Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalition

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

  • 7/30/2019 Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalition

    1/31

    Aeria Ei Review 2012, 102(4): 14461476hp://x.i.r/10.1257/aer.102.4.1446

    1446

    C h b h . N, h

    w w f h . Y,

    h b h w-k , h - h b . F ,

    h b h j h

    h b z -

    . I , h h j b h

    w h . M b , b

    h, , z , z

    h b h h.

    W b wk h -

    . C b .

    I sae. A wk bh . I , ( ,b h ) hw h (.., whh b h h

    Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions,

    Coalitions, and Clubs

    By Daron Acemoglu, Georgy Egorov, and Konstantin Sonin*

    I yai lleive eisi aki, urre eisis eeriehe uure isribui pliial pwer a iuee uure ei-sis. We evelp a eeral raewrk suy his lass prb-les. Uer ayliiy, we haraerize yaially sable saes as

    uis he iiial sae a bai w eeral isihs. Firs,a sial arraee is ae sable by he isabiliy alera-ive arraees ha are preerre by sufiely pwerul rups.Se, efiey-ehai haes ay be resise beause

    urher haes hey will eeer. We use his raewrk aa-lyze yais pliial rihs i a siey wih iere ypes exreis views. (JEL D71, D72, K10)

    * A: D E, Mh I Th, 50 M D, B E52,R 380B, Cb, MA 02142-1347 (-: @.); E: D M E D S, K Sh M, Nhw U, 2001 Sh R., Jb C,R 539, E, IL 60208 (-: [email protected].); S: Nw E Sh, 47Nkhk ., O 922, Mw, 117418, R (-: k@.). W hk h , Jh D, Mhw Jk, Rb Pw, h ASSA 2008(Nw O), h 2008 G Th W C, Bk, Cb, C I Th,H, P, Nhw, S, Y . A kw - h NSF, AFOSR, h C I A Rh.

    T w , h h://../10.1257/.102.4.1446.

    http://dx.doi.com/10.1257/aer.102.4.1446http://dx.doi.com/10.1257/aer.102.4.1446
  • 7/30/2019 Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalition

    2/31

    1447AcEmogLU Et AL .: conStItUtIonS, coALItIonS, And cLUBSVoL. 102 no. 4

    ; E 1 2). O qb wh w-k. U

    h C- , w h hz h

    (yaially) sable saes. A qb b

    whh h b (s0) h s0. W hw h h b h .

    Ahh h h -

    b, bh wh h-

    z b . Th hz h b h

    w-k wh h w

    () h h h, (sabiliy axi). W w h h - h h h w . W hz h

    , , h wh h h whh h q b (Th 1). W hwh wh , h b b w1,2, .

    O Th 2. U h h () h 1, () h () h , h qb -

    . C, ,h h h h qb -

    b .Bh hh b hhz h b , hh h b

    .1 Th hh

    b whh w ,

    w, b h b h wh h w (whh -q k , bw). W b h j h z

    .2 W h , hw, h h h

    b h hh

    ( h, qb, q wh hw h b wh h ; bw).

    A h h h k ie

    -k bh h -k w

    1Th h h wh h h w h h h h.S w w ( , bw ), h b wh w-k wh ( E 3, 4, 5 h A).

    2O h b h h

    h , , h, b A Rb (2000, 2006) Lzz P (2004). Th wk h wh b, , h h, b (hw, w h b ). Th b h h h h (.., , h bk bk wh ).

  • 7/30/2019 Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalition

    3/31

    1448 tHE AmERIcAn EconomIc REVIEW JUnE 2012

    h h h w

    h h k. Th k w -

    . F, (, , b) b b h b w h h

    , b b h b sable h b w . T wh

    b, w h h b h h w

    h w h. S, b b

    .., h b P b h h (Th 3).

    O , Th 4, h

    ( Th 1 2) h wh b (.., b ). I , hw h h wh () - -k ( h w ). Th h j ,

    b h h A. Th

    4 hw h bh b w

    ; , Th 1 2

    whh b .

    Bw, w w h h h-

    . W wh h h bw

    w h hh -

    . W h b , whh w S V.

    Example 1: C h w ,E, h ,

    m, h . Th h wh b

    w: (1) b h a, whhE, wh hm; (2) h , whhmh w ; (3) , whmb f E. S

    wE() < wE(a) < wE() , wm(a) < wm() < wm() .

    Th hEh hh h h

    b h (.., b bm ).O h h h, m h

    w- b h. Bh h

    (0, 1). S a,, , b . I b h,E whh w w;

    bh ,m .

    U , b , () = . I , b , , h w b

    h, () = . Th, , a,Eh , hw h w , h E

    UE(rer) = wE() + wE()_1

    .

  • 7/30/2019 Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalition

    4/31

    1449AcEmogLU Et AL .: conStItUtIonS, coALItIonS, And cLUBSVoL. 102 no. 4

    IE a , UE( rer) = wE(a)/(1 ).I , h UE( rer) < UE(rer), k. Wh w-k, hw ( ), hUE( rer) > UE(rer). I h , (a) = a. Th bh

    . F, a b b h b h ,, whh b h wh w a. S, bhEmw

    b b h a, h b a P -

    . I h h b wh w-

    k (wh , b; wh , bh a b).

    Example 2: C h h hw h b w -

    w. A wh

    M wh , , h

    . A , h S Ab I

    k h. A h h , Tk,

    S, A, E wh M h

    . Bh

    b b , , b . S

    Ab I h h w wk

    h , wh Tk b I h b -

    b h - h h

    w h h .3 S

    h Tk w w

    h h .T h h b w,

    n k . A s h

    Zwh h h h

    h . I h . S h h h wh h h , h (.., bh wh h

    k k b). W ,.., j j , h wh h bh h

    wh w h h h h .Th hh , w, . I

    h h h

    h h- b b -

    h h. M, bh h hh

    b h .4 I S V, w

    h h .

    3O , Sh (1985), h f bw ,

    Rb Lb (2008) R (2007).4F , Tk h Ib qk h b h (hh h w ), whh wh q h h hh . Fh, h f k, wh , whh wh .

  • 7/30/2019 Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalition

    5/31

    1450 tHE AmERIcAn EconomIc REVIEW JUnE 2012

    Th b h q: w h h -

    h h wh h b

    h? Th b z

    wh wk b h q

    h ( Bb Jk 2004). Sh P . O , hw, hhh h wh h

    h b b; .., wh j

    h w h h .

    Rb (1999) Bb, Mh, Sh (2001) b w j . Rb (1999) b whn, wh b j ,

    - , b h

    {1,2, ,k} k w. Bb, Mh, Sh(2001) b whh b h b w .5 L(2009), wh h

    , h . Th h A

    Rb (2000, 2006) Lzz P (2004), h - b Bb Jk(2004), b wk.

    Tw h Chw (1994) G Jh (2005).Chw wh b

    h b z h h

    bw w h, b. I Chw , hw, h h-

    z b.6 G Jh wh

    . Th hw h h

    h b h , h h qb b -

    wh h . I , P

    b , b q qb

    k wh 1. W

    hz ( q) , whh G Jh ( , wh , w h h -

    b). F, b h ,wh G Jh, h 1, h

    (.., h b h ).F, wk h -

    b h.7A bw h h

    h, b , w h

    h j ( j) h b h h w

    5Bb, Sh, Zh (1991) b q, h b w -

    b b ( h h q) . Th h h b , wh h, h , h w q q q .

    6Th k bw Chw b h A.7O , , .., M (1997); R Vh (1997, 1999); S

    W (1998); Kh R (2003). O b h, Ek . (1999) Sh (2002).

  • 7/30/2019 Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalition

    6/31

    1451AcEmogLU Et AL .: conStItUtIonS, coALItIonS, And cLUBSVoL. 102 no. 4

    h wh h j. Th wh h -

    - b b h . I ,

    h wk h b b (R Vh 1997,1999), wh w h h w.8

    Th h z w. S I h . S II . I S III, w

    h (-) Mk qb h bh h q bw

    h qb h hz S II. S IV

    wh b , wh S V

    h h E 2. S VI .

    A A ; , ,

    h A.

    I. Environment

    Th . T , b ( 1).Th saes whh w b . Thh h , |X| h b X, | | | | h b - , . S bh

    , h b w h -

    k (.., z , h -j, h wh w ). Ahh

    b , b b w- (b b ) h h h k, b .

    Th b s0. Th b h - h h b N . F 1, h s . A X alii, w h b . Eh s hz b ({wi(s)}i,s). H, h s , wi(s) () i . P s b b h wiialiis s, s, (b ) b . Th w

    z , h wh j j- , w. F , s j q

    k, s b h j; s - i , s h i.

    9 S s h , h k .10

    8Oh wk Bk W (2000), wh h b; Jh Sh (2001), wh hw h h q j j b h h ; A, A, E (2005),wh h b EU ; B B (2003), wh h h EU .

    9

    P z b h s , h wh k ,hw k , . Th b h - . W w hw h h h qb , j s .

    10O w h wh , s s, h b h w .

  • 7/30/2019 Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalition

    7/31

    1452 tHE AmERIcAn EconomIc REVIEW JUnE 2012

    Thh h , w h w .

    ASSUMPTION 1 (W C):Fr ay sae s ,s saisfes

    ()I X, Y, X Y, a Xs he Ys.

    ()IX,Ys, he X Y.

    P () h X w s, h h z h w h. P () h b hw j w h . Is= , s ex-eusly sable. N hz whh

    h b .

    W h w b . Fx,y , w w

    (1) x y i : wi(x) = wi(y).

    I h w x ypay-equivale, equivale. M

    h b z. F z , z b

    (2) y z x {i : wi(y) wi(x)} z.

    I,y z x h h h w (

    z) wh h b wk y x. N h - b z. F, b . I ,wi (y) wi(x) h i wh y h h

    x. Whh h h w h

    wh. S, h z - k h b h q. I

    h h . Th, h z z whh h wk y x w

    h w , whh . Wh h b

    , q (2) h, w hy weakly preerrexz. I h

    h , h h h y x, h h w b xy h

    h w , h b

    y h x. R z b

    (3) y z x {i : wi(y) > wi(x)} z.

    I(3) h, w hy srily preerrexz.11

    11R q ; xy y z, hx z. I , h b zz b . Nh, x,z , w hxz x, wh z , w hxz x. F A 1 w h h x,y,z ,y z xxz y, y z xxz y.

  • 7/30/2019 Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalition

    8/31

    1453AcEmogLU Et AL .: conStItUtIonS, coALItIonS, And cLUBSVoL. 102 no. 4

    Th j w

    .

    ASSUMPTION 2 (P): Pays {wi(s)}i, s saisy he llwi

    prperies:

    () Fr ay sequee saess1,s2, ,ski,

    sj+1 sj sj r all 1 j k 1 s1 sk sk.

    () Fr ay sequee saess,s1, ,ski S wihsjs sr1 j kasj sl 1 j < l k,

    sj+1 s sj 1 j k 1 s1 s sk.

    mrever, i rx,y,s Swe havexs say s x, hey s s.

    A 2 j (b wk h ). P () h y xx, z y y,

    xz zh , h h h , w h . P () h y s x, xs z, z s y( h x,y, z -q). A h, h y s x,z s y,xs z.

    12 I q

    h b .13

    Ahh A 1 2 , h

    b hz . M -

    , h ( Th 4 h A). I A 1 2, w b q b h w()q.

    ASSUMPTION 3 (Cb): Fr x,y,s suh ha xs s, y s s, ax y, eiher y s x r xs y.

    A 3 h w xy s( s), h q, hxy s-b. Th - b q qb.

    II. Axiomatic Characterization

    B h - , w -

    b hz b . Th h w

    12Nh A 2 b h h. E 6 7 h A h h wh h 2() 2() .

    13T w q h s,x,y z,y s x,xs z y s z. I, h whz = s.

  • 7/30/2019 Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalition

    9/31

    1454 tHE AmERIcAn EconomIc REVIEW JUnE 2012

    . F, h h k h h

    k h

    - . S, h h -

    h hz h qb h

    h . I , , Th 2, w k h hz.

    Th k h b hz hwih su-

    fiely rwar-lki behavir, a iiviual shul wish rasi a

    sae ha will uliaely lea aher sae ha ives her lwer uiliy. Th b

    h b h hz (axiaially) sable saes.M , hz

    h h , : b s h s0. W h w h .

    AIOM 1 (Db): I x,yare suh ha y = (x), he eiher y =x ry xx.

    AIOM 2 (Sb): I x,yare suh ha y = (x), he y = (y).

    AIOM 3 (R): I x,y,zare suh ha z xx, z = (z), a z xy, hey (x).

    A h h wh w h b. A 1

    q h h h x h y h w h h . A 2 -

    h b b; b,

    b h b . A 3 h -

    b q h h b z bhxy b w-

    x, h h ky x.14 N h wh h , h h .

    W h h h bw b .

    DEFINITION 1 (A Sb S):Le { : : saisfesA 13}. A sae sis (axiomatically) stable i(s) = s r se .the se sable saes (fxe pis) r appi is = {s : (s) = s}a he se all sable saes is = {s : (s) = s r se }.

    Th h bh h b h w

    Th 2, whh bh h q bw qb h

    14A 2() h y xx z xy, h z xx. Th, A 1 , h hqz xx b A 3.

  • 7/30/2019 Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalition

    10/31

    1455AcEmogLU Et AL .: conStItUtIonS, coALItIonS, And cLUBSVoL. 102 no. 4

    ( S III bw) b . A Th 1 A A.15

    THEOREM 1 (A Chz Sb S):Suppse Assupis 1

    a2 hl. the

    () the se is epy. tha is, here exiss a appi saisyi Axis 13.

    ()Ay a be reursively srue as llws. orer he saes as{1, ,| |}suh ha r ay 1 j < l | |, ljj. Le(1) = 1.Fr eahk= 2, , | |, efe

    (4) k = {s {1, ,k1} : s k ka(s) = s}.

    Th

    k k = (5) (k) = { . s k: z kwih z k s k (I here exis re ha es k suh haz k wihz ks, pik ay

    hese; his rresps uliple uis).

    (iii) the sable ses ay w appis1,2 iie; i.e., 1 = 2 = .

    (iv)I, i aii, Assupi 3 hls, he r ay w appis1a2i, 1(s) 2(s) r all s .

    Th 1 hz h h A 13. I, A 2() h h 1 h h h h s wh s 11. Tk 1

    b, w h { 1, , | |} j 2 h h. Th, w h k ,k= 2, , | |, h b h k(h , s h h (s) = s s kk). Wh h k , h b h k( k) b b w . I h ,w h (k) = k. Wh k , h h b h(k) = s h s. I ( h --), h hz hhh h

    b hz h I: k b b

    15Th h b wk . P () A 2 b b bh w : Fr ay sequee saes s,s1, ,sk i Swih sjs sr1 j k, sj+1s sj r all1 j k 1 wul iply s1s sk.

  • 7/30/2019 Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalition

    11/31

    1456 tHE AmERIcAn EconomIc REVIEW JUnE 2012

    h b w k h sable (.., b h h k= ). Th h .

    P () Th 1 hw h h b h h . F w 1 2 , b

    h 1(s0) 2(s0) s0, b h h h . Th , h h b , q b h w .16 F, 4 hw h

    wh A 3 h, b b

    -q. I h w, s1= 1(s0) s2= (s0), h s1 s2 h h w , b h h

    h .

    W h h Th 1 wh h h,

    wh w-k, b h

    b b ( h ; .., t t). Th h h b h .

    III. Noncooperative Foundations of Dynamically Stable States

    W w b h - h

    S I hz h Mk qb (MPE) h . Th h q bw h MPE h h

    Th 1.W h . A

    h , i z

    (6) Ui() = (1 )=

    ui( ) ,

    wh (0, 1) . W

    ASSUMPTION 4 (P):the sae pays i (6) are ive by

    wi(s) s = s1(7) ui() = { . wi s s1F h i x, w h

    wi < wi(x) .

    A 4 :

    whh h , h b w h h w

    16I h A, w h w h, N-M b Chw . U A 1 2, bh wh .

  • 7/30/2019 Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalition

    12/31

    1457AcEmogLU Et AL .: conStItUtIonS, coALItIonS, And cLUBSVoL. 102 no. 4

    h wh h . G z wi(s) > 0, A4 ; .., wi= 0 i. S w h 1, h h .17 I , ( ) b s h, wi(s) h h-

    . Sb, h h - MPE.18

    W : () q - h ; () . V q b bw; h q whh w .19 W

    h q ,{s}s, prl. L Ksb b h s . Th, s

    s : {1, ,Ks}

    h s . Th, h s q , h q - (h Ks hh h q s). Is(k), h -wh w k h . A, s(k), h whh

    . Th, h - h bh -

    h w b - .

    W k h w {s}s:

    ASSUMPTION 5 (P): Fr eah s , e (r bh) he llwi wiis hls:

    () Fr ay saez \{s}, here exissk : 1 k Ks suh has(k) =z.

    () Fr ay playeri here exissk : 1 k Ks suh has(k) = i.

    Th h h qs b h

    h h q s w b - - k b h . W h s h s; h h h w

    .

    17M , _

    = i,x|wi(x) wi|, whh h z . Th

    _

    , h 0< 1 h h Th 2 h > 0. Th , whh h A, h h h b wh .

    18E 4 5 h A h h q(7), (-) qb . Wh h b

    , h b b. A (.., h h ) wh w wh h .

    19Th q w MPE wh h h q qb. A, E, S (2009) qb, Mk b h qb, whh qb bh wh wh q .

  • 7/30/2019 Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalition

    13/31

    1458 tHE AmERIcAn EconomIc REVIEW JUnE 2012

    I h b, = 0, s0 (h h - h ). Sbq ( 1), h w:

    Periodb wh s1 h h . Fork= 1, ,Ks1, h kh Pk, w. Is1(k),

    h Pk,= s1(k). Is1(k), h s1(k) h Pk, . IfPk, s1, h h q bwPk, s1(w w hw

    h h q h h qb ). Eh yes( Pk,) ( s1). L Yk, h whyes. IYk, s1, h Pk, ; hw (Yk,s1), j. IPk,= s1, h w h - h h Pk, j.

    IfPk, , h s= Pk,k , h . IPk, j h bPk,= s1 k< Ks1,h h 2 wh k b 1; k= Ks1, h s= s1, h .

    Attheendoftheperiod,eachplayerreceivesstagepayoffui().

    A MPE h h b qb

    (SPE) wh - . H - h s b b, h - , w , -

    h ( h A ). AMk h , s s, wh s= s1

    h s1. I whw, w h MPE qb hb. N, w

    b .

    DEFINITION 2 (D Sb S): Sae s is a dynamically stablestate i here exis a iiial sae s0, a se prls {s}s, a mPE sraey

    prfle , a t< suh ha al he equilibriu pah we have s= sr all

    t.

    P , s b h t hs= s

    t. O bj () whh b h b b

    hz h h s0, () bh hq bw b hz

    h .

    W whh h hh 0(0, 1) A A. Th h

    z h w h.

    THEOREM 2 (Chz D Sb S): Suppse haAssupis 1,2,4, a5 hl. the here exiss 0(0, 1) suh ha r all > 0,he llwi is rue.

  • 7/30/2019 Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalition

    14/31

    1459AcEmogLU Et AL .: conStItUtIonS, coALItIonS, And cLUBSVoL. 102 no. 4

    () Fr ay here exiss a se prls {s}sa a pure-sraeymPE he ae suh ha r ay s0, s

    =(s0) r ay 1; hais, he ae reahes (s0) aer e peri a says i his sae hereaer.therere, r eah s0, s =(s0) is a yaially sable sae.

    () mrever, r ay se prls {s}shere exiss a pure-sraey mPE.Ay suh mPE has he prpery ha here exiss suh ha r ayiiial sae s0, s

    =(s0) r all 1. therere, all yaially sablesaes are axiaially sable.

    () I, i aii, Assupi 3 hls, he he mPE is esseially uique: ray se prls {s}s, ay pure-sraey mPE, ay iiial sae s0,a ay , s0

    (s0).

    P () () Th 2 h h b h b b hz Th 1 -; h A 13 h -MPE h MPE h . A h h hz b

    q (5) b b .Th q h Th 1 2 . H b

    h-h (), h w b h h h w h w h qb h. Wh

    , hw ( > 0), h b h h h h . Cq, w - w h () b Th 1.

    Th Th 2 h , b h . F

    , w j h - z s. W MPE h

    s wh b h . W h

    hw h b, h j.C, MPE, w hw h s w

    (s), h A 2(i) hw h qb h h -q (s). F,w h (s) A 13.

    A b E 1 h I, h bw -

    b b w h .

    S, P b wh h h b-

    w. Th h h whh P

    w .

    THEOREM 3 (P E): Suppse ha r every w saes x a yhere is a sae z suh ha {wi(z)}i = {wi(y)}i az x, a saeis exeusly sable (i.e.,s r eah s ). the, every (axiaiallyr yaially) sable sae is Pare efie. oherwise, sable saes ay bePare iefie.

  • 7/30/2019 Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalition

    15/31

    1460 tHE AmERIcAn EconomIc REVIEW JUnE 2012

    Th h wh h h h h -

    -k h wh

    w (whh h b h h xz h h y wh w h ),

    P b.

    IV. Ordered States and Agents

    Th 1 2 hz

    b h s0 hA 1 2 . Wh h

    hk, A 2 b wh . I h

    , w hw h wh h whh - -k-

    ( h w {s}s ), A 2 . Th b h-w h w .

    I b , h h , h wxy b k. Wh h , w k, wh

    , b b . S, . G h h h , w

    .20 A h w

    h .

    DEFINITION 3 (S-C S-Pk):give , ,a{wi(s)}i, s, he single-crossing condition hls i r ay i,j a x,y suh ha i wi(x) iplies wj(y) > wj(x) a wj(y) < wj(x)iplies wi(y) < wi(x).

    give a{wi(s)}i, s, preerees are single-peaked i r ay i here exiss a saexi suh ha r ayy,z , y < z xi rxi z >y iplieswi(y) wi(z).

    W z h h

    (.., h j wh h b).

    DEFINITION 4 (Q-M V): give a{s}s, player i is aquasi-median voter(i sae s) i r ay X Ws suh ha X= {j : a j b}

    r se a,b we have i X.

    D h q- s bms. L 1 h Th 4 hw h, h A 1 , h .

    20Rh (1990) A-Sh Bk (1999) h , - .A G S (1996) hw, h q - h b wk.

  • 7/30/2019 Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalition

    16/31

    1461AcEmogLU Et AL .: conStItUtIonS, coALItIonS, And cLUBSVoL. 102 no. 4

    DEFINITION 5 (M M V P):give a , hese wii aliis {s}shas monotonic median voter property i r eah

    x,y saisyi x

  • 7/30/2019 Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalition

    17/31

    1462 tHE AmERIcAn EconomIc REVIEW JUnE 2012

    W h h b h w b h . F , hh -

    h b ,

    b. S h k q, w

    h b

    wi(s) = vi() + V(Z) ,

    wh V(Z) , vi() h :

    vi() vj() wh i > j.

    Th , , h h q ,

    { i}i=1 , (wk) . I , , wh

    h q vi() = ( i)2.

    S -()j Zh h h ,, h h h bw mZ mZ, wh, b,

    mZ h q- . F, h (,Z), whZ b mZ mZ.

    Th h hh . G

    (., ) w h h- b, b h hh (., ) h h.Th h h h h wh -

    h h h b h Zh w h h h . D h, h h

    b h hz h

    qb.

    W bh h A 1 2 , h h

    qb h b hz b Th 1

    2. T h h , w h wi(s)wi(s) i ss, whh h A 6 h. Th, w (s0) h , bh b, h

    s0.

    PROPOSITION 1:

    () Fr ay eree (super) ajriy,Assupis 1 a2 are saisfe ahus theres 1 a2 apply i his evire. I pariular, here exiss

    0< 1 suh ha r ay isu ar > 0, a equilibriu exiss.

    ()AssueV(Z) be(srily) ireasi(wheeverZZ,ZZ ipliesV(Z) < V(Z )). the r ay iiial saes0, (s0)=s = (Z,)wih Z -aii a leas e he exree players, 1 r.

  • 7/30/2019 Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalition

    18/31

    1463AcEmogLU Et AL .: conStItUtIonS, coALItIonS, And cLUBSVoL. 102 no. 4

    T h , w h {s1, ,s| |} h s wk. W h bh h

    h, Th 4.21 Th P 1 hw

    h wh V , b h

    h b h . I, h h b h h h h w h -

    . Th, h w b w h

    h .

    Th h h w b b

    . Th h q. I wh w, w h

    V(Z) vi() -k i .

    PROPOSITION 2:defe A V( ) iV( \{i}) a Ai V( ) V({i}).

    () Suppse v1( 1) v1( m) < A a v( ) v( m) < A. the ray iiial saes,Z((s)) = .

    () Suppse v1( 1) v1( m) >A1 a v( ) v( m) >A. thereexiss k suh ha i he iiial saes0saisfes|Z(s0) | k, he(i)whe

    Z0ilues he ile player(r a leas e he w ile players i is eve),Z((s0)) = , a(ii)wheZ0ilues e he exree players,

    Z((s0)) .

    ()I > 1_

    , i.e., he rule is uaiiy, he r ay iiial saes0,Z((s0))= .

    Th h hw h

    ( h w ), h .M , h hw h wh h

    , w wh

    wh h .

    Th h h h , h h

    b b h q b h . I, h w w

    h h h b

    .22 Th h q whh h h

    w h

    h w -

    . Wh h b b , w b h

    b w -

    b k w h b

    21N, hw, h h h h h b ; w k h .

    22Th h Th 3, whh hw h wh b h wh h w w , qb P . (R h wh P h ).

  • 7/30/2019 Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalition

    19/31

    1464 tHE AmERIcAn EconomIc REVIEW JUnE 2012

    h b h . (O hh w h w

    h .)F, w h wh h

    h ()j . I , w s = (,Z,), wh, wh [,1] . Th, , h w .

    PROPOSITION 3:

    ()I his evire, Assupis 1 a2 are saisfe a hus theres 1a2 apply.

    () Suppse ha ais > 1_ . the r ay equilibriu a r aysaes0,Z((s0)) = .

    Th h b h

    whh h j -

    h. A, wh b , -

    . I, h k ( ) , h. W h, hw, h h h

    h h h w b. I

    , h h I

    w h A, h-w h w b b (wh) j h wh k, h b h w b b

    q.23 A h , ,

    h w b h h

    Tk h b h h .

    VI. Conclusion

    A k , h

    h h , b -, j , b h -

    bh, h h h

    k, b, b h b

    h . Th h -

    z h h.

    W wk h b. W

    bh hz b

    hw h h () b b .Th hz hhh h s b h

    b k w ( s) b . Th h b

    23S A, E, S (2008) .

  • 7/30/2019 Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalition

    20/31

    1465AcEmogLU Et AL .: conStItUtIonS, coALItIonS, And cLUBSVoL. 102 no. 4

    b P ; h h hh

    , b b.

    O b h . Sb

    , h , h.

    Oh, h h , b , hh h h . A b , -

    h b h h h b

    h b w h , -k

    b h b h h .

    Appendix

    PROOF OF THEOREM 1:

    Part 1: W , b , q {1, ,| |}hh

    (A1) 1 j < l | | , h l j j.

    A 2(i) h , hz h h x,xz z. A h , w b 1.Nw, w h j j k 1, wh k | |. A h h \{ 1, ,k1}, w h h

    k (A1) h k.Th , b , : . F k= 1, (k) = k. S w h (j)

    j k 1 wh 2 k | |. D h k (4).Th h b whh h b whh - (s) = s kwh k. Ik , h w (k) = k. Ik , h k (k) =zkh h

    (A2) s k z sk

    ( A 2(ii) k, w h h zkh h s kz, h s kz, sk). P 2 k | |, wb q (5).

    T h , w h (5) A 13.Th hw A 1 2. I , b , h

    (k) = k( h h h ), (k) k.I h ,(k) kk ((k)) = (k) b (4). T hk A 3, - h kh y h hy kk,y = (z), y k(k).Th y kk, b wh (A1), hy { 1, ,k1}, hyk. B h y k(k) (A2). Th h h y , h A 3 .

    Part 2: Th q h w: , q

    { 1, ,| |}wh h (A1), (k) (5) k, h

  • 7/30/2019 Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalition

    21/31

    1466 tHE AmERIcAn EconomIc REVIEW JUnE 2012

    A 13. S h (k) b (5) k= 1.Th (1) 1, (1) = l l > 1. I h , A 1,b l11 b (A1). Nw, k> 1 b h k whh (k) b (5). S, b , h A 13 h. Th k

    (4) w , h k= k. Ik= (k) b (5), h (k) k. Th, A 1 2 (k) kk((k)) = (k). S k= , w h h (k) = l l > k, b h (k) kk (A1). Th h h A 1 A 2 ( bh). Ik, h l= (k). Il > k,h A 1 . Il = k, h A 3 ( h, k

    z k b h z kk, z k(k) (z) =z). I l < k, hA 1 A 2 (k)k. Th, (k) b (5), h y kh hy k(k). B h A 3,

    y k(k),y

    kk, (y) =y . W h b b

    .

    Part 3: S, b , h 12. Th k:1 k | |h h j1j2 j < k, b h k1 k 2, k 1 k2. Wh , h k1 k 2. Th 2 h 2(k) = l l < k. A A 1 2 2, w b lkk 2(l) = l; h hl2. S, b hh, j1j2 j < k, w h l1.Th, lkk, lk1(k)(b 1(k) = k), 1(l) = l, b h

    A 3 1.

    Part 4: S A 3 h. S, b , h

    s, 1(s) 2(s). P 3 h Th h 1(s) = s 2(s)= s; 1(s) 2(s), w h h 1(s) s2(s). A 1 h 1(s) s s, 2(s) s s, A 3 h h 1(s) s2(s) 2(s)s1(s). Wh , h h h . Th

    y = 2(s) h z = 1(s) h hz s y,z s s, 2(z) =z(h hb 1(s) = s b A 2, h 2(s) = s b 3 h Th). Thw A 3 2 s h 2(s) y, .

    PROOF OF THEOREM 2:

    Part 1: A h w :

    (A3) i x,y ,

    wi(x) < wi(y) wi(x) < (1 | |)wi + | |wi(y).

    T 2, w w h w :

    (A4) i x,y,z ,

    wi(x) < wi(y) 1 _

    (wi(z) (1 ) wi) + wi(x) < wi(y).

  • 7/30/2019 Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalition

    22/31

    1467AcEmogLU Et AL .: conStItUtIonS, coALItIonS, And cLUBSVoL. 102 no. 4

    I , h b (A3) (A4). Th, h 0(0, 1) h h > 0, (A3) (A4) h.

    Pk s0 S. W MPE h h h h 1, s= (s1). F i s,q ,

    (1 )wi(s) s = q(A5) Vi(s,q) = { }(1 ) wi s q

    wi((q)) (q) = q+ { }. (1 ) wi+ 2wi((q)) (q) q

    I h qb w bw, Vi(s,q) w b h i h s h q. I h , w

    .

    F h s , k Ks | | 1. Tk s( ) h h A 5 h, (s) s, h s(Ks) = (s). C * w:Eh i Pk(yes) :

    () h k= Ks(w h ), PKs = (s) Vi(s,(s)) >Vi(s,s);

    () Vi(s,Pk) > Vi(s,(s)).

    I , s(k) k, h h Pkb.Th * Mk. W w hw h MPE h .F, w hw h h *, h (s) (s) s

    (s) = s. S h (s) s, h A 1 h

    Xs {i : wi((s)) > wi(s)} s.

    Nw, (A3) > 0 h i Xs, w h

    Vi(s,(s)) = (1 ) wi + wi((s)) > (1 )wi(s)

    + (1 ) wi + 2wi((s)) = Vi(s,s) .

    Cq, (s) s, h *, h (s) Ks h.

    L w hw h h Xs s Pk h h Vi(s,Pk) >Vi(s,(s)) i Xs; .., h wh Vi(s,Pk) > Vi(s,(s)) w s. T b , h h

    Xs Pk. Th, Pk s ((s)) = (s), w w h h i Xs, wi((Pk)) > (1 ) wi + wi((Pk)) Vi(s,Pk)

    > Vi(s,(s)) (1 ) wi + wi((s)),

  • 7/30/2019 Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalition

    23/31

    1468 tHE AmERIcAn EconomIc REVIEW JUnE 2012

    h, b (A3),

    wi((Pk)) > wi((s)) i Xs.S,Xs s (Pk) s(s), whh, h (s) s s, (Pk) s sb A 2(ii). B (Pk) s(s), (Pk) s s, ((Pk)) = (Pk) - A 3. Th, h wh Vi(s,Pk) > Vi(s,(s)) w s. Th h *, (s) = s, (s) s, h b h , h PKs = (s) .

    S, w h *, - q b (A5). I q s , h h q, wh , h h i

    (1 )wi(s). I h , h ( (q)) * (q) q, h h h qb h.H, h b (A5).

    Th, w hw h h b * . F -, h h b h h k . F

    , h Mk, w b

    h h h (wk) , h wh * b. I, (s) s, h h , h i Vi(s,(s)) h Vi(s,s) j. I h , i Vi(s,Pk) Pk

    Vi(s,(s)) j (b (s) w b (s) s (s) = s). Th, h -b * h (A1). Th, * b s , h * MPE h .

    Part 2: W h MPE , h h MPE h h . W A 13. Tk q { 1, ,| |} (A1). Th, w h b Th 1. F, w (1) = 1. I l 2 w h l= , h (l) = l;

    hw, Zl lb

    Zl = {z l : s l : s z s l z}.

    Th Zl, w A 2(b) l. Ch - Zl (l) w. L Yl b h l h h j Yl, l(j) l(j) Zl, l h z Zl: wi(z) > wi(l), wh i = l(j). B A 5, Yl ; kl

    * b h Yl. Il(kl*) , h (l) = l(kl*), whl(kl

    *) , h (l) b z Zl h h wi(z) > wi(l) i = l(j ). P b l, w .

    W w qb h . I h qb, - i h s q , Vi(s,q), b (A5); , h i Vi(s,s). G

  • 7/30/2019 Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalition

    24/31

    1469AcEmogLU Et AL .: conStItUtIonS, coALItIonS, And cLUBSVoL. 102 no. 4

    h , h b w () wh b Vi(s,q). W MPE h b bkw .

    Case (i):(s) s. G s, h ks* b h . Iks* h , h Ksw ks*+ 1 w h w. S h h , h h s. C h 1, w h SPE,s b s = (s) j hw. B b Ys, s b b i. P bkw h - , w h h i h wi((s)) wi(s), h h s, whh h s = (s) h b . B (s) h h h Ksh h h s. W h

    ks*+ 1, SPE h b ks*+ 1 wh s .

    C w ks*. B h , (s) b . A h , h h h

    , s(ks*) = i , h i b (s): i , hs . H, b h ks*, h SPE wh (s) .

    I ks* 1, w wh bkw . A ks* 1, h h (s) b , w h h h (s)

    j h ( ks*

    ). I h h - i, h , w k . P bk-w, w h SPE h h s h (s) s.

    Case (ii):(s) = s. Tk h , h s s . F i s, wi((s )) > wi(s) h. S(s) = s, hw, h w . Cq,w h h h w b -

    . Cq, h - , b h,

    h b . W bkw wh .

    N h bh , w h b Mk b h h q b wh . H

    s , w Mk . B h h -, h b (A5), h- h b -h (hw, w b SPE s). Th hw h MPE.

    O bh h h MPE . Tk

    {s( )}s - MPE . F s, h qh h qb h w- ( q = s - j) (s) = q. F, h : h :(s) s h > 1, (s) s(wh 2(s) ((s)), .). Th b bh b . S h h h (s) = s, b

  • 7/30/2019 Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalition

    25/31

    1470 tHE AmERIcAn EconomIc REVIEW JUnE 2012

    (s) s. D bJs {1, ,Ks}h s wh - Pk h qb h . B , h Js (s). Tw b.

    Case (i): k Js, +1(Pk)(Pk) . Th h - k Js. IPk , h i wi, Pk j, i (1 )wi(s) + wi> wi. B Pk b MPE, h .

    Case (ii): k Js, +1(Pk) =

    (Pk) . D h h kbJsJs; , h Js Js. L kb h Js; h+1(Pk) =

    (Pk) | | 1. C h kJsh k. A h k, Pk, wi h i, wh j (1 | |) wi+

    | |wi(| |(Pk)) > wi. Th, Pk

    b MPE, whh bh h

    .

    Th h (s) = | |1(s) | | 1.D (s) = | | 1(s), , wh h h 0(s) s,

    (A6) (s) = { {0} : (s) = (s)}.

    E, 0 (s) | | 1, (s) = 0 (s) = (s) = s.

    M,

    (A7) ((s)) = ((s)) = ((s)) = (s)

    s, w h . F,

    (1 )wi(s) (s) = s(A8)

    _

    Vi(s) = { } + wi((s)),(1 ) wi (s) swhh h qb i h qb (s) , , h b h ,

    _

    Vi,

    (1 )wi(s) s = q(A9)

    _

    Vi(s,q) = { }+ _Vi(q) .(1 ) wi s qC,

    _

    Vi(s,q) h i s q , qb ( ) w. W w ; h w w h (s) A 1 2, h h (s) = (s)(whh s= (s0) 1), h A 3.

    Pr ha i prpsals Pkj a Pkl, j < l, are prpse a aepe i sae s,he (Pkj) (Pkl)a (Pkj) (Pkl). W h wh(s) s, h, (s) 1. F h s k h Jh

  • 7/30/2019 Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalition

    26/31

    1471AcEmogLU Et AL .: conStItUtIonS, coALItIonS, And cLUBSVoL. 102 no. 4

    h h kJ, h Pk . LJ= {k1, ,k|J|}, wh kj< klj < l(w s ); hJ. I qb, Pk1 , (s) = Pk1 (Pk1) = (s). S h Pkl 1 l |J| h qb, h 1 l < |J|,

    _

    Vi(s,Pkl) _

    Vi(s,Pkl+1) w

    s. F h ,

    (A10) (1 (Pkl)+1) wi + (Pkl)+1wi((Pkl))

    (1 (Pkl+1)+1) wi + (Pkl+1)+1wi((Pkl+1)),

    h, (A3), wi((Pkl)) wi((Pkl+1)); h (Pkl) s(Pkl+1). W h h

    _

    Vi(s,Pk|J|) _

    Vi(s,s) w s, h ,

    (A11) (1 (Pk|J|)+1)wi + (Pk|J|)+1wi((Pk|J|))

    (1 )wi(s) + ((1 (s))wi + (s)wi((s)))

    > (1 (s)+1) wi + (s)+1wi((s)).

    F (A3), w wi((Pk|J|)) wi((s)) = wi(Pk1); h, (Pk|J|) s(Pk1).

    A 2(ii) w h (Pkj) (Pkl) 1 jwi(s). W h h h s h h (s) s, (s) s s, h A 1 h.

    Pr hasaisfes Axi 2 hw ((s)) = (s) (A7).Pr ha(s) = (s). I(s) = s, h (s) = s = (s) h

    . L h (s) s, h (s) k ; .., h (s)= (s)(, q, (A6)(s) = 1 wh (s) s).C w .

    Case (i): (s) = Pkj j : 1 j |J|. I h , (Pkj) = 0 A 2 h. B w h (Pkl) wk l,h, ((s)) = (Pk1) = 0, h (s) = 1.

    Case (ii):(s) = Pkj h j. Th h (Pk1) 1 (s) (s). S h k, h Pk= (s) ( h qb h). Th , h i w _

    Vi(s,Pk) = (1 ) wi+ wi((s)), j, h w

    _

    Vi(s,x) (1 )wi(s) + (1 ) wi + 2wi((s))

  • 7/30/2019 Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalition

    27/31

    1472 tHE AmERIcAn EconomIc REVIEW JUnE 2012

    xh h (x) = (s). A wh wi((s)) > wi(s) , (A3), h

    _

    Vi(s,Pk) >_

    Vi(s,x). S (s) s s(A 1), Pk= (s) wb .

    B A 5, h w b

    k, h w b -. I h , k J, b h (s) = Pkj h j, . Ih , i h h wi((s)) > wi(s) h - k, h h Pk= (s) qb, w b , w . P Pk= (s), hw, w _

    Vi(s,Pk) wh k h qb w _

    Vi(s,x). F i,_

    Vi(s,Pk) >_

    Vi(s,x) w , h h h b . Th h qb, whh h (s) = (s) s .

    Pr hasaisfes Axi 3. S h A 3 h. Th h h s,z h h (z) =z,z s s(whh z s),

    z s(s)(whh (z) (s)). A b, h k, h Pk=z ( qb h). I , h i w

    _

    Vi(s,z) = (1 ) wi+ wi(z), j, h w

    _

    Vi(s,x) (1 )wi(s) + (1 ) wi + 2wi((s))

    xh h (x) = (s). Nw, (A4) h_

    Vi(s,z) >_

    Vi(s,x) wh- wi(z) > wi((s)); .., w s. Th, Pk= zw b .

    S (z) (s), b hz h qb h.B A 5, h b h b h - k. Wh wh wi(z) > wi((s)) b h -,z b h. Th h qb,

    h bh h A 3. Th h 2 h Th.

    Part 3: Th w Th 1 2 h

    Th.

    PROOF OF THEOREM 3:S, b , h b s P .

    Th h x, wi(x) > wi(s) i . B hh, hy h h y s wi(y) = wi(x) > wi(s) i . Tk - . h A 13. C w . I(y) =y, h (s) = s y s s w y s(s), A 3 ( h z h h(y) =y, y s s, y s z, h z (s)). I (y)y, h A 1 wi((y)) > wi(y) > wi(s) w y, whh w s, h (y) s s (y) s(s). A 2 h ((y)) = (y).A, w h A 3.

    PROOF OF THEOREM 4:

    Th , h A, hz q-

    . R hms h q- s.

  • 7/30/2019 Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalition

    28/31

    1473AcEmogLU Et AL .: conStItUtIonS, coALItIonS, And cLUBSVoL. 102 no. 4

    LEMMA 1: give , , pay uis {wi(s)}i, s, a wiialiis {s}ssaisyi Assupi 1, he llwi are rue.

    () Fr eahs, he sems is epy.

    ()I he sile-rssi prpery i defii 3 hls, he r ay saesx,y,z ,

    xz yi a ly i r alli mz, wi(x) >wi(y), a

    xz yi a ly i r alli mz, wi(x) >wi(y).

    ()I i eia ver ii i defii 5 hls, he here is aereasi sequee{s}s players suh hasmsr alls .

    PROOF OF THEOREM 4:

    Part 1: W wh A 2(i). S h h s1, ,slh h sk+1sksk 1 k l 1 s1slsl. Tk q {s}s. R h s w s, h, x z,xz z, h wx(z) > wz(z). Nw hs w wh s h ;.., s= {X : s X}. D h bw b, w h h xz z, hxz

    z. Cq, h w s1, ,slh h sk+1sksk 1 k l 1 s1slsl, h w h sk+1 sk sk

    1 k l 1 s1 sl sl; h, . Nw k h h (whh b ). Wh , h s2 h w ( s2 s1 s2 s3); h s2 s1 s2 s3.S s3 s2 s2 s2 s1 s1, w h ws2(s3) > ws2(s2) ws1(s2) > ws1(s1).B s2 s3 s2 s1, h, ws2(s3) ws2(s2) > 0 ws1(s3) ws1(s2) > 0. Cb h wh ws1(s2) > ws1(s1), w h ws1(s3) >ws1(s1). B h s3 s1 s1, s1 h s1. Th h s2 b k h , h h {sk}k=1

    l h h.

    T A 2(ii), k s s ms. S h s1, ,slh h sk+1s sk 1 k l 1, s1s sl, sj sk1 j < k l. Wh , h slz h - s s1, ,sl. Th ws(sl) ws(s1), A 6 ws(sl) > ws(s1). B h, b L 1, s1s sl, h h - . F, x,y h h xs s y s x, h i ms w h wi(y) > wi(x) > wi(s), whh, , y s s. Th hwh A 2(ii) h h 1.24

    24Th b Th 4.6 A-Sh Bk (1999).

  • 7/30/2019 Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalition

    29/31

    1474 tHE AmERIcAn EconomIc REVIEW JUnE 2012

    Part 2:25 L = ss; h , w , - A 1. L * b b x*y {i : wi(x) >wi(y)} . S -k, Th 4.1 A-Sh Bk (1999) h * , h . C,

    A 2(i) w b *; A 6, w A 2(ii). H, h . F, Th 4.1 A-Sh Bk (1999) h h s -, xs s y s xy s s.

    Prs Prpsiis i Sei V

    PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:

    Part 1:S > 1_2

    h , A 1 . E s1, , s(wh = | |) h h sk wk k(h wh h b b). Wh h , h- D 3. I, sk< sl i < j, h

    (wj(sl) wj(sk)) (wi(sl) wi(sk))

    = (vj(sl) vj(sk)) (vi(sl) vi(sk)) 0,

    b sk sl v h . Nw q q- ; h w

    h h. F sk, k sk h hsk sk < sk+1 sk < , sk = hw. Th sk q h sk, wk , q- skbh b . W w 1 Th 4 hw h A 2 Th 1 Th 2 .

    Part 2: S h s wh 1, Z(s) b. SZ(s) = [a,b]

    Z = [a 1,b + 1]. Th mZ mZ mZ mZ, h s = (s,Z ) b . B h V(Z), sP - s. Tk h A 13 x= (s ). ThA 1 h wi((s )) wi(s ) > wi(s) w s, h, b L 1, i ms . Th, h h i ms, h w s. S ((s )) = (s ), w A 3. Th h s b, h 1 h b Z(s) b s. H, s0, h wb .

    25W hk h 2 Th 4.

  • 7/30/2019 Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalition

    30/31

    1475AcEmogLU Et AL .: conStItUtIonS, coALItIonS, And cLUBSVoL. 102 no. 4

    PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2:

    Part 1: N h xwhZ(x) = b, wh (x)xw A 1. I, m x m

    -k, q- mw b w y why > x, mw b w y < x. Nw , b , h s h hZ(s), (s) = s. C h w. C (): (s) < m. Tkx= ( m, ); b hh, w1(x) > w1(s), h

    w1(x) = v1( m) + V( ) > v1( 1) + V(s) v1(s) + V(s) = wi(s) .

    S (x) > (s), h wi(x) > wi(s) i . B w h xb, h (s) = s A 3. C (): m s m. Tk

    x= (s, ) h wi(x) > wi(s) i . S w h(x) =x, w A 3. C (): s > m.Th (). I , (s) = s .

    Part 2: L k= 1. L s b h hZ(s) kZ(s) h . D h Z(s) b i k x= ( i, ), whh b . Th (x) =x . I(s) x, h A 3 , wi(x) > wi(y) y x. Th h (s) =x.

    I s h 1 Z(s) k, h h s = (

    1,{1}) s = ( ,{}). S h (s) =x= (, ); h m m, v1() v1( m) v() v1( m) b -k. Th h ,

    w1(x) = v1() + V( ) v1( m) + V( ) < v1( 1) + V({1}) = w1(s) ,

    h A 1 . S, h ,w(x) < w1(s), A 1 . Th h (s) x.

    Part 3: Tk s; , b , h (s) =xh h

    Z(x). B A 1, wi(x) > wi(s) i . Cy = (x,); h - hy b (x). A hw , (y) =y, wi(y) > wi(x) > wi(s) i . B h (s) =x A 3, .

    PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3:

    Part 1:Th w h 1 P 1.

    Part 2: S, b , h s, (s) =xh hZ(x) h A 1 3. B A 1,wi(x) > wi(s) w s. Cy = (,x, ) h h >

    1_

    ; hy -b. B (y) =y, wi(y) > wi(x) i . Th wi(y) > wi(s) w x. B h (s) =x A 3, .

  • 7/30/2019 Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalition

    31/31

    1476 tHE AmERIcAn EconomIc REVIEW JUnE 2012

    REFERENCES

    Acemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov, and Konstantin Sonin. 2008. C F N-D-.Review Ei Suies 75 (4): 9871009.

    Acemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov, and Konstantin Sonin. 2009. Eqb R D

    V G. Mh I Th D E Wk P09-26.

    Acemoglu, Daron, and James Robinson. 2000. Wh D h W E h Fh? D,Iq, Gwh H P. Quarerly Jural Eis 115 (4): 116799.

    Acemoglu, Daron, and James Robinson. 2006. Ei oriis diarship a deray.Nw Yk: Cb U P.

    Alesina, Alberto, Ignazio Angeloni, and Federico Etro. 2005. I U.Aeria E-i Review 95 (3): 60215.

    Austen-Smith, David, and Jeffrey S. Banks. 1999. Psiive Pliial thery I: clleive Preeree.A Ab, MI: U Mh P.

    Barber, Salvador, and Matthew O. Jackson. 2004. Ch Hw Ch: S-Sb MjR C. Quarerly Jural Eis 199 (3): 101148.

    Barber, Salvador, Michael Maschler, and Jonathan Shalev. 2001. V V: A M hE E. gaes a Ei Behavir37 (1): 4078.Barber, Salvador, Hugo Sonnenschein, and Lin Zhou. 1991. V b C.Eeria

    59 (3): 595609.Bordignon, Massimo, and Sandro Brusco. 2006. O Eh C.Jural Publi E-

    is 90 (1011): 206390.Bourguignon, Franois, and Thierry Verdier. 2000. Oh, D, Iq Gwh.

    Jural develpe Eis 62 (2): 285313.Burkart, Mike, and Klaus Wallner. 2000. Cb E: E L A. h://

    ./b=248994.Chwe, Michael S. Y. 1994. Fh C Sb.Jural Ei thery 63: 299325.Ellickson, Bryan, Birgit Grodal, Suzanne Scotchmer, and William R. Zame. 1999. Cb h M-

    k.Eeria 67 (5): 11851217.

    Gans, Joshua, and Michael Smart. 1996. Mj V wh S-C P.Jural Publi Eis 59 (2): 21937.

    Gomes, Armando, and Philippe Jehiel. 2005. D P S E I-: O h P I.Jural Pliial Ey 113 (3): 62667.

    Jehiel, Philippe, and Suzanne Scotchmer. 2001. C R E J F-.Review Ei Suies 68: 393413.

    Konishi, Hideo, and Debraj Ray. 2003. C F D P.Jural E-i thery 110 (1): 141.

    Lagunoff, Roger. 2009. Th D Sb R P I. gaes a E-i Behavir67: 56983.

    Lizzeri, Alessandro, and Nicola Persico. 2004. Wh D h E E h S? D h S G, wh A B A R. Quarerly Jural Eis 119 (2): 70563.

    Mariotti, Marco. 1997. A M A S F G.Jural Ei the-ry 74 (1): 196217.

    Rabasa, Angel, and Stephen Larrabee. 2008. the Rise Pliial Isla i turkey. S M, CA:RAND.

    Ray, Debraj, and Rajiv Vohra. 1997. Eqb B A.Jural Ei thery73 (1): 3078.

    Ray, Debraj, and Rajiv Vohra. 1999. A Th E C S. gaes a E-i Behavir26 (2): 286336.

    Roberts, Kevin W. S. 1999. D V Cb. h://./b=1160966.Rothstein, Paul. 1990. O R P Mj R. Sial chie a Welare

    7 (4): 33142.Roy, Olivier. 2007. Seularis crs Isla. Nw Yk: Cb U P.

    Schauer, Frederick. 1985. S S.Harvar Law Review 99 (2): 36183.Scotchmer, Suzanne. 2002. L Pb G Cb. IHabk Publi Eis,

    b A Abh M F, 19972042. A: Nh-H.

    http://ssrn.com/abstract=248994http://ssrn.com/abstract=248994http://ssrn.com/abstract=248994http://ssrn.com/abstract=248994http://ssrn.com/abstract=248994http://ssrn.com/abstract=1160966http://ssrn.com/abstract=1160966http://ssrn.com/abstract=1160966http://ssrn.com/abstract=1160966http://ssrn.com/abstract=248994http://ssrn.com/abstract=248994