Dr.kumar Ratnesh

8/12/2019 Dr.kumar Ratnesh

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EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY UNDER THE DOMAIN OF SOCIAL

EVALUATION SPACES IN INDIA

Dr. Kumar Ratnesh

Lecturer (Senior Scale),

Deptt. of P.G. Studies and Research in Economics,

Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru P.G. College, BANDA (U.P.).

[BUNDELKHAND UNIVERSITY]

[email protected].

1. Introduction

Economists, in their introductory courses, learn that eff iciency is

achieved when an economic allocation is Pareto optimal. In other

words, economic efficiency implies that it is impossible to increase

one's uti l ity without decreasing someone else's uti l ity. However, the

normative concept underlying the definition of eff iciency are far more

complex than it seems. Since John Rawl's Theory of Justice (Rawls,

1971), polit ical philosophers have questioned the appropriateness of

util it ies for the evaluation of social justice. The appropriate space for

evaluation of social justice is not individual uti l it ies but the space for

social primary goods - c iv i l l ibert ies, free access to social posit ion and

socio-economic advantages. The Theory of Justice is so important in

polit ical philosophy literature that since it has been published, every

author in this f ield has to explain the differences and similarit ies

between his view and Rawl's. Nozick (1974) crit icizes Rawls and

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argues that the criterion of social justice is the space of formal

l iberties. Amartya K. Sen (1980) argues that although Rawls properly

demonstrates that uti l ity is not an appropriate space for social justice

evaluation, he eliminates too many of the differences between

individuals. Some differences, such as handicap, gender or race may

be important. Thus, he proposes to evaluate social justice in the space

of capabil it ies which are sets of social functioning available to each

individual. Sen (1980) was also the instigator of the debate on

"equality of what?". Dworkin (1981a and b) formalizes the principle of

individual accountabil ity which was inherent in Rawls (1971) and Sen

(1980). In this context, he argues that social justice must be

evaluated in a space defined by the resources available to individuals.

Arneson (1989) crit icizes Dworkin on the l ink he draws between

resources and preferences. He argues that the appropriate l ink

between resources and preferences should be opportunities of welfare.

He thus, proposes to evaluate social justice in the space of

opportunities of welfare. Cohen (1989) argues that the space of

opportunities of access to socio-economic advantages is more

appropriate1. Van Parijs (1995) adopts a completely different

framework and proposes to assess social justice in the space of 'real

l iberties'. These modern formulation discards the emphasis placed by

util itarians on the space of uti l it ies in favour of a focus on a space of

real freedoms or capabil it ies, distinguishing in the process that latter

space from the space of resources. This formulation of equity

emphasizes the importance of individual preferences and freedom of

choice in the movement from the space of real freedoms to a vector of

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actual functionings. An attempt is, therefore, made in this paper to

evaluate the theoretical alternatives that would democratize

development and ensure the space for equitable participation by the

civil society, the poor and excluded and chalk out a policy that would

mitigate the efficiency and equity within the domain of social

evaluation spaces in India.

2. Defining Efficiency Criterion :

As briefly discussed in the previous sect ion, a social planner's

objectives may be evaluated in different spaces. An efficiency criterion

must then be associated to each respective space. In order to do so,

let us consider an economy of I individuals may be described by the

individuals initial allocation, ),.....,,( 21 iϖ ϖ =Ω by the procedure Ψ

that transforms those initial allocation and by the final allocation X=

. Let).....,( I x x x )........,( 2 I φ φ φ =Θ be a social evaluation space

associated with this economy. If this space is individual uti l it ies, then

I φ is the util ity of individual i. If we consider opportunities of

welfare I φ than is the opportunities of welfare available to individual i,

etc. We can now give a first definition

Definition 1 :Θ - eff iciency. An economy ( ) X ,,ΨΩ is Θ - eff icient ↔

''' ,, X ΨΩ∉ : }:{ '1'φ k k k I I φ φ φ >∃∧∀≥

In this context, it is easy to see that Pareto efficiency is a

particular case; such that the economy ),,( X ΨΩ is eff icient in the

space of individual uti l it ies is and only if

)}()(:)()({:),,( ''''' xk uk xuk k xu xu X k I ii I i >∃∧∀≥ΨΩ∉

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As economist, we may face situations in which policy makers do

not agree on the appropriate social evaluation space. It is then

interesting to identify situations which are efficient for a wide

spectrum of social evaluation space.

Let be a set of N different social evaluation

spaces. We can now give a second definition.

},........,{: 21 N ΘΘΘ=∧

Definition 2 : - eff iciency. An economy∧ ),,( X ΨΩ is eff icient∧

( ) ∧∈Θ∀>∃∧∀≥ΨΩ∃↔ nn

k k n

i I nn k X }:{:,,

''

1''' φ φ φ φ

In this section, we consider :o∧ = {util it ies, Resources, Formal

l ibert ies}

This set of social evaluation spaces wil l be used in two simple

examples. First we will consider a purely competitive economy and

analyse is eff iciency. Second we will discuss the case of provision of a

public good.

First, consider a purely competitive economy ),,( 111 X ΨΩ of I

individual with private goods, perfect and symmetric information and

complete markets. From the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare

Economics, we know that this economy is "Util ity -eff icient". Since it is

impossible to increase without decreasing for at least on j i, this

economy is also "Resources - eff icient". If 1Ψ is such that all

production decisions and all exchanges between individuals are non

coercive, this economy is also "Formal Liberties" - eff icient. This

economy is thus ^0 -efficient.

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Let us now consider Dworkin's (1981b) proposition for social

justice. After choosing resources as the appropriate space, Dworkin

suggest that justice requires the equality of resources. As some

resources are non-transferable, he suggest that the just distribution

will transfer resources from one individual to another in order to

mimic an insurance system that wil l have been chosen by the

individual if they were placed behind the veil of ignoranic. This yield a

new procedure . This redistrib ution of resources yields another

Resources -efficient outcome of the economy. The Second

Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics also insures that

wil l also be util ity-efficient. However, coercion is needed to

transfer resources from an individual to the other. As a result, some

individuals experience a decrease in their formal l iberties without

increasing anyone else's. This implies that

2Ψ

),,( 121 X ΨΩ

),,( 121 X ΨΩ is not "Formal

Liberties" - eff icient. We concluded that ),,( 121 X ΨΩ is ^1 - eff icient

where ^1 = {util ity, resources}.

Let us now consider our second example which is the provision

of a public good. Suppose now an economy where ),,( 212 X ΨΩ . Here,

X2 incorporates a non-rival public good without exclusion. This implies

that this public good is consumed in equal quantity by every agent.

Note that the procedure 1Ψ is such that all production and

consumption is chosen by the individuals who interact through market

mechanism. Introductory public economics teachers us that

is not uti l ity eff icient. However, since it is impossible to

increase

),,( 212 X ΨΩ

i without decreasing j for at least one i j ≠ , this economy is

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resource efficient. The use of procedure 1Ψ is also implies that it is

also "Formal Liberty" - eff icient. We conclude that ),,( 212 X ΨΩ is ^2 -

efficient where ^2 = {Resources}.

Let us now consider a new procedure 3Ψ which consist of free

markets with the exception imposing a tax on the initial allocation of

resources in order to produce a quantity of public good that is

compatible with Samuelson's rule. This new economy is

Resource-efficient since it is impossible to increase

),,( 232 X ΨΩ

i

without

decreasing j for at least one i j ≠ . Standard public economics

teaches us that is also Util ity-effici ent. However, taxing

individuals implies coerion. So, all individuals experience a decrease in

their formal l ibert ies. This impl ies that

),,( 232 X ΨΩ

),,( 232 X ΨΩ is not "Formal

Liberties"- eff icient. We conclude that ),,( 232 X ΨΩ ` is ^1 -efficient.

Our discussion of some simple examples has shown that analysts

need to identify the social evaluation space that they refer to before

stating that and economy is eff icient. In other words, even in some

simple case, these may be divergence in opinion if two analysts chose

different social evaluation spaces for eff iciency with equity.

3. Equity : Of What ?

Equity is defined as 'fairness' of distribution of goods and

services between different members of society, not necessarily

implying absolute equality of income 2. Two broad redistributive

principles govern the impact of government policies in terms of social

evaluation spaces. The first-horizontal equity (HE) - helps to evaluate

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the equity of the impact across individuals who are equal in all

'relevant respects'; the second - vertical equity (VE) serves to assess

the equity of the impact on individuals with differing initial levels of

'well being'. the HE and VE principles are generally applied to the

monetary dimension of the government's impact. Material welfare

being, however, only one of the dimensions well-being, they should

also be applied to dimensions other than simply income. Considering

other dimensions may, in fact, be decisive in comparisons of the

benefits and drawbacks associated with various government policies

(Feldstein, 1976). Dimensions which are closely associated to Rawls'

primary social goods and Sen's capabil it ies would be viable options.

John Rawls' defines equity in terms of allocation of certain types

of primary goods. Those primary goods are things "which it is

supposed a rational man wants whatever else he wants" and which,

regardless of what an individual's preferences and actual choices may

be, "he would prefer more of rather than less" (Rawls, 1971, p. 92).

Rawls' general conception of justice is then that

"All social primary goods - l iberty and opportunity, income and

wealth, and the bases of self-respect are to be distributed equally

unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the

advantage of the least favoured." (Rawls 1971, p.303).

This is the well-known "maxi-min" rawlsian rule.

In other words, Rawls idea to equity is based on two basic

principles. First principle's justice as fairness or basic equal right for

all. Without establishing rights as equal in the original position, the

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individual would not know whether they would be the person lacking

certain rights. It is through this l ine of thinking that the importance of

primary goods (basic l iberties) becomes clear. The second principle

establishes that inequalit ies are just only if there is a fair opportunity

and inequalit ies work to the benefit of the least privileged in society

(difference principle or maximin). Fair distribution of opportunity

allows all invidiuals to make a l iving and succeed despite relative

talents. Of course, not all individuals wil l have the same earning

power, but establishing the best situation for the worst off would

ensure a relatively stable economy. Similarly this principle allows

society to be more efficient because it allows certain inequalit ies that

improve the situation of the lowest group..... "without at the same

time making other person ....... worse off" (Rawls, p.67). These two

principles arose through experiment, performed under the so-called

veil of ignorance, in which the members of society know practically

nothing about themselves or one another and are forced to agree upon

basic rules for society.

In addition to the plurality of redistributive views in the absence

of a veil of ignorance3 , there can also be a heterogeneity of needs and

handicaps across individuals that must be accounted for in sizing

capabi l i t ies4 . Amartya Sen (1985a) stresses that different people might

have different "conversion factors" from resources to capacities. It

might also seem reasonable to consider inputs such as "talents",

"productivity", or "intell igence" as determinants of the capabil it ies to

which one has access since these inputs are primarily bequeathed to

individuals by nature or inculcated by its environment. For Sen, the

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concept over which to define equity is the 'capabil ity set' from which a

person might be able to choose. Sen thus opts to construe Rawls'

primary goods as capabil it ies, and thus to define equity in a capacity

space, from which individuals can subsequently freely choose their

actual functioning or actual chosen outcomes.

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4. Equity within capability spaces

The introduction of the capabil it ies idea was meant to be an

answer to the question : "Equality of What?" (Sen, 1980). Sen's

answer to the question "Equity of What" introduces two basic notions -

what matters to define well-being are the funct ioning of a person , i.e.

her/his achievements - what she/he manages to do or to be (being

well nourished, well clothed, mobile, taking part in the l ife of the

community). According to him, more important than well being is the

advantage of the person i.e. her/his real opportunities. These are

cal led-capabi l i t ies .

The well-being of a person has to be evaluated on the basis of

what he or she manages to do or to be. The "funct ioning" have to be

distinguished from the commodities which are used to achieve them

because personal features matter a lot in the transformation from

objective characteristics of commodities to functioning. Because a

focus on the possession of material commodities neglects these crucial

individual differences, it is not acceptable as description of well-being.

Sen gives a f irst and very useful formalisation of these concepts. The

achieved functioning5 vector-bi of individual-i can be written as :

bi = f i (c (xi) ) .... . . . . ( i)

Where xi is the vector of commodities possessed by person i,

c(.) is the function converting the commodity vector into a vector of

objective characteristics and f i (.) is a personal uti l ization function has

to be interpreted in the Gorman (1956) Lancaster (1966) tradition and

is independent of the individual concerned, the transformation of

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these characteristics into functioning is individual specif ic. The well-

being of person i can then be sum as the valuation of the vector of

functioning- bi :

V i = V i (f (c(xi))) ..... . . .

( i i)

Sen emphasises that the valuation function V i(.) can represent a

part ial ordering.

The interpretation of V i(.) is crucial. If we interpret the

valuation exercise as objective and at the same for all individuals, we

could drop the individual subscript. If we introduce the possibil ity of

inter-individual differences and therefore keep the subscript, V i(.) is

formally similar to a uti l ity function V i(xi) since it can also be seen as

the representation of a (possible partial) ordering of commodity

bundles - xi. However, in Sen's view, it is necessary to distinguish the

functioning vector from the util ity derived from it. He distinguished

different possible interpretations of uti l ity. In the util itarian

interpretation : one interprets uti l ity as subjective happiness (pleasure

and pain), the other as the extent to which desire are fulf i l led. As

representations of being they both entails similar problems. The first

problem is what Sen calls - "physical condition neglect" : Util ity is only

grounded on the mental attitude of the person, and does not

sufficiently take into account the real physical conditions of the this

person. The second problem is "valuation neglect", Valuing a l ife is a

reflective activity in a way that being happy or desiring needs not be.

This is not to say that "happiness" or "desire fulf i l lment" - cannot be

important component of well being. But they are part of the story. The

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most adequate way of taking them into account is to see them as

elements of the vector-bi.

In a further step, Sen claims that a description of the individual

l iving standards in terms of achievements is not sufficient, because

one has also to introduce the notion of freedom. It is useful here to

distinguish between two definitions of freedom : formal freedom and

real freedom . Formal freedom consist in a formal/legal right to or to

haveX, say. It only constitutes a necessary, but not a sufficient

condition for real freedom, which is the actual capacity to be or to do

X. Broadly speaking, the set of real freedom to which someone has

access is a function both of formal freedom and of the resources and

socio-economic conditions required to act on them. He proposes the

concept of the advantage of a person i.e. real opportunit ies . The

person can choose the util ization function fi (.) from an individual

specif ic set-Fi. If we moreover assume- that his choice of commodity

vector is restricted to his "entit lements " - xi, we can represent his

"real freedom" by the set of feasible functioning vectors-

)),((/][)(iiii

X c f biib X Q == for someii F f ∈ and for some - ( i i i) ii

X x ∈

Qi can then be called the 'capabi l i t ies ' of person i. Sen is quite

explicit about the importance of the move from funct ioning to

capabi l i t ies The typical example is the comparison between two

individuals who both are undernourished. For the first individual, the

under nourishment is the result of his material deprivation. The

second individual is wealthy, but freely decides to fast for religious

reasons. While their achievements in terms of the nutrit ional functions

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are identical, it seems clear that their situations are not equivalent

from an egalitarian point of view.

Equalization of capabil it ies goes beyond equalization of

opportunities in the narrow sense of the world and also beyond

removal of discrimination, although both are important element of it.

Capabil it ies are a reflection of the real (positive) freedom of

individuals, and should not be restricted to the securing of negative

freedom.

In general, Sen's capabil ity approach requires the translation of

resources into valuable beings and doings (i.e. functioning) from

which the various combination of achievable funct ioning may be

chosen (this possibil ity of choice forms the space of capabi l i t ies ). In

other words, resources, shifted by personal and social factors, allow

the attainment of a number of beings and doings, which may be

represented by the vectors of achieved funct ioning (or the capabi l i ty

set ). Moreover, the conversion of resources into functioning is

supported by a set of instrumental freedoms 7 , which provide and

enhance inst i tut ional-eff ic iency 8 and effectiveness and thus uphold the

success of the translation process (we call this complex connection

'the Institutions-Freedom or (IF- Vortex 9). Finally, the choice of a

specif ied subset (a vector) of functioning generates a given level of

well-beings, which in turm can eventually 'tune back' institutions and

their responses.

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Figure-1 : The Capability Approach : A General View.

We think that this schematic and intrinsically dynamic

representation as the capabil ity approach itself, is quite consistent

with Sen's view of well-being. This f igure and the following Figure

represent a sequential mapping of the notion of capabil ity elaborated

according to Sen's approach. A fundamental point in f igure 2 is the

distinction between Ends and Means of development, that is

Instrumental and Const itut ive (or Substant ive) Freedoms . All the

elements of the picture are strictly interrelated and at the same time,

cooperate to the generation of a set of Achieved Functioning .

Achieved Functioning constitute Human Development, since in Sen's

view the of choice, to which functioning refer, is the basis of

development.

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Figure 2 : A map of the Capability Approach.

From the theoretical point of view the reference unit of the

capabil ity approach is the individual functioning and capabil it ies being,

in fact, is properties of ' individuals'. More specif ically, Sen moves in

the space of 'moral individualism' and consider the individual as the

only unit that counts when evaluating social concerns, avoiding at the

same time, to reduce society to mere sum of individuals and their

properties as set by ontological individualism. Nonetheless, Sen's

'moral indiv idual ism' does not forget that the human being is a ' zoon

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pol it ikon' , in so far her evaluative process is shaped by a number of

social elements mainly IF vortex. For these reasons, it is possible to

use the capabil ity approach to assess social well-being10 (Sen, 1991 :

15-16)

5. Social Evaluation Spaces : Indian References

Human beings are faced with alternative choices and human life

is comprised of a set of these choices. So choice is : "selecting one

from among alternative options". If man lived alone by himself, the

only effective factor in this process would have been him personal

capabil it ies; but when human beings need to l ive socially and

collectively due their diverse needs and also l imited resources then

social relations and structures play the major role in

determining.......... ing alternative options in human choice.

If we would accept the above two assumptions, namely, choice

as selecting from among alternative options and the role of social

relat ions in shaping of these alternative options, we can develop a

notion for choice enlargement dynamism . Choice enlargement happens

through the expansion of alternative options in the context of an

enabling social environment becomes apparent. Social structures 11

show their impact, particularly on the macro level and for the general

public, within facil itating or l imiting social conditions. Dynamic and

enabling relations and structures create the ground for expanding

alternative options while static and exclusive relations tend to l imit

them. Naturally question arises here is that what sort of societal

structure/relations are prevail ing in India.

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Indian society has experienced complexities in identif ication of

class system due to manifold gradation of social rank, which have

evolved in the form of caste and tribe alongwith quasi-religious setting

of deprivation. The Indian constitution and polit ical community have

given recognition to the grave condition of resourcelessness of the

weakest section of Indian society through the system of 'scheduled'

castes and 'scheduled' tribes. In other words, while recognizing the

heuristic value of 'castes', 'gender', 'tribe' and 'class' as separate

analytical and sociological categories, numerous evidences suggests

that caste, tribe and class merge into each other in the domain of

absolute as well as chronic deprivation in India. This clarif ication is

important as there are a large number of instances of "castes into

class" and "class into caste" as well as tribe - caste convergence in

terms of economic conditions. But they do not negate the fact that for

the last several decades there is marginal difference in the caste

status of the absolutely deprived classes and there is very l imited

evidence of prosperity ('creamy layer') among the depressed castes

and tribes particularly in the rural domain of Indian Society (Kumar,

2005).

Theoretical formulation by economists recognized that in its

essential form caste as a system of social and economic governance or

organization (of production and distribution) is governed by certain

customary rules and norms, which are unique and distinct (Akerlof

1976, Scovil le 1991, Lal 1988, Ambedkar, 1936 and 1987). The

organizational scheme of the caste system is based on the division of

people in social groups (or castes) in which the civil, cultural, and

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economic rights of each individual castes are pre-determined or

ascribed by birth and made and made hereditary. The assignment of

civil, cultural and economic rights is, therefore, unequal and

hierarchal. The most important features of the caste system, however,

is that it provides for a regulatory mechanism to enforce the social

and economic organization through the instruments of social ostracism

(or social and economic penalties), and reinforce it further with the

justif ication and support from the philosophical elements in the Hindu

religion (Lal 1988, Ambedkar 1936).

The caste system's fundamental characteristics of f ixed civil,

cultural and economical rights for each caste, with restriction for

change implies "forced exclusion" of one caste from the right of other

caste, or from undertaking the occupations of other castes. Exclusion

and discrimination in civil, cultural and particular in economic spheres

such as occupation and labour employment, is therefore, internal to

the system and a necessary outcome of its governing principles. In the

market economy framework, the occupational immobility would

operate through restrictions in various markets such as land, labour,

credit, other inputs, and services necessary for any economic activity.

The caste system has divided Indian society both horizontally

and vertically. Conditions of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled

Tribes are well documented, and the evidence shows that, despite

some improvement in their conditions, they lag behind the rest of the

population in all areas of socio-economic development. What is worse,

the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes are not yet free from the

age-old prejudices and st igma of being considered inferior v is-a-vis

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the 'others'. They continue to be subjected to all sorts of

discrimination and exploitations which check their upward mobil ity and

overall socio-economic progress (For Caste Base Discrimination, see

Sukhadeo Thorat and K.S. Newman, 2007).

In this context, it is distressing to observe the extent and

severity of atrocities of various kinds committed against the members

of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. For instance, during the

five year period from 2001 to 2005, more than 1,76,000 acts of

atrocities against the SCs and STs were registered in different parts of

India. Of them, 1,46,000 were against Scheduled Castes and 30,000

against the Scheduled Tribes. These atrocities include instances of

murders, rapes, kidnapping, loot, injuries, practices of untouchables

and other atrocities. Cases of the untouchables-practices alone were

to the tune of 56,000, while the cases registered under the prevention

of atrocities against the SCs and STs Act were more than 74,000

(government of India, 2005).

Similar issue pertain to the analysis of gender discriminating in

Indian society. Patriarchy is at the core of the structural element in

discriminating women of India. Patriarchy constrains women in all

facets of l ife. Control of women's reproduction abil it ies and sexuality

is placed in men's hand. Patriarchy l imits women's ownership and

control of property and other economic resources, including the

products of their own labour. Women's mobil ity is contrained and their

access to education and information hindered. Over the years, it has

been recognized that the experiences of the majority of women are

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grouped in both poverty and patriarchy. Both these feed into each

other and subject women to exclusion and exploitation.

Modern law and legislation on marriages recognize free choice

marriage but the weight of custom and tradition associated with the

reproduction of the caste system works severely against it particularly

for rural women in India. The lives of young rural girls are governed

by strict social disciplines of the vil lage that monitor inter caste inter

actions among the young or various castes. For the individual, these

social disciplines operates at the level of caste socialization, which

produces a 'doxic' submission to the social order of arranged

marriages of vil lage exogamy and caste endogamy. Mody (2003)

observes of the bizarre notion of 'honour' or ' izzat'. It depends rather

heavily on a code of conduct of women. Modesty, obedience, duty

define good conduct for women. A women's failure to l ive within the

prescribed code results in the loss of honour of her family. "Exercising

choice and breaching the caste barrier are extreme violations of the

code and apparently are good grounds for murder or at a minimum,

the forcible dissolution of marriage". The notion of honour in rural

north India that govern social and sexual relation and that

distinguishes between the interwined 'biradari ' honour and 'vil lage

honour', sometimes known as 'gaon ki nak' (the vil lage nose), that

rests solely on the behaviour of women [Lambert 1997, Chowdhary

2004 and 2007]. The boundary maintenance of different castes and its

role in the assignment of patri l ineal descent with the attendant

implications on the control over women's sexuality, property and

rights (Dube, 1986 )

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These scenario of rural society of India evinces that the caste

system, patr iarchy as wel l as kinships and marriage-rules regulates the

choices and desires of untouchables and women at large. In fact, they

negate not only equality and freedom, but also of the basic human

rights. The principles of equality and freedom are not the governing

principles of caste system or patriarchy system. This is because the

underlying principles of the caste system and patriarchy system or

marriage norms assume particular notion of human rights.

So, the question of choice enlargement of untouchables and

women in rural India is related to human rights and its

implementations. In the human rights l iterature- 'to have right' means

'to have a claim to something of value' on other people or institutions,

the state or the international community, who in turn have the

obligations of providing or helping to provide that something of value.

Rights are entitlements that requires correlated duties, and

recognizing a right would necessitate identifying the duty-holder who

has the obligations of fulf i l l ing or enabling the fulf i l lment of the right,

so that the culpabil ity for any fulf i l lment or violation of the right can

be established. But human rights should not be l imited to only legal

rights and they should be linked to the Kantian concept of both

'perfect ' and ' imperfect ' obl igat ions .12 This does not negate the right-

duty correspondence, which according to Sen is precisely the binary

relation which separates out human rights from the general 'valuing of

freedom'. But, logically, it should extend beyond perfect obligation to

include imperfect obligations to correspond to human rights. The

fulf i l lment of all human rights, whether they are civil and polit ical

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rights, or economic, social and cultural rights, or taking all the rights

together or the right to development is associated with perfect and

imperfect obligations.

However, the right to the process of developing is different from

the right to the outcome. It is a programme of plan or policies

executed over time maintaining consistency and sustainablity with

phased realization of the targets, and it is expected, with a high

probabil ity, to lead to the realization of all those outcome rights. This

is what Amartya Sen describes as a "metarights"13. A meta right to

something x can be defined as the right to have policies p(x) that

genuinely pursue the objective of making the right to x realizable even

if the right to x remains unfulf i l led or immediately unrealizable, the

metaright to x, p(x) can be fully valid right if all the obligations

associated with p(x) can be clearly specif ied. So a right to x, such as

not to be hungry may be an abstract, background right, but to give a

person the right to demand that policy be directed towards securing

the objectives of making the right to food a realizable right is right to

p(x) as a meta r ight to x, wi l l be a real r ight.

From the perspective of implementation of the rights, the notion

of metarights brings out clearly the cogency of the right discourse. In

terms of the traditional thinking on human rights, an individual 'A' can

be said to have a r ight to x, i f there is an agent B, who have the duty

to enable A to have that x.

The obligation of B can be regarded as "perfect" if it is possible

to specify the actions and policies B must adopt, namely Px B to enable

to right to be enjoyed. These policies can be punitive or rewarding,

Page 22



protective or promotional, non-interferring or even disabling,

depending upon the nature of the rights and of the party on whom the

obligations or duties are assigned. It may be, however, noted that

enabling the right to be enjoyed does not mean that the right wil l

actually be enjoyed, unless there is a one-to-one correspondence

between those policies and actions of B, Px B and A's realization of the

rights. There may be many other influences which may prevent the

right from being realized, even when PxB is in place. The search then

has to be for a PxB which has the maximum likelihood of realising A's

right to X.

So culpabil ity for realizing a right may not be unequivocally

established for many rights, unless a Px B can be identif ied, even if it is

recognized that B has the duty to enable A to enjoy the right. If A not

having or enjoying the right, B may have many valid excuses or

reasons for not performibng the duty. The judicial authorities may

examine all those extraneous explanations and decide to reject them.

But in many cases this may not be possible and B's inabi l i ty to fulf i l l

the right is genuinely conditioned by actions of other agents who are

influenced by other factors. However, if a PxB can be established,

which has the highest probabil ity of realizing x for A, it should be

possible to assign the precise responsibil ity on B to execute that PxB,

so that if B does not honour that responsibil ity, B can be held culpable

for not executing PxB. In that situation, PxB has the status of a right,

as a meta right to x, which is accepted as a human right.

The argument becomes even more cognet if we move from

'perfect' to ' imperfect obligations' and if it is recognized that A's

Page 23



having a right to X, implies that there are a number of agents B, C, D,

E etc. the state parties, the domestic civil society, international

agencies, government of foreign countries, who have the obligations

to enable A to realize the right. That means it should be possible to

establish for each of these agents, specif ic policies and actions, Px B ,

PxC, PxD , etc. which make the maximum contribution to the realization

of the right, and it is those Px B, PxC, PxD , etc. which are the duties

that these agents must perform, and they would be culpable if they do

not perform them. The specif ication of some of the duties may be

quite precise and thus amendable to legislative formulation and legal

justif icabi l i ty. But in other cases, it may be not so precise or exact,

but sti l l specif ied enough to identify them as exercisable duties, which

can be monitored and enforced by non-judicial or quasi-judicial

consensual mechanism having sufficient moral force binding the

different agents. It should then be possible to identify a meta right

P(x), which wil l be a composite of all Px B, PxC, PxD , etc.

In determining these policies and actions Px B, PxC , PxD, etc.

account must be taken of the interdependence between these policies

of different agents and between all the different rights. Without taking

into account of these interdependencies, the specif ication of these

policies and actions of different agents wil l not only remain imprecise,

but also often inconsistent and therefore, unable to fulf i l l those rights.

So the programme of actions and measures that is associated with the

right to development has to be necessarily designed in a way that the

obligations of all different agents the state authorities, the civil

society, the NGOs, the local governments, the MNCs, the corporates,

Page 24



the multi lateral agencies and the international communities have to be

clearly specif ied. It thus becomes a fully valid real right; having all

the justif ication of a human right. But, in the contemporary rural

Indian society's scenario, even right with imperfect obligations can be

legitimate human rights if they are accepted as standards of

achievement and norms of behaviour in rural societies as societal

goals.15

6. In Lieu of Conclusion

Our study shows that the paradigm of economics for eff iciency

and equity has been shifted from ' individual uti l ity' to Rawlsian

'primary social goods' and then from Rawlsian 'primary social goods' to

Sen's 'capabil ity set' of social functioning. While evaluating the social

functioning of rural India, we identif ied that structures particularly,

'caste' or/and 'class' as well as patriachy system are not conducive to

' instrumental freedoms' and 'right to development'. Rather, caste-

system and patriachy system are creating ' institutional constraints' for

social spaces of the outcomes of development to be realized

particularly to the 'untouchables' and 'women' at large. Since the

outcomes of the development and the way the outcomes are realized

both constitute the process of development, regarded as a human

right. The right to a process of development is not just an umbrella of

rights or the sum of all rights - civil, polit ical, social, cultural,

economic etc. Additionaly, it is the right to process that expands the

'capabil it ies' or 'real freedom' of individual to improve their well-being

and to realize what they value. Thus, the requirement for improving

the well-being rests on 'realized rights' to development.

Page 25



Improvement in the realization of at least one right, while no

other rights are violated or detoriated could be minimum condition for

'well-being' or development. However, 'realized rights' are not

sufficient condition for well-being or development. In fact, all

elements of rights, in turn, are dependent to each other, together with

the 'eff icient allocation of resources' or growth of GDP (g) and other

financial, technical and institutional resources, in a manner that

enables any improvement in the well being of the entire population

could realize to rights to be sustainable and socially justif ied.

In actual practice, however, growth of GDP(g) may violate some

rights say by increasing inequalies or through increased deprivation.

The violation of rights to development by 'g' may be seen as small and

temporary, leading to a much larger and inclusive 'g' in the longrun,

or a much wider fulf i l lment of human rights. Analytically this would

imply conditions on the cross-effects or second order effects, which

would more than compensate the direct effect on violation.

Apart from 'g', institut ional constraint's may violate r ights to

development as identif ied in rural society of India, say by caste and/or

class or interlocking of class and caste as well as patriarchy system

and duty providers. In this concern, the fulf i l lment of precisely

specif ied obligation can go with the Kantian concept of ' imperfect

obligations'. This doesnot negate right-duty correspondence. But sti l l

specif ied enough to identify the exercisable ' imperfect obligation' must

be monitored and enforced by non-judicial or quassi-judicial

consensual mechanisms having sufficient 'moral force' binding the

different agents of ' imperfect obligations'.

Page 26



As regards the caste and/or class based and partiarchy based

violation of human rights in concerned, the remedies l ies in the

accepted standard and norms of behaviour in societies as social goals.

Societal goals can be realized through ' socia l pol icies' , based on

'Weberian Perspect ives' . Until and unless, the right the right to certain

unprivilezed section of the society remains unfulf i l led or unrealizable,

the social policy must be operationlize in the form of 'metarights', if

all the obligations - perfect and imperfect-associated with social policy

must be clearly specif ied.

Page 27



Annex.

In l ieu of conclusions, as elaborated above can be expressed in

symbols, as

RD = (g, R1, R2, ..... . . . . . . . Rn)

where RD stands for the right to development.

g = growth of GDP, adjusted for growth of technology and

institutional resources.

Ri = the ith r ight, recognized as a human right , i = 1, 2, ..... . . . .

n

Further,

RD = )(irij ji −−−−∑∑

Where,

rij = ith human right for the jth individual

RD = Right to development becomes development RD becomes

an additive function only of all the rights i.e.

RD = )(............,1, iimi Rii −−−−−=∑

and each Ri = ..........,1, m jall for rij j

=∑

According to this formulation, al l individuals and al l rights are

given equal weight. It is a composite of al l the r ights implemented

together as part of the development programme in the context of

growth of resources.

Any particular right, Ri, is however, a function of the enjoyment

of that right by all the individuals and the growth of resources i.e.

Page 28



)(),,( iii ji Rjg f Ri −−−−=±

The functional form or the indicators, need not be uniform for

all countries or for all rights.

An improvement in the r ight to development,

Shown by that impliesdt

dR D 0>

0: ≥g

:and there is at least one i, such that

0>dt

dRi

: and all other rights, 1,0 ≠> jdt

dRj

Further, if for any right, 1, ,0<dt

dRi

then ,0<dt

dR D or the right to development is violated.

To ensure such an improvement in the RD, it would be sufficient

if these constraints are supplemented by the condition.

.,0,0 i Rj

and g Ri ≠≥∈≥

δ δ δ

Analytical ly, g i .e. growth of GDP can also be made a function of

other rights, (for instances, fulf i l lment of the right to education may

raise the rate of growth), when growth becomes both as a mean and

an end in the process of development. It would, however, enormously

complicate the formulation of the development programmes, because

Page 29



in most policy-plans, growth is related to capital accumulation, labour

productivity etc., and specif ication of the functional relationship

between growth and other social development indicators would often

be very diff icult. So the constraints that g and Ri, s are positively or

at least non negatively related should be sufficient for our purpose.

NOTES

1. Roemer (1993) formalizes the theory of equal opportunities.

Fluebary (1994, 1995), Bossert (1995) and Bossert and Fluebary

(1996) adopt an axiomatic approach to those theories.

2. See for instance Neil l, Robin. "Harold Admas Innis". Vet

Encyclopedia, edited by Robert Whaples, January 10, 2005.

3. The concept of veil of ignorance was advanced by J. Haryasanyi.

For Details see Haryasanyi, J. (1955) : "Cordinal Welfare,

Individualistic ethics and Interpersonal comparison, Journal of

Polit ical Economy, 63, 309-21.

4. Or opportunities - see World Bank (2005) for a recent influential

use of that formulation of equity.

5. Achieved functioning could be alternatively seem as an

elementary valuation of the capabil ity set. In this sense - only in

this sense - functioning and capabil it ies coincide.

6. The influence of the idea of capabil ity soon went far beyond

welfare economics and even far beyond economics. There is now

even a successful "Human Development and Capabil ity

Page 30



Association" Launched in September, 2004, its aim at "promoting

research from many disciplines on key problems including

poverty, justice, well being and economies.

7. The families of instrumental freedoms as pointed by Sen

(1999:38-40) includes : polit ical freedoms, economic facil it ies,

social opportunities, transperency guarantees, protective security.

8. Institution represent the space of instrumental freedoms :

through institutions people (or more l ikely their representations)

can intervene to enlarge capabil ity set. Institutions should ideally

be developed through a democratic and participation process. We

are aware that they are far from perfect. Nontheless, for the

purpose of this paper, we postulate a direct relationship between

their eff iciency and effectiveness and constitution freedom or

instrumental freedom. The greater the institutional freedoms, the

wider the constitutive freedom.

9. The expressi on "Institutional Freedom Vortex" is taken from

Chopra, Duraippah (2001).

10. Sen (1991 : 15-16) points out that this is non-welfarist approach

to the assessment of what standard theory defines social welfare.

11. Structures that humans impose on human inte raction and

therefore define the incentives that (together with the other

constraints) determine the choices that individuals make that

shape the performance of societies and economies over time.

(North, D, 1994 : 1-2). In another perspective, the traditional

definition of institutions of North, plus the most narrow notion of

Page 31



social capital of R. Putuan (social networks and related rules)

enables norms to develop and shapes social structure (grootcard,

1997:3).

12. Sen (2000), "Consequential Evaluation and Practical Reason", The

Journal of Philosophy Vol. XVII, No. 9, see also Stephen Marks,

The Human Rights Framework for Development : Five Approaches

: FXB Center for Health & Human Rights, Working Paper Series,

No. 6, 2001.

13. Amartya Sen "The right not to be hungry" in Phil ip Altson and

Katarina Tomasevski ed. The Right to Food, SIM, Netherlands,

1984.

14. See Holif ield (1917) description of different types of rights which

form the basis of the modern discourse of Rights in Yale Law

Review, Vol. 23, 1913 and Vol. 26, 1917.

15. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge, Harward

University Press, 1977.

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Dr.kumar Ratnesh