September 30, 1988

Docket No. 50-331

Mr. Lee Liu Chairman of the Board and

Chief Executive Officer Iowa Electric Light and Power Company Post Office Box 351 Cedar Rapids, Iowa 52406

DISTRIBUTION: Docket Files PDIII-3 r/f GHolahan RHall DHagan BGrimes Wanda Jones ACRS(1O) ARM/LFMB

NRC & Local PDRs KPeirIdns &,¾14-lvev64

PKreutzer OGC-WF1 EJordan TBarnhart(4) EButcher GPA/PA PDIII-3 Gray Files

Dear Mr. Liu:

SUBJECT: DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER - AMENDMENT NO. 153 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-49; STANDBY GAS TREATMENT AND STANDBY FILTER UNIT SYSTEMS OPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS (TAC NO. 67465)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 153 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-49 for the Duane Arnold Energy Center. This amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application dated August 31, 1987.

The amendment deletes the requirement that both emergency diesel generators (EDG's) must be operable for the Standby Gas Treatment and Standby Filter Unit Systems to be considered operable, and adds a requirement for availability of certain auxiliary AC power sources and emergency filtration systems during core alterations. Other minor editorial changes are also included. An additional request to extend the EDG inspection interval was previously approved.

A copy of the related Safety issuance will be included in notice.

Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register

Sincerely,

/s/

James R. Hall, Project Manager Project Directorate 111-3 Division of Reactor Projects - III,

IV, V & Special Projects

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 153to

License No. DPR-49 2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures: See next page

Office: Surname: Date:

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Mr. Lee Liu Iowa Electric Light and Power Company Duane Arnold Energy Center

cc: Jack Newman, Esquire Kathleen H. Shea, Esquire Newman and Holtzinger 1615 L Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036

Office for Planning and Programming 523 East 12th Street Des Moines, Iowa 50319

Chairman, Linn County Board of Supervisors Cedar Rapids, Iowa 52406

Iowa Electric Light and Power Company ATTN: R. Hannen Post Office Box 351 Cedar Rapids, Iowa 52406

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resident Inspector's Office Rural Route #1 Palo, Iowa 52324

Regional Administrator, Region III U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Mr. John A. Eure Assistant to the Division Director

for Environmental Health Iowa Department of Public Health Lucas State Office Building Des Moines, Iowa 50319

0 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

IOWA ELECTRIC LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY CENTRAL IOWA POWER COOPERATIVE

CORN BELT POWER COOPERATIVE

DOCKET NO. 50-331

DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 153 License No. DPR-49

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A. The application for amendment by Iowa Electric Light and Power Company, et al., dated August 31, 1987, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

C. There is reasonable assurance (I) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted In compliance with the Commission's regulations;

D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated In the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-49 is hereby amended to read as follows:

F'DR DC 056 P, 533

u Pric

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(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 153, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. The license amendment Is effective as of the date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

John "N. Hannon, Director Project Directorate 111-3

Division of Reactor Projects -III,

IV, V and Special Projects

Attachment: Changes to the Technical

Specifications

Date of Issuance: September 30, 1988

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 153

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-49

DOCKET NO. 50-331

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised areas are indicated by marginal lines.

REMOVE INSERT

3.7-15 3.7-15 3.7-16 3.7-16 3.7-43 3.7-43 3 . 7-45a -3.7-46 3.7-46 3.7-47 3.7-47 3.8-4 3.8-4 -- 3.9-4a

3.10-1 3.10-1 3.10-2 3.10-2 3.10-4 3.10-4

DAEC-I

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

(3.7)

B. Standby Gas Treatment System

1. Except as specified in Specifications 3.7.B.3 and 3.9.D, both trains of the standby gas treatment system shall be OPERABLE at all times when SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is required.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT.4-

(4.7)

B. Standby Gas Treatment System

l.a. Annually it shall be demonstrated that pressure drop across the combined high efficiency and charcoal filters is less than 11 inches of water in the flow range of 3600 to 4000 cfm.

b. Annually demonstrate that the inlet heaters on each train are capable of an output of at least 11 Kw.

c. Annually demonstrate that air distribution is uniform within 20% of averaged flow per unit across HEPA filters.

d. Once per operating cycle automatic initiation of each branch of the standby gas treatment system shall be demonstrated.

e. Manual operability of the bypass system for filter cooling shall be demonstrated annually.

f. System drains quarterly for level in loop

shall be inspected adequate water seals.

g. Each bed will be visually inspected in conjunction with the sampling in Specification 3.7.B.2.b to assure that no flow blockage has occurred.

Amendment No. IM.,M.153

I

3.7-15

DAEC-I

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

2.a The results of the inplace cold DOP and halogenated hydrocarbon tests in the flow range of 36004000 cfm on HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks shall show > 99.9% DOP removal and L 99.9% halogenated hydrocarbon removal.

b. The results of laboratory carbon sample analysis shall show < 1.0% penetration of radioactive methyl iodide at 70% R.H., 150 *F, 40 + 4 FPM face velocity with an inlet concentration of 0.5 to 1.5 mg/m 3 inlet concentration methyl iodide.

c. Fans shall be shown to be capable of operation from 1800 cfm to the flow range of 3600-4000 cfm.

3. From and after the date that one train of the standby gas treatment system is made or found to be inoperable, reactor operation or fuel handling is permissible only during the succeeding seven days unless such train is sooner made OPERABLE, provided that during such seven days all active components of the other standby gas treatment train are OPERABLE.

4. If Specifications 3.7.B.1, 3.7.B.2 and 3.7.B.3 are not met, the reactor shall be placed in the COLD SHUTDOWN condition within the next 24 hours and fuel handling operations shall be prohibited.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT4. -

2.a The tests and sample analysis of Specification 3.7.B.2 shall be performed initially and then annually for standby service or after every 720 hours of system operation and following significant painting, fire or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system.

b. Cold DOP testing shall be performed after each complete or partial replacement of the HEPA filter bank or after any structural maintenance on the system housing.

c. Halogenated hydrocarbon testing shall be performed after each complete or partial replacement of the charcoal adsorber bank or after any structural maintenance on the system housing.

d. Each circuit shall be operated with the heaters on at least 10 hours every month.

3. When one train of the standby gas treatment system becomes inoperable, the OPERABLE train shall be demonstrated to be OPERABLE immediately and daily thereafter.

Amendment No. 70,15J3, 153

I

3.7-16

DAEC-I

needed to cleanup the reactor building atmosphere upon containment

isolation. If one system is made or found to be inoperable during

reactor operation or core alterations, there is no immediate threat

to the containment system performance. Thus, reactor or refueling

operation(s) may continue while repairs are being made, provided

the requirements of Specifications 3.7.B.3 and 3.9.D, respectively,

are met. If neither circuit is operable, the plant is brought to a

condition where the standby gas treatment system is not required.

High efficiency particulate absolute (HEPA) filters are installed

before and after the charcoal adsorbers to minimize potential

release of particulates to the environment and to prevent clogging

of the iodine adsorbers. The charcoal adsorbers are installed to

reduce the potential release of radioiodine to the environment.

The in-place test results should indicate a system leak tightness

of less than I percent bypass leakage for the charcoal adsorbers

and a HEPA efficiency of at least 99.9 percent removal of DOP

particulates. The laboratory carbon sample test results should

indicate a radioactive methyl iodide removal efficiency of at least

99.9 percent for expected accident conditions. If the efficiencies

of the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers are as specified, the

resulting doses will be less than the 10 CFR 100 guidelines for

Amendment No. ;$,153 3.7-43

DAEC-1

Demonstration of the automatic initiation capability and operability

of filter cooling is necessary to assure system performance capability.

If one standby gas treatment system is inoperable, the other system

(excluding the supporting diesel generator) must be tested daily.

This substantiates the availability of the operable system and thus

reactor or refueling operation can continue for a limited period of

time.

Initiating reactor building isolation and operation of the standby gas

treatment system to maintain at least a 1/4 inch of water vacuum

within the secondary containment provides an adequate test of the

operation of the reactor building isolation valves, leaktightness of

the reactor building and performance of the standby gas treatment

system. Functionally testing the initiating sensors and associated

trip channels demonstrates the capability for automatic actuation.

Performing these tests prior to refueling will demonstrate secondary

containment capability prior to the time the primary containment is

opened for refueling. Periodic testing gives sufficient confidence

of reactor building integrity and standby gas treatment system

performance capability.

8. Primary Containment Power Operated Isolation Valves

Automatic isolation valves are provided on process piping which

penetrates the containment and communicates with the containment

Amendment No. 70,153 3.7-46

DAEC-l

atmosphere. The maximum closure times for these valves are selected

in consideration of the design intent to contain released fission

products following pipe breaks inside containment. Several of the

automatic isolation valves serve a dual role as both reactor coolant

pressure boundary isolation valves and containment isolation valves.

The function of such valves on reactor coolant pressure boundary

process piping which penetrates containment (except for those lines

which are required to operate to mitigate the consequences of a loss

of-coolant accident) is to provide closure at a rate which will

prevent core uncovery following pipe breaks outside primary contain

ment.

In order to assure that the doses that may result from a steam line

break are within 10 CFR 100 guidelines, it is necessary that no fuel

rod perforation results from the accident occur prior to closure of

the main steam line isolation valves. Analyses indicate the fuel

rod cladding perforations would be avoided for main steam valve

closure times, including instrument delay, as long as 10.5 seconds.

The test closure time limit of 5 seconds for these main steam isolation

valves provides sufficient margin to assure that cladding perforations

are avoided. Redundant valves in each line insure that isolation

will meet the single failure criteria.

Amendment No. 153 3.7-47

DAEC-1

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

b. From and after the date that one of the two 125 volt station battery systems is made or found to be inoperable for any reason, reactor operation may continue for three days provided Specification 3.5.G is met, and repair is immediately initiated.

c. From and after the date that.the 250 volt station battery system is made or found to be inoperable for any reason, the HPCI system shall be considered to be inoperable and the requirements of Specification 3.5.D shall be met.

3. Offsite Power

a. From and after the date that the startup or standby transformer and one diesel-generator or associated buses are made or found to be inoperable for any reason, reactor operation may continue provided the requirements of Specification 3.5.G.1 are satisfied.

b. From and after the date that both the startup and standby transformers become inoperable, reactor operation may continue for seven days provided both emergency diesel-generators, associated buses and all low pressure cooling systems are operable.

4. Auxiliary Electrical Equipment

CORE ALTERATIONS

a. Refer to Specification 3.9.D.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

3. Offsite Power

a. When it is determined that one of the diesel-generators or associated buses is inoperable, the requirements of Specification 4.5.G.1 shall be satisfied.

b. When it is determined that both the startup and standby transformers are inoperable both diesel-generators, associated buses and all low pressure core and containment cooling systems shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately and daily thereafter.

Amendment No. 153 3.8-4

DAEC-l

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT

D. AUXILIARY ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT CORE ALTERATIONS

1. CORE ALTERATIONS shall not be performed unless all of the following conditions are satisfied:

a. At least one off-site power source and either the startup or standby transformers are OPERABLE and capable of supplying power to the 4kV emergency buses, and

b. One diesel-generator is OPERABLE with:

1) its associated standby gas treatment system train OPERABLE, and

2) its associated main control room ventilation standby filter unit subsystem OPERABLE.

Amendment No. 153 3.9-4a

DAEC-1

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.10 ADDITIONAL SAFETY RELATED PLANTCAPABILITIES

Applicability:

Applies to the operating status of the main control room ventilation standby filter unit system and the emergency shutdown local control panel.

Objective:

To assure the availability of the main control room ventilation standby filter unit system, and emergency shutdown control panels under the conditions for which the capability is an essential response to station abnormalities.

A. MAIN CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION

1. Except as specified in Specifications 3.9.D and 3.10.A.3, the main control room ventilation standby filter unit system shall be OPERABLE at all times when SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is required.

2.a The results of the in-place cold DOP and halogenated hydrocarbon tests at design flows on HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks shall show > 99% DOP removal and > 99% halogenated hydrocarbon removal.

SIIPVFII I ANCF RFflIITRFMFNT

4.10 ADDITIONAL SAFETY RELATED PLANT CAPABILITIES

Applicability:

Applies to the surveillance requirements for the main control room ventilation standby filter unit system, and the emergency shutdown control panels which are required by the corresponding Limiting Conditions for Operation.

Objective:

To verify that operability or availability under conditions for which these capabilities are an essential response to station abnormalities.

A. MAIN CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION

1. Annually, the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks shall be demonstrated to be less than 6 inches of water at system design flow rate.

2.a The tests and sample analysis of Specification 3.10.A.2 shall be performed initially and then annually for standby service or after every 720 hours of system operation and following significant painting, fire or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system.

Amendment No. 7#ý,153

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION SURVEIILANrP Rrni1TRPMf7NT

I

3.10-1

DAEC-I

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION... , V TI I •., Dr HI TDCMC,'. •

b. The results of laboratory carbon sample analysis shall show > 90% radioactive methyl iodide rlemoval at a face velocity of 40 fpm, 0.05 to 0.15 mg/m 3 inlet iodide concentration, > 95% R.H. and > 125°F.

c. System flow shall + 100 cfm.

be 1000 cfm

3. From and after the date that one of the main control room ventilation standby filter unit subsystems are inoperable, reactor operation or refueling operations is permissible only during the succeeding seven days unless such circuit is sooner made OPERABLE.

4. If these conditions cannot be met, reactor shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in COLD SHUTDOWN within 24 hours for reactor operations and refueling operations shall be terminated immediately.

B. EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN CONTROL PANEL

1. At all times when not in use or being maintained the emergency shutdown local control panel shall be secured.

b. Cold DOP testing shall be performed after each complete or partial replacement of the HEPA filter bank or after any structural maintenance on the system housing.

c. Halogenated hydrocarbon testing shall be performed after each complete or partial replacement of the charcoal adsorber bank or after any structural maintenance on the system housing.

d. Each circuit shall be operated at least 10 hours every month.

3. Annually, automatic initiation of the control room air treatment system shall be demonstrated.

B. EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN LOCAL CONTROL PANEL

1. The emergency shutdown local control panel shall be visually checked once per week to verify it is secured.

2. Operability of the switches on the emergency shutdown local control panel shall be functionally tested once per operating cycle.

Amendment No. J#, 153

I

3.1•0-2

DAEC-1

filters and charcoal adsorbers are as specified, the resulting doses

will be less than the allowable levels stated in Criterion 19 of the

General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, Appendix A to

10 CFR Part 50. Operation of the fans significantly different from

the design flow will change the removal efficiency of the HEPA filters

and charcoal adsorbers.

If one of the systems is found to be inoperable, the second unit

provides protection and reactor operation or refueling operation(s)

may be performed for a limited period of time while repairs are being

made. If the system cannot be repaired within seven days, the

reactor is shutdown and brought to cold shutdown within 24 hours or

refueling operations are terminated.

E. EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN LOCAL CONTROL PANEL

The Emergency Shutdown Local Control Panel is provided to assure the

capability of controlling reactor pressure for taking the plant to

the hot shutdown condition external to the control room for the

unlikely condition that the control room becomes uninhabitable.

Amendment No. 153 3.10-4

"0 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

SXWASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 153 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-49

IOWA ELECTRIC LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY CENTRAL IOWA POWER COOPERATIVE

CORN BELT POWER COOPERATIVE

DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER

DOCKET NO. 50-331

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated August 31, 1987, Iowa Electric Light and Power Company, et al., requested changes to the Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) Technical Specifications (TS's). The proposed changes would delete the requirement that both emergency diesel generators (EDG's) be operable for the standby gas treatment system (SGTS) and the main control room ventilation standby filter units (SFU's) to be considered operable. The proposed changes would also add a specification to clarify the requirements for availability of certain auxiliary AC power sources and emergency filtration systems during core alterations, and would make other minor word changes for clarification. An additional change to extend the EDG inspection interval from 1 year to 18 months was the subject of Amendment No. 149 to Operating License No. DPR-49, issued February 23, 1988.

2.0 EVALUATION

Currently, DAEC TS's 3.7.B.1 and 3.10.A.1 explicitly require that the EDG's be operable in addition to the standby gas treatment system and the main control room ventilation system SFU's during periods when secondary containment is required. This restriction (i.e., the need for both EDG's to be operable for the other systems to be considered operable) Is not addressed in the TS bases and is inconsistent with the DAEC TS definition of "LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION" and the BWR Standard Technical Specifications (STS's). The DAEC TS definition of "LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION" states, in part, "When a system, subsystem, train, component or device is determined to be inoperable solely because its emergency power source is inoperable, or solely because its normal power source is inoperable, it may be considered OPERABLE for the purpose of satisfying the requirements of its applicable Limiting Condition for Operation, provided: (1) its corresponding normal or emergency power source Is OPERABLE; and (2) all of its redundant system(s), subsystems(s), trains(s), components(s) and devices(s) are OPERABLE, or likewise satisfy the requirements of this specification."

38E101 10194 0,.--0930 PDR ADOCK 05000331 P PDC

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During power operation, core alterations or any other time that secondary containment is required, normal electrical power to both trains of the SGTS and both SFU subsystems will be available and will be supplemented by the two EDG's. During power operation, if one EDG is determined to be inoperable, T.S. 3.5.G.1 requires that it be restored to operable status within 7 days, or an orderly reactor shutdown be initiated. This requirement effectively duplicates those of TS's 3.7.B.3 and 3.10.A.3; i.e., a 7-day Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) is entered due to an inoperable EDG. Therefore, during power operation, the proposed removal of references to EDG operability in TS's 3.7.B.1 and 3.10.A.1 would not change the existing requirement, which will be retained in TS 3.5.G.1.

During core alterations, current TS's 3.7.B.1 and 3.10.A.1 severely limit the licensee's ability to perform maintenance on one EDG in parallel with refueling activities, as a 7-day LCO would have to be entered due to EDG inoperability. This restriction results in longer refueling outages as extensive required EDG inspections must be performed prior to fuel movement. Deleting the specific requirements for operability of both EDG's when secondary containment is required is consistent with STS's 3.6.5.3, 3.7.2 (which have no such specific requirement), and the DAEC TS definition of "LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION," which explicitly states that a system may be considered operable when only its emergency power source is inoperable.

The addition of proposed TS 3.9.D would further clarify requirements during core alterations. The proposed TS would require operability of at least one off-site power source, one startup or standby transformer, and one EDG with its associated train of SGTS and SFU, or core alterations would not be permitted. In sections 6.5.3.3 and 15.7.2.5 of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for the DAEC, the licensee has indicated that a single train of the SGTS and one SFU subsystem have sufficient capacity to perform the systems' functions as analyzed for the spectrum of design basis accidents. Consequently, theaddition of this specification will provide added assurdnce that redundant power sources will be available so that the design function of the SGTS and SFU's will be met during core alterations. In addition, revised TS's 3.7.B.1 and 3.10.A.1 would still require both trains of the SGTS and both SFU subsystems to be operable whenever secondary containment is required, including during core alterations.

In summary, the proposed deletion of the specific requirement for both EDG's to be operable for the SGTS and SFU's to be considered operable (current TS's 3.7.B.1 and 3.10.A.1) is acceptable for the following reasons:

(1) During power operation, the requirements for EDG operability will remain unchanged.

(2) During core alterations, the addition of new TS 3.9.D will require that redundant power sources are available for at least one train of SGTS and one SFU subsystem. The licensee's FSAR indicates that a single train of the SGTS or SFU subsystem has sufficient capacity to perform the design function. Therefore, during core alterations, at

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least two independent power supplies will still be required to ensure adequate power to the SGTS and SFU's.

(3) At all times when secondary containment is required, both trains of the SGTS and SFU subsystems will still be required to be operable, consistent with the DAEC TS definition of "LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION" and the STS.

On theses bases, the staff approves the proposed changes to DAEC TS's 3.7.B.1 and 3.10.A.1 and the addition of proposed TS 3.9.D.

The remainder of the proposed changes are minor wording changes for clarity and consistency.

Revised TS 3.7.B.1 capitalizes the phrase "SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY," consistent with the practice for all terms listed in the TS definitions.

Revised TS 3.7.B.3 makes some minor editorial changes without affecting the requirements of the specification.

Revised TS 3.7.B.4 specifies that the reactor shall be placed in the "COLD SHUTDOWN" condition within 24 hours, consistent with other requirements in the DAEC TS and the STS. The current specification has no specified time requirement.

The bases on pages 3.7-43, 3.7-46 and 3.10-4 are revised to reflect the changes

to TS's 3.7.B.1 and 3.1O.A.1.

TS 3.8.B.4 Is added, which only references new TS 3.9.D.

TS's 3.10, 3.10.A.1, and 3.10.A.3 are revised to refer to the main control room ventilation standby filter unit system and subsystems, for consistency with plant procedures. The existing TS's refer to the "control room air treatment system" and "main control room ventilation system." Page 3.7-45a is deleted and pages 3.7-46 and 3.7-47 are reformatted to make the bases edsier to read.

The staff finds these remaining proposed changes to be acceptable, as they are minor editorial changes that improve the clarity and consistency of the DAEC TS.

3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

This amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 or changes a surveillance requirement. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

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4.0 CONCLUSION

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: James R. Hall

Dated: September 30, 1988