e-

,Draft of Comments on the Briefing at The White Houseon Friday, February 25, 1966

(Dictated 1 hour after briefing)

Present were the President, the Vice President, and various offi-

cials of the Executive Branch, including Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary

of Defense ticNamara, Admiral Raborn, Director of CtA, and his deputy, Mr.

Helms, General Wheeler, Ambassador Avenu Harriman, and ten or fifteen more,

including White House Staff, plus about 20 White House interns. The briefing

lasted from about 8:30 A.K. to 10:30 A.M. Approximately 150 to 200 Members

of the House and the Senate were present. Apparently, this was the second

half of the Congressional briefings, the other having been held on Thursday.

The stated purpose of the briefing was to hear from Vice President Humphrey

on his trip to Southeast Asia.

I had the feeling that the briefing was one of historical interest,

from a variety of standpoints. First, the briefing, as well as the President's

conduct, revealed much about the character and temperament of the man. Second,

the implications of the briefing from the standpoint of the U.S. effort in South

Viet Nam. Third, the continuing question ¡n our system of the relationship

between the Executive and the Legislative Branches of the Federal Government,

as well as the whole question of the degree of Congressional involvement in

foreign policy and national security decision-making. And fourth, the political

implications of the war in Southeast Asia in the 1966 elections.

It should be noted that the briefing was called at 5:30 P.M.,

Thursday afternoon. A phone call from the White House to my office invited

me for 8:30 next morning. It snowed last night and the streets were covered

with snow; ¡t was a Friday morning with no session of the House to be held, and

despite these factors, the attendance was excellent.

The President opened the meeting with brief remarks. Then the Vice

President spoke on his Asian trip and then invited brief remarks by Harriman.

f

(Dictated 1 hour after briefing)

.. Draft of Comments on the Briefing at The White House, on Friday, February 25, 1966

Present were the President, the Vice President, and various offi-

cials of the Executive Branch, including Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary

of Defense McNamara, Admiral Raborn, Director of CIA, and his deputy, Mr.

Helms, General Wheeler, Ambassador Averi11 Harriman, and ten or fifteen more,

including White House Staff, plus about 20 White House interns. The briefing

lasted from about 8:30 A.M. to 10:30 A.M. Approximately 150 to 200 Members

of the House and the Senate were present. Apparently, this was the second

half of the Congressional briefings, the other "having been held on Thursday.

The stated purpose of the briefing was to hear from Vice President Humphrey

on his trip to Southeast Asia.

I had the feel ing that the briefing was one of historical interest,

from a variety of standpoints. First, the briefing, as weIl as the President1s

conduct, revealed much about the character and temperament of the man. Second,

the implications of the briefing fram the standpoint of the U.S. effort in South

Viet Nam. Third, the continuing question in our system of the relationship

between the Executive and the Legislative Branches of the Federal Government,

as well as the whole question of the degree of Congressional involvement in

foreign policy and national security decision-making. And fourth, the political

implications of the war in Southeast Asia in the 1966 elections.

It should be noted that the briefing was called at 5:30 P.M.,

Thursdayafternoon. A phone call from the White House to my office invited

me for 8:30 next morning. It snowed last night and the streets were covered

with snow; it was a Friday morning with no session of the House to be held, and

despite these factors, the attendance was excel1ent.

The President opened the meeting with brief remarks. Then the Vice

President spoke on his Asian trip and then invited brief remarks by Harriman.

White House Briefing - page 2

2/25/66

This portion lasted maybe 25 minutes. During the remainder of the time, the

Vice President supposedly chaired the meeting but with the a1most continuous

assistance and interruption of the President, whether necessary or not, and

responded to questions. He also called upon Rusk, McNamara, and Wheeler to

respond to questions. The President was up and down like a yo-yo al] morning

long. He gives the impression of a man sitting on the lid of a volcano, and

he keeps erupting. He made at least three direct jabs at Senator Robert

Kennedy's speech (without using Kennedy's name) concerning dealing with the

Viet Cong.

Humphrey's speech was well done, but would be more appropriate

for an audience in Minnesota, in that it seemed politically very astute

but was superficial and, in my opinion, devoid of fact, theory, or new

information. Humphrey's remarks were typically "Humphrey," very optimistic

and bubbling, an excellent sales job. The first question asked, obviously

a planted question, involved desertions, and the questioner quoted an article

from the morning paper. Humphrey tried to explain that--and this is unbeliev-

able--the Viet Cong had defections (not desertions) at the rate of 80 per day

and that they came to South Viet Nam. The army of South Viet Nam didn't have

defections, they had some desertions and they were simply instances where the

men went home to harvest crops. He explained that the soldiers were allowed

to do it under the French and just didn't understand that they shouldn't now,

but that Ky was going after them and bringing them back.

Both Humphrey and General Wheeler seemed to have resurrected that

word, "Victory." ff you carefully sift through the verbiage, you discover

that the word ¡s applied only in a broad sense, to the war on the "ancient

enemies" of want, disease, etc., not to the military war effort. General

Wheeler applied it in a very limited way to the war effort by specifying

~ White House Briefing - page 22/25/66

This portion lasted maybe 25 minutes. During the remainder of the time, the

Vice President supposedly chaired the meeting but with the almost continuous

assistance and interruption of the President, whether necessary er not, and

responded to questions. He also called upon Rusk, McNamara, and Wheeler to

respond to questions. The President was up and down like a yo-yo all morning

lang. He gives the impression of a man sitting on the 1id of a volcane, and

he keeps erupting. He made at least three direct jabs at Senator Robert

Kennedy·s speech (without using Kennedyß s name) concerningdealing with the

Viet Cong.

Humphrey's speech was well done, but would be more appropriate

for an audience in Minnesota, in that it seemed political1y very astute

but was superficial and, in my opinion, devoid of fact, theory, or new

information. Humphreyls remarks were typical1y IIHumphrey,11 very optimistic

and bubbling, an excellent sales job. The first question asked, obviously

a planted question, involved desertions, and the questioner quoted an article

from the morning paper. Humphrey tried to explain that--and this is unbeliev-

able--the Viet Cong had defections (not desertions) at the rate of 80 per day

and that they came to South Viet Nam. The army of South Viet Nam didn1t have

defections, they had some desertions and they were simply instances where the

men went horne to harvest crops. He explained that the soldiers were al10wed

to do it under the French and just didn1t understand that they shouldn't now,

but that Ky was going after them and bringing them back.

80th Humphrey and General Wheeler seemed to have resurrected that

word,IIVictory.11 If you carefully sift through the verbiage, you discover

that the word is applied only in a broad sense, to the war on the lIancient

enemies" of want, disease, etc., not to the military war effort. General

Wheeler applied it in a very limited way to the war effort by specifying

White House Briefing - page 32/25/66

victory with respect to our U.S. objectives and commitment, namely, stopping

aggression in South Viet Nam.

President Johnson came up with a number of homey anecdotes. He

quoted Sam Rayburns comment concerning General George Marshall and, appar-

ently, a reporter's question to Rayburn about military strategy and a Marshall

decision relating thereto. The President quoted Rayburn as having said to the

reporter something to the effect that "I donut comment on such matters. If he

(Marshall) doesn't know more than I do in this area, then we have been wasting

a whale of a lot of money on West Point for the past decades." This seemed to

be aimed at giving the audience the impression that we probably would be well

advised not to second-guess L.B.J. and his advisers on the subject of Viet Nam,

unless we believed we have been wasting a lot of money on West Point all these

years. The President buttressed this point later when he, in a burst of para-

graphs, tied practically everyone ¡n the world into his policy by saying that

this was President Kennedy's policy; that the Secretary of State and the

Secretary of Defense were appointed by someone other than President Johnson,

namely, President Kennedy; that he, President Johnson, has the best advisers

in the world, and he named them all, including Ambassador Goldberg, and that

they had talked to the Pope, etc. And how can anyone suggest that all these

President's advisers, etc., including President Eisenhower, who was always

the first to support and has never failed to support President Johnson's

decisions--how can anyone ¡n the world think they know the answers better

than this group of talented people. He spelled it out, saying, "There is

no Senator or Congressman whose judgment or knowledge can be compared with

those individuals, with that team." He quoted an anecdote from Rayburn

again, to the effect that when President Truman came to Rayburn (I presume

White House Briefing - page 32/25/66

victory with respect to our U.S. objectives and commitment, namely, stopping

aggression in South Viet Nam.

President Johnson came up with a number of homey anecdotes. He

quoted Sam RayburnDs comment concerning General George Marshall and, appar-

ently, a reporterls question to Rayburn about military strategy and a Marshall

decision relating thereto. The President quoted Rayburn as having said to the

reporter something to the effect that .11 donDt comment on such matters. If he

(Marshall) doesn1t know more than I do in this area, then we have been wasting

a whale of a lot of money on West Point for the past decades. '1 This seemed to

be aimed at giving the audience the impression that we probably would be well

advised not to second-guess L.B.J. and his advisers on the subject of Viet Nam,

unless we believed we have been wasting a lot of money on West Point all these

years. The President buttressed this point later when he, in a burst of para-

graphs, tied practically everyone in the world into his policy by saying that

this was President Kennedy·s policy; that the Secretary of State and the

Secretary of Defense were appointed by someone other than President Johnson,

namely, President Kennedy; that he, President Johnson, has the best advisers

in the world, and he named them all, including Ambassador Goldberg, and that

they had talked to the Pope, etc. And how can anyone suggest that all these

Presidentls advisers, etc., including President Eisenhower, who was always

the first to support and has never failed to support President Johnsonls

decisions--how can anyone in the world think they know the answers better

than this group of talented people. He spelled it out, saying, JlThere is

no Senator or Congressman whose judgment er knewledge can be compared with

those individuals, with that team. 1I He queted an anecdote from Rayburn

again, to the effect that when President Truman came to Rayburn (I presume

White House Briefing - page L2/25/66

he meant Pres. Roosevelt came to Rayburn) arid said, "We need money to develop

an atomic bomb," Rayburn said, "How much will ¡t cost?" The answer was $2

billion, and Rayburn said, "I will tell Joe Martin, but only Joe Martin. Ifwe tell any more of the Congressmen, it will get out." (Suggesting that he

can't tell us all or Members of Congress will leak ¡t.) "Why do you need it?"

The answer was given, and Rayburn said, "O.K., you can have the $2 billion.

If it works, it will end the war, If it fails, it is on you.0 (All responsi-

bility on the President.)

iThe President, in a fit of emotion, yelled at one questioner,

"Hanoi is the stud (or stuck) duck ¡n this operation." (Whatever that meant.)

Later on, he commented that Hanoi has more tin-horn lawyers pleading

their case than you can shake a stick at. They always say, Why don't you do

this and that. "Well, we have done all those things--we have changed the

Generals, we have changed the head of the South Vietnamese Government,(some

admission!) we have asked everybody ¡n every capital--we have tried everything.

Finally, we decided we had done everything but take it to the UN. So, we took

it to the UN, but 1a11 bet you a speckled bird dog," LBJ said, "that they said,

Why didn't we take it there sooner, or later, or taller, or shorter, or hotter,

or colder."

i asked a question, which was almost exactly as follows: "Congress-

man John Young of Texas asked the question, n1hy, in view of all of the power,

the airplanes, the bombing, the manpower, the billions of dollars, have not

the Viet Cong quit? Vice President Humphrey's answer to Congressman Young

was that they were not convinced that we won't pull out. They are not convinced

they are going to lose. Later, Secretary Rusk said the same thing, basically

that the North Vietnamese, the Viet Cony, think they will win. They believe

White Hause Briefing - page 42/25/66

he meant Pres. Roosevelt came to Rayburn) and said, "We need money to develop

an atomic bomb," Rayburn said, "How much wi 11 it cost?1I The answer was $2

billion, and Rayburn said, III will tell Joe Hartin, but only Joe Hartin. If

we tell any more of the Congressmen, it will get out. 1I (Suggesting that he

can1t tell us all or Members of Congress will leak it.) "Why do you need it?JI

The answer was given, and Rayburn said, "O.K., you can have the $2 billion.

If it works, it will end the war, If it fai1s, it is on you. 1I (All responsi-

bil ity on the President.)

lhe President, in a fit of emotion, ye11ed at one questioner,

"Hanoi i 5 the stud (or stuck) duck in this operation. tI (Whatever that meant.)

Later on, he commented that Hanoi has more tin-horn lawyers pleading

their case than you can shake a stick at. They a1ways say, Why don1t you do

this and that. "We11, we have done all those things--we have changed the

Generals, we have changed the head of the South Vietnamese Government,(some

admisslon~) we have asked everybody in every capital--we have tried everything.

Final1y, we decided we had done everything but take it to the UNe So, we took

it to the UN, but 18 11 bet you a speckled bird dog," LBJ said, Ilthat they said,

Why didn1t we take it there sooner, or 1ater, or tal1er, or shorter, or hotter,

o r co 1der . I I

asked a question, which was almost exactly as follows: IICongress-

man John Young of Texas asked the question, Why, in view of all of the power,

the airplanes, the bombing, the manpower, the bill ions of dollars, have not

the Viet Cong quit?· Vice President Humphrey·s answer to Congressman Young

was that they were not convinced that we won1t pu1l out. They are not convinced

they are going to lose. Later, Secretary Rusk said the same thing, basically

that the North Vietnamese, the Viet Cong, think they will win. They believe

White House Briefing - page 5

2/25/66

the U.S. will fold up like France did. My question is, Why are they not

convinced of our national will? In 1hat ways have we failed to convince

them of this determination, and what is being done, or can be done, to

convince them?"

Before Humphrey could answer, President Johnson popped up and

pointing his finger, yelled, "I'll tell you what will convince them--more

of the same like we've given them." I said, "Like the bombing pause?"

He said, "For the past 30 days we've stepped up bombings, 20,000 casualties,"

and so on and so on, he described the damage that the U.S. is inflicting on

the Viet Cong and the tons of bombs the U.S. is dropping. I then said,

"Well, Mr. President, ¡f we have been doing this since the conclusion of

the pause, is there any hint or indication that we are, in fact, being

successful in convincing them? Is this message getting through?" And he

said, "No, there isn't."

LBJ said lhat no man wants to end the war as badly as he does,

because, he said, "I 've a lot riding on it." That statement summarizes

the whole last hour of the briefing. The last hour was devoted not to

details of the conflict but rather to a long, rambling, extremely political,

statement by the President, showing how everyone in the world, including

the Pope, was tied into his policy. How practically every Member of Congress

was tied into his policy, and explaining the political facts of the situation

here in the U.S., as he sees them, trying to convince, I presume, the Democrats

that they are going to be all right in the next election ¡f they stick to him

and don't sway on this issue. And the Republicans that if they raise their

voices on this ¡ssue he ¡s going to land on them with both feet. He reiterated

White House Briefing - page 52/25/66

the U.S. will fold up like France did. My question is, Why are they not

convinced of our national will? In What ways have we failed to convince

them of this determination, and what is being done, or can be done, to

convince them?1I

Before Humphrey cou1d answer, President Johnson popped up and

pointing his finger, yel1ed, 111 111 tell you what will convince them--more

of the same 1ike we1ve given them. l' 1 said, "Like the bombing pause?JJ

He said, "For the past 30 days we1ve stepped up bombings, 20,000 casua1ties,1f

and so on and so on, he described the damage that the U.S. is inflicting on

the Viet Cong and the tons of bombs the U.S. is dropping. I then said,

"We1l, Mr. President, if we have been doing this since the conclusion of

the pause, is there any hint or indication that we are, in fact, being

successfu1 in convincing them? 15 this message getting through?" And he

said, "No, there isn 1t. 1I

LBJ said ~hat no man wants to end the war as badly as he does,

because, he said, "Il ve~ ~ lot riding ~ ...!..!." That statement summarizes

the who1e last hour of the briefing. The last hour was devoted not to

details of the conf1ict but rather to a 10ng, rambling, extremely politica1,

statement by the President, showing howeveryone in the world, inc1uding

the Pope, was tied into his po1icy. How practical1y every Member of Congress

was tied into his pol icy, and explaining the pol itical facts of the situation

here in the U.S., as he sees them, trying to convince, presume, the Democrats

that they are 90in9 to be all right in the next election if they stick to hirn

and don1t sway on this issue. And the Republicans that if they raise their

voices on this issue he is going to land on them with both feet. He reiterated

White House Briefing - page 6

2/25/66

of course, that Rusk, McNamara, and Lodge have all been appointed by Kennedy,

and that Ike supported his actions.

At one point, ¡n describing all of the things they attempted to

do, such as, changing the General in South Viet Nam to Gen. Westmoreland,

etc., he defended the present regime and Ky, saying that they have four

goals: (1) To resist the aggression; (2) to wipe out the "ancient enemies";

(3) to have a secure peace, and something else--and that these are all

"laudable" goals. And he said some people don't like Ky--well, we could

dump him like we dumped Diem and the others, but we have nothing better

to take his place.

This is the first time I have heard any official of the U.S.

Government admit that the U.S. Government had played a role ¡n the changes

of government which have taken place in South Viet Nam in the past 5 years.

At one point, LBJ said nice things about Rusk, and the audience

stood and applauded. McNamara received only slight applause. McNamara

was dogmatic in his answers. He said that there was "absolutely no substance

to Hanson Baldwin's article," in answer to a question by Congressman Philbin.

The President pulled out of his pocket a crumpled piece of paper

which was the 196k Congressional resolution. He then proceeded to quote it

practically from memory. He said he had ¡t in his pocket every day since

the resolution was passed. He repeated and repeated various phrases from ¡t,

such as, "support and approve." He said, "That's two words, and they are

both there." He talked about the SEATO Treaty and how the Senators voted

for it; he knew each Senator"s vote and pointed out that he had been absent,

hinting he wasn°t responsible; and how, in summary, practically every Member

I~

White House Briefing - page 62/25/66

of course, that Rusk, McNamara, and Lodge have all been appointed by Kennedy,

and that Ike supported his actions.

At one point, in describing all of the things they attempted to

do, such as, changing the General in South Viet Nam to Gen. Westmoreland,

etc., he defended the present regime and Ky, saying that they have four

goals: (1) To resist the aggression; (2) to wipe out the lIanc ient enemiesll ;

(3) to have a secure peace, and something else--and that these are all

"laudablell goals. And he said some people don1t like Ky--well, we could

dump hirn like we dumped Diem and the others, but we have nothing better

to take his place.

This is the first time I have heard any official of the U.S.

Government admit that the U.S. Government had played a role in the changes

of government which have taken place in South Viet Nam in the past 5 years.

At one point, LBJ said nice things about Rusk, and the audience

stood and applauded. McNamara received only slight applause. McNamara

was dogmatic in his answers. He said that there was Jlabsolutely no substance

to Hanson Baldwin's article,JI in answer to a question by Congressman Philbin.

The President pulled out of his pocket a crumpled piece of paper

which was the 1964 Congressional resolution. He then proceeded to quote it

practically from memory. He said he had it in his pocket every day since

the resolution was passed. He repeated and repeated various phrases from it,

such as, IIsupport and approve. 1I He said, "That's two wo~ds, and they are

both there. 1I He talked about the SEATO Treaty and how the Senators voted

for it; he knew each Senator 8 s vote and pointed out that he had been absent,

hinting he wasnDt responsible; and how, in summary, practically every Member

White House Briefing - page 72/25/66

of Congress was responsible for the commitment that the U.S. faced today,

and that Johnson was not responsible for it, that previous Presidents and

the Congress were responsible for it; and that he, Johnson, is not responsible

for the war and that he is tired of hearing people say that Well, we have to

do something, but I don't like the way he is doing it. He pointed out that

George Kennan had never been in Southeast Asia and Gen. Gavin had been

Ambassador to France. He dismissed them critically. He said that he,

Johnson, is not to blame, that his advisers are doing the job, and they

were appointed by other people. To use a Johnsonian phrase, my impression

of the briefing was to recall the old saying that "A stuck pig squeals,"

and President Johnson was indeed squealing this morning. It is clear to

me that the political situation in the country as of this date, regardless

of what happens next November, is moving in favor of the Republican Party, in

large part because of the situation in Viet Nam; clearly, this is a source

of great concern to President Johnson. His actions as President appear

to be geared, in large part, as a reaction to that political fact which

faces him--and he does not like it.

The last 20 minutes of LBJ's performance were defensive and

emotional, and at points, I felt embarrassment for him.

He repeatedly said, "I want to be able to say I 've tried every-

thing.' Note he didn't say, I've tried everything because I want peace.

He said, I want to be able to say I did. This type of slip, ¡f it was a

slip, is but one of the numerous instances that his comments were phrased

¡n terms of the political situation and where blame would fall and how he

White House Briefing - page 72/25/66

of Congress was responsible for the commitment that the U.S. faced today,

and that Johnson was not responsible for it, that previous Presidents and

the Congress were responsible for it; and that he, Johnson, is not responsible

for the war and that he is tired of hearing people say that Well, we have to

do something, but I don1t 1 ike the way he is doing it. He pointed out that

George Kennan had never been in Southeast Asia and Gen. Gavin had been

Ambassador to France. He dismissed them critically. He said that he,

Johnson, is not to blame, that his advisers are doing the job, and they

were appointed by other people. To use a Johnsonian phrase, my impression

of the briefing was to recall the old saying that IIA st~ck pig squeals,1I

and President Johnson was indeed squeal ing this morning. It is clear to

me that the political situation in the country as of this date, regardless

of what happens next November, is moving in favor of the Republ ican Party, in

large part because of the situation in Viet Nam; clearly, this is a source

of great concern to President Johnson. His actions as President appear

to be geared, in large part, as areaction to that pol itical fact which

faces him--and he does not 1 ike it.

The last 20 minutes of LBJ1s performance were defensive and

emotional, and at points, I felt embarrassment for hirn.

He repeatedly said, "1 want to be able to say I ·ve tried every-

thing. JI Note he didn1t say, I ·ve tried everything because I want peace.

He said, I want to be able to say I did. This type of sl ip, if it was a

slip, is but one of the numerous instances that his comments were phrased

in terms of the political situation and where blame would fall and how he

White House Briefing - page 82/25/66

would defend himself, and how he would attack anyone who attacked him.

He asked 'epeatedly, Where were all the critics and experts when the

commitments were being made?

Throughout the first half of the morning, at least 3 White

House Aides circulated throughout the audience, planting questions.I

personally saw questions planted with Senator Javits, who asked a question

which was carefully pro-Johnson and anti-Kennedy, and with Jack Brooks and

with another Member sitting two rows in front of me.

The President closed the briefing by saying, ''And dont any of

you ever say you have not been briefed." These were his last words. He

pointed out that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense had

spent day after day on the Hill, briefing Congress, and that he needed

them to do their jobs.

Interestingly, the next day Vice President Humphrey declined

to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where he would

have had to submit to cross-examination, rather than simply perform as he

did at the White House under the protection of the President and where he

could respond to planted questions.** Some briefing

**The Vice President met in executive session with the Senate ForeignRe]ations Committee on Wednesday, March 2, 1966.

- -L8X e4

White House Briefing - page 82/25/66

wou1d defend himse1f, and how he wou1d attack anyone who attacked hirn.

He asked repeated1y, Where were all the critics and experts when the

commitments were being made?

Throughout the first half of the morning, at least 3 White

House Aides circu1ated throughout the audience, p1anting questions.

persona11y saw questions planted with Senator Javits, who asked a question

which was carefu11y pro-Johnson and anti-Kennedy, and with Jack Brooks and

with another Member sitting two rows in front of me.

The President c10sed the briefing by saying, "And don't any of

you ever say you have not been briefed. '1 These were his last words. He

pointed out that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense had

spent day after day on the Hi11, briefing Congress, and that he needed

them to do their jobs.

Interesting1y, the next day Vice President Humphrey dec1ined

to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where he wou1d

have had to submit to cross-examination, rather than s'imp1y perform as he

did at the White House under the protection of the President and where he

could respond to planted questions.1~~ Some briefing!

id,The Vice President met in executive session with the Senate ForeignRelations Comrnittee on Wednesday, March 2, 1966.

Jf,s/66

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March lO, 1966

Impressions of Briefing held at The White Houseon February 25, 1966

The President spoke rapidly, extempore for approximately one houri

after earlier diinating briefing supposedly called for purpose of

getting report from Humphrey on S.E. Asian trip.

Johnson terribly intense, emotional--frequently gesticulating--

eaving in stories like one about John Garner, greatest leader of

Democratic Party ever had. But vould come into Cloak Room and say:

Boys, I'm going to pull out of this fightthey're hauling up the

heavy artillery. If you zant to follow me, you're ielcome to.

But Johnson says I zon't pull out. Hanoi is the 1stud-duck" in

whole thing. How do e get through to them that \\le're going to stick.

Well, they've had 30,000 casualties since the first of the year. By

increasing their losses.

He is obviously intolerant of Senate Foreign Relations Committee

critics (Told of buying sleeping pills for Steve Young) Ridiculed

Kennan and Gavin having to leave their postS.

Constantly reverts to 5l4--2 vote on Tonkin Resolution of August l96L

(pulled it out of coat pocke±) says even if repealed--he'd stick because

he is Commander-in-Chief. Indicated only reason for seeking Congressional

support is his recollection that after Korea Truman support vent from 8L%

to 21. "Even a blind hog picks up an acorn once in aihile."

Says Husks and McNamara il1 both remain as Secretaries as long as he

is President (if he can keen them).

Says 'We on put any Viet Cong into office in S.Viet Ham. They've

already got more layei: (i.e. V.0 in Washington than anhere else.

Believes criticism here--encourages Hanoi.

March 10, 1966

Impressions of Briefing held at The White Houseon February 25, 1966

The President spoke rapidly, extempore for approximately one hour

fter earlier daminating briefing supposedly called for purpose of

getting report from Humphrey on S.E. Asian trip.

Johnson terribly intense, emotional--frequently gesticulating--

weaving in stories like one about John Garner, greatest leader of

Democratic party ever had. But 'Would come into Cloak Room and say:

"Boys, I Im going t 0 pull out of this fight - -they Ire hauling up the

heavy artillery. If you \olant to follO\~ me, you Ire welcome -co.

But Johnson says I \olon't pull out. Hanoi is the "stud-duck" in

whole thing. Hml do \oIe get through to them that we 're going to stick.

Well, they've had 30,000 casualties since the first of the year. By

increasing their losses.

He is obviously intolerant of Senate Foreign Relations Committee

critics (Told of buying sleeping pills for Steve Young) Ridiculed

Kennan and Gavin having to leave their post .

Constantly reverts to 514-2 vote on Tonkin Resolution of August 1964

(pulled it out of coat pock~c) says even if repealed--hefd st~ck because

he is Commander-in-Chief. Indicated only reason for seeking Congressional

support is his recollection that after Korea Truman support went from 84%

to 24%. "Even a blind hog picks up an acorn once in awhile."

Says Rusks and McNamara will both remain as Secretaries as long as he

is President (if he can keep them).

Sa;y-s ",>Je wont put any Viet Cong into office in S.Viet Nam. TheJT 've

a lready got more lawyenr (1. e. V. c) in Ylashingt on than anywhere else.

Believes criticism here--encourages Hanoi.

Comparself and trouble he's having with those of Lincoln and

other Presidents.

No supply shortages, says McNamara. Baldwin article cOElpletely

without foundation.

Wheeler said: "No shortages that have 'adversely affected military

operations'

West-moreland has whole series of tactical plans extending far into

future for operations designed to win military victory over V.C.

Johnson: Decision made last summer to send more troops in July 65

to go ahead in Viet Nani.

It was at that time decision had to be made to either augment our

effort in S. Viet Warn or get out.

McNamara: Decision to bomb Haiphong, Hanoi--Mine harbor blow up

P.O.C. etc. is in the future. i.e. vr impression was decision against

such tactics not totally foreclosed.

Level of bombing now (of North) 3 X the level attained just before pause

Humphrey: 'We no longer need to be afraid to speak of victory. The

tide has turned.'

Compare:1 seH and trouble he ts having with those 01' Lincoln and

other Fresidents.

No supply shortages) says McNamara. Bal&~in article campletely

vlithout foundation.

\fueeler said: "No shortages that have t'adversely affected military

operations Il I •

Westmoreland has whole series of tactical plans extending far into

future for operations designed to win militaI~ victory over V.C.

Johnson: Decision made last summer to send more troops in July 65

to go ahead in Viet Ham.

It was at that time decision had to be made to either augment our

effort in S. Viet Nam or get out.

IvIcNamara: Decision to bornb Haiphong) Hanoi--Mine harbar blovl up

F.O.C. etc. is in the future. i.e. My impression was decision against

such tactics not totally foreclosed.

Level of bombing no"l (of North) 3 X the level attained just before pause

Humph:.ey: "He no longer need to be afraid ta speak of victary. The

tide has turned."

2

By Drew PearsonPublicly President Johnson

scored a resounding victoryin the Senate debate on Viet-nam. But below the surface,scars are deep.m':cSome of hismost vigoroussupporters ofthe Great So-iciety programare bitter.

This wasmade ati tooclear at aclosed - doormeeting of'dove" Sena-tors Who had previouslysigned the resolution p r o-posed by Sen. Vance Hartke,(D-lad.), urging peace in Viet-nam. Criticism of the Demo-cratic President by DemocraticSenators at this session wa svitriolic In the extreme. Mr.Jolhnson was called a "desper-ate man," a "wild animal" whowas takIng the country intowar with China.

The meeting of Senate"doves" - all Democrats -took place just one day beforethe Senate was sciheduled tovote on the resolution of Sen.Wayne Morse, (D-Ore.), to re-scind the Bay of Tonkin Reso-lutlon whidh, in the fall of1964, gave Mr. Johnson anoverwhelming endorsement forwhat was then a much smaller

Pearson

The Washington Merry-Go-Round THE WASHINGTON POST Thursday, March 10, 1966 F 13

Democratic 'Doves' vs. Johnsonand less dangerous Vietnamwar.

Morse Stood FirmFirst order of business was

to try to persuade Morse notto proceed with his resolution.Other Senators argued thatthe overwhelming majority ofthe Seinate would line upagainst hiiyi and this would beconsidered a significant defeatfor advocates of peace.

Morse replied that he hadmade commitments and couldnot withdraw his resolution.

It was then proposed thatanother, milder resolution beintroduced, putting the Senateon record against escalatingthe war. Such a resolution, itwas argued, would get morevotes than the more drasticMorse resolution.

Sen. J. William Fulbright(Ark.) was against this strat-egy, 'argued that such a reso-lution would get only 15 or 16votes rand thus would be con-sidered a great Johnson vic-tory.

Emotional CriticismSen. Eugene McCarthy

(Minn.) argued the other way.He maintained that it was bet-ter to get 15 votes than tomake no test at all. McCarthygot quite worked up over thedanger of war.

We've got a wild man In theWhite House, he said, and we'are going to have to treat himas such.

Sen. Albert Gore (Tenn.)was also critically emotional.He described the President asa "desperate man who waslikely to get us into war wit'hChina, and we have got toprevent it. We all like thePresident, but we've got tostop him!"

Fuibright, chairman of theSenate Foreign RelationsCommittee differed with Mc-Carthy, claimed it was bette'rto avoid a showdown whichthe public could point to asa defeat for the "d'oves" anda victory for Mr. Johnson.

Sen. Robert F. Kennedy(N.Y.) agreed that the resolu-tion against escalation of thewar was desirable but was in-clined to side with Fuibrightthat a showing of only 15 or16 votes would not particu-larly impress the public orthe President. Kennedy wascareful to steer clear of anystrong language against thePresident.

'Sen. Stephen Young (Ohio)supported McCarthy's viewthat even 15 or 16 votesagainst the President wouldbe a healthy warning not tolet the war get out of hand.

No Republicans attendedthe dove meeting, thoughseveral were 'n completesympathy. One of these, Sen.George Aike'n (Vt.), expressedhis private view to Demo-cratic Senators that the Presi-dent was headed 'for nuclearwar with China.

Those attending the closed-

door meeting, in addition tothe Senators mentioned above,included Quentin Burdielç (D-ND.), Frank Moss (D-Utah),George McGovern (D-S.D.),Ernest Gruening and E. L.Bartlett, both (D-Alaska), andJoe Clark (D-Pa.).

War Against RhodesiaIt may be denied, but the

British government has beentalking seriously to the StateDepartment about the possibil-'ity of using force against thewhite government of Rhodesia.

Thi's is an unusual stepwhich the Labor governmentof Prime Minister Wilson haslong hoped to avoid. However,economic sanctions againstRhodesia are not working,chiefly b cause of help fromthe white government of SouthAfrica. As 'of today, Prime Min-ister Iran Smith is strongerthan he was before his breakwith London.

FDR Jr. in N.Y. RaceFra'thlin D. Roosevelt Jr.,

third son of the 32d Presidentof the United States, toldmembers of the Senate thisweek that his d'ecision is nowfirm to run for Governor ofNew York.

If he wins, this will meananother big-name Democraticcandidate for President inaddition to Vice PresidentHumphrey and Sen. RobertKennedy.© 1966, Bell-McClure S1'ndicate Inc.

Hechinger Brings New Styleand Quality To Ready To

L11i t U ra

• -

8y Drew Pearson land less dangerous Vietnam Sen. Alberrt GOTe (Tenn.) door meeting, in addition towar. wa!! also critically emotional. the 8enatol1s mentiJoned lIIbO'Ve,

Publidy President Joh11lS0n '" .d d·· Morse Stood Firm He desClr1bed 1Jhe President as mcluded Quentm Burd1ck (D-score a resoun mg VICtOry CI ) CD

. th S t d balt V· t FiJrst orrder of bus'-ess was oll desperate man who was N.D., Frank Moss -Utah),m 'e erna e e' e on 1e - .lJJl illrel t t· .tnam. But below the surface to 1lry to pe~suade Morse .not 0'~ o~d ~se JJnihto wa;:ow

t1th George McG~vern (D-S.D.),

, to proceed Wl11h his resolubon <L, ,aV'e '" 0 Ernest Gruenmg and E. L.scars are dee'?' Other Senatorrs argued that pTevent it. We an like the Bart1ett, both (D-Alaska), andSome ?f the ovelrW!helming mllljol"ity of Presid~nt:, but we've got to Joe Clark (D-Pa.).most V'1gorro the Sooate wOllld line up stop h:im!oopp'ortJers ,agairnst hd:Jin and this would be Fulbriglht, ethairman of the War Against Rhodesiathe Great So- . d" . f Sen at e Foretgn Relations .eiety program considere 'a s~gmflCant de eat Oommittee differed with Mc- ~t. Il,lIay be demed, brut theare ..•.....er for ad'\'ocates of peaee. C th l' d't b tt Bntlsl1 government has been

11.1:V, • aJI' y, C·a;~e 1 was e er . .T ih i s was Morrse replied that he had to av,oid a showdown which talkmg senously to the State

made allJ. t 0° made oommitments laII1d cowld 1ihe public could poonrt: to as ?ep:artm~Il't about the :possibil-cl e a r at a not withocaw bis resolution. a defeat for the "doves" and [ty. of usmg :llorce agamst t~edosed . d 0 0 r 1t was tlhen proposed that a victÜ'ry for Mr. JoIhnson. whlt~ go:rernment of Rhod·es1a.me e tin g of . another, milder resolution be Sen. Robert F. Kennedy ~hils lS a~ unusual step"dove" Sena- l'earson intl'oouced, putting the Senate (N.Y.) agreed that the resolu- Wh1Ch; the ~a:?or go,:ernment'tors ~o had previously on record ag,lIi1nst esoalating tion against escalatio'1l of the 'of Prlffie M1mste~ WI'1son hassigned 1Jhe resolUitiron pro- 1Jhe war. Suoh a 1"esolution, it war was desiralbloe but was in- long ho~ed to aV?1d. Howeyer,posed by Sen. Vanee Hanke, was ar·gued, wQ'UJld get morre clined to side with Fulbright econom,rc sanctlOns aga~nst

(D-1nd.), urging peace in Viet- votes than the more dms'ti{l that a Showing of onlly 15 or R:~tSl~.are :th ~or~ng,nam. Criticism of tlhe Demo- Morse resolution. ' 16 votes would not particu- ~h1 K.t ecause te fS ro~er8lt1c Presidenrt by Democratic Sen J Willitam Fulbritght laJI'ly impress the puiblic or Af,e.w IAe g'Ofvterdnmepn.o M°U:

. Sena·to"" 'at t"",a ·se-........·n wa s .. .... P 'd t K d rlCa. s '0 '0 ay, rrme m-g~... .lll" ""lv (Ark.) was IBJg,ainst this strat- Ulle reS1 en. enne' y was ister l'an Smith is stronger

viltriolic in the eXltr~e. Mr. egy, 'aJI'gued 1Jhat such a ['eso- caJI'eful to steer cleaa:: of ·any tlhan he was before his breakJoIhnson ,:wa~. Calildled'~ dl~s.:~r- lution woul1d get only 15 or 16 sptr~dg~!.:mguagle ,agalDst the with London.ate man, a w anlffia waO volles ,and thus would be eon- reS1 cu... .

was ~king the country iIlltO sidered a great Johnson vic- Sen. Stephen Youn:g (O~lO) FDR Jr. in N.Y. Racei~h C'h' to . supported McCaJI'thy's V1ew

war ~ 'C ma. ry. that even 15 or 16 votas Frarrklin D. Roosevelt Jr.,'I1he m oe e tin g 'Gf Senate E t· I C 01" 0 against the President would third son of the 32d P1"8si'l1ent

"doV'es" - all Democrats - mo lona 1'1 IClsm be a healthy warning not to of the Dnited States, toldtook pl:a.,ce jUlst one day before ~·en. Eu gen e McOarthy let 11he WaJI' get out of hand. members of the Senate tJhisth S t dh d 1 d t (MlrnD) am~ued tihe other way. No Republicans attendJed week that his dectsion i5 now

e ena e was s e u e 0 He mam1Jlli~ned that it was bet- the dove meeting, though firun :to run for Governor oivote on the resolution of Sen. ter to get 15 votas 1JhaJn to sevel'al were in complete New York.Wayne Morse, (D-Ore.), to re- make 1110 test at 8011. McOaJr:thy sympathy. One of these, Sen. If he wins, tlhis will meanseind ilJhe Bay of Tonkin Res<>- got quite W'Ol"ked up OV'e!l" the George Aiken (Vt.), ex:pTessed aJIl!other big-name Democraticlulll.on whidh in tlle fall of dangerr of WlaJI'. his private view to Demo- candidate Tor President - in1964 M J h We've ·got a wild man in the cratie Senators that 1fue Presi- addition to Vice President

, gave. r. 0 OOOD an Wlhite House, he said, and we dent was h,eaded for nuclear Humphrey 'and Sen. Robertove:rWhelmmg endQrsement for we ,gomg to haV'e to treat hirn WIarr with China. Kennedy.what Wlas then a mudh smaUer ,as :sueh. ThQse <9.ttending Ithe elosed- l!l> 1966, Bell.McCluro Syndlcate. Inc.

Democratic 'Doves' VS. Johnson'

.,

11

The Washington Merry-Go-Round THE WASHINGTON POST Thursday, March 10,1966 F13·

Hechinger Brings New Styleand Quality To Ready To

··~~alitu[e

Jiiiile Report.LBJ in the East Room

THE FABLED face-on-facepersuasive power of LyndonB. Johnson, so differentfrom his stilted and uncom-fortable television style, wasturned full force on Con-gress in two glittering per-formances.

These emerged in brief-ings for members of Con-gress, on Feb. 24 and 25, inthe White House East Roomby Vice President HubertI-Iumphrey after his FarEastern tour. Humphreywas nudged out of the spot-light by his chief. On almostevery question asked ofHumphrey, the Presidentpopped up to field it.

Employing light ridiculerather than heavy rhetoric,Mr. Johnson put the Sen-ate's peace bloc in itsplace at the second briefing.

The President delib-erately understated the ef-fect of the peace bloc. Hereferred to the problemsthat Abraham Lincoln hadwith Congress in prosecut-ing the Civil War. The clearimplication: Lincoln had fardeeper problems with hisCongress than Mr. Johnsonis having with his.

THE PRESIDENT thendirectly alluded to Sen. Ste-phen Young of Ohio, apeace Democrat, who re-cently said he wouldn'tsleep well at night so longas Dean Husk was Secretaryof State. The President toldthe Congressmen.

"I went to the drugstorelast night to buy SteveYoung some sleeping pills,because Dean Rusk is goingto be Secretary of State fora long, long time, and Steveought to be sleeping nights."

While dealing in banter-Ing style with the peacebloc, the President wasdeadly serious in taking onthe Capitol Hill hawks whoare demanding stepped-upbombing and general en-largement of the war.

In this fashion, he madeabsolutely clear to his EastRoom audiences the posi-tion he long has enunciatedin his inner circle: Thoughthe American people basi-cally support the effort tocontain communism inSoutheast Asia, they mayover-support that is, de-mand faster and faster mil-itary escalation.

Included at the Feb. 24session 'vas one of the Pres-ident's oldest friends andnow a kader of the hawks:John Stennis of Mississippi,the second and presentchairman of the Senate De-fense Pre -,aredness subcom-mittee. (Sen. Lyndon B.

Johnson was its first chair-man.)

THE COURTLY Stennisvolunteered that he andmany Senators were solidlybehind the President's standin Vietnam. In reply, Mr.Johnson delivered this sub-tle but unmistakable rebuff:

If Stennis were so muchbehind him, asked the Pres-ident, why was his subcom-mittee issuing reports aboutthe inadequacy of U.S. prep-aration for the war? If Sten-nis really were worriedabout the credibility of theU.S. effort, as viewed inHanoi and Peking, hewouldn'tand shouldn'tbecasting doubts about thecountry's ability to continueits war effort, he suggested.

Sen. Strom Thurmond,the Dixiecrat-turned-Repub-lican and superhawk fromSouth Carolina, next criti-cized Mr. Johnson's cautiouswar policy. He suggestedthe U.S. is following a no-win policy in SoutheastAsia.

The President repliedevenly that it vas essentialfor the country to under-stand the unique nature ofthe war. The annihilationof the North Vietnam

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He had not set the boun-dary between North andSouth Vietnam at the 17thparallel, the President wenton, but there it wasandthere it was going to stay.U.S. policy, he told Thur-mond, was to keep Commu-nist aggression on the northsiae of the 17th parallel.

Apart from devastatinghis criics, the Presidentused the techniques thatmade him master of theSenate for nearly a decade:humor, mimicry, drama, pa-thos. Even his critics wereimpressed.

Since those two perform-ances at the White House,Capitol Hill grousing aboutconduct of the Vietnam wareither from left or right'-seems to have dc-escalated.Yet, the President still hasnot presented his case tothe American people.

President Johnson's fearis that the American peoplewill soon demand a danger-ously escalated war, a fearborne out by recent pollsshowing increasing sen-timent for the bombing ofHanoi. To contain this sen-timent, he must substitutethe sort of lively argumentsthat filled the East Roomfor the dry-as-dust script-reading he does on televi-sion. To transfer his mag-netism to the TV is essen-tial to President Johnson'swar policy.

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government is not our goal,much less the destruction ofCommunist China.

He had not set the boun­dary between North andSouth V'ietnam at the 17thparallel, the President wenton, but there it was-andthere it was going to stay.D.S. policy, he to1d Thur­mond, was to keep Commu·nist aggressJJon on the northsi.de of the 17th parallel.

Apart from deva-sta<tinghis criJ:ics, the PresidenJtused the techniques thatmade hirn master of theSenate for near1y a decade:humor, mimicry, drama, pa­thos. Even his critics wereimpressed.

Since those two perform­ances at the White Hous'e,Capito1 Hill grousing aboutcond uct of the Vietnam war-either from 1eft 01' righ1J­seems to have de-esca1ated.Yet, the President still hasnot presented his c'ase tothe American people.

President Johnson's fearis that the American peop1ewill soon demand a danger­ously escalated war, a fearborne out by recent pollsshowing increasing sen·timent for the bombing ofHanoi. To contain this sen­timent, he must substitutethe sort of lively argumentsthat filled the East Roomfor the dry-as-dust script­reacling he does on te1evi·sion. To transfer his mag·netism to the TV is essen·tial to President Johnson'swar policy.

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Johnson was its first chair­man.)

THE CODRTLY Stennisvolunteered that he andmany Senators were solidlybehind the President's standin Vietnam. In Ireply, MI'.Jolhnson delivered this sub­tle but unmistakabl<e rebuf.f:

If Stennis were so muchbehind hiJm, asked the Pres­ident, why was his subcom­mittee issuing reports aboutthe inadequacy of D.S. prep­aration for the war? If Stenonis really were worriedabout the credibility of theD.S. effort, as viewed inHanoi and Peking, hewouldn't-and shouldn't-becasting doubts about thecountry's ability to continueits war effort, he suggesued.

Sen. Strom Thurmond,the Dixiecrat-turned-Repub­lican and superhawk fromSouth Carolilla, nex,t criti­cized MI'. Johnson's cautiouswar policy. He suggestedthe D.S. is following a no­win policy in SoutheastAsia.

The President repliedevenly that it was essentialfor the country to under·stand the unique nature ofthe war. The annihilationof the North Vietnam

.JHsille Report . . . By Rowland Evans and Rohert Novak

LB] in the East RoomTHE FABLED face-on·face

persuasive power of LyndonB. Johnson, so differentfrom his stilteel anel uncom­fol'table television style, wasturned full force on Con·gress in two glittering per­formances.

These emerged in brief­ings for members of Con­gress, on Feb. 24 and 25, inthe White House East Room

. by Vice President HubertHumphrey after his FarEastern tour. Humphreywas nudged out of the spot­light by hls chief. On almostevery question asked ofHumphrey, the PresideIJJtpopped up to field it.

Employing light ridiculerather than heavy rhetoric,MI'. Johnson put the Sen­ate's peace bloc in itsplace at the second briefing.

The President delib-erately understated the ef­fect of the peace bloc. Hereferred to the problemsthM Abraham Lincoln hadwith Congress in prosecut­ing the Civil War. The clearimplication: Lincoln had fardeeper problems with hisCongress than MI'. Johnsonis having with his.

THE PRESIDENT thendirectly alluded to Sen. Ste­phen Young of Ohio, apeace Democrat, who re­cently said he wouldn'tsleep well at night so longas Dean Rusk was Secretaryof State. The President toldthe Congressmen.

"I went to the drugstorelast night to buy SteveYoung some sleeping pills,because Dean Rusk is goingto be Secretary of State fora 10ng, 10ng time, and Steveought to be sleeping nights."

Whi1e dealing in bantel"ing style with the peacebloc, the President wasdeadly serious in taking onthe Capitol Hill hawks whoare demanding stepped-upbombing and general en­largement of the war.

In this fashion, he madeabsolute1y clear to his EastRoom audiences the posi­tion he 10ng has enunciatedin his inner circle: Thoughthe American people basi·cally support the effort tocontaiu communism inSoutheast Asia, they mayover-support -that is, deomand faster and faster mil·itary escalation.

Incluc.:ed at the Feb. 24session ",,ras one of the Pres­ident's ',ldest friends andnow aleader of the hawks:John Stennis of Mississippi,the sec(,nel and presentchairman of the Senate De­fense Pre Jaredness subcom­mittee. (;Sen. Lynclon B.