Duffield Wildfire Behavior and Review of April 24 2001 ...cfs.nrcan.gc.ca/bookstore_pdfs/24736.pdfdepartment personnel, and consultation with affected residents and RCMP. Generally,

Duffield Wildfire Behavior and Review of

April 24 2001 Fire in Parkland County in

West-Central Alberta

by Brian Mottus

Natural Resources Canada, Canadian Forest Service Edmonton, Alberta

© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada as represented by the Minister of Natural Resources (Canada).

This publiFation is available at no charge from:

Natural Resources Canada Canadian Forest Service Northern Forestry Centre 5320 - 122 Street Edmonton, Alberta T6H 3S5

Cover Photo - Sam Borys Property and Parkland Drive - Looking Northwest after April 24,2001

Photo courtesy of Parkland County.

1

Duffield Fire Perimeter April 24, 2001. Map source: Parkland County Millennium Edition 2000.

II

CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Issues and Recommendations ..................................................... ..... 1

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................... ... 3

The Duffield Fire Review .............. '" ................ , . .. . .. . ... .. .. . . .. . .. . .. . ... 3

The Review Process ......... , ............................ " ................ " . .. . .. . . ... 3

OVERVIEW ..................................................................................... 4

Wildland-Urban futerface .................. , . ..... . .. . . ..... .. . ..... . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . ... 4

The Duffield Fire . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 4

Fire chronology and development . . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . ..... . .. . .. . .. . ... 4

Suppression ..................................................................... 5 Fire environment ......................................... " . ... .. . .. . ..... ... .. 6

Topography ............................................................ 6

Fuels ................................................................ .... 6

Duffield fire weather ..................... , .............. , . .. . .. . ... .. 7 Synoptic weather of the active fire period . . .. . . . . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. .. 16

Analysis of fire behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Summary of public consultations ..... ..... ............... ................. 19

Communications . . .. . ... ...... .. ...... . .. . .. . .. . .. . ... .. . .. . .. ... ... 19

Parkland County firefighting efforts .................. , . .. . .. . .... 19

Community protection efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . 20

Post-fire activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Positive comments emerged from area residents . . .. . .. . . . . .. .. 21

Meeting- Stony Plain RCMP-March 18, 2002 . . .. . .. . . .. .. . .. . . 21

KEY ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................... .... 22

COlilmunications .................... -..... -....... ; .... ; ... ;-. -.. : .-..... -.............. ; . .. 22 Key issue .. .. . ... ......... .. . .. . ..... . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . . . . .. . .. ... . .. 22

Examples of the issue in the Duffield fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 22

Education ........ ... ... ... ...... ... .. ... . .. . . . . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . . .. .. . . 22

Fire loss compensation ................................. , . .. . .. . .. . . 22

Opportunities for Improvement .............. " ... . . . . .. . .. . . . . .. . .. . .. . . ... 23

Recommendation 1 . . ... .. . ..... . .. ... . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . ... ... 23

Unified Planning and Action .............................. , .............. , . .. . .. ... .. 23

Key issue . . ..... ... ... ...... . .. . .. .... .. ... .... . . . ... .. . .. . .. . .. . . .. .. . .. ... . ... 24

Examples of the Issue in Duffield Fire ................... ............. .... 24

Opportunities for Improvement . . ... .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . . . . .. ... . .. . .. . .... 24

Recommendation 2 . . ... .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. ... . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. .. . . .. . ... 24

iii !

Community Protection ............................................................. . Key issue .................................................................... . Examples of the issue in the Duffield fire ............................. .

Op . . £". • portunities lor unprovement ......................................... . , Recommendation 3 ............................................ .

Presuppression Planning and Suppression for Future Extreme Fire Behavior Conditions ........... " .............................................. .

Key issue ................................................................... . Examples of the issue in the Duffield fire ............................. . Opportunities for improvement .......................................... .

Recommendation 4 ............................................... .

25 26 26 26 26

27 27 27 27 28

ACKN"OWLEDGMENTS ............................................................... . 28

REFERENCES 29

APPENDIXES Appendix 1 .......................................................................... 30

Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 30 Appendix 2 .......................................................................... 35

SRD Wildfire Jurisdiction, Policies and Program ................. ... 35

REVIEWMEMBER ..................................................................... 37

NOTE

The views, statements, and conclusions expressed and the recommendations made in this report are entirely those of the author and should not be construed as statements or conclusions of, or as

expressing the opinions of the Canadian Forest Service.

IV ,/

EXECUTIVE SUl\Il\IARY

The Duffield fire and the subsequent events of April 24, 2001 prompted Parkland County Protective Services to request a review of the fire incident. The Duffield fire review was conducted between February and April 2002 and involved an in-depth study of the wildfire, an evaluation of emergency communications, discussions with fire department personnel, and consultation with affected residents and RCMP.

Generally, Parkland County fire services suppression activities are very effective; however, a small percentage of wildland fire excursions become very large wildfires. This is of particular concern in the wildland-urban interface that occurs throughout Parkland County.

This review concludes that it is necessary to address wildland-urban fire issues proactively in a cooperative manner; such action will improve human safety, reduce the risk of property loss, and allow wildland-urban fire suppression resources from outside the county to be used in a cost effective manner.

The review identified major issues and developed recommendations for consideration. There is no single solution to the identified issues, but key actions as expressed in the review recommendations can help reduce the risk of loss from wildfire.

Issues And Recommendations There are four broad issues that overlap and necessarily support each other.

These recommendations are based on the following issues: • Communication • Unified planning and action (interagency coordination) • Community protection • Pre�pl�nning and suppression for·future extreme fire behavior conditions

Recommendation 1 Parkland County should take a lead with the necessary resources and ensure

priority is given to creating a communication plan. This plan could involve strategies and tactics to actively communicate with Parkland County residents most likely to be affected by wildland-urban fire; education on roles and responsibilities for different stakeholders, including steps property owners should take to reduce the risk of loss; and details on interagency communication before a major fire event.

Recommendation 2 Parkland County Emergency Services should improve command and resource

coordination with mutual-aid partners and adjacent counties and municipalities. This can be accomplished by establishing an integrated and coordinated command system to ensure interagency resource sharing and decision-making during a complex wildland fire.

Duffield F ire Review April 2002 Page 1

Recommendation 3 Parkland County Emergency Services should recognize the need for wildfire

suppression strategy and tactics separate from those used for wildland-urban fire suppresslon.

The implementation of this recommendation requires a well understood, coordinated and communicated definition of responsibilities when ground crews will attempt to engage wildfire. Wildfire suppression areas would be operated separately from but in coordination with the wildland-urban suppression approach.

Recommendation 4 Parkland County should include appropriate levels of aerial support to help reduce

the occurrence, or impact of large fires during anticipated extreme fire behavior conditions. During a large wildfire, additional ground suppression units should be requested from adjoining counties to supplement, assist and rotate with county fire crews. These additional resources first would be deployed to the staging area, and then assigned specific tasks or sectors as required by fire ground command.


!

INTRODUCTION

The Duffield fire occurred in Parkland County during the fourth week of April 2001. CoPtcidentally, this was the beginning of a very severe early wildfire season in the municipalities and forests of Alberta. The fire started in the southeast comer of the Village of Duffield, adjacent to a large lowland area. The Duffield fire ignited on April 24 at about 1125 MDT; it was observed from the air and ground and was characterized as an out-of-control fire that exhibited extreme fire behavior. The Duffield fire developed within hours of detection into a Class "E" fire (Le., >200 ha in size). It spread 9.4 kilometres in 5 hours and 55 minutes, within a moderately populated county.

The 2001 Duffield fire exhibited rapid spread rates covering over one-half of the total area burned of 1097 hectares during several hours in the mid-afternoon. Parkland County spent $500,000 fighting the Duffield fire.

The Duffield Fire Review

The Parkland County operations services committee approved an administration request to have a member of the fire research group of Natural Resources Canada, Canadian Forest Service in Edmonton draft a review. Assessment of the fire's behavior, firefighting suppression tactics, and prevention activities comprise the tenns of reference.

The Review Process

The review process for gathering information about the Duffield fire included the following steps:

1. Accessing transcribed records of Parkland County emergency conmlUnications.

2. Contacting (in person and by telephone) Parkland County ground suppression crew leaders, air suppression crews, and ground contract suppression groups.

3. Meeting with residents affected by the fire in the Duffield area.

Duffield Fire Review April 2002 Page 3

OVERVIE\V

Wildland-Urban Interface

Wilci¥nd-urban interface is a tenn used to describe an area where various structures (mostly private homes) and other human developments meet or are intermingled with forest and other vegetative fuel types. Wildland-urban fire can occur in any vegetation type (forest or grassland) and poses a serious risk to human life and property. By extending our communities farther into rural and forested areas we become more exposed to wildfire.

The threat of wildfire will always be imminent in areas of clustered and scattered development if prevention measures are not considered, planned, and implemented in advance. Residents must be aware of the problems related to wildfire and the preventative actions required to supplement the efforts of organized firefighting services.

Wildland-urban fire occurs when a fire burning in natural vegetation fuels gets close enough with its flames and/or firebrands (lofted burning embers) to potentially create ignitions of residences and/or acreage or fann out buildings. Destruction of residences/structures is the major concern during wildland-urban fires, but structures that cannot ignite do not bum. Recognizing the potential for wildland-urban home/structure ignitions and preventing structure ignition is the principle challenge.

The Duffield Fire

The following section details the Duffield fire from the time it was reported to the time the fire was extinguished. It includes weather conditions leading up to the fire, initial fire department response efforts, mutual-aid fire department assistance, fire behavior, and involvement of aerial support with suppression.

F'ire chronology" alia development

The Duffield fire was called into the Parkland County Emergency Communication Centre (BCC) at 1136 Mountain Daylight Time (MDT). It was reported as out of control (OC), with the fire size estimated to be about 0.1 hectares (ha). This fire was the result of a person's attempt to bum a bee's nest, using gasoline as an accelerent. The bee's nest was on a dry grass surface. The fire began at about 1125 MDT.

The initial ground attack began 25 minutes after the estimated ignition time with the arrival of District 4 Wabamun Municipal Fire Department at 1150 MDT. The fire size was estimated to be about 1.4 to 1.8 ha. It passed through sedge grass in a lowland adjacent to Duffield and moved east-northeast of the village, where it entered a black spruce stand, and produced a large black smoke column. The following additional dispatched fire departments responded at the times reported: District 7 Seba Beach

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D uffield F i re Review April 2002 Page 4

Municipal Fire Department (1259 MDT), District 3 Stony Plain Fire Department (1458 MDT), District 2 Parkland Village Fire Department (1608 MDT).

Within 10 minutes after the arrival of the Wabamun fire department, the fire continued to spread and entered the first stand of lowland black spruce, which became an intermitt<1l1t crown fire with a rate of spread (ROS) near 10 metres/minute (mlmin). The distance the fire traveled was over 800 metres to the north-northeast (NNE).

Ground suppression continued with limited effectiveness as the fire traveled well into the lowland area, with no road access for ground suppression crews. By 1246 MDT the frontal fire was over 1 km away from the point of origin. At 1351 MDT, the fire intensity increased to a running crown fire in the black spruce. As a result of increased surface drying conditions and increasing west-southwest surface winds, the spread distance was nearly 2 km. Over the next 2 hours, from 1400 to 1600 MDT, the surface wind speed increased to a peak wind of 30 kmIh, gusting to 48 kmIh by 1500 MDT. This increased the rate of spread (ROS), mainly in grass, from 52-79 mlmin resulting in the most intense fire run of the day. At 1528 MDT, the frontal fire then narrowed to under 50 metres in the lowland drainage that breaches Parkland Drive. The fire had traveled 7 km in 3 hours.

The surface fire moved in a northeast direction past Parkland Drive at 1528 MDT and followed the lowland drainage, orientated southwest to northeast. It was being driven by a moderate southwest surface wind. Frontal fire intensities varied, but ROS remained high at about 45 mlmin as the fire traveled through another area of black spruce, producing crowning and high intensity surface fires in the grasses along the lowland drainage. The last 200 metres of the Duffield fire traveled through standing grass and was stopped by a significant fuel break at and along the junction of Secondary Highway 770 and Highway 16 at about 1714 MDT. Fire spotting breached Highway 16 temporarily at 1720 MDT where these were extinguished. Overall, the Duffield fire had traveled 9.4 km in 5 hours and 55 minutes, burnt 1094 ha, and had a perimeter of about 23km.

During this fire run, flame length in the black spruce stands was observed to be about 20-25 metres in the lowland trees. In the open grass area, flame lengths were about 2-4 metres and may have been greater during the unobserved mid-afternoon fire run.

Suppression

With no ground access nor values-at-risk in the lowland areas, fire department resources were dispatched to acreage and farm properties that flank the fire. Evacuation was initiated at 1334 MDT in Edinburgh Estates, followed by the northeast end of Johnny Lakes subdivision at 1512 MDT. RCMP assistance was requested for evacuation of residents at 1 337 MDT, with additional subdivisions mainly on the west flank of the fire evacuated during early to mid-afternoon.

Duffield F i re Review April 2002 Page 5

I

Ground suppression units were dispatched to several threatened structures (mainly residences in Edinburgh Estates at 1246 MDT and a residence near Parkland Drive beginning at 1501 MDT). Additional resources were deployed to Parkland Drive near RR 25 at 1608 MDT. Resources were requested at Secondary Highway 770 and Highway 16 by 1659 MDT as the fire approached this area.

! A Delta Helicopter arrived near the fire area by about 1335 MDT, a Bell 204

medium rotor wing with a bucket; then landed by Edinburgh Estates at 1341 MDT. Air reconnaissance of the fire was in progress by 1530 MDT, after arrival of a Delta Jet Ranger 206 rotor wing light, with Parkland County Deputy-Fire Chief and a wildfire behavior specialist from Wildfire Consulting on-board. Communication with ground firefighting resources was established, which helped with ground crew deployment and requests. The Bell 204 helicopter dropped numerous buckets of water on targets considered values-at-risk and flank fire hot spots. Both helicopters remained on the scene until about 2100 MDT.

On day two and three of the Duffield fire, the wind direction changed to northwest and the temperature dropped by up to 6° C, which allowed for mop-up activities to begin. Parkland County fire crews where on the scene both days, dealing with a few surface fire flare ups and several precautionary evacuations. Private contract fire resources were on the scene. This fire continued as a ground fire, and private contract firefighting resources remained active until June 3 when the ground fires were considered extinguished. The depth of bum in the lowland soil/peat moss around the tree bases and roots varied up to as much as .6 metres.

Fire environment

The fire environment is defined as the "surrounding conditions, influences, and modifying forces of topography, fuel and fire weather that detennine the fire behavior" (Merrill and Alexander 1987).

Topography

The area of the fire was generally a flat landscape with small elevation variations throughout the fire area of about 20 metres, which would have had minimal affect on the fire behavior. The elevation of the fire area was about 750 metres above mean sea level.

Fuels

Parkland County and the Duffield area are classified as part of the Mid Boreal Mixedwood ecoregion, which is composed of aspen, balsam poplar, willow and grasses with black spruce bogs and marshes. (Forestry Canada and Alberta Forest Service 1993). The Duffield area comprises land used for mixed agriculture including forage and grain production, grazing, intermixed with residential subdivisions on non-productive agriculture lands.

D u ffield F i re Rev i ew Apri l 2002 Page {)

The area near the point of origin of the Duffield fire was dominated by cured grasses and a small stand of leafless aspen and white spruce trees on the residential property boundaries. The lowland area just east to northeast of the ignition location consisted mainly of standing sedge grass. The fire spread almost entirely through the lowland a,ld drainage area consisting of stands of black spruce, willow, dead and down woody fuels, and medium to heavy free standing sedge grasses. Adjacent to the lowland/drainage area were stands of aspen, white spruce, and grasses extending out to agriculture fields and residences.

The Canadian Forest Service Fire Behavior Prediction (FBP) System (Forestry Canada Fire Danger Group 1992) was developed to predict wildfire behavior characteristics such as rate of spread, spread distance, and fire intensity. It consists of 16 major fuel types; three of these fuel types occur in the Duffield area affected by the fire: boreal spruce, leafless aspen, and unpacked free standing grass. (De Groot 1993).

Duffield fire weather

Normal or above normal annual precipitation was last recorded in the Parkland CountylDuffield region in 1996 (Fig. 1 ) at about 40% above normal.

EI Nino (displacement of warm air from mid-Pacific in northwestern North America, associated with warm tropical water currents moving northward along the North American west coast line) influenced northwest North America in the fall of 1997 and through the spring of 1998, resulting in a general persistent warm and dry upper 500 mb (millibar) ridge over the area.

For this region, EI Nino presence began, coincidentally, with a continuous below normal annual precipitation trend from 1997 to 2000 (Figs. 2-5) ranging from 20-30%, with many sloughs drying and disappearing during this time. A very severe fire season occuned in Albelia in1998, and this was followed by another active fire season in 1999.

Generally northwestern North America weather circulation for November 2000 to May 2001 (not an EI Nino event), began holding a persistent weak upper ridge 500 mb pattern over Alberta, diverting any moisture well north and south of the region of the Duffield fire area. As a result, the winter of 2000/2001 in western Canada, including the Rocky Mountains through to the west coast of British Columbia received record or near record low precipitation values (Fig. 6). There were unusual winter sights throughout the region including the Duffield area: open area with snow-free fields through the winter months, low elevation forest areas with little more than ankle-deep snow present, and mountains with only traces of visible snow.

The below normal precipitation deficit sharpened in the region to 40%, and in the winter of 2000/2001 it increased to 70% (Fig.6), then in the spring of 2001 it was measured at 65% (Fig. 7). There was a localized extreme precipitation deficit in the fire area, as recorded at the Stony Plain weather station. In January 2001, precipitation was

j

D u ffield F i re Review April 2002 Page 7

measured at 0.2 mm (98% below the normal reading of 24 mm). In February, March, and April all readings were below normal at 79%, 56%, and 89%, respectively. With these extremely dry conditions, the Stony Plain weather station records indicate the remaining snow cover was gone by April 1, 2001.

Observations on April 24, 2001, indicated that the grass was still at the 100% cured grass stage, deciduous trees were stillieafiess, and coniferous trees were in the very early bud stage. Normal green up of grass and shrubs should occur during the second to fourth week of May.

D uffield F i re Review Apri l 2002 Page 8

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PRECIPITATION DEPARTURES FROM NORMAL NOMALIES DES PRECIPITATIONS PAR RAPPORT A LA NORMALE

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Duffield Fire Review April2002 Page 9

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Duffield Fire Review April 2002 Page 1 1

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Synoptic weather conditions preceding and during the active fire period

Meteorological data was obtained from Alberta Sustainable Resource Development Forest Protection Division (FPD), and additional supporting information was obtained from Meteorological Service of Canada (MSC) in Edmonton. This data includes elimate normals and monthly precipitation data from the Stony Plain weather station. Hourly surface data was collected from the Stony Plain automatic weather station (WSE) and the High Vale automatic weather station (WHA). Additional meteorological information was obtained from internet sources of the National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) for archived satellite weather imagery and upper air maps from the NOAA Storm Prediction Centre. Supporting surface weather data included surface weather maps and upper air profiles.

April 1-7, 2001

The weather pattern produced mainly cloudy skies, and it remained dry, with daytime highs reaching 7 to 13° C, with overnight lows dropping to below freezing -1 to -6° C.

April 8-12, 2001

A cooler, northwest flow pattern produced unsettled weather conditions that persisted with daytime highs ranging from 0 to 5° C, and precipitation of 1.4 mm was recorded at Stony Plain weather station and 4.2 mm at High Vale weather station.

April 13-18, 2001

Mainly sunny, dry conditions persisted, with a generally east surface wind component and moderate wind speeds. Daytime highs ranged from 6 to 17° C, and low daytime relative humidity (RH) ranging from 22 to 40%. Overnight. lows range from-7 to 3° C.

April 19-20, 2001

A cold front moved through the region and produced cloudy, cooler, and moister conditions with a daytime high of 12° C on April 19 and 3° C on April 20. Precipitation was recorded at Stony Plain in the form of light rain and light flurries, but no

.

precipitation was recorded at the High Vale weather station.

April 21-23, 2001

Sunny dry conditions returned with a warm, dry upper ridge of high pressure building into the region from the southwest. This produced daytime highs ranging from 10 to 17° C, low RH values of 25-30%, and light to moderate surface wind speed.


April 24, 2001

The wann upper ridge passed through the Duffield area during mid-morning, breaking down the early morning temperature inversion, resulting in wann temperatures and low RH along with an increasing south to southwest wind. The airmass became unstable witt,. surface daytime heating. The weather at the start of the fire was sunny, with a temperature of 170 C, RH at 27%, and wind south-southwest from 9 to 19 kmIh.

The temperature increased reaching the daytime high of 21 0 C and minimum RH of 23% by 1400 MDT. This was coincidental with a maximum observed gusting surface wind of 48 kmIh at 1448 MDT. Average mean wind direction was west-southwest, mean wind speed remained between 19 and 28 kmIh during the main fire run.

April 25, 2001

A weak cold front passed through the fire area overnight, veering winds to the northwest with moderate speeds. Wind decreased to light by mid - to late afternoon and temperatures were about six degrees cooler than the previous day. Precipitation was very spotty and missed the fire area.

Table 1 . Hourly (1100-1800 MDT) weather observations at High Vale automatic weather station (latitude - 53.27N; longitude 114.28W) on April 24, 2001.

Time (MDT) Temp RH Wind Direction/speed

eC) (%) (True) (km/h)

1100 16.0 31 SSW 19 1200 17.9 27 S 9 1300 19.7 24 WSW 19 1400 20.4 23 WSW 24 1500 18.7 26 W 24 G 48 1600 18:3 27 ' -WSW· 28 -. 1700 19.4 28 SW 26 1800 18.8 27 WSW 15

RH = relative humidity. Note: The High Vale weather station was located about 5 Ian southwest of where the Duffield fire started. Wind speed was measured at the standard height of 10 metres.


Analysis of fire behavior

The April 24, 2001 Duffield wildfire was a very intense wind-driven fIre that spread through a dry lowland/drainage area. Continuous and occasional intermittent crowningloccurred in coniferous stands, intermixed with severe surface fire in the medium to heavy cured mostly standing grass fuels. The two main fuel components also combined to produce signifIcant fire spotting. Other fuels included cured vegetation and woody material in aspen stands near and along boundaries of the lowland and adjacent agriCUlture fIelds.

Observed flame lengths were one tree height above the crowns and were about 2-4 metres in the standing cured grass. With flank fires moving into lighter fuels, fire intensity decreased, and suppression possibilities became apparent, with aerial bucketing from one rotor wing, attempting to steer flank fires and suppressing spot fires near values at risk.

Wind speed increased in the mid-afternoon and gusted to near 50 km/h by 1400 MDT. This added to the severity of the fire due to dry conditions existing on the lowland and forest floor. At this most dangerous time (1400 to 1600 MDT) of the wildfire, ROS varied from 52 to 79 mlmin, and suppression tasks were impossible to accomplish. The lowland, which was abundant with water and moisture in 1997, contained available vegetation and a humus layer that had been dried and stressed. Totally cured grasses and shrubs stressed by little winter and spring moisture and coniferous and aspen stands under stress from the same dry conditions were all in optimum condition for burning.

Concluding remarks

Several examples of extreme fire behavior were observed within the first hour of the fire near and eaSt of Duffield in the lowland and especially during the mid-afternoon, with gusting surface winds. Extreme fire behavior was observed both in standing gr3.§8�S _ _

and the iowland coniferous stands, making any type of ground suppression impossible; it -

was very unsafe to attempt suppression activities. -

Documentation of the fire weather from the nearby High Vale weather station did show conditions were conducive to high fire intensities in coniferous forest stands and cured standing grasses. Additional documentation showing extreme fire behavior included a home video of the fire near Edinburgh Estates, aerial photographs of coniferous trees candling, resident still photographs from the northeast comer of Johnny's Lake, and newspaper photographs of the fire traveling through grass approaching the intersection of Secondary Highway 770 and Highway 16. The Canadian Forest Service fire behavior prediction system (FBP) quite accurately predicted the rate of spread distances, and fire intensity during the day.

No human injury or resident structure loss occurred, although two adult head of cattle and one new born calf died as a result of the wildfire. Cattle evacuation of up to

D u ffield F ire Review April 2002 Page 18

----------------------------.--�".-�-"--- - --

200 head occurred on one farm property. Significant fire spotting did threaten the Spruce Ridge Properties subdivisions. Significant fire spotting was calculated to be as much as 700 metres ahead of the fire front due to gusting surface winds. This continued the ignition of very dry fuels downwind and caused Parkland Drive to be easily breached. Fire spotting threatened residences and other out buildings and contributed to the loss of multiple famp. structures as well as stacked hay bales that were adjacent to the flank fire. Several farm machinery implements and working vehicles were overrun by fire causing further additional loss.

Summary of public consultations

The following is a summary of opinions and suggestions raised during the public outreach process conducted as part of the Duffield fire review during the week of March 18 - 22, 2002. This outreach process provided important local input that was considered

_ in the development of the final recommendations for Parkland County. Comments for this summary were obtained by the reviewer during meetings with individuals at their private residences and also at a meeting with the local RCMP.

While participants raised a wide range of issues and suggested solutions, recurring themes emerged and are summarized below. These comments reflect views of those interviewed and not necessarily those of the reviewer.

Communications • Some residents were confused about the evacuation. Evacuation

communication was poor and affected residents were not told where to go or how long they would be there. Several elderly residents were assisted by neighbors and one senior individual in a wheelchair was transported by a neighbor to another neighbors residence.

• Residents were frustrated; they wanted to know where the fire department was, and they wanted to know if the fire department was

, going help with evacuations. There was no visible county supervision. • Property owners were very frustrated with the lack of communication

with county fire services, L.'1cluding clarification about use and status of their equipment (tractors, crawlers, etc.), and assisting county fire crews and private contractors during and after the fire.

Parkland County flreflghting efforts • There was a great deal of concern about the initial attack, some

residents said there was too much delay due to the split up of county resources the week before the Duffield fire.

• Resident concern was very high: who was and where were the Parkland County Fire Chief and Deputy-Chief when this fire began? Frustration was high as the firefighting efforts appeared to be very disorganized and ineffective. Apparently residents felt no one individual was in control of this fire.


• Local neighbors and friends were actually the ones fighting the fire near structures and fann yards, as no assistance came from county fire services. Residents felt that the neighbor volunteers helping fight fire in their yards saved major structure and property loss and strongly agreed friends and neighbors are the only ones they can absolutely rely on.

• When the RCMP blocked road access, it hindered neighbors from helping neighbors, resulting in some people traveling cross country to help out.

• While one owner was briefly away, his property became threatened by fire. When he returned, a number of people were fighting surface fires using hand tools, discing, and using backburning tactics. During this threat, no county fire protection was ever present, including bylaw personnel and RCMP. A county road grader was in the immediate vicinity and was used to provide some fuel breaks along the ditches nearby.

• During previous large fires in the late 80s, residents had seen use of the fire command post and expressed concern of it not being seen or used; some wondered whether Parkland County had a command post.

Community protection efforts • Considering the nearby equipment available or standing idle, there was

lack of protection provided. • Airtankers that were visible to residents during the morning were not

used for firefighting. (These airtankers were leased to the Government of Northwest Territories and were practicing.)

• Frustration was expressed when firefighting resources from outside the county were offered but were told help was not needed and the fire was under control.

• Residents expressed concern about the ineffective use of water tankers that were close by or had offered to assist. .. . . .

. . -

• There was an obvious delay for a request for response by the Stony Plain Fire Department, which resulted in 6 employees from one Stony Plain business traveling by private vehicles to the fire to assist. They arrived 1.5 hours before the Stony Plain Fire Department.

• The aftermath was as frustrating as the event. Some residents were very discouraged by the fact that Parkland County spent money on outside contractors, and one perception was that County residents aiding contractors would be compensated, or at least recognized for their extraordinary effort and expense, which included very effective suppression of the flank fire during the fire run.

Post-flre activities • Residents received no direction or information on what was going to

happen to the fire area or on possible reclamation activities.


• Landowners who contributed equipment, time, and effort received no follow-up direction or procedures after the fire.

Positive comments emerged from area residents • Several residents expressed concern about the high number of fire calls

volunteers are responding to, and they said they would encourage the County Protective Services to seriously consider creating a paid daytime tactical County fire crew of about 3-5 members. They expressed a willingness to accept higher property taxes to support this function. Aerial suppression was another part of fire fighting resources residents would be willing to support with additional taxes.

• Some residents felt that strategically placed fire pumps and hose should be available for use when fire resources were scarce or not present during a fire incident, mainly in the spring fire season (AprillMay). Advantages and disadvantages of having these fire pumps placed in the County were actively discussed, but residents felt it was certainly worth a try.

Meeting - Stony Plain RCMP - March 18, 2002 • The county command post, which contains the RCMP radio

communication module, was not used and would have substantially improved radio communication and interagency coordination.

• The RCMP were requested by County fire services to assist with efforts to request residents to leave homes threatened by fire, which proceeded without incident.

• Regarding evacuation: the RCMP only have authority to remove people after the declaration of a disaster. This is limited to instances where children were involved or where the members felt that the residents may not have been sufficiently able to look after their own welfare due to mental distress.

Duffield F i re Review Apri l 2002 Page 21

KEY ISSUES AND RECOl\ll\IENDATIONS

I Communications

Most people living in rural wildland-urban areas have limited knowledge of wildand fire, and they may not fully appreciate its potential intensity, the limits of fire suppression effectiveness as well as the responsibilities and roles of landowners, governments, and municipal agencies.

Wildand-urban fires usually involve several jurisdictions, such as municipal and wildand fire agencies, police, social and health services, utilities, government departments, and private industry. The Duffield fire was located in a single jurisdiction, Parkland County, and in the future inter-agency will be critical to effective fire management.

The following section focuses on communication issues with local residents and between agencies such as Parkland County before and after the Duffield fire.

Key issue

The following communication issues emerged with the Duffield fire: education about wildand-urban fires and the responsibilities of all those involved and affected is required before any major fire event; and fire loss compensation.

Examples of the issue in the Duffield fire

Education

Individual homeowners generally did not understand their responsibilities when they chose to live in a rural and or forested area and were not aware of some of the personal efforts they could make to be fire smart.

Fire Loss Compensation

Most residents had the perception that if a wildfire occurred, they would be compensated by county or provincial government for a non-insurable event. In fact, fire insurance policies include compensation for residences, outside structures, and other additional coverage, which may include fence lines.


Opportunities for improvement

There are opportunities for Parkland County to improve by developing better ways of infonning rural residents of the potential risks of fire and the need to work to reduce the ignitability of their structures. This may include, for example:

• Hazard assessment (using the FireSmart Wildfire Hazard Assessment System from publication FireSmart: Protecting Your Community from Wildfire (partners in Protection 1999).

• Engage residents in education efforts to communicate home, landowner and community responsibilities.

Recommendation 1

Parkland County should take a lead with the necessary resources and ensure priority is given to creating a communication plan. This plan could involve • A set of strategies and tactics that could be actively

communicated to Parkland County residents that will most likely be affected by wildland-urban fire;

• A plan for community education on roles and responsibilities for different stakeholders, including steps property owners should take to reduce the risk of loss;

• An interagency communication plan detailing resource arrangements before a major fire event.

Unified Planning And Action

In Alberta, management of disasters is a municipal responsibility, and each municipality is required to prepare a Disaster Management Plan. Currently, disaster planning use� the Emergency Site ManagementlEl11ergency.Operations.Centre (ESMlEOC) system. This" sysfem is similar to the" Incident Command System (ICS), an emergency response command and control system commonly used by fire departments, and is particularly useful when more than one type of emergency discipline is present at an incident. rcs is also widely used with industry and transportation agencies throughout much of North America.

A significant wildfire incident, as experienced with the Duffield wildfire in Parkland County, is a rare event that may include problems for which emergency plans have not been anticipated. These types of events require multiple agency involvement, and they are beyond the management ability of a single agency. At this level (or higher) a larger command operation maybe required.

D uffield F i re Review April 2002 Page 23

Key issue

In a situation like the Duffield fire, a premium is placed on swift, efficient communication and coordination about fire protection action with county mutual-aid partners and including outside agency resources. This active communication interchange is at the heart of effective command in a complex incident. A key issue this review identified was the need to integrate the various protection partners into a more coordinated command structure.

Examples of the issues in Duffield fire

Parkland County set up the EOC system in Parkland County headquarters near Stony Plain to respond to this major wildfire. The EOC was used to provide coordination efforts to the field fire command units.


To effectively manage a fire incident as complex as the Duffield fire, a decisionmaking system is required. A system would ensure that efforts and information are integrated and coordinated (a coordinated command structure). A system would help manage the inherent complexity associated with an incident of this nature by ensuring specific attention were paid to each different strategic and tactical requirement (wildland firefighting, wildland-urban fire fighting, working with property owners, etc.).

Face-to-face contact at a field ICS command post and resource assembly area is the best way to facilitate information flow and effective deployment of resources. This ensures the timely request and sharing of information with all partners at once, including clarification of roles and responsibilities of assembled resources.

.

.Recommend,;,tiQ1� 2

Parkland County Emergency Semceg shoUld· unprovecorDmaiJ.d and resource coordination with mutual-aid partners and adjacent counties and municipalities. This can be accomplished by establishing an integrated and coordinated command system that can help ensure partners share any potential interagency information, resources, and decision-making during a complex wildland fire.

The key point is not to implement a formal program, but recognize the benefits of the familiar ICS format giving the command post, incident commander or fire ground command, effective command and control of all resources and activities with decision making for outside agencies offering their assistance. This would allow the EOC to better function in a secondary role and allow section

Duffield Fire Review Apri l 2002 Page 24

heads to work together while maintaining contact with the field command post.

Community Protection

Un41erstanding how homes ignite during wildland-urban fires can help provide a basis for assessing the potential for structure/home ignition and thereby effectively mitigating wildland-urban fires. Fires do not spread by flowing over the landscape, and high intensity fires do not engulf objects, as do avalanches. Fires spread by meeting the requirements for combustion: a sufficient amount of fuel, heat and oxygen.

During a wildland-urban fire, structures ignite from two possible sources: directly from flames (radiation and convection heating) and/or from firebrands deposited directly on the home. Even the large flames of high intensity crown fires do not directly ignite structures at distances beyond 60 m (See Fire Sciences Laboratory website in References section). Additionally, firebrands can only ignite a structurelhome through contact. Thus, the home ignition zone, a 30-60 m (See Fire Sciences Laboratory website in References section) of space around a structure/home, becomes the focus of attention and activities to reduce potential wildand-urban fire destruction. This has implications for reducing home ignition potential before a wildfire as well as implications for emergency fire response strategy and tactics.

Wildland-urban fire emergency strategy and tactics differ from either standard wildland or standard urban fire suppression practices. Wildland fire suppression largely attempts to keep a fire from spreading beyond its current location. That is, keeping the wildfire away from a valued area protects the values at risk. Urban fire suppression initially addresses life safety (mainly building occupants) and then fire containment within a portion of the structure and/or prevents adjacent structure involvement. Neither the wildland nor urban structure suppression practices typically provide for potential reduction of home ignition if faced with an encroaching wildfire.

W lldiand-urban strategy and tactics assume the> wildfire may pass tbrciugb the r��identiaJJsubdivision area without containment. Wildland-urban strategy and tactics principally focus on preparing the home for the wildfire by reducing the potential for home ignition within the home ignition zone.

Ideally, most preparation should occur before a wildfire occurs; however, that isn't always the case, and significant reductions in ignition potential can occur after the fire has started but before wildfire encroachment. Then, if possible, the wildland-urban firefighting resources suppress ignitions that threaten structures during and after the wildfire approach.


Key issue

A key issue arising from the Duffield fIre is whether fIre suppression teams on future wildfIres can become more effective in protecting property, subdivisions, and communities.

Examples of the issue in the Dumeld fire

The Parkland County emergency services suppression team's efforts were less effective because of a number of conditions and activities. The original fIre call was for a structure fIre, the fIrst suppression fIre crew arrived 14 minutes after the initial call. Dry, warm, windy conditions rapidly spread the fIre from the structure to the wildland grass and nearby spruce trees, and quickly entered the lowland and was out of control.

The wildland fIre behavior, not recognized soon after initial size up, remained severe for about a 6-hour duration, with erratic high spread rates in the grasses, high intensity crown fIres, and spot fIres that breached a major fuelbreak at Parkland Drive.

In the Duffield fIre, strategy and tactics remained primarily in the suppression mode protecting only a few residences near encroaching flank fIres and a secondary evacuation mode, as the fIre rapidly traveled threatening several subdivisions. Severe fIre behavior, made ground suppression impossible.


Had the Parkland County fIre suppression team dedicated a wildland-urban fIre personnel resource crew, more effective community protection could have occurred. The wildland-urban fIre personnel resources might have evaluated the site-specifIc conditions, identifIed ignition factors, and in cooperation with residents, if available, mitigated those factors to increase area and or structure ignition resistance. In addition, wildland-urban fire personnel might also have assisted in evaluating conditions regarding their nGed·�o .

evacuate the area for life safety of residents.

Recommendation 3

Parkland County Emergency Services should recognize the need for wildfIre suppression strategy and tactics separate from those of wildland-urban fIre suppression.

The implementation of this recommendation requires a well understood, coordinated, and communicated definition of responsibilities for all ground crews. WildfIre areas should be operated separately from but in coordination with the wildlandurban fIre suppression approach.


It should be well understood that a wildfire strategy is a different approach, and fire personnel require a deeper understanding of potential fire behavior and how structurelhome ignitions occur - not just that there is different equipment.

Parkland County should continue to implement previously recognized wildland firefighting training requirements for Parkland County emergency services fire fighting personnel.

Presuppression Planning and Suppression For Future Extreme Fire Behavior Conditions

Successful presuppression planning and suppression requires the ability of fire managers to understand and predict fire behavior. Fire behavior depends on the interaction of fuel, weather and topography.

Fire behavior is described by outputs of the Canadian Forest Fire Behavior Prediction (FBP) System, such as rate of spread, fuel consumption, and fire intensity. Knowledge of potential fire behavior allows managers to hire and deploy extra resources in a strategic fashion, provide for safety of fire suppression personnel, and choose strategy and tactics most suited to the situation.

Key issue

Drought over several years, lack of winter precipitation, and dry spring weather contributed to extremely low fuel moisture in Parkland County forest and grass fuels.

A key issue is whether existing procedures for fire prevention and initial response were reviewed or altered in view of the extreme drought conditions. In hindsight, it appears that knowledge of the extreme conditions was not always taken into account and applied, and there may have been missed opportunities to limit spread of fire before it became lir.illlanageable.

.

Examples of the issue in the Duffield fire

Parkland County District 4 Wabamun Municipal Fire Department did not request assistance from District 7 Seba Beach Municipal Fire Department for over a hour after arrival at the fire, and a further 2 hours elapsed until District 3 Stony Plain Fire Department assistance was requested.


Parkland County fire management now have the opportunity to review standard operating guidelines in light of known weather conditions and fire behavior at the Duffield fire, days later at Clyde, and late in May 2001 at the Redwater, Colington, Nistow, and Chisholm fires.

D u ffield F i re Review April 2002 Page 27

Attention may now have to be directed to development of a Wildfire Hazard Identification or Wildfire Threat Assessment Map, for identifying wildfire hazards in the wildland-urban interface throughout and including the many subdivisions in Parkland County. This can be phased in as a multi-year project, first with an aerial survey of Parkland County, and then assessing the hazards. This effort may be coordinated with SRD and !partnered for cost sharing. It could also, include other jurisdictions wishing to develop similar fire prevention methods. Eventually with the establishment of hazard maps, issuance of fire weather indexes by SRD during critical wildfire months (AprillMay) to counties should enable fire managers to monitor fire weather and potential fire behavior conditions. This not only gives a head start on response but allows for planning for strategic acquisition and deployment of outside resources when necessary.

Aerial suppression resources used during the Duffield fire consisted of one rotor wing with bucket, and one rotor wing as a bird dog. The review would advise for a major wildfire like Duffield that effective aerial suppression requires a minimum of two rotor wings with buckets per flank plus additional aerial resources as a bird dog and reconnaissance. Airtankers were not recommended for the Duffield fire due to ground personnel and resident safety concerns; they were also not immediately available due to positioning in Red Deer and the unexpected early fire season start.

Recommendation 4

Parkland County should include appropriate levels of aerial support to help reduce the occurrence, or impact of large fires during anticipated extreme fire behavior conditions. During a large wildfire, additional ground suppression units should be requested from adjoining counties to supplement, assist, and rotate with fireline crews. These additional resources would first be deployed to the staging area, and then assigned specific tasks or sectors as required by fire ground command.

ACKN O\YL E D G l\ I E NTS

I j "

The author thanks the many individuals who provided information on the Duffield Fire. Emergency Services Staff and County Bylaw, from Parkland County are acknowledged for emergency communication transcripts, maps, aerial photographs, and personal observations during the Duffield fire. Staff at Alberta Sustainable Resources provincial fire centre provided fire weather indexes and codes and are thanked for their contribution. Comments from Wildfire Consulting Services, Delta Helicopter air crew, and Delta Helicopter bird dog pilot were helpful. Weather archives from staff at Stony Plain weather station. Climatologist from Environment Canada Meteorological Service of Canada, Edmonton, provided hourly weather reports from Stony Plain and High Vale auto weather stations. Home video was supplied by David Poudrier, a resident of Edinburgh Estates, and wildfire photographs were provided by Harlin Fulton, a Parkland County resident.

Duffield Fire Review Apri l 2002 Page 28

REFERENCES

Alberta Environmental Protection. 1 998. Glossary of forest management terms. Alta. Sustainable Resour. Dev., Edmonton, Alberta. Accessed 7 May 2002. <http://envweb.env.gov.ab.ca/env/forests/fpdlpdf/glossary.pdf.>.

I Alberta Sustainable Resource Development. 2001. Presuppression and Preparedness System (SRD). Alta. Sustainable Resour. Dev., Edmonton, Alberta. Accessed 7 May 2002. <http://envweb.env.gov.ab.ca/env/forests/fpdlpdf/pps2001 .pdf.>.

Alberta Sustainable Resource Development. 2001 . Wildfire management in Alberta. Alta. Sustainable Resour. Dev., Edmonton, Alberta. Pub!. 1/857.

Chisholm Fire Review Committee. 2001. Chisholm Fire Review Committee final report. Prepared for Alta Sustainable Resour. Dev., Edmonton, Alberta. Accessed 7 May 2002. <http://www3.gov.ab.ca/srdlforests/chisholm/pdfs/Chisholm.pdf.>.

Cohen, J.D. 2000. What is the wildland fire threat to homes? U.S. Dep. Agric., For. Serv., Fire Sci. Lab., Missoula, Montana. Accessed 7 May 2002. <http://www.firelab.orglfbp/cohen/homeig.pdfl>.

De Groot, W.J. 1 993. Examples of fuel types in the Canadian Forest Fire Behavior Prediction (FBP) System. For. Can., Northwest Reg., North. For. Cent., Edmonton, Alberta. Poster (with text).Forestry Canada and Alberta Environmental Protection. 1 993. Ecoregions of Alberta For. Can., Northwest Reg., North. For. Cent., Edmonton, Alberta, and Alta. Environ. Prot., Land For. Serv., Edmonton, Alberta. Alta. Partnership Agree. For. Poster (with text).

Forestry Canada Fire Danger Group. 1992. Development and structure of the Canadian Forest Fire Behavior Prediction System. For. Can., Sci. Sustainable Dev. Dir., Ottawa, Ontario. Inf. Rep. ST-X-3.

__ ." • .-. .r, _ � .... �. ......... .�.

Merrill, D.F.; Alexander, M.E., eds. 1 987. Glossary of forest fire management terms. Nat!. Res. Counc. Can., Comm. For. Fire Manage., Ottawa, Ontario. Pub!. NRCC 265 16. 4th ed.

Partners in Protection. 1 999. FireSmart: protecting your community from wildfire. Partners in Prot., Edmonton, Alberta.


f

APPENDIX

APPENDIX l G lossary

I This glossary attempts to define most of the terms used within this report with information provided from Glossary of Forest Management Terms, Alberta Land and Forest Services, 1998.

Control a Fire To complete a control line around a fire, spot any fires from there, and any interior islands to be saved; burning out any unburned areas next to the fire side of the control lines; burning off any unwanted islands inside the control lines; and cooling down all hot spots that are immediate threats to the control line until the lines can be expected to hold under foreseeable conditions. Stages of control are:

Out-or-Control (OC) - A wildfire not responding or only responding on a limited basis to suppression action such that perimeter spread is not contained. Being Held (DB) - Indicates that with currently committed resources, sufficient suppression action has been taken so that the fire is not likely to spread beyond existing or predetermined boundaries under prevailing and forecasted conditions. (Contained.) Under Control (UC) - A wildfire that has received sufficient suppression action to ensure no further spread. Being Patrolled - In a state of mop-up, being walked over and checked. Out - Extinguished.

Control Line All constructed or natural fire barriers and treated fire edge used to control a fire .

. . . ";:- � ' - !,�: ' " ":;..- .... . - , -

Crown fire A fire that advances thfough the canopy of a forest (A layer of foliage in a forest stand. This most often refers to the uppermost layer of foliage). In other words, an intense wildfire that has taken hold of the treetops and can spread very quickly with the wind. Crown fires can be classified according to the degree of dependence on the surface/ground fire phase:

Intermittent Crown Fire - A fire in which trees intermittently torch, but rate of spread is controlled by the surface/ground fire phase. Active Crown Fire - A fire that advances with flame extending from the ground surface to above the canopy. Independent Crown Fire - A fire that advances in the canopy only.


Deciduous Trees belonging to the botanical group Angiospermae with broad leaves that are shed annually. Examples include trembling aspen, balsam poplar and white birch. Also known as hardwood.

r Detection The act or system of discovering and locating fires.

Dozer Any tracked vehicle with a front-mounted blade used for exposing mineral soil.

Dozer Line Fire line constructed by the front blade of a dozer.

Drought A long period of substantially less than normal precipitation, occurring usually over a wide area.

Entrapment A situation where personnel are unexpectedly caught in a fire behavior-related, lifethreatening position where planned escape routes or safety zones are absent, inadequate or compromised. These situations may or may not result in injury and include near mIsses.

Extreme Fire Behavior A level of fire behavior that sometimes precludes any fire suppression action. It usually involves one or more of the following characteristics: high rate of spread and frontal fire intensity, crowning, prolific spotting, presence of large fire whirls, and a well-established convection column. Fires eXhibiting such phenomena often behave in an erratic, sometimes dangerous m;mner . .

Fine Fuels Fuels that readily ignite and are consumed rapidly by fire (cured grass, fallen leaves, needles, small twigs). Dead fine fuels also dry very quickly.

Fire Behavior The manner in which fuel ignites, flame develops and fire spreads and exhibits other related phenomena as determined by the interaction of fuels, weather and topography. Some common terms used to describe fire behavior include

Smouldering - A fire burning without flame and barely spreading. Creeping - A fire spreading slowly over the ground, generally with a low flame. Running - A fire rapidly spreading and with a well-defined head. Torchfforching - A single tree or a small clump of trees is said to "torch" when its foliage ignites and flares up, usually from bottom to top.

D uffie ld Fire Review April 2002 Page 31

Candling - A single tree ignites and flares up. Spotting - A fire producing firebrands carried by the surface wind, a fire whirl, and/or convection column that fall beyond the main fire perimeter and result in spot fires. Crowning - A fire ascending into the crowns of trees and spreading from crown to crown.

Fire Break A natural or constructed barrier used to stop or check fires that may occur or to provide a control line from which to work. Sometimes called a fire line.

Fireguard A manually or mechanically built barrier intended to stop a fire or retard its rate of spread and from which suppression action is carried out to control a fire; the constructed portion of a control line.

Fire Line Fire break built around a fire either with use of tractor-plow machinery or with hand tools. Fire lines may also be roads, plowed fields, streams and wet, swampy areas that will resist fire. If fire lines are successful in stopping a fire's progress it is commonly said "the lines held."

Flanks The parts of a fire's perimeter that are roughly parallel to the main direction of spread. The left flank is the left side as viewed from the base of the fire, looking toward the head.

Fuels Dry grasses, leaves, twigs, needles, shrubs or trees easily consumed by fire. More fuels cause a fire to burn more intensely (not faster). The rate of spread is controlled by the dryness of the fuels (prim�!J' fi.n� fuels), fuel type and degree of curing (in.the case of grass or deciduous growth), ·and the wmd speed.

Fuel Break An existing barrier or change in fuel type (to one that is less flammable than that surrounding it), or a wide strip of land on which the native vegetation has been modified or cleared, that act as a buffer to fire spread so that fires burning into them can be more readily controlled. Often selected or constructed to protect a high value area from fire.

G round Fire (or Surface Fire) Burning organic soil that sometimes burns several inches to several feet under ground. Ground fires are often difficult to detect and can burn for an extended time. Fire burning on the ground and not reaching into the canopy.

,/

D uffie ld F i re Review Apri l 2002 Page 32

lIeadfFrontal Fire The portion of a forest fire spreading the fastest. Unless lives or property are threatened, firefighter's primary concern is stopping the head fire. The head can change direction depending on wind, making it particularly dangerous to work on directly. A forest fire can have motle than one head.

lIome Ignition Zone Wildland-urban ignition research indicates that a home's characteristics and the area immediately surrounding a home within 30 to 60 metres (100 to 200 feet) principally determine a home's ignition potential during a severe wildland fire. This area that includes a home and its immediate surroundings is the home ignition zone.

Initial Attack Fire control work by first firefighters arriving at a fire.

Litter The top layer of the forest floor composed of loose debris of dead sticks, branches, twigs and recently fallen leaves or needles. Decomposition has altered the forest floor very little.

Mop-up The act of making a fire safe after it is controlled by extinguishing or removing burning material along or near the control line.

Prescribed BurnlFire Controlled application of fire to wildland fuels in either their natural or modified state under specified environmental conditions which allow the fire to be confined to a predetermined area and at the same time to produce the intensity of heat and rate of spread required to attain planned resource management objectives. Any fire deliberately . used for prescribed burning; usually set by qualified fire management personnel according to a predetermined burning prescription�- ' ' . . . . . _.' - . " . ' = .

Presuppression The movement and placement of firefighting resources around the forest before and in anticipation of wildfire outbreak.

Rate of Spread The horizontal expansion of the fire perimeter primarily at the head of the fire, but also including the spread from the flanks and rear of the fire.

Skidder A wheeled or tracked vehicle used for sliding and dragging logs from the stump to a landing

Skidder Unit

;


A self-contained unit consisting of a water tank, fire pump, and hose specially designed to be carried on a logging skidder for use in fire suppression.

Suppression The control and limitation of a wildfire's progress once it has started.

! Tightlining Following the edge of the fire when building a dozer line to minimize unburned fuel between the fire and the dozer line. The alternative dozer line tactics are parallel attack (building a shorter, straighter fire line a short distance from the fires edge) and indirect attack (building dozer line at some distance from the fires edge, often to take advantage of certain fuel types or natural barriers to fire spread).

Unified Command A command structure that allows all responsible agencies or individuals to jointly manage an incident through a common set of objectives.

Values at Risk Community assets such as people, places and natural resources that may be lost during a wildfire.

Wildfire A destructive or uncontrollable fire that spreads with great speed and involves flammable vegetation such as trees, bushes and grasses.

Wildland Undeveloped land in its natural state, often vegetated with trees, bushes and grasses.

Wildland-Urban (Interface) The line, area or zone where structures and other human development meet or intermingle with undeveloped wildland or vegetative fuels.


APPENDIX 2 SRD Wildfire Jurisdiction, Polices and Programs

Roles and Responsibilities !

Alberta Sustainable Resource Development the (SRD) takes responsibility for preventing, detecting, and fighting wildfires within the forest protection areas of Alberta. Municipalities are responsible for dealing with fires within cities, towns and villages. Parkland County, which is outside the forest protection area, has fire fighting responsibilities on any portion of land within the county.

Policies and programs

An overview of the SRD policies and programs is presented for the following functions and activities:

Planning and Presuppression Preparedness Prevention Suppression Wildand-Urban Fire Cooperation and Communication Post Fire Activities

Planning and Presuppression Preparedness

Presuppression preparedness is based on the principle that as the fire danger increases, additional firefighting resources should be strategically placed to minimize initial attack time. The major elements of presuppression planning include

• identification of high value/high priority areas . • . planning timely availability of resources and any required transport.

There are guidelines and procedures to detennine fire size up, and these results are used to detennine adequate suppression coverage, and suppression resource requirements when dealing with a wildfire.

Prevention

Guidelines, based largely on weather and fuel conditions, provide direction and advice on matters such as public awareness, fire permits, fire guardians, and closure orders.


Suppression

Guidelines and procedures are in place to ensure the availability of resources, priority activities when a fire escapes, and procedures dealing with the transition from initial attack to a sustainable action.

Wildland-Urban Fire

Municipalities have responsibility within their jurisdiction for wildland-urban fire, but this is a complex matter. Sustainable Resource Development (SRD) is responsible for fighting fires in the Forest Protection Area, and they have a template available for mutual aid agreements between SRD and municipalities.

There are very few guidelines related to wildland-urban fires; however, the publication "FireSmart: Protecting Your Community from Wildfire " (partners in Protection 1999) provides practical tools for individuals, communities, homeowners, industry and forest officials on methods for cooperating to reduce the risk of fire losses from wildfire. Primary topics include a description of wildland-urban issues, evaluation of hazards, mitigation strategies and techniques, emergency response for agencies and individuals, training for firefighters, community education programs, and regional planning solutions.

Cooperation and Communication

Partners in Protection and FireSmart programs are based on cooperative efforts and include a less formal communication method such as

• local fire department or community centre open houses, • newspaper articles, • wildfire pamphlets or fact sheets, • mail inserts in ffiumciparresidenfcc'rrespbndertce, aila • maps.

Post-Fire Activities

Limited guidelines exist for the requirement of restoration of the fire construction area to provincial reclamation standards.

Duffield F i re Review April 2002 Page 36

REVIE\V l\IEl\IBER

Brian Mottus, Natural Resources Canada, Canadian Forest Service, Edmonton, Alberta, focuses on the fire and forest management of the wildland-urban interface, a wildfire behavior specialist, experienced professional structural firefighter, and lead for the detailed submission of the fire environment for the Final Documentation ReportChisholm Fire May 2001 .

D u ffield F i re Review Apri l 2002 Page 37

Documents

Duffield Wildfire Behavior and Review of April 24 2001 ...cfs.nrcan.gc.ca/bookstore_pdfs/24736.pdfdepartment personnel, and consultation with affected residents and RCMP. Generally,