COVER STORY: The Marine Corps Returns to its Amphibious Roots:Lessons from Exercise BOLD ALLIGATOR 2012

MARINE CORPS CENTER FOR LESSONS LEARNED

M C C L L R E P O R T S :

F E AT U R E D A R T I C L E S A N D L E S S O N S :

R E G U L A R F E AT U R E S :

14 The Most Popular Downloads from the MCCLL WebsiteDocuments in the MCCLL repositories that have been accessed most often tend to highlight topics that Marines and other readers fi nd of particular interest.

15 Briefl yThree short articles are highlighted this month:

▪ An Offi cial Marine Corps Briefi ng for Civilian Audiences,

▪ A Compilation of Offi cial Afghanistan Agree-ments from 2001 to 2011, and

▪ New Functionality for "My Binders" on the MCCLL Websites.

17 Reading Lists and Book ReviewsTwo books on the Commandant's Professional Reading List are featured this month, along with a compilation of essays on the doctrinal experiences of American and British amphibious operations:

▪ Once an Eagle by Anton Myrer, ▪ The Speed of Trust by Steven M. R. Covey, and ▪ Assault from the Sea, edited by Merrill L.

Bartlett.

20 MCCLL Products "in the Pipeline" Several recent, ongoing and planned MCCLL collections are scheduled to result in the publication of MCCLL reports in coming months.

21 Contact Information for MCCLL Program Analysts This roster provides contact information for MCCLL representatives assigned at major Marine Corps and Joint commands and organizations.

3 The Marine Corps Returns to its Amphibious Roots: Lessons from Exercise BOLD ALLIGATOR 2012 (BA-12)This MCCLL report documents the results of interviews conducted with participants in BA-12, the largest amphibious exercise conducted during the past ten years.

5 Security Force Assistance Support to African Nations: Lessons from Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) 12.1This report provides observations and recommen-dations from SPMAGTF 12.1 based on its sixth-month deployment to conduct distributed security force assistance missions with partner nations in Africa.

7 Lessons from a Regimental Combat Team's Afghanistan Deployment A fi rst 100 days after action report (AAR) from Regimental Combat Team 6 (RCT-6) provides lessons from its initial experiences as the command element for ground combat forces operating in northern portions of the Regional Command Southwest area of operations.

8 A Reconnaissance Battalion's Experiences in Afghanistan A fi nal deployment AAR from 3d Reconnaissance Battalion is based on its deployment to perform combat operations, conduct key leader engagements, and provide humanitarian assistance to the local citizens of northern Helmand Province.

9 Withdrawing from Afghanistan A report prepared by a social scientist member of a Human Terrain Team (HTT) with the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force - Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) provides an assessment of the Soviet Union's experiences withdrawing from Afghanistan in 1988/1989.

10 A Decade of War in the Deserts of Iraq and Deserts and Mountains of Afghanistan This Joint and Coalition Operations Analysis (JCOA) report compiles fi ndings, observations and best practices that have been documented during the past decade of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

11 Lessons from Exercise COLD RESPONSE 2012 AARs from U.S. Marine Corps Forces Europe (MARFOREUR) and the 24th Marine Regiment provide lessons from this year's exercise in Norway.

12 Conducting Operations in Mountainous Environments This Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) handbook provides guidance on conducting operations in the challenging climates and terrains associated with mountainous environments.

13 Deactivation of a Marine Corps Artillery Battalion An AAR from 5th Battalion, 10th Marines (5/10) is based on its experiences planning for its own deactivation.

INSIDE THIS ISSUE

Front Cover photo credit: LCpl Robert Walters

Marines from the 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion (AABN) prepare to depart the well deck of the USS Kearsarge (LHD 3) in amphibious assault vehicles during an Exercise BOLD ALLIGATOR 2012 ship-to-shore movement.

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JULY 2012 VOLUME 8, ISSUE 7 3

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The Marine Corps Returns to its Amphibious RootsLESSONS FROM EXERCISE BOLD ALLIGATOR 2012

For more than ten years, the Marine Corps has focused its resources and training on the need to perform counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability operations in the deserts of Iraq and the deserts and mountains of Afghanistan. As the Marine Corps' participation in these confl icts ends, the Commandant has emphasized continually the need to regain the amphibious core competencies that distinguish the Corps and ensure that it does not devolve into another land army. A major milestone occurred in efforts to revitalize Marine Corps' amphibious competencies during a two-week period beginning on 30 January 2012, when Exercise BOLD ALLIGATOR 2012 (BA-12) took place along the coasts of North Carolina and Virginia. This was the largest amphibious exercise conducted during the past ten years, involving more than 20,000 U.S. and coalition personnel operating aboard over twenty-fi ve ships. In addition to U.S. Navy and Marine Corps participants, coalition forces from the United Kingdom, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and six other nations participated, as well as additional forces simulated by the II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Simulation Center at Camp Lejeune, NC. The objectives of BA-12 included the planning and execution of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB)-sized amphibious assault from a sea base. The previous year's exercise, BA-11, had been a strictly synthetic exercise conducted aboard Navy shipping at pier side, with its results then serving as a key input in developing the focus for BA-12's signifi cantly more complex live and synthetic exercise.

In an effort to ensure that all of the key Marine Corps lessons were systematically captured from the complex training environ-ment associated with BA-12, program analysts from the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) interviewed key exercise participants in late February and early March 2012 at Camp Lejeune and Norfok, VA. Interviewees included the commanders and staffs of U.S. Marine

M C C L L R E P O R T S :

Naval integration should be added to the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, and facilities (DOTMLPF) of the Marine Corps. . . Marine Corps planners should not make a single decision without fi rst asking, (1) Will it fi t on the ship? and (2) Is it compatible with the Navy?

Colonel Scott Aiken, Chief of Staff, 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade

Corps Forces Command (MARFORCOM), II MEF, 2d MEB, and major subordinate elements (MSEs).

The results have been documented in a MCCLL report, entitled Amphibious Operations: Exercise BOLD ALLIGATOR 2012; Lessons, Observations and Recommendations from 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade. A complete set of For Offi cial Use Only (FOUO) comments and observations

Photo credit: LCpl R. J. Driver

A tank commander with Delta Company, 2d Tank Battalion, guides a tank onto a landing craft, air cushion at Onslow Beach aboard Camp Lejeune during Exercise

BOLD ALLIGATOR 2012.

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JULY 2012 VOLUME 8, ISSUE 7 4

are included in the MCCLL report. Among the observations releasable in this newsletter are:

▪ Organization and Personnel. During the pre-exercise phase, a number of the most signifi cant challenges involved personnel issues.

▪ Many of these issues resulted from the number of staff personnel who were not available to participate during the exercise planning phase.

▪ Planning. Once the results of BA-11 had helped to establish the level of focus and guidance needed for planning this year's exercise directive, monthly BA-12 planning meetings were scheduled between the MARFORCOM and Fleet Force commands' staffs.

▪ Participants pointed out that complying with the "one-third/two-thirds" guidelines for the planning time allotted for the MEB staff and for its MSEs was particularly challenging.

▪ Training. Monthly professional military education (PME) briefi ngs addressed such topics as command and control (C2), the Navy's composite warfare commander concept, battle studies, the Maritime Prepositioning

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Force (MPF), Military Sealift Command (MSC) shipping, and other important topics of particular relevance for forces participating in the exercise.

▪ The Regimental Landing Team 2 (RLT-2) commander pointed out the need for a building block approach to training for units embarking aboard ship, similar to the training employed in preparing a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) for deployment.

▪ Marine Corps Operations. Exercise participants emphasized that a MEB-level deployment cannot be considered merely the combining of several MEUs. As noted by the G3 Plans Offi cer, 2d MEB, "We should never pass up an opportunity to put Marines on ships. . . We have the MEUs down pretty good, but a MEB-level Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) is not just a MEU times three. It is exponentially more."

▪ In particular, the exercise results emphasized the complexity of command relationships between the ESG, MEB, and Carrier Strike Group (CSG) and their need for continual refi nement.

▪ Blending live and synthetic exercise events proved to be challenging at the tactical and staff levels during execution of the events. The MEB staff addressed this issue by splitting staff responsibilities. One group from the G3 current and future operations sections worked on live events while a second group worked the synthetic exercise play.

▪ The MEB embarkation offi cer indicated that both live and synthetic training provided value, but suggested that there should be a "time separation" between the live and synthetic exercise events.

▪ Interoperability of the communications architectures aboard ship proved to be a challenge, as did the modernization of communications suites in the landing force operations center (LFOC) and other C2 locations.

▪ Coalition Operations. Interoperability issues associated with communications among the participating coalition forces surfaced during the exercise planning phase. Some interoperability challenges were mitigated through the assignment of Marine Corps radio operators and equipment with the coalition partners.

▪ The MEB also assigned liaison offi cers with the Combined Force Maritime Component Command (CFMCC), Combined Force Air Component Command (CFACC), and the Naval Expeditionary Force (NEF) in order to expedite coordination at these levels.

Photo credit: Sgt Rachael Moore

A landing support Marine from Combat Logistics Battalion 26 (CLB-26) coordinates with the vehicle commander of an armored assault vehicle to obtain an accurate account of vehicles and passengers during the exercise.

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During the summer of 2011, Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) 12.1 was formed to conduct distributed security force assistance (SFA) missions with partner nations in several regions of Africa, including the Maghreb (extending across the north and northwest of Africa, minus Egypt), the Trans-Sahel (the biogeographic zone separating the Sahara in the north from the Sudanese savannahs to the south), and the Horn of Africa (the region of northeastern Africa comprising Somalia and adjacent territories). The objective was to establish a forward-deployed force to support the requirements of Marine Corps Forces Africa (MARFORAF), Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAF), Joint Special Operations Task Force - Trans Sahara (JSOTF-TS), Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), and U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). SPMAGTF 12.1 was the fi rst of two rotations of forces sourced from Marine Corps Forces Reserve (MARFORRES) units that were scheduled for deployment during FY 2012. Being a composite unit, the command element (CE) of SPMAGTF 12.1 was formed from the headquarters of 4th Force Reconnaissance Company (FORECON), while the ground combat

element (GCE) was sourced from 3d FORECON and the logistics combat element (LCE) (principally) from 4th Marine Logistics Group (MLG). The aviation combat element (ACE) consisted of a two-plane KC-130T detachment from 4th Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW). Personnel were drawn from MARFORRES units located across the country, while individual augments from the active component rounded out the force. Based on its availability and similarity of mission sets, the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) was designated as the SPMAGTF's higher headquarters and sponsor during pre-deployment training.

In October 2011, SPMAGTF 12.1 deployed to Naval Air Station (NAS) Sigonella, Italy (NASSIG) to begin a six-month deployment ferrying security cooperation teams (SCTs) to and from the African continent to conduct SFA missions with partner nations. This deployment demonstrated the broad utility of a forward postured SPMAGTF that was task organized, trained and equipped for security cooperation missions.

Observations and recommen-dations from this deployment have been documented in a MCCLL report, entitled SPMAGTF 12.1: Security Force Assistance in Support of Marine Forces Africa Theater Security Cooperation Campaign. A complete set of For Offi cial Use Only (FOUO) comments and observations are included in the MCCLL report. Among the observations releasable in this newsletter are: ▪ Organization and Person-

nel. 4th Marine Division was tasked to source the command and ground combat elements for the SPMAGTF. The Division sub-sequently selected 4th FORECON as the core unit due to its organic mission set and demonstrated

SPMAGTF 12.1 deploys task organized security cooperation teams (SCTs) to train company-size partner nation forces (PNF) in tactical and logistics skills and deploys advisory teams to teach, mentor, and advise battalion/brigade-size PNF in . . . combat and stability operations.

Mission Statement for SPMAGTF 12.1

Security Force Assistance Support to African NationsLESSONS FROM SPECIAL PURPOSE MARINE AIR GROUND TASK FORCE 12.1

Photo credit: 1stLt Mark Lazane

Liberian armed forces personnel, trained by Marines from SPMAGTF 12.1, charge to quell a group of protestors during a non-lethal weapons skills' demonstration at Edwin Binyah Kesselly Military Barracks, Liberia.

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MARINE CORPS CENTER FOR LESSONS LEARNED

JULY 2012 VOLUME 8, ISSUE 7 6

capacity for independent distributed operations. ▪ Personnel were eventually drawn from over forty reserve

units, creating signifi cant challenges in the areas of administration, pre-mobilization training, equipment, and other areas.

▪ Due to the relatively small size of the SPMAGTF and the need to organize SCTs that included personnel from the CE, GCE, and LCE, the command structure was subsequently modifi ed to provide a functional mission-specifi c task organization, with the command element and subordinate SCTs comprised of personnel from each of the combat elements.

▪ For subsequent rotations, efforts are underway to further develop the crisis and contingency response capabilities of the SPMAGTF.

▪ Training. The SPMAGTF's phased pre-deployment training program (PTP) included basic and military occupational speciality (MOS) sustainment training, limited mission-specifi c SFA training, and extensive anti-terrorism/force protection (AT/FP) training.

▪ PTP was designed primarily by the unit based on its own mission analysis, as well as higher headquarters guidance and the signifi cant support and advice of the 24th MEU.

▪ The PTP concluded with a mission rehearsal exercise

that combined various aspects of security cooperation into a complex scenario-based evolution, complete with contracted foreign nationals acting as interpreters and partner nation unit commanders.

▪ Sustainment training began shortly after arrival at NASSIG and included training by selected Marines on non-lethal weapons, anti-terrorism, airborne operations, desert survival, and other topics.

▪ Mission Planning. The remote and austere African locations, together with the multiple stakeholders, increased the complexity associated with planning for the SFA and security cooperation missions.

▪ In most cases, the SFA programs of instruction were self-generated by the SPMAGTF using fi eld manuals and training and readiness (T&R) manuals as the baselines.

▪ Pre-deployment site surveys (PDSS) were especially valuable components of mission planning.

▪ Operations. Among the types of missions performed by the SCTs were counter-terrorism training; tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) exchanges to foster interoperability and cooperation; vehicle and equipment maintenance assistance teams; unit training management and mission essential task list (METL) development training; driver training; military decision-making process (MDMP) staff training;

non-lethal weapons training; small unit leadership training; and basic weapons and Marine Corps Martial Art Program (MCMAP) training. ▪ Due to the nature of security

cooperation missions, the SPMAGTF 12.1 interviewees indicated that these missions favor seasoned personnel, especially those with substantive training and experience as instructors. ▪ The available dedicated aviation

assets simplifi ed SFA mission execution. ▪ The command operations center

established by SPMAGTF was able to effectively maintain contact with the deployed SCTs and ensure a common operating picture (COP). ▪ However, achieving communications

interoperability with the partner nations forces was often challenging; tactical communications was generally achieved using host unit organic equipment.

Photo credit: Sgt Rachael Moore

A Marine and a Navy corpsman from SPMAGTF 12 (with assistance from a Coast Guard translator) provide instruction to Mozambican sailors and Marines on the proper application of a tourniquet.

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JULY 2012 VOLUME 8, ISSUE 7 7

In early 2012, Regimental Combat Team 6 (RCT-6) deployed to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 12.1 to begin a year-long deployment as the command element (CE) for ground combat forces operating in northern Helmand and Nimruz Provinces. Although this region had encompassed some of the most kinetic regions in Afghanistan during early 2011, great strides were made later in the year to limit the insurgents' freedom of movement and increase acceptance by the local populace of local and district elements of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). After three months in theater, the RCT-6 Gunner prepared a well-received First 100 Days After Action Report (AAR) that was highlighted in the MCCLL May 2012 Newsletter. This report included numerous best practices for the employment of weapons systems in the kinetic environment of northern Helmand and the proper use of counter-improvised explosive device (IED) systems as part of a total "combined arms package." Since then, MCCLL has received the complete RCT-6 First 100 Days AAR, which incorporates the Gunner's report while furnishing additional information on effective tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) that have been identifi ed and practiced by RCT-6 and its subordinate units during their fi rst months in theater.

The AAR emphasizes the fact that the use of biometrics presents one of the greatest opportunities to achieve an understanding of the demographics of a given area. This is

F E AT U R E D A R T I C L E S A N D L E S S O N S :

Lessons from a Regimental Combat Team's Afghanistan Deployment FIRST 100 DAYS AFTER ACTION REPORT FROM REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM 6

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. . . Overall, we continue to impose a statutory justice system on a population that prefers tribal or community-based justice and confl ict resolution. . . one of the single largest drivers of instability involves land disputes that date back to Durrani's reign some 200+ years ago. The past 30+ years of war and the limited number of legal land titles amplify this driver of instability. . . [RCT-6 recommends] that we . . . continue to leverage and encourage traditional justice and dispute resolution mechanisms for resolving local problems to include land reform. . . and that the GIRoA employ traveling circuit judges . . . to settle disputes outside the district centers and the provincial capital.

From the RCT-6 First 100 Days AAR

particularly true of the human terrain encountered in rural Helmand. The AAR identifi es a number of tools and resources available that can assist in focusing biometrics collection efforts based on the population patterns and density of reporting.

Prior to its deployment, the RCT made a conscious decision to limit the number of working groups that had previously tended to proliferate at the battalion level and above. These working groups had often become the de facto method for driving staff coordination. Instead, the RCT elected to ensure staff integration through the use of traditional staff roles and adherence to doctrine. This approach, together with efforts to limit the number and duration of staff meetings, proved to be effective. The AAR recommends that these approaches be considered for future RCT and battalion deployments.

Readers are encouraged to review the entire AAR for numerous recommendations organized by the warfi ghting func-tions of maneuver, intelligence, fi res, logistics, command and control, anti-terrorism/force protection and special staff functions.

Photo credit: LCpl Mark Garcia

Marines from 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, RCT-6, together with their Afghan National Army (ANA) counterparts,

conduct a partnered security patrol. The battalion emphasize the use of partnered operations to help ensure

that the ANA would be capable of providing effective security in northern Helmand following the drawdown.

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Beginning in June 2011, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion deployed to begin conducting combat operations, key leader engagements, and humanitarian assistance (HA) operations in northern Helmand Province. Following completion of its deployment, the battalion has prepared an informative and actionable OEF 11.1 Deployment After Action Report (AAR) with many recommendations for follow-on units.

During this deployment, the battalion validated that reconnaissance units can be force multipliers in counterinsurgency environments, particularly in areas that have not had a persistent coalition or host nation military presence. Reconnaissance companies can provide valuable reports on the atmospherics of these areas, perform human terrain mapping (through biometrics collections that assist in obtaining general information on the local

populace), and make recommendations on the appropriate level of government support for the local citizenry. In addition, the battalion found that battle tracking of non-kinetic events is as important as that of kinetic incidents. Through analysis of non-kinetic events, units can often determine the effectiveness of their information operations (IO) campaigns.

During a portion of its deployment, the battalion was partnered with the reconnaissance Tolay of the 4th Combat Service Support Kandak. This partnership involved providing the Tolay with training on counter-improvised explosive device (IED) techniques, as well as on basic tactics. The battalion's objective was to "work itself out of a job" by helping the Afghan National Army (ANA) to become profi cient enough to conduct independent operations. The AAR points out that given the right circumstances, the transition to ANA-led operations can take place relatively quickly. Units need to be willing to take additional risk, by having the ANA take the lead on mission execution and by ensuring that the number of ANA soldiers outnumber Marines on the mission. Risk can be

partially mitigated by having ANA-led patrols continue to include participation by a Marine team leader and other key individuals.

Forging personal relationships with the ANA leadership during the early months of the deployment paid dividends throughout the subsequent months. For example, having the platoon commanders and battalion staff members eat meals with their ANA counterparts a few days a week led to signifi cant increases in ANA productivity and willingness to support Marine operations. In addition, these visits served to increase the prestige of the Tolay leaders among their own men, thus making them more effective. The AAR recommends that the battalion staff and company and platoon leaders spend as much time as possible with their counterparts in order to build the trust necessary for successful relationships.

A Reconnaissance Battalion's Experiences in AfghanistanPOST-DEPLOYMENT AFTER ACTION REPORT FROM 3D RECON BATTALION

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Photo credit: SSgt Ryan Smith

Marines from 3d Reconnaissance Battalion take up positions overlooking a major road while on patrol outside of Patrol Base Transformer in the Upper Sangin Valley.

Photo credit: SSgt Ryan Smith

An Afghan National Army (ANA) soldier ties an Afghanistan fl ag on

an electrical power pole as a symbol of nationalism during Operation

Sing Sing, a partnered operation in the Upper Sangin Valley with 3d

Reconnaissance Battalion.

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As the Marine Corps, other U.S. military services, and coalition partner nations continue to draw down their forces from Afghanistan and prepare for the turn-over of security responsibilities to the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF), a review of the experiences and lessons learned of a nation that attempted its own "responsible" withdrawal from Afghanistan almost twenty-three years ago seems especially appropriate. This is the objective of a report prepared by a social scientist member of the Human Terrain Team (HTT) assigned to the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force - Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A). The report, entitled Transfer of Authority: The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan, highlights actions taken by the Soviet Union to ensure that the Soviet-backed Afghanistan government would be able to

govern effectively and garner the support of the local populace following the Soviet withdrawal, as well as actions taken to position the Afghan National Army (ANA) to be able to provide effective security.

Among the political actions initiated by the Soviets was a name change for the ruling political party from the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan to the Homeland Party and a change in the nation's name from the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan to the Republic of Afghanistan. Additional seats in the government were allotted to ethnic minorities, seats in parliament were specifi cally reserved for opposition parties, a campaign was initiated against government corruption and bribery, and numerous other actions were taken to help ensure effective governance. Obviously, events did not transpire as envisioned by the Soviet leadership on either the political or military fronts. The report attempts to highlight elements of the Soviet strategy that

worked well and those that did not. An enumeration of lessons that the U.S. and Afghanistan governments should learn from the Soviet's withdrawal strategy is summarized in the report, along with observations for U.S. military forces to keep in mind during the transition period.

Among the key points emphasized in the HTT report is the extremely important role of strong, charismatic commanders in the Afghan military. In the Afghan culture, ANSF commanders, particularly those at the company and battalion levels, should have strong personal qualities, demonstrate an understanding of the needs of their men, and focus efforts on ensuring those needs are met. Even though there has been noticeable improvement in the capabilities of ANSF commanders in some localities, it is considered likely that this requirement will be particularly diffi cult to satisfy in the time frame targeted for the coalition withdrawal and the turnover of security responsibilities to Afghan forces.

Withdrawing from AfghanistanLESSONS FROM THE SOVIET UNION'S AFGHANISTAN EXPERIENCE

Afghan soldiers may be trained to perfection, but will not fi ght without motivation... which varies depending on ethnicity... For Pashtuns, the motivation could be the strict restrictions imposed by the Taliban on education, social life, music, television, etc... Continuous and active [efforts should be focused] on strengthening cultural cohesion and patriotic unity of ethnically diverse units. ("We are all the sons of Afghanistan!") ...[The report points out] the potential relevance of the U.S. military's experiences in racially integrating the U.S. armed forces.

From The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan

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Photo credit: Cpl Meredith Brown

Among the instructors at the Joint Sustainment Academy Southwest (JSAS) aboard Camp Leatherneck is an Afghan National Army (ANA) soldier (back row, second

from right) who had fought against the Soviet Army when it invaded in 1979, was later captured by the Soviets, eventually escaped, and then fl ed to Pakistan. In

2006, he joined the ANA and was later accepted as an instructor at the JSAS.

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JULY 2012 VOLUME 8, ISSUE 7 10

The experiences of Marine Corps forces, as well as those of the other U.S. military services and coalition partners, during the past decade of major combat/counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, stability operations, and training mis-sions in Iraq and Afghanistan have the potential to provide a wealth of lessons that can inform DoD plans, operations and training for many years to come. The ongoing drawdown of U.S. and coalition forces from Afghanistan is a signifi cant milestone that is serving as an impetus to capture and document these lessons in a systematic manner and ensure that they are not forgotten in the midst of current efforts to reorient DoD plans and operations in support of other priorities. In an effort to ensure that these lessons are not lost, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has tasked the joint community to "make sure we actually learn the lessons from the last decade of war."

An initial effort by the Joint and Coalition Operations Analysis (JCOA) Division to respond to this tasking is now available in Volume I of a report, entitled Decade of War: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations, which compiles fi ndings, observations and best practices from 46 studies that were conducted from 2003 to the present. In addition to these source documents, the JCOA analysis was further refi ned by subject matter experts during a week-long "Decade of War" conference held in

May 2012. In addition to operations in Iraq

and Afghanistan, these studies also included lessons from COIN operations in the Philippines, humanitarian assistance efforts in Pakistan, Haiti, and the U.S., and emerging regional and global threats. The JCOA report organizes lessons from the past decade into eleven strategic themes that were identifi ed during the course of the study: (1) Understanding the Environment, (2) Conventional Warfare Paradigm, (3) Battle for the Narrative, (4) Transitions, (5), Adaptation, (6) Special Operations Forces and General Purpose Forces Integration, (7) Interagency Coordination, (8) Coalition Operations, (9) Host Nation Partnering, (10), State Use of Surrogates and Proxies, and (11) Super-empowered Threats.

JCOA makes it clear that this report is only the initial step in ensuring that critical observations become

"lessons learned" and that fi ndings are integrated into "a continuous joint force development cycle that will serve as an enabler to building a more responsive, versatile, and affordable force."

A Decade of War in the Deserts of Iraq and Deserts and Mountains of AfghanistanWHAT HAVE WE LEARNED FROM THESE YEARS OF CONFLICT?

Over the past ten years of military operations, adver-saries of the U.S. realized that physical victory on the battlefi eld was not the only way to meet their overall objectives. By infl uencing perceptions on a local or global scale, they could advance their interests. The U.S. also had interests in shaping perceptions, and this resulted in a competition in the information domain . . . [however, the U.S.] was often ineffective in applying and aligning the narrative to goals and desired end states. . .

From Lessons on "Battle for the Narrative"

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Photo credit: Petty Offi cer 3rd Class Monique La Rouche

A Marine instructor provides improvised explosive device (IED) recognition training to Marines from 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (1/7) during the Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSO&I) course at Camp Leatherneck. This

same course is taught to Marines, special operations forces (SOF), Afghan soldiers, and troops from other coalition nations.

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Since 1990, six caves and two storage facilities in central Norway have provided operational support for the Norway Air-Landed Marine Expeditionary Brigade (NALMEB). Although these caves are remnants of U.S. "Cold War" assets, they are now components of the Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway (MCPP-N). In 2004, the NALMEB was redirected to support security cooperation engagements and humanitarian assistance efforts across multiple theaters, using resources from the caves that included motor transport equipment, arsenal equipment and medical supplies. In 2011, equipment from the MCPP-N was pulled to provide assistance to Turkey following that year's earthquake and, previously, in 2010 to furnish support to Russia in fi ghting major forest fi res. In addition, a small amount of equipment is pulled from these caves to support each iteration of Exercise COLD RESPONSE, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) exercise conducted bi-anually in Norway.

This year's exercise took place in March 2012 and included participation by fi fteen nations. The 24th Marine Regiment was tasked to contribute a rifl e company (from 3d Battalion, 24th Marines (3/24)) and to provide a command element (CE)

from the Headquarters Company. The exercise consisted of a week of pre-fi nal exercise training and a week-long fi nal exercise (FINEX). For participating units, each Exercise COLD RESPONSE provides an excellent opportunity for training in cold weather operations, amphibious operations, and small unit offense and defense, all in a multinational environment.

Following this year's exercise, MCCLL received two after action reports (AARs) that provide observations and recommendations based on the experiences of the participants: a U.S. Marine Corps Forces Europe (MARFOREUR) AAR and 24th Marine Regiment AAR. The key learning points from the MARFOREUR AAR emphasize the importance of host nation liaison and coordination, the development and dissemination of logistics movement plans, fi scal planning and responsibilities, and force protection. The 24th Marines' AAR addresses challenges associated with exercise planning and preparations, cold weather training, and a number of logistics and communications challenges faced during the exercise.

Lessons from Exercise COLD RESPONSE 2012 AFTER ACTION REPORTS FROM U.S. MARINE CORPS FORCES, EUROPE AND 24TH MARINE REGIMENT

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Photo credit: LCpl Marcin Platek

Marines from 3d Battalion, 24th Marines (3/24) prepare to debark from a Dutch landing craft utility (LCU) in Norway

that had carried them from Her Netherlands Majesty's Ship Rotterdam during Exercise COLD RESPONSE 2012.

... the training available both at the Allied Training Center and as part of COLD RESPONSE is not only invaluable, but simply cannot be replicated at any other location or venue. It is a common adage in the infantry community that "if you can survive and fi ght in the cold, you can survive and fi ght anywhere." . . . In addition to the cold weather training, the opportunity to combine cold weather operations with amphibious operations is simply unparalleled and exponentially valuable to the exercise unit and the command element. . . An additional value to participation in COLD RESPONSE that cannot be overlooked is strategic engagement . . . among our NATO allies, the relationships at the military-to-military levels are incredibly strong and viable. . . Our ability to operate seamlessly, cooperatively and enthusiastically with them, as they do with us, has long-term strategic implications for the U.S. . .

From the 24th Marine Regiment AAR for Exercise COLD RESPONSE

MARINE CORPS CENTER FOR LESSONS LEARNED

JULY 2012 VOLUME 8, ISSUE 7 12

Although Marine Corps forces have lately been focused on operations in the deserts of southwestern Afghanistan, there have been many occasions in which Marines have been required to conduct combat or humanitarian operations in the challenging climates and terrains associated with mountainous environments. Earlier in the decade-long confl ict in Afghanistan, Marines regularly conducted combat operations and performed training missions in the mountains of eastern Afghanistan. The establishment of the Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center (MCMWTC) at Bridgeport, CA, in 1951 is testimony to the importance that the Marine Corps has placed for over fi fty years in the need for focused training under mountainous and cold-weather conditions. In addition, as noted in the previous article on Exercise COLD RESPONSE 2012, the Marine Corps regularly trains in the winter snows of Norway in an effort to ensure that Marines are conditioned to these extreme environments and have confi dence in their ability to operate in them.

A recent update to the Soldiers' Guide to Mountain Warfare handbook prepared by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) in collaboration with the Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) documents best practices identifi ed by U.S. forces operating during the past ten years in the mountains of Afghanistan. The information in the handbook incorporates the fi rst-hand observations of operational advisers from (or attached to) the AWG, as well as inputs from the Army Mountain Warfare School, Ranger Training Brigade, and Northern Warfare Training Center.

Although movements in mountainous terrain can be accomplished either dismounted or mounted (via helicopters, pack animals, or motorized vehicles), ultimately Marines and Soldiers will need to dismount and move by foot to many locations. By maintaining the high ground in the mountains, military forces derive their "strength, balance, and freedom of action through the effective use of terrain." The individual service member "should understand the terrain and principles that may mean the difference between success and failure during complex mountain operations. Skills honed and practiced . . . in realistic rehearsals provide the foundation for conducting any operation at altitude where the environmental elements are as much the enemy as are the opposing forces." Although seizing and maintaining the high ground may be critical, other factors should also be considered, with weather often being a major concern. Flexibility is an essential attribute in conducting operations in the mountains.

Conducting Operations in Mountainous EnvironmentsA NEW HANDBOOK FROM THE CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

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. . . Mountains produce the effect of canalization because of the steep terrain and watercourses commonly found there. When properly evaluated, the canalized areas can be exploited by our enemies and by U.S. forces. Mountainous terrain stretches the limits of armies and individuals not adequately prepared to fi ght in and meet its demands. U.S. forces must anticipate, understand, and adapt to these physical demands in order to combat the challenges of fi ghting in areas where our technological supremacy can be negated by even the most crude and non-technical enemy actions. Severe weather that restricts mountain operations is just one example of an uncontrollable element that can eliminate the use of [these] assets . . .

Introduction to Soldiers' Guide to Mountain Warfare

Photo credit: LCpl Marcin Platek

Marines from 3d Battalion, 24th Marines (3/24) hike down a mountain in snowshoes at the Allied Training Center in Norway during Exercise COLD

RESPONSE 2012.

MARINE CORPS CENTER FOR LESSONS LEARNED

JULY 2012 VOLUME 8, ISSUE 7 13

One of the recommendations contained in the Report of the 2010 Force Readiness Review Group called for the deactivation of two Marine Corps artillery battalions as one of the means for reducing the Corps' personnel strength and refi ning "the organization, posture and capabilities required of America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness in a post-Afghanistan security environment." As a result, one artillery battalion was subsequently identifi ed for deactivation in FY 2012; on 1 June, 5th Battalion, 10th Marines (5/10), with its four fi ring batteries and headquarters battery, was deactivated at a ceremony at Camp Lejeune, NC. In an effort to document lessons that the battalion learned during this process, 5/10 has prepared a very insightful After Action Report (AAR) based on its own deactivation as a planning guide for future such occurrences.

In addition to including many recommendations concerning the need to ensure that the affected Marines are taken care of (see the quote from the AAR to the right), 5/10 emphasizes the importance of maintaining rigid accountability of equipment prior to the beginning of the equipment divestiture process. The commander must "thoughtfully implement accountability measures that are much more rigid than under normal business-as-usual operating circumstances."

In addition to personnel movements and equipment divestment, other planning requirements include facilities turnover, classifi ed materials/storage turnover, SL-3/consumables collection and disposal, administrative ac-

counts deactivation, and supply, maintenance, and fi scal account clearance and deactivation. Plan-ning should begin a year prior to the deactivation data, with weekly in-progress review (IPR) meetings held with the principal staff members, commanders from each subordinate unit, and commodity representatives from the logistics section to review actions completed and pending.

The AAR emphasizes the need for higher headquarters to take an active, visible role in the management of the equipment transfer process. This is particularly important in ensuring that the conditions and standards of equipment transfers do not "leave room for interpretation" by receiving units. Higher headquarters needs to remain engaged during the entire process from initial coordination meetings to the fi nal transfer.

Deactivation of a Marine Corps Artillery BattalionAFTER ACTION REPORT FROM 5TH BATTALION, 10TH MARINES

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Photo credit: Senior Airman Courtney Witt

The 5th Battalion, 10th Marines (5/10) color guard present the unit colors before a static display of three M777A2 howitzer cannons during the deactivation

ceremony for the battalion on 1 June 2012.

. . . The most important aspect of a unit's deactivation is ensuring its Marines and Sailors are not unfairly penalized by the institutional requirement to deactivate the battalion. This can be likened to "never, under any circumstance, leave a Marine behind." The transfer of personnel has, and must, drive the timing of the unit's deactivation. A number of personnel in the battalion will undergo a permanent change of station (PCS) during deactivation, and will progress along a normal career path. However, the majority of personnel will not meet time-on-station requirements and, therefore, will require permanent change of assignment (PCA) orders. It is the PCA population that must be carefully planned for so as to prevent "pooling" at their next command . . .

From the 5/10 Deactivation AAR

MARINE CORPS CENTER FOR LESSONS LEARNED

JULY 2012 VOLUME 8, ISSUE 7 14

Many of the documents high-lighted in MCCLL monthly newsletters and weekly new data rollups are downloaded every month from the MCCLL NIPR and SIPR websites. These include MCCLL reports and “quick looks,” Marine Corps unit after action reports (AARs), recent doctrinal publications, briefi ngs on a wide range of topics, and many other source documents with valuable lessons learned. In an effort to inform readers concerning the products that other Marines, civilian Marines, and contractors have found of interest, we include in each monthly newsletter a list of documents that have been accessed and downloaded most often during the previous month.

During June 2012, the docu-ments listed in the table to the right were most frequently accessed.

This diverse collection of documents includes three MCCLL reports (including a recent trends report), the fi nal report from Exercise BOLD ALLIGATOR, recent AARs from three Marine Corps units, a hot wash briefi ng from the II Marine Expeditionary Force MEFEX-12, a Marine Expeditionary Unit Operational Advisory Group (OAG) 12-1 briefi ng, and the MCCLL June 2012 Newsletter.

These documents were down-loaded most often by offi cers in grades from O-2 to O-6, NCOs in grades from E-5 to E-8, DoD civilians in grades from GS-11 to GS-13, and DoD contractors.

There continue to be a signifi cant number of new registrations on the MCCLL website each month, with 576 new registrants signing up in June, compared with 535 in May.

The Most Popular DownloadsFROM THE MCCLL WEBSITE

T O P T E N D O W N L O A D S F R O M T H E M C C L L W E B S I T E , JUNE 2012

1. Trends in Ground Combat Element Lessons and Observations (MCCLL)

2. MV-22 "Osprey" Operations in OEF (MCCLL)

3. Exercise BOLD ALLIGATOR Final Report (U.S. Fleet Forces Command & U.S. Marine Corps Forces Command)

4. 5th Battalion, 10th Marines (5/10) Deactivation After Action Report (AAR)

5. Regimental Combat Team 6 (RCT-6) First 100 Days AAR

6. Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) 12.2 Activation and Pre-deployment Training AAR

7. Regimental Combat Team 8 (RCT-8) in OEF (MCCLL)

8. II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) MEFEX-12 Hot Wash Briefi ng

9. June 2012 Newsletter (MCCLL)

10. Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Operational Advisory Group (OAG) 12-1 Briefi ng

R E G U L A R F E AT U R E S :

Photo credit: Senior Airman Jonathan Garcia

A Marine non-lethal weapons instructor from SPMAGTF 12.2 provides instruction to Congolese service members on the use of a magnesium spike tire-defl ation device aboard High-Speed Vessel Swift (HSV 2) during Africa Partnership Station 2012.

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MARINE CORPS CENTER FOR LESSONS LEARNED

JULY 2012 VOLUME 8, ISSUE 7 15

▪ We will keep faith with our Marines, our Sailors and our families.

A new version of this briefi ng is scheduled to be issued approximately every three months in order to provide updates to the current operations section. As these updated versions are published, they will be included in the MCCLL database.

In recognition of the fact that relevant stakeholders with varying interests in Afghanistan may require ready access to the major, offi cial texts of Afghanistan agreements, the Civil Military Fusion Centre (CFC) has prepared a compilation of Afghanistan Agreements: Offi cial Texts from 2001 to 2011. This document eliminates the need for interested parties having to search through a myriad of websites and fi les to fi nd these offi cial documents. All of the agreements included in this compilation have been prepared following international conferences whose agendas focused solely on Afghanistan and involved participation at the head of state and government levels. The conference agreements were all endorsed (or agreed to, although not necessarily ratifi ed in a formal sense) by a wide number of nations and/or organizations. The agreements in this compilation are also broad in nature; some agreements that were more narrowly focused on economic or legal matters are not included in the compilation.

The texts of the following agreements are furnished in the CFC report:

▪ The Bonn Agreement from the First International Bonn Conference on Afghanistan, December 2001

▪ The Co-Chairs' Summary of the Conclusions of the Tokyo Conference from the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan, January 2002.

▪ The Berlin Declaration from the International Conference on Afghanistan, April 2004.

▪ The Afghanistan Compact from the International Conference on Afghanistan in London, January 2006.

▪ The Declaration of the International Conference in Support of Afghanistan in Paris, June 2008.

▪ The London Conference Communiqué from the

In an effort to provide Marine Corps commands, units and organizations with an offi cial briefi ng that can be given to civilian audiences, Headquarters, Marine Corps has prepared America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness to serve this purpose. This unclassifi ed, publicly-releasable briefi ng is designed to provide a brief history of the Marine Corps, its capabilities, modernization efforts, and current operations, as well as to identify the priorities articulated by the Commandant of the Marine Corps. These current priorities are:

▪ We will continue to provide the best trained and equipped Marine units to Afghanistan. This will not change. This remains our top priority!

▪ We will rebalance our Corps, posture it for the future and aggressively experiment with and implement new capabilities and organizations.

▪ We will better educate and train our Marines to succeed in distributed operations and increasingly complex environments.

Briefly:

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Photo credit: LCpl Sarah Wolff

Marine wives are given an opportunity to fi re M4s during "Mary Mun Day" at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS), Camp Pendleton. This was a spousal appreciation event designed to provide information on the mission and organization of the MCAS to spouse's and guests in order to help ensure a more resilient family. Keeping faith with the families of Marines is one of the Commandant's top priorities.

AN OFFICIAL MARINE CORPS BRIEFING FOR CIVILIAN AUDIENCES

A COMPILATION OF OFFICIAL AFGHANISTAN AGREEMENTS FROM 2001 TO 2011

MARINE CORPS CENTER FOR LESSONS LEARNED

JULY 2012 VOLUME 8, ISSUE 7 16

London Conference on Afghan Leadership, Regional Cooperation, and International Partnership, January 2010.

▪ The Kabul Conference Communiqué from the Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan, July 2010.

▪ The Bonn Conference Communiqué from the Second International Bonn Conference on Afghanistan, December 2011.

Users of the MCCLL NIPR and SIPR websites may have

noticed that the functionality of the My Binders Link on the

home page was revised signifi cantly this past month. Instead

of facing a daunting list of binders on every conceivable

topic that various individuals have created over the past

six years for their own unique purposes, you will see only

binders that you have created. In effect, the page has been

transformed into your own personal workspace that is not

accessible to any other MCCLL website user. You are able to

create private binders that collect documents and lessons

on a particular topic from the MCCLL database that you

have identifi ed during MCCLL searches to support your own

distinct requirements. Although all of the binders that you

create are "private," you can provide the link to other users,

who will then be able to copy the binder, essentially creating

their own private binder that they can revise as they wish.

The new binder functionality allows you to sort your

list of binders by Binder ID, Binder Title, or Update Date.

In addition, you can export the list of binders to an Excel

spreadsheet.

Once inside one of your binders (see the graphic below),

you can sort the list of documents and lessons by Record

ID, Record Title, Type of Document/Lesson (i.e., MCCLL

report, after action report (AAR), briefi ng, interview, etc.),

Campaign/Operation/Exercise, and Document Date. You

can also export this list of records to an Excel spreadsheet.

MCCLL has prepared a Binders' Help Document that is

viewable on the My Binders page as an aid in helping explain

the binder functionality, including the processes for adding

records to a binder, viewing the records, and sharing your

binders with other users.

MCCLL is very interested in receiving feedback on the

new binder functionality. Please submit your feedback

(positive and negative) to us so that we can continue to

enhance this capability in keeping with the needs of our

user community.

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NEW FUNCTIONALITY FOR "MY BINDERS" ON THE MCCLL WEBSITES

MARINE CORPS CENTER FOR LESSONS LEARNED

JULY 2012 VOLUME 8, ISSUE 7 17

In July 2011, the Commandant’s Professional Reading List was revised by a review panel established by General James F. Amos to ensure that the list continues to be relevant and provides Marines with a variety of resources to broaden their perspectives and help ensure that they benefi t from the experiences of others. The list continues to highlight First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps by LtGen Victor H. Krulak, USMC (Ret), as the Commandant’s “choice book” to be read by all Marines. In addition, Marines are tasked to read a minimum of one book from the list for their grade each year. The CMC list, as well as other reading lists (such as those prepared by I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) and the Director of Intelligence), are highlighted on the Marine Corps University (MCU) website, along with discussion guides and other resources.

This month we feature three books: ▪ Once an Eagle by Anton Myrer, on the

Commandant’s list for Major and Chief Warrant Offi cer 5,

▪ The Speed of Trust by Stephen M. R. Covey, on the Commandant’s list for Staff Sergeant, 2nd Lieutenant, Warrant Offi cer, and Chief Warrant Offi cer 2 and

▪ Assault from the Sea, a book of essays, edited by Merrill L. Bartlett, that provides several different viewpoints on the doctrinal experiences of American and British amphibious operations.

[In 1996], the Army War College Foundation Press . . . re-printed the book some have called "America's War and Peace." Anton Myrer's Once an Eagle was fi rst published in 1968 to wide critical acclaim. When it appeared as a 12-hour television mini-series in the late 1970s, it returned to the New York Times best seller list and reached "Number 1." The book has been published in 19 languages.

Once an Eagle is one of the most important military novels ever written. In its stark and realistic descriptions of men in combat it ranks with All Quiet on the Western Front and The

Red Badge of Courage. In its penetrating analysis of the human and technical challenges and the moral dilemmas of leadership and command, it is a fi tting companion to Herman Wouk's The Caine Mutiny and C.S. Forester's The General.

Myrer's book is the story of Sam Damon, a Nebraska farm boy who wanted to go to West Point, but who did not have the political connections that

were necessary in the early years of the century to gain an appointment. Damon enlisted in the regular Army and served in the Mexican border operation of 1916. Two years later, he was an infantry squad leader in France, where he earned the Medal of Honor and a battlefi eld commission.

Damon fi nished World War I as a major, but he had to revert to a fi rst lieutenant to remain in the post-war Army. Damon's career as a company-grade offi cer then drags through the long and lean inter-war years, from post to dreary post in the American west, and to the overseas bases like the Canal Zone and the Philippines. Throughout this period of the book, Myrer paints a sharp portrait of the Depression-era U.S. Army and the often degrading conditions endured by the Marshalls, the Eisenhowers, the Pattons, and the Bradleys as they relentlessly honed their professional skills in preparation for the next war they knew would come all too soon.

Throughout Damon's career he was overshadowed by another offi cer, Courtney Massengale, the epitome of the ambitious, poised, and polished staff offi cer -- but without Damon's leadership skills or combat experience. Damon, meanwhile, was continually dogged by his origins as a "Mustang." In an era when enlisted soldiers were considered little more than unskilled laborers, Damon resolutely defended them and their interests.

His critics, Massengale foremost among them, dismissed Damon as never having made the psychological shift from an NCO to an offi cer.

At the start of World War II, Damon goes to the southwest Pacifi c, where his competence in combat eventually leads to divisional command. Near the end of the war, Damon is once more confronted by Massengale, who this time is his corps commander.

At the story's climax, Damon's division is decimated

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ONCE AN EAGLE ANTON MYRER (HARPERTORCH, 2001 (original publication in 1968))

Reading Lists and Book Reviews

MARINE CORPS CENTER FOR LESSONS LEARNED

JULY 2012 VOLUME 8, ISSUE 7 18

(Although the following review of Speed of Trust is not oriented towards military applications, it points out the importance of "trust" in all effective organizations.)

From inspiring trust by beginning with yourself, to utilizing consistent behavior, to creating alignment (a tough one for any organization) this book provides a 380-page road-map on

building and infusing trust in you and those around you (personal relationships, colleagues, teams, families, society). Just like "Social Styles" allows you to evaluate the particular style of an individual, the "Smart Trust (TM) Matrix" allows you to determine to what degree one’s present tendencies add to, or reduce, one’s ability to extend trust

How the Results are Deter-mined:

Covey begins with how trust is critical to results. The traditional business formal says that strategy multiplied by execution equals results:

S * E = R.However, the hidden variable (trust) in this formula can

either discount the output, or greatly increase it:(S * E) T = R.But this becomes clear because an organization can have

a great strategy and the ability to execute, but lack of trust will kill the results. Another view is that an organization may be obtaining results that are meeting benchmarks, but the lack of trust may not allow their business to:

• Scale as they attempt to grow, • Introduce new offerings to the marketplace, • Obtain more business from existing customers, or• Reduce the speed at which you wish to grow. Five Waves of Trust: Covey calls them the 5 Waves of Trust, but . . . the fourth

and fi fth [seem superfl uous]. The fourth is the result of the fi rst three being done properly and the fi fth is simply a contribution. But here is how they are broken down:

1. Self Trust: It’s about building the 4 Cores of Credibility that make you believable, both to oneself and others.

in a Japanese counter attack after the corps commander prematurely commits the division's reserve elsewhere for no sound operational purpose other than the glory of capturing a Japanese-held city intact. Damon himself survives the action, but he is left with the moral conundrum of how -- or even whether -- to expose the powerful and politically connected Massengale.

The book easily could have ended with the conclusion of World War II; but in a short fi nal section Myrer extends the story by taking Damon -- and Massengale -- up to the early years of Vietnam. Recalled from retirement as a lieutenant general in 1962, Damon is sent on a fact-fi nding mission to Vietnam -- called Khotiane in the book. Damon once more faces Massengale, who is now a four-star general and the commander of the military advisory group in the country. Damon discovers and attempts to derail an effort by Massengale to bring America into a full-scale war in Southeast Asia. Before Damon can act, however, he is killed in a guerilla grenade attack.

In creating the character of Sam Damon, Myrer provides us with the benchmark for what an American offi cer can and should be. Damon, though, is human, and therefore far from perfect. What sets him apart is that he continually analyzes himself and tries to be the best offi cer he can be. On another level, Damon is a metaphor for the U.S. Army itself in the fi rst seven decades of the 20th Century - -came of age in World War I, achieved greatness in World War II, and died in Vietnam.

This . . . edition of Once an Eagle carries a foreword by General John W. Vessey, Jr., the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose own career may well offer the closest parallel to that of the fi ctional Sam Damon. [Another] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Hugh H. Shelton, once wrote, "Sam Damon has been and will be a beacon of moral and physical courage for young American warriors."

In republishing the book, the Army War College Foundation has made this vital work accessible to an entire new generation of U.S. Army leaders. Many of today's general offi cers and colonels read Once an Eagle early in their careers; and because of that, the book had a profound infl uence on the shape and character of the post-Vietnam U.S. Army. Now the Army's future senior leaders, today's lieutenants, and captains, and majors, have the opportunity to read it as well. A re-reading of the book will also allow today's senior leaders to refl ect upon the course

of their own paths since they fi rst read it.

READ THE COMPLETE REVIEW BY COLONEL DAVID T. ZABECKI, FA,

JOURNAL OF ROYAL ARTILLERY

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THE SPEED OF TRUST: THE ONE THING THAT CHANGES EVERYTHING STEPHEN M.R. COVY WITH REBECCA R. MERRILL (THE FREE PRESS, 2008)

MARINE CORPS CENTER FOR LESSONS LEARNED

JULY 2012 VOLUME 8, ISSUE 7 19

(The following comments on Assault from the Sea,

as well as numerous other books addressing the doctrinal

experiences of U.S. and British amphibious operations,

has been extracted from a

May 2003 Marine Corps

Gazette article by LtCol John

D. Gibson, Royal Canadian

Artillery.)

This article is intended

as a historiographical discus-

sion of the evolution of

British and U.S. doctrines

on amphibious operations in

the 20th century. Up to that

time, no systematic attempts

had been made to explain the

principles of sea power in general, or amphibious operations

in particular. Beginning in the late 19th century, naval

historians underwent a sort of schizophrenia. On the one

hand, they sought scientifi c explanations of past experience,

and on the other they eschewed past experience in the

face of new technology. The purpose of this article is to

demonstrate that the evolution of amphibious doctrine over

the last 100 years in Britain and the United States occurred

largely without benefi t of the lessons of the even relatively

recent past and by a process of reinvention. It will appear

that this was due in part to institutional amnesia, in part due

to national responses to one’s own national experiences—

and those of others—and in part as a reaction to what was

seen at the time as massive technological change that

obviated the lessons of history. . . The idea is to discuss

the evolution of amphibious thought rather than raw events.

Having said that, it would appear that the literature has now

evolved to the extent that the effi cacy of amphibious warfare

and a general understanding of its basic principles has been

substantially documented subject, of course, to adaptation

2. Relationship Trust: Imbuing the 13 Behaviors to develop consistent behavior.

3. Organizational Trust: Utilizing the 4 Cores and 13 Behaviors to build alignment in an organization.

4. Market Trust: It’s all about brand and the principle of reputation.

5. Societal Trust: Its contribution. Four Cores of CredibilityThe fi rst layer, or Wave is about the four dimensions of

credibility. These are the foundational elements that make people believable to themselves and to others and they are:

1. Integrity: Being the same individual inside and out (no gap between intent and behavior).

2. Intent: Having a good plan, or purpose. 3. Capabilities: Creating both personal and

organizational credibility. 4. Results: Classify an individual as a producer and

performer Thirteen BehaviorsThe second layer is about behaving in thirteen different

ways. Covey believe that these behaviors are common to high-trust leaders and individuals worldwide. These can all enhance one’s ability to establish trust in all relationships. One through fi ve fl ow from character, the second fi ve from competence, and the last three from a combination both. This is a list you will most probably have to come back to time and time again.

1. Talking Straight 2. Demonstrating Respect 3. Creating Transparency 4. Righting Wrongs 5. Showing Loyalty 6. Delivering Results 7. Getting Better 8. Confronting Reality 9. Clarifying Expectations 10. Practicing Accountability 11. Listening First 12. Keeping Commitments 13. Extending Trust Smart TrustFinally, to inspire trust is to create the foundation on

which truly successful organizations/relationships stand. Now here’s the key part – this ability (the fi rst job of a leader) is the prime differentiator between managing and leading. A vital component is to extend “Smart Trust”. . .

READ THE COMPLETE REVIEW FROM WORDPRESS.COM

ASSAULT FROM THE SEA: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE EDITED BY LTCOL MERRILL L. BARTLETT, USMC (RETIRED) (UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PRESS, 1993)

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MARINE CORPS CENTER FOR LESSONS LEARNED

JULY 2012 VOLUME 8, ISSUE 7 20

to constantly evolving technology.

. . . a major contribution to the fi eld doctrinally, is a

collection of essays under the auspices of the U.S. Naval

Institute Press in 1983 entitled Assault From The Sea:

Essays on the History of Amphibious Warfare. This book

really does, in a very wide way, perhaps due to the surfeit

of chapter authors, go the country mile in reconciling in

one volume the British and American amphibious doctrinal

experiences. It deals with the legacy of the Seven Years’ War,

Corbett and Callwell and Gallipoli from the British experience,

as well as the U.S. Marine Corps in its pre-World War I

activities, the crucial “between wars” activities of Pete Ellis,

and all of the Pacifi c and Western Hemisphere amphibious

matters by a plethora of authors of various nationalities, up to

and including the Falkland campaign in 1982. The joint effect

is highly cosmopolitan and includes brief conclusions on the

effi cacy of amphibious warfare. This book of essays is a must

for any serious student. . .

In conclusion, it is clear . . . that the principles of

amphibious operations, as seen as a subset of sea power in

general, underwent a considerable evolution from the end

of the 19th century. . . All of this was part of the scientifi c

analysis of warfare that itself was part of the industrial

revolution of the late 19th century. . . After World War II, the

U.S. Marine Corps took over the issue of amphibious doctrine

due to its size and only then began to learn from, or at least

acknowledge, the old lessons of amphibious warfare. This

emerged from the evolution beyond the theory, as discussed

above, that the major amphibious assaults of World War II

were aberrations that would never occur again. All of this was

in the short term part of the transition from the Falklands War

on the one hand and the collapse of the Soviet Union on the

other. In the long term, historiographically, it represented a

maturation of the view of amphibious operations from the

19th century historically scientifi c view, through the early

20th century technological view, and into the now current

historical, technological, and geographic view. The end result

would seem to be a complete acceptance in all quarters now

of the reality of amphibious capability as fundamental in the

modern era.

READ THE COMPLETE ARTICLE BY LTCOL JOH D. GIBSON, ROYAL CANADIAN ARTILLERY,

MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

The results of a number of recently completed, ongoing and planned collection efforts are scheduled to be documented in MCCLL reports within the next few months. “Stay tuned” for these MCCLL products:

▪ Operations of the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)

▪ 1st Battalion, 6th Marines Operations in OEF

▪ Exercise SSANG YONG: Amphibious Operations

▪ Biometric Efforts in Afghanistan

▪ Harvest Hawk Operations in Afghanistan

▪ Expeditionary Energy Operations

▪ Exercise Rim of the Pacifi c (RIMPAC) 2012

▪ Air Operations in Support of Logistics

▪ Results from the Regimental Combat Team 5 (RCT-5) Lessons Learned Conference

MCCLL Products “in the Pipeline”

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The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) newsletter provides "initial impressions" summaries that identify key observations and potential lessons from collection efforts. These observations highlight potential shortfalls, risks or issues experienced by units that may suggest a need for change. The observations are not service level decisions. In addition, some information in this newsletter has been compiled from publicly available sources and is not offi cial USMC policy. Although the information has been gathered from reliable sources, the currency and completeness of the information is subject to change and cannot be guaranteed.

MARINE CORPS CENTER FOR LESSONS LEARNED

JULY 2012 VOLUME 8, ISSUE 7 21JULY 2012 VOLUME 8, ISSUE 7 21

Contact Information for MCCLL Program AnalystsContact information for Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) representatives at major Marine Corps and joint commands and organizations is provided below. In many cases, both commercial telephone numbers and Defense Switched Network (DSN) numbers are provided.

Individuals from commands and organizations that do not have a MCCLL representative may contact the MCCLL Operations Offi cer at (703) 432-1284.

Questions or comments (or requests to be added to the MCCLL newsletter distribution list) can be directed to: Mr. Harry T. Johnson, Editor: (703) 432-1279 │ DSN: 378-1279.

HQMC PP&O Washington, DC(703) 571-1068DSN: (312) 671-1068

MAGTF TC 29 Palms, CA(760) 830-8196DSN: (312) 230-8196

I MEF Camp Pendleton, CA(760) 725-6042DSN: (312) 365-6042

1st MARDIV Camp Pendleton, CA(760) 763-4285DSN: (312) 361-4285

1st MLG Camp Pendleton, CA(760) 725-5931DSN: (312) 365-5931

3d MAW MCAS Miramar, CA(858) 577-5202│5163DSN: (312) 267-5202

II MEF Camp Lejeune, NC(910) 451-3192DSN: (312) 751-3192

2d MARDIV Camp Lejeune, NC(910) 451-8161DSN: (312) 751-8247

2d MAW Cherry Point, NC(252) 466-3193DSN: (312) 582-3193

2d MLG, Camp Lejeune, NC(910) 451-6924DSN: (312) 751-6924

III MEF & 1st MAW Okinawa, JapanDSN: (315) 622-9218

3d MARDIVOkinawa, JapanDSN: (315) 622-7358

3d MLGOkinawa, JapanDSN: (315) 637-1401

Hawaii MarinesKaneohe Bay, Hawaii(808) 257-5939DSN: (315) 257-5939

MARFORRES, 4th MAW & 4th MLGNew Orleans, LA(504) 697-7322DSN: (312) 647-7322

4th MARDIVNew Orleans, LA(504) 697-7334DSN: (312) 647-7334

MARFORCOM & DD J7 JCOANorfolk, VA(757) 836-2797DSN: (312) 836-2797

MCCDCQuantico, VA(703) 784-2871DSN: (312) 278-2871

JCS J-7 Representative at MCCLLQuantico, VA(703) 432-1316DSN: (312) 378-1316

CALL Representative at MCCLLQuantico, VA(703) 432-1649DSN: (312) 378-1649

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