Dr. Habibullah MAGSIAssistant Professor Department of Agricultural EconomicsSindh Agriculture University, Pakistan

Impacts of large scale land-based investment: case of Chotiari water reservoir from Pakistan

Prof. Dr. Andre TorreEconomistINRA AgroParisTechRue Clause Bernard, 75005 Paris, France

To identify conflictive events on different pieces of land in the developing countries (how to extend and modify previous studies on developed countries?)

To shed light on the factors of land use conflicts for an infrastructure setting, which lead to dramatic social disagreements, protestations, and environmental degradations

To breach the gap between principle actors and outside stakeholders, in order to manage existing conflicts and to reduce their chances in upcoming projects

Introduction: aims of the thesis

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Traditional approaches. Conflict is the problem, how to solve it?

Institutional efficiency (Ostrom, 1990; Williamson, 1998)

Technical & scientific planning (Barron et al., 2004)

Negative externalities (Pham, 2010)

Elite capture of resources & violation of rights (Scudder, 2005)

Voice approach. Conflict is the purpose of analysis (not often used in developing countries)

Dumping voices (Hirschman, 1970; Rucht et al., 1999; Hessel, 2010)

Proximity mobilization (Torre and Beuret, 2012)

Different paths of conflicts in developed and developing countries

I.

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II. Research questions & hypotheses

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Main topic of research: questions

What are the impacts on the territory of different conflicts over the uses of a piece of land, with respect to available resources, economic activities, and governance structure?

What factors are associated with land use conflicts in infrastructural projects and what are their responsible actors?

Does the stakeholders’ relationship network create dissimilar power distribution?

Are there any solution to such situations (in general as well as case study perspective)?

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II.

Analytical question

What changes needed in analytical methods to bring real image of land use conflicts in the developing countries (how to extend and modify previous studies)?

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II.

Overview about the hypotheses

Land use conflicts in developing countries are mainly due to:

Insufficient involvement of regional population from decision to construction operations, and violation of their rights

Governance inefficiency and inconsistency in rehabilitation, relocation and compensation process

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II.

III. Methods

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Case study selection:

Large infrastructure facing opposition

Superposition of land uses

Social and environmental damages

Ground realities of a particular land use conflict model

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III.

Method: data collection

Daily press

Administrative litigations

Expert opinions interviews

Field visits

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Websites, offices of dailies, offices of the Community Based Organizations

Administrative, researchers, legal experts, NGOs, journalists, landlords, affected family heads

III.

Source: Torre et al., 2010; Rucht and Neidhardt, 1999

∙ Other secondary sources: Published literature (public & private organizations)

GIS (digital aerial photographs and remote sensing images)

Internet (web pages & blogs)

Source: Magsi, 2013

Case study

Agriculture36%

Water bodies 26%

Open wood and forest24%

Dunes and barren land14%

Source: Government of Pakistan (1993 & 1998)

Chotiari reservoir occupies 18000 hectares ecologically rich wetlands 80 lakes (1–200 hectares)

Entitled

Un-entitled

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III.

Source: Magsi, 2012

Source: Government of Pakistan (1998) ; WWF (2008)

Local population: 993 families

Major economic activities

Fishermen39%

Agriculturists15%

Livestock keepers

13%Servants8%

Artisans3%

Driver2%

Shop-keeper

2%

others18%

Case study

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III.

Fishermen Servants/ drivers

Agriculturists Shop keeper Artisans

Rs./day 169 143 129 106 72

10

30

50

70

90

110

130

150

170

Illiterate52 %

Primary(1-5)

Secondary (6-10)

Higher secondary(11-12)

Graduate(13-16)

Post-graduate(17 + )

Level of education among households

Source: Government of Pakistan (1998) ; WWF (2008)

Case study

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III.

IV. Results

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Villages (993 families)

Results: principle oppositions & conflicts

Forceful displacement of local population outside the reservoir

Source: Chotiari Resettlement Agency 15

IV.

1993 2003 2011

Aerial view: different phases Social, economic and environmental threats

Source: Magsi and Torre, 2013

Conflict dynamics of Chotiari reservoir

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IV.

Natural resources degradation: last five years

Drinking water

Irrigation water

Fish Forest Local birds Migratory birds

Forest an-imals

Grazing lands

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

2.94 2.772.34 2.28

2.04 2.03 1.87 1.84

94

78 7884

7875

8478

Perception (average) Respondents (percentage)

Per

cen

tag

e

Ave

rag

e

Source: Magsi and Torre, 2012

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IV.

Conflict factors

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IV.

Source: Magsi and Torre, 2012

Factor types CausesPercentage

Articles in daily press

Experts opinion

Structural factors

Corruption/ misuse of funds 23.94 34.38

Unilateral decision 21.81 21.88

Lack of technical and scientific research 19.68 9.38

International interest 7.98 12.50

Non-existence of national resettlement policy 9.04 9.38

Proximate factors

Ethnic diversity and disarray (unrest among communities) 13.83 12.50

Nepotism & Illiteracy 3.72 0

Ministry of Irrigation

Planning commission of

Pakistan

SFD

International

National

Regional

Provincial

World BankSaudi Fund for Development

WWF

SIDA

WAPDA

EPA

SWMB

SEPA

CRA

SANGI (NGO)

SAFWCO(NGO)

PFF

Land Lords

Courts

PoliceLocal

population

Type of relations

Neutral

Allied

Supportive

Conflict / tension

Network of stakeholders & their relations

SWMB: Sindh Wildlife Management Board SFD: Sindh Forest DepartmentSEPA: Sindh Environmental Protection Agency CRA: Chotiari Resettlement AgencySIDA: Sindh Irrigation and Drainage Authority EPA: Environmental Protection AgencyWAPDA: Water & Power Development Authority PFF: Pakistan Fisher-folk Forum

Interest (hidden)

Favoring reservoir

Admins. loyalty

Opponents

Politicians

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IV.

Source: Magsi and Torre, 2014

General anatomy of land use conflicts in developing countries

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IV.

P o v e r t y and b r i b e

Income reduction

HomelessnessLivelihood

losses

Financial losses

Investor’s profit

DisplacementLoss of agricultural

landUnion of local

population

Birth of Community Bsd. Organizations

Property right loopholes

Psychological pressure and fear

Profitable project

Institutional inconsistencies

Lack of technical and scientific

research during feasibility study

Corruption or miss use of power

Unavailability of resettlement policy

International interests

Powerful people’s influence

Unequal power distribution

Rivalry and ethnicity

Disputed land ownership

Land use

for development

projects

Conflict causes and consequences

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IV.

Source: Magsi and Torre, 2014

Land use conflicts in developing countries: main figures

Policy responsive of institutional behavior for their decision towards

development projects

Land use Conflicts

Ex post conflicts lead resistance against misuse of power and corruption

Land use decision due to over population and

urbanization

Infrastructural projects lead by public authorities

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IV.

Source: Magsi and Torre, 2013

V. Conclusion & Recommendations

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Conclusion: main contributions of the thesis

Peculiarity of land use conflicts in developing countries Ex post conflicts, due to flawed decisions and institutional inconsistency

Land use conflict methodological modifications with regards to developing countries

Eliminating administrative litigations Adding: (locally published literature; GIS; and web pages)

Chotiari case study: Stakeholders relationships and network dynamics

Multilevel governance

Violations of rights

Policy recommendations

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V.

Recommendations

Conflict management and prevention for infrastructural projects

Mitigate and balance the interests

Participatory land use management

Economic viability

National Resettlement Policy : alternative livelihoods, compensation, acquisition

Flawed infrastructural projects

Low governance capacity

Weak follow-up procedure from land use decision, acquisition, construction to compensation

Loss of livelihood and environmental values

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V.

Thank you for your attention !