t h e evacuat ion of U.S. f o r c e s from Southeas t Asia."

Hots d u p l i c i t o u s coqcept of a bloc o f - n e u t r a l s w a s la ter i n s e r t e d i n t o t h e L i b e r a t i o n Front ls proposa l s of 1 7 J u l y : "South Vietnam is ready t o form wi th Cambodia and Laos a n e u t r a l zone i n which each country en joys f u l l s o v e r e i g n t y . 'I B u t negot i a t ion was e x p l i c i t l y d e c l a r e d t o be an " i n t e r n a l m a t t e r , " and f i r s t on t h e list of neu- t ra l b a t i o n p roposa l s (which included a c e a s e - f i r e and format ion of a c o a l i t ion goternment) was t h e demand t h a t t h e MACV be d i s s o l v e d and a31 American t r o o p s withdrawn from t h e South.

During t h e summer o f , 1 9 6 2 , t h e North Vietnamese f e l t t h e need t o work more ~ c t i v e l y t o e n l i s t E h r u s b c h e v ' ~ s u p p o r t f o r an anti-U. S. cobference . Pham Van Dong on 5 June demanded t h a t t h e Geneva co-chairmcn "dram serious

conclueions regard ing t h e American po l i cy of m i l i t a r y aggress ion i n South Vietnam, On t h a t basis, t h ey should hold c o n s u l t a t i o n s wi th t h e c o u n t r i e s concerned s o as to f i n d e f f e c t i v e measures t o pu t an immodiato end t o t h e U.S. -imporiRl+fit po l i cy of aggress ion ." (enkplranis s u p - p l i e d , i n d i c a t i n g Hanoi's awareness of I ~ l ~ r u s h c l ~ e v ' s foo t - dragging) The North Vietnnmese promier was openly c r i t i c a l 01 Great B r i t a i n , which "has not l i v e d up t o its posi - t i o n and o b l i g a t 5ons ." The charge cut in t h e d i r e c t i o n o f Khrushchev. The North Vietnamese a t t h e t i m e were f e e l i n g the pinch of s tepped up ope ra t i ons aga ins t t h e V l e t Cong and hoped t o i n f l uence t h e Sovie t l e a d e r t o r e v e r s e his d e s i r e t o s t a n d c l e a r . Ho mag have t r i e d t o p r e s s Khrushchev for an i n i t i a t i v e on an i n t e r n a t i o n a l meeting. Reuters repor ted him i n Moscow on 22 June; on 28 June, t h e North Vietnamese ambassador i n Peking was d i spa tched t o Moscow, apparen t ly t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t o p l e v e l Soviet-DRV t a l k s .

P r i o r t o t h e meeting, Khrushahev had been remhded : t h a t t h e USSR is "a country having the i n i t i a t i v e t o , con - vene t h e 1954 Geneva conference." (Nhan Dan e d i t o r i a l of 19 March 1962) But he continued € ? E i v m r eques t i ng such a conference of t h e B r i t i s h , recogniz ing t h a t t h e Western pawers would resist such a r eques t . Unlike his succe s so r s , he was w i l l i n g t o rebuff t h e North Vietnamese on ma t t e r s p e r t a i n i n g t o r e a l p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e f o r t h e Vietnam war. Unlike h i s succe s so r s , he was accorded i nc r ea s ing an t i pa thy from men who had shown him less h o s t i l i t y t han had t h e Chinese l e a d e r s .and who had been w i l l i n g to-worsen t h e i r r e l a t i o n s wi th t h e Chinese t o ga in Sovie t suppo r t . Thus by summer 1962, t h e North Vietnamese saw t h e handwri t ing on t h e wall--namely, Sov ie t as w e l l as Western and n e u t r a l oppos i t ion t o a Geneva conference on Vietnam. Following t h e Soviet-DRV meeting i n Mosoow i n l a t e June, Ho and Pham Van Dong t o l d Bernard F a l l (on 13 Ju ly) t h a t t h e y agreed wi th t h e i dea of a 14-nation conference, bu t t h a t it would be "for l a t e r . l' They had. f a i l e d i n their e f f o r t t o budge t h e Sovie t l e a d e r a t a t i m e when he was needed t o genera te i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r e s su re on Washington t o d i s so lve M A W .

As f o r North-South n e g o t i a t i o n s , t h e ,North V i e t - namese r evea l ed t h e a c t u a l meaning of t h e concept t o be

a process i n which t h e Communists would t a l k w i th t hose elementa i n t h e South who agreed t o su r r ende r . Ho and Dong t o l d F a l l t h a t " the s i t u a t i o n is not r i p e for nego- t iat ions. . . .We want t o n e g o t i a t e wi th t h e South, bu t on ly wi th people who agree t o d i t down at a t a b l e and want t o t a l k . " That is, D i e m was not prepared t o t a l k . about what he would g i v e Bo even i f Ho were on the way t o t a k i n g it. Hol s conc lus ion w a s t o cont inue t a k i n g it.

I3 . Laos-Type "Neut ra l i za t ion1v I n f e a s i b l e f o r Vietnam (August t o October 1962)

The North Vietnamese viewed t h e Laos agreement of J u l y 1962 as a d e t e r r e n t t o American involvement i n t h e Laos f i g h t i n g , but they were anxious t o reject it a s analogous t o t h e s i t u a t i o n i n Vietnam. In Vietnam, t hey were determined t o a t t a i n a m i l i t a r y v i c t o r y and were aware t h a t Diem had ref used nego t i a t i ons , i n s i s t i n g on a m i l i t a r y v i c t o r y himself . Unlike Laos, t h e r e was no power- f u l n e u t r a l i s t f i g u r e i n Vietnam who had t h e f o r c e s t o make nego t i a t i ons a real cbns idera t ion . The Vietnamese Communists1 real app ra i s a l of t h e re levance of t h e Laos- t ype wneu t r a l i z a t i on" f o r t h e s i t u a t i o n i n South Vietnam was t h a t it would become f e a s i b l e on ly a f t e r m i l i t a r y successes had smashed Saigon 's a b i l i t y and w i l l t o f i g h t on. The Laos-type s e t t l emen t was discussed i n a V i e t Cong document which evaluated s t r a t e g y i n t h e South, pos i t - i n g two possible developments which might l e ad t o an American withdrawal:

(1) nego t i a t i ons f ~ r c e d on t h e enemy, r e s u l t i n g i n "a s i t u a t i o n l i k e t h a t of Laos, o r

(2) " t h e enemy may be ob l iged t o recognize ou r sovere ign ty and' independence, a s happened i n Alger ia ," and complete ly re treat . (Docu- m e n t d a t e d 25 September 1962)

But t h e c e n t r a l po in t of t h e document was t h a t armed s t r u g g l e must be i n t e n s i f i e d , and t e prospect of nego t i a t i ng a 9

ee t t l emen t (or a "temporary compromisen) was viewed as f e a s i b l e on ly when, and i f , t h e US-ARVN m i l i t a r y e f f o r t were t o -bog down. Another V i e t Cong document pointed ou t :

. . .we should no t overlook t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of peacef u l developments t h a t w i l l gradu- a l l y improve t h e r evo lu t i ona ry p o s i t i o n . Th is p o s s i b i l i t y i s at p r e sen t very s m a l l , b u t t h e p a r t y must e x e r t i t s e l f and develop it. Never theless , because t h e U,S.-Diem c l i q u e w i l l never w i l l i n g l y s t e p down, our p a r t y must g e t ready t o br ing them down by f o r c e . (Document of e a r l y October 1962)

Both documents s t r e s s e d t h e p ro t r ac t ed and arduous na tu re of t h e m i l i t a r y e f f o r t ahead.

The North Vietnamese and t h e Viet Cong seemed t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e p rospec t s f o r nego t i a t i ng a U.S . withdrawal would be good on ly when t h e enemy was hard pressed. By c o n t r a s t , t h e y seemed t o be more r e l u c t a n t t o cons ider n e g o t i a t i o n s when t h e i r own f o r c e s were hard pressed. Thus t h e two above-mentioned documents d i scussed t h e pros- p e c t s of a p o l i t i c a l s e t t l emen t In t h e event of Viet Cong m i l i t a r y successes ; t hey d id not d i s c u s s a s e t t l emen t when - t h e V i e t Cong were bogged down m i l i t a r i l y . They d id not envisage a m i l i t a r y d e f e a t i n t h e South. As some Amerlcan f o r c e s were moved i n t o the South i n late 1962 and new a i r s t r i k e ao t i on was taken a g a i n s t t h e V i e t Cong, Hanoi matched t h e American e f f o r t by Inc r ea s ing its f n f il- t r a t i o n i n t o t h e South. That is, t h e North Vietnamese r e j e c t e d t h e a l t e r n a t i v e : reducing t h e s i z e of t h e Com- munist f o r c e s (or s t a n d i n g pa t wi th what was a l r e ady i n t h e f i e l d ) and allowing t h e f i g h t i n g t o recede t o a low b o i l .

C. DRV M i l i t a n t s Imp1 i c i t l y Rebuke Khrushchev -- m r c h - October I- -

Khrushchevls p o l i c y ,of r e f us ing t o provide t h e North Vietnamese wi th m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e and - real

p o l i t i c a l suppor t depr ived him of l everage on Hanoi. H i s foot-dragging w a s r e f l e c t e d i n t h e performance of CPSU s e c r e t a r y Andropov i n North Vietnam. In h i s speech of 1 6 January 1963, Andropov v e r b a l l y suppor ted Hanoi's demand " for an end t$ i n t e r f e r e n c e and t h e withdrawal of a l l U.S. troop&" f ro@ t h e South, b u t he i nd i ca t ed t h a t Sov ie t a i d was int,ended f o r t h e D R V f s "econorny,lt and he d i d not r e f e r t o d t reng then ing its m i l i t a r y defenses . H i e e f f o r t t o ga in Hanoi's suppor t i n t he Sino-Soviet d i s p u t e was no t succqssful--Nhan Dan on 20 January de- c l a r e d North Vietnamqse s u p p o r t - o a y f o r measures "aimed a t s t r eng then ing s o l q d a r i t y w i th in t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l Com- munist movement and p reven t ing a new wor ld war." Khru- ahchev's a t t a c k s agaxnst t h e CCP by proxy a t a series of Sovie t b loc p a r t y congresses c l e a r l y had f u r t h e r antagonized t h e mil i t iants among t h e North Vietnamese l e a d e r s , who were angered by h i s non-support.

Le Duan l e d t h e m i l i t a n t a t t a c k . I n h i s speech of 13 March 1963 a t the Nguyen A 1 Quoc P a r t y School, he i m p l i c i t l y r e j e c t e d Khrushchev's emphasis on ffeconomic and i d e o l o g i c a l s t rug&lesV1 by i n s is t ing t h a t t hey "must s e r v e t h e cause of t h e p o l i t i c a l s t r ugg l e ." He dec l a r ed r evo lu t i ona ry wviolen$etl t o be t h e "only way" t o seize n a t i o n a l power and c r $ t i c i z e d t h e "Yugoslav r e v i s i o n i s t s " f o r advocat ing a "roaQ of c l a s s compromise," concluding wi th t h e demand t h a t t h e s e r e v i s i o n i s t s should be "thoroughly exposed."

Some North Viednamese l e a d e r s apparen t ly t r i e d t o s t a n d clear of t h e p r o l i f e r a t i n g Sino-Soviet polemic and t h e swing t o t h e l e f t w i th in t h e Lao Dong Par ty . Pham Van Dong, a moderate, d i d not c r i t i c i z e Khrushchev by impl ica t ion and merely repea ted t h e p l a t i t u d e t h a t va r i ous Communist p a r t i e s have' " d i f f e r e n t op in ions on c e r t a i n quest ions ." (Report tr, t h e DRV Nat ional Assembly of 29 Apri l ) Th i s d i f f e r ence i n t r ea tment of Wrushchev re- f l e c t e d d i f f e r e n c e s among t h e l e a d e r s i n Hanoi. There is some evidence t h a t t e n s i o n s were high. Nhan Dan on 11 February 1963 had a l luded t o an i n n e r - p a r r d i e p u t e : d i f f e r e n c e s "may a r i s e , no t on1 y betwcen Communist and workers p a r t i e s , but also right among comrades w i th in t h e same par ty ." p a r t y f i r s t s e c r e t a r y Le Duan had a l s o

h.inted t h a t an argument had t aken p lace , t h e issue ap- p a r e n t l y being whether "to persevere1' br " t o retreat1* i n t h e South a t a t ime when U.S. and ARVN f o r c e s had i nc r ea sed t h e i r m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y . (Speech of 13 March) *

Le Duan's hard- l ine course f o r continued m i l i t a r y s t r u g g l e apparen t ly was t h e view t h a t p r eva i l ed , and it was t h e gu ide l i ne f o r f u t u r e po l i cy . L iu Shao-chi la ter i nd i ca t ed h i s s a t i s f a c t i o n wi th Le Duan '8 hard- l ine when he s t a t e d i n Hanoi on 12 May 1963 t h a t emphasis on Itsharp c l a s s s t r ugg l e . . .was well s a i d by comrade Le Duan."

This move closer t o t h e Chinese p o s i t ion d i d not mean t h a t t h e ,North Vietnamese l e ade r sh ip ' liad been pene- t r a t e d by CCP agen ts o r t h a t it had become t h e d o c t r i n a l ; cap t i ve of Liu Shao-chi and t h e hard- l ine l e a d e r s , of t h e CCP. (Liu, a t t h e t i m e , had come t o Hanoi i n May 1963 t o t r y t o move t h e North Vietnamese still c l o s e r t o h i s and Mao's po l i cy of non-compromise wi th Khrushchev.) Even t h e men u sua l l y dep i c t ed by f o r e i g n observers a s pro- Chinese were independent of o u t s i d e contro1;as wi tness t h e ' m i l i t a n t , Truong Chinh. Truong Chinh persona l ly p r a i s ed Liu Shao-chi i n a speech i n Hanoi on 15 May, but made it c l e a r t h a t he would not a c c e p t l i u ' s p o s i t i o n on t h e need t o reject "a middle course"between t h e CPSU and t h e CCP. H e i n s i s t e d t h a t North Vietnam's p rogress is " inseparable" from t h e suppor t of a l l o t h e r Communist p a r t i e s , " p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e CPSU and t h e CCP." (Truong Chinh is a l s o r epo r t ed t o have commented t o a f o r e ign diplomat i n May t h a t North Vietnam would bu i l d soc i a l i sm i n l i n e with i ts "ownw p o s i t i o n and n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s . ) Ho Chi Minh himself s t r o n g l y suggested t o Liu t h a t t h e North Vietnamese would no t accept t h e e n t i r e CCP p o s i t i o n i n t h e d i s p u t e . H e s t a t e d pub l i c l y i n L i u ' s presence on

T r a d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s of t h e inner-par ty d i spu t e , see . t he DD/I S t a f f Study, '*The North V l e t namese P a r t y and t h e 'New S i t u a t i o n 1 i n South Vietnam, (ESAU XXII- 63), of J u l y 1963.

1 0 May t h a t "The Vieenamese Workers P a r t y h i g h l y a p p r e c i a t e s a l l t h e e f f o r t s made by t h e f r a t e r n a l p a r t i e s , f i r s t of a l l t h e CPSU and t h e ! CCP." H o a l s o t o l d a Japanese t r a d e union o f f i c i a l i n e a r l y May t h a t he would n o t permit North Vietnam t o become a v i c t i m of Chinese imper ia l i sm as i n t h e p a s t .

Although t h e Borth Vietnamese re fused t o adopt t h e CCP p o s i t i o n t h a t CCP and CPSU r e l a t i o n s could not be r e t u r n e d t o a s t a t e of coopera t ion, t h e y were f u r t h e r angered by Khrushchev's move toward a degree of coogera- t ion w i t h Washington--signing of the t r i p a r t i t e p a r t i a 1 test ban treaty i n Ju ly . They used t h e p a r t y Journa l (Boc.Tap, - issue of Jdly 1963) t o a t t a c k t h e Sov ie t lead- er--ublng t h e s u r r o g a t e , l lTitol l--for r a i s i n g t h e u n l i k e l y prospect of a "world war with nuc lea r weaponsM t o con- c e a l t h e real American plan t o wage s p e c i a l wars and l o c a l wars; i n this way, he hoped t o avoid any " a c t i v e w suppor t f o r Communist-led small wars. They insisted (us ing Hoc Tap) t h a t n e g o t i a t i o n s wi th Western l e a d e r s must n o n e x e d t o "Yoresake t h e r c v o l u t i o n a r y i n k e r e s t s of na t ions" and t h a t armed s t r u g g l e is "the main wayu t o s e i z e power. On 1 6 J u l y , a DRV Foreign Minis t ry s t a tement implied t h a t Khrushchev was not doing a l l he could . I t c a l l e d on a l l governments t o s e v e r e l y condemn t h e U.S. openly and t o demand a withdrawal of American t r o o p s . The s ta tement reques ted t h e Geneva co-chairmen t o " t ake e v e r y e f f e c t i v e s t e p t o end t h e war." The m i l i t a n t s ' i r r i t a t i o n !wi th Khrushchev was a l s o suggested when, on 2 September, Sov ie t deputy f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r Lapin, wi th some show'of embarrassment, asked t h e B r i t i s h ambassador i n Moscow i f he had rece ived a DRV d e c l a r a t i o n of l a t e August. The o le= impl ica t ion was t h a t t h e North Vietnamese had no t prdvided Moscow wi th t h e usua l p r i o r knowledge of t h e con ten t of a DRV d e c l a r a t i o n t o t h e Geneva co-chairmen.

Th i s was on ly one of s e v e r a l i n d i c a t i o n s of t h e breakdown i n Hanoi-Moscow coopera t ion. The North V i e t - nalnose a l s o po in ted up t h e i r r e l e v a n c e of t h e p a r t i a l t e s t ban t r e a t y t o t h e , Communist effort i n South Vietnam. When t h e American d e l e g a t i o n "came s m i l i n g l y with an appearance of f r i e n d l i n e s s t o Moscow, " Pres iden t Kennedy

s t a t e d i n t h e U.S. t h a t America ' t w i l l continue t o g ive a i d t o Diem. . .and is determined t o s t a y in..South Vietnam." (E Tap, August 1963) The North Vietnamese were a l s o impelled to a t t a c k t h e UN inspeat ion team t o i nves t iga t e t h e Buddhist problem i n t h e South i n e a r l y October, c l e a r l y angered by t h e f a i i u r e of t h e Soviet UN delega- t i o n t o r a i s e any objec t ion t o its formation. Khrushchev --"Titoll--was a l s o c r i t i c i z e d f o r depio t ing t h e South and t h e North a s "two countr ies" i n h i s "scheme to perpetuate t h e d iv i s ion of Vietnam.'l (Nhan -- Dan a r t i c l e of 10 October 1963)

In s h o r t , Hanoi ts m i l i t a n t s a t tacked Khrushchev'o t h i n l y ve i led preference t o avoid provoking Washington by r e a l support .of Hanoi. In r e p r i s a l , Khrushchev took

defending t h e North Vietnamese aga ins t charges of v i o l a t - ing t h e Geneva agreements.

P a r a l l e l with t h e i r imp l i c i t c r i t i c i s m of Khru- shchev, t h e North Vietnamese sus ta ined t h e i r d i s t i n c t i o n between i n t e r n a l t a l k s and ex te rna l pressure on t h e U . S , Negotiations was s t r i c t l y an in t e rna l mat ter between "genuine represen t a t i ve s of t h e two zones, l t while t h e e x t e r n a l matter per ta ined t o t h e need f o r U.9. capi tu la - t ion :

On1 y by' de fea t ing U. S , aggression and form- ing a na t iona l c o a l i t i o n government i n South Vietnam, a s advocated i n t h e Libera t ion Front program, can t h e r e be condi t ions

. , t o achieve.peacefu1 r e u n i f i c a t i o n of t h e country. (Pham Van Dong speech t o *he DRV National Assembly of 29 April. 1963)

The order .of p r i o r i t i e s was c l e a r l y U.S. withdrawal ' f i r s t and i n t e r n a l negot ia t ions l a t e r , This order was set . .

. , forward by t h e Libera t ion Front i n a s ta tement of 18 Ju ly 1963:

W e ho ld t h a t t h e Sauth Vietnamese mob- l e m cannot be s e t t l e d wi thout c a r ry ing o u t t h e L i b e r a t i o n Front program--that is, t h e US government must end its armed i n t e r v e n t i o n and aggress ion i n t h e South, d i smant le t h e US m i l i t a r y command i n Saigon / IRAcv~, apd withdraw a l l t r oops , weapons, aEd w"ar maeerie1 of t h e U S and i t 6 s a t e l l i t e s from t h e South. Then t h e p a r t i e e concerned i h South ~ i e t n r m u s t s t o p f i g h t i n g wi th each o t h e r so as t o r e s t o r e peace and s e c u r i t y , w i th t h e un- de r s t and ing t h a t t h e South Vietnamese people will settle t h e i r own i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s , and a na t i ona l , democratic, peace- f u l , and n e u t r a l i s t c o a l i t i o n govera- ment w i l l be formed i n South Vietnam. (ernphae is suppl ied)

By avoiding t h e i s s u e of nego t i a t i ons wi th t h e U.S. about a c ea se - f i r e , t h e Communists side-stepped demands, p r i - mar i ly from n e u t r a l s , t h a t i b o t h s i d e s should make conces- s i o n s . They worked a t t h e ;same t i m e t o c r e a t e an impres- s i o n of reasonab leness and t o c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e U.S. as in- t r a n s i g e n t on t h e ma t t e r of w n e u t r a l l z a t l o n ~ - - a concept t hey knew D e Gaul le would accept as t h e p r e t e x t for induc- i ng an American withdrawal i

D. wNeut ra l i za t ion" : , A Finesse For Expel1 ing t h e U.S. (June 1963 t o March 1964) -

Pham Van Dong used t'he ambiguous concept of neutraa- l z a t i o n on 29 June 1963 inj h i s t a l k wi th t h e French d e l e g a t e General , who was l eav ing Hanoi and was a convenient channel for conveying Hanoi,'s l i n e t o P a r i e . De l a Bois- s iere descr ibed t h e concept; a s t h e "Soviet s o l u t ionw-- which it had been a t times 'in 1962 and 1963--but a t t h e time, Pham Van Dong was c l e a r l y aware t h a t it was t h e French s o l u t i o n , t oo . The depar t ing Delegate General t o l d American o f f i c i a l s i n Saigoh t h a t t h e DRV premier had in- s i s t e d on some s o r t of arrahgement t o n e u t r a l i z e t h e country

a s t h e only way t h e South could e J e c t t h e Americans. Hanoi apparen t ly hoped t h a t D e Gaulle would p u b l i c i z e t h i e l o g i c . They were i r r i t a t e d , t h e r e f o r e , when Ds Gaul le on 29 August 1963 went beyond Banoi*s concept by implying t h a t t h e North a s w e l l as t h e South should be neu t r a l i z ed . T h e y a p p a r e n t l y viewed t h e French l e a d e r as having been decep t ive wi th t h e i r own decep t ive i d e a of a n e u t r a l South. I n November 1963, t hey t o l d t h e head of t h e P o l i s h ICC miss ion i n Laos t h a t a f i n a l s e t t l e m e n t could inc lude n e u t r a l i z a t i o n , but went on t o i n s i s t t h a t any s o l u t i o n must inc lude depa r tu r e of Ameri- can f o r c e s from t h e South.

Regarding nego t i a t i ons , t h e North Vietnamese de- p i c t e d it as still a ma t t e r between t h e North and t h e South ( r a t h e r t h a n between t h e Communists and t h e Ameri- cans ) . Even i n t h e six "urgent demands" set f o r t h by t h e L i b e r a t i o n Fron t on 8 November 1963 I n an e f f o r t t o erode t h e post-Diem a u t h o r i t i e s t w i l l t o reeist, withdrawal was a key ~ t i p u l a t ion. (Negot ia t ions f o r a c ea se - f i r e was an i n t e r n a l ma t t e r , and the formation of a n e u t r a l zone wi th Cambodia and Laos was t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r demanding t h e o u s t e r of American f o r c e s .)* It was c l e a r , however, t h a t n e u t r a l i z a t i o n would not be app l i ed t o t h e North. -

The North Vietnamese p r i v a t e l y i nd i ca t ed t h e i r view t h a t t h e p rospec t s f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r a U.S. withdrawal were d i m . Pham Van Dong i n November said j u s t t h a t t o a non-Communist o f f i c i a l , and went on t o point t o t h e main e f f o r t a s being V i e t Cong opera t ions directed toward speeding up t h e p rocess of d i s i l lus ionment i n t h e U . S . Having expressed Hanoif s e s s e n t i a l , in t rans i - gence, he ended h i s .mwmrke,,py h4bting t h a t t he Communibts

*The N o r m E i Z G S i i e l e a d e r s a t t h e t i m e d i d no t , and' today do not, commit themeelves t o s topp ing t h e f i g h t - i ng i f t h e U.S. were t o withdraw. In e f f e c t , t h e i r posi- t i o n on t h i s ma t t e r is: t o f i g h t or t o cease f i g h t i n g a f t e r an American depa r tu r e is an " i n t e r n a l w mat te r .

would permit t h e Americans t o r e t r e a t when they wanted t o r e t r e a t : when t h e time was '*ripe," he s a i d , Hanoi would be as f l e x i b l e a s it was now r i g i d . A t t h e time, i n l a t e 1963, t h e North Vietnamese acted t o supply t h e Viet Cong, who were a t t ack ing i n l a rge r u n i t s , with more soph i s t i ca t ed weapons.

On t h e d o c t r i n a l l e v e l , t he North Vietnamese m i l i - t a n t 1 ine aga ins t i n t e rna t iona l negot ia t ions--that is, aga ins t t a l k s between any Cdmmunist country and t h e U.S . - - preva i led . They probably viewed IChrushchevps 31 December 1963 l e t t e r t o heads of s t a t e on s e t t l i n g border c o n f l i k t s through negot ia t ions a s c u t t i n g p a r t l y i n t h e i r d i r e c t ion. They at tacked h i s preference f o r p o l i t i c a l t a l b along t h e l i n e s of t h e o v e r a l l Chinese polemical o f fens ive . They d id not r u l e out i n t e rna t iona l d i scuss ions , but in- s i s t e d , i n a general d o c t r i n a l formulation, t h a t such t a l k s must not deprive Communists of t h e i r revolu t ionary goa ls :

Unprincipled negot ia t ions and compromise, which do not proceed from the i n t e r e s t s of revolu t ion and do not r e l y on mass s t rugg le , can only endanger revolu t ion and world peace. In such cases , t he g r e a t e r good w i l l we demonstrate f o r negot ia t ions , t h e harder t h e imper i a l i s t s w i l l p r e s s us. The more concessions w e make, t h e more they w i l l demand. (Hoc Tap article of January 1964)

-- I n aho r t , they i n s i s t e d t h a t i n t e rna t iona l negot ia t ions must not s tand i n t h e way of a revolut ionary s e i z u r e of power. *

T n mid-February 1964, t h e Chinese i m p l i c i t l y c r i t i c i z e d Xhrushchev f o r t r y i n g "to a t r i k e d i sgracefu l bargainsw with t h e U.S. a t the l*expe&eV of t h e North Vietnamese and V i e t Cong. (Budapest speech of Chinese s tudent de lega te broadcast on 1 7 February)

However, t h e North Vietnamese cont inued t o advocate n a t i o n a l n e g o t i a t i o n s wi th ant i -Saigon f o r c e s i n t h e South aB a p o s s i b l e ..way t o induce t h e U.S. t o withdraw. They were even w i l l i n g t o s o f t p e d a l p u b l i c i t y f o r armed s t r u g g l e a e t h e o n l y p o s s i b l e way t o o b t a i n an 'American p u l l o u t ; t h e y had t h e L i b e r a t i o n Fron t b r e a t h e new l i f e i n t o t h e i d e a of t a l k s among ViePnamese. When, on 3' February 1964-- fo l lowing t h e coup i n Saigon on 30 January--the Libera- t i o n Front i s s u e d its s ta tement proposing a "reasonable n e g o t i a t e d s e t t l e m e n t , " t h e Front . made it c l e a r t h a t t h e n e g o t i a t o r s would be ant i -Saigon e lements i n the South. The r o l e of Washington was n o t t h a t of n e g o t i a t o r . The F r o n t ' s minimum program c a l l e d for

1. The US i m p e r i a l i s t s t o s t o p t h e i r war and withdraw a l l t r o o p s , weapons, and war m a t e r i e l from South Vietnam.

2. The p a r t i e s and f o r c e s i n South Vietnam t o n e g o t i a t e wi th one ano ther t o s e e k a reason- a b l e measure f o r t h e coun t ry on t h e b a s i s of peace, independence, and n e u t r a l i t y i n South Vietnam, and on the p r i n c i p l e t h a t t h e South Vietnamese people s o l v e t h e i r i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s i n t h e s p i r i t of p l a c i n g n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s above a l l . (emphasis supp l i e d )

Demand (1) implied t h a t withdrawal was a p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r s e t t l e m e n t , bu t d i d no t a t a t e t h i s e x p l i c i t l y . Demand (2) conf ined t a l k s t o t h e sphere of i n t e r n a l d i s c u s s i o n s ,

The North Vietnamese aga in t r i e d t o use t h e bogus idea of n e u t r a x i t y t o s e r v e a s t h e p r e t e x t fox a U ; S . withdrawal. They were angered by t h e i m p l i c a t i o n of De Gaull iels p o s i t i o n , namely, t h a t n e u t r a l b a t i o n was a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e North, They complained : why had Vres i d e n t Johnsont1 ( r e a n e Gaulle") r a i s e d " the q u e s t i o n of n e u t r a l i z i n g both zones of Vietnam, a l though he knows t o o w e l l t h a t our people w i l l never accep t t h e n e u t r a l i z a t i o n of North Vietnam?" (Nhan Dan a r t i c l e of 11 February 1964) P r i v a t e l y , t h e y were n o t m i c a t e . I n e a r l y February, Ho Chi Minh and Pham Van Dong complained t o t h e French p a r l i a - mentary d e l e g a t i o n about F rance ' s f a i l u r e as a s i g n a t o r y

t o c a r r y ou t t h e Geneva agreements. Ho t hen repea ted t h e demand t h a t Amerlcan t r oops withdraw t o permit t h e Vietnamese " t o se t t le t h e i r own problems." In March, t h e Indian ICC r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , back from a t r i p t o Hanoi, r epo r t ed t h a t Pham Van Dong professed t o see Senator Mansfield 's commentston n e u t r a l i z a t i o n as t h e t r u e posi- t i o n of t h e Administrat ion, and s t a t e d t h a t when t h e Administrat ion t a k e s , t h i s p o s i t i o n pub l i c l y , Hanoi w i l l do "everything poss ib lew t o permit "a d ign i f i ed withdrawal by t h e U.S. from South Vietnam. " This apparen t ly d i f f e r e d from t h e Chinese view which r e f l e c t e d Mao's d e s i r e t o i n f l i c t a d i s a s t r o u s and c lea r -cu t m i l i t a r y d e f e a t on a l l ~ m e r i c a n f o r c e s i n t h e South and a face- l o s i n g withdrawal. '

E. Hanoi Says ~ i l i t a r y Successes Must Precede Talks (Apri l :- May 1964)

But before withdrawal could become a l i v e l y pos- s i b i l i t y , t h e North Vietnamese c a l c u l a t e d t h a t some d e f e a t s would have t o be imposed on U.S. forces.ome d e f e a t s had been imposed on French f o r c e s i n 1953 and 1954 before P a r i s agreed t o : withdraw, and t h e analogy was viewed a s being r e l evan t t o t h e cu r r en t s i t u a t i o n i n t h e South.

Hanoi's r e j e c t i o n of any i n t e r n a t i o n a l t a l k s be fore a t t a i n i n g a series of m i l i t a r y successes i n t h e South was s t r o n g l y suggested i n remarks made i n Apr i l and May 1964. Wri t ing i n t h e t h e o r e t i c a l j ou rna l Hoc Tap i n Apr i l , Major General Hoang Van Thaa stated t h a t the '1454 and 1962 Geneva conferences were convened "only a f t e r " important m i l i t a r y d e f e a t s had been adminis tered t o t h e enemy. That is, nego t i a t i ons could no t be he ld when t h e enemy was stil l conf iden t regard ing his. over -a l l m i l i t a r y pos i t i on . General Giap made t h e d e f i n i t i v e North Vietnamese s t a t e - ment on the s i t u a t i o n which should p r e v a i l be fore t a l k s wi th t h e U.S. could begin. Giap dec la red on 13 Apr i l :

We know t h a t D4en Bien Phu opened t h e way f o r t h e codclus ion of t h e 1954

I

Geneva agreements which e s t ab l i shed peace i n Indochina...All negot ia t ions with t h e i m p e r i a l i s t s must be baaked up by a r e s o l u t e s t rugg le under a l l forms aga ins t t h e i r per f id ious designs. On1 when t h e people 's fo rces have grown dk-37 e r s t r u g g l e a r e t h e i m p e r i a l i s t s compelled t o renounce t h e i r p r i v i l e g e s and i n t e r e s t s and recognize our l eg i t ima te r i g h t at. ( Interview with Wilfred Burchett , re leased on 9 May 1964) (emphasis suppl ied)

Giap indicated t h a t t h i s pos i t i on was t h a t of Ho Chi Minh. Giap claimed t h a t vWashington is now looking f o r a way ou t , " t h e implicat ion having been t h a t t h e U.S. was probing Hanoi's a t t i t u d e toward t a l k s . "But t h e only poss ib le way ou t , t h e only so lu t ion , our President Ho Chi Minh t o l d you t h i s morning."

Giap's vers ion of H o ' s pos i t i on a s w e l l as t h a t of the Libera t ion Front oont ained t h e unusual formulation t h a t "The p r e r e q u i s i t e /?or a se t t l ement7 must be t h e complete Withdrawal" of-American forces-and equipment. "Prerequis i tel ' had not appeared i n Hanoi s vocabulary because it c rea t ed t h e impression of unreasonable demands o r ig ina t ing with the North Vietnamese. ~ u r t h e r , it was anathema t o t h e Soviet l eaders , who p re fe r r ed t h e 'usual Hanoi locu t ions which avoided any t a l k of p re requ i s i t e s , precondi t ions , o r p r i o r pledges.* Hoqs main message t o Washington and ' t he West i n t h e sp r ing of 1964 was t h a t even i n t h e f ace of probable e s c a l a t i o n of t h e war, Hanoi would not end its m i l i t a r y e f f o r t i n t h e South.

-0-f s e n s i t i v i t y t o Vietnamese Communist usage was ind ica ted i n t h e sp r ing of 1963. After TASS had repofted t h a t i n an Important a r t i c l e on Vietnam t h e chairman of t h e Libera t ion Front had declared t h a t "The US must g ive a solemn' undertaking t o withdraw its armed fo rces . . . , " i n Pravda's purported vers ion (7 May 1963) t h i s demand f o r m o r pledge waa dele ted .

Ho a l s o t r i e d t o i nd ica t e t h a t t h e North Vietnamese w e r e not completely he lp leas and, i n t h e event of a i r - s t r i k e s aga ins t t a r g e t s i n t h e North, Vietnamese **both North and Southn would f i g h t toge ther and f i g h t harder. (Although Giap warned t h a t an American a t t a c k *twould be q u i t e dangerous" f o r t h e U.S., he d id not c i t e Chinese o r Soviet support a s a de t e r r en t .) To what degree were Khrushchev and Mao w i l l i n g t o support Hanoi's e f f o r t i n t h e South?

F. Mao Increases Support f o r DRV a s Khrushchev '

Stands h i d e (January 1964 t o August 1964)

Hanoi's m i l i t a n t s , while t ak ing a hard l i n e with Khrushchev, re turned t o t h e abandoned e f f o r t t o move him toward r e a l support i n January 1964. The Soviet l eader was inv i t ed t o end h i s footdragging a t a t i m e when a major Soviet de t e r r en t statement was needed t o warn t h e U.S. aga ins t beginning a i r s t r i k e s over t h e North. "We continue t o c a l l f o r ever more p r a c t i c a l and vigorous support ." (Nguyen Van Vinh article i n Hoc Tap of January 1964) A t t h e same t i m e , Le Duan's t r i p = =cow t o ga in Soviet a i d apparent ly was a f a i l u r e ; t he North Vietnamese continued t o demand wprac t ica l f l a id . (Nhan Dan e d i t o r i a l of 1 5 February) This e d i t o r i a l r e f e r r e d T a Soviet statement of support and went on t o r a i s e a plea: "We c l e a r l y s e e t h a t , transformed i n t o p r a c t i c a l deeds, t h i s statement w i l l be valuable." But ILhrushchevts apparent dec is ion a t the time was t o p e r e i s t i n h i s po l icy of non- involvement.

By c o n t r a s t , Mao became increasingly involved, p a r t i c u l a r l y following Amer'ican a c t ions t o b o l s t e r Laotian and ARVN force8 a f t e r t h e Cbmmunist offensive of mid-May

1964.* Mao a p p a r e n t l y decided t o review t h e Indochina m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n i n t h e con tex t of t h e clear demonstra- t i o n of U.S. de te rmina t ion , In mid-June 1964, h e and o t h e r Chinese l e a d e r s m e t a t t h e "work conference" of t h o CCP C e n t r a l Committee and apparen t ly decided, among o t h e r t h i n g s , t o i n c r e a s e l o g i s t i c suppor t f o r Hanoi, The North Vietnamese were con tac ted d i r e c t l y i

c carna w r G n &nu b-t t rppmnr ; ly oegan I

line L inu ing on v a r i o u s l e v e l s t h e r e a f t e r i n Peking, Kunming, and probably Hanoi u n t i l e a r l y J u l y . The completion of t h e DRV' s major tact ical a i r f i e l d a t Phuc Yen took p l a c e d u r i n g t h e series of Chinese-Vietnamese m i l it a r y meetings . **

, * C h i n e s e ~ ~ ~ % p e r t s apparen t ly m e t w i t h North Vietnamese o f f i c e r s a t a conference i n Mengtzu i n Febru- a r y , probably t o d i s c u s s Chinese l o g i s t i c a i d and p o s s i b l y

I I t o bogin p lanning f o r j o i n t a i r defense arrangements.

S t i f f e n e d by s i g n s of Chinese suppor t , a North Vietnamese o f f i c i a l , r e f l e c t i n g Hanoi 's t h i n k i n g , t o l d I

i n mid-February t h a t i f r;ne U.S. we I ce more xdrces and equipment i n t o t h e South,

t h e Communists would match such i n c r e a s e s . He a l s o s a i d t h a t Hanoi was ready t o d e a l wi th any U.S. a i r s t r i k e s a g a i n s t t h e North; a i r de fense p r e p a r a t i o n s were noted by Westerners i n North Vietnam i n February.

**Despite i n c r e a s i n g involvement, t h e Chinese a l l a long were c a r e f u l t o avoid i d e n t i f y i n g Peking i n any d i r e c t m i l i t a r y s e n s e wi th Hanoi 's defense e f f o r t . They a l s o wero c a r e f u l t o avoid open commitments t o defend North Vietnamese t e r r i t o r y , For example, when L t . General Nguyen Van Vinh d i scussed a h y p o t h e t i c a l flinvasionl ' of t h e North by U.S. ground f o r c e s and t h e n r e f e r r e d t o t h e consequences--viz . , t h a t t h o U. S. "would have t o cope n o t on ly wi th North Vietnam, but a l s o wi th Chinau (Hoc Tap article of January 1964)--the Chinese d e l e t e d tm hey passage i n t h e i r r e p r i n t .

For a d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s of Peking 's c a u t i o n s e e t h e DD/I S t a f f Study, "The Sino-Vietnamese E f f o r t t o Limit American Actionrs i n The Vietnam War, (POLO XX) , of June 1965, RSS No. 0008/65.

Despi te t h e i r Concern, which inc reased i n t h e f i r s t h a l f of 1964, t h e Nort,h Vietnamese n e i t h e r badked o f f from t h e i r mi l i tary-supporq r o l e of t h e V i e t Cong nor so f tened t h e i r p o s i t i o n t h a t n e g o t i a t i o n s was a mat te r f o r Vietnamese a lone . U.S. t r o o p s must be "completely withdrawn from t h e South, and t h e peaple of t h e South must themselves dec ide t h e m own a f f a i ~ s . " (DRV Foreign Min i s t ry s t a tement of 11 February 1964)* Repeating their l i n e of October 1963, t h e y s t a t e d t h e i r i n t e n t i o n t o pe r severe i n "a long and hard (Le Duc Tho a r t i c l e i n Nhan Dan of 3 February and Ho Chi Minh i n t e r v i e w of 29TGEru- - a r y ) A t t h e same t i m e , t h e y implied t h a t Khrushchev should d e s i s t from h i s p o l i c y of denying Hanoi va luab le m i l i t a r y equipment : "We must s t r e n g t h e n t h e n a t i o n a l de fense f o r c e s of a l l s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s , and not on ly t h a t of one p a r t i c u l a r country." (Pham Hung a r t i c l e i n Hoc Tap of May 1964) Never the less , Khrushchev he ld back and rsfused t o supply t h e North Vietnamese wi th any i m - p o r t a n t m i l i t a r y a i d .

During t h e CCP C e n t r a l Committee "work conference" i n June, Khrushchev may have t r i e d t o warn Mao and t h e North Vietnamese t h a t t h e USSR would not n e c e s s a r i l y sup- p o r t them i n t h e event of an en la rged war. Pravda on 21 June c a r r i e d an a r t i c l e which warned t h a t C.hEETi5uld no t count on S o v i e t s u p p o r t . The Chinese s t a t e d , through a Hong Kong channel , thart t h i s Sov ie t p o s i t ion encouraged r a t h e r t h a n d e t e r r e d Wgshington:

. . .such an i n d l c a t ion /That t h e Sino-Soviet t r e a t y was a dead l e t t C r 7 by t h e CPSU l e a d e r s a t a t irne when The U. S. is r a t - t l i n g its s a b r e is tantamount t o t e l l i n g t h e U.S., 'You can go ahead i n Indochina

*The Chinese r e i t e r a t e d t h e i r w i l l t o suppor t Hanoi: " t o r e l a x t e n s i o n i n Aaia, it is necessary f o r US im- p e r i a l i s m t o g e t o u t ob Asia and no t f o r China t o r e f r a i n f rom s u p p o r t i n g t h e pebples i n t h e i r s t r u g g l e ." (People 's Da i ly a r t i c l e of 1 9 February 1964)

.... You don ' t have t o worry about Sov ie t a s s i s t a n c e t o ' t h e people of Laos, South Vietnam, and China. ' (Hong Kong Wen Wei -- Pao commentary of 23 June) -

The Bong Kong channel. a l s o s t a t e d t h a t

Khrushchev...even i n d i c a t e d an i n t e n t i o n n o t t o f u l f i l l t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of t h e Sino-Soviet a l l i a n c e s o a s t o encourage American war t h r e a t s a g a i n s t t h e people of Indochina and China and t o . f o r c e China n o t t o resist American ag- g r e s s i o n . . . . Khrushchev has degenerated i n t o a c o n s p i r a t o r of U.S. aggress ion. (commentary of 14 J u l y )

.Khruehchev's non-support made it eaey f o r t h e Chinese t o d i s g r a c e him f u r t h e r i n t h e view of t h e North Vietnamese. by d e c l a r i n g t h a t China always maintained t h a t l1it is an unsh i rkab le p r o l e t a r i a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t d u t y t o sa feguard t h e peace and s e c u r i t y of t h e e n t i r e s o c i a l i s t camp, t o p r o t e c t a l l its members from imper l a 1 ist aggress ion. (People ' s Da i ly e d i t o r i a l of 9 Ju ly )

The North Vietnamese m i l i t a n t s s u s t a i n e d t h e i r a t t a c k a g a i n s t Khrushchev. An article by Le Chuong i n t h e J u l y 1964 i s s u e of Hoc Tap s t a t e d t h a t t h e po l i cy of making concess ions t o t h e U r S . 7 5 n o t t h e road t o peace "nor is it t h e road t o d r i v e back aggress ion and enslavement by t h e U.S. i m p e r i a l i s t s In South Vietnam...,The l i b e r a - t i o n of South Vietnam can be s e t t l e d only by fo rce . " T h i s ha rd- l ine criticism of Khrushchev's policy--or what t h e m i l i t a n t s p r o j e c t e d as be ing h i s po l icy--was s i m i l a r t o t h a t of Le Duan, whose r e p o r t t o t h e Lao Dong P a r t y C e n t r a l Committee of December 1963 was publ ished i n February 1964 w i t h imp1 i c i t an t i-Khrushchev t h r u s t s .

Khrushchev Os " b e t r a y a l H (non-support) of Hanoi was made even c l e a r e r immediately fo l lowing t h e 5 August U.S. a i r s t r i k e s a g a i n s t t a r g e t s i n t h e North d u r i n g t h e Gulf of Tonkin i n c i d e n t . The f a i l u r e of t h e S o v i e t United Nat ions d e l e g a t i o n t o r e f u t e t h e American account of t h e

North. Vietnamese nava l q t t a c k was c r i r i c i z e d by Peking on 6 August, and KhruehChev was a t t aoked by name by t h e Chinese on t h e 1 1 t h f o r d e l a y i n g h i s response and f o r non-support. ; t h e Chinese complained t h a t Khru- shchev had keJ. LU a*- : with t h e U.S. and had not even consu l t ed Hanoi about r a i s i n g t h e mat te r i n t h e United Nat ions . They charged t h a t " t h i s accc?ptance of t h e U. S. t a k i n g t h e Indochina q u e s t i o n t o t h e t h i t e d Nat ions is an even b igger b e t r a y a l . ... What does a l l t h i s show except t h a t n r u s h c h e v had g iven an assurance t h a t he would no t i n t e r v e n e i n Southeas t Asia, bu t would keep a loof from t h a t region?" I

When t h i s pressude impelled Khrushchev--who seemed t o accept t h e U.S. versaon of t h e Gulf inc iden t - - to demon- s t r a t e a t l e a s t v e r b a l suppor t f o r Hanoi, he suggested c o l l e c t i v e r a t h e r t h a n 3 o v i e t concern: "The DRV is a member of t h e mighty s o a i a l i s t camp, and a l l s o c i a l i b t c o u n t r i e s w i l l rise i n 4ts defense." (Speech i n Prague of 29 August)

The Chinese w e r e [somewhat less ambiguous, but they a c t e d w i t h c a u t i o n . P r i ~ a t e l y , t h e y ware anxious t o convey t o Washington an ;impress ion of r e s t r a i n t , almost c e r t a i n l y t o d e t e r t h e Y.S. from moving t h e t a r g e t of its s t r i k e s t o t h e mainlFnd .* In mid-.lugust, V i c e Premier

-- Wfiort ly b e f i r T t l i F a ! i r s t r i k e s , Chen Y i t r i e d t o convey

t o t h e U.S . t h e impression t h a t Khrushchev ehould be bound by t h e Sino-Sovieti t r e a t y t o 'he lp C h i S T i i - t h e event of a i r s t r i k e s a g a i n s t t h e mainland. In an e a r l y August i n t e r v i e w wi th a P a k i s t a n i newsman, he i n s i s t e d t h a t Peking " f a i t h f u l l y s tood : by t h e Sino-Soviet t r ea ty1! and t h a t it was still b ind ing on Moscow. The t r e a t y "cannot be t o r n up a t w i l l . Othbrwise, what s e n s e is t h e r e t o conclude a t r e a t y ? " H e was fo l lowing The Maoist t a c t i c of c i t i n g t h e v a l i d i t y oP t h e t r e a t y when a S o v i e t d e t e r - r e n t was needed--the o t h k r s i d e of t h e Chinese p r a c t i c e of d i s p a r a g i n g its v a l i d i t y when such a d e t e r r e n t was no t needed.

-22-

L i mien-nien t o l d a Pak i s t an i o f f i c i a l t h a t Peking in- tended t o "recoup the l o s s e s by ac t ing on t h e diplomatic f ron t .'l Although warning t h a t Chinese publ ic t h r e a t s should be taken s e r i o u s l y by Washington, he emphasized Peking's "pa t ien t and moderateu response t o t h e 5 August ' . a i r s t r i k e s . That is, they wanted t h e U.S. t o be de te r red by Chinese verbal involvemont. P r iva t e ly , they acted t o keep t h e i r i%iir-hvolvement l imi t ed . They apparent ly consul ted w i t h t h e North Vietnamese a t a high l e v e l t o reappra i se Amer i can i n t e n t ions and determine Hanoi ' s a i r defense needs. I

More tnan au jet r l g n t e r s aeplopea t o pnuc Yen a l r - I lelJd on 6 and 7 August--a contingency move probably prepared e a r l i e r in Chinese-Vietnamese meetings i n l a t e - June. Chinese o f f i c i a l s , however, were ca re fu l t o po in t out t h e d i s t i n c t ion between who would engage i n t h e r e a l f i g h t i n g and who would play a support ing r o l e . Liao Cheng-chib s a i d t h a t i f t h e U.S. were t o e s c a l a t e t h e war, " the Vietnamese people" would ann ih i l a t e Amer ioan f o r c e s (speech of 9 August), and Chen Y i committed only t h e Vietnamese-not t he Chinese--to administer "a r e s o l u t e rebuf f" t o t h e U.S. i n t h e event of resumed a i r s t r i k e a (statement of 7 September).

G. Mao I n s i s t s on Forcing U.S. t o Withdraw -------.- - (September 1964)

PekingP s cont ro l led involvement r e f l e c t e d Mao '8 determination--in f a c t , MaoPs preferenae--to admiriister by proxy a major m i l i t a r y . d e f e a t on U.S. fo rces i n t h e Far-EST. The i n t e n s i f i e d Sino-Soviet d i spute l e d him t o a doc t r ina l compulsion t o prove the e f f i c a c y of small wars aga ins t t h e U. 9. m i l i t a r y capab i l i t y . His r e j e c t i o n of a p o l i t i c a l se t t l ement is s t rong ly suggested by remarks he made l Ion 11 September.

I n response t o t h e :quest ion r e g a r d i n g "a s o l u t i o n t * t o t h e crisis i n ~ n d o c h i n d , Mao s t a t e d :

There w i l l be no spkedy s o l u t i o n . . .We must w a i t f o r t h e d,ay when t h e US w i l l be f o r c e d t o withdraw.

He went on t o s a y t h a t t h e U.S. was n o t w i l l i n g t o p u l l o u t , t h a t t h e U. S. had "not: y e t t t l e a r n e d from t h e French precedent i n t h e area, and t h a t Washington would no t accep t P a r i s ' advice ( " l i s t e n t o your wordat*). When asked a g a i n i f a "peaceful s o l u t i o n w were p o s s i b l e , Mao conceded t h a t it was a p o s s i b i l i t y , : but c l e a r l y emphasized a r n i l i - t a r y s o l u t i o n : "We must fkght u n t i l t h e Americans no l o n g e r want t o f i g h t ." He s a i d nothing, one way o r t h e o t h e r , about making a U.S. withdrawal a p recond i t ion f o r an i n t e r n a t i o n a l conf erencp . on Vietnam, n o t i n g on ly t h a t t h e U.S. was not prepared t o s u r r e n d e r because It opposed t h e convening of a conference. He implied B r i t i s h and Sov ie t suppor t f o r t h i s Amsrican a t t i t u d e , inasmuch a s n e i t h e r government was " a c t i v e l y f o r it .'* Mao made t h i s s t a t ement one month before Khrushchev f e l l and w a s r ep laced by l e a d e r s who were anxious f o r a conference . T h i s new Sovie t a t t it u d e w a s an impor*ant f a c t o r i n hardening him a g a i n s t a conferenoe I n 1965-66.

11. SINO-VIETNAMESE DISAGREEMENT ON NEGOTIATIONS AS KHRUSHCHEV IS REPLACED (October 1964 t o A p r i l 1965)

A . Peking --- Depar t s from Hanoi 's -- View on Timing of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Nenot i a t i o n s (October 1964 t o January 1965)

When, i n mid-October 1964, Khrushchev was brought down by a heterogeneous group, t h e m a j o r i t y of whom were more i d e o l o g i c a l l y o r i e n t e d t h a n t h e i r p redecessor , h i s p o l i c y of working f o r "normalu--i .e . , d o c t r i n a l l y unta in ted-- r e l a t i o n s wi th t h e U.S. ( a t t h e expense of S o v i e t i n f l u - ence i n Hanoi) was r e a p p r a i s e d . The new l e n d e r s appar- e n t l y concluded, roughly a t t h e t i m e Pham Van Dong d i scussed t h e war wi th them i n Moscow i n November 1964, t h a t t h e pi- imary d e f e c t o f Khrushchevq s pol i c y of non-support was : it had exposed t h e CPSU t o e f f e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l a t t a c k s from t h e CCP. And when, i n December and January , t h e y probed U.S. i n t e n t i o n s t o de termine t h e degree of e s c a l a - t ion which Washington cons ide red f e a s i b l e and s a f e , t h e y seem t o have concluded t h a t d i r e c t Sov ie t m i l i t a r y involvement wi th U.S. f o r c e s was u n l i k e l y and, a t t h e wors t , a r i s k which could be c o n t r o l l e d . Moreover, t h e y apparen t ly be l i eved t h a t t h e U.S . wanted a way o u t . They f e l t s ecure , t h e r e f o r e , i n t r y i n g t o i n c r e a s e t h e i r i n f l u e n c e (and reduce Chinese i n f l u e n c e ) wi th Ho by beginning a program of m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l s u p p o r t .

Never the less , t h e y r e t a i n e d t h e former basic S o v i e t p re fe rence - -v iz . , t o have Ho end t h e war. Thus they were enmeshed i n a dilemma between i n c r e a s i n g a i d , which sus- t a i n e d Hots d e s i r e and a b i l i t y t o keep f i g h t i n g , and working f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l n e g o t i a t i a n s , which undercut t h a t d e s i r e . They a p p a r e n t l y be l i eved t h a t a marginal chance e x i s t e d f o r r e s o l v i n g t h e dilemma by convincing Ho t o n e g o t i a t e an American withdrawal.

A l l a long, Peking and Hanoi a p p a r e n t l y had agreed on t h e d e s i r a b i l i t y of c o n t i n u i n g t h e m i l i t a r y e f f o r t and on t h e t iming of i n t e r n a t i o n a l n e g o t i a t i o n s . They a p p a r e n t l y he ld i n r e s e r v e t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s on whether

t o s u b j e c t t h e U.S. t o a t o t a l m i l i t a r y d i sg r ace (as Mao p re f e r r ed ) o r t o permit t h e U.S. t o make a face-saving wit'hdrawal (as Ho preferred o r was w i l l i n g t o accep t ) . When, however, t h e new Sovie t l e a d e r s h i p r a i s e d t h e pos- s i b i l i t y of n e g o t i a t i n g an American p u l l o u t , Peking ac t ed t o make t h i s an imposs ib i l i t y . So long a s Khru- ehchev was i n power and cont inued t o avoid involvement i n Vietnam, r e f u s i n g t o p r e s su re Washington t o withdraw, t h e Chinese were not worried about t h e p rospec t s of any i n t e r n a t i o n a l nego t i a t i ons on Vietnam t ak ing place . But when Khrushchev's successors , s t a r t i n g i n November 1964, began t o r e b u i l d t h e Moscow-Hanoi r e l a t i o n s h i p which Khrushchev had almost completely des t royed, t h e Chinese began t o r e v e a l cons iderab le s e n s i t i v i t y t o t h e i s sue of nego t ia t ions .* They f ea r ed t h a t Moscow's b a s i c p re fe r - ence f o r t a l k s would now be pressed upon Hanoi wi th a b e t t e r chance of success , and began t o f i g h t a new holding b a t t l e . Their su sp i c ion of H o Q s i n t e n t ions increased a s they de teo ted t r a c e s of f l e x i b i l i t y i n Hanoi's view of i n t e r n a t i o n a l nego t i a t i ons .

I n t h e most ex t ens ive pub l i c d i s cus s ion of precon- d i t i o n s f o r n e g o t i a t i o n s up t o t h a t t i m e (December 1964), t h e North Vietnamese i nd i ca t ed t h a t t hey were i n a s t r o n g m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n and s t a t e d t h a t t hey would t a l k when t h e Americans were ready t o withdraw. They were look ing f o r i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t t h e Americans were ready.**

+Following d i s cus s ions wi th Pham Van Dong i n Moscow i n November 1964, t h e Sov i e t s de l i ve r ed se l f -p rope l led a n t i - a i r c r a f t guns, which a r r i v e d by ca rgo s h i p In Haiphong on 22 December. This s i g n and o t h e r signs--such as Hanoi9s

' d r a s t i c reduc t ion of an t i - sov i e t criticism beginning i n November--alerted t h e Chinese t o t h e new in f luence t h e Russian8 were a t t a i n i n g wi th t h e North Vietnamese. (For a d i s cus s ion of Sov ie t m i l i t a r y a i d t o North Vietnam see t h e DD/I I n t e l 1 igence Study, "The 1965 Sino-Soviet-Viet- names0 Controversy over Sov ie t M i l i t a r y Aid t o Hanoi," ESAU XXIX, RSS No. 0012/65, 20 December 1965)

**They were looking f o r an i n d i o a t i o n t h a t Washington had changed, or would be w i l l i n g to change, t h e p o s i t ion se t f o r t h by Ambassador Lodge i n h i s p u b l i c s t a tement i n P a r i s on 18 Auguet 1964: t h e " f i r s t and abso lu t e pre- r e q u i s i t e condit ion1' f o r a conference would be t h e cess&- t i o n of Vietnamese Communist i n t r u s i o n s i n t o t h e South.

They s t a t e d t h a t t h e iU .8 . "is no t w i l l i n g t o e n t e r i n t o n e g o t i a t i o n s because !it is i n a l o s i n g pos i t ion . " (Nhan Dan a r t i c l e of 5 'December 1964) The i s s u e of A m e r i c a n - c o n d i t i o n s f o r t a l k s Was openly and f u l l y d i scussed f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e i n the , Nhan Ban e d i t o r i a l of 1 9 December. Noting t h a t Dien Bienl P h u h a d M f o r c e d t h e enemy t o accept d e f e a t ," this impor tant e d i t o r i a l complained t h a t

I

Though heavily0 d e f e a t e d , t h e y o b d u r a t e l y ask t h a t t h e i r opponent shou ld n e g o t i a t e on t h e b a s i s of! t h e i r c o n d i t i o n s . As vanquished, thgy i n s i s t on be- d e f e a t e d wi th honor. W b must cont inuo t o f i g h t . W e a r e determihed t o oppose aggress ion , but are no t i n t r a n s i g e n t . . . . When t h e aggre 4 s o r g i v e s up his aggress ive scheme and r e s p e c t s o u r independence and s o v e r e i g n t y , w$ a r e ready t o t a l k peace wi th him. (emghasis s u p p l i e d ) --- The North Viethamese l e a d e r s i n d i c a t e d t h e i r view

t h a t t h e precedent of t h e 1954 French withdrawal could p o i n t t h e way t o an even tua l American p u l l o u t . A s t h e 19 December e d i t o r i a l jput it :

We c a r r i e d o u t a p r o t r a c t e d war a g a i n s t t h e French...and even when w e won g r e a t v i c t o r y a t Dien Bien Phu, we were prepared t o ho ld p e a c e f y l n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h t h e French a t t h e deneva conference . But w e a l s o r e a l i z e d tlhat u n l e s s t h e Dien Bien Phu v i c t o r y was woq, t h e French would no t have gone t o Geneva f o r peace fu l n e g o t i a t i o n s wi th us . A s f a r t h e U.S. a g e r e s s o r s , a l though t h e y have been b u r n t t o t h e eyebrows, they s t u b b o r n l y ma in ta in t h a t t h e i r s i t u a t i o n , is c r i t i c a l b u t has no t y e t come a c ropper . Ta lks by means of weapons must be cont inued more v igorous ly .

The i m p l i c a t i o n s of thYs passage a r e :

(1) t h e U. S. must be f o r c e d t o cons ide r withdrawal, and

(2) when Washington is prepared t o do s o , a t o t a l d e f e a t o f a l l American f o r c e s is not necessary; t h e withdrawal could be n e g o t i a t e d t o s a v e f a c e f o r Washington.

But t h e Chinese l e a d e r s moved t o make (2) an impos- s i b i l i t y by r a i s i n g c o n d i t i o n s which would prevent Wash- ington from e v e r moving toward t a l k s . F i r s t , aware of t h e Washington-Saigon p o s i t i o n a g a i n s t m n g t a l k s with r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e L i b e r a t i o n Fron t , t h e Chinese i n l a t e December 1964 g r e a t l y i n t e n s i f i e d t h e North V i e t - namese e f f o r t t o d e p i c t t h e Front a s t h e on ly l e g i t i m a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e South Vietnamese. Second, aware t h a t Washington would not agree t o withdraw-American f o r c e s p r i o r t o r e c e i v i n g adequate guaran tees from t h e Communist s i d e , t h e Chinese made an a c t u a l American withdrawal a p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r an i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference on ~ i e t n a m 7 h e fo l lowing d i s c u s s i o n w i l l examine t h e two-pronged Chinese s p o i l i n g e f f o r t and w i l l t h e n t u r n t o Moscow's p o l i t l e a l maneuvers t o improve t h e p rospec t s f o r negot i a t ions .

B. Peking Helps t o Upgrade t h e Role of t h e L i b e r a t i o n Fron t (December 1964) -- -

In late December, when Hanoi was c e l e b r a t i n g three a n n i v e r s a r i e s w i t h about equa l p u b l i c i t y f o r each, t h e Chinese downplayed two and emphasized t h e importance of t h e t h i r d - - i . e . , t h e founding of t h e L i b e r a t i o n Front i n December 1960.* Both i n t h e n a t u r e and i n t h e number of

*By c o n t r a s t w i t h t h e i r t r ea tment of (1) t h e L i b e r a t i o n F r o n t ' s ann iversa ry , t h e Chinese downplayed (2) t h e begin- n i n g of t h e V i e t Minh r e s i s t a n c e war and (3) t h e founding o f t h e PAVN a n n i v e r s a r i e s . ( foo tno te cont inued on page 28)

t h e i r comments, t h e Chinese exceeded t h e North Vietnamese i n p r a i s e f o r t h e Front a s t h e l e a d e r of t h e Southerners . Chen Y i made t h e s t r o ~ g e s t Peking s t a t ement of suppor t f o r t h e F ron t up t o t h a t time. Chen d e c l a r e d t h a t t h e F ron t

has now become t h e genuine r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e 1 4 m i l l i o n South Vietnamese people , and t h e South Vietnam q u e s t i o n can o n l y be s e t t l e d through n e g o t i a t i o n s wi thout o u t s i d e i n t e r f e r e n c e and i n accordance w i t h t h e program of t h e Nat ional L i b e r a t i o n Front and t h e d e s i r e of t h e South V i e t - namese people. There is no o t h e r way o u t . (Speech of 1 9 ~ e c e m b e r 1964) (emphasis s u p p l l e d )

Hanoi's VNA account of Chen's speech omi t t ed t h i s e n t i r e passage, which had upgraded t h e Fron t . The North V i e t - namese, anxious t o marnta in t h e f i c t i o n of t h e F r o n t ' s autonomy, were c a r e f u l t o c r e a t e t h e impression t h a t they had p layed no d i r e c t i h g r o l e i n upgrading the . F r o n t ' s s t a t u s . Moreover, t h e y a p p a r e n t l y hoped t o s u s t a i n t h e i r pose of f l e x i b i l i t y . ' B u t t h e Chinese had no such requ i re - ments and t h e y e x t e n s i v e l y p u b l i c i z e d , w i t h exaggera t ion , t h e p o l i t i c a l s t a t u s of t h e F r o n t .

(footniite con t inued f tom page 27)

As f o r t h e PAVN alpniversary, t h e y went s o f a r as t o i n d i c a t e t h e i r annoyadce w i t h Hanoi f o r c la iming, i n t h e f a l l and w i n t e r of 1964, t h a t North Vietnamese had o r i g i n - a t e d t h e s t r a t e g y and j t a c t i c s of "people ' s war." I m p l i c i t l y rebuking Genera l Giap, a Peking Red Flag a r t i c l e of 22 December ; pub1 i shed pzrecisely o n m e m ann ive r sa ry d a t e , made no mention of t h e PAVN and i n s i s t e d t h a t Mao, "and no one else, '' was t h e o r i g i n a t o r of t h e concept of an- n i h i l a t i o n g u e r r i l l a $ar . (For a f u l l e r d i s c u s s i o n , see t h e DD/ I I n t e l 1 igence Memorandum, ltPeiping-Hanoi D i f f e r - ences over Doc t r ine and S t r a t e g y f o r t h e V i e t Cong," RSS No. 0006/65, 2 A p r i l q96S.)

I n t e r p o s i n g t h e Front a s a major f o r c e and t h e r e - f o r e a s t h e l e g i t i m a t e n e g o t i a t o r f o r t h e Communist s i d e i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l talks was welcomed by t h e Chinese a s a way t o make such t a l k s impoesible. I n LWcember 1964, t h e y a p p a r e n t l y welcomed any move from Hanoi t o t h r u s t t h e F r ~ n t forward as a major p o l i t i c a l f o r c e . An NCNA r e p o r t of t h e 19 December r e c e p t i o n i n Peking desc r ibed t h e Front a s t h e "organizer and l e a d e r of v i c t o r i o u s revolu- t i o n a r y s t r u g g l e of t h e South Vietnamesew and t h e n quoted t h e a c t i n g head of the Fron t ' s Peking o f f ice a s c la iming t h a t t h e Front was expanding d a i l y and had formed "bas ic l e v e l u n i t s " i n t h e countrya\lide and t h e c i t i e s . However, Hanoi 's VNA v e r s i o n omi t t ed both s t a tements . Only i n t h e fo l lowing months d i d ~ a n o i ; i n s t a t e m e n t s a t t r i b u t e d t o North Vietnamese, exaggera te t h e r o l e of t h e Fron t p u b l i c l y a s Peking had s t a r t e d to do i n December. I t was impor tant , i n t h e view of t h e Chinese l e a d e r s , t o p u b l i c i z e t h e Fron t as a n e g o t i a t o r a t a time when t h e post-Khrushchev l e a d e r s h i p was moving t o i n f l u e n c e Hanoi, i f p o s s i b l e , t o c o n s i d e r t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of n e g o t i a t i o n s wi th t h e U.S. and t o probe Washington t o determine its view on t a l k s .

C. Peking Opposes Vietnam Negot ia t ions Unt il A f t e r an American Withdrawal (January 1965) -

In a d d i t ion t o g r e a t 1 y i n c r e a e i n g pub1 i c i t y f o r t h e Fron t , t h e Chinese l e a d e r s a c t e d t o s p o i l any r e a l p r o s p e c t s f o r n e g o t i a t i o n s by in t roduc ing a p recond i t ion which Washington could n o t accep t . Th i s p recond i t ion was t h e demand t h a t t h e U.S. withdraw its f o r c e s b e f o r e t a l k s could t a k e p l a c e . They were aware t h a t the= would reject a procedure i n which t h e key mat te r t o be n e g o t i a t e d had a l r e a d y been reso lved be fore t a l k s s t a r t e d .

: The Chinese l e a d e r s s h i f t e d t o t h i s t a c t i c when Edgar snow, ,us ing an apparen t ly pre-arranged ques t ion , asked Mad' on 9 January 1965: "Is it your p o l i c y now t o i n s i s t upon t h e withdrawal of US f o r c e s b e f o r e p a r t i c i p a t - i n g i n a .Geneva conference t o d i s c u s s t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o s i t i o n o f a u n i f i e d Vietnam?" Nei ther i n p r i v a t e

d i s c u s s i o n s o r publ ished aterials had t h e Chinese pre- v i o u s l y mentioned t h e tacgic of withdrawal b e f o r e ho ld ing an i n t e r n a t i o n a l conferen6e. It was a new ploy, almost c e r t a i n l y d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t Moscow and Hanoi: t h e Sov ie t and t h e North Vietnamese d i d not refer t o t h i s Maoist p o e i t ion i n p r i v a t e o r p u l q l i c s t a t e m e n t s . T h e i r p o s i t ion was t h a t t h e r e could be no f i n a l s e t t l e m e n t wi thout a U.S. withdrawal, but t h e d t a r t of n e g o t i a t i o n s would not r e q u i r e p r i o r withdrawal.

In h i s r e p l y , Mao is quoted by Snow a s having r a i s e d s e v e r a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s . By t a l k i n g around t h e p o i n t , Mao p a r t i a l l y concealed t h e new Chinese p o s i t i o n among a range of f o u r p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n o r d e r t o avoid t h e appearance of i n c r e a s e d i n t r a n s i g e n c e , (Furthermore, by r a i s i n g f o u r p o s s i b i l i t i e s , Mao w a s e n s u r i n g h i s i n f a l l i b i l i t y , inasmuch a s he coufd h a r d l y be proven wrong on a l l four . )

S e v e r a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s should be mentioned. F i r s t , a conference might be he ld and US withdrawal would fo l low. Second, t h e con- f e r e n c e might be deaer red unt 11 a f t e r a a h d r a w a l . T m , a conference m m b e held but dS t r o o p s might s t a y around Saigon, as i n t h e c a s e of Kbrea. F i n a l l y , t h e South Vietnamese Fron t might d r i v e o u t t h e Americans wi thout any conference o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreement. (emphasis sup- p l l e d )

It w i l l be clear from t h e December 1964 upgrading of t h e Front and t h e Maoist downplaying of n e g o t i a t i o n s , t h a t Mao r e a l l y p r e f e r r e d t h a t t h e f i n a l p o s s i b i l i t y would be a t t a i n e d . But he was speaking i n t h e con tex t of a ques- t i o n on t a l k s be fore o r a f t e r a U. S. withdrawal. That , f a c e d w i t h c o n s i d e r a t i o n of a conference, he p r e f e r r e d t h e p o s i t i o n underscored i n t h e passage above was later in- d i c a t e d by t h e c h i e f NCNA o f f i c i a l i n Paris. He s t a t e d

LG2 on 18 February 1965 t h a t Mao had r a i s e d f o u r e developments of t h e Vietnam war, bu t t h e Chinese

" g r e a t l y pref erw t h e p o s s i l b i l i t y of a U.S. " r e t r e a t f i r s t , fol lowed b y n e g o t i a t i o n s ." By c o n t r a s t , Sovie t and North Vietnamese demands f o r an American withdrawal d i d n o t i n d i c a t e when t h i s w a s t o t a k e p lace . -

This i n t e r p r e t a t ion--namely, t h a t Mao had in t roduced a p r e c o n d i t i o n which hardened t h e Chinese pas it ion--is suppor ted by two v e r s i o n s of Chou E n - l a i l s January 1965 s t a t e m e n t t o Edgar Snow. According t o one v e r s i o n , Chou t o l d Snow t h a t

The on ly p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r an i n t e r n a t i o n a l conferenae is, a s Chairman Mao Tse-tung h a s s t a t e d , t h e withdrawal of U . S . f o r c e s from Vietnam. (Tokyo Ashai v e r s i o n of 27

+ February 1965, e v e n i n g m i o n )

According t o a l a t e r v e r s i o n of Chouls remark, t h e Chinese d e s i r e d a conference t o be he ld uinunediatelyw on Laos and Cambodia, bu t no t on Vietnam. Regarding Vietnam, t h e " p r e r e q u i s i t e q u e s t ion , l1 Chou s a i d , was withdrawal, not a conference:

The p r e s e n t s tate of South Vietnam is no t euoh as demands t h e immediate holding of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference . The b i g g e s t and most p r e r e q u i s i t e ques t ion is t h e withdrawal of American f o r c e s . (Tokyo Ashai v e r s i o n , 7 March 1965, Weekly I s sue)

T h i s second v e r s i o n I n e f f e c t made withdrawal of American f o r c e s a p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r holding any i n t e r n a t i o n a l nego- t i a t i o n s on Vietnam. I t is c l o s e t o t h e p o s i t i o n " r e t r e a t f i r s t , fol lowed by n e g o t i a t i o n s . " Although t h e Chinese l e a d e r s t o l d P r e s i d e n t Ayub i n Peking on 7 March t h a t t h e y might agree t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n an i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference wi thout p recond i t ions , t h e y i n s i s t e d t h a t i f negot i a - t i o n s were mentioned i n t h e Sino-Pakist an communique, t h e s t a tement must inc lude withdrawal of U.S. f o r c e s a s a c o n d i t i o n f o r t a l k s . As a r e s u l t , no d i r e c t r e f e r e n c e was made t o Vietnam.

z Taken t o g e t h e r , t h e p o s i t i o n s of Mao and Chou ap- p a r e n t l y were in tended to undercut any Sov ie t move t o use a Geneva conference on Laos a s t h e venue f o r beginning t a l k s on South Vietnam a t a t i m e when Hanoi had begun t o I

d i s c u s s more e x t e n s i v e l y t h a n e v e r b e f o r e Washington's I

a t t i t u d e toward Vietnam negot i a t ions . i I

D. Moscow Suggests ai "Way Out" For t h e U.S. .-- --

(February 1965) : -..--

Fragmentary r e p o r t s sugges t t h a t Kosygin proposed t o Chou and Chen Y i on 5 February t h a t t h e matter of negot ia- t i o n s shou ld be considered a s t h e means f o r ~ e r m i t t i n n Washington t o withdraw w i t h face. * Chinese bf f i c i a l s - t o l d

) In late February a r Kosvaln had t r i e d t o h e l ~ t h e U.S. e x t r i c a t e i t s e l f

from a " ios ingw s i t u a t i o n i n h c h a way a s t o permit t h e Americans t o s a l v a g e a measure of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e s p e c t . Chen Y i t s own e l i p t i c a l vgrs ion of Kosygin's 5 February p roposa l was t h a t China hbd been asked "to persuade North Vietnam t o agree t o n e g o t i a t e peace.. . A t t h a t t i m e , I answered t h a t t h e North Vketnamese people's s t r u g g l e had been going on even b e f o r e t h e Chinese r e v o l u t i o n , and t h a t i f China d i d a s it was asked t o , China would be laughed at for its cowardice." ( tn te rv iew wi th Japanese p a r l i a - mentar ians , Tokyo Shimbun, 2 June 1965) That is, Chen r e j e c t e d t h e ~ t i a t i o n s proposal and t h e sugges t ion t h a t Peking apply p r e s s u r b t o Hanoi. Y e t another Chinese Communist v e r s i o n d i d n o t mention t h e matter of Kosygin's a l l e g e d r e q u e s t f o r apply$.ng p ressure on Eanoi, but desc r ibed h i s negot & a t i o n s proposal :

I n t h e course of t h e exchange of op in ions between a . i n a and t h e Sov ie t Union, Comrade Kosygin emphasized t h e n e c e s s i t y t o h e l p t h e

*Chou a l a 6 T Z E T ~ K o s y g i n on 1 0 February i n Peking a f t e r t h e l a t t e r ' s v i s i t t o Hanoi, b u t it is not known whether t h e matter of n e g o t i a t i o n s on f l e t n a m was discus - sed . Kosygin s t a t e d on 11 February ( i n a d i s c u s s i o n w i t h Mao) t h a t he had d i scussed t h e m a t t e r of "what h e l p t o g i v e w Hanoi wi th Chou as 3811 a s w i t h t h e North Vietnamese, and when Mao s a i d S o v i e t a i d was wsmal l , " Kosygin suggested t h a t Peking %auld h e l p wi th a v i a t i o n . " MPO r e j e c t e d t h e sugges t ion .

U.S. " f ind a wag o u t of Vietnam." I n com- p l e t e e a r n e s t we poin ted o u t a t t h a t t i m e that s i n c e t h e American imperialists w e r e s t e p p i n g up t h e i r aggress ion a g a i n s t V i e t - nam, t h i s was no t i m e t o n e g o t i a t e wi th t h e American a g g r e s s o r s , b u t r a t h e r t o t a k e up arms w i t h a view t o r e s i s t i n g them. We hoped t h a t you would not seek a way o u t f o r t h e U.S., nor make any s e t t l e m e n t wi th them concerning t h e V i e t - namese ques t ion . A t t h a t t i m e , Comrade Kosygin expressed agreement w i t h o u r views and dec la red t h a t t h e new S o v i e t l e a d e r - s h i p "would no t b a r g a i n w i t h o t h e r s over t h i s ques t ion." (CCP l e t t e r t o CPSU of 14 J u l y 1065)

The Chinese rebuff d i d n o t prevent Kosygin and t h e S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p from p r e s s i n c n t o exp lo re t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s of a conference on Vietnam.

In lianoi, Kosygin probably broached t h e m a t t e r of a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference with t h e North Vietnamese l e a d e r s . On 7 February, he agreed wi th t h e "DRV Govern- ment" t h a t a conference on Laos should be he ld , but went beyond t h i s t o s t a t e t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e "Soviet Unionff i n suppor t of t h e r e s o l u t i o n of t h e C a i r o nonaligned n a t i o n s conference f o r t h e convocation of "a new i n t e r n a - t i o n a l conference on Indochina wi th a view t o t h e peacefu l s e t t l e m e n t of t h e q u e s t i o n s which have a r i s e n the re . " T h i s c a r e f u l d i s t i n c t i o n between Hanoi's d e s i r e f o r a conference on Laos and Mosco9's suppor t f o r a conference on I n d ~ c h i n a ' ~ ( read "Vietnamtt) s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e North Vietnamese wore r e l u c t a n t t o commit themselves t o i n t e r - n a t i o n a l n e g o t i a t i o n s on t h e war i n t h e South. However,

' u n l i k e t h e Chinese, t h e y had not r e j e c t e d it p u b l i c l y .

Hanoi 's p u b l i c p o s i t i o n i n February was noncommit- t a l . The new Sovie t l e a d e r s h i p was n e i t h e r : a t t a c k e d nor d i r e c t l y suppor ted i n its e f f o r t t o con t inue e x p l o r i n g t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r convening a conference on Vietnam. The North Vietnamese a t t i t u d e a t t h e t ime seemed t o be one of t a c i t acquiescence i n t h e Sov ie t maneuvering.

That Koeygin d id no t g a i n a c l e a r - c u t agreement t o '

advocate an i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference is suggested by two statements he made in : Hanoi fo l lowing t h e 7 February at- tack on P le iku . (1) He s t a t e d p u b l i c l y t h a t t h e Indochinese people ' s r i g h t t o s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n was "a b a s i s ... t o normalize t h e s i t u a t i o n i n Southeas t Asia, l1 b u t d i d n o t d e c l a r e t h a t a conference would be t h e road t o normaliza- t i on . (speech of 8 February) (2) Be a l s o s t a t e d p u b l i c l y - t h a t unanimity of views had been reached w i t h t h e North Vietnamese o n l y on measures f o r s t r e n g t h e n i n g " the defense p o t e n t i a l of t h e DRV," whi le " f rank t a l k s " had t a k e n p l a c e on many i n t e r n a t i o n a l problem:. ( f a rewel l speech of 10 February) F a i l u r e t o g a i n Halioi's c l e a r - c u t con- cur rence is a l s o suggested by t h e absence of any North Vietnamese comment, d a r i n g h i s v i s i t , on t h e convening of a conference on Vidtnam. F u r t h e r , deputy f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s Zorin and Lapin, between 11 and 1 7 February, avoided r e p 1 y ing t o quest ions r e g a r d i n g Sov ie t suppor t f o r a conference when asked by t h e French and B r i t i s h ambassadors.

On t h e o t h e r hand, t h a t Kosygin had not been given a c l e a r - c u t r e j e c t i o n i i s suggested by Hanoi 's subsequent p u b l i c treS€55ntoff7ippeals for convening an i n t e r n a t i o n a l meeting. Hanoi noted t h e French government s t a tement of 10 February which was ,paraphrased a s d e c l a r i n g t h a t Itan i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreement m u s t be signedw t o e l i m i n a t e i n t e r - f e rence i n Indochina, * Canadian Premier Pearson 's s t a tement of 10 February a p p r o v h g " the convening of ap i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference t o p e a c e f u l l y s o l v e t h e Indochina problem,"

*On 10 Yebruary,'l?FSS promptly r e p o r t e d t h e French appea l and Indira Ghandi ts c a l l f o r a "14-nation con- f e r e n c e on Indochina; "' on 16 February, Pravda pub1 i c i z e d WPC P r e s i d e n t Bernal 'sl ca l l f o r a conference; and on t h e 1 7 t h , a Pravda commentator noted French, Canadian, and Burmese p roposa l s a e well a s t h e f a v o r a b l e a t t i t u d e toward a p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n by c e r t a i n v l far -s ightedw o f f i- cials i n Washington.

and t h e U Thant and Burmese s ta tements dec la r ing t h a t t he I

U . S . llmust f i n d a way o the r than t h e m i l it a ry one i n South Vietnam." (Nhan Dan a r t i c l e of 14 February) --

This t reatment suggests t h a t a t least some of t h e North Vietnamese l eade r s ( i . e . , t h e moderates) were w i l l - ing t o publ ic ize t h e appeals of o the r governments f o r a conference fol lowing Kosygin's p r i v a t e proposal--certainly t o Peking and probably t o Hanoi--that t h e r e was a need t o "find a way out of Vietnam1* f o r t h e U.S. That a t least some of t h e North Vietnamese l eade r s acquiesced i n Moscow's probes i n a period of i n i t i a l explora t ion is a l s o suggested by the s t rong a t t a c k leveled a t t h e B r i t i s h f o r opposing a conference. Prime Minister Wilson was a t tacked because

I

H e was r a s h enough t o s ay t h a t t h e a t t acks aga ins t t h e DRV a r e unavoidable and t h e present.moment is not y e t convenient f o r t h e convening of a Geneva conference on Indochina. (Nhan Dan a r t i c l e of 14 February) --

In s h o r t , the French,. Canadian, and Burmese. proposals f o r a conference were i m p l i c i t l y favored while t h e B r i t i s h r e j e c t ion was disparaged, Hanoi's apparent i n t e n t ion being t o s u s t a i n a degree of f l e x i b i l i t y .

By t o l e r a t i n g t h e probes of o the r governments, t he North Vietnamese r e t a ined f o r themselves a degree of f l e x i b i l i t y e i t h e r t o move toward an in t e rna t iona l conference ( i f t h e Russians could ever s t imu la t e one) o r away from a conference ( i f t h e Russians f a i l e d ) . In e i t h e r case , they would not appear anxious f o r negptia- t i o n s a t a t l G f increased American pressure-namely, t h e a i r s t r i k e s aga ins t t h e North on 7 , 8, and 11 February. The North Vietnamese t a c t i c of maintaining an ambiguous pos i t i on probably was a l s o designed t o d e f l e c t Chinese '

Communist c r i t i c i s m , inasmuch as they could l a t e r argue t h a t they had not e x p l i c i t l y agreed t o Kosyg&nQs proposal. That t he Chinese In mid-February 1965 were uncer ta in and even d i s t r u s t f u l of Hanoi's ambiguity is suggested by t h e s ta tement of t he Chinese Communist e d i t o r of t h e Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao. When asked on 1 5 February by an American c o r r e s p o n m t what Peking 's a t t i t u d e toward

negot ia t ions on Vietnam mi$ht be, he r e p l i e d t h a t Hanoi might be w i l l i n g t o engage i n t a l k s , but even i f it were t o do so , it could not epeak f o r t h e Viet Cong.

I

Hanoi's t a c i t acquidscence a t t h e time apparen t ly encouraged t h e Soviet l e a d e r s t o propose, t o Peking and Hanoi simultaneously, t h a t a j o i n t publ ic appeal f o r an i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference should be made. The Chinese l a t e r complained t h a t fol ldwing Kosygints r e t u r n t o Moscow, t h e Soviet l e ade r s "behind t h e backs of Vietnam and China, a c t i v e l y engaged i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l maneuvering f o r 'peace negot ia t ions . ' " The Chinese d i d not support t h e i r charge t h a t t h e s e maahinat ions were undertaken with- ou t Hanoi'e knowledge, and it is unl ike ly t h a t t h e Soviet l e a d e r s would have continued t o probe i f Kosygin had been given a c lear -cu t "no" i n Banoi. The Chinese complained t h a t

The most s t r i k i n g o f a l l was t h e f a c t t h a t on 16 Feb?uary,l t h e day a f t e r Comrade Kosygin's r e t u r n t o Moscow, t h e Soviet Government o f f i c i a l l y proposed t o Vietnam and China t o c a l l f o r a new conference on Indochina, which i n e f f e c t was tantamount t o defending "uncondit iona l negot i a t ions1' on t h e Vietnamese question. (CCP l e t t e r t o CPSU of 14 J u l y 1965)

Upon Kosygints r e t u r n , t h e Soviet l e a d e r s may have decided t o t r y t o demonstrate t o t h e North Vietnamese t h e d e t r i - mental aspec t of Chinese i n d l e x i b i l i t y on a mat te r requi r - i n g diplomat ic maneuvering 'to he lp l i m i t t he 'degree of Washington's involvement in : Vietnam. They apparent ly bel ieved t h a t , a t t h e very l e a s t , t h e whole mat te r of

eking-Hanoi t ens ions . I] ' s e n i o r NCNA o f f i c i a l com- ch t h a t "America" may t r y i with t a l k about confer-

ences." H e went on t o s a y t h a t t h e North Vietnamese would " in p r i n ~ i p l e , ~ ' always be i n t e r e s t e d i n an i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference , but t h a t it wougd' be unreal 1st ic to convene one a s de s i r ed by t h e Sovie t s , Indians, and Yugoslavs.

T h i s is t h e f i r s t known s u g g e s t i o n from a Chinese Communist s o u r c e t h a t t h e s u b j e c t of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference could c r e a t e Sino-Vidtnamese d i f f e r e n c e s .

I n t h e wake of American a i r e t r i k e s (beginning on 7 February) , t h e Sov ie t l e a d e r s ' room f o r p o l i t i c a l maneuvering w a s d r a s t i c a l l y reduced, They were impelled t o c r i t i c i z e Washington f o r a i r a t t a c k s on a b l o c coun t ry whi le , a t t h e same t i m e , t h e y were s e e k i n g some means f o r s t i m u l a t i n g a d e s i r e among f o r e i g n governments f o r ne o t i a - t i o n s . The t w o a c t i o n s were incompat ib le . T h e i r s t a t e m e n t s r e f l e c t e d t h e i r anger and f r u s t r a t i o n a c&? unable t o move forward p o l i t i c a l l y , Regarding t h e i r anger over t h e r e t a r d i n g e f f e c t which t h e a i r s t r i k e s had had on t h e S o v i e t moves t o e x p l o r e t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r h o l d i n g a confercnce , on 1 5 February deputy f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r Zor in t o l d a Western diplomat t h a t (a) Washington r e g u l a r l y had r e J e c t e d any h i n t of a conference and (b) t h e Sov ic t Union would on ly h e l p t h e North Vietnamese: " t h e r e is no o t h e r p o l i c y t o be expected from u s . " A t t h e same t i m e , t h e S o v i e t s almost i n d e s p e r a t i o n con t inued t o s e e k some s i g n of suppor t from t h e French. They d i r o c t e d Ambassador Vinogradov i n Par is t o submit a document on i n t e r n a t i o n a l t a l k s t o De Gaul le .

t h e document which Vinogra ov w i t h t h

- e French p r i s i d e n t on 23 February d i d no t use t h e

word "confe rence Iw s u g g e s t i n g t h a t Moscow recognized t h a t a p r e c o n d i t i o n m u s t be set f o r t h i f Hanoi were e v e r t o be persuaded t o t a l k . I t opened w i t h a s t a t e m e n t of S o v i e t concern r e g a r d i n g t h e Vietnam s i t u a t i o n and went on t o s a y t h a t t h e time is now r i p e f o r n e g o t i a t i o n s , t h e o n l y p r e c o n d i t i o n now be ing t h a t Washington must not t a k e armed a c t i o n a g a i n s t North Vietnam. The suspens ion of American a i r s t r i k e s , t h e Sov ie t l e a d e r s a p p a r e n t l y believed, was a b s o l u t e l y necessa ry i f t h e y were t o have any chance of budging t h e North Vietnamese l e a d e r s t o c o n s i d e r n e g o t i a t i o n s and t h e y had no assu rance t h a t such a suspens ion would be s u f f i c i e n t cause f o r Hanoi t o agree t o t a l k .

t h e Sov le t l e a d e r s were unaer cons l a e r a w e '

p r e s s u r e from t h e Chinese t o t a k e a s t r o n g l i n e a g a i n s t t h e U.S., t o r e f r a i n from ~ r e s s i n a f o r a Vietnam conference , -and t o stress t h e demand f o r an American withdrawal.

l the Sov ie t l e a d e r s had s t a t e d n d l t h r e g a r d to l n d i a t s n o t e of 8 ~ e b r u a r p - t h w

I xn . S . ceased a c t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e North and i f t h e E r t h Vietnamese were Wi l l ing , Mosco:v would have no o b j e c t i o n t o going t o P confeyence. The S o v i e t s a l s o i n d i c a t e d t h a t they would not ob3ect to having

h i n t s t o t h e North Vietnamese about might bo, a c c e p t a b l e t o t h e West. I

I I Ianoi 's apparent equ ivoca t ion probably r e f l e c t e d

t h e North Vietnamese t a c t i c of t r y i n g t o s e c u r e a cessa- t i o n of U.S. a i r s t r i k e s a g a i n s t t h e North by implying t h a t t h e f i r s t p recond i t ion f o r any conference--which Hanoi d i d n o t r u l e ou t a s a p r o s p e c t i v e development--must be an end t o bombing. The North Vietnamese a p p a r e n t l y found no reason t o d iscourage Moscow's e f f o r t s t o p r e s s Ylashing- t o n t o s t o p t h e a i r s t r i k e s ; t h e y acquiesced, theref o r e , i n Sov ie t maneuvers. In t h e pe r iod between t h e t i m e of t h e S o v i e t proposal t o Hanoi and Peking t h a t an appeal should be made for convening a conference on Vietnam (16 February) and t h e t i m e when t h e Chinese c la im t o have r e j e c t e d t h e Sov ie t sugges t ion (27 February), Hanoi d i d not a t t a c k t h e concept of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference - o r negot i a t i o n s .

The Chinese see$ t.0 have d i s t o r t e d t h e North V i e t - namese p o l i c y of e q u i v o c a t i o n , . o f avoiding a f l a t "no1' t o S o v i e t e f f o r t s t o e l i m i n a t e a i r s t r i k e c e s s a t i o n a s a ba rga in ing i s s u e and t o suggeet t h a t t h e s i r s t r i k e s must be ended, Although t h e Chinese l a t e r claimed t h a t Hanoi had r e j e c t e d t h e Sov ie t appea l of 16 February f o r a

*The w e CPSU of 14 Ju ly 1965 claimed t h a t "On 23 February, ignoring t h e Vietnamese Government's r e j e c t i o n of t h i s proposal and without wai t ing f o r an answer from t h e Chinese Government, you discussed with t h e French President--through t h e Soviet Ambassador i n France-the quest ion of convening an in t e rna t iona l con- f erenue without s t i p u l a t i n g p r i o r condi t ions ." (emphasis suppl ied)

conference, s e v e r a l anomalies suggest t h a t "re ject ion1' was a s t ronger word than t h e f a c t s warranted.* The anomalies are:

(1) t h e Chinese delayed t h e i r own r e j e c t i o n u n t i l 27 February; t h a t is, they lagged behind t h e North Vietnamese, who were s a i d t o have r e j e c t e d Moscow's bid p r i o r t o t h e 23rd. Why had t h e Chinese waited? Apparently they were engaged i n pressur- - i n g t h e North Vietnamese t o rebuff Mos- 'cow unequivocally. The necess i ty of CCP pressure a t t h e time is suggested i n a p r i v a t e b r i e f i n g which t h e CCPts Foneign Bureau held f o r pro-Chinese West European l e f t i s t s i n Peking i n October 1965. Ac- cording t o t h e CCP b r i e f e r s , Moscow's proposal of 16 February " w a s r e j e c t e d by the Premier of North Vietnam." However, t he b r i e f e r s went on t o cons t ruc t a locu t ion, designed t o conceal apparent pressure on Hanoi: "China's r eac t ion was no t immediate because t h e a u t h o r i t i e s wiehed t o d i scuss t h e mat ter with t h e Vietnamese." The b r i e f e r s did not expla in why t h e r e had been any need f o r l l d i s c u s s ~ I n g l t h e mat ter with Hanoi i f t h e North Vietnamese had i n f a c t reJec ted Moscow unequivocally. (At t h e same time, t h e Chinese were angered by Hanoi's wi l l ing- ness t o j o i n with Moscow i n proposing a j o i n t Soviet-Vietnamese-Chinese statement

of warning t o Washington, which the North Vietnamese proceedqd t o d r a f t on 22 February. )

(2) t h e North V i e t n a m e s e i n late February and e a r l y March d i d n o t a t t a c k t h e i d e a of a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference openly a l though t h e Chinese pressed: them t o do j u s t t h a t .

E. Peking S u s t a i n s Pressure on Hanoi Openly to - - - -.- Re-lect Neao t ia t i o n s (March 1966)

A w a r e t h a t the North Vietnamese accepted t h e i d e a of a conference i n p r i n c i p l e and concerned t h a t the U. S. and USSR might move Hanol t o n e g o t i a t e , %he Chinese t r i e d t o impel HO p u b l i c l y t o rehounce n e g o t i a t i o n s . * ~ u t Hanoi's equ ivoca t ion had left t h e S o v i e t s some (not much) leeway t o t r y t o d e t e r the tU.S. from resuming t h e a i r - s t r i k e s a g a i n s t t h e North i n late February. When, on 26 February, he t r i e d t o s t i m u l a t e f u r t h e r i n i t i a t i v e s by o t h e r governments toward t a l k s , Kosygin had spoken of a d e s i r e t o s o l v e t h e Indochina q u e s t i o n "tit a conference t a b l e w and went on t o se t Q o r t h a major precondit ion--e.g. , "An end t o U.S. a g g r e s s i v e a c t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e DRV is needed, f i r s t and foremost; t o c r e a t e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e e x p l o r a t i o n of avenues l e a d i n g t o t h e normal iza t ion of t h e s i t u a t i o n i n Vietnam." (An end t o U. S, a i r s t r i k e s a g a i n s t t h e North a lone , r a t h e r t h a n I t f i r s t and foremost ," became t h e b a s i c and o n l y Sovie t p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r negot ia- t i o n s . ) Immunity from furqher U.S. s t r i k e s was p r e c i s e l y what Hanoi d e s i r e d a t t h e Oime, and t h e Chinese were a l e r t

-Chinese concern was s u s t a i n e d by S e c r e t a r y Rusk's etate- ment t h a t Itpol it i c a l channels a r e openg8 and t h a t " th ings could begin t o movew i f V i a t Dong a t t a c k s were h a l t e d (25 February 1965) and xosy/gints r e f e r e n c e t o a "normali- z a t i o n " of t h e s i t u a t i o n (216 February 1985).

t o t h e Sov,iet e f f o r t ~ i m u l t a n e o u s l y t o end an embarrassment f o r Moscow and t o e n s u r e t h e s a n c t u a r y p rev ious ly enjoyed by " s o c i a l istw North Vietnam.

The Chinese r e j e c t i o n of t h e Sov ie t conference p roposa l on t h e 27th was fol lowed by p u b l i c (and probably p r i v a t e ) hints t o Hanoi t h a t it should more d i r e c t l y , openly , and unequivocal ly a t t a c k t h e proposal and o t h e r m a t i o n s - E X d s . The U.S. is t r y i n g "to g a i n a t t h e n e g o t i a t i n g t a b l e what it is unable t o g a i n on t h e b a t t l e - f i e l d ." (Red - Flag ar t ic le of 27 February, broadcas t i n ~ietnamese--an-ly i n Vietnamese--six t i m e s on 2 March) "We s h a l l never succumb t o t h e U . S . i m p e r i a l i s t s ' b e l l i c o s e b lackmai l . No s o c i a l i s t coun t ry should." (People ' s Dai ly e d i t o r i a l of 1 March) These and subsequent Chlinesestafe- ments s t r o n g l y suggested Chinese concern w i t h Hanoi's p o s i t i o n . They p o i n t t o t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t h e CCP c l a i m of a North Vietnamese v r e j e c t i o n ' ' of t h e Sov ie t conference p roposa l was a d i s t o r t i o n .

Two s e p a r a t e p o s i t i o n s t a k e n by Sovie t - inf luenced L i b e r a t i o n Front o f f i c i a l s , on t h e one hand, and a Chinese- i n f luencod L i b e r a t i o n Front o f f i c i a l , on t h e o t h e r hand, i n e a r l y March p o i n t up Pek ing ' s d i s t r u s t of North Vie t - namese equivocat ion. According t o 1-1 t h e Chinese d e l e g a t i o n a t a p r e p a r a t o r y meeting of t h e Sovie t - o r i e n t e d World Peace Council (WPC) held i n B e r l i n i n e a r l y March, i n s i s t e d t h a t a WPC proposal d e c l a r e t h a t t h e U.S. must withdraw before n e g o t i a t i o n s could t a k e p lace . A marked d i f f e r e n c e was r e p o r t e d between t h e Chinese and L i b e r a t i o n Front d e l e g a t e s : when t h e Chinese c i r c u l a t e d a document a t t a c k i n g t h o s e who sought an accommodation w i t h t h e U.S., t h e Front d e l e g a t e s d i d not suppor t it. Unlike t h e Chinese, t h e Fron t d e l e g a t e s r e p o r t e d l y d i d no t r u l e ou t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of n e g o t i a t i o n s on some formula s h o r t of a complete p r i o r U . 3 . withdrawal. I n Peking, however, the Chinese-influenced a c t i n g c h i e f of t h e F r o n t ' s permanent o f f i c e , Nguyen Minh Phoung, d i r e c t l y a t t acked t h e idea of n e g o t i a t i o n s . The Chinese i n s i s t e n c e t h a t t h e North Vietnamese openly a t t a c k t h e idea of i n t e r n a - t i o n a l t a l k s on Vietnam was suggested by d i f f e r e n t Peking and Hanoi t r ea tment of t h e acting c h i e f ' s p r e s s conference of 8 March. While NCNA (on 9 March) r e p o r t e d h i s

s ta tement t h a t by advocat ing peaceful n e g o t i a t i o n s t h e U.S. was t r y i n g t o " e x t r i c a t e w i t s e l f from f a i l u r e i n t h e South, VNA ( a l s o on t h e 9 t h ) d e l e t e d t h i s a t t a c k on negot ia- t i o n s from its v e r s i o n . I t is important t o n o t e t h a t Peking, not Hanoi, tobk t h e i n i t i a t i v e i n making a s t a t e - ment on behal f of t h e F r o n t , t h a t it used t h e a c t i n g chief ( i n t h e absence of t h e c h i e f of t h e permanent d e l e g a t i o n t o c h i n a ) , t h a t it i n a c c u r a t e l y dep ic ted him a s a South Vietnamese w l e a d e r , w and t h a t it pub l ic ized an a t t a c k on t a l k s two days i n advance of a formal L i b e r a t i o n Front c e n t r a l committee s t a tement which avoided any r e f e r e n c e t o n e g o t i a t i o n s . Pekfng 's i n i t i a t i v e a t a t i m e when t h e F r o n t ' s c e n t r a l committee apparen t ly was meeting (some- where i n Vietnam) s t r o n g l y s u g g e s t s CCP i n t e r f e r e n c e i n t h e a f f a i r s of t h e Hanoi-control led f r o n t . *

The North Vietnamese had t r i e d t o avoid an open and c a t e g o r i c a l reject ion of i n t e r n a t i o n a l negot ia-s 5 3 , s imul taneously , sugges t t o t h e Chinese t h a t t h e y -would n o t be fo rced t o n e g o t i a t e o r be misled by Moscow and Washington. I n t h e i r f i r s t s u b s t a n t i v e comment on t h e 2 March a i r s t r i k e s ! a g a i n s t t h e North, t h e y s t a t e d t h a t Vietnamese " w i l l ho t be deceived1* by P r e s i d e n t Johnson's a l l e g e d r e f e r e n c e t o t a l k s and t h a t t h e U.S. was wrong i f it be l i eved t h e s t r i k e s would l e a d t o a "nego t ia ted s e t t l e m e n t ." (Nhan Dan e d i t o r i a l of 3 March) They fol lowed up t h i s c o m m e ~ w ~ h was p a r t l y in tended t o r e a s s u r e Peking, by s a y i n g t h a t '*Nobody w i l l be duped by t h e f a l l a c i o u s U. S . ' a l l e g a t ions1* about a **measured expansion1' and " t r y i n g t o reach a nego t ia ted se t t l ement . l l

1 t o l d U.S. o f f i c i a l s 0 hinese were making an

zo e a r a m leh "a ' s p e c i a l r e l a t 1 0 n s h i p ~ ~ wi th t h e a n F r o . b1tdough t h e Chinese had not fo rmal ly extended r e c o g n i t i o n t d t h e Fron t , they n e v e r t h e l e s s were t r e a t i n g t h e F r o n t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n Peking a s if h e were a du ly a c c r e d i t e d diplomat and, on ceremonial occas ions , were rank ing him f o r p ro toco l purposes as an ambassador.

(Nhan Dan e d i t o r i a l of 4 March) Sov ie t articles cont inued t o v O C 8 t e hand l ing t h e Vietnam s i t u a t i o n a$ "a conference t a b l e w (New Times e d i t o r i a l of 4 March) and by "negot i a t i o n s T p r m a r t i c l e of 5 March) and ins i s t ed- - a f t e r t h e 2 M a r c h t r i k e s - - t h a t t h e way o u t f o r t h e U. S . was t h e 'limmediate end t o aggress ive act i o n s a g a i n s t t h e DRV" p r i o r t o n e g o t i a t i o n s . (Red -- S t a r a r t i c l e of 5 March)

Following t h e 14-15 March a i r s t r i k e s , t h e North Vietnamese took a more e x p l i c i t 1 i n e on negot ia t ions , going beyond t h e e a r l y March r e a s s u r a n c e s t o Peking t h a t t h e y would no t be duped. For t h e f i r s t t ime i n many months, t h e y a t t a c k e d ' tT i tov f o r h i s 2 March l e t t e r t o P r e s i d e n t Johnson c a l l i n g f o r n e g o t i a t i o n s wi thout pre- c o n d i t i o n s and t h e n dec la red :

There can be no ques t ion of n e g o t i a t i o n s wi th t h e U.S. i m p e r i a l i s t s when t h e y openly d e c l a r e and b r a z e n l y x p up t h e aggress ive war i n South Vietnam and ex tend t h i s war t o North Vietnam. (Nhan Dan a r t i c l e of 18 March) ( e r n p h a s i s u p - p l i e d )

In a t t a c k i n g "Ti to ," t h e North Vietnamese were a l s o im- p l i c i t l y rebuking t h e heads of state of t h e 1 7 non-aligned a a t i o n s f o r t h e i r appeal of 15 March c a l l i n g f o r negot ia- t i o n s wi thout p r e c o n d i t i o n s . * T h i s North V-ietnamese

- *During his s h o r t - n o t i c e v i s i t t o Alger ia from 30 March

t o 1 Apr i l , Chou En-la1 r e p o r t e d l y took an uncompromisingly hard p o s i t i o n on Vietnam wi th Ben B e l l s and desc r ibed t h e appeal a s harmful . H e a l s o demanded t h a t t h e U.S. n e g o t i a t e wi th t h e L i b e r a t i o n F r o n t , us ing t h i s opening t o make t h e f u r t h e r p o i n t t h a t t h e r e was no need f o r U Thant t o t r a v e l t o Peking or Hanoi o r f o r a 5-nat ion conference t o be held . A s a r e s u l t of Chou's p r o t e s t a t i o n s , Ben Elella r e p o r t e d l y d i r e c t e d t h e Alger ian ambassador i n Peking to withdraw from a group of d ip lomats who were scheduled t o p r e s e n t a message f r o m t h e - 17 non-aligned powers t o t h e CPR.

formulat ion was remarkably ambivalent. On t h e one hand, it d i f f e r e d from Sovlet s t a tements becauee it d i d no t state t h a t a h a l t t o , U.S. a i r s t r i k e s was necessary t o c r e a t e cond i t i ons f o n e g o t i a t i o n s . * By f a i l i n g t o s t a t e p r e c i s e l y what was r i quired before t a l k s coudd begin, Hanoi avoided m x n g a commitment t o nego t i a t e i f a i r - s t r i k e s were t o be suspended. On t h e o t h e r hand, it d i d not r e j e c t f u t u r e neqo t i a t i ons and d i d not i n s i s t t h a t a p r i o r U . S . withdrawal was a p recondi t ion f o r t a l k s . The Chinese apparentxy de tec ted t h i s ambivalence: t h e e n t i r e formulat ion was omit ted from Peking 's ve r s i on of t h e a r t i c l e as broadaast i n Vietnamese on 20 March.

, I n t h e wake of' t h e 14-15 March a i r s t r i k e s aga in s t

t h e North, t h e Soviet l e a d e r s 1 l o s s of a l l room f o r maneu- ve r i ng was r e f l e c t e d i n t h e i r a c t i o n s and s ta tements . On 15 March, t hey formal ly r e j e c t e d London's proposal of 20 February t h a t Geneva conference c o u n t r i e s be canvassed f o r t h e i r views on cond i t i ons f o r a peaceful s e t t l emen t i n Vietnam, and on t h e 16 th , Gromyko, i n London, declared t h a t t h e f i r s t s t e p f o r t h e Geneva co-chairmen must be t o denounce "U. S. aggress ion aga in s t Vietnamw--a c l e a r

f o r a Vietnam s e t t l emen t and dec la red t h a t t h e only duty of Belgrade and Moscoy was not to c a l l a conference, but t o (iemand a p p l i c a t i o n ' o f t h e Geneva agreements and a U.S. withdrawal. Th is s t r u n g l y sugges t s t h a t by mid-March,

I

t h e Sov i e t s maintained a l t pon for beginning t o calm condi-

t ions and the reby seek. t h e de s i r ed s e t t l emen t was f o r t h e ~ m e r i c a n s t o - s t o p t h e i r North Vietnam."

I

t h e North Vietnamese had d i r e c t l y rebuf fed t h e Russians on t h e matter of n e g o t i a t i o n s , i n c o n t r a s t w i t h t h e i r equ ivoca t ibn throughout February.

F. ~ i b e r a t ion Front I n s i s t s on Withdrawal Before Negot ia t ions (22 March 1965)

By l a t e March, t h e p o s i t i o n t aken by t h e L i b e r a t i o n Fron t on n e g o t i a t i o n s was even ha rder than Haad ies tough- ened p u b l i c s t a n d . The r e a c t i o n of t h e Front t o t h e U . S . a i r s t r i k e s was t h e most d ramat ic of a l l Communist responses ; it was formal lzed on 22 March by Front chairman Nguyen Huu Tho i n a *?f ive-point s t a tement on t h e i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n and enlargement by t h e U.S." of t h e war i n t h e South. The f i v e p o i n t s were, i n b r i e f , a d e c l a r a t i o n of t h e V i e t Conge s de te rmina t ion t o p rosecu te t h e war without i n t e r - r u p t ion and f o r a long t i m e . They conta ined (1) a d i s - t o r t e d review of U.S. p o l i c i e s toward Vietnam s i n c e 1954, (2) a r e i t e r a t i o n of V i e t Cong de te rmina t ion t o f igh% on, t h e c la im t h a t t h e V i e t Cong had t aken three-f o u r t h s of t h e t e r r i t o r y and c o n t r o l l e d one-half of t h e popu la t ion , t h e new hard p o s i t i o n on n e g o t i a t i o n s , and t h e r e q u i r e - ment--eurfaced i n ~ e c e m b e r m c t ; h a t t h e F r o n t D s "deci- s i v e vo icew must be recognized be fore t a l k s could t a k e p l a c e , (3) a commitment t o " l i b e r a t e " t h e South and u n i f y t h e country , (4) a c la im t h a t t h e Fron t has t h e r i g h t t o a c q u i r e o u t s i d e a i d , inc lud ing weapons and, i f necessa ry , f o r e i g n v o l u n t e e r s and s o u t h e r n e r s who had been regrouped i n t h e North, and ( 5 ) an appeal t o a l l sou$herners t o u n i t e and f i g h t t o win on a l l b a % t l e f i e l d s . *

P o i n t 2 r e f l e c t e d t h e i n t r a n s i g e n t Chinese p o s i - t ion on n e g o t i a t i o n s :

*The f i v e l tgoIntsw are r e p r i n t e d i n t h e annex of t h i s paper .

A t p r e s e n t , a l l n q g o t i a t i o n s a r e u s e l e s s a s l o n g as t h e u s l i m p e r i a l i s t e do no t withdraw a l l t h e t r o o p s , weapons, and means of war of tlbe US and its s a t e l l i t e s from South Vietnam and d e s t r o y t h e i r m i l i t a r y bases i n . South Vietnam; a s l o n g a s t h e s a c r e d r i g b t s of t h e South V i e t - namese people--r i$hts t o independence and democracy--are still s o l d by t h e V i e t - nameae t r a i t o r s t? t h e US i m p e r i a l i s t s , and as long a s t h e L i b e r a t i o n Front--the t r u e and o n l y r e p t e s e n t a t i v e of 1 4 m i l - l i o n South Vietnamese people--does not have t h e d e c i e i v e ' voice . (emphaa is s u p p l l ed )

T h i s p o s i t i o n went w e l l beyond Hanoivs 18 March s t a tement t h a t n e g o t i a t i o n s were ou t of t h e ques t ion 'mile t h e U.S. i n t e n s i f i e d t h e war i n tne South and a g a i n s t t h e North, inasmuch a s it dec la red l la lks u s e l e s s without (1) a p r i o r U.S. withdrawal and (2) a d e c i s i v e vo ice f o r t h e Front . It was e t r i k i n g l y s i m i l a ~ t o p o e i t i o n s Peking had tPken p u b l i c l y and p r i v a t e l y s i n c e December 1964. In p a r t i c u l a r , it was similar t o L iao Cneng-chih's 24 March s t a tement t h a t "negot ia t i o n s N were ' imposs ible without a p r i o r withdrawal of U. 9. t r o o p s . .

The Chinese, more , t h a n t h e North Vietnamese, a c t e d q u i c k l y t o e x p l o i t t h e F # o n t q s 22 March " f i v e p o i n t w a t a t e - ment, s t r e s s i n g and quot ing i n its e n t i r e t y t h e hard pas- s a g e on negot ia t ions . . (E)eoplets Da i ly e d i t o r i a l of 25 March). Following P r e s i d e n t Johnson's 25 March s t a tement , t h e Chinese aga in took t h e i n i t i a t i . v e and dec la red t h a t lfonZy" i n t h e event of a ;withdrawal of U.S. t r o o p s could t h e r e be "any t a l k about a r e v i v a l of t h e Geneva agreements and about a ' p o l i t j c a l s e t t l e m e n t ' on t h e b a s i s of t h e agreements."* (People ' s Da i ly e d i t o r i a l of 29

* T h e m n e s e were say ing , i n e f f e c t , t h a t a c e a s e f i r e , agreed t o a t Geneva, was . imposs ible p r i o r to t h e d e p a r t u r e of U.S. f o r c e s .

March) By c o n t r a s t , al though ~ a h o i r e b r o a d c a s t t h e Front s t a t e m e n t on t h e 23rd, it d i d no t i n i t i a t e its own comment on it u n t i l 28 March, a t which time a Nhan Dan e d i t o r i a l p r a i s e d it b u t avoided t a k i n g a s t a n d f o r o F X g n i n s t negot i a t i o n s ,

The q u e s t i o n arises: why was t h e Fron t s t a tement s i g n i f i c a n t l y h a r d e r and more e x p l i c i t on t h e mat te r of n e g o t i a t i o n s t h a n t h e Nhan Dan e d i t o r i a l of 28 March? The reason may be ~ a n o - d m r e t o s u s t a i n t h e f i c t i o n of Front autonomy and t o appear f l e x i b l e i n its own p u b l i c s t a n d . T h i s t a c t i c pe rmi t t ed Hanoi t o con t inue its game of convincing c e r t a i n Western l e a d e r s and n e u t r a l s t h a t Washington was t h e r e a l r e c a l c i t r a n t on t h e mat te r of i n t e r n a t i o n a l negot i a t i o n s .

Regarding t h e p o l i t i c a l s t a t u s of t h e F r o n t , Hanoi p r i v a t e l y adopted -the-hard-TZne of Peking and Front l e a d e r s , ag ree ing t o i n t e r p o s e t h o Fron t a s a n e g o t i a t o r . On 24 March, a North Vietnamese l i a i s o n o f f i c i a l t o l d a Western diplomat i n Hanoi t h a t i f t h e r e were t o be any n e g o t i a t i o n s or a s e t t l e m e n t of t h e war, it would have t o be between t h e L i b e r a t i o n Front and t h e U.S. a s t h e " p a r t i e s d i r e c t l y involved." By l a t e March and e a r l y A p r i l , t h e r e f o r e , t h e North Vietnamese moved t o upgrade t h e r o l e of t h e F r o n t a s a l e g i t i m a t e n e g o t i a t o r ~ a n i i Tu tu re i n t e r n a t i o n a l t a l k s on Vietnam.

I n e f f e c t , t h i s move made n e g o t i a t i o & even more remote, inasmuch a s Hanoi was c l e a r l y aware t h a t Washing- t o n would no t accep t t h e Front as t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e South. The Chinese l e a d e r s worked a c t i v e l y t o con t inue t o make n e g o t i a t i o n s a pure ly h y p o t h e t i c a l ma t te r by i n t e r - pos ing t h e F r o n t . When, on 30 March, Chou En- la i responded t o U T h a n t t s request--which was passed from Ben B e l l a t o t h e Chinese ambassador i n A l g i e r s on 1 4 March-- about Peking ' s c o n d i t i o n s f o r beginning n e g o t i a t i o n s , he d i d s o by f l y i n g on s h o r t n o t i c e from Bucharest t o A l g i e r s t o t e l l Ben B e l l a t h a t t h e U. 9. could not n e g o t i a t e wi th Peking or Hanoi, b u t on ly w i t h t h e F r o n t . -

111. HANOI FORMULATES VERBALLY ELASTIC POSITION BETWEEN THAT OF PEKING AND NOSCOW (Apri l 1965 t o September 1966)

A. Hanoi Manipulates! t h e Concept of P recond i t ions For Negot ia t ions . (Apri l 1965) -- --.

Responding t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r e s s u r e f o r neggt i a - t i o n s , t h e North Vietnamese moved to fo rmal ize t h e i r posi- t ion , f i x i n g it i n a mold of p recond i t ions , which key l e a d e r s euphemis t i ca l ly c a l l e d "po in t s . 'I Ho Chi Minh p e r s o n a l l y set t h e mold i n response t o a ques t ion about "minimum c o n d i t ions1* f o r a s o l u t i o n :

To se t t le t h e South Vietnam querjltion, f i r s t of a l l t h e ULS. must withdraw from South Vietnam', let t h e South V i e t - namese people d e c i d e t h e i r own a f f a i r s themselves, and s t o p t h e i r provocat ive a t t a c k s a g a i n s t t h e DRV. The c a r r y i n g o u t of t h e s e b a s i c p o i n t s w i l l - b r i n g ZGiut f a v o r a b l e conZC€3Ziis f o r a con- f e r e n c e along t h e p a t t e r n of t h e 1954 Geneva conference . (emphasis supp l l ed ) ( In te rv iew wi th ~ o k ~ o Akahata r e p o r t e r , Takano, ' on 5 Apr i l , 1965)-'

C l e a r l y , t h i s set f o r t h aj p recond i t ion , namely, t h a t t h e U. S . must withdraw b e f o r e an i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference could be considered. Acting For i g n Min i s te r Thien t o l d t h e

i n e a r l y Apr i l t h a t "Unt i l t h e . American aggress ion ' lei! , t h e r e was nothing t o se t t le o r d i s c u s s ." This was s i b i l a r t o t h e hard p o s i t i o n set f o r t h by Mao i n January 1965 and r e f l e c t e d t h e s t i f f e n i n g which the North Vietnamese p o s i t i o n had acquired s i n c e t h a t time.

But t h i s fo rmula t ibn made Eio and h i s regime appear i n t r a n s i g e n t a t a t i m e when he was working t o a t t r a c t widespread in te rna t . iona1 irupport f o r h i s e f f o r t a g a i n s t

t h e South and t h e U . S . s t a n d t h e r e . The North Vietnamese a p p a r e n t l y decided t o in t roduce an element of f l e x i b i l i t y , inaemuch as t h e y be l i eved it would be d i p l o m a t i c a l l y s t u p i d t o i n s k s t on p r e c o n d i t i o n s e x p l i c i t l y a f t e r t h e 1 7 n e u t r a l n a t i o n s ( i n e a r l y Apr i l ) and P r e s i d e n t Johnson (on 7 A p r i l ) had c a l l e d f o r uncond i t iona l n e g o t i a t i o n s . Loosening t h e mold, Pham Van Dong, i n ' h i s speech of 8 Apr i l , r e p l y i n g t o P r e s i d e n t Johnson's address of 7 A p r i l , begged t h e e n t i r e -ques t i o n of e x p l i c i t p recond i t ions . That is, he was d e l i b e r a t e l y vague on . t h e import a n t m a t t e r of how and when n e g o t i a t i o n s could begin. He d e c l a r e d t h a t i f t h e s t a n d expounded i n t h e f o u r ' 'points" is "recognized" as t h e b a s i s f o r a s o l u t i o n , " favorab le c o n d i t i o n s w i l l be c r e a t e d f o r peacefu l s e t t l e m e n t of t h e Vietnamese problem and it w i l l be p o s s i b l e t o cons ide r reconvening an i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference on Vietq$m."* T h i s language was more t o r t u r e d t h a n Ho's and f o r good reason , a s it was in tended t o conceal a c o n t r a d i c t i o n . I t was in tended t o provide the ' North Vietnamese wi th a p r e t e x t f o r arguing t h a t , on t h e one hand, t h e y had not e s t a b l i s h e d a U . S , withdrawal i n f a c t a s a p recond i t ion , whi le i n s i s t i n g t h a t , on t h e o t h e r hand, be fore a conference ( o r b i l a t e r a l s ) t h e U.S. must s t a t e p u b l i c l y its pledge t o withdraw ( t h e t i m e and procedure of withdrawal be ing a mat te r f o r t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s ) .

A f t e r U,S. a i r s t r i k e s a g a i n s t t h e North became a more permanent p o l i c y i n A p r i l , t h e N o r t h Vietnamese had new evidence t h a t Washington would not make a p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t , p r i o r t o a conference , ag ree ing t o an even tua l m i l i t a r y d e p a r t u r e . They made it clear t h a t t h e y would engage i n no t a l k s b e f o r e ga in ing such a U.S. p u b l i c s t a t e - ment of s u r r e n d e r . The e x e r c i s e i n f l e x i b i l i t y , t h e r e f o r e , was p r i m a r i l y in tended t o s h i f t t h e blame f o r opposing uncondi t iona l n e g o t i a t i o n s from Hanoi ( t h e real r e c a l - c i t r a n t ) t o Washington ( t h e a l l e g e d r e c a l c i t r a n t ) i n t h e e y e s of Western and n e u t r a l l e a d e r s . Pham Van Dong

*The f o u r ' 'points" a r e r e p r i n t e d i n t h e annex of t h i s paper .

p e r s o n a l l y t r i e d t o c r e a t e t h e impression of s o b r i e t y and f l e x i b i l i t y i n t a l k i n g t b men whose goodwill was p o l i t i - c a l l y impor tant . For e x b p l e , i n mid-April, he t o l d Sihanouk l s l e f t i s t ~ r e n c h p r e s s adv i sor t h a t t h e cessa- t i o n of a i r s t r i k e s a g a i n l t t h e North was t h e on ly pre- c o n d i t i o n f o r negot ia t ions . Meyer , t h e p r e s s adv i sor ,

7 1 i n s i s t e d t o o t b e r s t h a t . Dong, had no t mentioned withdrawal of U. S . t roop9 as a negot i a t ions p recond i t ion .

The Chinese p r e f e r r e d Ho's fo rmula t ion of 5 Apr i l --namely, t h a t t h e U.S. must "ca r ry out1* a withdrawal-- t o Dong's fo rmula t ion o f , 8 April--namely, t h a t t h e U.S. must pub1 i c l y **recognizev' t h e need t o withdraw--pr i o r t o t h e p o s s i b l e convening of a conference on Vietnam. Ho's fo rmula t ion was s i m i l a r t o t h e L i b e r a t i o n F r o n t ' s demand of 22 March c a l l i n g f o r a U.S. pul l -ou t p r i o r t o negot ia- t i o n s . Speaking t o t h e ambassador of a n e u t r a l n a t i o n i n Peking i n mid-April, Chou En- la i mentioned o n l y t h e F r o n t ' s demand and Ho's fo rmula t ion of t h e 5 t h i n speak- i n g of t h e l tpos i t ions setl f o r t h recent ly1 ' by t h e Vietnamese and d i d not r e f e r t o Dong's formulat ion. The Chinese l e a d e r s were aware t h a t a l though Hanoi d i d n o t , a t t h a t t ime, envisage a ~0nf tm3dc0 , t h e DRV p o s i t i o n was t o main- t a i n a w i l l i n g n e s s t o atdend a conference i n t h e fu tu re - t h a t is, t o accept t h e p r i n c i p l e of a conference provided t h a t t h e U.S. would p u b l f c l y agree t o retire (as t h e French had i n 1954) . Accordingly, Chinese commentaries i n A p r i l omi t t ed , on occas ion b u t ;not always, t h e r e f e r e n c e s which b o t h Ho and Dong had made t o t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a f u t u r e conference on Vietnam, t h e i m p l i c a t i o n being t h a t Peking d e s i r e d a t o t a l U.S. m i l i t a r y d e f e a t r a t h e r t h a n a n e g o t i a t e d w i t h d r a w a l ~ o m e s t a g e lpr ior t o such a d e f e a t . Chou En- la i ' s cho ice of words ,on s e v e r a l occas ions r e f l e c t e d h i s dieagreement with

I I al though Chou endorsed Phlam Van Dong's formulat ion of f o u r "po ln te , he omitted:, s i g n i f i c&t ly , Dong's s t a t e - ment t h a t American r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e s e a s a b a s i s could open t h e door t o negot ia t ; ions . By c o n t r a s t , t h e North

Vietnamese continued t o go beyond t h e f o u r "points" p a r t of Dongqs fo rmula t ion t o t h e " recogn i t ionu p a r t of it (Nhan Dan e d i t o r i a l of 20 Apr i l and Pham Van Dong i n t e r - v i e w w i t h t h e Hungarian news agency, c a r r i e d by VNA on t h e 2 0 t h ) .

B. Chinese Sabotage Prospec t ive Conference on Cambodia (Apr i l 1965)

Chouqa a t t a c k s on t h e i d e a of n e g o t i a t i o n s p r i o r t o withdrawal had capped a month of Chinese Communist maneuvering t o sabotage any p r o s p e c t s f o r holding an in- t e r n a t i o n a l conference on Cambodia, a t which a Vietnam s e t t l e m e n t could be i n i t i a l l y d i scussed . The Chinese wrecking e f f o r t was important because t h e Sov ie t - insp i red i d e a of such a conference was not a t t acked by Hanoi. On 3 A p r i l , Moscow had proposed a Cambodian conference and by 1 0 A p r i l Gromyko had s t a t e d t h a t Mosbow $8 proposal was a s e r l o u s one. S h o r t l y a f t e rward , Gromyko t o l d t h e French ambassador t h a t it was ''now" d e s i r a b l e f o r Moscow and P a r i s t o d i s - c u s s *'a meeting o r meetings on Cambodia and perhaps Laos." A t t h e same t i m e 1 1

such a conrerence would provide the [oppor tunizy l o r t a l K s l o n Vietnam. More impor tan t ly , on 1 7 A p r i l , d u r i n g h i s four-day v i s i t t o Moscow, L e Duan agreed t o t h e fo l lowing wording i n t h e j o i n t USSR-DRV communique: "it would be u s e f u l t o convene t h e r e l e v a n t i n t e r n a t i o n a l conferencesv t o s o l v e t h e problems of Laos and Cambodia. In a p r i v a t e conversa t ion wi th American newsmen on 22 Apr i l i n Washington, Ambassador Dobrynin s t a t e d t h a t the proposed conference on Cambodia was t h e "only p o s s i b i l i t y nuw a v a i l a b l e f o r any s o r t of t a l k s t t and went on t o suggest t h a t such a conference might pro- v i d e t h e o ~ w o r t u n i t ~ f o r "cor r idor t a l k s v about Vietman.

i n reKlng naa z o l a 1 1 1 as a r e s u l t of the IhxrmCV ais I - CUS-

' s ions , t h o n o r t h Vietnamese had adopted a more f l e x i b l e p o s i t i o n on n e g o t i a t i o n s . He s t a t e d t h a t Hanoi would f o r e g o s t i p u l a t i n g t h e evacua t ion of American f o r c e s a s

a p r e c o n d i t i o n and would agree t o beg in t a l k s on t h e b a s i s of t h e " a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e Geneva agreements and a f t e r t h e c e s s a t i o n of American bombing of t h e DRV." On 26 A p r i l , Sov ie t deputy f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r Zimyanin t o l d t h e B r i t i s h ambassador t h a t he recognized t h e need f o r e a r l y a c t i o n on a co-chairmen message regard ing t h e Cam- bodian conference .

. . But Sov ie t enthusiasm began t o wane i n l a t e Apr i l .

I n his t a l k s wi th t h e French, Gromgko i n d i c a t e d t h a t Mos- cow cont inued t o look favorab ly on a Cambodian confer- e n c e , bu t he d i d no t o f f e r any f u r t h e r e l a b o r a t i o n and i n s i s t e d t h a t a c e s s a t i o n of American a i r s t r i k e s was a p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r a conference on Vietnam. The j o i n t Soviet-French communique of 29 Apr i l merely noted t h e agreement of Washington and London t o hold a conference on Cambodia and s t a t e d t h a t Moscow and P a r i s had e a r l i e r advocated such a conference , but t h e o n l y way t o s o l v e t h e problems of Indochina was s a i d t o be a r e t u r n t o t h e Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962, which s p e c i f i e d t h e " i m p e r m i s s i b i l i t y of f o r e i g n i n t e r f e rencem i n t h e domestic a f f a i r s o f Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

The Chinese had played a major r o l e i n wrecking t h e pcospects f o r a conference . I n mid-April, Chou had t o l d Sihanouk t h a t such a conference would be p o i n t l e s s and t h a t Peking would nbt agree t o n e g o t i a t e wi thout pre- c o n d i t i o n s on Vietnam. ' H i s j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r P e k i n g Q s hard l i n e was: t h e U . S . shows p o l i t i c a l (not m i l i t a r y ) weakness, p a r t i c u l a r l y aegard ing p r e s s u r e from Western c o u n t r i e s t o end t h e war, and t h i s weakness m u s t be ex- p l o i t e d t o t h e maximum by main ta in ing an i n t r a n s i g e n t posi- t i o n i n upholding DRV c o n d i t i o n s f o r a s e t t l e m e n t . On 20 Apr 11, Chinese o f f ic iale were i n d i c a t i n g

La n t h a t Peking o b j e c t e d t o t h e i d e a o a con e r e n c e t a t e t a l k s on Vietnam. On 22 Apr i l , t h e Cambodians

i n d i c a t e d t o t t h a t Cambodia would now i n e i az a b ~ n e v a conrerence sno?ld d i s c u s s o n l y Cambodian m a t t e r s . F i n a l l y , S ihanoukas speech of 24' Apr i l r e f l e c t e d t h e i n t e n s i v e - e f f o r t s of ~ h o u En- la i and Chen Y i t o sabotage . t h e whole i d e a by convincing t h e Cambodian l e a d e r t h a t n e g o t i a t i o n s were unnecessary.

t h e Chinese l e a d e r s had t o l d two y e a r s t h e s i t u a t i o n i n Sou th ,

Vietnam would permit t h e V i e t Cong t o b r i n g about a set- t lement on t h e i r "own" terms. It was a tr iumphant and c y n i c a l Chou who d e c l a r e d p u b l i c l y on 29 A p r i l t h a t Sihanouk's s t a t e m e n t s of t h e 23rd and 24th--namely, t h a t a Cambodian conference could not be used t o d i s c u s s t h e Vietnam iesue--were f u l l y suppor ted by t h e Chinese government. And t o make t h e p r o s p e c t s f o r an i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference even more remote, Chou s t a t e d p u b l i c l y on 29 A p r i l what he had a l r e a d y d e c l a r e d p r i v a t e l y t o Sihanouk i n mid-April: "The Chinese Government ho lds t h a t at any i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference on t h e Indochina ques t ion , o n l y t h e L i b e r a t i o n Front can r e p r e s e n t t h e South Vietnamese peop le , no t t h e Saigon puppet regime by any means." T h i s was i n accord w i t h a s t a t e m e n t made by a North Vietnamese l i a i s o n o f f i c i a l t o Western d iplomats i n Hanoi on 24 March 1965, namely, t h a t any n e g o t i a t i o n s would have t o be between t h e L i b e r a t i o n Front and t h e U.S. a s t h e " p a r t i e s d i r e c t l y involved. l1 North Vietnamese ambassadors i n Apr i l began t o d i s semina te t h i s l i n e , s t a t i n g t h a t no f a v o r a b l e answer t o American peace i n i t i a t i v e s would be forthooming u n t i l Washington agreed t o accept t h e Front a s an e q u a l "par tner" i n n e g o t i a t i o n s . F ina l ly , on 5 May, Hanoi made its f i r s t comment s i n c e t h e 17 Apri l Sovie t - Vietnamese communique on a Cambodian conference and i n e f f e c t r u l e d o u t d i s c u s s i o n on Vietnam a t t h e conference . By l a t e May 1965, t h e S o v i e t s were r e p o r t e d as be ing complete ly d isenchanted w i t h t h e p r o s p e c t s of us ing t h e Cambodians a s a v e h i c l e f o r o r g a n i z i n g a conference on Vietnam,

I

Obviously, t h e people who o b j e c t e d were t h e North Vietnamese ( u n t i l Washington made a p u b l i c pledge ' t o withdraw) and t h e Chinese ( u n t i l U.S. f o r c e s were d e f e a t e d i n t h e f i e l d and were f o r c e d t o withdraw) .

C. Moscow Reduced t o Wait inn f o r I n i t i a t i v e from -

Hanoi During May 1965 and January 1966 A i r - -- S t r i k e Suspensions

1. May 1965*

Confronted by t h e hard Qanoi p o s i t i o n and t h e even ha rder Peking p o s i t i o n , t h e S o v l e t s were unwi l l ing t o p r e s e t h e North Vietnamese t o moderate t h e i r s t a n d , aware t h a t i f t h e y d i d s o they would be exposing themselves t o an a t t a c k from t h e Chinese along t h e l i n e s of "phoney1* S o v i e t suppor t . The North Vietnamese d i d no t d i scourage t h e S o v i e t s i n t h e i r l i n e t h a t c e s s a t i o n of a i r s t r i k e s a g a i n s t t h e North was a p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r n e g o t i a t i o n s and t h e y a p p a r e n t l y acquiegced i n t h e Sovxet e f f o r t t o c r e a t e t h e impression t h a t Hanoi might n e g o t i a t e fo l lowing a suspension. However, t d e North Vietnamese d i d no t commit themselves , .tnor d i d t h e ,Russians commit them, t o t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t c e s s a t ion was t h e o n l y p recond i t ion . -

Desp i te hhe remoae p rospec t f o r n e g o t i a t i o n s i f a suspension were t o t a k e p l a c e , t h e Chinese suspec ted t h a t t h e S o v i e t s had had t a c i t approval from t h e North Vietnamese t o p r e s s f o r suspension and i n d i r e c t l y c r i t i - c i z e d Hanoi f o r a l lowing Moecow leeway t o p r e s s forward a long t h i s l i n e . Peking i n d i r e c t l y warned Hanoi and c r i t i c i z e d Moscow a s fo l lows : "To agree t o e n t e r i n t o n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r a s e t t l e m e n t of t h e Vietnam i s s u e on t h e c o n d i t i o n t h a t t h e U.S. s t o p s bombing North Vietnam is tantamount t o admi t t ing t h a t t h e p i r a t i c a l bombing of t h e North is p e r f e c t l y j u s t i f i e d and t h a t t h e people i n North Vietnam a r e t o t a l l y wrong i n s u p p o r t i n g t h e i r f e l l o w countrymen i n t h e South ... Would anyone w i t h n a t i o n a l self- r e s p e c t , would any sovere ign s t a t e . . . e v e r t h i n k of accep t ing

" '-The May 198s s u s p ~ s f o n w a s maintained from t h e 1 2 t h through t h e 1 8 t h .

such monstrously h u m i l i a t i n g condi t ions?" (People 's Da i ly commentary of 1 2 May) Hanoi i m p l i c i t l y '(on 16 May) a n d e x p l i c i t l y (on 18 May) c a l l e d t h e c e s s a t i o n a t r i c k t o dece ive i n t e r n a t i o n a l op in ion , and t h e Fore ign Min i s t ry s t a tement on. t h e 1 8 t h repea ted t h a t t h e f o u r "points" were t h e b a s i s f o r a s e t t l e m e n t . But p r i v a t o l y , on 18 May, t h e DRV r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . i n P a r i s ac ted wi th speed t o impress t h e French wi th Hanoi 's f l e x i b i l i t y . He s t a t e d t h a t r e c o g n i t i a n of t h e f o u r "pointsw would "open" t h e p o s s i b i l i t y f o r convenipg a Geneva conference and t h a t i f t h e r e were agreement on t h e p o i n t s , t h e "ways and means" of applying t h e p r i n c i p l e s of Hanoi's p o s i t i o n would be found, and i n a- peacefu l manner. In s h o r t , Hanoi had i n s t r u c t e d its r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o s u s t a i n t h e image of r easonab leness wi th t h e French.

Desp i t e h i n t s t h a t a suspension of a i r s t r i k e s a g a i n s t t h e North might open t h e way f o r n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h Hanoi, t h e Sov ie t l e a d e r s , fo l lowing t h e suspension of a i r s t r i k e s i n mid-May 1965, p r i v a t e l y complained t h a t t h e i r hands were t i e d . That is, t h e y were unwi l l ing t o argue w i t h t h e North Vietnamese about t h e need f o r begin- n i n g d i s c u s s i o n s . For example, j u s t be fo re t h e suspension s t a r t e d on 1 2 May 1965, p o l i t b u r o member She lep in t o l d s e v e r a l Western d iplomats i n Moscow t h a t n e g o t i a t i o n s were imposs ible as long a s U. S. a i r s t r i k e s cont inued. But a f t e r Peking f i r s t and t h e n Hanoi had denounced t h e suspens ion , t h e Sovie t l e a d e r s i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e y would no t t a k e t h e s t e p of p r e s s i n g f o r a f a v o r a b l e response from Hanoi a t t h e c o s t of l o s i n g i n f l u e n c e wi th t h e North Vietnamese.* On 28 May, a Sov ie t United Nat ions o f f i c i a l

- *But t h e ChTnese l e a d e r s kep t up t h e p r e s s u r e on t h e

Russ ians f o r having implied t h a t an a i r s t r i k e suspension might l e a d t o n e g o t i a t i o n s . For example, t h e Peking Foreign Min i s t ry s t a tement of 21 May denounced "some peo- p l e " who "do no t demandw an American withdrawal bu t merely a s k t h e U.S. " t o s t o p bombing t h e DRV." The Sov ie t - Indian communique of 1 9 Way, which c a l l e d f o r an end t o t h e bombing of t h e North, had exposed t h e S o v i e t f l a n k t o such Chinese criticism, which f o r c e d t h e Russ ians t o r e t r e a t .

s t a t e d t h a t a s u s p e n s i o n of a i r s t r i k e s f o r I* j u s t a f e w days" was i n s u f f i c i e n t , f p r s t a r t i n g n e g o t i a t i o n s , and Premier Kosygin i n l a t e June responded with c o n s i d e r a b l e p ique t o t h e s u g g e s t i o n of I t a l i a n o f f i c i a l s t h a t Wash- ing ton was w i l l i n g t o n e g o t i a t e , d e c l a r i n g t h a t t h e S o v i e t s would no t n e g o t i a t e and t h a t t h e y had no mandate from t h e North Vietnamese t o do so. Kosygin argued t h a t Moscow suppor ted Hanoi ' s f o u r **points" and t h a t t h e U. S . , the re - f o r e , should withdraw, a s t h e r e was nothing t o n e g o t i a t e . In e a r l y August, Yugoslav o f f i c i a l s s t a t e d p r i v a t e l y t h a t d u r i n g T i t o ' s v i s i t t o Moscow, they were t o l d by t h e S o v i e t s t h a t t h e USSR was not i n a p o s i t i o n t o i n f l u e n c e t h e DRV on t h e m a t t e r of n e a o t i a t i o n s . A t about t h e same t i m e . - - - . s t a t e d t h a t Moscow was i m - :elled t o wa i t f o r P e k i n ~ o r a n o i t o make t h e first move toward n e g o t i a t i o n s and t h a t even i f another country were t o recommend a Geneva conference , t h e USSR would not sup- p o r t it u n t i l t h e Chinese and North Vietnamese i n d i c a t e d a w i l l i n g n e s s t o p a r t i c i p a t e . Kosygin, i n a conversa t ion

i n mid-October, i n s i s t e d t on t o h i n t a t t h e

North Vietnamese p o s i t i o n : " i f t h i s t a k e s p l a c e through n e g o t i a t i o n s , t h a t is dependent on ly upon t h e Government of North Vietnam. ** (emphasis supp l ied) The S o v i e t s cont inued t o i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e y would not budge and, indeed, could not,budge t h e North Vietnamese from t h e i r p o s i t i o n t h a t a suspension of a i r s t r i k e s was no t t h e on ly p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r n e g o t i a t i o n s , inasmuch as t h e main one w a s t h e demand t h a t Washington p u b l i c l y d e c l a r e a d e c i s i o n t o withdraw.* They i n s i e t e d t h a t t h e y had no i n i t i a t i v e .

- * T h e e i n d i c a t e d t h e c r u c i a l importance t h e y ass igned t o an American pledge t o withdraw. "In o r d e r t o e t r i k e back a t t h e U.S. Government's words and a c t i o n s , t h e Government of t h e DRV has a l r e a d y put forward its w e l l - known four -po in t s t and . Of t h e s e , t h e first two a r e t h e most impor tant . The f i re t f i i t h d r a w a l 7 ia a d e c i s i v e p o i n t , bu t t h e second is a l s o ve ry imEortant. The U.9. i m p e r i a l i s t s t h i n k t h a t o n l y by c a r r y i n g o u t t h e second p o i n t (making a i r r a i d s a g a i n s t t h e North) t h e y w i l l be a b l e t o c u r b t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y movement i n t h e South..." (Hoc -- Tap article of September 1965) (emphasis supp l ied)

Thus i n l a t e November, Gromyko t o l d Senator Mansfield t h a t t h e Russ ians "have n o t been au thor ized t o n e g o t i a t e on t h i s 'ques t ion" and i n e a r l y December, he was r e p o r t e d t o have r e i t e r a t e d t h i s p o s i t i o n t o Fore ign S e c r e t a r y S tewar t i n Moscow.

During and a f t e r t h e mid-May 1965 suspens ion of a i r s t r i k e s , Hanoi cont inued t o manipula te t h e concept of p r e c o n d i t i o n s f o r n e g o t i a t i o n s t o s u s t a i n an impress ion of r easonab leness and, a t t h e same t ime , demand a U . S . p u b l i c pledge t o withdraw. As noted above, on 18 May the DRV r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n P a r i s had c a l l e d f o r recogni- t i o n by Washington of t h e p r i n c i p l e s embodied i n : the f o u r "points" a p p a r e n t l y t o c o u n t e r t h e impress ion c r e a t e d bv t h e suspens ion t h a t t h e North Vietnamese were t h e r e a l r e c a l c i t r a n t s on t h e i s s u e and t o l e a v e open t h e door t o n e g o t i a t i o n s . H e had avoided u s i n g t h e word "precondi- t ion'L-a p r a c t i c e which marked Hanoi s t rea tmen t of its p o s i t i o n . In l a t e May, t h e DRV Fore ign Min i s t e r r e f u s e d t o s ~ e c i f v I- 1 whether t h e - - - - - - -~ -

f o u r - lvpo ih tk - were p r e c o n a l t ions o r u l t i m a h g o a l s f o r a f i n a l s e t t l e m e n t af ons had s t a r t e d ; i n l a t e

was r e p o r t e d t o have t o l d t h a t Washington was m i s - i n t e f o r negot ia t ions because Hanoi was no t mqking withdrawal a "precondit ion1' f o r n e g o t i a t i o n s , b u t r a t h e r a "commitment l' f o r a p u l l o u t ; i n e a r l y September t h e L i b e r a t i o n Fron t r e p r e s e n t a i v e i n Cambodia t o l d pro-Soviet j o u r n a l i s t Burche t t t h a t F ron t l e a d e r s were prepared t o d i s c u s s t h e m o d a l i t i e s of a m i l i t a r y withdrawal wi th r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e U. S . Gov- - .

ern~nent : A more d e t a i l e d p r e s e n t a t ion of Hanoi ' s p o s i t i o n

I In p r i n c i p l e , were w i l l i n n t o n e a o t i a t e .

buz ~ n e i were adamant t h a t American t r o o p s woulg have t o l e a v e Vietnam al though t h e y were no t i n s i s t i n g on a d e f i n i t e t ime- tab le f o r withdrawal, which could be e f f e c t e d d u r i n g o r a f t e r n e g o t i a t i o n s . He mainta ined p o s i t i v e l y t h a t t h e North would no t n e g o t i a t e u n l e s s t h e y could be s u r e of a f i n a l American withdrawal. He mainta ined t h a t t h e "4 p o i n t programme" muat be accep ted i n p r i n c i p l e as a b a s i s f o r n e g o t i a t i o n s , and claimed t h a t Pham Van Dong .

himself had t o l d him t h a t t h e Vietnamer~e would accept "as a b a s i s w a s t h e ope ra t i ve phase, and no t t h e acceptance of t h e 4 p o i n t s as precondi t ions . (The Libe ra t i on Fron t would have t o be represen ted a t a conference.)* I n e a r l y December t h e DRY r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n P a r i s t o l d a French o f f i c i a l t h a t Dong's f o u r "po in t sw were no t p recondi t ions , but merely t h e "basis" f o r d i scuse ions .

A major considernbion i n Hanoi's e f f o r t t o advance t h i s l i n e was t o commit Washington t o a s ta tement of su r r ende r without exp1ic : i t ly aay ing t h a t such a s ta tement i n f a c t was tantamount t o su r r ende r . Euphemistic language was used; t h e North Vietnamese demanded a "surrendert ' no t i n words, but i n f a c t . They c e l l e d f o r Washington t o *'recognizew o r '*acceptw t h e f o u r flpointsfl and, fo l lowing t h e American i npu t s i n i u l y 1965, t hey more f r equen t l y than ever before demande,d t h a t Washington "carry out" o r show by "ac tua l deeds*' t h a t it recognizes t he se points ." For example, Ho himself s ides tepped a r e p o r t e r s ' r eques t t o name t h e "pre requ is i t e s* ' f o r nego t i a t i ons , r ep ly ing t h a t t h e "most c o r r e c t do lu t ionw l a y i n implementation o f t h e Geneva agreements and t h e "carrying out" by t h e U. S. of t h e f o u r 'vpointtqt* and t h e f ive-point program of t h e L ibe r a t i on Fron t . (VNA's 2 September 1965 ve r s ion of Hots in te rv iew with Neues Deutschland correspondent) A Japanese r e p o r t e r w a s F I n e a r l y October by Pham Van Dong t h a t t h e U.S. government "must solemnly dec l a r e its acceptance" of t h e four "points" be fore a p o l i t i c a l s e t t l emen t could be considered . Locked i n t o t h i s p o s i t ion of demanding a d e c l a r a t i o n o f su r r ende r , t h e North V i e t - namese su s t a ined t h e i r adamancy i n t o December 1965, when

*In lineTFX€K-XZndi'% p r i v a t e s t a tements t h a t t h e t i m - ing of an American withdrawal could be t h e primary mat te r l e f t f o r nego t i a t i ons , t h e DRV Foreign Min is t ry ' s memorandum of its p o s i t ion ( re leased on 23 September 1965) d i d not d e p i c t withdrawal a s an Immediate p r e r e q u i s i t e . ( I t d i d i n s i s t , however, t h a t t h e r e cannot be "any negotia- t ions" on t h e South Vietnam i s s u e without t h e L ibe r a t i on Fr'ont "having its deci8:ve say.")

a new and longer suspension .of a i r s t r i k e s i n d i c a t e d t h a t Washington was determined t o i n c r e a s e p ressure on Hanoi t o make a concession--i .e . , t o agree t o n e g o t i a t e . Hanoi was aga in provided wi th an o p p o r t u n i t y t o g a i n a permanent suspension and t o demonst ra te t h a t complete conquest of t h e South was a goal t h a t could be set a s i d e and rep laced by acceptance of a h a l f -way s t a t ion--1. e . , consol i d a t ion of t h e North a lone .

2. December 1965 t o January 1966*

The S o v i e t l e a d e r s cont inued t o s t a t e p r i v a t e l y t h a t a suspension of a i r s t r i k e s was necossary f o r any i n t e r n a t i o n a l n e g o t i a t i o n s , b u t were st ill not i n a pos i- t i o n t o guarantee a p o s i t i v o response from t h e North V i e t - namese. When, i n mid-December 1965, Ambassador Dobrynin spoke wi th Ilarriman, he s t a t e d t h a t Moscow be l i eved t h e c e s s a t i o n of bombing f o r a long enough (not def ined) pe r iod might l e a d t o n e g o t i a t i o n s and implied t h a t t h e S o v i e t s wourd encourage t h e North Vietnamese. S i g n i f i c a n t l y , he avoided be ing s p e c i f i c about t h o p r e c i s e a c t i o n t h e S o v i e t s would t a k e and what made t h e m b e l i e v e t h a t Hanoi would respond c o n s t r u c t i v e l y . Higher-level , Sov ie t o f f i c i a l s p r i v a t e l y i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h o i r hands wore t i e d again--that is, ( j u s t a s i n May 1965) t h a t they would not apply pres- s u r e f o r n e a o t i a t i o n s on t h e North Vietnamese. Thus on 1 January 1566, Sov ie t deputy f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r Fi rpubin made it c l e a r t o c e r t a i n Asian diplomats i n Moscow t h a t t h e S o v i e t government would do nothing. He s a i d t h a t Moscow had not been au thor ized by Hanoi t o c a r r y on any n e g o t i a t i o n s wi th t h e U.S .. and t h a t the Sovie t government would no t do anything wi thout t h e consen t , agreement, and i n s t r u c t i o n s of Hanoi. He took a hard l i n e on Wash- i n g t o n ' s 14-point proposal,'** s a y i n g t h a t it was an

- *The second a i r s t r i k e suspension .was maintained from

24 December 1985 t o 31 January 1966.

**The 14-point p o s i t i o n of t h e U. S. is p r i n t e d i n t h e annex of t h i s paper.

nultimatum.w F i n a l l y , hg d e c l a r e d t h a t "we have not r e c e i v e d any r e s ~ b n s e . r e a c t ion. o r i n s t r u c t . i o n s from Vietnam yet:" x & ~ ~ ~ I ~ took an e q u a l l y n o n 6 n m i t t a l l i n e

I 1 i n Tashkent on 5 ana -crlea ZO ina x a t e that ' MOSCOW had nopdesi re

t o p r e s s t h e North Vietnamese, l e a v i n g t h a t t o Washington. H e s t a t e d t h a t Hanoi had t o be e a t i e f h d t h a t t h e U.S. genuinely d e s i r e d peace and t h a t f o r t h i s t o be accomplished, " the American a u t h o r i t i e b " should e s t a b l i e h a d i r e c t l i n e of communications wi th Hanoi. That is. Kosygin had no real i n i t i a t i v e i n t h e matter, nor d i d h i s Sov ie t co l l eagues . TASS i n d i r e c t l y r e v e a l e d t h i s p u b l i c l y when, i n its 21 January account of Japanese Fore ign Min i s te r S h i i n a ' s p r e s s conference , it noted t h a t S h i i n a quoted Kosygin a s having s a i d t h a t " t h e : S o v i e t s i d e n a t u r a l l y cannot 'mediate ' i n any way i n t h i s c o n f l i c t ."

The North Vietnamese responded t o t h e suspension and t h e American 14-point propoeal by r a i s i n g a new and more p r e c i s e s t i p u l a t i o n ] o n a i r s t r i k e s and a new p u b l i c emphasis t h a t Washington negot l a t e wi th t h e L i b e r a t i o n Front . That is, t h e y reeponded w i t h greater admancy than i n May 1965.

Ho p e r e o n a l l y hardened t h e North Vietnamese posi- t i o n t o a new degree of i n t r a n s i g e n c e by demanding not o n l y t h a t Washington wrecognize's t h e f o u r "po in t su and " r e a l l y prove it by concwete deeds, bu t , i n a d d i t i q n , "complete1.y end its bombing^ and a l l a c t s of war a a a i n e t t h e DRV. I T h i s was t h b f l re t s i g n t h a t t h e North Vietnamese l e a d e r s ' were working o u t a ha rder p o s i t i o n by adding a new detai l and a new emphasis t o P o i n t One: "The U S government must completely and uncondi t iona l ly end its bombings and a l l a c t 8 of war againe t t h e i R V 7 T 7 u n d e r l i n i i d d i a a t e s new phrase) As t h e North Viednamese l e a d e r e d e l i b e r a t e d dur ing t h e bombing pause, t h e y decided on y e t ano ther e t i p u l a - tion--namely, t h a t t h e U.S. must n e g o t i a t e wi th t h e Lib- e r a t i o n Front . The c o m p b t e r e v i s e d and hardened posi- t i o n was set f o r t h i n Hoqa let ter t o heade of s t a t e of 24 January 1966:

If t h e U.S. r e a l l y wants peace, it m u s t r ecogn ize t h e L i b e r a t i o n Fron t a s t h e s o l e genuine r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e peop le of South Vietnam and engage i n nego t i a - t i o n s w i t h i t . . . . I f the-U;-ernment r e a l l y w i n f s a p e a c e f u l s e t t l e m e n t , it must accep t t h e four-point s t a n d of t h e DRV government and prove t h i s by a c t u a l deeds; it must end u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y and -- f o r e v e r a l l bombing r a i d s and o t h e r war i Z t s a g a i n s i i h e D B V . e D B V . - T m p has is s u p p l i ed )

T h i s became t h e new b a s i s , beyond t h e 8 A p r i l 1965 f o u r points. , f o r a f i n a l s e t t l e m e n t . I However, it d i d not r u l e o u t t h e s t a r t of n e g x a m i f t h e U.S. were t o make a p u b l i c dec la ra t ion-€5TF€fSraw and a c t u a l l y begin one phase of t h a t withdrawal p rocess .

By i n s i s t i n g on an "uncondit i o n a l w suspension of a i r s t r i k e s , t h e North Vietnamese clear1 y in tended t o e x t r i c a t e themselves from deep p o l it i c a l embarrassment i n c u r r e d d u r i n g t h e December-January suspens ion and t o n e u t r a l i z e t h i s e f f e c t i v e American p o l i t i c a l weaponr by f r a n t i c a l l v i n s i s t i n n t h a t bombing-cessat i o n was n o t a - bargaining- coun te r . The North ~i&,namese took t h i s pos i - t i o n l - 1 when[ I - . ] i n e a r l y June 1966, t h e DRV ambassa I (ana n l s c n l n e s e co l l eague) s t a t e d t h a t i f t h e U.S . s topped bombing t h e North, it would no t be enough t o b r i n g about n e g o t i a t i o n s .a Only Washington's acceptance of t h e f o u r

"points" could l e a d t a i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i scuss ion . And p u b l i c l y , a commentary i n Quan Doi Nhan Dan of 1 9 J u l y 1966 s t a t e d t h a t Hano& wouY37iaEiFno lvconcess ions1* a s t h e p r i c e f o r ending t h e a i r s t r i k e s .

While t h e North Vietnamese kept t h e door of negot ia- t i o n s open i n t h e even t t h a t Washington a t some f u t u r e d a t e would d e c l a r e a w i l l i n g n e s s t o withdraw, t h e Chinese t r i e d t o c l o s e t h e dour and prevent such a f u t u r e development. The Chinese were c l e a r l y p leased wi th Hops let ter t o heads of s tate of 24 January 1966 i n d i c a t i n g Hanoi's r e j e c t i o n of n e g o t i a t i o n s i n t h e wake of t h e bombing suspension. But t h e y were a l e r t t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e North Vietnamese had no t m a d e a c t u a l withdrawal of U.S. f o r c e s a p recond i t ion f o r the* beginning of n e g o t i a t i o n s and t h a t t h e S o v i e t s would w e l c o m e a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference . That a Geneva conference of t h e Geneva-agreement c o u n t r i e s was always a p o l i t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y was a f a c t t h a t con- s t a n t l y t r o u b l e d t h e Chinese and when, on 7 J u l y 1966, Prime M i n i s t e r Ghandi proposed t h a t t h e conference be re- convened, t h e Chinese a g a i n s t r e s s e d t r o o p withdrawal as a precond i t ion . Chou k n - l a i moved q u i c k l y t o s t a t e t h a t M r s . Ghandi 's proposal is designed t o "sap t h e f i g h t i n g w i l l of t h e Vietnamese, people ," adding t h a t "unless American t r o o p s a r e withdrawn, t h e reconvening of t h e Geneva conference is e n t i r e l y ou t of t h e ques t ion." (Speech at t h e Afro-As$an writers meeting on 9 J u l y 1966) And when, on 1 6 J u l y , t h e S o v i e t and Indian l e a d e r s d e c l a r e d i n t h e i r j o i n t communique i n Moscow t h a t a i r - s t r i k e s must be ended and t h a t a s o l u t i o n could be found "only w i t h i n t h e framework of t h e Geneva agreements," t h e Chinese s t r o n g l y emphasized t h e i r l ine-on t h e ia- v a l i d i t y of t h e s e agreements. They "were l o n g ago t o r n t o shreds* ' by t h e U.S.' (People 's Dai ly a r t i c l e of 18 . J u l y ) .

The Chinese b locking e f f o r t - - t h a t is, t h e move t o c l o s e t h e door on any f u t u r e n e g o t i a t i o n s r e g a r d i n g V i e t - nam--was r a t i o n a l i z e d p u b l i c l y a s fo l lows:

The A 6 J u l y soviet-1ndian7 communique ,

s t a t & t h a t t h e j bombing 03 t h e DRV should be s topped immegiately and t h a t t h e so lu - t i o n of t h e problem of Vietnam can o n l y

be found w i th in t h e framework of t h e 1954 Geneva agreements on Indochina. As every- one knows, t h e c o r e of t h e Vietnam ques- t i o n a t p r e sen t is abso lu t e ly not a matter of merely s t opp ing t h e bombing of t h e DRV. To l a y onesided stress on t h e s t opp ing of bombing is p r e c i s e l y t o cater t o t h e needs of t h e US i m p e r i a l i s t po l i cy of blackmail . The purpose of t h e American bombing of no r the rn Vietnam is to make people beg it t o show mercy, beg it t o s t o p t h e bombing, and accept its terms f o r su r r ende r . One is t r y i n g to "force peace talks through bombing, " while t h e o t h e r is say ing t h a t peace t a l k s 'can be he ld once bombing i s stopped. Th is is a p u b l i c performance of a due t w i t h U. S. lmper i a l i s m , . . . It must be po in ted o u t t h a t U.S. imper ia l - i s m long ago t o r e t h e Geneva agreements t o sh reds . . . . In bombing nor thern Vietnam, moreover, the U.S. had completely broken t h e l i n e of demarcation between sou the rn and no r the rn Vietnam. Now t h e US bombing of t h e DRV c a p i t a l s p e l l s t h e f i n a l b u r i a l of t h e Geneva agreements and t h e total l i q u i d a t i o n of all t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s and l i m i t a t i o n s l a i d down i n t h e Geneva agreements. I n t h e s e c i rcumstances , whoever still a t t empte t o use the Geneva agreement8 t o t i e t h e hands of t h e Vietnamese people, t h e Chinese people, and t h e r evo lu t i ona ry people of t h e world w i l l never succeed. (Tao Chu speech of 22 Ju ly )

That a f u t u r e conference was t h e bone t h a t s t u c k i n t h e t h r o a t of t h e Chinese l e a d e r s was s t r o n g l y suggested by the fo l lowing s ta tement : "The Chinese people have always he ld t h a t a conference table can - never b r i n g the oppressed n a t i o n s a new world of independence and freedom. l t (People 's Da i ly e d i t o r i a l o f 24 July) (emphasis supp l ied) By con- =, t h e North Vietnamese cont inued t o de sc r i be t h e

Geneva agreements as st ill v a l i d and ope ra t i ve , l eav ing room f o r maneuvering toward a pos s ib l e conference i n t h e fu tu r e . * Hots s t resa (letter t o heads of s t a t e on 24 January 1966) on t h e ' e n d of a i r s t r i k e s was no t dup l ica ted by t h e Chinese l e ade r s , who, again by c o n t r a s t , concen- t r a t e d more on t h e matter of Immediate withdrawal of U.S. f o r c e s . For example, i n a 19 May in te rv iew with a Reuters r e p o r t e r , Chen Y i s t a t e d t h a t China would never t ake t h e i n i t i a t i v e t o sponso t nego t i a t i ons f o r a s e t t l emen t unless two cond i t i ons were u l f i l l e d : t h e "complete withdrawal"

k S o u t h and U. S. r ecogn i t i on of American f o r c e s f o m of t h e Fron t a s t h e s o l e sou thern r ep re sen t a t i ve . In t h i s way, t h e Chinese l e a d e r s went beyond Banoi 's demand f o r a U.S. d e c l a r a t i o n on withdrawal t o demand a "com- p l e t e " pu l l ou t be fore negot ia t ions--a d i f f e r e n c e which r e f l e c t e d further Chinese susp ic ion of Hanoi's a t t i tude .**

, I

-- @I%Coli;tFast between Hanoi's f h x i b l i t y on t h e ques-

t i o n of when n e g o t i a t i o n s can be begun and Peking's in- f l e x i b i l w o n this po in t emerges from p r i v a t e s t a tements a s w e l l as pub l i c fo rmula t ions . Thc North Vietnamese ambassador i n Alger ia s t a t e d Lz? i n e a r l y February 1966 t h a t "When t h e American o go, there w i l l be many ways f o r them t o depart--before, a f t e r , or dur ing nego t ia t ions . That 16 not t h e problem." However, when a Chinese embassy o f f i c i a l i n Prague was reminded i n mid- March 1966 t h a t t h e French negot ia ted wi th t h e Algerians whi le t h e i r f o r c e s remained i n Alger ia , he dismissed t h e Idea a s w r i d i c u l o u s ."

**The pro-Chinese Belgian Communist, Jacques Grippa, who r epo r t ed ly t a l k e d with Mao on 31 August 1966 i n Peking, commented on t h e chines0 a t t i t u d e i n terms which suppor t t h e view t h a t Mao and h i s l i e u t e n a n t s have r ea l fears t h a t at some s t a g e of t h e war Ho might a g r e e t o n e g o t i a t e a peaceful se t t l ement . . Grippa s t a t e d p r i v a t e l y t h a t t h e Chinese l e a d e r s had warned t h e Vietnamese aga in s t r ev i - s i o n i s t s and "the tendency toward peace."

D. Hanoi Downgrades ~ r o s p e c t of --- h•÷i l i t&y, and ~ p k r a d e s P r o s p e c t i c a l , -. Victory (Fa l l 1965 t o September 1966) ---

The B-52 missions begun i n mid-June 1965 and t h e U.S. i npu t s and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e f i g h t i n g begun s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n Ju ly 1965 apparent ly impelled t h e North Vietnamese t o r e v i s e t h e i r content ion (probably a genuine es t imate) ' t h a t they could win a m i l i t a r y v i c to ry i n t h e South. In t h e f a l l of 1965, t h v began t o speak more

success

<*n Done hld seemed obseasec~ w l t f i ; . m e ' i dea t h a t ~ m e i i c a n l a s s i t u d e toward t h e war would u l t ima te ly c r e a t e condi t ions i n America s i m i l a r t o those p reva i l i ng i n France i n 1954, and t h a t t h i s would force Washington t o accept Dong's four "points." The emphasis on American p o l i t i c a l opinion was r e f e r r e d t o again by t h e DRV Consul h n e r a l i n Rangoon who, i n mid-May 1966, s t a t e d 1-1 t h a t he bel ieved publ ic opinion i n t h e U.S. would not continue t o support t h e e f f o r t i n Vietnam and t h a t , accordingly, Hanoi believed it could u l t imate ly w i n . The Po l i sh ICC r ep re sen ta t ive , r e tu rn ing from the North i n e a r l y June 1966, made t h e following summation of t h e North Vietnamese a t t i t u d e :

ZIe s t a t e d 1 7 1 t h a t Hanoi has no i n t e r e s t i n nego a t ions . It p lans no peace feelers now o r i n t h e f u t u r e . I t is determined t o go on f i g h t i n g f o r two o r t h r e e more years, a t l e a s t under present condi t ions i n South Vietnam, p lus accele- r a t e d bombing of t he North, Hanoi is absolu te ly convinced t h a t t h e American publ ic w i l l grow t i r e d of t h e war i n a year o r so and fo rce Washington t o withdraw on North Vietpamese terms.

This a t t i t u d e a l s o extended t o their view of what might happen with a change i n t h e American Administration. Ho and o the r t o p North Vietnamese o f f i c i a l s t o l d a European

Communist i n mid-suauner 1966 t h a t "The only question to discuss is when the Aknericans w i l l go. I t could take a man's age. We have t i m e . The rEuropeaner have less t ime. There, governmbnts s h i f t and leaders come and go. In t h e end, there will come a man i n Washington who w i l l say there is no sense i n s tay ing , and they w i l l l e a v e . We are sure of t h i s . "

ANNEX

1. The L i b e r a t i o n F r o n t ' s F ive P o i n t s

The fo l lowing a r e e x t r a c t s from a s ta tement i ssued by t h e C e n t r a l Committee of t h e NFLSV on.March 22, 1965:

Facing t h e p r e s e n t s i t u a t i o n of utmost g r a v i t y t h e NnSV d e e m it necessa ry t o r e a f f i r m once again its iron- l i k e and unswerving s t a n d t o c a r r y through t h e war of r e s i s t a n c e a g a i n s t t h e US i m p e r i a l i s t s .

1. The U S i m p e r i a l i s t s a re ! t h e s a b o t e u r s of t h e Geneva Agreements, t h e most braeen warmonger and aggressor and t h e sworn enemy of t h e Vietnamese people.

2. The h e r o i c South Vietnamese people a r e r e s o l v e d t o d r i v e o u t t h e U S imper ia l - ists i n o r d e r t o l i b e r a t e South Vietnam, ach ieve an independent , democratic ,

' peacefu l and n e u t r a l South Vietnam, wi th a view t o n a t i o n a l r e u n i f i c a t l p n .

( A t p r e s e n t a l l n e g o t i a t i o n s are use less ' a s long a s t h e U S i m p e r i a l i s t s do no t withdraw a l l t h e t r o o p s , weapons and means of war, of t h e U S and its s a t e l l i t e s from South Vietnam and d e s t r o y t h e i r m i l i t a r y bases i n South Vietnam; a s long a s t h e s a c r e d r i g h t s of t h e South Vietnamese people-r ights t o independence and democracy-- a r e still be ing s o l d by t h e Vietnamese t r a i t o r s t o t h e US i m p e r i a l i s t s ; and a s long a s t h e NFLSV--true and only r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of 14 m i l l i o n South Vietnamese people--does not have t h e d e c i s i v e vo ice .)

3. The v a l i a n t South Vietnamese people and t h e South Vietnam L i b e r a t i o n army a r e r e s o l v e d t o accompllsh t o t h e f u l l t h e i r s a c r e d d u t y t o d r i v e o u t t h e US i m p e r i a l i s t s s o a s t o l i b e r a t e South Vietnam and defend North Vietnam.

4. The South Vietnamese people express t h e i r prodound g r a t i t u d e f o r t h e whole- h e a r t e d suppor t of the people of t h e world who c h e r i s h peace and j u s t i c e and d e c l a r e t h e i r r e a d i n e s s t o r e c e i v e a l l ' a$s iekaz ice inc lud ing weapons and a l l o t h e r . war m a t e r i e l s from t h e i r f r i e n d s i n t h e f i v e c o n t i n e n t s .

5. To u n i t e t h e whole people, t o arm t h e whole people , con t inue t o march forward h e r o i c a l l y and be r e s o l v e d t o f i g h t and d e f e a t . t h e US aggressors and t h e Vietnamese t r a i t o r s .

2. Nor th ,Vie tnamts Pour P o i n t s

The fo l lowing p o i n t s were put forward by Prime Min i s te r Pham Van Dong on Apr i l 8, 1965:

It is the unswerving p o l i c y of t h e Government of t h e Democratic Repubgic of Vietnam (DRV) t o s t r i c t l y r e s p e c t t h e 1954 Gendva Agreements of Vietnam, and t o c o r r e c t 1 y implement tihe ir b a s i c p r o v i s i o n s as embodied i n t h e fo l lowing p o i n t s :

Recogni t ian of t h e b a s i c n a t i o n a l r i g h t s of 'the Vietnamese people: peace, indbpendence, sovere ign ty , u n i t y and ' t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y . According t o t h e Geneva Agreements, t h e US Government must withdraw from South, Vietnam a l l US t r o o p s , m i l i t a r y personnel and weapons of a l l k inds , d ismant le a l l US m i l i t a r y bases t h e r e , c a n c e l its " m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e t t y i t h South Vietnam. I t must end its p o l i c y of i n t e r v e n t i o n and aggress ion i n South Vietnam. According $0 t h e Geneva Agreements, t h e US ~ovbrnment must s t o p its a c t s

of war a g a i n s t North Vietnam, completely c e a s e a l l encroachments on t h e t e r r i - t o r y and s o v e r e i g n t y of t h e DRV.

Pending t h e peacefu l r e u n i f i c a t ion of Vietnam, whi le Vietnam is still temporar i ly , d iv ided i n t o two zones , t h e m i l i t a r y p r o v i s i o n s f o r t h e 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam must be s t r i c t l y r e s p e c t e d : t h e two zones must r e f r a i n from j o i n i n g any m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e w i t h f o r e i g n coun- t r ies, t h e r e must be no f o r e l g n m i l i - t a r y bases , t r o o p s and m i l i t a r y person- n e l i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e t e r r i t o r y .

3. The i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of South Vietnam must be s e t t l e d by t h e South Vietnamese peop le themselves, i n accordance wi th t h e ' programme of t h e NFLSV, without any f o r e i g n i n t e r f e r e n c e .

4 , The peacefu l r e u n i f i c a t i o n of Vietnam is t o be s e t t l e d by t h e Vietnamese people i n both zones , without any f o r e i g n i n t e r f e r e n c e .

T h i s s t a n d unquest ionably e n j o y s t h e approval and suppor t of a l l peace and j u s t i c e - l o v i n g governments and peoples i n t h e world. The Government of t h e DRV is of t h e view t h a t t h e above-expounded s t a n d is t h e b a s i s f o r t h e soundest p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t of t h e Vietnam problem. I f t h i s b a s i s ie recognized, f avourable c o n d i t i o n s w i l l be c r e a t e d f o r t h e peacefu l s e t t l e m e n t of t h e Vietnam problem, and it w i l l be p o s s i b l e t o cons ide r t h e reconven- i n g of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference along t h e p a t t e r n of t h e 1954 Geneva Conference. The Government of t h e DRV d e c l a r e s t h a t any approach c o n t r a r y t o t h e above s t a n d is i n a p p r o p r i a t e ; any approach t e n d i n g t o s e c u r e a UN i n t e r v e n t i o n i n t h e Vietnam s i t u a t i o n is a l s o i n a p p r o p r i a t e because such approaches a r e b a s i c a l l y a t va r i ance wi th t h e 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam.

The Geneva,Agreements of 1954 and 1962 a r e an adequate b a s i s f o r peace i n South-East Asia;

W e would wblcome a conference on South- Eas t Asia ?r on any p a r t t h e r e o f ;

We would welcome " n e g o t i a t i o n s wi thout precondi t iQnsw as t h e 17 non-aligned n a t i o n s pu$ it;

We would wqlcome uncondi t iona l d i scus - s i o n s as Px!esident Johnson put it;

A c e s s a t i o d of h o s t i l i t i e s could be t h e f i r s t o r d e r of bus iness at a conference ' o r could be t h e s u b j e c t of p re l iminard d i s c u s s i o n s .

Hanoi 's Four P o i n t s could be d i scussed a long w i t h o t h e r p o i n t s which o t h e r s might wish , t o propose;

3. United S t a t e s v l . ~ ! P o i n t s

The f ol'lowing p o i n t s , made by Vice-Pres ident Humphrey i n the White House on, January 3, 1966, were r e l e a s e d by t h e S t a t e Department On January 7:

The fo l lowing Ltatements are on t h e p u b l i c r ecord about 'e lements which t h e US b e l i e v e s can go i n t o peace i n South East-Asia. '

W e want no 'US bases i n South-East Asia;

We do not #sire t o r e t a i n US t r o o p s i n South V i e t n i a m a f t e r peace is assured;

We suppor t f r e e e l e c t i o n 8 i n South Vietnam t o g i v e the : South Vietnamese a government of t h e d r own cho ice ;

10. The ques t ion of r a n i f i c a t i o n of Vietnam shou ld be determined by t h e Vietnamese through t h e i r own free decision;

11. The c o u n t r i e s of .South-East Asia can be non-aligned o r n e u t r a l i f t h a t be t h e i r o p t i o n ;

12. We would much p r e f e r t o use our re- s o u r c e s f o r t h e economic recons t ruc - t i o n of South-East Asia t h a n i n war. If t h e r e is peace; North Vietnam could p a r t i c i p a t e i n a r e g i o n a l e f f o r t t o which w e would be prepared t o c o n t r i b u t e a t l e a s t one b i l l i o n dollars;

13. The P r e s i d e n t has s a i d *'The Vietcong would no t have d i f f i c u l t y being r e p r e s e n t e d and having t h e i r views r e p r e s e n t e d i f f o r a moment Hanoi decided s h e wanted t o c'ease aggres- s i o n . I d o n ' t t h i n k t h a t would be an insurmountable problem."

14. We have s a i d p u b l i c l y and p r i v a t e l y t h a t we could s t o p t h e bombing of North Vietnam as a s t e p toward peace a l though t h e r e has not been t h e s l i g h t - est h i n t o r s u g g e s t i o n from the o t h e r s i d e a s t o what t h e y would do i f t h e bombing stopped.

In o t h e r words, w e have p u t e v e r y t h i n g I n t o the basket of peace except t h e su'rrender of South Vietnam.

4 . Ho Chi Minh's L e t t e r of 24 January 1966 t o Heads of S t a t e s (Excerpt)

If t h e United S t a t e s r e a l l y wants peace, it must r ecogn ize t h e NFLSV a s t h e sole genuine r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e people of South Vietnam

and engage i n nego t i a t i ons wi th it.. . . So long as the U. S. army of aggress ion still remains on our so i l , our people w i l l r e s o l u t e l y f i ght aga ins t I t . If t h e U . S . government r e a l l y wants a peace- f u l s e t t l e m e n t , it must accept t h e four -po in t stand of t h e DRY government and prove thie; by a c t u a l deeds; it must end uncondi t ibna l ly and for good a l l bombing raids and o the r war ac t s aga in s t t he DRV. Only i n t h i s way can a p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n t o the Vietnam problem be envisaged.

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