DRAFT PROCEDURAL REPORThttpAssets... · DRAFT PROCEDURAL REPORT Prepared by the Secretariat ... Tajikistan and Ukraine. The Group also took note that in accordance with article 5

GROUP OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE

CONVENTION ON PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN

CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH MAY BE DEEMED TO BE EXCESSIVELY

INJURIOUS OR TO HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS

(Fifteenth Session - Geneva, 28 August – 6 September 2006)

DRAFT PROCEDURAL REPORT

Prepared by the Secretariat

1. The Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the

Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to

Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) held at Geneva on 24 and 25 November 2005 decided, as

contained in paragraph 29 of its report (document CCW/MSP/2005/2), to commission follow-up

work under the oversight of the President-designate of the Third Review Conference of the States

Parties to the Convention.

2. The Meeting of the States Parties decided, as contained in paragraph 26 of

CCW/MSP/2005/2, “to convene the Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the

Convention from 7 to 17 November 2006 at Geneva in conjunction with the Eighth Annual

Conference of the States Parties to Amended Protocol II.” The Meeting of the States Parties also

decided, as contained in paragraph 27 of CCW/MSP/2005/2, that “all necessary preparations for the

Third Review Conference be undertaken within the framework of the existing Group of

Governmental Experts.”


CCW/MSP/2005/2, to recommend that “the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as Depositary

of the Convention and its annexed Protocols, and the President-designate, on behalf of the States

Parties, exercise their authority to achieve the goal of universality of the Convention and its annexed

Protocols.”


CCW/MSP/2005/2, that the Working Group on Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) would continue

its work in the year 2006 with the following mandate:

“To continue to consider, including through participation of legal experts, the

implementation of existing principles of International Humanitarian Law and to further

study, on an open-ended basis, with particular emphasis on meetings of military and

technical experts, possible preventive measures aimed at improving the design of certain

specific types of munitions, including sub-munitions, with a view to minimising the

humanitarian risk of these munitions becoming explosive remnants of war. Exchange of

information, assistance and co-operation would be part of this work. The Group will report

on the work done to the Third Review Conference in 2006.”

Page 2


CCW/MSP/2005/2, that the Working Group on Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines

(MOTAPM) would continue its work in the year 2006 with the following mandate:

“a) To continue to consider all proposals on Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines put

forward since the establishment of the Group of Governmental Experts with the aim of

elaborating appropriate recommendations on Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines for

submission to the Third Review Conference in 2006.

b) Meetings of military experts shall also be conducted to provide advice on these

activities.”


CCW/MSP/2005/2, that “the President-designate shall undertake consultations during the

intersessional period on possible options to promote compliance with the Convention and its

annexed Protocols, taking into account proposals put forward, and shall submit a report, adopted by

consensus, to the States Parties.”


CCW/MSP/2005/2, that “the President-designate shall undertake consultations during the

intersessional period on the possibility to establish a sponsorship programme under the Convention

and on the modalities of such a sponsorship programme, and shall report to the States Parties.”


CCW/MSP/2005/2, to “designate Ambassador François Rivasseau of France as President of the

Third Review Conference of the States Parties to be held in 2006.” The States Parties also appointed

Ambassador Edvardas Borisovas of Lithuania as Coordinator on Explosive Remnants of War, and

Ambassador Carlos Antonio da Rocha Paranhos of Brazil as Coordinator on Mines Other Than

Anti-Personnel Mines.


CCW/MSP/2005/2, that “the intersessional work of the Group of Governmental Experts will be

undertaken in three sessions at Geneva during 2006.”

10. The Fifteenth Session of the Group of Governmental Experts was held at Geneva from 28

August to 6 September 2006.

11. The following States Parties to the Convention participated in the work of the Group:

Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and

Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech

Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See,

Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Malta, Mexico,

Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal,

Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia,

Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,

Page 3

Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of

America and Venezuela.

12. The following Signatory States to the Convention also participated in the work of the Group:

Afghanistan and Egypt.

13. The following States not parties to the Convention participated as observers: Azerbaijan, Iran

(Islamic Republic of), Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Myanmar, Qatar, Saudi

Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen.

14. The representatives of United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and

United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) took part in the work of the Group.

15. The representatives of the following organisations also took part in the work of the Group:

Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and International Committee of

the Red Cross (ICRC).

16. The representatives of the following non-governmental organisations also took part in the

work of the Group: Actiongroup Landmine.de, Austrian Aid for Mine Victims, Cluster Munition

Coalition, Geneva Call, Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, International Campaign to

Ban Landmines (ICBL), Landmine Action (UK), Norwegian People’s Aid, Pax Christi International,

Pax Christi Netherlands, Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines, Tchad Agir pour l’Environnement,

University of Exeter.

17. On 28 August 2006, the session was opened by the President-designate of the Third Review

Conference, Ambassador François Rivasseau of France.

18. The meetings of the Working Groups of the Group of Governmental Experts were chaired by

the two Coordinators: Ambassador Edvardas Borisovas of Lithuania as Coordinator on Explosive

Remnants of War and Ambassador Carlos Antonio da Rocha Paranhos of Brazil as Coordinator on

Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines. Mr. Peter Kolarov, Political Affairs Officer, Department

for Disarmament Affairs, Geneva Branch, served as Secretary of the Group, and was assisted by Mr.

Bantan Nugroho, Political Affairs Officer.

19. The Group held eight plenary meetings. At its first plenary meeting, on 28 August 2006, the

Group confirmed its Agenda (CCW/GGE/XIII/7, Annex I), and the Rules of Procedure as adopted

and used by the Second Review Conference (CCW/CONF.II/PC.1/1 with oral amendments) and

adopted its Programme of Work (CCW/GGE/XV/1/Rev.1).

20. At the same plenary meeting, the Group of Governmental Experts considered the question of

participation, including that of the United Nations agencies, specialized and other agencies and non-

governmental organizations in the work of the Group and agreed to exercise the utmost degree of

transparency in its activities.

Page 4

21. At the same plenary meeting, the following States participated in a general exchange of

views on the preparation for the Third Review Conference: Argentina, Canada, China, Finland (on

behalf of the European Union, the Acceding Countries Bulgaria and Romania, the Candidate

Countries Croatia and The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Countries of the

Stabilization and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Montenegro, Serbia, as well as Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova aligning themselves), Japan,

Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, and Russian Federation. GICHD, Human Rights Watch and

Cluster Munition Coalition also participated in the general exchange of views.

22. At the plenary meeting, on 28 August 2006, the Group of Governmental Experts devoted

time for the consideration of the status of CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. The

meeting was chaired by Ambassador Edvardas Borisovas of Lithuania, Coordinator on Explosive

Remnants of War. The Group took note of the 23 States Parties which had notified the Secretary-

General of the United Nations of their consent to be bound by Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of

War: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Finland, Germany, Holy

See, India, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Sierra

Leone, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan and Ukraine. The Group also took note that in

accordance with article 5 (3) of the Convention, Protocol V will enter into force on 12 November

2006 during the Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention.

23. In accordance with the decisions taken by the Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention

in 2005 (CCW/MSP/2005/2), the Group of Governmental Experts devoted time for the

consideration of the preparation for the 2006 Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the

Convention at the plenary meetings on 28 August, 4 and 6 September 2006. The meetings were

chaired by Ambassador François Rivasseau of France and considered papers presented by the

President-designate titled “Provisional Programme of Work of the Main Committee I of the Third

Review Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or

Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively

Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects” as contained in CCW/GGE/XV/4, dated 25 August

2006, “Provisional Programme of Work of the Main Committee II of the Third Review Conference

of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of

Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have

Indiscriminate Effects” as contained in CCW/GGE/XV/5, dated 25 August 2006 and “Draft Final

Document of the Third Review Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on

Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to

be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects” as contained in CCW/GGE/XV/L.2,

dated 29 August 2006.



consideration of options to promote compliance with the Convention at the plenary meetings on 30

August, 4 and 6 September 2006. The meetings were chaired by Ambassador François Rivasseau of

France, who was assisted by Ambassador Gordan Markotić of Croatia, Friend of the President on

Compliance, and considered papers presented by the President-designate titled “Amendment to the

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which

Page 5

May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects” as contained in

CCW/GGE/XV/2, dated 16 August 2006, “Revised Draft Proposal on Compliance” as contained in

CCW/GGE/XV/2/Rev.1, dated 1 September 2006, and CCW/GGE/XV/2/Rev.2, dated 5 September

2006.



consideration of the possibility to establish a sponsorship programme under the Convention and on

the modalities of such a sponsorship programme at the plenary meetings on 30 August, 4 and 6

September 2006. The meetings were chaired by Ambassador François Rivasseau of France and

considered papers presented by the President-designate titled “Draft Decision on the Establishment

of a Sponsorship Programme under the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of

Certain Conventional Weapons which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have

Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)” as contained in CCW/GGE/XV/3, dated 16 August 2006, and

“Revised Draft Decision on the Establishment of a Sponsorship Programme under the Convention

on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which May be Deemed

to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)” as contained in

CCW/GGE/XV/3/Rev.1, dated 31 August 2006.

26. The Working Group on Explosive Remnants of War held three meetings and discussed the

implementation of existing principles of International Humanitarian Law and possible preventive

measures aimed at improving the design of certain specific types of munitions, including sub-

munitions, with a view to minimise the humanitarian risk of these munitions becoming explosive

remnants of war. It also considered a paper presented by the President-designate titled “Draft

Declaration on the Occasion of the Entry into Force of CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of

War” as contained in CCW/GGE/XV/L.1, dated 25 August 2006. It also held one meeting of

military and technical experts, chaired by Ms. Vera Bohle of GICHD, and discussed document

CCW/GGE/XV/WG.1/1, dated 8 August 2006, presented by the Chairperson of the Meetings of

Military and Technical Experts on Explosive Remnants of War titled “Provisional Agenda for the

Meeting of the Military Experts on ERW” and its addenda as contained in

CCW/GGE/XV/WG.1/1/Add.1, dated 8 August 2006 titled “Annotated Provisional Agenda”, and

CCW/GGE/XV/WG.1/1/Add.2, dated xxx September 2006 titled “Draft Table of Explosive

Ordnance Types and Systems”.

27. The Working Group on Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines held three meetings and

discussed proposals on Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines put forward since the establishment

of the Group of Governmental Experts. It considered papers presented by the Coordinator titled “Set

of Provisions on the Use of MOTAPM/AVM. A Compilation of Provisions that Could Command

Consensus in the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE)” as contained in CCW/GGE/XV/WG.2/1,

dated 14 August 2006, and CCW/GGE/XV/WG.2/1/Rev.1, dated 4 September 2006. It also held one

meeting of military experts, chaired by Brigadier-General Gerson Menandro Garcia de Freitas of

Brazil.

28. During the course of the session, the Group of Governmental Experts considered documents

CCW/GGE/XV/1 to CCW/GGE/XV/5, CCW/GGE/XV/WP.1 to CCW/GGE/XV/WP.3, as well as

Page 6

CCW/GGE/XV/L.1 and CCW/GGE/XV/L.2, as listed in Annex IX. The Working Group on

Explosive Remnants of War considered documents CCW/GGE/XV/WG.1/1,

CCW/GGE/XV/WG.1/1/Add.1, CCW/GGE/XV/WG.1/1/Add.2, and CCW/GGE/XV/WG.1/WP.1

to CCW/GGE/XV/WG.1/WP.3, as listed in Annex IX. The Working Group on Mines Other Than

Anti-Personnel Mines considered documents CCW/GGE/XV/WG.2/1,

CCW/GGE/XV/WG.2/1/Rev.1 and CCW/GGE/XV/WG.2/WP.1 and CCW/GGE/XV/WG.2/WP.2,

as listed in Annex IX. These documents are available in all official languages through the Official

Document System of the United Nations at http://documents.un.org, and the official website of the

CCW as part of the website of the United Nations Office at Geneva at

http://www.unog.ch/disarmament/ .

29. The Group of Governmental Experts heard presentations by ICRC on “Battlefield lasers and

loss of vision: a question of dose”; by Gari Owen, an independent consultant, on “Lasers and

associated hazards”; by UN DDA to launch the new official website of the CCW as part of the

website of the United Nations Office at Geneva at http://www.unog.ch/disarmament/. The Working

Group on Explosive Remnants of War heard presentations by France titled “ERW – Quality

Management Process”; UNMAS on “Cluster Munitions in Lebanon”; and Human Rights Watch on

“Cluster Munitions, ERW and Protocol V”.

30. The Group of Governmental Experts decided to recommend to the Third Review Conference

the “Provisional Programme of Work of Main Committee I of the Third Review Conference of the

High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain

Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have

Indiscriminate Effects” as contained in Annex IV, and “Provisional Programme of Work of Main

Committee II of the Third Review Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on

Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to

be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects” as contained in Annex V. The Group

also decided to recommend to the Third Review Conference the “Draft Final Document of the Third

Review Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or

Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively

Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects” as contained in Annex VII, the “Draft Declaration on

the Entry into force of CCW Protocol V on ERW”, as contained in Annex VI, as well as the “Draft

Decision on the Establishment of a Sponsorship Programme under the Convention on Prohibitions

or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be

Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects”, as contained in Annex VIII.

31. At the final plenary meeting, on 6 September 2006, the Group of Governmental Experts

adopted the procedural report of the Fifteenth Session, as contained in document

CCW/GGE/XV/CRP.1, as orally amended, which is being issued as document CCW/GGE/XV/6.

Page 7

Annex I

REPORT

OF THE WORK ON EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR

Prepared by the Coordinator on ERW and

the Chairperson of the Meetings of Military and Technical Experts1

1. MANDATES OF THE GGE ON ERW

1.1. INITIAL MANDATE ADOPTED BY THE SECOND REVIEW CONFERENCE IN 2001

At the Second Review Conference the States Parties to the CCW decided to establish an open-

ended Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) with two separate Coordinators on Mines Other

Than Anti-Personal Mines (MOTAPM) and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW). The GGE on

ERW was mandated to:

“(a) discuss ways and means to address the issue of Explosive Remnants of War (ERW). In this

context the Group shall consider all factors, appropriate measures and proposals, in particular:

1. factors and types of munitions that could cause humanitarian problems after a conflict;

2. technical improvements and other measures for relevant types of munitions, including sub-

munitions, which could reduce the risk of such munitions becoming ERW;

3. the adequacy of existing International Humanitarian Law in minimizing post-conflict risks of

ERW, both to civilians and to the military;

4. warning to the civilian population, in or close to, ERW-affected areas, clearance of ERW, the

rapid provision of information to facilitate early and safe clearance of ERW, and associated issues

and responsibilities;

5. assistance and co-operation. ”2

Under the same decision the Coordinator on ERW had to “undertake work in an efficient manner

so as to submit recommendations, adopted by consensus, at an early date for consideration by the

States Parties, including whether to proceed with negotiating a legally-binding instrument or

instruments on ERW and/or other approaches”.

The 2002 Meeting of the States Parties to the CCW decided that “the Working Group on Explosive

Remnants of War would continue its work in the year 2003 with the following mandate:

(a) (i) To negotiate an instrument on post-conflict remedial measures of a generic nature which

would reduce the risks of ERW. These measures would be based on a broad definition covering

most types of explosive munitions, with the exception of mines. Abandoned munitions would have to

be included. In these negotiations, questions need to be considered regarding, inter alia,

1 In cooperation with GICHD

2 CCW/CONF.II/2

Page 8

responsibility for clearance, existing ERW, the provision of information to facilitate clearance and

risk education, warnings to civilian populations, assistance & co-operation, and a framework for

regular consultations of High Contracting Parties. These negotiations would have to establish the

scope of this instrument consistent with Article I of the Convention as amended at its Second

Review Conference.

(a) (ii) To explore and determine whether these negotiations could successfully address preventive

generic measures for improving the reliability of munitions that fall within the agreed broad

definition, through voluntary best practices concerning the management of manufacturing, quality

control, handling and storage of munitions. Exchange of information, assistance and co-operation

would be important elements of such best practices.

(b) Separate from the negotiations under (a): to continue to consider the implementation of existing

principles of International Humanitarian Law and to further study, on an open ended basis,

possible preventive measures aimed at improving the design of certain specific types of munitions,

including sub-munitions, with a view to minimize the humanitarian risk of these munitions

becoming ERW. Exchange of information, assistance and co-operation would be part of this work.

(c) In the context of the activities described above, meetings of military experts can be conducted to

provide advice in support of these activities.”3

1.2. MANDATE AFTER THE ADOPTION OF PROTOCOL V

Following recommendations of the GGE, the 2003 Meeting of the States Parties to the CCW

decided4 that the GGE would continue its work on ERW in 2004 with the following mandate

5:

“To continue to consider the implementation of existing principles of International Humanitarian

Law and to further study, on an open-ended basis, and initially with particular emphasis on

meetings of military and technical experts, possible preventive measures aimed at improving the

design of certain specific types of munitions, including sub-munitions, with a view to minimize the

humanitarian risk of these munitions becoming explosive remnants of war. Exchange of

information, assistance and co-operation would be part of this work.”

Following recommendations of the GGE, the 2004 Meeting of the States Parties to the CCW

decided6 that the GGE would continue its work on ERW in 2005 with the following mandate

7:

“To continue to consider, including through participation of legal experts, the implementation of

existing principles of International Humanitarian Law and to further study, on an open-ended

basis, with particular emphasis on meetings of military and technical experts, possible preventive

3 CCW/MSP/2002/2

4 CCW/MSP/2003/3

5 CCW/GGE/VI/2

6 CCW/MSP/2004/2

7 CCW/GGE/IX/2

Page 9

measures aimed at improving the design of certain specific types of munitions, including sub-

munitions, with a view to minimizing the humanitarian risk of these munitions becoming explosive

remnants of war. Exchange of information, assistance and co-operation would be part of this

work. The Group will report on the work done to the next Meeting of the States Parties.”

The mandate of 2005 was also adopted by the States Parties for the year 20068.

2. PROTOCOL ON EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR (PROTOCOL V) ADOPTION,

RATIFICATION, UNIVERSALIZATION AND IMPLEMENTATION EFFORTS

The Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War was negotiated by the GGE under the mandate

established by the 2002 Meeting of the States Parties as a result of the considerable advancement of

the work of the Group on ERW in 2001-2002.

The Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War was adopted as the Fifth CCW protocol by the

Meeting of the States Parties to the CCW in 2003:

“Following the recommendations of the Group of Governmental Experts, the Meeting of the States

Parties decided to adopt the Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War, which is contained in

Appendix II attached to the Procedural Report of the Sixth Session of the Group of Governmental

Experts (CCW/GGE/VI/2), annexed to this Report as Annex V.”9

Protocol V was adopted by the States Parties on 28 November 2003. The Protocol was adopted on

the understanding that it was subject to checking of the official translation into United Nations

language versions by States whose working language was not English. Accordingly, proposed

corrections from different delegations on the Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish texts of the

Protocol had been received, considered and approved by the CCW States parties, and effected by

the Secretary-General of the United Nations, acting as depositary of the Convention.

For their national ratification procedures, some States Parties needed the consolidated corrected

versions of the certified true copies of the original Protocol (in all 6 United Nations language

versions). The Treaty Section of the UN Office of Legal Affairs has been approached accordingly

by the President-designate of the Third Review Conference, States Parties, the Presidency of the

European Union and others. In this regard, the following depository notifications in relation to the

authentic texts of Protocol V were issued:

• C.N.241.2006.TREATIES-1 “Issuance of the corrected French version of the Protocol”;

• C.N.379.2006.TREATIES-4 “Issuance of the corrected version (Spanish authentic text) of

the Protocol”;

• C.N.437.2006.TREATIES-9 “Issuance of the corrected version (Chinese authentic text) of

the Protocol”;

8 CCW/MSP/2005/2

9 CCW/MSP/2003/3

Page 10

• C.N.440.2006.TREATIES-9 “Issuance of the corrected version (Russian authentic text) of

the Protocol”.

In order to promote the early entry into force of the Protocol the President-designate of the Third

Review Conference, the Coordinator on ERW and the Presidency of the European Union on behalf

of its Member States carried out demarches in a number of the States Parties to the CCW that have

not yet ratified Protocol V.

On 12 May 2006 – the date by which 20 States Parties to the CCW notified their consent to be

bound by Protocol V, the conditions for the entry into force of the Protocol were met. In

accordance with Article 5 (3) of the CCW, Protocol V will enter into force on 12 November

200610

, six months after the submission of the 20th instrument of ratification, during the Third

Review Conference of the States Parties to the CCW.

For the present, the following 23 States are party to Protocol V (as listed in alphabetical order):

Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Denmark, El Salvador, Finland, Germany, Holy

See, India, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway,

Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, and Ukraine.

The Protocol provides for the Contracting Parties to undertake consultations and cooperate with

each other on all issues related to the operation of the Protocol. In accordance with Article 10,

paragraph 1: “For this purpose, a Conference of High Contracting Parties shall be held as agreed

to by a majority, but not less than eighteen High Contracting Parties”.

There is no decision yet concerning the timing of the First Conference of the High Contracting

Parties. The High Contracting Parties to the Protocol noted it might be possible to hold a meeting in

preparation for the First Conference in 2007 taking into consideration other CCW-related meetings

and, inter alia, address procedural matters, discuss substantive issues with the aim to make the

Protocol operational as soon as feasible. In preparations for the First Conference of High

Contracting Parties to Protocol V, issues related to the implementation of Protocol V could be also

considered in informal meetings within various existing venues.

In recognition of the importance that the Protocol should become operational after its entry into

force without delay, certain efforts have already been undertaken with this regard.

In 2006, a series of formal GGE meetings and consultations of different settings took place at the

initiative of, and in cooperation with, the President-designate of the Third Review Conference, the

Coordinator on ERW, the Netherlands, UNDDA, UNMAS, ICRC, GICHD and others.

At the request of the Coordinator on ERW, UNMAS, on behalf of the Inter Agency Coordination

Group on Mine Action (IACG-MA), prepared and submitted to the GGE a document titled “The

United Nations and the Implementation of Protocol V”11

. The GICHD presented some practical

10

C.N.382.2006.TREATIES-6 (Depositary Notification) 11

CCW/GGE/XV/WG.1/WP.2

Page 11

ideas on the same issue and, in particular, on existing mine action tools that have the potential to

equally support the implementation of Protocol V as well as to establish synergies between

Protocol V and the implementation of the 1997 Convention on Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,

Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Ottawa Convention).

Consultations and practical steps taken at the national level have also been reported by some States

Parties that have ratified Protocol V.

The States Parties have agreed that the Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the CCW

should hold a Special (High Level) Segment to mark the entry into force of Protocol V on 13

November 2006. In this regard, the States Parties drafted and recommended for adoption to the

Third Review Conference a special Declaration on the Entry into Force of Protocol V.

3. DISCUSSIONS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN

LAW

3.1. THE COORDINATOR’S THREE-STEP APPROACH

During the Sixth session of the GGE in March 2004 the Coordinator on ERW suggested a “three-

step” approach12

(hereinafter – the Coordinator’s Three Step Approach) in considering the

implementation of existing principles of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Step one would

seek to deliberate and agree upon which of the existing principles of IHL could be considered as

applicable to ERW, step two – to consider the status of implementation of these principles by the

States Parties, taking into account the obligations of the States Parties under the Conventions and/or

Protocols from which they are derived, and, step three would include consideration of the adequacy

of the mechanisms provided for in these Conventions and/or Protocols for promoting

implementation of these principles and whether any further measures are required in this regard.

3.2. IHL-8 INITIATIVE: IHL QUESTIONNAIRE. MCCORMACK REPORT, ITS

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In pursuance of the goal outlined in the Coordinator’s Three-Step Approach in March 2005, eight

States Parties – Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom

and United States of America (hereinafter – IHL-8) in consultation with the ICRC submitted a

proposal13

to facilitate the work of the GGE on step one and step two of the Coordinator’s Three

Step Approach. States Parties were invited to consider responding to the questionnaire (IHL

Questionnaire) introduced by IHL-8. The proposal enjoyed a broad support. This encouraged a

follow-up action, and during the GGE Twelfth session of in November 2005 Canada presented a

working paper titled “A Way Ahead for IHL Questionnaire Response Analysis”14

. It was suggested

by IHL-8 that written responses to the IHL Questionnaire and compiled oral intervention transcripts

12 CCW/GGE/VII/WG.1/WP.1 13

CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2 14

CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/WP.12

Page 12

will be analyzed on a “without prejudice” basis for the purpose of identifying general trends with the

overall aim of establishing a baseline or baselines from which further discussion can proceed in

accordance with step three of the Coordinator’s Three Step Approach.

Professor Tim McCormack of the Faculty of Law, University of Melbourne, Australia, has offered

to undertake the required analysis. By 26 January 2006, 33 States Parties had submitted their

responses to the IHL Questionnaire. In accordance with the proposed course of action, the findings

and analysis by Prof. McCormack and his team were presented to the Coordinator in the form of a

report (McCormack Report15

) and later released to States Parties. The Coordinator also invited

ICRC and GICHD to provide their critical analysis of the McCormack Report, which they did

accordingly16

.

The McCormack Report concluded that “Protocol V to the CCW and the existing rules of IHL are

specific and comprehensive enough to deal adequately with the problem of ERW provided that those

rules are effectively implemented.”17

The following recommendations for practical steps that the GGE might consider in order to advance

their work on IHL and ERW were offered in McCormack Report:

“Recommendation 1: All States Parties to the CCW should be encouraged to ratify Protocol V on

ERW as expeditiously as possible. […]

Recommendation 2: The GGE should continue to stress to all CCW States Parties the significance

of legally binding rules of International Humanitarian Law applicable to all weapons types and to

the specific problem of ERW. […]

Recommendation 3: The GGE should consider the development of a set of non-legally binding

Guidelines on ‘best practice’ application of relevant rules of International Humanitarian Law to the

problem of ERW. […]

Recommendation 4: The GGE should encourage all States Parties to the CCW which do not

already do so to establish a process for legal review of all new and modified weapons systems. […]

Recommendation 5: The GGE should consider introducing a system of written confidence building

reports by States as to their unilateral destruction of old or outmoded weapons to reduce potential

sources of ERW.”18

During the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth sessions of the GGE, the discussion on the

implementation of existing principles of IHL that are applicable to ERW took place mainly on the

basis of the IHL Questionnaire, the McCormack Report, in particular its conclusions and

15

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/WP.12, CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/WP.12/Add.1, CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/WP.12/Add.2,

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/WP.12/Corr.1, CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/WP.12/Corr.2 16

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/WP.15 and CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/WP.13 17

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/WP.12 18

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/WP.12

Page 13

recommendations, “A Critical Analysis by the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian

Demining”19

, the “Comments by the International Committee of Red Cross”20

, and the remarks21

prepared by the Asia Pacific Centre for Military Law, University of Melbourne, which were meant to

form a constituent part of the analysis by Prof. McCormack and his team and be essential in

interpreting its findings.

In order to narrow down the persisting divergence of views, particularly on Recommendation 3, a

new document titled “Preliminary Thoughts on a Possible Approach to Recommendation 3”22

was

prepared by Prof. Tim McCormack, presented and discusased at the Fourteenth session of GGE and

debated.

After the presentation of McCormack Report for the consideration by the GGE and by the end of

the Fifteenth session of GGE, 9 (nine) more States Parties submitted their responses to the IHL

Questionnaire.

4. MEETINGS OF THE MILITARY AND TECHNICAL EXPERTS ON THE

ASSESSMENT OF THE HUMANITARIAN THREAT AND ON TECHNICAL

PREVENTIVE MEASURES

After the adoption of Protocol V, subsequent meetings of the Military and Technical Expert Group

focussed on the following points:

1. Specific types of munitions and threat assessment from an ERW perspective

2. Technical preventive measures with a view to reducing humanitarian risk

3. Consideration of the relevance and feasibility of these measures

4. Possible assistance and cooperation with regard to implementing these measures.

These points were reflected in the agendas of the meetings (see Annex “List of Documents of the

GGE on the Issue of ERW”).

The following substantive proposals and achievements were made:

4.1. SPECIFIC TYPES OF MUNITIONS AND THREAT ASSESSMENT FROM AN ERW

PERSPECTIVE

A. Classification of munitions and common understanding

As a first step to come to a common understanding of “certain specific types of munitions, including

sub-munitions”, as per mandate, it was necessary to get a consistent overview of explosive ordnance.

19



CCW/GGE/XIV/WG.1/WP.1 22

CCW/GGE/XIV/WG.1/WP.4

Page 14

For this, a “Draft Table of Explosive Ordnance Types and Systems”23

was produced, continuously

updated and improved. A workable version has been achieved, but finalisation will be required.

Germany has initiated a common understanding of the term “Cluster Munitions”24

, and has collected

on request of the Coordinator other delegation’s input. Common positions have been identified as

well as controversial points. Further work on a common understanding would be required. The

common understanding forms part of a German 8-Point-Position on Cluster Munitions, which has

been presented for discussion during the sessions, and which aims at replacing Cluster Munitions by

alternative munitions in the long term.

B. Assessment of humanitarian threat

The Coordinator on Explosive Remnants of War noted on 8 March 2004: “As the Group is

mandated to study preventive measures aimed at improving the design of certain specific munitions,

the first task for the Group, therefore, is to specify which type of munitions, including sub-munitions,

need to be considered for improving the design through possible preventive measures,”25

. Generic

preventive measures are already dealt with in Article 9 and part 3 of the Technical Annex of

Protocol V.

The aim of the Military and Technical Expert’s sessions was to define ERW that present a specific

humanitarian risk, having in mind that all ERW in large quantities present a humanitarian problem,

but some munitions may by design have a greater potential to present a specific humanitarian threat

as ERW. The definition of ERW that present a specific humanitarian risk has been a difficult task,

because there is no existing methodology and there is a significant lack of detailed data for many

ammunition types. The approaches taken were the following:

The former Swiss chair of the Meeting of Military an Technical Experts had prepared a Matrix

which considered humanitarian risk of ERW (latest version: CCW/GGE/IX/WG.1/1, referred to as

“Swiss Matrix”), but this matrix was not meant to provide a methodology to define it. It was meant

to provide a structure for the collection of information on possible technical preventive measures. In

this regard, the Swiss Matrix is open for further development.

The United Kingdom had prepared a Humanitarian Threat Matrix26

, which was considered to be too

subjective. Consequently, the United Kingdom developed a methodology27

with the aim to assess

the relative risk of categories of explosive ordnance becoming Explosive Remnants of War more

objectively. However, in the given framework it has not been possible to achieve results through the

application of the methodology. Hence this approach has been discontinued and essential elements

are available for incorporation into the French Matrix (see below).

23

CCW/GGE/XIV/WG.1/1/Add.2 24

CCW/GGE/XV/WG.1/WP.3 25

CCW/GGE/VII/WG.1/WP.1 26

CCW/GGE/IX/WG.1/1 27


Page 15

UNMAS presented preliminary findings of a survey undertaken in 2005 together with UNDP28

.

UNMAS and UNDP had requested UN programme managers and technical experts from a number

of mine action programmes to give their assessment on the risks posed by specific ERW from a

clearance perspective. The main preliminary finding was that Cluster Munitions and their associated

sub-munitions present a specific humanitarian threat and a particular challenge to clearance

operations.

Several Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have published numerous studies and gave

presentations in side meetings indicating that from a humanitarian point of view Cluster Munitions

remain the key explosive remnants of war to be addressed.

General thoughts or presentations on how to define more precisely “certain specific types of

munitions, including sub-munitions” were encouraged and presented. Furthermore, the GICHD

conducted a review of publications, presentations and statements in the context of the CCW on the

issue.

The munitions mentioned so far presenting a specific humanitarian risk have been Cluster

Munitions. Some delegations argued that all munitions present a risk as ERW and no distinction

should be made.

4.2. TECHNICAL PREVENTIVE MEASURES WITH A VIEW TO REDUCING THE

HUMANITARIAN RISK

There have been numerous presentations on this issue during the GGE sessions. Some of the

presentations focussed on generic preventive measures and national practices, some of them on

preventive measures for specific ammunition types, namely Cluster Munitions. Other delegations

presented detailed statements on these issues.

France addressed steps to prevent munitions from becoming ERW in their working paper

“Munitions – A Method to reduce the Risks associated with Explosive Remnants of War (ERW)”29

(called “French Matrix”). The Matrix has been continuously improved and is evolving into a

common document for the Group of Military and Technical Experts by including elements of the

explosive ordnance table, of the methodology of the United Kingdom, of the Swiss Matrix, of

national practices on how to prevent munitions from becoming ERW, and of experts, for example in

the fields of munitions design, production and training. The Matrix at this stage is meant to provide

a catalogue of questions and proposals, allowing countries to assess technical preventive measures

for all ERW, and thus facilitating the implementation of Protocol V. The development of the Matrix

has not been completed yet.

4.3. CONSIDERATION OF THE RELEVANCE AND FEASIBILITY OF THE MEASURES

28

CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/WP.11 29


Page 16

There have been only preliminary discussions on this issue so far, because no suitable technical

measures had been identified yet. Once these measures are identified, their relevance for the

reduction of the humanitarian threat of ERW and their feasibility would need to be discussed.

4.4. POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION WITH REGARD TO IMPLEMENTING

THE MEASURES

There have been only preliminary discussions on this issue so far. Once concrete results have been

achieved on technical preventive measures, their relevance and feasibility, ideas on exchange of

information, assistance and co-operation should be addressed.

4.5. WAY AHEAD OPTIONS FOR THE WORK OF THE GROUP OF MILITARY AND

TECHNICAL EXPERTS ON ERW:

1. Continuation of the Threat Assessment process:

a. Completion of the ammunition table to form a technical base for further discussions

b. Further development of the common understanding of the term “Cluster Munitions”,

with Germany continuing to compile input from other delegations and reporting to

the Group

c. Agreement on munitions that present a specific humanitarian threat.

2. Continuation of the research for Technical Preventive Measures:

d. Further work on the French Matrix, which would then become a common document

of the group and incorporate other delegation’s working papers and presentations

e. Focus on munitions, including Cluster Munitions, deemed to present a specific

humanitarian threat

f. Extension of the mandate from design issues to the consideration of the whole life

cycle of munitions

g. Consideration of the relevance and feasibility of the identified measures

h. Consideration of technical cooperation and assistance.

3. Shifting of the non-technical aspects of Cluster Munitions to the meetings on ERW of the

GGE.

5. ASSESSMENT OF THE OUTCOME OF THE WORK OF THE GROUP ON EXPLOSIVE

REMNANTS OF WAR

There is an agreement that the major achievement of the Working Group on Explosive Remnants

of War since the 2001 Review Conference is the adoption and entry into force of Protocol on

Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V). Its universalization and effective implementation is the

most important goal in addressing the humanitarian problems related to ERW.

There is a common understanding that all States Parties to the CCW shall be encouraged to ratify

Protocol V as expeditiously as possible. Protocol V does impose basic obligations upon States that

Page 17

are parties to armed conflicts to minimize the risks and effects of ERW as well as encourages them

to take generic preventive measures aimed at minimizing the occurrence of ERW.30

In preparations for the First Conference of High Contracting Parties to Protocol V, its

implementation issues have already been addressed, and could be also further considered in

informal meetings within various existing venues.

It was commonly recognized by the States Parties that the effective implementation of IHL

principles and rules pertinent to ERW should be pursued.

The Group agreed on the value that all States Parties recognize the significance of legally binding

rules of International Humanitarian Law applicable to all weapons types and in particular to the

specific problem of ERW. The State Parties should acknowledge the serious consequences of

violation of customary and/or treaty-based legal obligations applicable to the problem of ERW.31

The Group also concluded that the States Parties to the CCW which are the parties to the Additional

Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions and which do not already do so should be encouraged to

establish a process for legal review of all new and modified weapons systems falling under the

scope of CCW as a way to increase the likelihood of compliance with international legal obligations

relating to the means and methods of warfare in military operations and thus preventing the

occurrence of ERW.32

Divergence of views remained concerning an introduction of a system of voluntary confidence

building reports by the States Parties as to their unilateral destruction of old or outmoded weapons to

reduce potential sources of ERW. 33

At the same time the common understanding on whether Protocol V and the existing rules of IHL

are specific and comprehensive enough to deal adequately with the problem of ERW was not

reached. Some States Parties agreed to the conclusions of the McCormack Report that the existing

rules of IHL are sufficient, provided that those rules are faithfully and effectively implemented.

Other States Parties felt that there was a need of specific regulations for certain types of munitions,

including cluster munitions. Some States Parties noted a need to concentrate particularly on cluster

munitions.

In this context, a number of States Parties have supported the idea proposed in Recommendation 3

of McCormack Report that one of the feasible means to reinforce the effective implementation of

IHL principles and rules pertinent to ERW could be the development of a set of non-legally binding

guidelines on the best practice of application of relevant rules of IHL to the problem of ERW. Prof.

McCormack has proposed preliminary thoughts on the possible structure of such guidelines34

.

30

As recommended in McCormack Report, Recommendation 1 31




CCW/GGE/XIV/WG.1/WP.4

Page 18

At the same time, during the discussions on this subject, some concerns were expressed that the

interpretation of legally binding obligations of IHL within the CCW might encounter certain

ambiguity or that legally binding regulations rather than non-legally binding guidelines should be

general practice of the CCW regime. A number of States Parties indicated that further clarification

of this idea or consideration of other means to reinforce the effective implementation and

application of IHL principles and rules pertinent to ERW would be possible. Some States Parties, in

particular those of the opinion that existing rules of IHL were sufficient, believed that those rules did

not need to be supplemented, but rather faithfully implemented.

According to the mandate to further study possible preventive measures aimed at improving the

design of certain specific type of munitions, including sub-munitions, with a view to minimize the

humanitarian risk of these munitions becoming ERW, the Group put its particular emphasis on

meetings of military and technical experts.

In the period 2004-2006, the Group of Military and Technical Experts identified types of

munitions, including sub-munitions, which needed to be considered for improving the design

through possible preventive measures. While considering such measures, the Group of Military and

Technical Experts needed to determine whether these preventive measures were essential, effective

in substantially enhancing reliability of munitions, including sub-munitions, technologically and

economically feasible. Given the disparity in military, technological and economic capabilities

among States Parties to the CCW, the Group has agreed to the necessity to take into account the

financial and technological implications for the States Parties, particularly for the developing

countries, of producing or stockpiling the new munitions with improved design and for

decommissioning/retro-fitting or destruction of the existing stockpiles35

.

Divergence of views remained on what type of munitions posed the greatest humanitarian threat

and thus should be further considered with the view to improving their technical characteristics and

design in accordance with the mandate of the Group.

In the opinion of some States Parties most of the problems caused by ERW could be attributed to

the use of cluster munitions. Other States Parties continue to consider cluster munitions as one in a

number of types of munitions, which could possibly contribute to the problems caused by ERW.

There is an understanding that the Group of Military and Technical Experts was able to deepen

discussion and should continue the work in progress until its completion, in particular on

classification of munitions and common understanding and technical preventive measures with a

view to reducing the humanitarian risk, as presented in chapter 4 of this report.

Cooperation and assistance, in particular of technical nature, forms an important aspect in

addressing the problems caused by ERW and therefore merits attention by the States Parties.

Having taken into account the broad scope of positions of the States Parties with regard to the work

accomplished by the Group of Governmental Experts on ERW since the last Review Conference,

few options could be considered as a follow-up on ERW.

35

CCW/GGE/VII/WG.1/WP.1

Page 19

A large number of States Parties recognize the value of the work accomplished by the Group at this

stage and favor continuation of the work in the CCW beyond the Third Review Conference on

munitions which may become ERW in order to fulfill the tasks outlined in the present mandate. As

proposed by some States Parties, without prejudice to the issues under the jurisdiction of Protocol

V, the work on ERW could be continued on the basis of the present mandate to further study, on an

open-ended basis, with particular emphasis on participation of military and technical experts,

possible preventive measures aimed at improving the design of certain specific types of munitions,

including sub-munitions, with a view to minimizing the humanitarian risk of these munitions

becoming explosive remnants of war and to consider, including through participation of legal

experts, the implementation of existing principles of International Humanitarian Law. Exchange of

information, assistance and co-operation should be part of this work.

A number of States Parties have indicated the need to establish preferably legally binding

regulations, within the CCW, aimed to reduce the risks of certain specific munitions, including

cluster munitions, or specifically cluster munitions. It was repeatedly mentioned by some States

Parties that, the work on ERW could focus without prejudice to the issues under the jurisdiction of

Protocol V on requirements for such specific munitions, including their reliability and accuracy,

training, transfers, use, management, destruction of stockpiles, etc.

Some States Parties expressed an opinion that upon the entry into force of Protocol V on 12

November 2006 the basic mandate of the GGE on ERW would be considered to be completed. One

state however recognized that the ongoing work of the Military and Technical Expert Group with

regard to possible preventive measures should be encouraged to continue until the completion of its

respective mandate.

In any case, the States Parties to the CCW should be called upon to make their every best effort to

promote universalization and implementation of Protocol V in its full scope, including voluntary

provisions of its Annexes. At the same time, the implementation of IHL principles and rules

applicable to ERW should stay under review of the States Parties to the CCW, as appropriate.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

It would be recommended:

1. To continue consideration and consultations on ERW-related issues, in preparation of the

Third Review Conference, within the scope of the mandate of the GGE on ERW for 2006,

including the work of the military and technical experts.

2. To endorse the draft declaration on the occasion of the entry into force of CCW Protocol on

Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V) as contained in Annex VI of this Procedural

Report, and transmit it to the Third Review Conference for adoption.

Page 20

3. To consider continuation of the work on ERW beyond the Third Review Conference,

including the work of the military and technical experts, and in particular taking into account

the formal proposals submitted by the States Parties.

Page 21

VII. APPENDIX

LIST OF DOCUMENTS OF THE GROUP OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS

ON THE ISSUE OF EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR

Symbol Title Submitted by

CCW/GGE/I/WP.2 Discussion Paper on Clearance of Explosive

Remnants of War

Coordinator on ERW

CCW/GGE/I/WP.3 Explosive Remnants of War – Assistance and

Cooperation

Brazil, Japan and Peru

CCW/GGE/I/WP.4 Technical improvements and other measures for

relevant types of munitions, including sub-

munitions, which could reduce the risk of such

munitions becoming ERW

Switzerland

CCW/GGE/I/WP.5 The types of munitions which become explosive

remnants of war – Factors which contribute to the

occurrence of explosive remnants of war

GICHD and ICRC

CCW/GGE/WP.5/Add.

1

Information on Explosive Remnants of War

Useful to Mine/UXO Action Organizations

GICHD and ICRC

CCW/GGE/I/WP.6 Discussion paper on “Warning to civilians” Norway and Landmine

Action (UK)

CCW/GGE/I/WP.7 European Union Position on the Issue of

Explosive Remnants of War

European Union

CCW/GGE/I/WP.8 Information Sharing as a Tool to Protect Civilians

from the Effects of UXO/ ERW

United States of America

CCW/GGE/I/WP.9 The adequacy of existing international law in

minimizing the post –conflict risks of Explosive

Remnants of War

Sweden

CCW/GGE/I/WP.9/Cor

r.1 (English only)

The adequacy of existing international law in

minimizing the post –conflict risks of Explosive

Remnants of War

Sweden

CCW/GGE/I/WP.10 Legal Issues Regarding Explosive Remnants of

War

United Kingdom of Great

Britain and Northern

Ireland

CCW/GGE/I/WP.11 Discussion paper on the issue of explosive

remnants of war

Russian Federation

CCW/GGE/II/WP.1 Core questions on ERW by the Coordinator Coordinator on ERW

CCW/GGE/II/WP.3 Elements for an EU paper on AVM European Union

CCW/GGE/II/WP.4 A Survey of Questions and Issues for the Group

of Governmental Experts on Explosive Remnants

of War

Canada

CCW/GGE/II/WP.6 Technical Improvements to Submunitions France

CCW/GGE/II/WP.8 Explosive remnants of war – An examination of

legal issues raised in the ERW discussions

ICRC

Page 22

CCW/GGE/II/WP.10 Group of Governmental Experts on Explosive

Remnants of War – Explosive Ordnance Disposal

from a field and donor perspective

Landmine Action (UK)

CCW/GGE/II/WP.11 Group of Governmental Experts on Explosive

Remnants of War – Information needs from a

field perspective

Landmine Action (UK)

CCW/GGE/II/WP.13 Explosive Remnants of War – Experience from

Field Operations

UNMAS

CCW/GGE/II/WP.15 Explosive Remnants of War Russian Federation

CCW/GGE/II/WP.19 ERW Information Requirements – Render Safe

Procedures (RSPs) during Humanitarian

Clearance Operations

GICHD

CCW/GGE/II/WP.20 Joint Discussion Paper on Technical

Improvements of Ammunitions to Prevent and

Reduce ERW

China and Russian

Federation

CCW/GGE/II/WP.22 The relevance of the principle of precautions in

attack in the ERW context

Sweden

CCW/GGE/II/INF.2

Letter to military participants of the Group of

Governmental Experts of States Parties to the

CCW concerning the meetings of military experts

on ERW – Proposed Programme of Work and

provisional Agenda

Chairperson of the

Meetings of Military and

Technical Experts

CCW/GGE/III/WP.1 Explosive Remnants of War: The way forward –

Note by the Coordinator on ERW – Draft

Proposal

Coordinator on ERW

CCW/GGE/III/WP.3 Measures to Prevent ERW: Good Practice in

Munition Management



Ireland

CCW/GGE/III/WP.6 International Humanitarian Law and Targeting:

An Australian Approach

Australia

CCW/GGE/III/WP.8 Report on the Meeting of Military Experts at the

Third Session of the Group of Governmental

Experts of the States Parties to the CCW, Geneva,

4th December 2002

Switzerland

CCW/GGE/IV/WG.1/

WP.1

ERW Framework Paper: Possible Structure for an

ERW Instrument

Coordinator on ERW

CCW/GGE/IV/WG.1/

WP.2

Explosive Remnants of War: Victim Assistance South Africa

CCW/GGE/IV/WG.1/

WP.3

Explosive Remnants of War: Assistance and

Cooperation

Pakistan

CCW/GGE/IV/WG.1/

WP.4

Amendments on the Protection of the Civilian

Population from the Effects of ERW (Article 6 of

the ERW Framework Paper)

ICRC

CCW/GGE/IV/WG.1/ ERW Framework Paper: Article 7 Australia

Page 23

WP.5

CCW/GGE/IV/WG.1/

WP.6

Definition of Explosive Remnants of War Russian Federation

CCW/GGE/V/WG.1/W

P.1/Rev.1

Draft Proposal for an Instrument on Explosive

Remnants of War

Coordinator on ERW

CCW/GGE/V/WG.1/W

P.2

The United Nations and Explosive Remnants of

War

UNMAS

CCW/GGE/V/WG.1/W

P.3

The Provision of Warnings and Risk Education

for Explosive Remnants of War

GICHD

CCW/GGE/V/WG.1/W

P.4

Information Requirements for Explosive

Remnants of War

GICHD

CCW/GGE/V/WG.1/W

P.5

Ensuring the Reliability of Munitions Through

Their Proper Handling

Russian Federation

CCW/GGE/V/WG.1/W

P.6

International Humanitarian Law and Explosive

Remnants of War

Norway

CCW/GGE/VI/WG.1/

WP.1

Draft Proposal for an Instrument on Explosive

Remnants of War

Coordinator on ERW

CCW/GGE/VI/WG.1/

WP.2

Comments of the Inter-Agency Coordination

Group on Mine Action on the draft proposed

Instrument on Explosive Remnants of War

UNMAS

CCW/GGE/VI/WG.1/

WP.3

National interpretation and implementation of

International Humanitarian Law with regard to

the risk of Explosive Remnants of War

Norway

CCW/GGE/VII/WG.1/

WP.1

Note by the Coordinator Coordinator on ERW

CCW/GGE/VII/WG.1/

WP.2

Proposal for the Structuring of IHL/ERW

Discussions during CCW Experts’ Meetings in

2004

Sweden

CCW/GGE/VII/WG.1/

WP.3

Questions and Issues with regard to Preventive

Technical Measures for Certain Specific Types of

Explosive Ordnance

Switzerland

CCW/GGE/VII/WG.1/

WP.3/Corr.1

(English only)

Questions and Issues with regard to Preventive

Technical Measures for Certain Specific Types of

Explosive Ordnance – Corrigendum

Switzerland

CCW/GGE/VII/WG.1/

WP.4

Exchange of Information on a Voluntary Basis on

Protocol V

Netherlands

CCW/GGE/VIII/WG.1/

1

Provisional Agenda of the Meetings of the

Military Experts on Explosive Remnants of War

(ERW)

Chairperson of the


Technical Experts

CCW/GGE/VIII/WG.1/

WP.1

Methodological approach to evaluation in the

context of improvement of the design of certain

specific types of munitions

France

CCW/GGE/IX/WG.1/1 Meetings of military and technical experts Chairperson of the

Page 24

Meetings of Military

Experts on MOTAPM

CCW/GGE/IX/WG.1/

WP.1

Dealing with the Impact of Cluster Munitions Cluster Munition Coalition

CCW/GGE/IX/WG.1/

WP.1/Corr.1

(English only)

Dealing with the Impact of Cluster Munitions Cluster Munition Coalition

CCW/GGE/IX/WG.1/

WP.2

Reliability, Safety, and Performance of

Conventional Munitions and Submunitions

Germany

CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/1 Provisional Agenda for the Meeting of Military

Experts on ERW

Chairperson of the Meeting

of Military and Technical

Experts

CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/W

P.1

Military Utility of Cluster Munitions United Kingdom of Great


Ireland

CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/W

P.2

International Humanitarian Law and ERW Australia, Canada, New

Zealand, Norway, Sweden,

Switzerland, United

Kingdom of Great Britain

and Northern Ireland and


in consultation with the

ICRC

CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/W

P.3

Proposed definitions for cluster munitions and

sub-munitions

UNMAS, UNDP and

UNICEF

CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/W

P.4

Reliability and Use of Cluster Munitions Germany

CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/W

P.5

Review 2004 Chairperson of the


Technical Experts

CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/W

P.6

Perspectives 2005 Chairperson of the


Technical Experts

CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/1

Provisional Agenda for the Meeting of the

Military and Technical Experts on ERW

Chairperson of the


Technical Experts

CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/

WP.1

Responses to Document

CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, Entitled IHL and

ERW Dated 8 March 2005



Ireland

CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/

WP.1/Corr.1 (English

and Russian)



ERW Dated 8 March 2005, Corrigendum



Ireland

CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/

WP.2



Canada

Page 25


CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/

WP.3




Poland

CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/

WP.4





CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/

WP.5




Norway

CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/

WP.6




Australia

CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/

WP.7

Existing Principles and Rules of International

Humanitarian Law Applicable to Munitions that

May Become Explosive Remnants of War

ICRC

CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/

WP.8




Sweden

CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/

WP.9




Germany

CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/

WP.10

Replies to Document CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2,

Entitled “International Humanitarian Law and

ERW”, Dated 8 March 2005

Argentina

CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/

WP.11

Preventive Technical Measures in Munitions

Management

Argentina

CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/

WP.12




Japan

CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/

WP.13




Switzerland

CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/

WP.14




Austria

CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/

WP.15

Discussions on Improving Munition Reliability Australia

Page 26

CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/

WP.16




New Zealand

CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/

WP.16/Corr.1

(Arabic, English and

French Only)



ERW Dated 8 March 2005, Corrigendum

New Zealand

CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/

WP.17

Explosive Remnants of War and International

Humanitarian Law

France

CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/

WP.18




Denmark

CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/

WP.19

International Humanitarian Law Principles and

Explosive Remnants of War (Working Paper

based on the Presentation by Prof. Tim

McCormack, University of Melbourne, Australia)

Prepared at the request of

the Coordinator on

Explosive Remnants of

War

CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/

WP.1

Responses to document

CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, entitled IHL and

ERW, dated 8 March 2005

Brazil

CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/

WP.1/Corr.1

(English, French,

Russian and Spanish

only)




Corrigendum

Brazil

CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/

WP.2




Belarus

CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/

WP.3




Russian Federation

CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/

WP.4




Netherlands

CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/

WP.5




Estonia

CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/

WP.6


CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, of 8 March 2005,

entitled International Humanitarian Law and

Explosive Remnant of War

Belgium

CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/

WP.7




Croatia

CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/ Responses to document Finland

Page 27

WP.8 CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, entitled IHL and


CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/

WP.9

Working Paper on Submunitions France

CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/

WP.10




Lithuania

CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/

WP.11

Survey on the Humanitarian Threat Posed by

Munitions and Sub-munitions that Have Become

ERW - Preliminary Assessment Based on

Responses and Findings

UNMAS and UNDP

CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/

WP.12

A Way Ahead for IHL Questionnaire Response

Analysis

Presented by Canada.

Prepared by IHL

Questionnaire Co-

Authoring Delegations:

Australia, Canada, New

Zealand, Norway, Sweden,

Switzerland, United

Kingdom of Great Britain

and Northern Ireland and


CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/

WP.13

Explosive Remnants of War -

A View from an Operational Theatre

Australia

CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/

WP.14




Republic of Korea

CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/

WP.15

How Does Existing International Law Address

the Issue of Explosive Remnants of War?

Prepared at the request of

the Coordinator on ERW

CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/

WP.16

General Requirements for Safety and Suitability

for Service of Cluster Munition

Germany

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/

1





Experts

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/

WP.1




Italy

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/

WP.2




Czech Republic

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/

WP.3




Ireland

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/

WP.4



South Africa

Page 28


CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/

WP.5




Mexico

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/

WP.6




Portugal

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/

WP.7

Assessment of the relative risk of categories of

explosive ordnance becoming Explosive

Remnants of War: Methodology



Ireland

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/

WP.8

Draft Table of Conventional Ammunition Types

and Systems

Chairperson of the


Technical Experts

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/

WP.9




China

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/

WP.10

German Understanding of Cluster Munitions Germany

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/

WP.11

Cluster Weapons - a Real Humanitarian Threat,

or an Imaginary One?

Russian Federation

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/

WP.12

Report on States Part ies’ Responses to

the Questionnaire on International

Humanitarian Law and Explosive Remnants Of

War, CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, dated 8 March

2005. Introduction to the Report

Asia Pacific Centre for

Military Law, University

of Melbourne

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/

WP.12/Corr.1

(English only)





2005



of Melbourne

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/

WP.12/Add.1





2005



of Melbourne

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/

WP.12/Add.2





2005. Introduction to the Report



of Melbourne

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/

WP.13

A Critical Analysis on the "Report On States

Parties' Responses to the Questionnaire" on


Remnants of War

GICHD

Page 29

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/

WP.14

Munitions - A Method to Reduce the Risks

Associated with Explosive Remnants of War

France

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/

WP.15

Comments on the "Report On States Parties'

Responses to the Questionnaire" on International

Humanitarian Law and Explosive Remnants of

War

ICRC

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/

WP.16

Responses to the Survey on the humanitarian

threat posed by munitions and sub-munitions that

have become ERW - preliminary assessment

based on responses and findings, document

CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/WP.11,

Dated 12 December 2005

Belarus

CCW/GGE/XIV/WG.1

/1





Experts

CCW/GGE/XIV/WG.1

/1/Add.1


Military and Technical Experts on ERW-

Annotated Provisional Agenda



Experts

CCW/GGE/XIV/WG.1

/1/Add.2


Military and Technical Experts on ERW-Draft

Table of Explosive Ordnance Types and Systems



Experts

CCW/GGE/XIV/WG.1

/1/Add.2/Corr.1

(English and Russian

only)


Military and Technical Experts on ERW-Draft




Experts

CCW/GGE/XIV/WG.1

/WP.1

Remarks on documents

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/WP.12,

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/WP.12/Add.1 and

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/WP.12/Add/2



of Melbourne

CCW/GGE/XIV/WG.1

/WP.2




Hungary

CCW/GGE/XIV/WG.1

/WP.3

Technical Comments on document


Argentina

CCW/GGE/XIV/WG.1

/WP.4

Preliminary Thoughts on a Possible Approach to

Recommendation 3



of Melbourne

CCW/GGE/XV/WP.1 Proposal for a Mandate to Negotiate a Legally-

Binding Instrument that Addresses the

Humanitarian Concerns Posed by Cluster

Munitions

Austria, Holy See, Ireland,

Mexico, New Zealand,

Sweden

CCW/GGE/XV/WP.3 Proposal for a Mandate on Explosive Remnants

of War (ERW)

European Union

CCW/GGE/XV/WG.1/

1





Page 30

1 Military and Technical Experts on ERW of Military and Technical

Experts

CCW/GGE/XV/WG.1/

1/Add.1


Military and Technical Experts on ERW-




Experts

CCW/GGE/XV/WG.1/

1/Add.2


Military and Technical Experts on ERW- Draft




Experts

CCW/GGE/XV/WG.1/

WP.1




Spain

CCW/GGE/XV/WG.1/

WP.2

The United Nations and the Implementation of

Protocol V

UNMAS on behalf of

IACG-MA

CCW/GGE/XV/WG.1/

WP.3

Initiative on a Common Understanding of Cluster

Munitions within the Military Experts Group of

the CCW

Germany

Page 31

Annex II

REPORT

ON THE WORK IN 2006 ON MINES OTHER THAN ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES

Prepared by the Coordinator on MOTAPM

and the Chairperson of the Meetings of Military Experts

The present report on the results of the work carried out by the Coordinator on Mines Other Than

Anti-Personnel Mines (MOTAPM) during the three Sessions of the CCW Group of Governmental

Experts (GGE) of the CCW held throughout 2006, is presented to the President-designate of the

Third Review Conference of the States Parties to CCW

The 2005 Meeting of the States Parties appointed a Coordinator of the Working Group on Mines

Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines, and decided that the Group should continue its work in the year

2006 with the following mandate:

“a) To continue to consider all proposals on Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines put

forward since the establishment of the Group of Governmental Experts with the aim of

elaborating appropriate recommendations on Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines for

submission to the Third Review Conference in 2006.

b) Meetings of military experts shall also be conducted to provide advice on these

activities.”36

In discharging his duties, the Coordinator on MOTAPM relied on the invaluable contributions of

Brig.-Gen. Gerson Menandro Garcia de Freitas, who acted as an advisor to the Coordinator and

chaired the Meetings of Military Experts on MOTAPM held during the 2006 GGE Sessions, and

whose report is enclose to this document.

In the Thirteenth Session, held between March 6th and 10

th, the Coordinator indicated to delegations

that, despite the strenuous efforts by the GGE on MOTAPM throughout the last four years, it was

yet not possible to eliminate a number of divergences, in particular as regards the most controversial

issues of “detectability” and “active life” of MOTAPM. In light of this, the Coordinator asked

delegations to present a frank assessment of the current status of debates, and requested indications

of alternatives for future work of the GGE on the issue. The Coordinator also announced his

intention to conduct informal consultations with all interested delegations, with a view to identify

room for manoeuvre in the discussions throughout 2006.

Prior to the Fourteenth Session, the Coordinator has circulated a “Questionnaire on issues that might

enhance the level of understanding on the question of responsible use of Mines Other Than Anti-

Personnel Mines (MOTAPM)”. The Questionnaire was presented in the format of new language

that might be considered for addressing the topics identified as most contentious, as follows:

36

CCW/MSP/2005/2

Page 32

“perimeter marked areas” (PMA); “active life of MOTAPM”; “production and transfer of

MOTAPM”; and “detectability of MOTAPM”. It also provided for the submission of additional

comments on other issues that may be deemed relevant. Delegations were requested to comment the

proposed language (and ideas and/or concepts related to), on the basis of relevance, acceptance,

possibility of being incorporated to or of replacing the conceptual framework under discussion.

During the Fourteenth Session, held between June 19th and 23

rd, discussions were based on the

possibilities identified by the abovementioned questionnaire. A new round of informal consultations

in various settings also took place.

In the intersessional period prior to the Fifteenth Session of the GGE, the Coordinator has decided to

circulate a document entitled “Set Of Provisions On The Use of MOTAPM/AVM - A Compilation

of Provisions that could Command Consensus In The Group Of Governmental Expert (GGE)”37

,

which in his opinion encompasses all the areas that command consensus in the discussions held on

MOTAPM. The text builds upon all previous papers, including the Set of Recommendations

prepared by the previous Coordinator on MOTAPM, Ambassador Markku Reimaa of Finland

(CCW/GGE/XII/WG.2/1/Rev.2, dated 22 November 2005), and was presented as a basis for a

possible consensus during discussions that were to be held in the first days of the Fifteenth Session.

In addition to the most controversial issues of “detectability” and “active life”, some other questions

have also been identified as inspiring divergences among delegations, and were modified in relation

to the previous Coordinator´s text, in an attempt to identify consensus language: among the

modifications, the expression “Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines/Anti-Vehicle Mines”

(MOTAPM/AVM) was introduced as a means to address concerns raised by some delegations in

relation to what they perceive as “excessive breadth” and “subjective character” of the previous

definition of MOTAPM. A general reorganization of articles and paragraphs was also performed, in

order to bring together provisions on a single subject and to arrange them in a coherent, logical

manner.

As regards the most contentious issues of “detectability” and “active life” of MOTAPM, once no

possible consensus solution had yet been identified, they were not included in the first version of my

Set of Provisions. In its introduction, the Coordinator has outlined three possibilities as to the

inclusion of those two pending issues on a possible future protocol on MOTAPM, namely: a) the

insertion of legally binding language on the two issues in the main text; b) dealing with the issues of

“detectability” and “active life” in a way which would allow States-Parties the option to accept or

reject obligations on those two issues; c) place those two issues as non-binding best practices in a

technical annex.

In the Fifteenth and final Session of the GGE prior to the Third Review Conference, held between

August 28th and September 6

th, discussions on MOTAPM were based on the abovementioned Set of

Provisions. Many comments have been presented during plenary sessions, and a number of informal

consultations have taken place, with a view to allowing delegations to present comments and

37

CCW/GGE/XV/WG.2/1

Page 33

proposals, and hence explore all possibilities of language that could lead to a consensus on how to

move forward towards the Third Review Conference.

As regards the issues of “detectability” and “active life”, many delegations indicated that they

continue to support the adoption of legally-binding provisions on both pending issues, along the

lines of chapters III and IV of the Set of Recommendations38

by the previous Coordinator,

Ambassador Markku Reimaa of Finland.

One delegation, after consultations with a wide spectrum of other delegations, has prepared a

proposal of language on “detectability” and “active life” that follows the second approach suggested

in the introduction of the first version of the Set of Provisions, i.e., the inclusion of both issues as

optional legally-binding commitments. According to the proposal, a State that adheres to a possible

future Protocol on MOTAPM may indicate, at the time of the submission of the instrument of

ratification, that it agrees to be bound by one or both of such provisions, by means of a written

declaration to the Depositary. At any time after the entry into force of the future Protocol for a given

State, the State concerned may submit written declarations to the Depositary expressing consent to

be bound by one or both of such provisions. While some delegations expressed discomfort with the

idea of introducing optional provisions in an optional Protocol, as well as with the possibility of

creating obligations that would bind some States Parties while not binding others, a number of

delegations have indicated this approach as a promising possible way of reconciling humanitarian

concerns with the requirements related to national security and defence doctrines and needs.

Other delegations retained their reservations as to the adoption of legally-binding commitments on

“detectability” and “active life”, on the grounds that such commitments may impinge upon essential

capabilities related to national defence, in exchange of what they perceived as merely marginal

returns in terms of minimisation of an already limited humanitarian impact of MOTAPM. Against

such background, those delegations expressed their preference for the inclusion of both pending

issues on a non-binding “best-practices” annex to a possible future Protocol on MOTAPM.

Some delegations have also indicated that, in considering any restrictions on “detectability” and

“active life” of MOTAPM (both under the legally-binding and the optional approach), a transitional

period was needed in order to allow for adaptation of existing stocks and/or military procedures.

In addition to the debate on the pending issues, substantive discussions were held on other subjects

such as the definition of “MOTAPM/AVM” and “perimeter-marked areas”, the “scope of

application”, restrictions on “transfers”, as well as on “fuse design and sensors”.

In particular, it became clear that, for a considerable number of delegations, the issues of “transfers”

and the definition of “PMA” were intrinsically connected to the pending issues of detectability and

active life, and consequently could not be analyzed separately. Additionally, while some delegations

insisted upon the prohibition of transfers of non-detectable, persistent MOTAPM (except for the

purposes of destruction or for development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or

mine destruction techniques), other delegations have questioned such prohibition, on the grounds

38

CCW/GGE/XII/WG.2/1/Rev.2

Page 34

that the Set of Provisions allowed the operational use of such persistent, non-detectable mines inside

PMA.

One delegation has re-introduced a proposal on MOTAPM, according to which all the provisions

being discussed would be substituted by a prohibition of the use of MOTAPM by a State outside its

national territory. Another delegation has introduced a new proposal containing what it regards as

the “main features that could form the basis of future deliberations in the GGE on the issue of anti-

vehicle mines”.

After the extensive debate on all three approaches on “detectability” and “active life”, as well as on

other yet controversial issues mentioned above, the Coordinator has decided to revise his Set of

Provisions so as to include all alternative languages pertaining to each of the three approaches,

which may help to command consensus during discussions at the Third Review Conference, if

States Parties agree to demonstrate political will and flexibility to cope with all sensitive issues.

The Coordinator has enclosed the last version of the document to the present report. Alternative

texts on controversial issues other than “detectability” and “active life” were also included. All

modifications in relation to the previous version are displayed in the text in italics. Alternative

language is displayed between brackets.

It is the understanding of the Coordinator that, upon discretion of delegations that have introduced

proposals during the Fifteenth Session, in case such proposals are timely handed to the Secretariat,

they will be circulated as official documents of the Third Review Conference.

CONCLUSIONS

In light of the above, the Coordinator has the honour to submit to the consideration of the Third

Review Conference of the CCW, to be held between November 7th and 17

th, 2006, the revised

version of his “Set of Provisions on the Use of MOTAPM/AVM – A Compilation of Provisions that

Could Command Consensus in the Group of Governmental Experts”, as contained in the appendix I

to this report.

It is the understanding of the Coordinator that all other formal proposals put forward to the

consideration of the Group of Governmental Experts since its establishment – a list of which shall

also be enclosed to this report as appendix II - will be considered by the Third Review Conference,

in accordance with the mandate bestowed upon the Group by the 2005 Meeting of States Parties.

Page 35

REPORT OF THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE MEETINGS OF MILITARY EXPERTS ON

MOTAPM IN 2006

In the light of the three sessions held in 2006, this appraisal of the situation provides an overview on

the work performed by the Military Experts on MOTAPM. As a reminder, the overall mandate of

the GGE on MOTAPM states:”[…] Meeting of military experts shall also be conducted to provide

advice on these activities.”

At the opening meeting of the XIII Session, was realized that the persisting divergences in views -

which had undermined any possible progress on this issue – were still strong.

The Coordination was also aware that CCW/GGE/XII/WG.2/Rev.2 was presented but not

thoroughly discussed at the XII Session of GGE in November 2005. Although not a consensual text,

it was officially submitted by the former coordinator and reflected positions expressed by many

State Parties on a wide range of subjects.

It was therefore necessary, before moving forward in a search of common grounds, to assess the

positions of States Parties on the issues contained in that specific paper and, as contained in our

mandate, in all proposals put forward since the establishment of this Group.

During the Thirteenth Session, one formal Meeting of Military Experts was held. This group also

participated in two plenary meetings conducted by the Coordinator on MOTAPM. However, the

most useful and productive events were the seven informal meetings, in both formats: bilateral and

plurilateral. In those sessions the Coordinator had direct contact with 16 State Parties and

International Organizations. As preliminary results, were improved the conditions to a frank and

constructive dialogue, mandatory step towards a mutual understanding.

As some discussions have clearly highlighted key controversial issues, under the guidance of the

Coordinator a questionnaire was circulated, focusing on the following topics: Perimeter Marked-

Areas (PMA) to emplace MOTAPM; Active Life; Transfer; and Detectability of MOTAPM. In

addition, the delegations were requested to make further comments or suggestions on possible ways

to address the mentioned items.

The responses to the questionnaire were helpful and oriented the organization of the Fourteenth

Session, which was intended to deepen the examination of the issues raised in that document.

In the Fourteenth Session another Meeting of the Military Experts took place, along with the two

formal sessions conducted by Coordinator on MOTAPM. Eleven informal consultations were

conducted, in different settings, in search of possibilities for mutual understanding and a concrete

breakthrough.

Page 36

Although it was clear that significant divergences still remained, the informal and formal works

during that Session have provided the coordination on MOTAPM valuable tools for building

confidence and orienting new possibilities to broker consensus in the elaboration of

recommendations on MOTAPM.

At that time, during the intersessional period, the Coordination team on MOTAPM has decided to

submit a comprehensive text, encompassing all the areas that command consensus and which

required an analysis in its entirety.

This paper, entitled “Set of Provisions”, was aimed to facilitate more focused discussions, to help in

assessing the level of acceptance of some key issues and, hopefully, to pave the way for successful

outcome of the Group`s work.

The Last Preparatory Session for the 3rd

Review Conference hosted intensive formal consultations

among military experts, in three plenary meetings and one specific technical-military meeting. In the

same session eighteen informal meetings were held in different settings, leading to more focused

and fruitful discussions. It should be mentioned that nine delegations presented proposals and

comments, which greatly helped the Coordinator in his efforts towards the refinement of the Set of

Provisions. In terms of tangible and recent outcomes, such consultations and exchanges of views led

to the elaboration of two revised versions of CCW/GGE/XV/WG.2/1, both introduced during the

Fifteenth Session.

The last version of the abovementioned document incorporates new approaches, from different

perspectives, on issues that proved to remain controversial, such as the definition of

MOTAPM/AVM, transfers, detectability, active life, and fuse design and sensors of

MOTAPM/AVM. It was also consolidated a consensual definition and additional remarks on

perimeter marked-area. Moreover, innovative language was introduced on the humanitarian aspects

related to responsible use of mines.

Page 37

Appendix I

SET OF PROVISIONS ON THE USE OF MOTAPM/AVM –

A Compilation of Provisions that Could Command Consensus

Presented by the Coordinator

This version of the Set of Provisions outlines alternative options pertaining to each of the three

approaches on the issues of “detectability” and “active life” suggested in the introduction to

CCW/GGE/XV/WG.2/1, which are included in an appendix.

All other modifications in relation to the previous version (Rev.1) are displayed in italics.

Alternative texts are displayed [between brackets].

Article 1

General provision and scope of application

1. This set of provisions applies to the use on land or the transfer of MOTAPM/AVM, including

mines laid to interdict beaches, waterway crossings or river crossings, but does not apply to the use

of anti-ship mines at sea or in inland waterways.

2. This set of provisions shall apply to situations referred to in Article 1 of this Convention, as

amended on 21 December 2001.

3. This document is without prejudice to the existing international humanitarian law, provisions of

the Convention of 1980 on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional

Weapons which my be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects or

other international instruments and decisions by the Security Council of the United Nations which

provide for more strict obligations or have wider application.

Article 2

Definitions

1. For the purpose of this set of provisions:

(a) "Mine" means a munition placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and designed

to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or vehicle.

(b) "MOTAPM/AVM” means a mine which cannot be defined as an anti-personnel mine. An anti-

personnel mine is a mine primarily designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of

a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. A MOTAPM/AVM is

primarily designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of armored or

transportation vehicles and that will damage, incapacitate or destroy one or more of such vehicles.

Page 38

(c) "Anti-handling device" means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to,

attached to or placed under the MOTAPM/AVM and which activates when an attempt is made to

tamper with the MOTAPM/AVM.

(d) "Minefield" is a defined area in which mines have been emplaced and "mined area" is

an area which is dangerous due to the presence of mines. "Phoney minefield" means an area free of

mines that simulates a minefield. The term "minefield" includes phoney minefields.

(e) "Perimeter-marked area" is an area which, in order to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians,

is monitored by military or other authorized personnel, or protected by fencing or other means.

(f) "Recording" means a physical, administrative and technical operation designed to obtain, for the

purpose of registration in official records, all available information facilitating the location of

MOTAPM/AVM, minefields and mined areas.

(g) "Remotely-delivered MOTAPM/AVM means those not directly emplaced but delivered by

artillery, missile, rocket, mortar, or similar means, or dropped from an aircraft. MOTAPM/AVM

delivered from a land-based system from less than 500 meters are not considered to be "remotely

delivered".

(h) "Self-deactivation" means automatically rendering a munition inoperable by means of

the irreversible exhaustion of a component, for example a battery, that is essential to the operation of

the munition.

(i) "Self-destruction mechanism" means an incorporated or externally attached automatically-

functioning mechanism which secures the destruction of the munition into which it is incorporated

or to which it is attached.

(j) "Self-neutralization mechanism" means an incorporated automatically-functioning mechanism

which renders inoperable the munition into which it is incorporated.

(k) "Transfer" involves, in addition to the physical movement of MOTAPM/AVM into or from

national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the MOTAPM/AVM, but does not involve

the transfer of territory containing emplaced MOTAPM/AVM.

Article 3

Detectability of MOTAPM/AVM39

39

Three possible courses of action are envisaged for this article, as described in the appendix that

follows this set of provisions.

Page 39

Article 4

Active life of MOTAPM/AVM40

Article 5

Measures on the Restriction of Irresponsible Use of MOTAPM/AVM

1. Each State or party to a conflict is, in accordance with this set of provisions, responsible for all

MOTAPM/AVM employed by it and undertakes to clear, remove, destroy or maintain them as

specified in the relevant articles of this document.

2. Each State shall take action with a view to limiting the irresponsible use of MOTAPM/AVM,

which may include:

(a) establishment of adequate national systems and corresponding documentation;

(b) effective export and import control measures relating to MOTAPM/AVM;

(c) effective management and security of stockpiles and transport of MOTAPM/AVM;

(d) adoption of such measures as may be necessary, including, where appropriate, penal

sanctions, to prevent and suppress activities prohibited by this set of provisions;

(e) suppression of activities related to the production of MOTAPM/AVM under invalid or expired

licenses; and

(f) strengthening cooperation with the purpose of implementation of this set of provisions.

3. It is prohibited in all circumstances to use any MOTAPM/AVM which is designed or of a nature

to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.

4. It is prohibited to use a MOTAPM/AVM which employs a mechanism or device specifically

designed to detonate the munition by the presence of commonly available mine detectors as a result

of their magnetic or other non-contact influence during normal use in detection operations.

5. It is prohibited to use a self-deactivating MOTAPM/AVM equipped with an anti-handling device

that is designed in such a manner that the anti-handling device is capable of functioning after the

MOTAPM/AVM has ceased to be capable of functioning.

40

Three possible courses of action are envisaged for this article, as described in the appendix that

follows this set of provisions.

Page 40

6. It is prohibited in all circumstances to direct any MOTAPM/AVM, either in offence or

defense, or by way of reprisals, against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians

or civilian objects, as defined by paragraph 7 of article 2 of Amended Protocol II.

7. The indiscriminate use of MOTAPM/AVM is prohibited. Indiscriminate use is any placement of

MOTAPM/AVM:

(a) which is not on, or directed against, a military objective, as defined in the Protocol on

Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and other Devices, as amended on 3

May 1996 (Amended Protocol II). In case of doubt as to whether an object

which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other

dwelling or a school, is being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be

presumed not to be so used; or

(b) which employs a method or means of delivery which cannot be directed at a specific military

objective; or

(c) which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to

civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and

direct military advantage anticipated.

8. Several clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a city, town, village or other

area containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects are not to be treated as a single

military objective.

9. All feasible precautions shall be taken to protect civilians from the effects of MOTAPM/AVM.

Feasible precautions are those precautions which are practicable or practically possible taking into

account all circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations.

These circumstances include, but are not limited to:

(a) the short- and long-term effect of MOTAPM/AVM upon the local civilian population for the

duration of the minefield;

(b) possible measures to protect civilians (for example, fencing, signs, warning and monitoring);

(c) the availability and feasibility of using alternatives; and

(d) the short- and long-term military requirements for a minefield.

10. Effective advance warning shall be given of any emplacement of a MOTAPM/AVM which may

affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit.

11. States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and enforce appropriate laws

and regulations in order to prohibit and sanction the production, acquisition, possession,

Page 41

development, transport, transfer or use of MOTAPM/AVM by any unauthorized individual or entity,

as well as participating in any of the abovementioned actions as an accomplice, or providing them

with assistance or finance.

12. States shall adopt and enforce effective national measures with a view to preventing illicit

circulation and trafficking of MOTAPM/AVM, including the following:

(a) oversight and control over the production, storage or transportation of MOTAPM/AVM; and

(b) physical protection of stockpiles.

13. States shall cooperate among themselves in order to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit

trafficking of MOTAPM/AVM, in accordance with national legislation and pursuant to international

law.

Article 6

Recording of MOTAPM/AVM, minefields and mined areas

1. It is prohibited to use any MOTAPM/AVM unless all information concerning MOTAPM/AVM

minefields and mined areas is recorded in accordance with paragraph 1 of Technical Annex A. All

such records shall be retained by the parties to a conflict, who shall, without delay after the cessation

of active hostilities, take all necessary and appropriate measures, including the use of such

information, to protect civilians from the effects of MOTAPM/AVM, minefields and mined areas, in

areas under their control.

2. Without delay after the cessation of active hostilities, the parties to a conflict shall also make

available to the other party or parties to the conflict and to the Secretary-General of the United

Nations all such information in their possession concerning MOTAPM/AVM, minefields and mined

areas, laid by them in areas no longer under their control.

However, subject to reciprocity, where the forces of a party to a conflict are in the territory of an

adverse party, either party may withhold such information from the Secretary-General and the other

party, to the extent that security interests require such withholding, until neither party is in the

territory of the other. Any information so withheld shall be disclosed as soon as those security

interests permit.

Wherever possible, the parties to the conflict shall seek, by mutual agreement, to provide for the

release of such information at the earliest possible time in a manner consistent with the security

interests of each party.

Article 7

Removal of MOTAPM/AVM, minefields, and mined areas

Page 42

1. Without delay after the cessation of active hostilities, all MOTAPM/AVM, and minefields and

mined areas shall be cleared, removed, destroyed or maintained in accordance with the provisions of

this set of provisions.

2. States and parties to a conflict bear such responsibility with respect to MOTAPM/AVM,

minefields and mined areas, in areas under their control.

3. With respect to MOTAPM/AVM, minefields and mined areas laid by a party in areas over which

it no longer exercises control, such party shall provide to the party in control of the area, pursuant

to paragraph 2 of this article, to the extent agreed by the parties concerned, technical and material

assistance necessary to fulfill such responsibility, without prejudice to the obligations set by

paragraph 1 Article 5.

4. At all times necessary, the parties to a conflict shall endeavour to reach agreement, both among

themselves and, where appropriate, with other States and with international organizations, on the

provisions of technical and material assistance, including, in appropriate circumstances, the

undertaking of joint operations necessary to fulfill such responsibilities.

Article 8

Protection from the effects of MOTAPM/AVM, minefields, and mined areas

1. Each Party to this set of provisions shall be bound by the provisions in Article 12 of Amended

Protocol II, regardless of whether that State is a Party to Amended Protocol II. Such provisions

include the Scope of application; Peace-keeping and certain other forces and missions;

Humanitarian and fact-finding missions of the UN system; Missions of the International Committee

of the Red Cross; Other humanitarian missions and missions of enquiry; Confidentiality; and

Respect for laws and regulations.

Article 9

Transfers

1. Each State shall not transfer any MOTAPM/AVM:

(a) to any recipient other than a State or State agency authorized to receive it;

(b) which does not meet the standards set out for detectability and active life of MOTAPM/AVM,

except for the use in perimeter marked area, or for the purpose of destruction or for development of

and training in mine detection, demining, or mine destruction techniques;41

[alternative language for subparagraph “b”:

41

Language retained pending an agreement on Article 3 “Detectability of MOTAPM/AVM” and Article 4 “Active life of MOTAPM/AVM”

Page 43

(b) which does not meet the standards set out for detectability and active life of MOTAPM/AVM,

except for the purpose of destruction or for development of and training in mine detection, demining

, or mine destruction techniques; 42

]

(c) without an end-user certificate, which, in the case of mines that do not meet the standards set out

for detectability and active life, shall include an explicit commitment to abide by the restrictions

mentioned in subparagraph “b” above; and

(d) to States that are not bound by this set of provisions, unless the recipient formally agrees to apply

its provisions.

2. In order to prevent illicit trafficking of MOTAPM/AVM, States shall establish or improve

effective national controls.

3. Each State undertakes to exercise restraint in the transfer of any MOTAPM/AVM with a

Category One fusing system, as described in Technical Annex B, paragraph 5 (b), except for the

purpose of destruction or for development of and training in mine detection, demining, or mine

destruction techniques.

4. Pending the entry into force of this set of provisions, all States will refrain from any actions which

would be inconsistent with this Article.

Article 10

Transparency and other confidence-building measures

1. Each State shall provide to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall circulate to the

other States, information on the implementation of the provisions of this set of provisions. This

information should include the following elements:

(a) an initial report, to be provided upon the entry into force of this set of provisions for each State ;

and

(b) periodic updating of the report.

2. The report referred to in paragraph 1 may include, information on:

(a) dissemination of the provisions of this set of provisions to their armed forces and to the civilian

population;

(b) demining and rehabilitation programmes;

(c) steps taken to meet technical requirements of the provisions of this set of provisions and any

other relevant information pertaining thereto, other than that relating to weapons technology;

42

Language retained pending an agreement on Article 3 “Detectability of MOTAPM/AVM” and Article 4 “Active life of MOTAPM/AVM”

Page 44

(d) legislative and other measures taken for the implementation of the provisions of this set of

provisions;

(e) measures taken on cooperation and assistance provided under Article 11 of this set of

provisions; and

(f) general information on the national rules and requirements for transfers of MOTAPM/AVM, and

information on these transfers.

Article 11

Cooperation and assistance

1. Each State in a position to do so shall enhance cooperation and assistance at bilateral, regional

and international levels aimed at assisting the other States in the fulfillment of their obligations in

respect of MOTAPM/AVM. Cooperation and assistance may be provided through humanitarian

organizations. Such cooperation and assistance may include the following:

(a) Provision of technical and financial assistance, including exchange of experience, technology

other than weapons technology, and information, in order to facilitate the implementation of

necessary modifications to improve the reliability of, and minimize the humanitarian risks posed by,

existing and future MOTAPM/AVM. Provision of such assistance may be used to facilitate the

development, if feasible, of advanced mine detection equipment and to make such equipment readily

available.

(b) Cooperation and assistance in the destruction of stockpiles of MOTAPM/AVM that do not meet

and cannot be modified to meet the requirements of this set of provisions.

(c) Cooperation and technical, material and human assistance for the rapid and effective demining,

removal or destruction of MOTAPM/AVM.

(d) The timely provision of geographic and technical information on MOTAPM/AVM to relevant

humanitarian missions and to the database on mine action maintained within the United Nations

System.

(e) Cooperation and assistance on the provision of risk education for civilian populations.

(f) Cooperation and assistance for the care and rehabilitation and the social and economic

reintegration of victims of MOTAPM/AVM.

(g) Cooperation and assistance in the implementation of the provisions of this set of provisions.

Article 12

Page 45

Fuse design and sensors of MOTAPM/AVM

1. The States should, to the extent feasible, follow the best practices on fuse design stipulated in

paragraph 5 of Technical Annex B.

[alternative approach:

1. The States, to the extent feasible, in the future production of MOTAPM/AVM, shall follow

the best practices in relation to the fuse and sensors production to design them to minimize

the possibility of involuntary or accidental activation of a mine by a person.

2. In the future production of fuses the States, to the extent feasible, shall strive to apply

modern, including multi-sensor, technology to develop them based on technology factors,

life environment factors.]43

[Article 1344

Transition Period

In the event that a State determines it cannot immediately comply with the requirements of [articles

3 and 4] of this Set of Provisions, it may declare at the time of its notification of consent to be bound

by this set of Provisions that it will defer compliance for a period not to exceed [XX] years from the

entry into force of this Set of Provisions for that State. ]

43

This alternative language is based in a generic approach to fuse design, as opposed to the specific approach of

the current text, which makes reference to a list of fuses and sensors categorized according to sensitivity (in terms of the

risk of involuntary activation by a person), as included in Technical Annex B. In case the generic approach prevails,

subsection 5 of Technical Annex B should be deleted. 44

The inclusion of this article will depend on the decision on how to address the issues of “detectability” and

“active life”. See also Appendix I ( I. First Option: Article 3 paragraph 7 and Article 4 paragraph 4).

Page 46

Technical Annex A

1. Minefield Recording

(a) Recording of the location of MOTAPM/AVM other than remotely-delivered MOTAPM/AVM

shall be carried out in accordance with the following provisions:

(i) the location of the minefields and mined areas shall be specified accurately by relation to the

coordinates of at least two reference points and the estimated dimensions of the area containing

these weapons in relation to those reference points;

(ii) maps, diagrams or other records shall be made in such a way as to indicate the location of

minefields and mined areas in relation to reference points, and these records shall also indicate their

perimeters and extent; and

(iii) for the purposes of detection and clearance of MOTAPM/AVM, maps, diagrams or other

records shall contain complete information on the type, number, emplacing method, type of fuse and

life time, date and time of laying, anti-handling devices (if any) and any other relevant information

on all of these weapons laid. Whenever feasible the minefield record shall show the exact location of

every MOTAPM/AVM, except in row minefields where the row location is sufficient.

(b) The estimated location and area of remotely-delivered MOTAPM/AVM shall be specified by

coordinates of reference points (normally corner points) and shall be ascertained and when feasible

marked on the ground at the earliest opportunity. The total number and types of MOTAPM/AVM

laid, the date and time of laying and the self-destruction time periods shall also be recorded.

(c) Copies of records shall be held at a level of command sufficient to guarantee their safety as far as

possible.

(d) All MOTAPM/AVM produced after entry into force of this set of provisions shall be marked in

English or in the respective national language or languages with the following information:

(i) Name of the country of origin; and

(ii) Month and year of production; and

(iii) Serial number or lot number.

2. Marking of Perimeter-marked area

(a) a perimeter-marked area shall be marked by appropriate signage in accordance with paragraph 3

of this Technical Annex, except during periods of active hostilities. The marking shall be of a

distinct and durable character and shall at least be visible to a person who is about to enter the

perimeter-marked area;

Page 47

(b) the marking shall be visible, legible, durable and resistant to environmental effects, as far as

possible; and

(c) during periods of active hostilities, a perimeter-marked area should, to the extent feasible, be

appropriately marked. After the cessation of active hostilities and as soon as feasible, the area shall

be marked in accordance with sub-paragraph (a) above.

3. International signs for Minefields and Mined Areas

(a) Signs similar to those specified within Amended Protocol II and detailed below shall be utilized

in the marking of minefields and mined areas to ensure their visibility and recognition by the

civilian populations:

(i) Size and shape: a triangle or square no smaller than 28 centimetres (11 inches) by 20 centimetres

(7.9 inches) for a triangle, and 15 centimetres (6 inches) per side for a square;

(ii) Colour: red or orange with a yellow reflecting border;

(iii) Symbol: the symbol illustrated in the attachment, or an alternative readily recognizable in the

area in which the sign is to be displayed as identifying a dangerous area;

(iv) Language: the sign shall contain the word “mines” in one of the six official languages of the

convention (Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish) and the language or languages

prevalent in the area;

(v) Spacing: signs shall be placed around the minefield at a distance to ensure their visibility at any

point by a civilian approaching the area.

Page 48

Technical Annex B

This Annex contains best practices for achieving the objectives of this set of provisions.

This Annex will be implemented by States on a voluntary basis.

1. Control Measures

(a) Prior to Commencement of Active Hostilities

All minefields, within the territory controlled by the party concerned, should be monitored by

military or other authorized personnel, or protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the

effective exclusion of civilians from the area.

(b) During Active Hostilities

Parties to a conflict should ensure, to the extent feasible, that all minefields known to them at the

time and within territory under their control are either monitored by military or other authorized

personnel or protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians from

the area. Remotely-delivered MOTAPM/AVM and nuisance minefields may be emplaced as

required during active hostilities noting the recording requirements detailed in Technical Annex A.

(c) After the Cessation of Active Hostilities

(i) All parties to a conflict should be encouraged to cooperate in order to facilitate, to the extent

feasible, the exchange to the other parties concerned of all information in their possession

concerning minefields, mined areas, and MOTAPM/AVM laid by them in areas no longer under

their control.

(ii) At the earliest opportunity and to the extent feasible all minefields within the territory controlled

by the party concerned, are to be secured and monitored by military or other authorized personnel,

or protected by fencing or other means to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians from the area. If

fencing or other marking means have been removed from minefields during the conflict they should

be restored at the earliest opportunity in order to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians from the

area.

(iii) At the earliest opportunity and to the extent feasible, all remotely-delivered and nuisance

minefields emplaced during active hostilities, and within the territory controlled by the party

concerned, should be appropriately recorded in accordance with Technical Annex A. In addition and

to the extent feasible, they should be secured and monitored by military or other qualified personnel,

or protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians from the area.

2. Common Warning Measures Required At All Times

To the extent feasible, and as soon as practicable after MOTAPM/AVM are laid, signposted or other

warning measures should be provided on all primary traffic routes into the mined area to ensure the

effective warning of civilians. A primary traffic route is one over which most population movement

occurs between population centres. When providing these warning measures parties should be

Page 49

mindful of prevailing local environmental factors, such as regular flooding, which could contribute

to the natural but unintended movement of MOTAPM/AVM over time.

3. Marking Systems

Marking systems are utilized to effectively and efficiently identify the perimeter or boundary

between mined and unmined areas. They can include natural or artificial features or a combination

thereof but to the extent feasible they will be enhanced through the inclusion of warning signs, as

described in Technical Annex A. Notwithstanding the potential removal of these measures (fencing

or other means) at the onset of active hostilities and the ongoing requirement in these circumstances

for parties to ensure, to the extent feasible, that all minefields are monitored by military or other

qualified personnel, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians from the area, the following

guidelines are provided for marking at all other times:

(a) Immediate Warning Markers. Immediate warning markers are used to expediently mark hazards

encountered by military or civilian personnel until a long-term or more permanent marker can be

established. The basic pre-requisites for these markers are:

(i) any marking means capable of identifying the hazardous areas as quickly as possible;

(ii) visibility at not less than 50 m indicating the location, direction and type of hazard;

(iii) the marking material(s) have a lifespan of at least 180 days; and

(iv) the marking means used should be readily recognizable in the area in which they are displayed

as identifying a hazardous area.

Immediate markers could include but should not be limited to:

(i) mine marking tape; or

(ii) wire, pickets (iron, timber, concrete, plastic or other) and signage; or

(iii) painting of natural features such as trees and rocks in hazard recognition colours; or

(iv) any other locally or otherwise available and accepted hazard recognition materials;

(v) sign should be robustly emplaced and difficult to remove.

To the extent feasible, the location of the hazard and its marking details such as the marking systems

employed should be promulgated in general terms to the civil population as soon as is practicable to

ensure their effective exclusion from the area. To the extent feasible they should be enhanced

through the inclusion of warning signs, as described in Technical Annex A.

(b) Long-Term Warning Markers. Long-term warning markers are to be used if the hazard is likely

to remain in location for a protracted duration or when immediate hazard markers need to be

Page 50

replaced and upgraded. Long-term markers represent an improvement on an immediate warning

system and the minimum standard of a long term warning sign could include but should not be

limited to:

(i) A fence (minimum single strand of barb wire) to waist height with appropriate military mine

hazard recognition markers as detailed in Technical Annex A at intervals appropriate to the terrain

and vegetation;

(ii) Permanent signage, visible to the extent feasible by day and by night, both proximate to the

hazard itself and on all identifiable primary traffic routes into the area in which the hazard is

contained;

(iii) A permanent cyclone wire type fence reinforced with barbed wire and anti-climbing measures

inclusive with mine hazard markers at specified minimum intervals and type;

(iv) Concertina wire and pickets;

(v) Concrete barricades; or

(vi) Other locally or otherwise available material enhancements.

4. Specifications on Self-destruction, Self-neutralization and Self-deactivation45

(a) MOTAPM/AVM that are designed to self-destruct or self-neutralize should do so within 45 days

after arming. Self-deactivation of MOTAPM/AVM that fail to self-destruct or self-neutralize should

take place within 120 days after arming.

(b) Each State should take the measures necessary to ensure that no more than 10 percent (with a 90

percent confidence level) of activated MOTAPM/AVM will fail to self-destruct or self neutralize

after 45 days.

(c) Each State should take the measures necessary to ensure that in combination with self-

destruction or self-neutralization mechanisms, no more than one in a thousand of activated

MOTAPM/AVM will function as a mine after 120 days.

5. Fuse design and sensors of MOTAPM/AVM46

(a) Based on information and data provided by States the following broadly available fuses and

sensors should be considered as relevant: acoustic sensors; break wires; fiber-optic wires; infra-red-

45

The assessment of the reliability rate of the SD/SDA or SN/SDA is left to the discretion of each State. 46

As mentioned in the footnote to article 12, this subsection of Technical Annex B should not be included in case the

generic approach to fuze and sensor design is chosen.

Page 51

sensors; magnetic sensors; pressure sensors; roller arms; scratch wire sensors; seismic/vibration

sensors; tilt rods; trip wires.47

(b) The broadly available fuses and sensors referred to in the previous paragraph should be graded

into the following categories:

Category One: Fusing systems that cannot be designed not to be excessively sensitive.

(i) Break wires and trip wires do not appear to be a recommended method of activation, as it does

not seem possible to design them in such a way that an individual cannot, within reason, initiate the

mine.

(ii) Tilt rods do not appear to be recommended method of activation, if they cannot be designed in

such a way that an individual cannot, within reason, initiate the mine.

Category Two: Fusing systems that can be designed not to be excessively sensitive, but are best

used in conjunction with other sensors.

(i) Acoustically activated fuses use electronic sensors to react to acoustic pressure and recognize the

acoustic signature. Use in conjunction with other sensors is preferable.

(ii) Infrared activated fuses should be designed so as not to be activated in the presence of a person.

The sensor should be able to match detected heat signatures to the intended target preferably in

conjunction with other sensors.

(iii) Seismic/Vibration sensors cannot currently locate their targets precisely; their use in

conjunction with other sensors appears therefore to be indispensable. The sensor should be capable

to match a seismic signature to the intended target.

Category Three: Fusing systems that can be designed not to be excessively sensitive, that can be

designed to operate satisfactorily without other sensors and which fulfill the best practice safety

guidelines of this Technical Annex.

(i) The pressure required to break the fiber-optic signal should be appropriate for the intended target.

(ii) To enhance military utility, magnetically activated mines should be capable of matching a

magnetic signature to the intended target.

(iii) Pressure sensors, pressure activated mechanisms, should, where possible, be subject to a

minimum pressure force appropriate for the intended target. Pressure should preferably be exerted

over a significant area (equal to that of a vehicle) rather than a single point.

47

The sequence of the fuses and sensors is strictly alphabetical and does not entail an assessment of their

availability, distribution or use.

Page 52

(iv) The number of turns required to initiate the roller arm fuse should be matched to the intended

target.

(v) The scratch wire sensor should be designed for specific targets by optimizing the scratch time,

frequency and amplitude required to initiate the sensor by the intended target.

(c) All MOTAPM/AVM, with the exception of those fitted with Category Three fuses, should

incorporate in future production, to the extent feasible, multi-sensor fuses technology in order to

reduce the possibility of inadvertent or accidental activation by a person taking into account

operational, life cycle, environmental and climate factors.

(d) The influence of environmental factors, particularly:

(i) of weather and climate;

(ii) of storage, handling and other external conditions should be taken into account when selecting

the types of fuses and determining the sensitivity of fuses; and

(e) Considerations and proposals of technical measures should take into account operational,

procurement as well as life cycle factors; they should address clearly identified humanitarian issues.

Page 53

Appendix

Three possible options on how to address the issues of “detectability” and “active life” are

envisaged:

I. First option – Insertion of legally-binding language on “detectability” and “active life”.

Article 3

Detectability of MOTAPM/AVM

1. It is prohibited to use a non-detectable MOTAPM/AVM, subject to the exclusions

specified below.

2. A MOTAPM/AVM is detectable if, upon emplacement:

(a) it provides a response signal equivalent to a signal from eight grammes or more of

iron in a single coherent mass buried five centimetres beneath the ground and can be

detected by commonly available mine detection equipment; or

(b) it can be reliably and effectively detected through the use of alternative methods and

equipment that reflect developments in detection methodologies, and if the States, taking into

account testing and evaluation by relevant institutions, have decided by a four-fifths majority

of the States present and voting that such alternative methods and equipment are effective

and commonly available.

3. A MOTAPM/AVM is also detectable if it can be reliably and effectively detected

through the use of methods and equipment that are not commonly available but are readily

available to a State, provided that:

(a) the State in question has, before the use of such MOTAPM/AVM, demonstrated to the

other States that the MOTAPM/AVM can be reliably and effectively detected through the use

of such readily available methods or equipment; and

(b) it is not used outside perimeter-marked areas located on the territory of the State in

question.

4. A MOTAPM/AVM emplaced in a perimeter-marked area is excluded from the

detectability requirement of this chapter.

5. It is prohibited to produce, after the entry into force of this set of recommendations,

any MOTAPM that is not detectable.

6. All MOTAPM/AVM from existing stocks shall meet the detectability requirement of this

chapter prior to their emplacement, except in the case referred to in paragraph 20.

Page 54

7. In the event that a State determines it cannot immediately comply with the

requirements of this chapter, it may declare at the time of its notification of consent to be

bound by this set of recommendations that it will defer compliance for a period not to exceed

12 years from the entry into force of this set of recommendations. In the meantime that State

shall, to the extent feasible, minimize the use of any MOTAPM/AVM that does not meet the

detectability requirement of this chapter.48

Article 4

Active life of MOTAPM/AVM

1. It is prohibited to use a remotely-delivered MOTAPM/AVM which does not incorporate a

self-destruction mechanism or a self-neutralization mechanism with, in either case, a back-

up self-deactivation feature (hereinafter referred to as "SD/SDA or SN/SDA"), whereby the

MOTAPM/AVM will no longer function as a mine when it no longer serves the military

purpose for which it was emplaced.

2. States shall not deliver a MOTAPM/AVM from a land-based system from less than 500

meters, nor shall they hand-emplace a MOTAPM/AVM, which does not incorporate a

SD/SDA or SN/SDA, outside a perimeter marked area.

3. When implementing the recommendations of this chapter the States shall take all

measures stipulated in Technical Annex A and should follow the best practices stipulated in

Technical Annex B.

4. In the event that a State determines it cannot immediately comply with paragraphs 24

and 25, it may declare at the time of its notification of consent to be bound by this set of

recommendations that it will defer compliance for a period not to exceed 12 years from the

entry into force of this set of recommendations. In the meantime that State shall, to the extent

feasible, minimize the use of any MOTAPM/AVM that does not so comply.49

II. Second option – Inclusion of Provisions on Detectability and Active Life as two optional, legally-

binding Annexes.

In this case, provisions on detectability and active life would be incorporated into the text as two

separate optional annexes, and an article disciplining the entry into force of such annexes for States

Parties would be inserted on the main text.

48

See also Article 13 / Set of Provisions. 49

See also Article 13 / Set of Provisions.

Page 55

Article 3

Detectability and Active Life of MOTAPM/AVM

1. At the time of submittal to the Depositary of its instrument expressing its consent to be

bound to this set of provisions, a State may submit a written declaration agreeing to be

bound by Optional Annex A on detectability or Optional Annex B on active life, or agreeing

to be bound by both.

2. A declaration referred to in paragraph 1 may also be submitted to the Depositary by a

State that has previously expressed consent to be bound by this set of provisions at any time

after the entry into force of this set of provisions for that State.

3. A declaration referred to in paragraph 1 or 2 may stipulate that it is effective immediately

or may stipulate a specific date upon which it shall be effective.

Optional Annex A

Detectability of MOTAPM/AVM

1. It is prohibited to use MOTAPM/AVM which are not detectable.

2. A MOTAPM/AVM is detectable if, upon emplacement, it provides a response signal

equivalent to a signal from eight grammes or more of iron in a single coherent mass buried

five centimeters beneath the ground and can be detected by commonly-available technical

mine detection equipment.

3. MOTAPM/AVM used in a perimeter-marked area are excluded from the detectability

requirement of this Annex.

Optional Annex B

Active Life of MOTAPM/AVM

1. It is prohibited to use MOTAPM/AVM that do not incorporate a self-destruction

mechanism or a mechanism for self-neutralization designed and constructed so that no more

than ten percent of activated mines will fail to self-destruct within forty-five days after

arming.

2. It is prohibited to use MOTAPM/AVM that do not incorporate a back-up self-deactivation

feature that is designed and constructed so that, in combination with the mechanism referred

to in paragraph 1, no more than one in one thousand activated mines will function as a mine

one hundred twenty days after arming.

Page 56

3. MOTAPM/AVM used in a perimeter-marked area are excluded from the requirements of

this Annex.

III. Third option – Inclusion of detectability and active life in the form of “best practices” in a

technical annex.

Some general ideas and proposals have been discussed as regards the inclusion of

provisions on detectability and active life as best practices in a technical, non-binding annex.

The adoption of a “best practices” approach to theses issues would necessarily imply

changes both in the main text of a possible understanding on MOTAPM/AVM and in the provisions

of a new binding technical annex.

Page 57

Appendix II


ON THE ISSUE OF MINES OTHER THAN ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES


CCW/GGE/I/WP.1 Draft EU Food-for-Thought Paper on Mines Other

Than Antipersonnel Mines

European Union

CCW/GGE/I/WP.12 Discussion paper on the issue of restrictions on the

use of anti-vehicle mines

Russian

Federation

CCW/GGE/II/WP.2

(No electronic version

available)

Elements for discussion during the Second meeting

of GGE (Geneva, 15-26 July 2002) on the issue of

Mines Other Than Antipersonnel Mines

(MOTAPM)

Coordinator on

MOTAPM

CCW/GGE/II/WP.3 Elements for an EU paper on AVM European Union

CCW/GGE/II/WP.5 “Food for Thought” on Mines other than Anti-

Personnel Mines (MOTAPM) for the second

meeting of experts in July 2002 – Sensitive fuzes

Germany

CCW/GGE/II/WP.5/Ad

d.1

Addendum: Sensitive Fuses for Anti Vehicle

Mines

Germany

CCW/GGE/II/WP.9 Anti-vehicle mines: effects on humanitarian

assistance and civilian populations

ICRC

CCW/GGE/II/WP.12 List of Areas for Possible Discussion in the CCW

Group of Governmental Experts, Military Experts

Meeting on Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel

Mines (MOTAPM)

Coordinator on

MOTAPM

CCW/GGE/II/WP.14 Anti-Vehicle Mines – Experience from Field

Operations

UNMAS

CCW/GGE/II/WP.16 Reflection Paper on Sensitive Fuses of Land Mines

Other than Anti-Personnel Mines

Romania

CCW/GGE/II/WP.17

and Corr.1

Certain technical aspects of anti-vehicle landmines China

CCW/GGE/II/WP.18 Current AV Mine Specific Restrictions under

International Law

Coordinator on

MOTAPM

CCW/GGE/II/WP.21 Information on Technical Measures Related to AV

Mines: Detectability and SD/SN/SDA

United States of

America

CCW/GGE/III/WP.2 Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines

(MOTAPM) – Draft Proposal by the Coordinator

on MOTAPM

Coordinator on

MOTAPM


(MOTAPM) laid outside fenced and marked areas

Ireland


(MOTAPM) – Sensitive Fuzes for Anti-Vehicle

Mines (Overview of Fuzes and Recommendations

Germany

Page 58

for Best Practice) - Synopsis

CCW/GGE/IV/WG.2/W

P.1

Core Questions on Mines Other Than Anti-

Personnel Mines

Coordinator on

MOTAPM

CCW/GGE/IV/WG.2/W

P.2

Irresponsible Use of Mines Other Than Anti-

Personnel Mines by Non-State Actors

India

CCW/GGE/IV/WG.2/W

P.3

Field Report Afghanistan UNMAS

CCW/GGE/V/WG.2/W

P.1

Core questions on Mines Other Than Anti-

Personnel Mines

Coordinator on

MOTAPM

CCW/GGE/V/WG.2/W

P.2

Sensitive Fuses for Anti-Vehicle Mines: Overview

of Fuses, Sensors and Recommendations for Best

Practice (Synopsis)

Germany

CCW/GGE/V/WG.2/W

P.3

‘Food for Thought’ Paper on International

Cooperation and Assistance for Mines Other Than

Anti-Personnel Mines

Canada

CCW/GGE/V/WG.2/W

P.4

Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines:

Canadian Overview of Fuses, Sensors and

Recommendations for Best Practice

Canada

CCW/GGE/VI/WG.2/W

P.1

Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines – Draft

Proposal by the Coordinator

Coordinator on

MOTAPM

CCW/GGE/VI/WG.2/W

P.2

Non-State Actors and the humanitarian dangers of

Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines

Mines Action

Canada

CCW/GGE/VI/WG.2/W

P.3

Sensitive Fuses for Anti-Vehicle Mines –

Overview of Fuses, Sensors and Recommendations

for Best Practice

Germany

CCW/GGE/VI/WG.2/W

P.4

Landmines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines

Emplaced Outside Fenced and Marked Areas

Russian

Federation

CCW/GGE/VI/WG.2/W

P.5

Detectability of Mines Russian

Federation

CCW/GGE/VI/WG.2/W

P.6

Improvised Explosive Devices Russian

Federation

CCW/GGE/VI/WG.2/W

P.7

Consideration Relating to the Sensitivity of the

Fuses of Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines

Russian

Federation

Page 59

CCW/GGE/VI/WG.2/W

P.8

Consideration Relating to the Blowing Up of

Motor Vehicles Belonging to Humanitarian

Missions

Russian

Federation

CCW/GGE/VI/WG.2/W

P.9

Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use

and Transfer of Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel

Mines

Denmark,

United States of

America and

other States

CCW/GGE/VI/WG.2/W

P.9/Corr.1



Mines

Denmark,

United States of

America and

other States

CCW/GGE/VI/WG.2/W

P.10

Proposals by the Russian Federation for further

work by the Group of Governmental Experts on

the issue of Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel

Mines (MOTAPM)

Russian

Federation

CCW/GGE/VI/WG.2/W

P.11

Field Report on Angola UNMAS

CCW/GGE/VII/WG.2/

WP.1

Military Experts Meeting: Tentative List of Areas

for Discussion

Coordinator on

MOTAPM

CCW/GGE/VII/WG.2/

WP.2

Landmine Detection Technology

Australia

CCW/GGE/VII/WG.2/

WP.2/Corr.1

(English only)

Landmine Detection Technology - Corrigendum

Australia

CCW/GGE/VII/WG.2/

WP.3

A Common Inter-Agency Coordination Group on

Mine Action (IACG-MA) on Mines Other Than


UNMAS on

behalf of the

IACG-MA

CCW/GGE/VII/WG.2/

WP.3/Corr.1

(English only)

A Common Inter-Agency Coordination Group on

Mine Action (IACG-MA) on Mines Other Than


UNMAS on

behalf of the

IACG-MA

CCW/GGE/VII/WG.2/

WP.4

Current and Future Technology for MOTAPM

Detection and Clearance

UNMAS

CCW/GGE/VII/WG.2/

WP.5

Two New Articles on International Cooperation

and Assistance and on Transparency Measures

Lithuania

CCW/GGE/VII/WG.2/

WP.6



Mines

Secretariat

CCW/GGE/VIII/WG.2/ Proposals and ideas on MOTAPM in the Group of Coordinator

Page 60

1

Governmental Experts (GGE) with the purpose to

provide a basis for further work

CCW/GGE/VIII/WG.2/

2

Provisional Agenda of the Meetings of the Military

Experts on MOTAPM

CCW/GGE/VIII/WG.2/

WP.1

Detectability of Anti-Vehicle Mines United Kingdom

of Great Britain

and Northern

Ireland

CCW/GGE/VIII/WG.2/

WP.2

Mines other than Anti-Personnel Mines

(MOTAPM) laid outside perimeter-marked areas

Ireland

CCW/GGE/VIII/WG.2/

WP.3

Sensitive Fuses and Sensors for Mines Other Than

Anti-Personnel Mines (MOTAPM), Proposal for

Best Practice

Germany

CCW/GGE/VIII/WG.2/

WP.4

The current detectability status of Mines Other

Than Anti-Personnel Mines currently available to

States Parties to the Convention on Certain

Conventional Weapons

GICHD at the

request of the

Coordinator

CCW/GGE/VIII/WG.2/

WP.5

Responses to Certain Concerns Regarding a

MOTAPM Protocol

United States of

America

CCW/GGE/IX/WG.2/1

Proposals and ideas on MOTAPM in the Group of



Coordinator on

MOTAPM

CCW/GGE/IX/WG.2/2

Provisional Agenda of the Meetings of the Military

Experts on MOTAPM

Chairperson of

the Meetings of

the Military

Experts on

MOTAPM

CCW/GGE/IX/WG.2/W

P.1

Sensitive Fuzes in Mines Other than Anti-

Personnel Mines

United Kingdom

of Great Britain

and Northern

Ireland

CCW/GGE/IX/WG.2/W

P.2

Minefield Marking Methodologies Australia

CCW/GGE/X/WG.2/1 Proposals and ideas on MOTAPM in the Group of



Coordinator on

MOTAPM

CCW/GGE/X/WG.2/2

Provisional Agenda for the Meeting of the Military

Experts on MOTAPM

Chairperson of

the Meeting of

Page 61

the Military

Experts on

MOTAPM

CCW/GGE/X/WG.2/W

P.1

Visualising Operational Impacts of proposed

Detectability and Fusing Standards

Coordinator on

MOTAPM

CCW/GGE/X/WG.2/W

P.2

Observations on Pertinent Issues Related to Mines

Other than Anti-Personnel Mines

Germany

CCW/GGE/X/WG.2/W

P.3

Wrap-up of the Meeting of the Military Experts on

MOTAPM

Chairperson of

the Meeting of

the Military

Experts on

MOTAPM

CCW/GGE/XI/WG.2/1 Proposals and ideas on MOTAPM in the Group of



Coordinator on

MOTAPM

CCW/GGE/XI/WG.2/2

Provisional Agenda for the Meetings of the

Military Experts on MOTAPM

Chairperson of

the Meetings of

the Military

Experts on

MOTAPM

CCW/GGE/XI/WG.2/W

P.1

Selected Rules on MOTAPM and Anti-Personnel

Mines in Amended Protocol II to the CCW

ICRC

CCW/GGE/XI/WG.2/W

P.2*

Package Solution to the Issue of MOTAPM People’s

Republic of

China

CCW/GGE/XII/WG.2/1 Proposals and ideas on MOTAPM in the Group of



Coordinator on

MOTAPM

CCW/GGE/XII/WG.2/1/

Rev.1 (English only)

Proposals and ideas on MOTAPM in the Group of



Coordinator on

MOTAPM

CCW/GGE/XII/WG.2/1/

Rev.2

Revised Proposals and ideas on MOTAPM in the

Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) with the

purpose to provide a basis for further work – Set of

recommendations on Mines Other Than Anti-

Personnel Mines (MOTAPM)

Coordinator on

MOTAPM

CCW/GGE/XII/WG.2/2



Chairperson of

the Meeting of

the Military

Experts on

MOTAPM

Page 62

CCW/GGE/XII/WG.2/

WP.1

Proposal on Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel

Mines (MOTAPM)

Cuba

CCW/GGE/XII/WG.2/

WP.1/Corr.1 (Español

solamente)

Propuesta sobre el tema de las minas diferentes a

las minas antipersonal (MDMA) - Corrección

Cuba

CCW/GGE/XII/WG.2/

WP.2

Comments on the paper prepared by the

Coordinator on Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel

Mines (MOTAPM) for the 12th Meeting of

Governmental Experts to the CCW

ICRC

CCW/GGE/XII/WG.2/

WP.2/Corr.1

Comments on the paper prepared for the twelfth

session of the Group of Governmental Experts of

the States Parties to the CCW by the Coordinator

on Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines

(MOTAPM), as contained in

CCW/GGE/XII/WG.2/1, dated 17 October 2005

ICRC

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.2/

WP.1

Impact of the detectability of mines other than anti-

personnel mines (MOTAPM) on their military

effectiveness

Russian

Federation

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.2/

WP.2

Practical experience in the Russian Federation in

the detection and deactivation of improvised

explosive devices

Russian

Federation

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.2/

WP.3

Promising technologies for the detection of

explosive objects

Russian

Federation

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.2/

WP.4

Anti-vehicle mines Russian

Federation

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.2/

WP.5

Principal approaches to the development of

methods for checking the reliability of anti-

personnel mine self-destruction mechanisms and

self-deactivation devices

Russian

Federation

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.2/

WP.6

Mapping, fencing and marking of minefields:

practice in the Russian Federation

Russian

Federation

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.2/

WP.7

Current restrictions on the use of anti-personnel

mines

Russian

Federation

CCW/GGE/XV/WG.2/1

/Rev.1

Set of provisions on the use of MOTAPM/AVM -

A compilation of provisions that could command

consensus in the group of governmental expert

(GGE)

Revised

proposal by the

Coordinator

CCW/GGE/XV/WG.2/

WP.1

Comments on the set of provisions on the use of

MOTAPM/AVM. A compilation of provisions that

could command consensus in the Group of

Governmental Experts (GGE), contained in

CCW/GGE/XV/WG.2/1 and Corr.1

European Union

CCW/GGE/XV/WG.2/ Proposal on Anti-Vehicle Mines (AVM) Pakistan

Page 63

WP.2

Page 64

Annex III

REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT-DESIGNATE ON THE ISSUE OF

COMPLIANCE

Mandate

1. Paragraph 32 of the Report of the Meeting of the States Parties in 2005 (CCW/MSP/2005/2)

stipulates that “the President-designate shall undertake consultations during the intersessional

period on possible options to promote compliance with the Convention and its annexed Protocols,

taking into account proposals put forward, and shall submit a report, adopted by consensus, to the

States Parties.”

Friend of the President

2. The President-designate has requested Ambassador Markotić to continue his efforts in order

to achieve an agreement on the issue of Compliance as Friend of the Chair. The President-designate

thanks him for his agreement and his tireless efforts. With the consent of the States parties, the

President-designate is requesting him to continue this work until the Review Conference.

Status Report

3. On the basis of our consultations a revised document, “Proposal of amendment to the

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may

Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects” was presented50

. It will

constitute the basis of the work for the Review Conference.

4. However, this document is not yet ready to be endorsed. To achieve a consensus the States

parties still need to resolve four pending issues:

• The question of the procedure on how to adopt the text: by a Decision or by an Amendment to

the Convention

• The content of paragraphs 6, 7 and 9 of Part II of the proposal as contained in

CCW/GGE/XV/2/Rev.1

Way forward

5. The President-designate and the Friend of the President consider that an agreement can be

reached on a Decision more easily than on an Amendment. Their advice is also that it will not be

possible to broaden the mandate of a the pool of experts provided for in Article 6, nor to restrict

further the possibility to transmit the report as provided in Article 9.

50

CCW/GGE/XV/2/Rev.1

Page 65

6. Concerning Article 7, it would be advisable to explain in the appropriate form the concrete

manner in which the President-designate envisages the selection process of the members of the pool

of experts in consultation between the UNSG and the requesting State party.

7. In conclusion, it is the view of the President-designate that with a few last modifications, that

could be made to articles 6 to 10, the States Parties should be prepared to arrive at the Review

Conference, ready to take a final decision on the basis of the annexed text, and in particular on the

basis of the option of the Decision.

Page 66

APPENDIX


ON THE ISSUE OF COMPLIANCE

Symbol

Title

Submitted by

CCW/CONF.II/PC.1/WP.8 Compliance Annex United States of America

CCW/CONF.II/PC.3/WP.7 Working Paper Submitted

by South Africa. Additional

Articles on Consultations

and Compliance

South Africa

CCW/CONF.II/PC.3/WP.8 Working Paper Submitted

by Belgium on behalf of the

European Union on

Compliance

Belgium on behalf of the

European Union

CCW/GGE/II/WP.7 Working Paper on

Compliance. Compiled by

the Chairperson, GGE on

CCW

Chairperson-designate

CCW/GGE/III/WP.7 Compliance in the CCW

Context

Sweden

CCW/GGE/V/2 Compliance in the CCW

Context

Greece on behalf of the

European Union

CCW/GGE/VIII/2 Discussion Paper on

Compliance

Chairperson-designate

CCW/GGE/VIII/WP.1 CCW Framework

Convention: Additional

Articles on Consultations

and Compliance

South Africa

CCW/GGE/IX/WP.1 Ideas and Suggestions

regarding a Possible

Compliance Mechanism

under the Convention on

Certain Conventional

Weapons

European Union

CCW/GGE/X/3 Compliance Chairperson-designate

CCW/GGE/X/WP.1 Responses to Certain

Concerns regarding a

Possible Compliance

Mechanism under CCW.

Elaborative Memorandum

on CCW/GGE/IX/WP.1

European Union

Page 67

CCW/GGE/XI/2 Compliance Chairperson-designate

CCW/GGE/XII/3 Compliance Chairperson-designate

CCW/GGE/XIV/2 Amendment to the

Convention on Prohibitions

or Restrictions on the Use

of Certain Conventional

Weapons Which May be

Deemed to be Excessively

Injurious or to have

Indiscriminate Effects

President-designate

CCW/GGE/XIV/WP.2 Alternative Approach to

Promoting Compliance with

the Convention and its

Annexed Protocols


CCW/GGE/XV/2 Proposal of Amendment to

the Convention on

Prohibitions or Restrictions

on the Use of Certain


Which May be Deemed to

be Excessively Injurious or

to have Indiscriminate

Effects

President-designate

CCW/GGE/XV/2/Rev.2 Proposal of Amendment to

the Convention on

Prohibitions or Restrictions

on the Use of Certain


Which May be Deemed to

be Excessively Injurious or

to have Indiscriminate

Effects

President-designate

Page 68

Annex IV

PROVISIONAL PROGRAMME OF WORK OF MAIN COMMITTEE I

OF THE THIRD REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE




DATE AGENDA

ITEM

TITLE

1 Opening of the meeting by the Chairperson Thursday,

9 November

2006

10 a.m. - 1 p.m. 2 Review of the scope and operation of the Convention and

its annexed Protocols. General statements regarding new

proposals

Friday,

10 November

2006

10 a.m. - 1 p.m.

3 Consideration of possible options to promote

compliance with the Convention and its annexed

Protocols51

4 Consideration of the scope and operation of the

Convention and its annexed Protocols:

4 (a) Plan of Action on the universalization of the Convention

and its annexed Protocols;

Tuesday,

14 November

2006

10 a.m.-1 p.m.

4 (b) Establishment of a Sponsorship programme under the

Convention.

5 Consideration of Laser Systems

6 Consideration of procedural matters and follow-up

7 Any other matters

Wednesday,

15 November

2006

10 a.m.-1 p.m.

8 Conclusions

51

In accordance with the mandate as contained in paragraph 32 of CCW/MSP/2005/2 dated 14 February 2006.

Page 69

Annex V

PROVISIONAL PROGRAMME OF WORK OF MAIN COMMITTEE II





DATE AGENDA

ITEM

TITLE

1 Opening of the meeting by the Chairperson Thursday,

9 November

2006

3 p.m. - 6 p.m.

2 General statements regarding new proposals

Friday,

10 November

2006

3 p.m. - 6 p.m.

3 Consideration of Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines52

.

Tuesday,

14 November

2006

3 p.m. - 6 p.m.

4 Consideration of Explosive Remnants of War53

.

5 Consideration of […]

6 Consideration of procedural matters and follow-up

7 Any other matters

Wednesday,

15 November

2006

3 p.m. - 6 p.m.

8 Conclusions

52

In accordance with the mandate as contained in paragraph 31 of CCW/MSP/2005/2 dated 14 February 2006. 53

In accordance with the mandate as contained in paragraph 30 of CCW/MSP/2005/2 dated 14 February 2006.

Page 70

Annex VI

DRAFT DECLARATION

ON THE OCCASION OF ENTRY INTO FORCE

OF CCW PROTOCOL ON EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR (PROTOCOL V)

THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON PROHIBITIONS OR

RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH MAY

BE DEEMED TO BE EXCESSIVELY INJURIOUS OR TO HAVE INDISCRIMINATE

EFFECTS (CCW),

Recalling the general principle of the protection of the civilian population against the effects of

hostilities,

Deeply concerned at the fact that after the end of hostilities, people continue to be killed or

injured by unexploded and abandoned explosive ordnance, and that such explosive remnants of

war can remain for decades a cause of humanitarian suffering, a daily threat to civilians and

military alike, an obstacle to the return of refugees and other displaced persons, a serious

impediment to humanitarian assistance, peace-keeping, post-conflict reconstruction and

economic development, as well as to the restoration of normal social conditions,

Recalling that the Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V) was negotiated by the

CCW Group of Governmental Experts in 2003 and was adopted by consensus on 28 November

2003 at the Meeting of the States parties to the CCW held in Geneva on 27 and 28 November

2003,

Recognizing that Protocol V provides for post-conflict remedial measures of a generic nature in

order to minimize the risks and the effects of explosive remnants of war and for encouraging

States Parties to take such post-conflict remedial measures and generic preventive measures

aimed at minimizing the occurrence of explosive remnants of war,

Emphasizing the importance that they attach to the universalization of Protocol V, and

expressing their determination to take all appropriate measures so that Protocol V attains

universal adherence,

Welcome the entry into force of Protocol V on 12 November 2006 and the fact that, […] States

have notified the Depositary of their consent to be bound by Protocol V by that date,

Reaffirm their conviction that Protocol V aims to significantly reduce the suffering and

contribute to the protection of civilian population and humanitarian personnel from the effects of

explosive remnants of war,

Page 71

Reiterate their determination to address the humanitarian, developmental and environmental

impact of explosive remnants of war, including existing explosive remnants of war, and

welcome the efforts already undertaken in this regard,

Emphasize their determination to reinforce international cooperation and assistance on the issues

related to the implementation of Protocol V, and in particular in clearance, removal or

destruction of explosive remnants of war, transmission of information, protection of

humanitarian missions and organizations, risk education, victims assistance, and to dedicate

greater efforts and resources, as appropriate, towards that end,

Encourage High Contracting Parties to Protocol V in accordance with Article 10 of the Protocol

to commence preparations for a Conference,

Urge all States that have not yet done so to become parties to the Protocol, as soon as possible.

Page 72

Annex VII

DRAFT FINAL DOCUMENT





PART I

REPORT OF THE THIRD REVIEW CONFERENCE

I. Introduction

II. Organization of the Third Review Conference

III. Work of the Third Review Conference

[TO BE COMPLETED]

PART II

FINAL DECLARATION

THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON PROHIBITIONS OR

RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH MAY BE

DEEMED TO BE EXCESSIVELY INJURIOUS OR TO HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS,

WHICH MET IN GENEVA FROM 7 TO 17 NOVEMBER 2006, TO REVIEW THE SCOPE AND

OPERATION OF THE CONVENTION AND THE PROTOCOLS ANNEXED THERETO AND

TO CONSIDER ANY PROPOSAL FOR AMENDMENTS OF THE CONVENTION OR OF THE

EXISTING PROTOCOLS, AS WELL AS PROPOSALS FOR ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS

RELATING TO OTHER CATEGORIES OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS NOT COVERED BY

THE EXISTING ANNEXED PROTOCOLS

Preambular paragraph 1. Recalling the precedent Declarations adopted by the First Review

Conference in 1996 and the Second Review Conference in 2001, in particular preambular

paragraphs 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12 and 14, as well as operative paragraphs 2, 3, 8, 12, 14 and 16 of the Final

Declaration of the Second Review Conference.

Preambular paragraph 2. Reaffirming their conviction that the Convention on Prohibitions or

Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be

Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects is significantly reducing the suffering of

civilians and combatants, [CCW/CONF.II/2, preambular paragraph 1, modified]

Page 73

Preambular paragraph 3. Recognising that most major armed conflicts are non-international in

character, and that such conflicts are also being brought within the scope of the Convention by

amendment, [CCW/CONF.II/2, preambular paragraph.4, modified]

Preambular paragraph 4. Emphasizing the importance of achieving universal adherence to the

Convention and their determination to call upon all States that have not done so to become parties to

the Convention and its annexed Protocols as soon as possible, [CCW/CONF.I/16, preambular

paragraph 3, CCW/CONF.II/2, preambular paragraph 2, modified]

Preambular paragraph 5. Welcoming the entry into force of the Amendment to Article 1 of the

Convention on 18 May 2004, by which the scope of application of the Convention was extended to

also cover conflicts of non-international character, [new]

Preambular paragraph 6. Emphasizing the importance of compliance with the provisions of the

Convention and its annexed Protocols by all State Parties, [new]

Preambular paragraph 7. Welcoming the entry into force of Protocol V on Explosive Remnants

of War (Protocol V) on 13 November 2006, [new]

Preambular paragraph 8. [MOTAPM]

Preambular paragraph 9. [ERW]

Preambular paragraph 10. Acknowledging the invaluable humanitarian efforts of non-

governmental organisations in mitigating the humanitarian impact of armed conflicts and welcoming

the expertise they have brought to the work of the Group of Governmental Experts and to the

Review Conference itself, [CCW/CONF.I/16, preambular paragraph 17, CCW/CONF.II/2,

preambular paragraph 15, modified]

SOLEMNLY DECLARE:

Operative paragraph 1. Their commitment to respect and comply with the objectives and

provisions of the Convention and its annexed Protocols to which they are party as an authoritative

international instrument governing the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed

to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, [CCW/CONF.I/16, operative

paragraph 1, CCW/CONF.II/2, operative paragraph 1]

Operative paragraph 2. Their commitment to the full implementation of, and compliance with,

the Convention and its annexed Protocols to which they are party, and to keep the provisions of the

Convention and its annexed Protocols under review in order to ensure their provisions remain

relevant to modern conflicts, [CCW/CONF.II/2, operative paragraph 6]

Operative paragraph 3. Their determination to consult and cooperate with each other in order to

facilitate the full implementation of the obligations contained in the Convention and its annexed

Page 74

Protocols to which they are party, thereby promoting compliance, [CCW/CONF.II/2, operative

paragraph 7, modified]

Operative paragraph 4. [COMPLIANCE]

Operative paragraph 5. [SPONSORSHIP PROGRAMME]

Operative paragraph 6. Their satisfaction at the entry into force of the amendment to Article 1

of the Convention extending the application of the Convention and its annexed Protocols to armed

conflicts of a non-international character, [CCW/CONF.II/2, operative paragraph 4, modified]

Operative paragraph 7. Their desire that all States respect and ensure respect for the revised

scope of application of the Convention to the fullest extent possible, and their determination to

encourage all States which have not yet done so to ratify, accept, approve or accede, as appropriate,

to the amendment to Article 1 as soon as possible, [CCW/CONF.II/2, operative paragraph 5,

modified]

Operative paragraph 8. Their determination to encourage all States to become parties, as soon as

possible, to the Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I), the Protocol on Prohibitions or

Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended on 3 May 1996

(Amended Protocol II), the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary

Weapons (Protocol III), and the Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV), and that all

States respect and ensure respect for the substantive provisions of these Protocols, [new]

Operative paragraph 9. Their satisfaction at the entry into force of the Protocol on Explosive

Remnants of War (Protocol V), as well as their determination to encourage all States to become

parties to Protocol V as soon as possible, and that all States respect and ensure respect for the

substantive provisions of Protocol V [new]

Operative paragraph 10. Their continuing commitment to address as a matter of urgency the

deleterious humanitarian effects of explosive remnants of war, through the effective and efficient

implementation of Protocol V and reinforced international cooperation aimed at minimizing the

risks and effects of unexploded and abandoned explosive ordnance. [CCW/CONF.II/2, operative

paragraph 9, modified]

Operative paragraph 11. [MOTAPM]

Operative paragraph 12. [ERW]

Operative paragraph 13. Their continuing commitment to assist, to the extent feasible, impartial

humanitarian demining missions, operating with the consent of the host State and/or the relevant

States Parties to the conflict, in particular by providing all necessary information in their possession

covering the location of all known minefields, mined areas, mines, explosive remnants of war,

booby-traps and other devices in the area in which the mission is performing its functions,

[CCW/CONF.II/2, operative paragraph 13, modified]

Page 75

RECOGNISE that the important principles and provisions contained in this Final Declaration can

also serve as a basis for further strengthening the Convention and its annexed Protocols and express

their determination to implement them,

AND TAKE THE FOLLOWING DECISIONS:

Decision 1

DECIDE [ON ERW]

Decision 2

DECIDE [ON MOTAPM]

Decision 3

DECIDE [ON COMPLIANCE]

Decision 4

DECIDE to adopt a Plan of Action to Promote Universality of the Convention, as contained in Part III C of the

Final Document.

Decision 5

DECIDE [ON SPONSORSHIP]

Decision 6

DECIDE [ON FURTHER WORK]

[TO BE COMPLETED]

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

REVIEW

Preambular paragraph 3

The Conference recalls the obligation to determine in the study, development, acquisition or

adoption of a new weapon, means and method of warfare, whether its employment would, in some

or all circumstances, be prohibited under any rule of international law applicable to the High

Contracting Parties. [CCW/CONF.I/16, CCW/CONF.II/2, review of preambular paragraph 3]

Page 76


The Conference reaffirms the need to continue, as appropriate, the codification and progressive

development of the rules of international law applicable to certain conventional weapons which may

be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. [CCW/CONF.I/16, CCW/CONF.II/2,

review of preambular paragraph 8]


The Conference underlines the need to achieve wider adherence to the Convention and its annexed

Protocols. The Conference welcomes recent ratifications and accessions to the Convention and its

annexed Protocols and urges the High Contracting Parties to accord high priority to their diplomatic

efforts to encourage further adherence with a view to achieving universal adherence as soon as

possible. [CCW/CONF.I/16, CCW/CONF.II/2, review of preambular paragraph 10]

Article 1

The Conference notes the provisions of Article 1, as amended on 21 December 2001.

The Conference calls upon States which have not yet done so to ratify, accept, approve or accede, as

appropriate, to the amendment to Article 1. [new]

Article 2

The Conference reaffirms that nothing in the Convention or its annexed Protocols shall be

interpreted as detracting from other obligations imposed upon the High Contracting Parties by

international humanitarian law. [CCW/CONF.I/16, CCW/CONF.II/2, review of Art.2]

Article 3

The Conference notes the provisions of Article 3. [CCW/CONF.I/16, CCW/CONF.II/2, review of

Art.3]

Article 4

The Conference notes that [100] States have ratified, accepted, acceded or succeeded to the

Convention.

The Conference calls upon States which are not parties to this Convention to ratify, accept, approve

or accede, as appropriate, to the Convention, thus contributing to the achievement of universal

adherence to the Convention.

Page 77

The Conference invites the High Contracting Parties to encourage further accessions to the

Convention and its annexed Protocols.

The Conference, in this context, welcomes the adoption of the Plan of Action to Promote

Universality of the Convention. [CCW/CONF.I/16, CCW/CONF.II/2, review of Art.4, modified

and updated]

Article 5

The Conference notes the provisions of Article 5.

The Conference recalls in particular the provisions of paragraph 3 of this Article which stipulates

that each of the Protocols annexed to the Convention shall enter into force six months after the date

by which twenty States have notified their consent to be bound by it. The Conference welcomes the

entry into force on 13 November 2006 of the Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V).

[CCW/CONF.I/16, CCW/CONF.II/2, review of Art.5, modified]

Article 6

The Conference encourages international cooperation in the field of dissemination of the

Convention and its annexed Protocols and recognizes the importance of multilateral collaboration

relating to instruction, the exchange of experience at all levels, the exchange of instructors and the

organization of joint seminars. The Conference underlines the importance of the High Contracting

Parties’ obligation to disseminate this Convention and its annexed Protocols, and, in particular to

include the content in their programmes of military instruction at all levels.

[SPONSORSHIP]

The Conference welcomes the establishment of a web page of the Convention and its annexed

Protocols on the website of the United Nations and on the website of the Presidency and requests the

United Nations Secretary-General to continue to make all documents relating to the Convention,

available on the UN website. [CCW/CONF.I/16, CCW/CONF.II/2, review of Art.6, modified]

Article 7


[COMPLIANCE]

Article 8

[MOTAPM]

Page 78

[FURTHER WORK]

The Conference decides, consistent with Article 8.3 (c) to convene a Meeting of the States Parties to

be held on […] in conjunction with the next Annual Conference of the States Parties to Amended

Protocol II.

The States Parties recall their agreement reached by the Second Review Conference in 2001 in

reviewing Article 8 of the Convention.

Article 9

The Conference notes with satisfaction that the provisions of this Article have not been invoked.

[CCW/CONF.I/16, CCW/CONF.II/2, review of Art.9]

Article 10

The Conference notes the provisions of Article 10. [CCW/CONF.I/16, CCW/CONF.II/2, review of

Art.10]

Article 11


The Conference notes the corrections to the original text of Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of

War (French, Russian and Spanish versions) and to the certified true copies effected by the

Secretary-General of the United Nations, acting in his capacity as depositary. [CCW/CONF.I/16,

CCW/CONF.II/2, review of Art.11, modified]

Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I)

The Conference takes note of the provisions of this Protocol. [CCW/CONF.I/16, CCW/CONF.II/2,

review of Protocol I]

Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices

(Protocol II) and Technical Annex to the Protocol

The Conference takes note of the provisions of this Protocol. [CCW/CONF.II/2, review of Protocol

II]

Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as

amended on 3 May 1996 (Amended Protocol II) and Technical Annex to the Protocol

The Conference acknowledges that the High Contracting Parties strengthened Protocol II in a

number of areas at the First Review Conference.

Page 79

The Conference also notes with satisfaction that in accordance with Article 13 of Amended Protocol

II, eight Annual Conferences of High Contracting Parties were held for the purpose of consultations

and cooperation on all issues related to Amended Protocol II.

The Conference recommends that future Annual Conferences of High Contracting Parties to

Amended Protocol II coincide with any meetings of High Contracting Parties to the Convention and

Conferences of High Contracting Parties to Protocol V.

The Conference takes note of the reporting obligations of High Contracting Parties under Amended

Protocol II, and calls on High Contracting Parties to fulfil these obligations in a timely, consistent

and complete manner.

The Conference acknowledges the valuable work of relevant agencies and bodies of the United

Nations; of the International Committee of the Red Cross pursuant to its mandate to assist war

victims; of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining as well as of NGOs in a

number of fields, in particular the care and rehabilitation of mine victims, implementation of

mine-awareness programmes and mine clearance. [CCW/CONF.II/2, review of Amended Protocol

II, updated and modified]

Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III)

The Conference takes note of the provisions of this Protocol. [CCW/CONF.I/16, CCW/CONF.II/2,

review of Protocol III]

Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV)

The Conference takes note of the provisions of this Protocol. [CCW/CONF.II/2, review of Protocol

IV]

Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V) and Technical Annex to the Protocol

The Conference takes note of the provisions of this Protocol and welcomes with satisfaction its entry

into force.

The Conference encourages the High Contracting Parties to make all best endeavours to comply

with suggested best practices, as specified in the Technical Annex, for achieving the objectives

contained in Articles 4, 5 and 9 of the Protocol.

The Conference looks forward to the Conference of High Contracting Parties which will be

convened pursuant to Article 10 of the Protocol on [TO BE COMPLETED]

The Conference acknowledges the valuable work of relevant agencies and bodies of the

United Nations; of the International Committee of the Red Cross pursuant to its mandate to assist

Page 80

war victims, of the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining as well as of NGOs in a

number of fields, in particular care and rehabilitation of explosive remnants of war victims, risk

education, and clearance, removal or destruction of unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive

ordnance. [new]

PART III

A. [MOTAPM]

[TO BE COMPLETED]

B. [ERW]

[TO BE COMPLETED]

C. [COMPLIANCE]

[TO BE COMPLETED]

D. PLAN OF ACTION TO PROMOTE UNIVERSALITY OF THE CONVENTION

1. The High Contracting Parties should:

Action # 1: Review thoroughly their participation in the Convention and its annexed Protocols

with the view to consider acceptance, at their earliest convenience, of those Protocols

and of the Amendment of Article 1 of the Convention, which they have not yet

ratified or otherwise acceded to.

Action # 2: Accord particular importance to encouraging the States signatories of the Convention,

to ratify it as soon as possible. These include: Afghanistan, Egypt, Iceland, Nigeria,

Sudan and Viet Nam.

Action # 3: Strengthen their efforts in promoting the universality of the Convention and its

annexed Protocols, by actively pursuing this objective, as appropriate, in their

contacts with States not parties, and seeking the cooperation of relevant international

and regional organisations.

Action # 4: Accord priority attention to encouraging adherence to the Convention and its annexed

Protocols by States in regions of conflict which could serve as a significant

confidence-building measure thus promoting reestablishment of understanding and

trust among Parties to an active conflict.

Action # 5: Direct specific efforts towards promoting adherence to the Convention and its

annexed Protocols in regions where the level of acceptance of the Convention

remains low.

Page 81

Action # 6: Undertake all appropriate steps to prevent and suppress violations of the Convention

and its annexed Protocols, by persons or on territory under their jurisdiction or

control.

Action # 7: Encourage and support involvement and active cooperation in these universalization

efforts by all relevant partners, including the United Nations, other international

institutions and regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross,

non-governmental organizations, parliamentarians and interested citizens.

2. For achieving the above actions the High Contracting Parties should undertake all

appropriate measures which should include, inter alia:

(i) seizing the opportunity of bilateral contacts and making use of diplomatic channels

available to promote adherence to the Convention and its annexed Protocols;

(ii) enhancing the knowledge of the Convention and its annexed Protocols through the

organization of workshops and regional and sub-regional seminars and workshops,

measures to increase awareness of the Convention and its Protocols, including

publications in UN official languages, as well as measures to reach the appropriate

audience in States not parties, and in cooperation with all relevant actors, be it

governmental, intergovernmental or non-governmental;

(iii) coordinating regional actions in accordance with the characteristics of each region,

mostly in those where acceptance of the Convention remains low. UN regional centres

for peace and disarmament, as well as regional organizations as appropriate, may play

an important role in this regard;

(iv) review this issue during meetings of the High Contracting Parties of the Convention.

3. The Secretariat shall report on the implementation of this Plan of Action, and keep the High

Contracting Parties regularly informed, so that they may review progress and monitor its

implementation effectively.

4. The implementation of this Plan of Action will be reviewed by the next Review Conference

which will take any decisions deemed necessary.

E. [SPONSORSHIP]

[TO BE COMPLETED]

Page 82

PART IV

DOCUMENTS

A. Agenda

[TO BE COMPLETED]

B. Programme of Work

[TO BE COMPLETED]

C. Agenda of Main Committee I

[TO BE COMPLETED]

D. Report of Main Committee I

[TO BE COMPLETED]

E. Agenda of Main Committee II

[TO BE COMPLETED]

F. Report of Main Committee II

[TO BE COMPLETED]

G. Report of the Credentials Committee

[TO BE COMPLETED]

H. [TO BE COMPLETED]

Annex I

List of Documents

[TO BE COMPLETED]

Page 83

Annex VIII

DRAFT DECISION

ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SPONSORSHIP PROGRAMME UNDER THE



INJURIOUS OR TO HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS (CCW)

The Conference of States Parties:

1. Decides to establish a sponsorship programme under/within the framework of the Convention

on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to

be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects (CCW);

2. Agrees on the following general principles:

(i) contributions to the programme will be made on a voluntary basis;

(ii) this programme will be conducted in an informal and flexible way with full respect to the

specific ad hoc nature of the CCW forum;

3. Sets the following basic goals to the Sponsorship programme:

(i) to strengthen the implementation of the Convention and its annexed Protocols;

(ii) to promote universal observance of the norms and principles enshrined in the Convention

and its annexed Protocols;

(iii) to support the universalization of the Convention and its annexed Protocols;

(iv) to enhance the cooperation, the exchange of information and the consultations among the

States Parties on issues related to the Convention and its annexed Protocols;

4. Sets the following basic operational purposes to the Sponsorship programme:

(i) to support the participation of the representatives of States Parties, especially from ERW-

and mine-affected States that have limited resources, to participate in the CCW activities.

Priority should be given to States Parties which, according to the United Nations, have

the world's least developed economies;

(ii) to provide Signatory States and States not yet parties to the Convention and its Protocols

with an opportunity to participate in the CCW activities and to acquire an acquaintance

with the work related to the Convention. Preference should be given to States which,

according to the United Nations, have the least developed economies, States which are

on the path towards accession to the Convention and its annexed Protocols and States

which are engaged in activities related to their own implementation of the Convention

and its Protocols;

Page 84

(iii) to support the attendance of appropriate qualified experts with field experience or of

scholars, particularly from the States referred to in paragraph 4(i), to prepare studies

and/or presentations on certain topics of interest at relevant meetings or seminars;

(iv) to provide other related forms of assistance, that might be deemed appropriate by the

States Parties;

5. Decides that the Sponsorship programme will operate according to the following basic

operational modalities:

(i) States Parties entrust the technical management of the programme to the Geneva

International Center for Humanitarian Demining;

(ii) An informal Steering Committee (hereinafter “the committee”) will set operational

modalities which have not been specified in this decision and ensure the guidance of the

day-to-day implementation of the CCW Sponsorship programme; it will be constituted

by representatives of donor States to this programme and the UNDDA;

(iii) The Committee will operate in a transparent way; for this purpose, representatives of the

three Regional Groups, and China, the President-designate of the CCW and

representatives of UNMAS will be invited to participate to its meetings as observers and

advisors. It is understood that every State Party could ask to be heard by the Committee.

(iv) The Committee will take all decisions related to the operation of the Sponsorship

programme, including the granting of travel and daily subsistence allowances for

participation in the CCW activities or to other expenditures, in accordance with the basic

goals and the operational purposes of the programme as spelt out above;

(v) The Committee will report annually on its activities, including on the beneficiaries of the

programme, to the CCW States Parties. The programme will be reviewed and assessed

by States Parties at the next Review Conference, as well as the modus operandi of the

programme;

(vi) The funds allocated to the Sponsorship programme will be subject to an audit by an

external auditor and audit reports will be sent to all members of the Committee, and

made available upon request to any State Party by the United Nations.

Page 85

Annex IX

[English Only]

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

OF THE GROUP OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS

THIRTEENTH SESSION, 6 – 10 MARCH 2006


CCW/GGE/XIII/1

Provisional Agenda President-

designate

CCW/GGE/ XIII/2

Provisional Programme of Work President-

designate

CCW/GGE/ XIII/3 Provisional Agenda of the Third Review

Conference

President-

designate

CCW/GGE/ XIII/4 Draft Rules of Procedure of Third Review

Conference of the States Parties to the Convention

on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of

Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be

Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or To Have


President-

designate

CCW/GGE/ XIII/5 Universalization of the CCW and its Annexed

Protocols

President-

designate

CCW/GGE/ XIII/6 Sponsorship Programme under the Convention

President-

designate

CCW/GGE/

XIII/WP.1

Food for thought paper. Ensuring a thorough

review of the status and operation of the CCW and

its Protocols at the Third Review Conference

International

Committee of

the Red Cross

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.

1/1



Chairperson of

the Meeting of

the Military and

Technical

Experts on

ERW

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.

1/WP.1




Italy

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.

1/WP.2




Czech Republic

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.

1/WP.3




Ireland

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.

1/WP.4



South Africa

Page 86


CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.

1/WP.5




Mexico

CCW/GGE/XIII/

WG.1/WP.6




Portugal

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.

1/WP.7

Assessment of the relative risk of categories of

explosive ordnances becoming Explosive

Remnants of War: Methodology

United

Kingdom of

Great Britain

and Northern

Ireland

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.

1/WP.8

Draft Table of Conventional Ammunition Types

and Systems

Chairperson of

the Meeting of

the Military and

Technical

Experts on

ERW

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.

1/WP.9

(Original: Chinese)




People’s

Republic of

China

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.

1/WP.10

German Understanding of Cluster Munitions Germany

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.

1/WP.11

Cluster Weapons-A Real Humanitarian Threat, or

An Imaginary One?

Russian

Federation

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.

1/WP.12

Report on States Parties’ Responses to the

Questionnaire on International Humanitarian Law

& Explosive Remnants of War,

CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, Dated 8 March 2005

Asia Pacific

Centre for

Military Law,

University of

Melbourne,

Australia

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.

1/WP.12/Corr.1

(English Only)





Corrigendum

Asia Pacific

Centre for

Military Law,

University of

Melbourne,

Australia

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.

1/WP.12/Corr.2

(Chinese, English and

Spanish Only)





- Corrigendum

Asia Pacific

Centre for

Military Law,

University of

Melbourne,

Australia

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG. Report on States Parties’ Responses to the Asia Pacific

Page 87

1/WP.12/Add.1 Questionnaire on International Humanitarian Law


CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, Dated 8 March 2005 -

Addendum

Centre for

Military Law,

University of

Melbourne,

Australia

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.

1/WP.12/Add.2




CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, Dated 8 March 2005 -

Addendum

Asia Pacific

Centre for

Military Law,

University of

Melbourne,

Australia

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.

1/WP.13

A Critical Analysis on the “Report on States

Parties’ Responses to the Questionnaire” on


Remnants of War, CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2,

Dated 8 March 2005, Prepared by the Asia Pacific

Centre for Military Law, University of

Melbourne, Australia and Presented at the Request

of the Coordinator on ERW as Document

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/WP.12 and Addenda

Geneva

International

Centre for

Humanitarian

Demining

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.

1/WP.14

Munitions - a method to reduce the risks

associated with explosive remnants of war

France

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.

1/WP.15

Comments on the “Report on States Parties’

Responses to the Questionnaire ”on International

Humanitarian Law and Explosive Remnants of

War, CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, Dated 8 March

2005, Prepared by the Asia Pacific Centre for

Military Law, University of Melbourne, Australia

and Presented at the Request of the Coordinator

on ERW as Document

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/WP.12 and Addenda

International

Committee of

the Red Cross

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.

1/WP.16

Responses to the Survey on the Humanitarian

threat Posed by Munitions and Sub-Munitions that

Have Become ERW-Preliminary Assessment

Based on responses and Finding, Document

CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/WP.11, Dated 12

December 2005

Belarus

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.

2/1



Chairperson of

the Meeting of

the Military

Experts on

MOTAPM

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.

2/WP.1

Impact of the detectability of mines other than

anti-personnel mines (MOTAPM) on their

military effectiveness

Russian

Federation

Page 88

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.

2/WP.2

Practical experience in the Russian Federation in

the detection and deactivation of improvised

explosive devices

Russian

Federation

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.

2/WP.3

Promising technologies for the detection of

explosive objects

Russian

Federation

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.

2/WP.4

Anti-vehicle mines Russian

Federation

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.

2/WP.5

Principal approaches to the development of

methods for checking the reliability of anti-

personnel mine self-destruction mechanisms and

self-deactivation devices

Russian

Federation

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.

2/WP.6

Mapping, fencing and marking of minefields:

practice in the Russian Federation

Russian

Federation

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.

2/WP.7

Current restrictions on the use of anti-personnel

mines

Russian

Federation

CCW/GGE/XIII/CRP.

1

Draft Procedural Report Secretariat

CCW/GGE/XIII/INF.

1

(English/French/Spani

sh Only)

List of Participants Secretariat

CCW/GGE/XIII/INF.

1/Add.1

(English/Spanish

Only)

List of Participants

Addendum

Secretariat

CCW/GGE/XIII/MIS

C.1

(English/French/Spani

sh Only)

Provisional List of Participants Secretariat

LIST OF DOCUMENTS


FOURTEENTH SESSION, 19 - 23 JUNE 2006

Number Title Submitted by

CCW/GGE/XIV/1

Provisional Programme of Work

President-

designate

CCW/GGE/XIV/2 Amendment to the Convention on

Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use

of Certain Conventional Weapons

Which May Be Deemed to be

Excessively Injurious or to Have


President-

designate

Page 89

CCW/GGE/XIV/3 Sponsorship Programme under the

Convention. A Possible Operational

Way Forward

President-

designate

CCW/GGE/XIV/4 Proposal on a Plan of Action to Promote

Universality of the CCW

President-

designate

CCW/GGE/XIV/4/Re

v.1

Revised Proposal on a Plan of Action to

Promote Universality of the CCW

President-

designate

CCW/GGE/XIV/5 Procedural Report Secretariat

CCW/GGE/XIV/WP.

1

Views on the CCW Sponsorship

Program

United States of

America

CCW/GGE/XIV/WP.

2

Alternative Approach to Promoting

Compliance with the Convention and its

Annexed Protocols

United States of

America

CCW/GGE/XIV/WP.

3

Preparing a Review of the CCW and its

Protocols

International

Committee of

the Red Cross

CCW/GGE/XIV/WG

.1/1

Provisional Agenda for the Meeting of

the Military and Technical Experts on

ERW

Chairperson of

the Meeting of

the Military and

Technical

Experts on ERW

CCW/GGE/XIV/WG

.1/1/Add.1



ERW – Addendum - Annotated

Provisional Agenda

Chairperson of

the Meeting of

the Military and

Technical

Experts on ERW

CCW/GGE/XIV/WG

.1/1/Add.2



ERW – Addendum - Draft Table of

Explosive Ordnance Types and Systems

Chairperson of

the Meeting of

the Military and

Technical

Experts on ERW

CCW/GGE/XIV/WG

.1/1/Add.2/Corr.1

(English and Russian

only)



ERW – Addendum - Draft Table of

Explosive Ordnance Types and Systems

- Corrigendum

Chairperson of

the Meeting of

the Military and

Technical

Experts on ERW

CCW/GGE/XIV/WG

.1/WP.1

Remarks on documents


CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/WP.12/Add.1 and

CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/WP.12/Add.2

Asia Pacific

Centre for

Military Law,

University of

Melbourne,

Australia

CCW/GGE/XIV/WG Responses to document Hungary

Page 90

.1/WP.2 CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, entitled IHL

and ERW, dated 8 March 2005

CCW/GGE/XIV/WG

.1/WP.3

Technical Comments on Document


Argentina

CCW/GGE//XIV/WG.

1/WP.4

Preliminary Thoughts on a Possible

Approach to Recommendation 3

Asia Pacific

Centre for

Military Law,

University of

Melbourne,

Australia

CCW/GGE/XIV/CRP

.1


CCW/GGE/XIV/MIS

C.1

(English/French/Span

ish Only)

Provisional List of Participants Secretariat

CCW/GGE/XIV/INF.

1

(English/French/Span

ish Only)

List of Participants Secretariat

LIST OF DOCUMENTS


FIFTEENTH SESSION 28 August-6 September 2006


CCW/GGE/XV/1 Provisional Programme of Work President-

designate

CCW/GGE/XV/1/Re

v.1

Revised Provisional Programme of Work President-

designate

CCW/GGE/XV/2 Proposal of amendment to the Convention on

Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain

Conventional Weapons which may Be Deemed to

be Excessively Injurious or to Have


President-

designate

CCW/GGE/XV/2/Re

v.1

Revised Draft Proposal on Compliance President-

designate

CCW/GGE/XV/2/Re

v.3

Revised Draft Proposal on Compliance President-

designate

Page 91

CCW/GGE/XV/3 Proposal for a Draft decision on the establishment

of a sponsorship programme under the

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the

Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which

may Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to

Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)

President-

designate

CCW/GGE/XV/3/Re

v.1

Revised draft decision on the establishment of a

sponsorship programme under the Convention on


Conventional Weapons which may Be Deemed to

be Excessively Injurious or to Have

Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)

President-

designate

CCW/GGE/XV/4 Provisional programme of work of the Main

Committee I of the Third Review Conference of

the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on


Conventional Weapons which May Be Deemed

to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have


President-

Designate

CCW/GGE/XV/5 Provisional programme of work of the Main

Committee II of the Third Review Conference of

the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on


Conventional Weapons which May Be Deemed

to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have


President-

Designate

CCW/GGE/XV/6 Procedural Report Secretariat

CCW/GGE/XV/WP.

1

Proposal for a Mandate to Negotiate a Legally-

Binding Instrument that Addresses the

Humanitarian Concerns Posed by Cluster

Munitions

Austria, Holy

See, Ireland,

Mexico, New

Zealand, Sweden

CCW/GGE/XV/WP.

2

Proposal for a Mandate to Study Laser Systems

Germany and

Sweden

CCW/GGE/XV/WP.

3

Proposal for a Mandate on Explosive Remnants

of War (ERW)

European Union

CCW/GGE/XV/L.1 Draft Declaration on the occasion of the entry

into force of CCW Protocol V on Explosive

Remnants of War

President-

Designate

CCW/GGE/XV/L.2 Draft Final Document of the Third Review

Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the

Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which

May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or

to Have Indiscriminate Effects

President-

Designate

Page 92

CCW/GGE/XV/WG.

1/1



Chairperson of

the Meeting of

the Military and

Technical

Experts on ERW

CCW/GGE/XV/WG.

1/1/Add.1


Military and Technical Experts on ERW –


Chairperson of

the Meeting of

the Military and

Technical

Experts on ERW

CCW/GGE/XV/WG.

1/1/Add.2


Military and Technical Experts on ERW – Draft


Chairperson of

the Meeting of

the Military and

Technical

Experts on ERW

CCW/GGE/XV/WG.

1/WP.1


CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, entitled International

Humanitarian Law and ERW, dated 8 March

2005

Spain

CCW/GGE/XV/WG.

1/WP.2

The United Nations and the Implementation of

Protocol V

United Nations

Mine Action

Service

(UNMAS) on

behalf of the

IACG-MA

CCW/GGE/XV/WG.

1/WP.3

Initiative on a common understanding of cluster

munitions within the Military Experts Group of

the CCW

Germany

CCW/GGE/XV/WG.

2/1




(GGE)

Coordinator on

MOTAPM

CCW/GGE/XV/WG.

2/1/Rev.1




(GGE)

Coordinator on

MOTAPM

CCW/GGE/XV/WG.

2/WP.1

Comments on the set of provisions on the use of

MOTAPM/AVM. A compilation of provisions

that could command consensus in the Group of

Governmental Experts (GGE), contained in

CCW/GGE/XV/WG.2/1 and Corr.1

European Union

Page 93

CCW/GGE/XV/WG.

2/WP.2

Proposal on Ant-Vehicle Mines (AVM) Pakistan

CCW/GGE/XV/MIS

C.1

Provisional List of Participants

Secretariat

CCW/GGE/XV/INF.

1

List of Participants

Secretariat

CCW/GGE/XV/CRP

.1


The above documents are available in all official languages through the Official Document System

of the United Nations at http://documents.un.org and the official website of the CCW as part of the

website of the United Nations Office at Geneva at http://www.unog.ch/disarmament/.

_____