NEGROS STEVEDORING CO., INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND DELGADO STEVEDORING CO., INC., respondents.

San Juan, Africa, Gonzales & San Agustin Law Offices for petitioner.

Parades, Poblador, Nazareno, Azada, Tomacruz & Paredez Law Offices for respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with preliminary injunction to review and set aside the Resolution of the Court of Appeals, Eighth Division, * dated 30 October 1972, in CA-G.R. No. 49755-R, which set aside its own Resolution, dated 28 September 1972, dismissing private respondent's appeal for failure to file its appellant's brief.

On 29 May 1967, petitioner Negros Stevedoring Co., Inc. (NESCO, for short) brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against private respondent Delgado Stevedoring Co., Inc. (DELGADO, for short) for the collection of the sum of P175,514.63, which allegedly represents losses and damages sustained by NESCO by reason of the sinking of its barge known as NESCO Barge 109, together with attorney's fees and costs. 1

After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of NESCO. DELGADO appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The latter, through its Clerk of Court, sent to DELGADO a Notice to File Brief, dated 15 May 1972, which was received by the latter on 18 May 1972. 2 The reglementary period for filing appellant's Brief lapsed, with DELGADO failing to file one; hence, the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 28 September 1972, motu proprio dismissed the appeal. 3

On 16 October 1972, DELGADO filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said order of dismissal, 4 to which motion, NESCO filed an opposition, dated 19 October 1972. DELGADO's motion for reconsideration and reinstatement of its case was based primarily on the following excuse:

Upon an inquiry made immediately upon receipt of the aforesaid order (dismissing the appeal), it appears that:

(a) the Notice to File Brief was received on May 13, 1972.[sic]

(b) thru inadvertence, the said notice was referred to an associatate of a (the same) law firm other than Atty. Samson S. Alcantara, who has been handling the said case from the beginning.

(c) that Atty. Melquiades Parades, to whom the notice was referred took no action thereon in the belief that Atty. Alcantara had already been advised thereof.

(d) that Atty. Alcantara knew of the receipt of the notice to file brief only upon receipt of the Notice to [sic] Dismissal of the appeal. 5

On 30 October 1972, the respondent Court of Appeals, in a minute resolution, resolved to 1) grant DELGADO's motion for reconsideration, 2) set aside its Resolution of 28 September 1972, 3) give due course to the appeal, and 4) admit DELGADO's Brief. 6

NESCO then sought to have the resolution of 30 October 1972 reconsidered. On 14 November 1972, it filed a Motion for Reconsideration and To Strike Out the Appellants (DELGADO) Brief, to which the latter filed no opposition. 7

On 22 November 1972, the respondent court resolved to deny NESCO's motion and required it to file its appellee's Brief. —

Hence, this petition.

The sole issue raised herein by the petitioner is whether or not the respondent court gravely abused its discretion in reinstating the appeal of DELGADO, which had been previously dismissed for failure to file appellant's Brief on time, and in admitting its appellant's Brief.

In Ganzon v. Chavez, the Court, thru Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla, held that:

Granting that the power or discretion to reinstate an appeal that had been dismissed is included in or implied from the power or discretion to dismiss an appeal, still such power or discretion must be exercised upon a showing of good and sufficient cause.... There must be such a showing which would call for, prompt and justify its exercise. Otherwise, it cannot and must not be upheld." 9

The point then to determine is whether the delay in filing DELGADO's appellant's Brief was due to a good and sufficient cause. The Court notes that the Notice to File Brief was received on 18 May 1972 by a clerk in the law office of DELGADO's counsel. Thru inadvertence, the clerk referred said notice to an associate lawyer of the law firm, other than Atty. Samson S. Alcantara, who had been handling, from the beginning, the case of DELGADO, Atty. Melquiades Parades, a lawyer of the same law firm to whom the notice had been mistakenly referred, took no action on said notice in the belief that Atty. Alcantara had already been advised of it. And it was only thereafter that Atty. Alcantara learned of said notice, when he received the notice of dismissal of DELGADO's appeal for failure to file the appellant's brief within the reglementary period. 10

The excuse proffered by DELGADO's counsel cannot be considered a good and sufficient cause or justification for the failure to file on time the appellant's Brief. It is

evident from the reason given by DELGADO's counsel that there was negligence not just on the part of the receiving clerk who inadvertently handed the notice to a lawyer, not in charge of the case, but, also in the part of the latter who did nothing to inform the lawyer in the same law firm, handling the case, of said notice, and principally, on the part of the lawyer handling the case who was just waiting for the notice, without doing anything to find out whether such notice might have already been received by the law firm.

The negligence committed in the case at bar cannot be considered excusable, nor is it unavoidable. Time and again the Court has admonished law firms to adopt a system of distributing pleadings and notices, whereby lawyers working therein receive promptly notices and pleadings intended for them, so that they well always be informed of the status of their cases. The Court has also often repeated that the negligence of clerks which adversely affect the cases handled by lawyers, is binding upon the latter.

In the case at bar, even if we were to grant that the law firm of private respondent's counsel had an efficient system which merely faltered in this instance, still, the omission of the lawyer to whom the notice was inadvertently given in not informing the lawyer concerned, in the belief that the latter had already been advised of the notice, is gravely irresponsible and inexcusable. Considering that the lawyer to whom the notice had been inadvertently given is an associate of the same law firm of DELGADO's counsel, and it would not take up so much of his time if he were to inform the lawyer concerned about an important notice, like a Notice to File Brief, whose reglementary period starts upon receipt, then, the conduct of said lawyer, in the case at bar, is unjustifiable. His reliance on his own belief that the lawyer concerned had already been advised of the notice is also unfounded considering that the copy of said notice was with him, so there was absolutely no ground for him to presume that Atty. Alcantara had already been informed about it.

As to the lawyer who was handling the case, his complacency in waiting for the notice despite the lapse of a period of time, without even inquiring from the clerks in the office as to whether such notice had already been received, or by simply investigating with the Court of Appeals as to the status of his appeal, considering that he allegedly had the draft of his appellant's brief prepared and that he was just waiting for the notice to file it, all suggest that the lawyer concerned failed to give the entire devotion he owed to the interest of his client 11 and to exercise the necessary care and diligence required of him as a member of the legal profession, to the detriment of his client. As held in Philippine Suburban Development Corporation v. Court of appeals:

The frequency of such cases which needlessly clog the court dockets and would render meaningless the guidelines set by the Rules of Court and jurisprudence for an orderly and expeditious procedure in the determination of law suits, constrains us to reiterate the Court's admonition in Juane v. Garcia[25 SCRA 801 (1968)], thus —

... It is painful enough for a litigant to suffer a setback in a legal battle. It is doubly painful if defeat is occasioned by his attorney's failure... It

is only when some such situation comes about that the negligent lawyer comes to realize the grave responsibility that he has incurred to his client and to the cause of justice. It is then that the lawyer is reminded that in his oath of office he solemnly declared that he "will conduct, himself "as a lawyer accordingly to the best of his knowledge and discretion. Too late. Experience indeed is a good teacher. To a lawyer, though, it could prove very expensive. 12

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that there was failure to show a good and sufficient cause which would call for, prompt and justify the reinstatement of the appeal. Hence, the Court holds that the respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it reinstated the appeal and admitted the appellant's Brief, despite the latter's failure to file it on time.

WHEREFORE, the Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 29 December 1972 is hereby made permanent. The respondent Court of Appeals is ordered to DISMISS the appeal in CA-G.R. No. 49755-R and to REMAND the case to the trial court for execution.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

ERECTORS, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND DANILO CRIS, respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:

This case should not have reached this Tribunal. It should have, in fact, been terminated three years ago but for the petitioner's counsels who had the temerity to cite a non-existent law with the obvious intention of delaying the proceedings if not outrightly evading financial responsibility under the law. This actuation, indeed, is flagrant dishonesty. We cannot let it pass.

But before we proceed, a recital of the background of the controversy is in order.

The private respondent, Danilo Cris, a contract worker as Earthworks Engineer in Taif, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, filed the case with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) on February 27, 1984 for the illegal termination of his contract of employment with the petitioner herein, Erectors, Inc. The petitioner, as a defense, contended that the private respondent was estopped from questioning the legality of his termination as he already voluntarily and freely received his termination pay. The POEA, on September 27,1984, rendered a decision adverse to petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered ordering the respondents ERECTORS, INC. and SOCIETE AUXILLAIRE D'ENTERPRISES (S.A.E.) jointly and severally, to pay the complainant, DANILO CRIS the sum of SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SIXTY SIX DOLLARS AND SIXTY SIX CENTS ($ 7,166.6), or its equivalent in Philippine Currency at the time of actual payment, representing the unpaid salaries for the unexpired term of complainant's contract. 1

The decision was received by the petitioner on October 25, 1984. Fifteen days later, or on November 9 of the same year, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with the respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The motion which was treated as an appeal was dismissed by the NLRC "for having been filed out of time." 2

The petitioner, through counsel, alleged that the respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case and affirmed that the motion for reconsideration or appeal was seasonably filed explaining thus:

xxx xxx xxx

While it is true that between 25 October 1984 (date of receipt of the POEA decision) and 09 November 1984 (actual date of filing of petitioner's motion for reconsideration), there were actually fifteen

(15) calendar days, however, it can not be disputed that within said period there were only ten (10) working days, and five (5) non-working or legal holidays, which were as follows:

October 26, 1984--Saturday

October 27,1984--Sunday

November 1, 1984--All Saint's Day

November 3, 1984--Saturday

November 4,198--Sunday 3

xxx xxx xxx

In support of its contention, the petitioner cited two provisions allegedly of the 1984 POEA rules and procedures, specifying Rule XXIV, sec. 1, and Rule XXV, sec. 2, thereof, which purportedly provide:

Rule XXV

xxx xxx xxx

Section 2. Finality of Decision, Order or Award — all decisions, orders or award shall become final after the lapse of ten (10) working days from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties and no appeal has been perfected within same period.

RULE XXIV

Section 1. Motion for Reconsideration. — The aggrieved party may within ten (10) working days from receipt of the decision, order or resolution of the Administration, may file for a motion for reconsideration; otherwise, the decision shall be final and executory (Emphasis supplied) 4

These cited rules do not exist. Nowhere in any law or rules relative to the POEA may the above provisions be found.

The POEA was created only on May 1, 1982 by virtue of Executive Order No. 797. Pursuant to the said Executive Order, the then Minister of Labor, Blas F. Ople promulgated on September 5, 1983 the POEA Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment which took effect on January 1, 1984. These 1984 Rules were superseded on May 21, 1985 by the POEA Rules & Regulations.

For the reason that the petitioner's appeal with the NLRC was filed on November 9,1984, the 1984 Rules should govern. And this was precisely what the petitioner insisted upon — the POEA rules obtaining in 1984 must be applied. 5 Yet therein, it is clear that the period for perfecting an appeal or a Motion for Reconsideration is ten (10) calendar days. The pertinent rule on the matter is found in Book VII, Rule 5, of the 1984 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment (POEA/MOLE) to wit:

Section 1. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND/OR APPEAL. The aggrieved party may, within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the decision, order or resolution file a motion for reconsideration which shall specify in detail the particular errors and objections, otherwise the decision shall be final and executory. Such motion for reconsideration shall be treated as an appeal as provided in this Rule otherwise the same shall not be entertained.

The above rule is expressed in a language so simple and precise that there is no necessity to interpret it.

Moreover, as early as 1982, this Court, in the landmark case of Vir-Jen Shipping & Marine Services, Inc. vs. NLRC6 construed the ten (10) day period for filing of appeals 7 from decisions of Labor Arbiters or compulsory arbitrators as ten (10) calendar days, as well as the raison d' etre for the shorter period, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

...if only because We believe that it is precisely in the interest of labor that the law has commanded that labor cases be promptly, if not peremptorily, disposed of. Long periods for any acts to be done by the contending parties can be taken advantage of more by management than by labor. Most labor claims are decided in their favor and management is generally the appellant. Delay, in most instances, gives the employers more opportunity not only to prepare even ingenious defense, what with well-paid talented lawyers they can afford, but even to wear out the efforts and meager resources of the workers, to the point that not infrequently the latter either give up or compromise for less than what is due them.

xxx xxx xxx

The POEA rule applicable in this case is precisely in consonance with the above ruling in that it expressed in no uncertain terms that the period for appeal is ten (10) calendar days. For "not even the Secretary of Labor has the power to amend or alter in any material sense whatever the law itself unequivocably specifies or fixes." 8

There is, thus, no doubt that the law mandates that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or appeal with the NLRC is ten (10) calendar days and not ten (10) working days.

It is, therefore, obvious that the counsels for the petitioner deliberately tried to mislead this Court if only to suit their client's ends. On this regard, said counsels have much explaining to do.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Resolution of the public respondent, dated December 28, 1984, AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on July 10, 1985 is hereby LIFTED. The counsels for the petitioner are also admonished for foisting a non-existent rule with the warning that repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely. With triple costs against the petitioner.

This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

SO ORDERED.

Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.

VERONICA S. SANTIAGO, BENJAMIN Q. HONTIVEROS, MR. SOCORRO F. MANAS, and TRINIDAD NORDISTA, complainants, vs. ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS, respondent.

DAVIDE JR., J.:

In their letter of 8 September 1993, the complainants, former clients of the respondent, pray that the latter be disbarred for "malpractice, neglect and other offenses which may be discovered during the actual investigation of this complaint." They attached thereto an Affidavit of Merit wherein they specifically allege:

1. That we are Defendants-Appellates [sic] in the Court of Appeals Case No. CA-G.N. CV No. 38153 of which to our surprise lost unnecessarily the aforesaid Petition [sic]. A close perusal of the case reveals the serious misconduct of our attorney on record, Atty. Amado Fojas tantamount to malpractice and negligence in the performance of his duty obligation to us, to defend us in the aforesaid case. That the said attorney without informing us the reason why and riding high on the trust and confidence we repose on him either abandoned, failed to act accordingly, or seriously neglected to answer the civil complaint against us in the sala of Judge Teresita Capulong Case No. 3526-V-91 Val. Metro Manila so that we were deduced [sic] in default.

2. That under false pretenses Atty. Fojas assured us that everything was in order. That he had already answered the complaint so that in spite of the incessant demand for him to give us a copy he continued to deny same to us. Only to disclose later that he never answered it after all because according to him he was a very busy man. Please refer to Court of Appeals decision dated August 17, 1993.

3. That because of Atty. Amado Foja's neglect and malpractice of law we lost the Judge Capulong case and our appeal to the Court of Appeals. So that it is only proper that Atty. Fojas be disciplined and disbarred in the practice of his profession.

In his Comment, the respondent admits his "mistake" in failing to file the complainants' answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91, but he alleges that it was cured by his filing of a motion for reconsideration, which was unfortunately denied by the court. He asserts that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was a "losing cause" for the complainants because it was based on the expulsion of the plaintiff therein from the Far Eastern University Faculty Association (FEUFA) which was declared unlawful in the final decision in NCR-OD-M-90-10-050. Thus, "[t]he unfavorable judgment in the Regional Trial Court is not imputable to [his] mistake but rather imputable to the merits of the case, i.e., the decision in the Expulsion case wherein defendants (complainants herein) illegally removed from the union (FEUFA) membership Mr.

Paulino Salvador. . . ." He further claims that the complainants filed this case to harass him because he refused to share his attorney's fees in the main labor case he had handled for them. The respondent then prays for the dismissal of this complaint for utter lack of merit, since his failure to file the answer was cured and, even granting for the sake of argument that such failure amounted to negligence, it cannot warrant his disbarment or suspension from the practice of the law profession.

The complainants filed a Reply to the respondent's Comment.

Issues having been joined, we required the parties to inform us whether they were willing to submit this case for decision on the basis of the pleadings they have filed. In their separate compliance, both manifested in the affirmative.

The facts in this case are not disputed.

Complainants Veronica Santiago, Benjamin Hontiveros, Ma. Socorro Manas, and Trinidad Nordista were the President, Vice-President, Treasurer, and Auditor, respectively, of the FEUFA. They allegedly expelled from the union Paulino Salvador. The latter then commenced with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a complaint (NCR-OD-M-90-10-050) to declare illegal his expulsion from the union.

In his resolution of 22 November 1990, Med-Arbiter Tomas Falconitin declared illegal Salvador's expulsion and directed the union and all its officers to reinstate Salvador's name in the roll of union members with all the rights and privileges appurtenant thereto. This resolution was affirmed in toto by the Secretary of Labor and Employment.

Subsequently, Paulino Salvador filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, a complaint against the complainants herein for actual, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees, under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3526-V-91.

As the complainants' counsel, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the said case on grounds of (1) res judicataby virtue of the final decision of the Med-Arbiter in NCR-OD-M-90-10-050 and (2) lack of jurisdiction, since what was involved was an intra-union issue cognizable by the DOLE. Later, he filed a supplemental motion to dismiss.

The trial court, per Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, granted the motion and ordered the dismissal of the case. Upon Salvador's motion for reconsideration, however, it reconsidered the order of dismissal, reinstated the case, and required the complainants herein to file their answer within a nonextendible period of fifteen days from notice.

Instead of filing an answer, the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and dismissal of the case. This motion having been denied, the respondent filed with this Court a petition for certiorari, which was later referred to the Court of Appeals and docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 25834.

Although that petition and his subsequent motion for reconsideration were both denied, the respondent still did not file the complainants' answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. Hence, upon plaintiff Salvador's motion, the complainants were declared in default, and Salvador was authorized to present his evidence ex-parte.

The respondent then filed a motion to set aside the order of default and to stop the ex-parte reception of evidence before the Clerk of Court, but to no avail.

Thereafter, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the complainants herein to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff Salvador the amounts of P200,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages or corrective damages; and P65,000.00 as attorney's fees; plus cost of suit.

The complainants, still assisted by the respondent, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which, however, affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.

The respondent asserts that he was about to appeal the said decision to this Court, but his services as counsel for the complainants and for the union were illegally and unilaterally terminated by complainant Veronica Santiago.

The core issue that presents itself is whether the respondent committed culpable negligence, as would warrant disciplinary action, in failing to file for the complainants an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 for which reason the latter were declared in default and judgment was rendered against them on the basis of the plaintiff's evidence, which was received ex-parte.

It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment, 1 subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. 2 He must serve the client with competence and diligence, 3 and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. 4Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. 5 This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. 6 If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. 7

The respondent admits that it was his duty to file an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. He justifies his failure to do so in this wise:

[I]n his overzealousness to question the Denial Order of the trial court, 8 [he] instead, thru honest mistake and excusable neglect, filed a PETITION FOR CERTIORARI with the Honorable Court, docketed as G.R. No. 100983. . . .

And, when the Court of Appeals, to which G.R. No. 100983 was referred, dismissed the petition, he again "inadvertently" failed to file an answer "[d]ue to honest mistake and because of his overzealousness as stated earlier. . . . "

In their Reply, the complainants allege that his failure to file an answer was not an honest mistake but was "deliberate, malicious and calculated to place them on the legal disadvantage, to their damage and prejudice" for, as admitted by him in his motion to set aside the order of default, his failure to do so was "due to volume and pressure of legal work." 9 In short, the complainants want to impress upon this Court that the respondent has given inconsistent reasons to justify his failure to file an answer.

We agree with the complainants. In his motion for reconsideration of the default order, the respondent explained his non-filing of the required answer by impliedly invoking forgetfulness occasioned by a large volume and pressure of legal work, while in his Comment in this case he attributes it to honest mistake and excusable neglect due to his overzealousness to question the denial order of the trial court.

Certainly, "overzealousness" on the one hand and "volume and pressure of legal work" on the other are two distinct and separate causes or grounds. The first presupposes the respondent's full and continuing awareness of his duty to file an answer which, nevertheless, he subordinated to his conviction that the trial court had committed a reversible error or grave abuse of discretion in issuing an order reconsidering its previous order of dismissal of Salvador's complaint and in denying the motion to reconsider the said order. The second ground is purely based on forgetfulness because of his other commitments.

Whether it be the first or the second ground, the fact remains that the respondent did not comply with his duty to file an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. His lack of diligence was compounded by his erroneous belief that the trial court committed such error or grave abuse of discretion and by his continued refusal to file an answer even after he received the Court of Appeals' decision in the certiorari case. There is no showing whatsoever that he further assailed the said decision before this Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to prove his claim of overzealousness to challenge the trial court's order. Neither was it shown that he alleged in his motion to lift the order of default that the complainants had a meritorious defense. 10 And, in his appeal from the judgment by default, he did not even raise as one of the errors of the trial court either the impropriety of the order of default or the court's grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to lift that order.

Pressure and large volume of legal work provide no excuse for the respondent's inability to exercise due diligence in the performance of his duty to file an answer. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill, and

competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.

All told, the respondent committed a breach of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires him to serve his clients, the complainants herein, with diligence and, more specifically, Rule 18.03 thereof which provides: "A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."

The respondent's negligence is not excused by his claim that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was in fact a "losing cause" for the complainants since the claims therein for damages were based on the final decision of the Med-Arbiter declaring the complainants' act of expelling Salvador from the union to be illegal. This claim is a mere afterthought which hardly persuades us. If indeed the respondent was so convinced of the futility of any defense therein, he should have seasonably informed the complainants thereof. Rule 15.05, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly provides:

A lawyer, when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of the client's case, neither overstating nor understanding the prospects of the case.

Then too, if he were unconvinced of any defense, we are unable to understand why he took all the trouble of filing a motion to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and lack of jurisdiction and of questioning the adverse ruling thereon initially with this Court and then with the Court of Appeals, unless, of course, he meant all of these to simply delay the disposition of the civil case. Finally, the complainants were not entirely without any valid or justifiable defense. They could prove that the plaintiff was not entitled to all the damages sought by him or that if he were so, they could ask for a reduction of the amounts thereof.

We do not therefore hesitate to rule that the respondent is not free from any blame for the sad fate of the complainants. He is liable for inexcusable negligence.

WHEREFORE, ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS is hereby REPRIMANDED and ADMONISHED to be, henceforth, more careful in the performance of his duty to his clients.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Bellosillo, Kapunan and Hermosisima Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

ARTEMIO ENDAYA, complainant, vs. ATTY. WILFREDO OCA, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

TINGA, J.:

The law is no brooding omnipresence in the sky, so spoke Justice Holmes. He must have made the statement because invariably the legal system is encountered in human form, notably through the lawyers. For practical purposes, the lawyers not only represent the law; they are the law.[1] With their ubiquitous presence in the social milieu, lawyers have to be responsible. The problems they create in lawyering become public difficulties. To keep lawyers responsible underlies the worth of the ethics of lawyering. Indeed, legal ethics is simply the aesthetic term for professional responsibility.

The case before us demonstrates once again that when a lawyer violates his duties to his client, the courts, the legal profession and the public, he engages in conduct which is both unethical and unprofessional.

This case unfolded with a verified Complaint[2] filed on January 12, 1993 by complainant Artemio Endaya against respondent Atty. Wifredo Oca for violation of the lawyer’s oath and what complainant termed as “professional delinquency or infidelity.”[3] The antecedents are:

On November 7, 1991, a complaint for unlawful detainer docketed as Civil Case No. 34-MCTC-T was filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Taysan-Lobo, Batangas by Apolonia H. Hornilla, Pedro Hernandez, Santiago Hernandez and Dominador Hernandez against complainant and his spouse Patrosenia Endaya.[4]

On December 13, 1991, the complainant and his wife as defendants in the case filed their answer which was prepared by a certain Mr. Isaias Ramirez. A preliminary conference was conducted on January 17, 1992, which complainant and his wife attended without counsel. During the conference, complainant categorically admitted that plaintiffs were the declared owners for taxation purposes of the land involved in the case. Continuation of the preliminary conference was set on January 31, 1992. Thereafter, complainant sought the services of the Public Attorney’s Office in Batangas City and respondent was assigned to handle the case for the complainant and his wife.[5]

At the continuation of the preliminary conference, respondent appeared as counsel for complainant and his spouse. He moved for the amendment of the answer previously filed by complainant and his wife, but his motion was denied.[6] Thereafter, the court, presided by Acting Trial Court Judge Teodoro M. Baral, ordered the parties to submit their affidavits and position papers within ten days from receipt of the order. The court also decreed that thirty days after receipt of the last affidavit and position paper, or upon expiration of the period for filing the same, judgment shall be rendered on the case.[7]

Respondent failed to submit the required affidavits and position paper, as may be gleaned from the Decision dated March 19, 1992 of the MCTC where it was noted that “only the plaintiffs submitted their affidavits and position papers.”[8]

Nonetheless, the court dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer principally on the ground that the plaintiffs are not the real parties-in-interest. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, this case is hereby dismissed on the ground that the plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue as they are not the real party (sic) in interest, in addition to the fact that there is no privity of contract between the plaintiffs and the defendants as to the verbal lease agreement.

SO ORDERED.[9]

Plaintiffs appealed the Decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas City, Branch 1, where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3378. On April 10, 1992, the RTC directed the parties to file their respective memoranda.[10] Once again, respondent failed the complainant and his wife. As observed by the RTC in its Decision[11] dated September 7, 1992, respondent did not file the memorandum for his clients, thereby prompting the court to consider the case as submitted for decision.[12]

In its Decision, the RTC reversed the decision appealed from as it held that plaintiffs are the co-owners of the property in dispute and as such are parties-in-interest.[13] It also found that the verbal lease agreement was on a month-to-month basis and perforce terminable by the plaintiffs at the end of any given month upon proper notice to the defendants.[14] It also made a finding that defendants incurred rentals in arrears.[15] The decretal portion of the Decision reads, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Taysan-Lobo dated March 19, 1992, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and new one entered, to wit:

Defendants ARTEMIO ENDAYA and PATROSENIA ENDAYA and all persons claiming under them are hereby ordered to vacate and dismantle their house on the land subject of the verbal lease agreement at their own expense. The defendants are likewise ordered to pay the monthly rental of P25.00 from the month of January 1991 to November 1991 and ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS monthly from December 1991 until the defendants finally vacate and surrender possession of the subject property to the plaintiffs and to pay attorney’s fee in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS.

No pronouncement as to cost.[16]

Complainant received a copy of the Decision on October 7, 1992. Two days later, or on October 9, 1992, complainant confronted respondent with the adverse decision but the latter denied receipt of a copy thereof. Upon inquiry with the Branch Clerk of Court, however, complainant found out that respondent received his copy back on September 14, 1992.[17]

Having lost the unlawful detainer case, on January 12, 1993 complainant filed the present administrative complaint against the respondent for professional delinquency consisting of his failure to file the required pleadings in behalf of the

complainant and his spouse. Complainant contends that due to respondent’s inaction he lost the opportunity to present his cause and ultimately the case itself.[18]

In his Comment[19] dated March 17, 1993, respondent denies that he committed professional misconduct in violation of his oath, stressing that he was not the original counsel of complainant and his spouse.[20] He further avers that when he agreed to represent complainant at the continuation of the preliminary conference in the main case, it was for the sole purpose of asking leave of court to file an amended answer because he was made to believe by the complainant that the answer was prepared by a non-lawyer. Upon discovering that the answer was in fact the work of a lawyer, forthwith he asked the court to relieve him as complainant’s counsel, but he was denied. He adds that he agreed to file the position paper for the complainant upon the latter’s undertaking to provide him with the documents which support the position that plaintiffs are not the owners of the property in dispute. As complainant had reneged on his promise, he claims that he deemed it more prudent not to file any position paper as it would be a repetition of the answer. He offers the same reason for not filing the memorandum on appeal with the RTC. Finally, respondent asserts that “he fully explained his stand as regards Civil Case No. 34-MCTC-T to the complainant.”[21]

Pursuant to our Resolution[22] dated May 10, 1993, complainant filed his Reply[23] to respondent’s Comment wherein he merely reiterated his allegations in the Complaint.

On July 28, 1993, this Court directed respondent to file his rejoinder within ten days from notice of our Resolution.[24] But he failed to do so despite the lapse of a considerable period of time. This prompted the Court to require respondent to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt and to file his rejoinder, both within ten (10) days from notice.[25]

In his Explanation[26] dated February 28, 1997, respondent admits having received a copy of the resolution requiring him to file a rejoinder. However, he asserts that he purposely did not file a rejoinder for “he believed in good faith that a rejoinder to complainant’s reply is no longer necessary.”[27] He professes that in electing not to file a rejoinder he did not intend to cast disrespect upon the Court.[28]

On June 16, 1997, we referred this case to the Office of the Bar Confidant for evaluation, report and recommendation.[29]

In its Report[30] dated February 6, 2001, the Office of the Bar Confidant found respondent negligent in handling the case of complainant and his wife and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for one month. The pertinent portions of the Report read, thus:

It is to be noted that after appearing at the preliminary conference before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, respondent was never heard from again. Respondent’s seeming indifference to the cause of his client, specially when the case was on appeal, caused the defeat of herein complainant. Respondent practically abandoned complainant in the midst of a storm. This is even more made serious of the fact that respondent, at that time, was assigned at the Public Attorney’s Office- a government entity mandated to provide free and competent legal assistance.

“A lawyer’s devotion to his client’s cause not only requires but also entitles him to deploy every honorable means to secure for the client what is justly due him or to present every defense provided by law to enable the latter’s cause to succeed.” (Miraflor vs. Hagad, 244 SCRA 106)

. . . .

The facts, however, do not show that respondent employed every legal and honorable means to advance the cause of his client. Had respondent tried his best, he could have found some other defenses available to his client; but respondent was either too lazy or too convinced that his client had a losing case.

. . . .

For intentionally failing to submit the pleadings required by the court, respondent practically closed the door to the possibility of putting up a fair fight for his client. As the Court once held, “ A client is bound by the negligence of his lawyer.” (Diaz-Duarte vs. Ong, 298 SCRA 388)[31]

However, the Bar Confidant did not find complainant entirely faultless. She observed, viz:

Respondent’s allegation that complainant failed in his promise to submit the documents to support his claim was not denied by complainant; hence, it is deemed admitted. Complainant is not without fault; for misrepresenting that he could prove his claim through supporting documents, respondent was made to believe that he had a strong leg to stand on. “A party cannot blame his counsel for negligence when he himself was guilty of neglect.” (Macapagal vs. Court of Appeals, 271 SCRA 491)[32]

On April 18, 2001, we referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.

Several hearings were set by the IBP but complainant did not appear even once. Respondent attended five hearings, but he failed to present evidence in support of his defense, as required by Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez. This compelled the latter to make his report on the basis of the pleadings and evidence forwarded by the Office of the Bar Confidant.

On October 11, 2002, Commissioner Fernandez issued his Report[33] wherein he concurred with the findings and recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant.

In a Resolution[34] dated April 26, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the Report of Commissioner Fernandez.

The Court is convinced that respondent violated the lawyer’s oath not only once but a number of times in regard to the handling of his clients’ cause. The repeated violations also involve defilement of several Canons in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Right off, the Court notes that respondent attributes his failure to file the required pleadings for the complainant and his wife invariably to his strong personal

belief that it was unnecessary or futile to file the pleadings. This was true with respect to the affidavits and position paper at the MCTC level, the appeal memorandum at the RTC level and the rejoinder at this Court’s level. In the last instance, it took respondent as long as three years, under compulsion of a show cause order at that, only to manifest his predisposition not to file a rejoinder after all. In other words, at the root of respondent’s transgressions is his seeming stubborn mindset against the acts required of him by the courts. This intransigent attitude not only belies lack of diligence and commitment but evinces absence of respect for the authority of this Court and the other courts involved.

The lawyer’s oath embodies the fundamental principles that guide every member of the legal fraternity. From it springs the lawyer’s duties and responsibilities that any infringement thereof can cause his disbarment, suspension or other disciplinary action.[35]

Found in the oath is the duty of a lawyer to protect and safeguard the interest of his client. Specifically, it requires a lawyer to conduct himself “to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients.”[36] This duty is further stressed in Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that “(A) lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.”

In this case, evidence abound that respondent failed to demonstrate the required diligence in handling the case of complainant and his spouse. As found by the Office of the Bar Confidant,[37] after appearing at the second preliminary conference before the MCTC, respondent had not been heard of again until he commented on the complaint in this case. Without disputing this fact, respondent reasons out that his appearance at the conference was for the sole purpose of obtaining leave of court to file an amended answer and that when he failed to obtain it because of complainant’s fault he asked the court that he be relieved as counsel.[38] The explanation has undertones of dishonesty for complainant had engaged respondent for the entire case and not for just one incident. The alternative conclusion is that respondent did not know his procedure for under the Rules on Summary Procedure[39] the amended answer is a prohibited pleading.

Even assuming respondent did in fact ask to be relieved, this could not mean that less was expected from him. Once a lawyer takes the cudgels for a client’s case, he owes it to his client to see the case to the end. This, we pointed out in Legarda v. Court of Appeals,[40] thus:

It should be remembered that the moment a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exert all effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion. A lawyer who fails to exercise due diligence or abandons his client’s cause make him unworthy of the trust reposed on him by the latter.[41]

Also, we held in Santiago v. Fojas,[42] “every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill, and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts if for a fee or for free.” In other words, whatever the lawyer’s reason is for accepting a case, he is duty bound to do his utmost in prosecuting or defending it.

Moreover, a lawyer continues to be a counsel of record until the lawyer-client relationship is terminated either by the act of his client or his own act, with

permission of the court. Until such time, the lawyer is expected to do his best for the interest of his client [43]

Thus, when respondent was directed to file affidavits and position paper by the MCTC, and appeal memorandum by the RTC, he had no choice but to comply. However, respondent did not bother to do so, in total disregard of the court orders. This constitutes negligence and malpractice proscribed by Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that “(A) lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.”

Respondent’s failure to file the affidavits and position paper at the MCTC did not actually prejudice his clients, for the court nevertheless rendered a decision favorable to them. However, the failure is per se a violation of Rule 18.03.

It was respondent’s failure to file appeal memorandum before the RTC which made complainant and his wife suffer as it resulted in their loss of the case. As found by the Office of the Bar Confidant, to which we fully subscribe, in not filing the appeal memorandum respondent denied complainant and his spouse the chance of putting up a fair fight in the dispute. Canon 19 prescribes that “(A) lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law.” He should exert all efforts to avail of the remedies allowed under the law. Respondent did not do so, thereby even putting to naught the advantage which his clients apparently gained by prevailing at the MCTC level. Verily, respondent did not even bother to put up a fight for his clients. Clearly, his conduct fell short of what Canon 19 requires and breached the trust reposed in him by his clients.

We cannot sustain respondent’s excuse in not filing the affidavits and position paper with the MCTC and the appeal memorandum with the RTC. He claims that he did not file the required pleadings because complainant failed to furnish him with evidence that would substantiate complainant’s allegations in the answer. He argues that absent the supporting documents, the pleadings he could have filed would just be a repetition of the answer. However, respondent admits in his comment that complainant furnished him with the affidavit of persons purporting to be barangay officials attesting to an alleged admission by Felomino Hernandez, the brother of the plaintiffs in the unlawful detainer case, that he had already bought the disputed property.[44] This did not precipitate respondent into action despite the evidentiary value of the affidavit, which was executed by disinterested persons. Said affidavit could have somehow bolstered the claim of complainant and his wife which was upheld by the MCTC that plaintiffs are not the real parties-in-interest. While respondent could have thought this affidavit to be without probative value, he should have left it to the sound judgment of the court to determine whether the affidavit supports the assertions of his clients. That could have happened had he filed the required position paper and annexed the affidavit thereto.

Further, notwithstanding his belief that without the supporting documents filing the required pleadings would be a futile exercise, still respondent should have formally and promptly manifested in court his intent not to file the pleadings to prevent delay in the disposition of the case.[45]Specifically, the RTC would not have waited as it did for the lapse of three months from June 5,1992, the date when plaintiffs-appellants submitted their appeal memorandum, before it rendered judgment. Had it known that respondent would not file the appeal memorandum, the court could have decided the case much earlier.

For his failure to inform the court, respondent violated Canon 12, to wit:

Canon 12: A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.

Respondent likewise failed to demonstrate the candor he owed his client. Canon 17 provides that “(A) lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.” When complainant received the RTC decision, he talked to respondent about it.[46] However, respondent denied knowledge of the decision despite his receipt thereof as early as September 14, 1992. Obviously, he tried to evade responsibility for his negligence. In doing so, respondent was untruthful to complainant and effectively betrayed the trust placed in him by the latter.

On top of all these is respondent’s employment as a lawyer of the Public Attorney’s Office which is tasked to provide free legal assistance for indigents and low-income persons so as to promote the rule of law in the protection of the rights of the citizenry and the efficient and speedy administration of justice.[47] Against this backdrop, respondent should have been more judicious in the performance of his professional obligations. As we held in Vitriola v. Dasig[48] “lawyers in the government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service.” Furthermore, a lawyer from the government is not exempt from observing the degree of diligence required in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 6 of the Code provides that “the canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks.”

At this juncture, it bears stressing that much is demanded from those who engage in the practice of law because they have a duty not only to their clients, but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. The lawyer’s diligence and dedication to his work and profession not only promote the interest of his client, it likewise help attain the ends of justice by contributing to the proper and speedy administration of cases, bring prestige to the bar and maintain respect to the legal profession.[49]

The determination of the appropriate penalty to be imposed on an errant attorney involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the facts of the case.[50] In cases of similar nature, the penalty imposed by this Court consisted of reprimand,[51] fine of five hundred pesos with warning,[52] suspension of three months,[53] six months,[54] and even disbarment in aggravated cases.[55]

The facts and circumstances in this case indubitably show respondent’s failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the lawyer’s oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby warranting his suspension from the practice of law. At various stages of the unlawful detainer case, respondent was remiss in the performance of his duty as counsel.

To reiterate, respondent did not submit the affidavits and position paper when required by the MCTC. With his resolution not to file the pleadings already firmed up, he did not bother to inform the MCTC of his resolution in mockery of the authority of the court. His stubbornness continued at the RTC, for despite an order to file an appeal memorandum, respondent did not file any. Neither did he manifest before the court that he would no longer file the pleading, thus further delaying the proceedings. He had no misgivings about his deviant behavior, for despite receipt of a copy of the adverse decision by the RTC he opted not to inform his clients accordingly.

Worse, he denied knowledge of the decision when confronted by the complainant about it.

At this Court’s level, respondent’s stubborn and uncaring demeanor surfaced again when he did not file a rejoinder to complainant’s reply.

Respondent’s story projects in vivid detail his appalling indifference to his clients’ cause, deplorable lack of respect for the courts and a brazen disregard of his duties as a lawyer.

However, we are not unmindful of some facts which extenuate respondent’s misconduct. First, when complainant sought the assistance of respondent as a PAO lawyer, he misrepresented that his answer was prepared by someone who is not a lawyer. Second, when complainant showed respondent a copy of their answer with the MCTC, he assured him that he had strong evidence to support the defense in the answer that plaintiffs were no longer the owners of the property in dispute. However, all that he could provide respondent was the affidavit of the barangay officials. Last but not least, it is of public knowledge that the Public Attorney’s Office is burdened with a heavy caseload.

All things considered, we conclude that suspension for two (2) months from the practice of law is the proper and just penalty.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Wilfredo Oca is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) months from notice, with the warning that a similar misconduct will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this decision be attached to respondent’s personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and to all the courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

REDENTOR S. JARDIN, complainant, vs. ATTY. DEOGRACIAS VILLAR, JR. respondent.

D E C I S I O N

TINGA, J.:

Law is a profession and lawyers are professionals. Implicit in professionalism is a certain level of competence and dedication. Far from measuring up to the standards of a lawyer’s conduct set in the Code of Professional Responsibility which are also the hallmarks of professionalism, the lawyer charged in this case virtually abandoned his client’s cause.

This is a complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Redentor S. Jardin against respondent Atty. Deogracias Villar, Jr., who was his counsel in a case, for the latter’s failure to formally offer the documentary exhibits, which failure resulted in the dismissal of the case.

The complainant Redentor S. Jardin is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 21480 of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City. A building contractor, he engaged the services of the respondent to represent him in the case which is for the collection of the sum of One Hundred Five Thousand Seven Hundred Forty Four and 80/100 Pesos (P105,744.80), representing the alleged unpaid contract price for the repair of the house of the defendants in the case.[1] The case went its course, but later despite several extensions of time given by the trial court, the respondent failed to file his formal offer of exhibits.[2] Consequently, on May 7, 2001, the trial court issued an Order the full text of which reads as follows:

When this case was called for continuation of hearing, Atty. Rodrigo C. Reyes, counsel for the defendants manifested that up to this date, Atty. Villar, Jr., counsel for the plaintiff has not formally offer (sic) the documentary exhibits for the plaintiff in writing as Order (sic) by the Court.

Records show that on February 26, 2001, Atty. Villar, Jr. was given an extension period of TEN (10) days within which to formally offer the documentary exhibits in writing copy furnished Atty. Reyes, counsel for the defendants who was given a period of Five (5) days within which to comment and/or oppose the admissibility of the said exhibits and set the continuation of the hearing of this case for the presentation of evidence for the defendant on March 30, 2001.

On March 30, 2001, when this case was called for hearing records show that Atty. Villar, Jr., counsel for the plaintiff has not complied yet with the formal offer of documentary exhibits for the plaintiff and again, in the interest of justice, the Court give (sic) Atty. Villar, Jr. another period of TEN (10) days within which to formally offer the documentary exhibits in writing and set the continuation of the hearing of this case for today for the presentation of evidence for the defendant.

Records show however, that on this date, the said counsel for the plaintiff have (sic) not complied with the submission of documentary exhibits for the plaintiff. For lack of interest on the part of the counsel for the plaintiff to further prosecute this case, upon motion of Atty. Reyes the oral testimonial evidence submitted by the plaintiff is

hereby ordered WITHDRAWN from the records and upon further motion of ordered WITHDRAWN from the records and upon further motion of Atty. Reyes, this case is hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of interest on the part of the plaintiff to further prosecute this case.

Upon motion of Atty. Reyes, set the continuation of the hearing of this case for the presentation of evidence on the counter claim on the part of the defendant on June 15, 2001 at 8:30 o’clock in the morning.[3]

The dismissal of the collection case prompted the complainant to file a verified Affidavit-Complaint[4] dated July 4, 2001 for the disbarment of the respondent with this Court, wherein he also alleged the developments which transpired after the dismissal of the case, viz: that he already terminated the services of the respondent as his counsel; that the respondent failed to return the originals of the documentary exhibits entrusted to him; and that the respondent finally handed over the documents only as an aftermath of a heated argument he had with the complainant’s wife.

In a Resolution[5] dated September 10, 2001, this Court required the respondent to comment on the complaint against him. However, the respondent failed to file his comment despite two (2) extensions of time granted to him. Thus, the Court resolved to dispense with the filing of the respondent’s comment and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[6]

Similarly, the respondent failed to file his answer as required by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP.[7] Hence, the averments made, as well as the evidence submitted by the complainant, are undisputed.

Investigating Commissioner Attorney Milagros V. San Juan, IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, found the respondent liable for negligence and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with the warning that a similar conduct in the future will be dealt with more severely. The salient portions of the Report and Recommendation dated March 4, 2003 of the Investigating Commissioner are as follows:

Complainant’s contention that respondent Villar failed to file plaintiff’s Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence is substantiated by the Orders dated 26 February 2001, 30 March 2001 and 7 May 2001 (Annexes 7, 9 and 10 respectively). The Order dated 7 May 2001 (Annex 10 of complainant’s Affidavit) reads:

. . . .

It is clear from the above-quoted Order that it was the failure of respondent Villar to file the Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits which led to the dismissal of Civil Case No. 21480 to the prejudice of respondent’s client, herein complainant. Respondent Villar has failed to offer any explanation for his failure to file the Formal Offer of Exhibits within the several extensions of time given him by the trial court to do so. There is no doubt that it was part of respondent’s obligation to complainant as the latter’s counsel of record in Civil Case No. 21480, to file said Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits, and respondent’s dereliction of this duty has prejudiced the

interests of respondent’s client. In accepting Civil Case No. 21480, it was respondent’s obligation to take all measures to protect the interests of his client in accordance with Canon (sic) 18 & 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility but it was respondent’ s negligence or omission which has caused damage to such interests.[8]

In its Resolution dated April 26, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved said Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

We are also in full accord with the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

At the outset, we find particularly glaring the respondent’s disregard of the resolution of this Court directing him to file his comment on the complaint. He exhibited a similar attitude in failing to file his answer when required by the Commission on Bar Discipline. The repeated cavalier conduct belies impudence and lack of respect for the authority of this Court.

The record clearly shows that the respondent has been languid in the performance of his duties as counsel for the complainant. He was given by the trial court several extensions of time: first, an extension of ten (10) days from February 26, 2001 or until March 8, 2001, and; second, another extension of ten (10) days from March 30, 2001, when the case was called for hearing and the court noted that no such formal offer had been filed then, or until April 9, 2001. It must also be emphasized that there was an interim period of twenty two (22) days between March 8, 2001 and March 30, 2001, and another interval of twenty-seven (27) days from April 9, 2001 until May 7, 2001 when the Order dismissing the case was issued. Effectively, therefore, respondent had three (3) months and nine (9) days within which to file the formal offer of exhibits.[9] The respondent did not bother to give an explanation even in mitigation or extenuation of his inaction.

Manifestly, the respondent has fallen short of the competence and diligence required of every member of the Bar. The pertinent Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:

CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

. . . .

Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.

CANON 17 — A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

. . . .

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

. . . .

CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHAL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.

It is indeed dismaying to note the respondent’s patent violation of his duty as a lawyer. He committed a serious transgression when he failed to exert his utmost learning and ability and to give entire devotion to his client’s cause. His client had relied on him to file the formal offer of exhibits among other things. But he failed him. Resulting as it did in the dismissal of the case, his failure constitutes inexcusable default. It therefore behooves the Court to take action on the respondent’s mortal infraction, which caused undeserved and needless prejudice to his client’s interest, adversely affected the confidence of the community in the legal profession and eroded the public’s trust in the judicial system. As an attorney, the respondent is sworn to do his level best and to observe full fidelity to the courts and his clients.[10] This means that in relation to his duty to his clients he should put his maximum skills and full commitment to bear in representation of their causes.

We can only echo our pronouncements in Basas v. Icawat,[11] to wit:

Respondent manifestly fell short of the diligence required of his profession, in violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 provides:

"A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."

As we reiterated in Aromin, et al. v. Boncavil, A. C. No. 5135, September 22, 1999:

Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.[12]

This Court has emphatically ruled that the trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients requires in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his

duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the public.[13] Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or free.[14] Certainly, a member of the Bar who is worth his title cannot afford to practice the profession in a lackadaisical fashion. A lawyer’s lethargy from the perspective of the Canons is both unprofessional and unethical.

The IBP recommended the suspension of the respondent from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. We find the recommended penalty commensurate with the offense committed.

In Aromin v. Boncavil,[15] this Court suspended a lawyer for six (6) months for his failure to file a written offer of evidence despite the trial court’s directive.

The failure to file formal offer of evidence is in pari materia with failure to file brief, which as this Court held in Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. v. Saquilabon[16] constitutes inexcusable negligence. In the Saquilabon case, the respondent lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. The Court likewise imposed the same penalty upon the respondents in the cases of In Re: Atty. David Briones,[17] Spouses Galen v. Paguinigan,[18] Spouses Rabanal v. Rabanal[19] for their failure to file the briefs of their respective clients.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Deogracias Villar is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective upon finality hereof, with the WARNING that the repetition of a similar violation will be dealt with even more severely.

Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records of respondent as a member of the Bar, and copies furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.